AFPAK in the House

For those that might otherwise complain about the parliament in Westminster being marginalised, prime minister Gordon Brown did at least reserve the official confirmation of what had been widely forecast – an increase in force levels in Afghanistan – for an official statement in the House.

In what is going to have to be a series of posts, we will first summarise the statement in this post. In another post, we'll look at the media response and then we'll pick up on how the politicians responded, in and out of the House.

Starting with the statement, Brown also took the opportunity to give a broader overview of the mission and its progress: about the work with the government of Pakistan to counter the terrorist threat from al-Qaeda and the Taleban; our priorities for Afghanistan in "the next stage" of the work our armed forces and civilians are undertaking there; and the conditions set for that stage, including for the best possible protection of our troops, especially against the growing threat of IEDs.

Before so doing, he reiterated the reason for all this endeavour: to prevent al-Qaeda launching attacks on our streets. Three-quarters of the most serious terror al-Qaeda plots, he said, have roots in the border and mountain areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Sustained pressure on al-Qaeda in Pakistan combined with military action in Afghanistan was having a suppressive effect on the organisation.

However, he told us, if we limit ourselves simply to targeting al-Qaeda, without building the capacity of Afghanistan and Pakistan to deal with terrorism and violent extremism, the security gains would not endure. So we were seeking to build and support the Afghan army and police and to work with the Pakistan security forces. As an overarching objective, we are also seeking to promote a peaceful and stable Afghanistan. That would be a strategic failure for al-Qaeda.

The strategy, therefore, is dedicated to counter-insurgency and then to "Afghanisation" of the mission.

To help out Pakistan, we are giving another £10 million, to add to the £22 million already provided for humanitarian assistance for areas recently liberated from the Taleban. Then, in Afghanistan, the "strategy" which starts with training, mentoring and partnering the Afghan army and police would be speeded up. The more that the Afghans can take responsibility for security, the sooner our troops will come home. The immediate target is to build up the Afghan army to 134,000 by next October.

The Afghans are to set up a corps headquarters in Helmand and British forces will be ready to partner 5,000 of the 10,000 Afghan troops being trained by the coalition in Helmand over the next few months. This is not just a case of embedding mentors with Afghan units, as has been done in the past, but working integrally right up to the top of the command chain. In future operations, the protection of populated areas must be the shared responsibility of Afghan and coalition forces.

To meet the changing demands of the campaign, which require greater concentration of our forces in central Helmand, the regional battle group for southern Afghanistan (500 troops) will be redeployed from Kandahar and the new force level has been agreed at 9,500, subject to three conditions.

The first is that a new Afghan government demonstrates its commitment to bring forward the Afghan troops to be trained and to fight alongside our forces. The second is that every soldier and unit deployed to Afghanistan is and must be fully equipped for the operations they are required to undertake. The third is that the international coalition bears its fair share of the burden.

As to the elections, the process in train must be allowed to run its course but, when a new government is formed, the international community, including Afghanistan's neighbours, must develop a contract with the new government that includes the commitment to growing the Afghan army; tough action on corruption; a more inclusive political process, including reaching out to the reconcilable elements of the insurgency; and stronger Afghan control of local affairs.

A better future for Afghanistan, with its village and rural population, Brown then averred, can only be forged if there is stronger governance right down to district level. To that effect, the number of civilian advisors has been doubled. Furthermore, they are supporting not just Governor Mangal, but district governors and village shuras. The Afghan government is now functioning in nine out of 13 districts, compared with five last year, and we are supporting community councils to consult with thousands of local people.

An extra £20 million for the stabilisation work in Helmand is already being disbursed - to increase the number of Afghan national police in Helmand by 1,000 a year for each of the next three years and to build a new police training academy and new facilities for district governors. We are also working with coalition partners to extend such support to the 34 provincial governors and 400 district governors right across Afghanistan.

And, to complete the package, Brown told us that British aid will continue to help to pay the salaries of teachers and doctors, and we are also ready to fund and partner the first Afghan teams sent for stability purposes from Kabul to work alongside us in Helmand.

In short, apart from the troop uplift, there is very little in the package that we had not heard before and, as we noted, even the extra 500 troops had been widely signalled. Clearly expressed, though, was the "conditionality". The Army is not being given a blank cheque. However, with the redeployment of the theatre reserve into Helmand, that will eventually put two extra battlegroups at the disposal of Task Force Helmand.

How the media have responded in general, we'll look at in another post, but it is worth noting that The Guardian is reporting a suspension of hostilities between the politicians and the military. CDS Sir Jock Stirrup and the CGS, Gen Richards, have both "enthusiastically endorsed" the package.

"Our objective, as part of the 42-nation coalition in Afghanistan, is to reduce the terrorist threat to the United Kingdom," says Stirrup. "We do this by assisting the Afghans to spread enduring governance to parts of their country that have in the past, and would in the future if abandoned, harbour and provide support to terrorist groups." Richards, on the other hand, says: "This is the right decision and it reflects the … advice the prime minister has received since the summer."

If the package works as well on the Taleban and al-Qaeda as it does our own military, we might just get somewhere.

COMMENT THREAD

Operational art

When the Strategic Studies Institute, part of the US Army War College, publishes a paper saying that the military have gone too far in the prosecution of war, and it is time to bring politicians back in the loop, it is time to sit up and take notice.

The paper, under the slightly whimsical title of "Alien: how operational art devoured strategy", is written by two Australians, Brigadier Justin Kelly and Dr Michael Brennan. It deals with what might seem to be an arcane subject – known as "operational art" - but this is a mainstream and important issue which strikes at the very root of the relationship between politics and the military, with direct and immediate relevance to the mission in Afghanistan.

The term "operational art" is almost certainly unfamiliar to those outside the narrow community of military theorists but is defined by the paper authors as the "thoughtful sequencing of tactical actions to defeat a component of the armed forces of the enemy." It relates to the development of inter-related and sometimes complex military actions, all designed to achieve a single effect, but, as the authors point out, the term has become misunderstood and mis-applied, with serious consequences.

The confusion, they argue, is in the similarity with a wholly different concept, the one carrying the much more familiar name of "strategy". That, narrowly defined, is the science and art of military command as applied to the overall planning and conduct of large-scale combat operations and, given the obvious similarity with what is meant by "operational art", it is unsurprising that confusion has crept in.

What has happened, argue Kelly and Brennan, has been that the term "operational art" has come to cover not just local tactical actions, battles or sequences of battles. It has been expanded to apply to campaigns and – in the "small wars" that tend to dominate modern warfare - the general conduct of those wars.

Consequently, they state, the term – or its application - has marginalised the role of politics in the direction of war. In particular, the idea of the campaign has come to overwhelm that of strategy, the former lying within the province of the military, the latter primarily of political concern, albeit developed as part of a "conversation" with the military.

Rather than meeting its original purpose of contributing to the attainment of campaign objectives laid down by strategy, operational art - practiced as a "level of war", has assumed the responsibility for campaign planning. In so doing, it has reduced the political leadership to the role of "strategic sponsors" and widened the gap between politics and warfare. The result, say Kelly and Brenna, has been a well-demonstrated ability to win battles that have not always contributed to strategic success, i.e., "a way of battle rather than a way of war."

The relevance of this issue is evidence from the recent behaviour of General Stanley McChrystal in offering what he termed a new "strategy" for the campaign in Afghanistan, then orchestrating a publicity campaign aimed at pressurising president Obama into providing the resources deemed necessary to implement it.

One sees, therefore, a general seeking to define strategy, with an attempt to relegate the politician to the role of passive "provider"- the "strategic sponsor" - taking no active part in formulating strategy but simply ensuring that such means as are demanded are made available.

A similar dynamic has been seen on this side of the Atlantic. Here, diverse military figures – most notably General Sir Richard Dannatt – have been demanding of the government more resources and increased troop levels. Yet they have not been willing to specify clearly the use to which they will be put, resisting what they argue is political interference in "operational" matters, which lie exclusively within the military sphere.

Against this artificial division – redolent of trades union demarcation disputes - Kelly and Brennan call in aid Clausewitz and his view of war as an extension of politics - "a chaotic process involving competing personalities (whose individual actions may indeed have a rational basis), chance and friction, and popular emotion." In a war, they argue, the actions of all of the protagonists are determined by this interaction of policy and politics. To isolate one from the other is to ignore a critical part of the whole.

The political leadership of a country, they say, cannot simply set objectives for a war, provide the requisite materiel, then stand back and await victory. Nor should the nation or its military be seduced by this prospect. Politicians must necessarily be concerned with the minute-to-minute conduct of war and today's plethora of military actions.

Thus political considerations are "influential in the planning of war, of the campaign, and often even of the battle." Clausewitz is then invoked once again, with his caution that multiple points of view - administrative, military, political - cannot be a basis for planning wars. The political perspective must be given precedence over everything.

What the authors of this remarkable paper do not deal with – and nor did they set out to do so – is the other side of the coin. While, through the mechanism described, the military have come to monopolise the strategic direction of war, quite deliberately excluding politicians where they can, to a certain extent this is also because the politicians are permitting it.

The increasing technology of war, the proliferation of jargon, the impenetrable acronyms and the emergence of the technocratic, professional "warrior class" on the one hand intimidate politicians - many of whom have had no military experience. On the other, the complexities of modern government and competing demands on time make it convenient to leave the war to the "generals", allowing the politicians to exercise a "hands-off" supervisory function.

Thus, if the application of military theory, expressed as "operational art", has had the effect of isolating politicians from the detailed management of war, politicians have themselves have contributed to the process. While Kelly and Brennan may argue that "the political perspective must be given precedence over everything", there is no evidence that the politicians are prepared to engage, to the extent that they are prepared to provide the political leadership.

That much may explain David Cameron's enthusiasm for appointing Gen Dannatt as his military "advisor" – soon to become defence minister – seen in the context of the absence of any original thinking from the Conservative party on how to conduct the mission in Afghanistan. Furthermore, the political retreat from strategy is being reinforced by the popular media which is taking the view that ministers should give the generals what they ask for. It is not for them to question, much less challenge "military advice".

Kelly and Brennan in fact refer to the aphorism that "strategy proposes but tactics disposes", considering it "valid", but remind readers that the strategic direction of a war needs to be intimately sensitive to the details of the warfare being conducted so as to ensure both that it is making realistic demands, and that the military action remains in keeping with the wider conduct of the war.

Where politicians are defining strategy, therefore, that requires of them an appreciation of the nature and utility of tactics employed, and a capacity to enter into a meaningful "conversation" with the military, most often in the glare of media scrutiny. Few contemporary politicians have demonstrated that capacity. Yet, devoid of political input, we end up with tactical action without strategic purpose. And that, observe the authors of the paper, is merely "senseless violence".

When a defining moment in the Afghan mission came with the announcement that British troops had expended a "million bullets" – and since have expended many more millions – without any indication that the mission is being successful, we are left with the impression that that is all we are achieving.

As we observed earlier, for things to change – if that is possible – the generals need to be put back in the box marked "tactics" and the politicians need to reclaim strategy from the grip of "operational art".

COMMENT THREAD

What if ... ?

As we get more embroiled in the Afghan venture, with strong hints that the UK is to commit yet more troops to the country – bringing our establishment up to 9,500 or thereabouts – and as we struggle to devise a credible exit plan, what if we have the strategic concept totally wrong, and we are trying to do the impossible?

In theory, at least, we are trying to create a "self-sustaining, stable and democratic Afghanistan", supporting the Kabul government and attempting to extend its writ across the whole of the "ungoverned space" that is resisting its rule.

For convenience, we label our attempts a "counter-insurgency" and identify our enemy – the enemy of Kabul – as the "Taleban", a generic title which covers a multitude of sins. And, in accordance with current counter-insurgency doctrine, we "win" when we convince enough of the population that their path to salvation lies with the government rather than the insurgents.

Then, according to that doctrine, the population turns on the insurgents, supports the government forces and thus enables to government to extend its rule, doing what governments are supposed to do, improving the prosperity of the people and their life chances.

But what if this is not a classic insurgency – as many people are saying, as indeed history tells us? And what if the "enemy" is not the "Taleban", as such – but a particular people, the Pashtuns? What if this is a nationalist movement, seeking to reunite a fragmented population spread across the border into Pakistan, into a single nation, and thereby throwing off the yoke of the Kabul government?

A clue that this might be the case was given by Major Mehar Omar Khan, but there are many, many more clues for those that wish to see them. Says Major Khan, what we are facing in Afghanistan is a "Pashtun Intifada". It is only "led" by bearded mullahs calling themselves "Taleban". Take out the Taleban and the insurgency will continue, he adds.

The sense of a wrong direction is reinforced today by a piece hosted by The Daily Telegraph, written by Vladimir Snegiryov, as a "special" for Russia Now.

Snegiryov, an Afghan specialist, tells us that the overwhelming majority of Afghans are absolutely indifferent – both to Communism and to the values of Western democracy – and reject any foreign interference. No one should be deceived, he says. Nato is only tolerated because, along with guns, its people are bringing bread and dollars.

It's a big mistake, Snegiryov warns, to think Nato is fighting terrorists in Afghanistan. The Taleban is an ideology that thousand of Afghans sympathise with, covertly or overtly. That's why, like 25 years ago when the Russians were seeking a way out, a military solution to this problem doesn't exist. Only 25 years ago, when Snegiryov's compatriots were fulfilling their "international mission", the "enemies" were called Mujahideen instead of Taleban.

In respect of the current phase of the conflict, however, Snegiryov is being too loose with his wording. We are not dealing with Afghans, but Pashtuns. The insurgency is a Pashtun uprising. We are fighting Pashtuns.

And, as Snegiryov and his Russian compatriots found out before us, and the coalition forces are now finding, they do not want us there. It does not matter what we do for them, what blandishments we offer them, they will never buy into our agenda. They have their own.

In fact, they have several agendas, because the Pashtuns are not a homogenous group. One thing for sure, they are peoples we do not understand and we thus have little chance of winning their "hearts and minds". And nor, as the Russians found, can we bomb them into submission. We need, it seems to me, completely to rethink our strategy.

COMMENT THREAD

Reclaiming the ground

Just as US defence secretary Robert Gates is calling for "calm and privacy" as Obama considers his next move on Afghanistan, across the Atlantic The Sun has chosen to ramp up the temperature, publishing yesterday an interview with General Sir Richard Dannatt, his first since retiring as Chief of the General Staff.

"We are fighting with one arm tied behind our back," says Sir Richard, who goes on to complain that prime minister Gordon Brown had refused "a plea" for 2,000 extra troops earlier this year.

With weary constancy, a Downing Street spokesman has denied Dannatt's charge, claiming that as a matter of "fact" that the 2,000 figure is false. Far from a direct "plea" as The Sun so graphically puts it, "ministers were presented with options" but none was ever for 2,000. The most we were asked for, says Downing Street, was 1,500 (from 8300 to 9800) of which the Army got 700.

On the face of it, there is nothing new in the Sun's story, the paper effectively reducing a retired General to a political pawn (although it is not clear who is using whom - probably a bit of both). The Dannatt view is: "If you're going to conduct an operation, you're doing it for one reason – to succeed." He thus claims that his aim has always been "to make sure we've got the right number of people with the right equipment, conducting successfully the mission the government has asked us to do."

For the moment, that "mission" is to develop a self-sustaining, stable and democratic Afghanistan. Within that, the Army's specific task is to "create a stable environment to enable the Afghan government extend its authority across the country and reconstruction and development to take place" – an extensive brief which is recognisably impossible to achieve within any defined timetable. It may well take generations to achieve.

In arguing that he wishes to "succeed", therefore, Dannatt is being more than a little disingenuous. As best, all the British Army can do – in concert with the 36 other nations that comprise ISAF – is achieve a degree of progress that brings the "mission" closer to completion.

To that end, the Army has considerable freedom to decide on what steps it will take. Senior officers – and especially the chiefs of staff - insist on maintaining the distinction between strategy and implementation, jealously guarding their right to initiate military operations without political interference. They are thus able to define what constitutes "success" by reference to objectives they, themselves, have set.

However – and especially in such a long-term and complex venture such as this – the distinction between grand strategy and the stages of implementation, including the definition of military strategy, is never precise. Dannatt, however, has insisted on a rigid division, not permitting the flexibility that the fluidity and uncertainties of the campaign demand. This has led to tension at the heart of government – and is at the heart of Dannatt's complaints of lack of support.

Shining a little light on this tension is Col Richard Kemp, commander of British forces in Afghanistan in 2003, who spoke at a fringe meeting at the Conservative party conference yesterday.

At the meeting, Kemp argued that Dannatt's public attacks were ultimately harming the military's cause in Whitehall, pointing out that: "It was incredibly dangerous for him to speak out when he was in office. He was a member of the Government team."

His action, said Kemp, "undermined the relationship between the military and the politicians," adding: "It's very easy for generals to point the finger at politicians and blame them, but decisions on defence taken at the highest levels are joint decisions. I don't think the military advice to ministers has always been the very best."

Putting that in the context of Afghanistan, what we have been seeing is the military, with Dannatt as it champion, unilaterally deciding on a level of operations which have required resources far beyond those available, leaving the Army dangerously exposed.

The point – and it is one that has not properly been identified – is that the Army has been dictating the pace of operations, resisting political constraints on their conduct, arguing that any such constitute interference in military operations. Having then created the situations in which the Army is struggling to maintain its momentum, Dannatt has been demanding more resources to complete what amount to self-appointed tasks.

Additional resources, however, have then been used to increase the pace of operations still further, leading to calls for still more resources. This has presented government with the dilemma of either committing to an open-ended cycle of reinforcement or seeking to restrain the exuberance of the military by denying it the resources it demands.

In fact, what the government is now attempting to do – and has been attempting for some time – is institute a bargaining process which it calls "conditionality".

Before permitting additional troops to be sent, it is thus demanding a clearer idea from the Army of its plans, and is seeking to force the Army to match manpower commitments with the flow of other resources – especially protected vehicles and helicopters. By this means, it is trying to restrain the Army's tendency to "crack on". It also wants to see a new Afghan government in place, ready to seize the initiative on corruption, and ready to send more Afghan troops to be trained and partnered by British troops.

What is happening therefore – in effect – is that the Army is being asked to cut its cloth according to the resources available, rather than devise in isolation an operational tempo that outstrips them, creating a need for more.

Refusing to accept this discipline, Dannatt has effectively taken the view that the role of the government is to support him unconditionally in implementing what he and his senior officers consider to be necessary to complete the "mission".

And, having not been goven what he wnats, he has broken ranks and been appealing directly to the media, a process he is continuing even after he has left office. And, having put the Army out on a limb, it is very easy to make what appears to be a powerful case for more resources.

The incoming CGS, General Sir David Richards – although imbued with much the same exuberance as his predecessor – is less inclined to break ranks and more disposed, as a team player, to accept the "conditionality" constraints.

Of course, there is another "player" in this convoluted game – the "enemy". Inconveniently, the disparate groups which have acquired the generic label of the "Taleban" have shown an unwillingness to conform with the strategic role set out for them, with their increased activity and tenacity driving the Army agenda.

But this is where the crucial issue of strategy comes in. Imbued with a conventional fighting ethos, instead of addressing the different and altogether more subtle dynamics of a counter-insurgency – the instinct of the Army has been identify an enemy and then hunt it down and engage it in battle. The presence and scale of the "enemy" has thus dictated the operational tempo and determined the level of resources required.

Enter another "uppity" general, Stanley McChrystal. His "take, hold, build" ideas are by no means new, but he offers the prospect of scaling back the objectives of the campaign by proposing only to take and hold the most populous areas. For that, though, he still feels an extra 40,000 troops are needed.

However, Henry Kissinger, architect of the US withdrawal from Vietnam, perhaps offers another pointer - in the current edition of Newsweek. He notes that military strategy is traditionally defined by control of the maximum amount of territory. That has indeed been the driver of the campaign to date.

But, he observes, the strategy of the guerrilla is to draw the adversary into a morass of popular resistance in which, after a while, extrication becomes his principal objective. In Vietnam, Kissinger recalls, the guerrillas often ceded control of the territory during the day and returned at night to prevent political stabilisation.

Therefore, he concludes, in guerrilla war, control of 75 percent of the territory 100 percent of the time is more important than controlling 100 percent of the territory 75 percent of the time. A key strategic issue, therefore, "will be which part of Afghan territory can be effectively controlled in terms of these criteria."

Gen McChrystal certainly would certainly agree with the premise that the territory held should be under complete control, but he is perhaps being too ambitious. We need to take a lead from Stephen Grey's precept of doing fewer things better.

One way of doing this was suggested by Major Mehar Omar Khan, who argued that the actual areas controlled only need to be modest. Just a few districts should be held. That is enough to achieve a long-term strategic effect, while also providing bases for the "counter-terrorism" component of the grand strategy.

This is the essence of a "third way" that is being considered in the halls of power, and could well resolve the tension between the militaries and their governments on both sides of the Atlantic. It would relieve the pressure on resources, while giving the military clear and achievable objectives.

First, of all, though, the generals must be put back in their boxes. The politicians must reclaim their lost ground and take charge of the military. Counter-insurgencies are not "wars" and their direction shouild not be militarily-led. They are essentially an exercise in practical politics. The political lead must be re-asserted.

COMMENT THREAD

The real debate emerges

On Afghanistan, the truth is that there are few differences between the two leaders [Brown and Cameron], says The Sunday Times. In fact, there are major differences – as we pointed out yesterday.

The Conservatives have very publicly bought-in to the McChrystal "strategy", agreeing (in principle) to more troops in theatre. The government is maintaining its more cautious "strategy first – then resources" stance. This leaves its options open, avoiding being left out on a limb if Obama comes up with a different strategy.

Quite how "political" the issue has become is brought home by two pieces in The Sunday Times. The first, from Christian Lamb, sketches out the political background, pointing out that there is now a clear divergence between Obama and McChrystal – something which the Conservatives have given no public signs of recognising.

The second piece is from columnist Andrew Sullivan, who underlines the difficulties president Obama faces in attempting to craft a strategy for the campaign in this troubled country.

"The near-impossible least-worst option remains maddeningly elusive," writes Sullivan. This is an Afghanistan after 30 years of violence, mayhem, brutality and anarchy. To believe that America can create a functioning, stable state in that context seems insane to him. Given America's fiscal crisis and profound public unease at deepening the commitment, a reckless bet on the future with a large increase in troops seems a definition of unwise.

He is worried about McChrystal's "all in or all out" analysis. It is not "quite right" he feels. Sketching out the consequences of both, Sullivan believes that, "In a moment of immense unpredictability and fluidity, it seems that muddling through for a while may be an unsatisfying but sensible option".

In support of this thesis, he cites Marc Lynch, "as shrewd a foreign policy analyst as exists in Washington," who argues: "Why choose between escalation or withdrawal at exactly the time when the political picture is at its least clear? Why not maintain a lousy Afghan government which doesn’t quite fall, keep the Taliban on the ropes without defeating it, cut deals where we can and try to figure out a strategy to deal with the Pakistan part, which all the smart set agrees is the real issue these days?"

Thus Lynch suggests focusing on applying the improved counterinsurgency tactics with available resources instead of focusing on more troops, If the American core objective in Afghanistan is to prevent its re-emergence as an al-Qaeda safe haven, or to prevent the Taleban from taking Kabul, those seem to be manageable at lower troop levels.

In other words, Sullivan avers, meticulously prepare for either the McChrystal counterinsurgency surge or a more low-key counterterrorism campaign. But right now, hold on to see what emerges. The time for a deep strategic call may not, in fact, be now. It will, for sure, be soon. But in wars and politics, timing is everything.

Where Sullivan may be being complacent though is in believing the Obama has time to play with. Separately reported by The Times are two incidents over the weekend in which ten US soldiers have been killed. They were stationed in remote outposts in the mountainous province of Nuristan, bordering on Pakistan and, in one of the incidents, where eight troops were killed, "scores" of insurgents are said to have stormed the outpost.

The presence of US soldiers is in part an implementation of Petraeus's "live amongst the people" doctrine, comprising the part of the "take and hold" strategy which McChrystal is advocating – and has been steadily rolled out since the arrival of fresh troop in May. Since then small packets of troops have been stationed, often in indefensible outposts throughout southern Afghanistan.

This is not the first time that relatively large numbers of US casualties have been taken in a single incident, with the New York Times currently reporting in the battle at Wannat in June 2008 when an outpost was almost overrun by 200 insurgents, costing nine American lives.

Time and again we are hearing that troop numbers are insufficient to complete the second half of the "take and hold" strategy. Having part implemented this strategy, McChrystal does not have enough resource to complete the next phase, leaving troops exposed and vulnerable. This situation is militarily and politically unsustainable.

There are already plans in place to withdraw garrisons from remote outposts in sparsely populated regions. These, in fact are already under way, where well-intentioned (or politically-driven) sallies into hostile territory are meeting with stiff resistance.

Under the current McChrystal "strategy", the plan is to concentrate troops in towns and cities, and therein lie the political fault-lines in Washington – as more will be needed than the current small-scale tactical withdrawals if massive reinforcements are not forthcoming.

Simon Tisdall writes in The Guardian of Kennedy and Vietnam parallels, and the challenge facing a young Democrat president. So, after a fleeting meeting between McChrystal and Obama – only the second time the pair have met – the political "game" is starting to be played for real.

Obama's national security adviser Gen James L Jones is now working to downplay the perceived importance of the McChrystal assessment, saying that it was just one part of a review of overall strategy that included such factors as a larger role for the Pakistani military and the integrity of the recent Afghan elections.

"It would be a mistake to underestimate the importance of other elements of the strategy," Gen Jones says, offering no endorsement of a recommendation for additional troops. He described McChrystal's recommendation as "his opinion" of "what he thinks his role within that strategy is." "The president should be presented with options, not just one fait accompli," he said. The general has been put back in his box. And now the real debate is getting under way – in Washington, if not London.

COMMENT THREAD

Thinking it through

The media, predictably, made great play of the intervention of Flight Lieutenant Victoria Anderton in the question session after General Stanley McChrystal's address to the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

"I'm actually going out to Kandahar to serve with the Tornado GR4s next year," she told the general, "and can I say how much more confidence I have now in my chain of command than I had after Prime Minister Gordon Brown was here a couple of weeks ago? " She then went on to thank him for his determined assurances that the campaign could be turned around and asked him if he was confident that he could transmit that attitude to Mr Brown and President Obama.

Whatever happened to "apolitical" one might have asked, that honourable tradition in the British Armed Forces, where serving members of the military do not discuss politics in public? Anderton might have enjoyed her brief notoriety but, with her pointed and highly political comment, rode rough-shod over a convention for which the military is rightly respected.

More to the point, it was a facile intervention from a young lady who did nothing more than demonstrate her own ignorance of the politics of an issue that is growing in complexity by the day.

McChrystal, of course, is a politician and, while wearing the uniform of a US Army general, his appearance in London was a highly political act, reinforced by later meetings with Gordon Brown and the leader of the opposition, David Cameron. He has a political case to make, one which is taking centre stage in Washington, where the issues have are being debated hotly and have yet to be resolved.

And, while Flt-Lt Anderton might be "confident" in McChrystal's analysis, there are many who are not. Three of those yesterday gave evidence to the US Senate foreign relations committee. All three warned of the failure of other countries' attempts to deal with Afghanistan in the past - including occupations by the Soviet Union and Britain – speaking against the McChrystal plan.

The first, Milt Bearden, is a former Central Intelligence Agency station chief in Islamabad. He spoke of the Soviets who had spent ten years in Afghanistan, with an average troop strength of 120,000. It was never, ever was enough to defeat that insurgency.

Bearden's view was that there would always be enough ethnic Pashtuns who viewed any foreign force as an occupation and who would engage US troops on the battlefield. "There is no, in my opinion, there is no possibility for the United States to provide enough troops in Afghanistan to pacify the situation," he said.

Another expert at the hearing, Maleeha Lodhi, a former Pakistani ambassador to the US, also said that a military escalation would be unlikely to succeed and would intensify rivalries in the region, such as the one between India and Pakistan.

Other negative consequences of a military surge could be an influx of militant and al-Qaida fighters into Pakistan. Furthermore, it could enhance the vulnerability of US and Nato ground supply routes throughout Pakistan, and would likely mean more Afghan refugees pouring into Pakistan. "It could endanger, erode and unravel the key public consensus that has been achieved in the past one year to fight the militancy," she said.

In his evidence, Steve Coll, President and CEO of The New America Foundation, suggested an alternative. The coalition should make it would make clear that the Taleban will never be permitted to take power by force in Kabul or major cities, he said.

"It would seek and enforce stability in Afghan population centres, but emphasize politics over combat, urban stability over rural patrolling, Afghan solutions over Western ones. And it would incorporate Pakistan more directly into creative, persistent diplomatic efforts to stabilize Afghanistan and the region," he added.

Under the chairmanship of John Kerry, these invited witnesses are obviously partisan, but it is not only Kerry's "chosen few" who are questioning McChrystal's megalomania. Published by Small Wars Journal, we have Mehar Omar Khan, "a Pakistani infantry officer who may soon end up being another name on an ever-growing list of the fallen soldiers in the war against terror".

Khan writes an impassioned plea for a different kind of strategy, under the title: "Don't Try to Arrest the Sea." What we are facing in Afghanistan is a "Pashtun Intifada". It is only "led" by bearded mullahs calling themselves "Taleban". Take out the Taleban and the insurgency will continue, he says.

While Gen McChrystal has his own agenda, he does, however, welcome the fact that there is a political debate underway, venturing the opinion that, even though it was taking time, the consequences of making a wrong decision were such that it was better to talk through the issues than rush into making a mistake.

The idea of a debate, though, was clearly above Flt-Lt Anderton's pay grade, with her having already decided to buy into the general's pitch. So too, it seems has UK foreign secretary David Miliband, who is urging Obama to "back his general", to a chorus of uncritical approval from Robert Fox of The Guardian who is accusing the US president of "dithering".

Nor indeed is the leader of the opposition expressing any concern about the general's line – which is hardly surprising since his shadow defence secretary seems to have bought into it. Mr Cameron, we are told, is ready to set up a "war Cabinet" to deal with the Afghan conflict if he wins the general election – thus displaying, perhaps, a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of the conflict. It is not a "war", as such, but a counterinsurgency, for which – it is rightly held – there is no military solution.

"Our military is at war in Afghanistan, but quite frankly, Whitehall isn't," says Cameron. But the fact that the military seems to be running the show, and considers itself "at war" is actually part of the problem. This is another person who does not seem to have been thinking it through.

COMMENT THREAD

Time is not on our side

It was at the end of August, or so we are led to believe, that president Obama received McChrystal's Afghan assessment report yet only yesterday has the White House started in earnest its strategy review. This is being done at senior official level, taking in video conference discussions with McChrystal in Kabul, and the debate is joined today by Obama, alongside vice president Joe Biden and secretary Gates.

Reading the runes, Obama seemed to be moving towards favouring the counter-terrorism strategy when he spoke yesterday of "dismantling, disrupting, destroying the al Qaeda network" as the mission, without mentioning the Taleban.

Emerging as an influential voice in the debate is failed presidential candidate John Kerry, now Senate foreign relations committee chairman. Not only was he at the White House last week, meeting with the vice president, he has been given the opportunity to express his views in the Wall Street Journal, in an authored opinion piece headed somewhat contentiously: "Testing Afghanistan Assumptions".

Referring to the McChrystal report, Kerry declares: "Now, we in Congress have our own assignment: to test all of the underlying assumptions in Afghanistan and make sure they are the right ones before embarking on a new strategy." Never more was it clear that the McChrystal "strategy" is not a done deal, and there is to be much political bloodshed before a resolution is reached.

As might be expected, Kerry rehearses the issues, with particular reference to the "deeply flawed presidential election last month", then noting that the debate so far has focused on absolute numbers - how many U.S. and allied troops are required, how many Afghan soldiers and police do we need to train, how many more billions must we pour into that impoverished country?

But, says Kerry, all the numbers are meaningless if the goal is ambiguous or the strategy is wrong. Before we send more of our young men and women to this war, we need a fuller debate about what constitutes success in Afghanistan. We need a clearer understanding of what constitutes the right strategy to get us there. Ultimately, we need to understand, as Gen Colin Powell was fond of asking, "What's the exit strategy?" Or as Gen David Petraeus asked of Iraq, "How does it end?"

Behind all this though, is the ghost of Vietnam, and Kerry brings it to the fore. One of the lessons from Vietnam, he says, is that we should not commit troops to the battlefield without a clear understanding of what we expect them to accomplish, how long it will take, and how we maintain the consent of the American people. Otherwise, we risk bringing our troops home from a mission unachieved or poorly conceived.

Hinting then at what will be the Democrat line, Kerry goes on to note that the McChrystal assessment "offers no timetable or exit strategy, beyond warning that the next 12 months are critical." He does not offer an alternative, but the marker is there. If McChrystal gets what he wants, or part of it, there will most likely be strings. It would be unsurprising if this was not precisely what Kerry is hinting at – an exit strategy and a fixed timetable. For the moment though, it is "wait and see". The Senator wants Obama to be given time and space to "test every assumption and examine every option."

The longer he leaves it, though, the greater the cost to Obama. Opinion is hardening and the different factions are shaping up for the fight of the century, which will make the insurgency in Afghanistan look like a walk in the park.

On the one hand, he appears to have the support of Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Nato secretary-general, who met Obama yesterday (pictured). ''The first thing is not numbers,'' says Ramussen, ''I agree with President Obama in his approach: strategy first, then resources,'' he said.

One the other hand, the Republicans are scenting blood. Another failed presidential bidder, Senator John McCain, is backing McChrystal, declaring that "time is running short." He argues for the president to approve the call for additional troops. If Obama fails to do so, it would "put the United States in much greater danger." "Time is not on our side," McCain emphasises, "so we need a decision pretty quickly."

One can see a political strategy emerging here. McCain says he thinks the drawn-out debate over the Afghan war policy in the United States "may be perceived by some of our allies in Europe and Pakistan and that region as a bit of weakness." Obama is being positioned to come across as weak and indecisive. Whatever decision he comes up with, if he leaves it too long, that will be the impression which gains traction.

COMMENT THREAD

Behind the curve

Those interested in the Afghan issue are doubtless aware of the recent McChrystal assessment report, and most will have either read the redacted copy or, at the very least, read one or more of the numerous media reviews of it.

Those who have done neither could, if they so wished, read the speech delivered today by Liam Fox to the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London.

With the working title, "Beyond the Smoke: Making Progress in Afghanistan", its substantive parts are unashamedly lifted from the McChrystal assessment report, comprising an evaluation of "three areas in the current struggle in Afghanistan". These are the role of the Afghan population in the war, capacity building of the Afghan Security Forces and the need to improve governance across Afghanistan.

Fox even admits the source, stating that they have been identified as priorities by the General, then somewhat rashly declaring that they form the basis of future strategy in Afghanistan.

Whether McChrystal was defining a strategy or simply a new (as applied to Afghanistan) tactical approach is moot, but the strategy comprises in essence the implementation of the "Integrated civil-military campaign plan", which goes well beyond the three areas enumerated by Fox.

Crucially though, Fox seems to have fallen into the trap (one of many) of assuming that the McChrystal assessment is a done deal. He is behind the curve, seemingly unaware that president Obama has not acted on it and, instead, has commissioned his own strategic review. Whether McChrystal's recommendations will become policy, therefore, remains a matter of speculation. They certainly cannot be taken as read.

The "game changer", of course, was the Afghan presidential election. It is recognised that any successful counterinsurgency requires a stable and legitimate political partner in the host country and, whether Karzai manages to cling on to power or not, there is general agreement that he will be weakened and that his administration will lack legitimacy.

On that basis, there are serious doubts as to whether the classic counterinsurgency strategy, advocated by McChrysal, can actually work. It was that which led Obama to commission his new review, from which an entirely different strategy might emerge.

Apparently completely oblivious to this development, Fox – in his only substantive reference to the election - states that it is "crucial" that it "must be seen to be credible and reflect the wishes of the Afghan people." This is wishful thinking beyond peradventure.

Thus, we are left with what amounts to a slavish adherence to the McChrystal creed, with not one scintilla of critical exploration. Fox's only concern is to ensure that the "strategy" is properly resourced. That much is picked up by The Times, which provocatively headlines: "Tories would send 2,500 more troops to Afghanistan, says Liam Fox".

The paper then reports that the shadow defence secretary had "indicated" that a Conservative government would increase British troop numbers in Afghanistan by up to 2,500 and deliver more helicopters, armoured vehicles and "other key battlefield enablers".

In what could have been an opportunity to set out a new direction for what is evidently a failing campaign, Fox has therefore sold the pass. Like so many before him, he pays lip-service to the received wisdom that the campaign cannot be resolved by a "military victory", but he then defines success as securing security – which of course he seeks to achieve by military means.

No one, it seems, can see the logical absurdity in this approach – least of all Fox. A military solution is not possible ... therefore we must seek a military solution. "The reconstruction will follow," says Fox. "The factors of prosperity, individual freedoms, and free markets ... may someday come to Afghanistan. We should do all we can to help this to happen but it will not happen overnight," he adds.

It does not dawn on him, the simple precept that the order might be reversed. Focus on economic reconstruction, build prosperity, and protect a people who then have a stake in their society and something to lose. Security will follow. In the final analysis, security comes not from the barrel of a gun – it comes from the will of the people. But then, that is probably too difficult for Fox to understand.

COMMENT THREAD

A deadly delay

Gradually, the British media is absorbing the implications of the McChrystal assessment, and the political ramifications surrounding it, and we are beginning to see some in-depth reports.

The Times for instance, is running a six-part series on Afghanistan, the latest dealing with the battle for "hearts and minds" on the home front, picking up on a theme it rehearsed in July.

The biggest challenge for the government, says this paper, is not how to beat the Taleban but how to keep the public at home onside. People tend to support the Armed Forces whatever they do but if there is any perception that British troops are dying in Afghanistan for no good reason the tide of opinion will turn.

Keeping people "onside" requires, at its most basis, a government which is able to offer a clear strategic direction and an indication that progress is being made, at an acceptable cost, with some prospect of an end in sight.

Defence secretary Bob Ainsworth, agrees that the government has to make clear the real reason why we need to be in Afghanistan. First and foremost, he then says, we must get security right so that we can prevent Afghanistan from once again becoming a haven for terrorism.

Only then does he moves on to tell us that building the Afghan state - its education and health services, alternative livelihoods to drugs and a strong legal system - will give the people a better future than the one offered by the Taleban.

The problem with that is that Ainsworth does not make a clear causal link between his assertions. A "secure" Afghanistan, he asserts, is necessary to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a haven for terrorists. He then asserts that building the Afghan state will give people a "better future" than the one offered by the Taleban, but he does not tell us that this condition is necessary to defeat the Taleban. We are left to assume that, as indeed we have to assume that achieving this desirable condition is conditional on achieving security.

The sequential relationship between establishing security and then building the Afghan state, however, seems to have lodged as the prevailing paradigm, with the greater problem that we appear to be stuck in stage one, as yet unable to establish the security on which everything else depends.

However, it is now readily acknowledged that defeating the insurgent – in this case the Taleban – and thus achieving security, depends entirely on gaining the support of the people. Yet, to gain the support of the people, it is necessary to give people a "better future" which, under the prevailing paradigm, demands that security is first achieved.

Expressed thus, this is something of a self-defeating task, unless overwhelming force can be brought to bear over a very short period of time, thus to secure an area and allow rapid improvements to be implemented, all with the aim of convincing Afghans that there is a prospect of a "better future".

This, presumably – and, in fact, almost certainly – is what McChrystal aims to achieve through his assessment. And, while he has not yet formally asked for more troops, we learn from The Washington Post that he is about to do so. That request, though, will be made to the Department of Defense, which has indicated that it will not immediately forward it to the White House, pending the current strategic review which is being conducted by the president.

Here, one can understand the dilemma in the White House. There is absolutely no guarantee that the McChrystal plan – such that it is – will actually work, or indeed any indication that it has any chance of working. Based on the Iraqi "surge" concept, there is in fact every chance that it will not.

Thus, one can see the attractions of trimming back the ambitions, turning away from a counterinsurgency strategy, where the focus is on the people, to a counterterrorism strategy where the focus is on killing the enemy – in this case al Qaeda. Unfortunately, as Captain's Journal makes abundantly clear, that strategy is unlikely to work either.

Torn between two equally unattractive prospects, therefore, the response of the White House has been delay. Since late August when McChrystal delivered his report to the president, there has been no progress. No decisions have been made and there is no indication that one is forthcoming. A dangerous strategic vacuum is building up, where troops on the ground are marking time, waiting for a decision – and action – that they believe will enable them to make progress.

That delay is the worst of all possible worlds, and it is being noticed. Richard Norton-Taylor of The Guardian writes that Gordon Brown and, "less characteristically" (his words, not mine), Barack Obama appear irresponsibly indecisive. US and UK military chiefs are tearing their hair out at the inability of their political masters and civil agencies to get a grip on the Afghan conflict.

If the home front needs signs of direction, firm leadership and progress, this indecision simply reinforces the sense of drift. As casualties mount – as they doubtless will – the frustration and uncertainty may yet spill over into outright hostility to the war, culminating in demands for complete withdrawal.

We are, in effect, on the road to nowhere and while, generally – in road safety terms – we are told that "speed kills", on this particular road the greater danger might be delay. But if the wrong decision is also likely to have fatal consequences, there is a problem building up of alarming proportions. An immediate decision might rebuild public confidence in the short-term but the longer-term cost might be strategic failure, with catastrophic effects on public sentiment.

Perhaps the real problem is, in fact, the focus on strategy without due consideration for tactics. We will have a look at this in a future post.

COMMENT THREAD

Leaving it a bit late

It is the New York Times that is now telling us that Obama is exploring alternatives to a major troop increase in Afghanistan. The process includes considering a plan advocated by vice president Biden to scale back American forces and focus more on rooting out al Qaeda there and in Pakistan.

This amounts to a "wholesale reconsideration" of a strategy the president announced with fanfare just six months ago, helpfully summarised by Newsweek. That strategy involved defeating the insurgents, preventing Al Qaeda from re-establishing a sanctuary and working to set up a democratic and effective government.

Crucially, it also involved training Afghan forces to take over from US troops and coaxing the international community to give more help. There was also an added element, focusing on Pakistan - "assisting efforts to enhance civilian control and stable constitutional government in Pakistan and a vibrant economy that provides opportunities for the people of Pakistan."

In pursuit of the Afghan end of what became known as the AFPAK strategy, Obama agreed to despatch an additional 17,000 troops to the theatre and then another 4,000 to help train Afghan security forces. And it was that strategy which Gen McChrystal took as his brief, working to produce his "assessment" of how it should be implemented.

What has actually confused the issue is that McChrystal writes extensively about needing a new strategy. In fact, the strategy had already been determined. What he has offered is a "significant change in ... the way we think and operate."

As we know, the essence of this "significant change" is defined as "take, hold and build", the first step having been achieved in part with the 17,000 extra troops. But now the coalition forces have taken more territory, McChrystal finds – as he always would – that he needs more troops to hold it. The figure of 30-40,000 has been mentioned.

Now – or so it would seem – Obama is having to confront the inevitable consequence of a strategy defined last March, which effectively rubber-stamped what Bush had put in place, and is now having second thoughts. Thus do we learn that Obama met with his top advisers on 13 September to "begin chewing over the problem", only to find no consensus – in fact, quite the reverse. "There are a lot of competing views," said one official.

Major factors which have prompted the second thoughts, though, are deteriorating conditions on the ground, the messy and still unsettled outcome of the Afghan elections and McChrystal's own report. However, there is view that Obama might just be testing assumptions — and assuring liberals in his own party that he was not rushing into a further expansion of the war — before ultimately agreeing to additional troops.

This notwithstanding, the debate seems to have polarised into two separate camps, on the one hand a counterinsurgency strategy – on which basis McChrystal has been working - and, on the other, a focus on counterterrorism. The latter is not dissimilar to that advocated by George F. Will known as "offshore balancing" which, as the New York Times observes, "would turn the administration's current theory on its head'.

Given that in May, Gen David D McKiernan was replaced by Gen McChrystal, who was empowered to carry out the "new" strategy, McChrystal can perhaps feel aggrieved by now having his assessment second-guessed at this late stage, after so much effort and energy has gone into responding to the original brief and the strategy has been partially implemented.

The "game changer" though appears to have been the Afghan presidential election, which has undermined the administration's confidence that it had a reliable partner in Karzai. As Bruce O. Riedel – the man who led the AFPAK strategy review – observes, "A counterinsurgency strategy can only work if you have a credible and legitimate Afghan partner. That's in doubt now."

Obama, says the NYT, now has to reconcile past statements and policy with his current situation. And, says former Defense Secretary William S. Cohen, "The longer you wait, the harder it will be to reverse it." In fact, Obama has left it a bit late now to question the very basis on which McChrystal was working, when strategy issues should have been settled from the outset – as indeed they appeared to have been.

COMMENT THREAD

Political games

Yesterday, confronted with the McChrystal assessment for the first time, we took the document at face value, starting on a process of review and analysis which is far from complete.

More than 24 hours later though, the document – seen through the prism of US political analysts – looks very different. From Spencer Ackerman of the Washington Independent, we see that the review itself is far from a neutral military appraisal of the situation on Afghanistan, and that the circumstances and the timing of the leak have strong political dimensions.

Via James Joyner of the Atlantic Council, we see the view expanded that the leak was an attempt "to box President Obama in to a static request for more U.S. troops and dare him to refuse his chosen commander’s recommendations", with a strong suspicion that the military was behind the leak.

I make no apologies for what might seem to a US observer as a certain naivety in my work so far. Firstly, it is difficult enough to get a grip with British politics and the subtleties of US politics are a minefield for the outside observer – we only need to see the mess US commentators make trying to understand British and European politics to see the pitfalls.

Secondly, with a complex document such as the McChrystal assessment, thrust into a highly political environment, the only way to evaluate it properly is to start at the beginning, and take it stage-by-stage, unpeeling it like an onion to reveal the inner workings.

What is amusing to see though is that while McChrystal deliberately plays down the resource (i.e., more troops) issue, putting strategy at the top, either he or the authors of the leak seem to understand the media all too well, fully expecting the Washington Post to focus on the need for reinforcements.

All it then needed was to rely on the coprophagic tendencies of the rest of the media to spread the word and, within a very short time, "more troops" would become the only game in town, the hope being to bounce Obama into giving the go-ahead for another 30,000 "boots on the ground". Predictably, the media fell for it, either not realising or perhaps not caring that they have been well and truly manipulated.

Looking in more detail at the assessment document, the view is beginning to gel that, although McChrystal is arguing for a new strategy, he is actually not offering one.

It was Herschel Smith of the admirable Captains Journal who started me thinking, when he remarked that counterinsurgency (COIN) was not a "strategy", per se. Rather, it is a collection of tactics. Thus, when McChrystal calls for a COIN strategy, he is actually defining a need to do things in a different way, but is not setting out any strategic concepts, the lack of which is dogging the Afghan campaign.

It was pointed out on our forum that the assessment bears some resemblance to the Briggs Plan of 1950, which shaped the Malaya campaign, and indeed it does. What is missing though is the all-important framework of the civilian role, in which context the military is supposed to be subordinate to the civilian power.

The McCrystal assessment, by contrast – and inevitably – is militarily orientated, which is what you expect from an army general. That notwithstanding, the Briggs Plan was framed by Lieutenant General Sir Harold Briggs, then retired, afterwards to become Director of Operations in Malaya.

Briggs, it seems, was able to transcend his military background. McChrystal, it seems, has not. What we have, on the face of it, is not a new strategy but simply a rag-bag of new tactics and a re-appraisal of tactical priorities.

One hates to concede that Paddy Ashdown (pictured) might have a point, but he is currently arguing for a proper political strategy for Afghanistan to support the military intervention in the country.

He has half a point – we need a proper political strategy, but not to support the military intervention. The military intervention should support the political strategy, and thus needs to be defined within the overall framework of a political strategy – not the other way around.

Emerging from the Malaya campaign were two basic precepts. Firstly, the government had to give priority to defeating political subversion, not the guerrillas. Secondly, to succeed, counterinsurgency efforts had to meet the true grievances of the people better than the insurgents.

McChrystal partially acknowledges these requirements, but he does not really spell out how they will be achieved, and it is not for the military to say. What we are missing, therefore, is that all-important civilian dimension, around which the military effort should be focused. All we are left with is a call for more troops. We have been had.

COMMENT THREAD

We can defeat ourselves

That is the blunt assessment from General Stanley McChrystal, the senior US commander in Afghanistan, in his aptly-named "assessment report" leaked by The Washington Post.

"The situation in Afghanistan is serious," he writes. "Neither success nor failure can be taken for granted." And, "although considerable effort and sacrifice have resulted in some progress," he adds, "many indicators show that the situation is deteriorating."

McChrystal sees three major problems, and he does not distinguish in importance between them. There is "a resilient and growing insurgency", but there is also "a crisis of confidence among Afghans" – in both their government and the international community. That undermines our credibility and emboldens the insurgents. Thirdly, there is "a perception that our resolve is uncertain makes Afghans reluctant to align with us against the insurgents."

Despite that, McChrystal believes that success is achievable. And in a single sentence, he injects a degree of realism that may yet make it happen, cutting through the cant and false optimism that we have been hearing for so long. That success "will not be attained simply by trying harder or 'doubling down' on the previous strategy."

The general concedes that additional forces are necessary but, he writes, "focussing on force or resource requirements misses the point entirely." The "key take away from this assessment", he declares, "is the urgent need for a significant change in our strategy and the way we think and operate."

There is no mistaking this phrasing. No matter how much the media – and anyone else - might spin it, McChrystal puts strategy as his first priority, his "key take away". To focus on force or resource requirements "misses the point entirely". You cannot get clearer than that but, just in case there is any doubt, he later adds: "... it must be made clear: new resources are not the crux."

NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), McChrystal avers, requires a new strategy which is credible to, and sustainable by, the Afghans.

When it comes to resources, he frames this carefully, stating that the strategy must be "properly resourced" but he links this with the requirement that it must be executed "through an integrated civilian-military counterinsurgency campaign that earns the support of the Afghan people and provides then with a secure environment."

There is no room for debate here either. McChrystal is making it clear that this is a "civilian-military" effort. He is not talking about the military winning the fight on its own.

Nevertheless, McChrystal concedes that the campaign in Afghanistan has been historically under-resourced, and "remains so today". ISAF, we writes, "is operating in a culture of poverty". Consequently, it requires more forces, well in excess of those which can be achieved by efficiency gains.

But, he admits, those greater resources will not be sufficient to achieve success. They will merely enable the implementation of the new strategy. Conversely, though, "inadequate resources will likely result in failure". Then, again emphasising the primacy of strategy, he declares "without a new strategy, the mission should not be resourced".

There is no messing here. Strategy comes first, then it must be resourced. Without the right strategy, there should be no resources, but without the resources, the "likely" result is failure. And the result of that, inevitably, must be withdrawal. McChrystal is effectively saying, change the strategy or pull out.

As expected, he lays great emphasis on growing and improve the effectiveness of the Afghan National Security Forces (ASNF), but he adds that the coalition must "elevate the importance of governance."

But then, in a clear change of direction, he notes that, in a country as large and as complex as Afghanistan, ISAF "cannot be strong everywhere". Therefore, we must, he writes, "prioritise resources in those areas where the population is threatened, gain the initiative from the insurgency and signal unwavering commitment to see it through to success."

Interestingly, McChrystal also devotes considerable space to looking at the nature of the "fight". We will look at these observations in detail in a separate post but, in summary, he tells us that we must redefine the nature of the fight, clearly understand the impacts and importance of time, and change our operational culture.

This is a different kind of fight, he states. It is not an annual cyclical campaign of kinetics driven by an insurgent "fighting season". Rather, it is a year-round struggle, often conducted with little apparent violence, to win the support of the people. Protecting the population from insurgent coercion and intimidation demands a persistent presence and focus that cannot be interrupted without risking serious setback.

As if that was not problematical enough, we are told that the coalition must conduct classic counterinsurgency operations in an environment that is uniquely complex. Three regional insurgencies have intersected with a dynamic blend of local power struggles in a country damaged by 30 years of conflict. This makes for a situation which defies simple solutions or quick fixes. Success demands a comprehensive counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign.

As to the strategy, it cannot be focused on seizing terrain or destroying insurgent forces; our objective must be the population. In the struggle to gain support of the people, every action we take must support this effort. The population also represents a powerful actor that can and must be leveraged in this complex system. Gaining their support will require a better understanding of peoples choices' and needs.

Within that, there is both a short and long-term fight. The long-term fight will be decisive. Failure to gain the initiative and reverse insurgent momentum in the near term (next 12 months) – while Afghan security capacity matures – risks an outcome where defeating the insurgency is no longer possible.

And then we get some serious candour, Formidable as the threat may be, McChrystal says we make the problem harder. ISAF is a conventional force that is poorly configured for COIN, inexperienced in local languages and culture, and struggling with challenges inherent to coalition warfare. These intrinsic disadvantages are exacerbated by our current operational culture and how we operate.

Pre-occupied with protection of our own forces, we have operated in a matter that distances ourselves – physically and psychologically – from the people we seek to protect. In addition, we run the risk of strategic defeat by pursuing tactical wins that cause civilian casualties or unnecessary collateral damage.

The insurgents, he concludes, cannot defeat us militarily but we can defeat ourselves. How McChrystal thinks we can avoid that, we will look at in more detail in successive posts.

COMMENT THREAD

Missing the point

The Washington Post has obtained a copy of Gen Stanley McChrystal's 66-page "assessment report" on Afghanistan. On the back of that, it headlines: "More Forces or 'Mission Failure'" with the strap: "Top US Commander For Afghan War Calls Next 12 Months Decisive". The lead paragraph of a long article written by Bob Woodward then tells us:

The top US and NATO commander in Afghanistan warns in an urgent, confidential assessment of the war that he needs more forces within the next year and bluntly states that without them, the eight-year conflict "will likely result in failure."

To give him his due, though, Woodward then goes on:

McChrystal makes clear that his call for more forces is predicated on the adoption of a strategy in which troops emphasize protecting Afghans rather than killing insurgents or controlling territory. Most starkly, he says: "[I]nadequate resources will likely result in failure. However, without a new strategy, the mission should not be resourced."

This last sentence is the nub of McChrystal's report. As it stands, the coalition forces are doing more harm than good, and are losing the war. Thus, in his report, he says: Success is achievable but it will not be attained simply by trying harder or "doubling down" on the previous strategy.

He then goes on to write that: "Additional forces are necessary, but focussing on force or resource requirements misses the point entirely. The key take away from this assessment is the urgent need for a significant change in our strategy and the way we think and operate."

The British media seems to be slow on the uptake, with the BBC first out of the traps with its report. Now look at the way it handles the issue. It tells us:

The US mission in Afghanistan will "likely result in failure" unless troops are increased within a year, the top general there has said in a report. He recently called for a revised military strategy in Afghanistan, suggesting the current one is failing.

This was followed by The Times which told us: "America and Nato's top military commander in Afghanistan has warned in a secret report that he needs more troops and a new strategy or his mission will probably end in failure."

You can bet that, when the rest of the media catches up, there will be heavy emphasis on "resources" – i.e., more troops - and much less on the need for a new strategy. Very little, I suspect, will be said of McChrystal's caveat, that "without a new strategy, the mission should not be resourced."

For what it is worth, that has been the consistent stance of the British government, which it is why it has resisted the siren calls of the "generals" and the media for more "boots on the ground". The case for more resources is not denied, but they have to be used properly, within the context of a well-founded strategic framework.

To date, the British military have not been able to offer anything like a coherent strategy, even within its own area of operation, as indicated by the tenor of the constant media briefing that we see in the British media. The emphasis throughout has been on more resources. There has been next to no discussion on strategy and, in fact, Stirrup's official "take" is that "the strategy in Afghanistan is the right one."

McChrystal now gives the lie to that, but there is little expectation of the media focusing on that. As with Iraq, the military will be the last to acknowledge that they got it wrong and their pals in the media will back them to the hilt.

The fact is though, that the most recent government (i.e., political) stance of not reinforcing failure has been the correct one. It had always been the intention to wait for the McChrystal review and then make decisions as to force levels on the basis of the strategic appreciation.

Now, it remains to be seen whether the coalition can absorb and deal with McChrystal's recommendations, and indeed whether he has got his priorities right and has offered a successful strategy. We will look at this in a more detailed post.

COMMENT THREAD

Yon is wrong

A new piece from Michael Yon is usually followed by a rush of e-mails in my inbox, alerting me to the fact. On this one, however, there has been something of a hush. Perhaps it is because Yon writes:

Having just spent another month with British forces in Helmand, today I am on my own in the same province. During the last month, our great allies the British lost dozens of soldiers who were killed or wounded. Cooperation from locals is almost nonexistent in many places. Interaction between civilians and British soldiers was nearly zero. The British treat the civilians very well, but being polite and respectful is not enough.

Without significant reinforcements, the British likely will be defeated in Helmand within a couple of years. My respect for British soldiers is immense. I have been in combat with them many times in Iraq and Afghanistan, including during the last couple of weeks and would go into battle with them today. Yet it must be said that the average British soldier has practically no understanding of counterinsurgency.

It is that last sentence that is the giveaway. Yon is allowed to applaud British soldiers – which he has been doing, wholeheartedly, awarding them fulsome praise. But he is not allowed to criticise them.

Correspondence with an expert watcher of the British Army on this elicited the comment that, "The problem is of course not so much British soldiers have no understanding of counter-insurgency but, disastrously, neither do their officers - even very senior ones. And that is why we are losing Helmand".

To that, I would substitute, in the phrase "even very senior ones", the word especially, and I would also include the Americans. No insurgency is the same, and counter-insurgency tactics must embrace the particular circumstances of each conflict. In that, it has often been said that Afghanistan is not Iraq. But we are seeing some of the same ideas which have been applied in Iraq being advocated for Afghanistan. They will not necessarily work.

Neither, incidentally, is Afghanistan the same as Northern Ireland, nor Malaysia, nor Oman – or even Rhodesia in the 1970s. There may be common principles that can be applied, but they will only have effect within the context of a well-structured strategic framework. And that is what is missing.

Afghanistan is primarily an agricultural country. Upwards of 80 percent of the country relies on the rural economy. Michael Yon, with the authority of "being there" characterises the country as "one of the most backward, violent places on Earth". He thus declares that it "will require a century before a reasonable person can call Afghanistan a 'developing nation'."

Yon is wrong. He is deceived by appearances, which can be and are misleading. Afghanistan is in fact, a complex and highly sophisticated country. For sure, there is grinding poverty and the country is dealing with the devastating effects of the Communist takeover in 1978 and the 30-years of unrest that followed it, but the vestiges of the societal and economic structures remain.

Principally, the agricultural economy remains and in coping with the turmoil and lack of security, the collective responses of the farming community have been both rational and remarkably sophisticated – far more so than the economically illiterate blundering of the Western powers and the aid agencies.

In Helmand, a province that was noted in pre-communist times for its wheat and cotton – and a wide variety of other products – farmers have adapted to the new crop of opium and, in a space of a few years, have not only broken productivity records but developed and sustained a multi-billion dollar industry in the face of official disapproval and multifarious incentives to discontinue it.

Furthermore, this "backward" nation has taken on the richest, best armed and militarily sophisticated nation on earth and is running it ragged, at the same time maintaining its own propaganda effort – on a shoestring – the like of which would be the envy of Madison Avenue, if it was harnessed to commercial ends.

As to our conduct of the counter-insurgency, Rupert Smith describes this activity as a "war amongst the people", with the prize being the people themselves. But, who are these "people" in Afghanistan?

In round terms, of course, the "people" are farmers. And it is my thesis that farmers are farmers throughout the world, whether Pashtuns, East Anglian barley barons or Japanese beef farmers. Their calling transcends nationality, ethnic background and religion. They are "wired" differently from the rest of us - they have their own universal "ethos". Treat them like farmers and they will respond.

The Pashtuns are farmers. And therein lies the problem. The Army doesn't understand farmers. Difid and the FCO do not understand farmers. And if they don't understand farmers, they are not going to win "hearts and minds". The counter-insurgency programme is going nowhere.

Here, though, the greater problem is that a little bit of something is not better than nothing. Everything the coalition powers do in Afghanistan makes the situation, on balance, worse. And the harder they try, the worse they make it. The campaign breaches the primary rule of warfare: "don't lose".

In his latest piece, Yon says the Afghan war is one we can't afford to lose. There, he is right. But we are losing it and, as it stands, with billions of dollars draining into the sand to no effect – and worse – we can't afford to win it either. Urgently – desperately urgently – we need to find a way of winning, at a price we and the Afghans can afford. And the answer, as has been said before, lies in the soil.

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