U.S. Policy Toward Algeria as a Case Study for the Egypt Crisis

By Barry Rubin

Two former ambassadors and several current and former U.S. diplomats have written me agreeing with my warnings regarding Egypt. One of them made the following remarks which I have heavily paraphrased.

After the 1991 elections in Algeria, in which the Islamic Salvation Front won 47 percent in the first round and was headed toward taking power, the army canceled the election and established a military junta as the government.

The U.S. government discussed the issue and decided to do nothing, remembering the Iranian experience and understanding that "one man, one vote, one time" for a radical Islamist regime was neither a great triumph for democracy or in the U.S. interest.

The U.S. hands-off policy toward Algeria during the civil war was a great success. The civil war was a horrible tragedy and both sides committed atrocities. But there was no way America could have prevented or mitigated this situation. The Algerian government appreciated the U.S. stance and its policies became a lot less extremist and hostile.

Some elements in the U.S.government wanted to push the Algerian government into negotiations with the Islamists and a coalition to emerge. The French government, which was taking the lead, was strongly opposed to this as were a number of U.S. officials. Among those supporting bringing in the Islamists was Robert Malley, today head of the International Crisis Group and an advocate for Hamas, Hizballah, Iran, and Syria. 

The U.S. government decided to stay out of it and, while no bed of roses (except for the thorns), the Algerian situation has turned out as well as could be expected.

While the United States has more leverage in Egypt than it had in Algeria, ability to affect events there is limited. Still, attempts to force that government into open elections--the approach that brought civil war to Algeria--and a totally different regime would be a big mistake, paid for in Egyptian blood and American interests.

Optional reading:

PS: As a check on Europe, consider the debate in the Netherlands. Today, two members of parliament--one conservative and one left-liberal--appeared on television and agreed on everything: Mubarak's era is over; democratic change is here; events are comparable to Eastern Europe in 1989.

The Labor party guy said this shows all the talk for years about the radical Islamist threat is false. On the other hand though, if the West doesn't side with the democratic forces a small minority of radicals (sic) would hijack the situation. Both agreed that Europe was very "guilty" because of having supported Mubarak for such a long time.

And the Labor party man got in the view that the United States had no need of having Israel as an ally any more because it didn't want to talk to the Palestinians (after two years when Israel has been seeking talks and the Palestinian Authority has refused!).

New publications

Two new books have been published:

1. Barry Rubin, editor, Conflict and Insurgency in the Contemporary Middle East is in my Middle East Military Studies series from Routledge.  There are a lot of good studies in the book of recent wars in the region (of which there are all too many) by an international cast of authors. See table of contents at the end. To order

2. Barry Rubin, editor, Lebanon Liberation, Conflict, and Crisis is published by Palgrave-Macmillan and is very timely examining the modern history, politics, culture, and international relations of Lebanon See table of contents at end.  To order

Inquiries about review copies and publicity materials welcomed.

Also you can read my article Barry Rubin, "U.S. Middle East Policy: Too Many Challenges and Yet a Single Theme," in the 2009/II issue of Orient, pp. 4-12.

Details.

1. CONFLICT AND INSURGENCY IN THE MODERN MIDDLE EAST

Barry Rubin, editor

Chapter 1: Barry Rubin, “What Do Middle Eastern Armies Do?”
Chapter 2 Norvell B. DeAtkine, “Why Arab Armies Lose Wars but Defeat Insurgencies”
Chapter 3 Joana Dodds and Benjamin Wilson, “The Iran-Iraq War: Will Without Means”
Chapter 4: Hassan Mneimneh, “The Lessons of the Jihadist Insurgency in Saudi Arabia”
Chapter 5: Barry Rubin, “Egypt’s Civil War”
Chapter 6: Boaz Ganor, “Terrorism as a Military Factor: the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process Era, 1993-2000”
Chapter 7: Jonathan Spyer, “Lebanon 2006: Unfinished War”
Chapter 8 Antoine Badran “Lebanon’s Militia Wars”
Chapter 9: Lester Grau, “The Soviet-Afghan War: A Superpower Mired in the Mountains”
Chapter 10: Jacob Mundy, “The Morocco-Polisario War for Western Sahara, 1975-1991”
Chapter 11: Yahia Zoubir, “Islamism and Insurgency in Post-Independence Algeria”
Chapter 12: William McCallister, “Iraq and U.S. Military Doctrine”
Chapter 13: James Russell, “Innovation and War: The U.S. Military and the Iraq Insurgency”


2. Barry Rubin, editor, Lebanon Liberation, Conflict, and Crisis

Chapter 1: William Harris, “Reflections on Lebanon”
Chapter 2 : Eli Fawuz, “What Makes Lebanon a Distinctive Country?”
Chapter 3 : Tony Badran, “Lebanon’s Militia WarsMilitary Conflicts in Lebanese Politics
Chapter 4: William Harris, “Lebanon’s Roller Coaster Ride”
Chapter 5: Mark Farha, “Demographic Dilemmasy and Democracy in Lebanon”
Chapter 6 : Charles Freund, “Lebanon’s Culture: Popular Music as a Case Study
Chapter 7: Nimrod Raphaeli, “Lebanon’s Economy between Violence and Political Stalemate
Chapter 8: Gary Gambill, “Islamists Groups in Lebanon: A Survey
Chapter 9: Eyal Zisser, “Hizballah’s Strategy: Islamist Revolutionary or Arab Nationalist Patriot Hizballah in Lebanon: Between Tehran and Beirut, between the Struggle with Israel, and the Struggle for Lebanon”
Chapter 10: Omri Nir, Lebanese Shi’a as a Political Community
Chapter 11: Jonathan Spyer, “Israel and Lebanon: Problematic Proximity”
Chapter 12: David Schenker, “America and the Lebanon Issue