Command Blocklist Bypass Allows Arbitrary Command Execution

[jip-0-0-0-0-0]

The current validation only checks the first token of a command, allowing an attacker to bypass restrictions by appending dangerous commands with shell separators. For example, an input like:

echo "safe"; sudo rm -rf /important/data

passes validation but then executes the forbidden sudo command. This could lead to arbitrary command execution. Consider enhancing the validation logic to inspect the entire command string or avoid using shell: true in command execution.

[wonderwhy-er]

Thanks, will be done

[wonderwhy-er]

I think we fixed that in this release
https://github.com/wonderwhy-er/DesktopCommanderMCP/releases/tag/v0.1.35

Feel free to test and if you find some gaps report them again.
Thanks for your report!