Cut and be damned

Public spending should be cut by £30 billion says the think tank, Reform, as retailed by The Daily Telegraph. Both main political parties, it goes on to say, should stop the "conspiracy of silence" which is ensuring state spending remains high.

The detail is in its report and, with good cause, one of its targets for cuts is defence procurement. "Inappropriate" defence projects, says the think tank, should be ended, these including the future carriers, Eurofighter Tranche 3, A400M and Nimrod MRA4. They, we are gravely informed, "do not contribute to the UK's modern defence requirements."

Notionally, this would save £2.7 billion in 2010-2011 and the savings thus gained would act as an effective platform for further reform of defence procurement. Says Reform, if necessary, some of these programmes could be replaced with relevant off-the-shelf purchases at a lower cost. This would come at a cost to the Exchequer which would reduce the savings identified

However, while one cannot begin to disagree with the general thrust of the Reform thesis, their offering does little more than illustrate the huge difficulty in making sensible decisions on the purchase of military equipment.

Taking the list from the top, it is strongly arguable whether the carriers could be regarded as not contributing to the UK's "modern defence requirements," but it is not an issue I would care to argue and be confident of winning either way. Of course, the savings would be substantial, but the greater saving would be in not buying the Joint Strike Fighter to equip the carriers. Yet, Reform has nothing to say on this.

But, if the saving, to say the very least, is controversial, the Eurofighter Tranche 3 is equally so. This saga is one of long-standing and such is the nature of the contractual arrangements that, to cut the order now would possibly cost as much in compensation as would buying the aircraft. There is, though, something of an end in sight.

The idea is that we should split the tranche of 88 and commit to just 40 aircraft immediately, then allowing the 24 sold to the Saudis to be included in that number. That would leave 16 aircraft to be paid for but, with each airframe at £88 million, that still leaves us £1.4 billion to find. Like it or not, this is probably the best deal we can hope for. Reform's idea of savings here are probably illusory.

Turning to the A400M, there are no savings there to be made at all. With or without – and preferably without – this aircraft, we still need the airlift capacity. Thus, if the aircraft is cancelled, the same amount of money will have to be spent on C-17s or C-130Js, or a combination of the two.

The Nimrod MR4, however, is another matter. It is probably fair to say that if the clock was wound back, this aircraft would not have been ordered. But, with such a huge investment already made, should it now be cancelled the loss would be enormous. And there would remain a need for a high performance maritime surveillance platform, which could hardly be cheap, and could hardly be off-the-shelf.

Looking at the Reform proposals in the round, therefore, it is very hard to see how their ideas could yield their projected – or any – savings. The bigger point, though, is that waving a magic wand, making arbitrary cuts, is not the way to contain defence costs.

Equipment requirements, as we have so often observed, should stem from strategic requirements and then the doctrines that emerge from them. We then look for best value amongst the equipment needed to fulfil the needs. It is not an exercise for bean counters and for Reform to enter the fray is unwise.

COMMENT THREAD

Operation Snakebite

Having in December 2007 followed the Musa Qala operation as best we could at the time, it is of more than usual interest that a book has been published, offering the first detailed account of what went on.

This is Operation Snakebite written by Sunday Times journalist Stephen Grey, described as "the explosive true story of an Afghan desert siege".

For those who enjoy the "war book" genre, this is a stonking good read. It is finely crafted, with a well-structured narrative and a good mixture of characterisation, description and fact to keep the reader turning the pages to the very end. It also provides a valuable historical account of an at times horrifying story – as the blurb puts it – "of a war which has gone largely unnoticed back home."

The reason it has gone "largely unnoticed", of course, is that the MoD not only avoided telling anyone about it, but put a security block on the official publication of details, which left the MoD website devoid of information, with journalists contacting the Taleban on their mobile telephones to get details of the operation.

Courtesy of Grey, we now know that there were several reasons for the MoD's reticence, one being the coincidental visit of Gordon Brown to Camp Bastion. With the largest operation then to have been mounted in Helmand Province and with the outcome far from certain, officials were concerned that news of the operation might detract from the prime minister's visit, especially if there were casualties.

But the major reason, Grey tells us, was that both the British and the Americans had decided that this was to be an I/O – an "information operation" – otherwise known as a propaganda exercise. The intention was to convey to the outside world that this was an operation led by the Afghanis, assisted by coalition forces.

As a result, we had the bizarre scene of the "capture" of the town centre being photographed by the MoD's Defence Combat Camera Team, showing jubilant Afghani troops raising their national flag. British and US forces who had fought their way into the town, after periods of intense combat, were forced to hide their vehicles and keep out of sight for the fiction to be perpetrated.

The fighting by the coalition forces, the lead up to the operation and the political background, are well-described by Grey, leaving the reader under no illusions that this major operation was almost entirely a coalition effort, made possible by the injection of massive US forces, including elements of the US 82nd Airborne Division, which paved the way for the assault with a daring, if risky, helicopter assault.

Behind this operation are the political machinations, both Afghani and military, which lends a conspiratorial overtone to the book, lifting it above the ordinary "war book", giving it more depth than would be expected from this genre.

With a highly informative account of the history of Helmand to open the book, this makes this a rounded narrative, which culminates in a short analytical chapter which tries to set the operation in the broader context of the counter-insurgency operation in Afghanistan.

Of special interest is Grey's detail of the number of mine strikes suffered by British forces, one of which he witnessed, giving a moving and personal edge to the account, which benefited from his presence as an embedded reporter and his personal knowledge and friendships with some of his subjects. He also notes that the King's Royal Hussars were equipped with Mastiffs, with the squadron taking fourteen IED hits, suffering no serious injuries – although does not link the two issues.

There is also a graphic and detailed account of the intervention of USAF AC-130H Spectres in the final stages of the assault on Musa Qala, a role which Grey describes as "decisive", confirming the utility of these airborne gunships as a battle-winning weapon - something of which British procurement officials should take note.

Despite its vibrancy as a book however and an amount of technical detail, Grey is obviously at the limit of his knowledge when it comes to Army equipment. At one point, he describes a Sultan APC as a "light tank" and an Afghani Army truck as a "Bedford" when it is an International 7400 truck. These and other minor points suggest that Grey is more of a "people" man and lacks a wider understanding of military issues.

That, to an extent, is also reflected in his analysis, which tends to be superficial and derivative. He perhaps over-reliant on the opinions of those he interviews – of which there are an impressive number, in excess of 200. Despite his access to top-ranking military officials, though, he makes very little use of them - and we thus do not see enough of Grey's own thoughts in terms of evaluating their responses.

This is not necessarily a weakness if your expectations are of a well-written historical narrative, in which Grey the journalist excels, aided by superb maps, illustrations and photographs. One important omission though is an index, which limits the utility of the book to serious students of the Afghani campaign.

That notwithstanding, for what it is, it is a valuable and important addition to the growing library of works beginning to emerge from the campaign and is an essential read for anyone who seeks a better understanding of what is indeed "a war which has gone largely unnoticed back home."

COMMENT THREAD

A hundred days ...

The troubled Airbus A400M project remains, er … troubled.

Yesterday, the Daily Mail was warning that the a customers' revolt could lead to the whole project being cancelled, with a break-point approaching on 1 April when the contract can be terminated in the event of non-delivery.

At this time, the only thing Airbus military has actually delivered is 28 colour photographs of the machine - all computer generated, for want of the real thing, which still has not left the ground.

The Times was also suggesting that the MoD would walk away from the project, and was looking at "alternative options".

However, after talks between the seven countries that ordered the aircraft on the sidelines of an EU defence ministers' meeting in Prague today, Reuters reports that customers have given the project a 100-day reprieve. They have thus agreed to postpone any decision on cancellation for three months from 1 April, during which period, "no state would take a decision without consulting the others".

With deliveries to the RAF possibly delayed until 2016, it is hard to see that 100 days will make that much of a difference, so it will be interesting to see what Airbus will do to make the UK change its mind about walking away.

The prospect had the Lord Pearson asking today in the Lords whether there was "any hope that the CargoLifter programme, the A400M, is thankfully slipping from postponement to cancellation", only for government spokesman Lord Davies of Oldham studiously to avoid answering the question and move on to another topic.

The government, however, is rapidly running out of options. With the bulk of the UK tactical transport fleet set to be grounded by 2012, it needs rapidly to look for alternatives, the most likely being the C-130J Hercules. In contrast with the euroweenies, Lockheed Martin have happily announced they have so far taken 257 orders and delivered 171, the euro-score being 180 ordered – none delivered.

Such is the popularity of the C-130J that the manufacturers are to increase the production rate from 12 aircraft a year in 2008 to approximately double by 2010. Lockheed Martin also says it is currently "in detailed discussions" with several countries about further orders. But, even with the increased rate of production, there is a backlog of 86 aircraft, which means that new orders cannot be accepted until well into 2012.

The government had better get its skates on, or it will be reduced to posting colour photographs of supplies to troops ... by overland mail.

COMMENT THREAD

Lost before it started - Part 1

For nearly five years now, we have been following the serpentine twists and turns of defence politics, initially charting the UK's progress towards European defence integration, with a very strong interest in equipment and procurement matters, and then, inceasingly, the progress of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

In a way we could not even have begun to imagine when we started, all these issues are intimately related. Drawing all the separate threads together, however, has been a complex and time-consuming affair. Only now that we have done so are we able to tell the story of how the first two led inexorably and inevitably to the defeat of the British Army in Iraq.

In a seven-part analysis - which we will post over this and the next six days - we will tell the story as it unfolded, starting with the political machinations which set off the process.

The beginning

The Army may have been defeated in Iraq. Yet the battle was actually lost in St Malo, France, and in Whitehall, specifically, in the portals of the MoD. It was lost before it had even started.

There were many reasons why the Army could have lost the counter-insurgency war, not least because of the tardy recognition of the fact of an organised Shi'a insurgency. But one of the main reasons was the Army's failure to re-equip, in order to deal with the weapons and tactics of the principal enemy in Iraq, the Mahdi Army. But, in seeking to re-equip, the Army had two more dangerous enemies: Tony Blair and its own High Command.

The shadow of Europe

Tony Blair did for the Army 1998, ten years before its final defeat in Basra. It was then that he met Jacques Chirac, then French President, in St Malo, France, for a summit on defence co-operation. It was there – and in Helsinki the following year – that Blair pledged to work towards building a European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF).

This was to be a Europe-wide force of 15 Brigades or about 50,000-60,000 troops, capable of intervening rapidly in a crisis. It was to be deployable within 60 days at a distance of 2,500 miles and sustainable in the field for a year. In order to maintain such a force, with rotating replacements, the actual manpower requirement was closer to 180,000. In addition, there would need to be home-based supporting elements and logistic support.

The potential British contribution included up to 12,500 troops, 72 combat aircraft and 18 warships, with a full range of supporting capabilities. Blair was in effect committing the bulk of the UK's long-term deployable forces to the venture – considerably more than he was to commit to the occupation of Iraq.

The immediate effect was to usher in an obvious but undeclared – and frequently denied – policy of "Europe first" in procurement issues, all aimed at securing the harmonisation and "inter-operability" of European forces. Through that, billions of pounds was wasted on European-sourced equipment which could have been obtained better and more cheaply elsewhere.

This was to cast a shadow over the defence budget, focusing procurement on high value projects which soaked up funds and reduced the ability of the MoD to respond to changing circumstances. Its main political priority became to equip the British component of the ERRF.

The effect on the Army

For the Army, the effect was dramatic. The ERRF embodied what was called the "expeditionary" concept, but with a difference. Because of the requirement for speed of deployment over distance, it needed a highly mobile, air-portable armoured force. This was a capability which the British Army completely lacked.

However, the requirement for air-mobility created huge technical problems. Currently available military transport aircraft (the C-130 Hercules being taken as the standard) imposed severe restrictions on dimensions, particularly height. Crucially their lifting capabilities restricted vehicle weights to around 20 tons.

Yet those same vehicles, once deployed, might be expected to confront main battle tanks three times their weight, with far thicker armour, and defeat them. To square the circle, an entirely new military concept emerged. This was not a vehicle as such, but a system. Actually, it was even more than that. It was a "system of systems." In British military circles, it became known as the Future Rapid Effects System or FRES.

The Future Rapid Effects System

FRES was a break from the established principles of relying on armoured vehicles which themselves relied on a compromise between protection, mobility and firepower. It added a fourth dimension – "situational awareness", the new religion in military thinking. This would be achieved by flooding the battlefield with advanced electronic and other sensors, including those fitted to a new generation of vehicles.

They would all be linked together by a vast electronic communications network – the military equivalent of the internet. It would allow commanders right down to the level of a four-man patrol to have a perfect overview of the battlefield. Instantaneous communication with all other units would be possible, allowing sharing of information and enabling the co-ordination of actions. In theory, the enemy could then be detected at a distance.

At that point, the final element came into play – an array of precision-guided, stand-off weapons which could be used to neutralise hostile forces before they came close enough to inflict damage to the lightly protected vehicles deployed.

This became the Holy Grail, the search for which was shared by most other Western armies and by US forces which were working on their own version called the Future Combat System (FCS).

Such ventures were of course welcomed by the military-industrial complex. It saw in the various projects opportunities for lucrative development and production contracts. There was also another dividend anticipated. The technology was seen as a "force multiplier", allowing the "effects" to be achieved with a vastly smaller number of men. It reduced the cost of maintaining large standing armies and the difficulties most nations were experiencing in recruiting enough personnel for their largely volunteer forces.

A major restructuring

Absent entirely from the UK's Strategic Review of 1998, FRES was nevertheless enthusiastically embraced by the former Member of the European Parliament Geoff Hoon. In October 1999, he had been appointed Secretary of State for Defence. Despite that, no immediate progress was made. Attention was consumed by 11 September 2001 and the attacks on the World Trade Centre and the events afterwards. These culminated in the invasion of Afghanistan on 7 October 2001 and the invasion of Iraq on 20 March 2003.

In May 2004, though, even as British forces in Iraq were about to confront the Mahdi Army uprising, the European Union's General Affairs and External Relations Council was kick-starting the ERRF. It delivered what were known as the "Headline Goals 2010". These were subsequently endorsed by the European Council of 17 and 18 June 2004. They were both a "shopping list" of equipment required to fill capability gaps and a deadline set for the completion of the ERRF, the member states undertaking to be ready by 2010 to carry out "military rapid response operations".

In anticipation of meeting the UK commitment, there had already emerged in the Defence White Paper of July 2003 completely new plans for "a major restructuring of the Army". There would be a "shift in emphasis to light and medium weight forces" based around the Future Rapid Effects System (FRES) family of vehicles. Three brigades would be equipped.

This was the British element of the ERRF, introduced at the very time when the Army, only in the first months of its occupation of Iraq, needed to keep its options open. Instead, it was committing its intellectual, planning and financial resources to a "major restructuring" involving an entirely new and untried system. With such a huge commitment, restructuring to meet the demands of a counter-insurgency campaign was not only inconceivable. It was beyond the financial resources of the Army and its organisational capabilities.

COMMENT THREAD

Seriously screwed!

The Airbus A400M has been delayed again and the earliest the RAF can expect an in-service date is 2014, with deliveries unlikely to start until a year earlier, some seven years later than originally promised. That is a period longer than the whole of World War II. Possibly the in-service date may be even be delayed until 2016, with the aircraft grossly overweight and not fully "mission capable".

Oh for those heady days of May 2000 when that wonderful Mr Tony Blair, imbued with the spirit of European co-operation, so presciently decided to order 25 of those shiny new Airbus A400M military transport aircraft.

How wise he was to spurn the entreaties of US President Bill Clinton, rejecting the tried and tested Lockheed C-130 Hercules, going for the new dawn of European military aviation, free from the oppressive dominance of the United States.

And how pleased the "colleagues" all were, with David Jennings, a spokesman at Airbus Military, welcoming Britain into the fold, even though Germany was not to follow until over a year later. Brimming with confidence, Jennings happily announced that Airbus would launch the programme at the end of the year 2000 and begin deliveries in 2006.

However, with the RAF originally expecting an in-service date by 2007, it started to slip and by 2004 had become 2011. But, even if the shine on the Great European Project was getting a little tarnished, up to 6 February this year the RAF was telling us that its 25-strong fleet would be complete by 2011.

With Airbus categorically denying "rumours" of delay, it was still looking a bit flakey. But never fear! Those Europeans really know what they are doing. A little late, perhaps, but 2011 it was going to be.

But then, tucked into an obscure publication called Hansard – which nobody bothers reading any more – was a tiny little question by Ann Winterton asking for the latest estimate of the in-service date for the A400M. Thus quoth the unfortunate Quentin Davies:

Airbus Military has announced a series of delays in the development and production of the A400M programme, and has recently indicated that first deliveries to customer nations will be three years after the achievement of first flight of the A400M prototype. Airbus has indicated that first flight will occur no earlier than the second half of 2009, and has also announced a slowdown in its production plans. Early A400M production aircraft will be delivered to some of our partner nations and therefore the first UK delivery would occur at least six months after Airbus delivers the first A400M. This suggests that initial UK deliveries could not start before 2013 and therefore the estimated in-service date of the A400M (defined as acceptance into service of the seventh aircraft) would be 2014.

Hey! Seven years later than the original estimate, with an in-service date now at least three years later than the last estimate of 2011, the shine has most definitely worn off Mr Blair's brave new project. The RAF is in the deepest of deep doo doo.

In June last year there were already warnings of "significant risks" that there would not be enough transport aircraft to fly British forces in future operations if there were any delays in bringing in replacements for the ageing fleet of C-130s.

Then, as many as nine of the older Hercules C-130Ks had been taken out of service early due to wing "fatigue" and five others are due to be retired next year. Even then, with the A400M not due to arrive until the following year, a grave "shortfall of capacity" was being predicted.

By last year we had 42 working Hercules aircraft, but the older C-130Ks were only flying because of a £15.3 million refit, which can only keep them in the air until 2012.

That is not the least of the problems. The newer C-130Js are taking such a hammering on operations (plus losses to enemy action) that several could need an intensive refit by 2012. And it gets worse. Because the bulk of the C-130 fleet was supposed to be retired, there is a shortage of engineers and spares to keep the full fleet running.

And just in case you were thinking it couldn't get worse, it just has.

The delays in the programme are costing Airbus a small fortune and the firm is running out of money. Thus it is indeed slowing down the programme and the MoD's estimates – as of yesterday – are looking unrealistically optimistic. Airbus is now saying that "the first significant wave of operational aircraft would not be delivered before 2014." Since we are down the queue, the chances of us making an in-service date of 2014 are nil. Add another two years at least, sixteen years since Mr Blair's happy little deal.

To add to our joys, there are serious problems with the software and the early versions will not be fully "mission capable". Furthermore, the aircraft coming off the production line are 12 tons heavier than planned. Even with a massive weight reduction programme, only seven tons is potentially capable of being removed from later production versions – and then that is not guaranteed.

This leaves an aircraft with a slated 37-ton capacity over 1,780 nautical miles coming in as a sub-30 ton machine, compared with the 20-ton capacity of the RAF's C-130Js. But then the C-130Js are currently priced at £38-40 million, against the A400M which at current euro exchange rates works out at £98 million – well over twice the price for considerably less than a fifty percent increase in load-carrying capacity.

Then that's "Europe" for you. Twice the money for less performance just about sums it up. But this is not funny. Blair has seriously screwed us – lives are at stake here and our operational capability is seriously at risk. He must be very proud.

COMMENT THREAD

Low grade misrepresentation

One of the many things which makes commenting on defence policy so very difficult these days is the absence of any balanced – or sensible – commentary in the media. Defence, as an issue, has become just another "stick" with which to beat an unpopular Labour government, fuel for the ongoing soap opera which now dominates political discourse.

A classic example of that dynamic comes today in a short piece in The Sunday Times, accusing the government of having "squandered" almost £500m by leasing RAF C-17 transport aircraft that could have bought outright for less money.

This is Mick Smith writing and, in principle, he is right. If the figures cited are accurate, the MoD paid a total of £769m to lease the aircraft and then – as Smith puts it – "had to buy them anyway for an additional £220m." The final payment was made last month, putting the total price over eight years at £989m, when they could have been bought originally for £520m.

According to the Smith legend, the MoD wanted to buy the four Boeing C17 Globemasters, but "was told by Gordon Brown, then the chancellor, to lease them because it would be cheaper". But that is just another of those distortions that hides the real – and more interesting - story.

In fact, the story goes back to the Strategic Defence Review in 1998 and the Short-Term Strategic Airlift (STSA) competition, which started in September of that year.

As set out by the Defence Procurement Agency (DPA) to the Defence Committee, the longer term needs were being addressed by the Future Transport Aircraft but, in the interim, there was a short-term gap which needed filling.

Thus, an invitation to tender was issued on 30 September 1998 to eight potential bidders, with a deadline for tenders of 29 January 1999, coinciding with the deadline for a four-nation collaborative competition which would identify the solution for the Future Transport Aircraft (A400M), requirement.

The two competitions were linked and were to be assessed in parallel, both to consider the most cost-effective solution overall and to ensure that the solution chosen for STSA did not prejudice the FTA competition.

In January 1999 five bids were received from Boeing/BAe (C-17), Air Foyle (Antonov An 124-210), IBP (Antonov An 124-100), Airbus Transport International (a mix of Beluga and A300 freighters) and Rolls-Royce offering a fleet management service of MoD acquired assets.

None of the bids offered an acceptable combination of capability and cost and the competition was abandoned. Options were then limited to a C-17 solution with support provided by USAF and the charter of Russian An 124-100 aircraft.

By 16 May 2000, the MoD has decided that the best solution to meet the short-term strategic airlift requirement was to lease four C-17A Globemaster III aircraft, while the Airbus A400M was selected to meet the longer-term requirement. On 2 September 2000, a contract with the Boeing Company was signed for the lease of four C-17 aircraft for a period of seven years, with the option of extending for up to a further two years,

At the time, the C-17s were leased to meet a short-term requirement, pending the introduction of the A400M, which was then expected to come into service in 2009. At the end of the lease period, the intention was to hand the aircraft back to Boeing. There was a purchase option in the contract but, as the DPA affirmed, there were no plans to retain the C-17 aircraft once A400M was in service.

It has to be said that, at the time, no objections were raised by the Conservative opposition and, in a subsequent NAO report, the arrangements were commended as "significant innovations" which illustrated "the scope for innovation and well managed risk-taking encouraged by Smart Acquisition."

Of course, following the lease, we had 9/11, the war in Afghanistan and then Iraq, when the airlift capabilities of the RAF were stretched. Then, as delays mounted to the A400M project, two things became clear. Firstly, A400M was not going to be in service early enough to provide for the ongoing airbridge requirements and, secondly, the C-17 provided a capability which would not in any event be satisfactorily performed by the A400M.

Under those circumstances, it made absolute sense to convert the leases into firm purchases, which the MoD did, in addition acquiring two more machines at the cost of £130m each.

With the benefit of hindsight, it would have been better to have bought all the aircraft outright, and we would have preferred the MoD to have bought a fleet mix of C-130Js and C-17s, rather than the A400M. If there was a mistake, therefore, it was in selecting the A400M – from which the STSA requirement stemmed. Yet, when it comes to that "mistake", the Conservatives were silent.

Thus, to accuse the government of "squandering" money is simply not a fair or reasonable interpretation of events. It is simply cheap journalism.

Neither is it right to condemn the lease deal as "an absolute shocking waste of public money when our troops are going without the equipment they need", as does Gerald Howarth, the Conservative defence spokesman - courtesy of Smith's piece. That requires a re-write of history and a complete misrepresentation of the original situation.

The point is that there are plenty of things over which this government can be justly criticised but to rely on such low grade misrepresentation merely trivialises the defence debate and demeans those who indulge in it.

COMMENT THREAD

The Saturday "toy"

Yes, it is the real thing, the Airbus A400M, and not a computer-generated graphic. It was actually rolled out on 26 June, to deadly silence from the popular media and very little note elsewhere. Of course, it has not flown yet and there is no firm schedule for the maiden flight. They are still flight-testing the engine, strapped onto a converted C-130 ... rather ironic really. But, at least we have a real pic of the beast. You might as well enjoy it.

COMMENT THREAD

Problems stacking up …

Mick Smith of The Sunday Times offers an interesting, if superficial report today on the ongoing struggle to balance the MoD budget.

He tells us that Gordon Brown has overruled services chiefs and told them to delay replacing "ageing weapons, vehicles and aircraft" to plug the infamous "£2 billion black hole in the defence budget".

Smith has it that the heads of the armed forces had suggested cancelling two programmes outright to preserve the rest of their replacements from "salami-slicing", the prime minister having been "understood" to have vetoed individual large-scale cuts for fear of negative publicity.

Smith may be right about the delay, but his sources may be misleading him about the provenance of the opposition to the "cuts". It rather depends from whom he has taken his "briefing" in the MoD, notoriously ridden with competing factions. Our understanding is that the prime minister's office was in fact seeking cancellations, rather than subjecting the Services to death by a thousand (salami) cuts.

Anyhow, we learn that "at least eight programmes" will now be delayed (or so it is claimed), with FRES being the highest-profile postponement. This now seems to have acquired the general and misleading description of "a new generation of armoured vehicles", which Smith seems to think was "due to come into service next year".

In the dreams of some, this may have been true, but has not been on the cards for some years. When we first reported on FRES in 2004, it was very clear then that the projected in-service date was not going to be met.

What we have learned not to expect, however, is any deeper analysis from defence (or any) correspondents. After the MoD announcement in May, when the provisional winner of the FRES competition was revealed, it looked like the generals were going to get their way, buying a fleet of unnecessary and hugely expensive armoured vehicles.

If that project is to be delayed, is good rather than bad news, especially if – as is suggested – it will save £800m from the 2008-11 budget. Interestingly though, if true, it parks the problem fairly and squarely in the Conservatives' domain, should they get elected in 2010. Then, one of their first big decisions may well have to be whether to reactivate the programme, or face the approbation of a high profile cancellation, right at the beginning of their term.

The political implications here are getting quite interesting. The Conservatives have publicly supported FRES and are promoting themselves as supporting the Armed Forces. Yet they are going to have every bit as big a problem as the current government in seeking to fund all the planned procurement projects. Their best hope in this respect was that Brown wielded the sword, saving the new government from the embarrassment of having to do the dirty deed.

As it is, Smith is telling us that "procurement chiefs" are expecting the budget crisis to get even worse, citing – as usual – an unnamed defence source”, who claims that, "The service chiefs are in 'survival mode', trying to avoid making any decisions to kill off programmes in the vague hope Gordon might go."

This seems to contradict what Smith has to say in respect of the "cuts" coming from Downing Street, but it is nevertheless the dynamic to which we alluded in an earlier post. There, we cited Allan Mallinson who then opined: "…all the service chiefs can then trust to is an incoming Tory government brave enough to make an overall adjustment to public spending, thus finding the extra money to reinstate the long-term projects."

Given David Cameron's refusal to commit to additional spending, and the likelihood that the public coffers will be empty by the time the Conservatives take office, it looks like the service chiefs may be disappointed.

Furthermore, FRES is not the only programme slated for delay. Others include the Integrated Soldier Technology (Fist) programme – although, after US experiences with a similar programme, this is also probably no bad thing – especially as postponing this programme will push £100m of spending three years into the future.

There is also a software upgrade designed to give the army's Bowman communications system a battlefield tracking system to avoid friendly-fire attacks. This has been delayed indefinitely, Smith claiming that it will push back more than £300m. Again, this is probably no bad thing – such a system is only really needed in the free flowing conditions of manoeuvre battles, and has less importance in COIN operations. A delay would allow the technology to mature and to take account of the developments made by our allies, the Americans, with whom interoperability is essential.

More worryingly, the RAF will receive no replacements for the three Hercules transport aircraft lost in Iraq and Afghanistan, or the nine scrapped over the past year due to fatigue problems. This will saving £600m, but leaves the RAF airlift capability dangerously stretched until the Airbus A400M programme comes on stream. Oddly enough, though, Smith does not mention the Super Lynx, which is a primary candidate for the chop.

The Royal Navy, though, seems to have survived virtually untouched, being forced only to accept that it will now only get six Astute submarines instead of the 12 (Smith says nine) originally planned and six new Type 45 destroyers, also instead of the original 12 (Smith gets this wrong as well, citing seven). But both these cuts were already accepted in return for the carriers, we are told, but no questions are asked about how a mere six Type 45s can provide adequate coverage for two carrier groups.

Most of all though, in common with most of the journalist fraternity, Smith does not seem to have understood the significance of the MoD’s non-review, even though the clue is in his own report.

"We have recently concluded our planning round which prioritises across the defence programme," says the MoD. "Some decisions will be put on hold while the examination of the equipment programme is carried out."

In other words, everything is to play for. Nothing is cast in stone and we may simply be seeing the expected round of manoeuvring and leaks public briefing, in order to influence the outcome of the non-review. Either way though, problems are definitely stacking up for the Conservative Party.

COMMENT THREAD

Not taking it seriously

Almost a year to the day, we reported the Canadian decision to purchase five Husky mine detection sets, with supporting vehicles, to deal with the rash of IED/mine attacks which were causing so many casualties in Afghanistan.

The "sets" comprising the Husky, a Buffalo and a 6x6 Cougar – which acts as a command vehicle - sweep roadways before the arrival of combat or supply convoys, thereby seeking to ensure safer passage by vehicles which are not mine protected.

The utility of these specialist vehicles quickly became apparent and we were able report with approval that at least the Canadian military seemed capable of learning lessons born of combat experience.

And indeed, they are continuing to learn those lessons. Reported by the Canadian Press, the Commander of the Canadian Expeditionary Force in Afghanistan is set to ask his government's approval to purchase another ten sets – known by their acronym EROC, standing for "Expedient Route Opening Capability" system.

What is particularly revealing about this report though are comments from unnamed "defence sources in Ottawa" who, "acknowledge the vehicles in theatre have been beaten up, but are continuing to prove their worth every day." One adds: "They've taken a pounding, but they're designed to go out and take a pounding and clear routes and not have the LAV targeted - or so other less protected vehicles."

Here, it is the reference to the LAV which is interesting – this being the armoured personnel carrier which forms the basis of Canadian Army formations. Although armoured, it is not mine protected and it has proved dangerously vulnerable to mine/IED ambushes.

Thus, before this type of vehicle is allowed to sally forth, the way is cleared for it. What a contrast this is with the British way of doing things, which resulted in the death of Trooper Ratu Babakobau, when his Spartan ACP – armoured but not mine protected – was blown apart by a mine.

Nevertheless, the strategy adopted by Canada is by no means entirely optimal. The military would prefer to transport more men and materials by the ultimate mine protected vehicle, the helicopter – but has been hampered by a chronic shortage of these aircraft.

Yet, while the same shortage of helicopters reportedly affects British forces, and despite the Husky sets being a relatively cheap option (the ten new sets estimated at $60-million – less than the price of one new transport helicopter), there are no signs of the British Army following suit. Instead, we see this ludicrous puff on the MoD website, as the Army unveils its latest weapon in the war against mines – hand-held mine detectors.

Nor, indeed, are helicopters the only option. Reported recently by Popular Mechanics (a surprisingly good source of reliable military information) is a new technique introduced by the US forces in Afghanistan. This is the GPS-guided or "smart" parachute – known as the Joint Precision Airdrop System (JPADS).

It can be used by high-flying transport aircraft to make precision drops of supplied to isolated outposts, reducing the need to use ambush-prone vehicle convoys and avoiding the hazards involved in helicopter re-supply. So successful has been the technique that the USAF delivered 313,824 pounds of supplies between August 2006, when the programme began, to September 2007 – keeping an estimated 500+ convoys off the roads.

In July 2007, the RAF acquired this technology, the first air force outside the US so to do, but the latest news of reduced C-130 capacity cannot assist in ensuring that maximum advantage is gained from its availability.

As a final option, the Army could, of course, ensure that troops were provided with mine-protected personnel carriers. After the first Canadian deaths attributed to IEDs, occurring outside Kabul on 2 October 2003 when a lightly protected Iltis jeep rolled over a mine, the Canadian Army procured RG-31s to protect their troops – with very great effect.

However, while belatedly the MoD is supplying mine-protected vehicles, the Army still content to send its soldiers out in ill-protected vehicles - despite more than adequate warning about Taleban intentions.

There can be no doubt, therefore, that British forces in Afghanistan still suffer from a huge capability gap. At the very least, we need mine detection vehicles, more helicopters, more transport aircraft and more mine-protected vehicles. But hey! Never mind! Harry got his medal for not being blown up in his Spartan. He was lucky not to get a state funeral.

What makes you think the government is not taking this war seriously?

COMMENT THREAD

Would things have been different?

The words, "according to documents leaked to The Sunday Telegraph…" always make the heart sink, but – if the documents have not been misread, quoted out of context, or over-egged – we have problems.

According to the paper's article, up to five RAF C-130 Hercules transports – more than a 10th of the fleet – have developed a "potentially dangerous defect", namely, "a number of wing cracks…".

The RAF is playing this down, as you might expect, its spokesman saying that, "All aircraft will have cracks due to such things as fatigue damage: the C130 is no exception." He adds: "There is a comprehensive inspection regime in place and all aircraft are maintained according to approved military airworthiness regulations to ensure that no crack becomes critical for the continued safe operation of the aircraft."

From all indications, this problem is not affecting operations but it appears that it is having an effect on training schedules, especially as five of the older C130s are being retired from service this summer. Thus, the report is cited as stating that the future for military training exercises is "bleak".

Taking the worst possible complexion, the RAF is going to be up to ten aircraft short in its medium-haul fleet and, having lost three C-130s on operations, will be struggling to meet its commitments (although the occasional Antonov charter and the additional C-17 will, presumably, ensure that the "air-bridge" to Iraq and Afghanistan will be maintained).

Nevertheless, it is pertinent to ask what has happened to the C-130 replacement, the fabled Airbus A400M, which was not due into RAF service until 2010 and is running late, with a year or possibly more delay.

When last we heard, engine problems were an "issue" and the latest report confirms that this remains so. Furthermore, costs related to the programme have risen by €1.4 billion which is creating difficulties for the manufacturer, saddled as it is with a fixed-price contract.

Peter Scoffham, head of defence capability marketing of Airbus Military, is still claiming that the delayed first test flight will be "by the summer", the picture (top) showing a somewhat incomplete aircraft being rolled out of its hanger in Seville last January. Presumably it will have some engines by then.

For the RAF to have been told that it would have to rely on this aircraft to replace its ageing C-130s, with a delivery schedule starting in 2010, was bad enough but, with the news of the current problems, A440M production delays look set to create even more difficulties for the service.

One cannot help but wonder whether things might have been any different, if Tony Blair had not fallen for the blandishments of Chirac and ordered the C-130J instead.

COMMENT THREAD

They didn't have to die

For anyone wishing to explore the substantive issues on defence, and maintain a sensible debate, the last few weeks have been dreadful.

No sooner are we through the hystérie du jour on Prince Harry then the media goes overboard on the wearing of military uniforms in public. The only thing we felt, under the circumstances, was to walk away for a short while, lest utter frustration get the better of us.

What brings us back is the headline in The Sun yesterday, which we reproduce above – in which the newspaper belatedly visits an issue which this blog has been pursuing doggedly for nearly two years.

Its topical hook for a thesis that 35 soldiers "might be alive today - if only they had been given the right KIT" - was the death of an SAS soldier, killed when his parachute failed to open during training, the inquest for whom has just started.

Also picked up by The Daily Telegraph and others, as well as more coverage from the Sun, this refers to Captain Daniel Wright of the Queen's Gurkha Signal Corps. He died at RAF Brize Norton in Oxfordshire after plummeting 2,500ft on 17 November 2005 and The Sun has obtained documents "that reveal Captain Wright is the latest victim of shocking penny-pinching."

According to The Sun's sources, the 25-year-old plummeted 3,000ft to his death - after pleas for a vital two-way radio were ignored to save £50. Apparently, his main parachute failed to open and he delayed opening his reserve – through inexperience, we are told – but might have acted quicker had he been equipped with a two-way radio enabling instructors on the ground at the parachute school to talk him out of trouble.

The MoD is reserving comment on this until the inquest verdict had been given, so we too must do likewise. But the broader significance of the paper's original piece was that it uses Captain Wright's death to assert that it brings to THIRTY-FIVE (the paper's emphasis) the number of "brave soldiers whose deaths are blamed on not being given proper equipment."

Amongst that number, it included ten personnel killed in January 2005 when a Hercules transport was shot down near Baghdad, the lack of a fire suppressant system in the fuel tanks being a contributory factor in the tragedy.

Also included was the death of Major Matthew Bacon, killed in a "Snatch" Land-Rover after the Lynx helicopter due to fly him from base to base broke down. The paper then adds Lt Tom Mildinhall, Lance Corporal Paul Farrelly and Corporal Gordon Pritchard, also killed on 11 June 2006 in a Land Rover, Captain Jim Philippson, "shot dead in Afghanistan after being sent into battle without crucial night vision goggles, grenade launchers or machine guns" and the 14 deaths arising from the crash of the Nimrod in November 2006.

Also listed is Corporal Mark Wright, who "bled to death because rescue helicopters had no winches" and, finally, the paper cites the deaths of Sergeant Chris Casey and Lance Corporal Kirk Redpath, killed in a "Snatch" Land Rover by a roadside bomb in Iraq, "because of a shortage of Mastiff armoured trucks".

There are several points here, not least that to attribute some all the deaths cited to lack of proper equipment is tendentious, not least the demise of Captain Philippson and Corporal Mark Wright.

However, the substantive point is the reference to 35 deaths attributable to the failure to provide the right kit. Yet, when we first addressed the Land Rover issue in June 2006, we identified 23 deaths which could be attributed – in part – to the lack of suitable armoured protection.

Nearly two years on, if we take in deaths arising in WIMIK Land Rovers (example pictured), Pinzgauers and the additional toll from "Snatch" Land Rovers – including that in Afghanistan - the number dead from inadequate protection in vehicles is closer to 50. Add to that the Hercules and Nimrod incidents, which The Sun points up, and that brings the actual casualties attributable to lack of the right kit to 74, more than double the number cited by the paper.

This brings us back into the area we explored last month, where we complained that our increasingly ill-informed media lacked focus in its criticism of military issues.

Here, we have to say that we do not and cannot object to The Sun or any other newspaper taking up cudgels on behalf of our troops. Simply, the ill-focused criticism in many cases hinders rather than assists the cause, diverting attention from the substantive issues and enabling those responsible to escape scrutiny.

Thus, in the case of The Sun, while we would agree entirely with the paper's central thesis that troops are being killed through lack of suitable kit, not only does it understate the problem but it is so general in the nature of its complaint that its political impact is slight. Real continuing issues, like the weaknesses of the Pinzgauer and the WIMIK go unaddressed.

In this context, think how long Pinzgauer Vectors would survive in theatre if the The Sun mounted a full-bodied campaign against these "coffins on wheels". That is the measure of the inadequacy of the newspaper – it is not so much what it does, but what it does not do.

That criticism could (and should) also be levied at other newspapers, and a more subtle example of this failure can be seen in last weekend's Sunday Times.

This paper's focus was on the story of a "British soldier awarded the Military Cross for fighting off 150 Taliban", written by defence correspondent Michael Smith. It is about the heroism of Fusilier Damien Hields who used a "grenade machinegun" mounted on his WIMIK Land Rover to destroy seven Taliban positions before himself being wounded.

At one level, the story is entirely commendable – and there is every reason why the heroism of Fusilier Damien Hields should be celebrated. But The Sunday Times is supposedly a serious newspaper, with a reputation for campaigning, yet it deals with the events in a breathless Boys' Own style, complete with graphics (illustrated) which are so amateurish as to be laughable.

It is in fact worth noting these graphics. The author of the piece, Mike Smith, will have had no control over them but they nevertheless are part of the piece. They represent the output of the Sunday Times and convey a message about the gravitas and accuracy of the corporate body.


The pictorial narrative offered (see above) is of a WIMIK Land Rover (although it is not identified as a WIMIK) leading a fifty-man convoy being blown up by a mine and flipped over. In loving detail, the windscreen of the vehicle is shown, complete with finely-drawn windscreen wipers. The only problem is the WIMIK does not have a windscreen – but it does have a GMPG in the front passenger position, which is not shown.

The second frame is even more laughable, purporting to show a Taleban fighter firing a rocket propelled grenade yet actually shows what looks uncannily like a Stinger anti-aircraft missile launcher (pictured).

Pedantry this might be – but was there no one on the entire editorial staff who had enough knowledge to recognise such obvious visual howlers? What does it say about a newspaper that lets them through?

Anyhow, back to the narrative which recounts how Fusilier Hields bravely assisting the convoy in fighting off a force far larger, as it was stalled behind the blown-up, inverted WIMIK. The obvious point which occurs, however, is that had the vehicle been effectively mine-protected, not only would it not have been overturned, but it could – like other such vehicles – have been able to drive clear of the "killing zone" (below), thereby avoiding the uneven match.

Further, given the size of the force – 150 or so – could it not have been detected before the convoy arrived, had there been effective aerial reconnaissance, perhaps by a UAV running ahead to look out for traps?

And then, with the 50 beleaguered British troops fighting for their lives, where was the air support? With such a large investment in men and materiel, could not the Army have ensured it was better protected by insisting that it had air cover?

There may, of course, be adequate answers to these questions – but they are not asked by The Sunday Times. If explored, they could have painted a completely different picture, one of a large number of troops to a very great extent rescued from disaster by the conspicuous heroism of one man.

Wholly admirable that may be but any Army which has to rely on such heroism is one that is seriously deficient. The next time there is a disaster, the hero might not be to hand. Or he might not be so lucky and be killed in the opening moments of the fight.

Returning briefly to the Sun's story, we see the tail end of the piece with an almost obligatory quote from an opposition spokesman, this time "Tory defence spokesman Gerald Howarth" who brands the "skimping" on equipment "a true scandal". He is allowed to say: "I intend to take this further in the House of Commons."

That phrasing gives the perhaps unfortunate impression that Howarth has just woken up to the problem – which is not exactly true. But it is worth looking at his record and working out how many of the 942 questions he has tabled actually deal specifically with equipment issues. Compare and contrast those with the careful probing of Ann Winterton and you might come away with the impression that The Sun's quote from its choice of spokesman is a ritualistic filler.

Be that as it may, when it comes to looking in detail at where equipment inadequacies lie, the media are not even beginning to get to grip with the subject. They are picking up only those issues presented to them on a plate. This is cheap, derivative journalism that exploits rather than serves our Armed Forces – it is playing with peoples' lives.

COMMENT THREAD

Does this help?

If the Armed Forces are feeling unappreciated – and indeed anecdotal evidence supports this – one wonders quite what is being achieved by the media stories that continue to filter through the system.

The latest comes from The Daily Telegraph announcing: "Armed Forces row over £1bn shortfall", whence we are informed that a "fresh row" over Armed Forces funding has broken out "after it emerged that defence chiefs are having to find an extra £1 billion for cost overruns on major projects."

This is on the back of the latest NAO major projects report, an annual production which charts the progress of the 20 most expensive MoD procurement projects.

Generally, however, the report is favourable, stating that, "Overall the Department is in a similar position to the Major Projects Report 2006 for forecast cost and performance," although it adds, "there continue to be time delays". These, as one might expect, are largely down to legacy projects, which started before the current procurement system was in place.

The main point of contention seems to be the transfer of parts of budgets from different projects into other categories, the details of which are abstruse, and could be construed as normal – or "creative" depending on your point of view – but nothing in the report would seem to warrant the government being "condemned by the Tories", as the Telegraph reports.

Nevertheless, we have Gerald Howarth, a Tory defence spokesman (pictured), saying: "This report provides further evidence of Labour's incompetence in supplying our forces with equipment, a failure which is potentially placing lives at unnecessary risk".

Included in that category is FRES and, we are told, "Ministers were also accused of seeking to disguise the fact that the £10 billion project for a "battle-field taxi" armoured vehicle - known as the Future Rapid Effect (sic) System - was slipping further behind schedule."

All of this could, of course, just be treated as part of the knockabout element of British party politics. Government performance should be open to scrutiny and should invite robust comment from the opposition.

However, none of the projects under consideration by the NAO, with the exception of the Nimrod MR4 project are directly related to the conduct of operations in either Iraq and Afghanistan, in such a way that there could be any serious arguments that lives were being put at risk.

And, of the Nimrod project, that programme was initiated in 1992 as the Replacement Maritime Patrol Aircraft (RMPA) procurement programme, and contracts were awarded in December 1996 – both events under the Conservative watch.

Furthermore, it really is the case that major defence projects are problematical, not only in this country – under every administration – but in countries as far afield as the United States, India and Australia. It is thus something of a cheap shot to complain that the current delays and overspend provide "further evidence of Labour's incompetence" – especially as, by common accord, the efforts of Lord Drayson have been successful in reigning in the excesses.

In respect of FRES, however, the criticism is especially unwarranted. From the outset, this was an over-ambitious project, based on the flawed assumption that medium-weight, air-portable armoured vehicles could be deployed safely in the modern battlefield. Had the project forged ahead, without taking into account experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, we would now be committed to building a range of extremely expensive and (even more) inadequate vehicles.

Even now, with much of the technology on which the FRES concept will rely being immature, there is a good argument to be made as to whether FRES should go ahead at all and whether the money earmarked for this project should be better spent elsewhere.

There is, for example, a good case for the purchase of light helicopters to enable increased air-mobility of tactical units, there is an argument for light aircraft to be used for close air support, for the greater use of a range of MRAP-type vehicles, for the development of a fixed-wing gunship on the lines of the AC-130, and many more issues which have been debated on this blog.

What one would expect of an opposition, in the context of holding government to account, is constantly to be probing the government on alternatives, on better ways of achieving a result, on cheaper ways of doing things, and of weaknesses in the systems which can readily be improved.

Defence is too important an issue for "biff-bam!" politics – morale is too fragile a beast to allow it to be used as a political football. The public should be able to judge the opposition not by the stridency of its criticisms of the government, but by its constructive (and realistic) comments and by its range of ideas which could improve the performance and conditions of our Armed Forces.

By this means, of course, the opposition could demonstrate to the public at large that defence would indeed be better in the hands of a new government, without having to rely on a diet of scare stories that the "government" was putting lives needlessly at risk.

COMMENT THREAD

A lack of imagination

The day after our post pointing out the extraordinary cost of Apache attack helicopters, it is rather ironic that Bernard Jenkin should publish a report on defence policy arguing for the Army to be equipped with more Apache helicopters.

Thus writes Jenkin:

The mountainous terrain of Afghanistan discouraged the deployment of Challenger 2s, and the Army have been much more dependent upon the Apache attack helicopter. When first ordered, many questioned the possible utility of Apache. Despite some teething problems, and their expense, the Apache has proved its worth in Helmand in the fight against the Taliban but there simply have not been enough of them. There is good reason to think that a larger number than the sixty-seven we presently have should be provided to the Army Air Corps although support helicopters are a much more urgent priority.

Now, it is possible to make too much of this, as this is one short paragraph in a 60-page publication, but sometimes small things can betray a mindset, an evaluation of which can permit drawing general conclusions.

With that in mind, if we explore the Apache issue, there is no dispute that this is an extraordinarily expensive machine to buy. With a total acquisition cost, including the training package, in the order of £4.1 billion, this works out in excess of £60 million per machine, almost equivalent in price to the Eurofighter (depending on which estimate you use). Interestingly, it is also similar in price to the AC-130 Hercules gunship, which has proved such a potent weapon.

Another thing about which there is no dispute is that the Apache is primarily an anti-tank weapon, designed for operations in Northern Europe against the massed forces of the Warsaw Pact, where its ability to fly low and slow, using the abundant cover in the region, is an essential part of the survival package.

In using this machine in Afghanistan, therefore, one has to recognise that it is not being used for its original purpose, and that many of the conditions which make it suitable for Europe do not apply in Afghanistan. Given the expense (to say nothing of the extremely high maintenance burden it imposes), there is thus an arguable case for exploring cheaper alternatives that could achieve the same or better effect.

There are, of course, arguments on both sides of the debate – although this blog tends to take the view that a light, fixed-wing turbo-prop attack aircraft could provide a better and far cheaper alternative. In fact, there are good arguments that suggest that light, fixed-wing aircraft will always provide a better alternative to attack helicopters, the latter owing its existence more to inter-service politics than operational imperatives.

This stems from the US Key West agreement (with a similar agreement in the UK), whereby the Army was prohibited from operating fixed-wing attack aircraft and therefore invested in attack helicopters as a way of circumventing what would otherwise be an air force monopoly in providing air support.

The relative merits of different types of aircraft, however, is not a debate that is going to be resolved here, in this post. But the essential point is that there should be a debate, that the different arguments should be rehearsed fully and that, eventually – the sooner the better – an informed decision should be made, on the basis of the issues brought out by the debate.

In Mr Jenkin's paper, however, there is no sign of that debate – no recognition even that there is a debate, or any acknowledgement that there might be substantially cheaper and better ways of doing things. Instead, Jenkin opts for the orthodoxy of pouring more money into a system.

Interestingly, the thrust of his argument is that defence spending needs to be increased by £3 billion a year for the next five years but, if part of Mr Jenkin's strategy is to furnish the Army with more attack helicopters at over £60 million each, even that amount of money will have little impact – on top of all the other things which he wants to acquire.

Something else Mr Jenkin presumably wants is the Future Rapid Effects System (FRES) which, rather alarmingly for someone who is on the defence committee, he calls the Forward Rapid Effects System. He complains that the service date "is slipping back and back" and is "rapidly getting heavier in response to threats encountered in Iraq and Afghanistan."

This leads Jenkin to conclude that "FRES is a bad advertisement for the present system of procurement" because, he avers, "it took so long to formalise a clear procurement strategy for the programme." He then suggests that the FRES programme "may become a victim of the squeeze resulting from the 2007 CSR (Comprehensive Spending Review.)"

Again this post is not the place to rehearse all the issues surrounding the FRES project. Suffice to say that there is an intense debate raging as to whether the original (or any) such concept is valid or even achievable, especially in view of the Army's determination to procure a multi-purpose vehicle which is suitable both for high intensity warfare and counter-insurgency operations.

Again this blog has a view, the essence being that the counter-insurgency roles would be better served by specialist – and far cheaper - vehicles such as the Mastiff, while high-intensity warfare (if we ever find ourselves fighting such a war) could be served by using upgraded Warriors, introducing net-centric capabilities incrementally, as the technology matures.

Here, Jenkin has some useful observations about the nature of future operations, writing:

Internationally, most recent crises, whether in the Balkans or the Middle East, have left the UK’s Armed Forces seeking to suppress an insurgency. Moreover, the main purpose of operations in Afghanistan is to counter al-Qaeda. Although we should never lose sight of the fact that the geo-political climate can change very quickly, the likelihood is that we will see a continued movement away from the kind of major war fought in World War II and planned for during the Cold War. As far as we can tell, the wars of the twenty-first century are likely to be "Fourth Generation" wars against smaller states or non-state actors. Our enemies lack the technology and resources to engage on an equal footing and so resort to "asymmetric" warfare, as we have seen in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Thus he concedes that we are most likely to be committed in the future to "Fourth Generation" wars, for which FRES is likely to be unsuitable and overly expensive.

Once more, this is not a debate that is going to be resolved here, in this post. But, exactly as we wrote above, the essential point is that there should be a debate, that the different arguments should be rehearsed fully and that, eventually – the sooner the better – an informed decision should be made, on the basis of the issues brought out by the debate.

Yet again, in Mr Jenkin's paper, there is no sign of that debate – no recognition even that there is a debate, or any acknowledgement that there might be substantially cheaper and better ways of doing things.

The penalty of such a superficial approach, however, is substantial. Given that FRES is expected to cost – at the very least - £16 billion, and Mr Jenkin is looking for £15 billion over the next five years, the answer to his problem is staring him in the face. Make a case for cancelling FRES and he has all the money he needs without increasing the defence budget.

One more point we have to raise – before this post gets too long – is Mr Jenkin's call for more support helicopters. Apart from the fact that the six Merlins and eight Chinooks are on their way, he also takes no note of the arguments for meeting urgent requirements with civilian contractors. It is not that he dismisses the arguments. He does not even – as before – seem to be aware that there is even a debate going on.

So it is that we draw our overall impression of the paper – tired, staid, unimaginative and conventional, drawing the same wearily predictable conclusions that the answer to all problems in our Armed Forces is simply to pump more money into them. Yet, as a Conservative – and supposedly a right-winger – Jenkin of all people should know, with the experience of the flood of money pumped into the health service and education, throwing money at public services does not necessarily yield proportional (or even any) improvement.

Somehow though – like so many of his colleagues – he seems unable to make that leap of imagination and conclude that the same dictum might apply to the Armed Forces which, despite its special role, is still a public service. And there, in a nutshell, is the central malaise in the Conservative Party and, in my view, the main reason why it has not (and will not) capture the imagination of the voting public.

COMMENT THREAD

They really don't get it

Aside from the torrent of defence related "news" and comment in the Sunday newspapers today, tucked into the business section of The Sunday Times (spotted by a gimlet-eyed reader) is a short piece on FRES.

As one would expect, this is presented in an entirely negative fashion, the headline reading, "Army hit by MoD delaying tactics" as the story records that the MoD is this week "expected to fudge a long-awaited decision on a new generation of fighting vehicles for the British Army."

We thus learn that, although and announcement had been expected on the choice of the FRES utility vehicle, the evaluation period had been extended instead. It is rumoured that two contenders, the Piranha and the French VBCI, will be taken forward, with the Boxer being dropped.

The delay is put down to a dispute between the now departed Lord Drayson, who was "understood to be eager to buy the French vehicle" and the military who wanted the Piranha.

However, while that may be the case in the short-term, the fact of the delay is very convenient for a government which is strongly rumoured to be considering cutting one or other of the major procurement projects in the pipeline, with FRES a possible candidate for the chop.

With that possibility extant, one might have thought that any defence correspondent worth his salt would have homed in on this snippet and made something of it. As usual though, FRES seems to be a complete blind spot and news of the project is confined to the business pages of a single newspaper.

This is all the more bizarre in the context of the current controversy over defence spending, where abandoning this project altogether would be of significant assistance in helping the MoD balance its books.

Instead of sniping at the MoD for the delay – as The Times report does – correspondents should be asking whether the project is really necessary. With the Mastiff proving an unexpected success in Afghanistan, being used successfully as an armoured personnel carrier in the assault role, and with over 700 Warriors still on the Army’s books – with an upgrade in progress, it would seem that the last thing the Army needs at the moment is a new armoured personnel carrier (APC).

If there is a gap in the order of battle, it is for a light reconnaissance and patrol vehicle to replace the ageing Scorpion and replace the dangerously vulnerable WIMIK Land Rover. Not since the 1920s has the Army been without a light armoured car, with the roles of the Ferret and then the Fox currently shared between Land Rovers and Scorpions.

Yet, although a new reconnaissance vehicle is part of the FRES package, it is taking second place to the "utility" vehicle – the APC.

The only possible rationale for the utility vehicle – which would not provide as much protection as the Mastiff yet cost a great deal more – is to provide the rapid reaction component for our contribution to the ERRF – neither the Mastiff nor the Warrior being air-portable.

Here again though, there are questions, as the projected weight of any vehicle chosen is likely to prevent it being transported by the Hercules fleet, requiring the introduction of the Airbus A400M to provide sufficient airlift capacity. Even then, this may not prove possible as there are indications that the Airbus may not be able to meet its design specification.

But, possibly, an even bigger threat are the major problems being experienced by Airbus industries with the strength of the dollar. With this savagely eroding the company's profits, there is some question as to whether it could even afford to build the A400M without sustaining massive losses on the fixed-price contract.

The spectre exists, therefore, of the Army acquiring an air-portable (just) vehicle without the RAF having the capacity to fly it anywhere, rather negating its utility – if it had any to start with.

All this amounts to a powerful argument for walking away from the FRES project – investing some of the funds liberated in more MRAP-type vehicles, which seems to be happening anyway.

But, while that may be the most sensible option, you can bet that any announcement of a FRES cancellation will be greeted with a storm of outraged protest, not least from the defence correspondents who will, once again, be demonstrating that they really don't get it.

COMMENT THREAD