Military

by RADM Paul F. Sullivan, USN

The Summer of 2004 will mark a critical milestone for submarine building, not only because the two most capable submarines ever launched - USS Jimmy Carter (SSN-23) and USS Virginia (SSN-774) - will enter service, but also because it will see the end of a five and one-half year gap in commissioning submarines. Never before in the history of the Submarine Force have we had so long a period without a new submarine entering the fleet.

The same way that the National Command Authority (NCA) asks, "Where's the nearest aircraft carrier?" during military crises, we're asking ourselves increasingly, "Where's the nearest submarine?" For Sailors in the fleet today, tasked with more missions than they can possibly support, the answer may be half a world away, en route to relieve on station. In terms of time, the answer for shipyard personnel may be the summer of 2004 - or for a fleet CINC, 24 to 48 hours - the time it can take to get an SSN into position to monitor a developing crisis. In any event, the nearest submarine is too far away for me in both time and distance. It will be too long before our next submarine finishes construction - and today at sea, the nearest submarine may be too far from the next hot spot, because we're spread too thin. Today there are 55 SSNs and 18 SSBNs in operation. In contrast, when I was commissioned in 1970, we had 144 submarines, including 103 SSNs and SSs and - significantly - "41 for Freedom" SSBNs. Since that time, we have closed the chapter of our nation's history known as the Cold War and marked a major turning point in shifting our focus away from mostly deep-water ASW deployments to more engagements with allied navies, special operations, strike missions, and most importantly, surveillance and reconnaissance in theaters world-wide. These are not new missions. These are things that the Submarine Force has done for a long time. But we didn't do as many of them in the midst of the Cold War.

Navy Core Themes
Any discussion of force level needs to be grounded in an appreciation of the Navy's core themes, so I'd like to review them quickly first. Let's start with the requirements: What do we need submarines to do in terms of their capabilities - and how many do we need today and in the future? The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) is currently trying to answer those questions for the entire military. As part of the Navy's QDR effort, a set of themes has emerged to define our service's role within the joint warfighting team as a whole. These themes are:

. Command of the seas
. Combat-credible presence
. Assured sustainable access
. Enabling the "transformation" of joint operations

Command of the Seas
Since the beginnings of our Navy, we have been charged to protect America's trade and the physical security of our allies. Today, with 99 percent of the world's trade volume and 64 percent of its value moved by sea, it should be clear that our economy is, and will continue to be, closely tied to the oceans. What would it be like if the Strait of Hormuz were closed? During the 1973-74 oil embargo, when the U.S. lost access to about 14 percent of the world's oil supply, there was a four percent increase in U.S. unemployment, a 48 percent devaluation of the S&P 500 stock index, and a six percent decline in the Gross Domestic Product. As a nation we cannot afford to let anyone deny us or our allies unrestricted access to strategic seas, and submarines have a proven history of effectively interdicting the forces of any nation who would deny our warships or trade vessels free passage.

Combat Credible Presence - U.S. Sovereign Power Overseas
Each U.S. warship is a sovereign entity, so there are no restrictions on when we decide to conduct flight operations from an aircraft carrier or position a naval show of force in international waters. This gives the Navy a unique role in preventing conflicts or joining them early on. With approximately one-third of our Navy forward-deployed today, we can back up our nation's words with on-scene combat capability. This is what presence is all about. Just the threat of an SSN off its coast may be enough to keep a belligerent country's navy in port, and the mere knowledge that an SSBN is on patrol can keep the peace and prevent war. We are there, and we are ready.

Assured Sustainable Access
Many countries defend their borders by employing anti-access strategies that incorporate a number of layered sensors and weapons. Coastal cruise missiles, mines, radar pickets, and diesel submarines in littoral waters are a few examples of the threats that can be arrayed to discourage access to particular regions. Who but submarines can gather intelligence data on these defenses and monitor them 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, for months at a time? Who else can gain entrance, despite an anti-access strategy, and operate deep inside denied areas with negligible risk to platform and crew?

Out of Sight - Not Out of Mind. The 18 Ballistic missile submarines currently in operation continue to play an integral role in strategic deterrence and the mere knowledge, that an SSBN is on patrol can keep the peace and prevent war.

But access is also about positioning sensors and weaponry where they can be most effective, long before a conflict ever begins. Stealth affords us the opportunity to place a full load of weapons within range of targets deep inside the enemy's borders without his knowledge and without being provocative - and if necessary, employ mine countermeasures, strike, or ASW capabilities to foreclose his options. Submarines can force the door open - and hold it open - for the joint team.

Working Together - Transforming Joint Operations
In transforming the joint force to prevail in the combat scenarios of the new century, the Submarine Force will be a key participant in achieving "full spectrum dominance" - with freedom to operate in all domains - sea, land, air, space, and information. Getting connected with network-centric warfare and placing a high priority on land attack are two areas where submarines are aiding the transformation. Here's a scenario showing how submarine stealth and combat capability will support the joint team:

Imagine being at periscope depth, well inside the enemy's layered defensive shield, during the prelude to a conflict. Your mission includes real-time photo reconnaissance of a beach for a landing which will occur tomorrow by Marines in the amphibious ready group. The Marines on the LHA have a remote, real-time view through your periscope from the same vantage point they will have during the landing. Three weeks of continuous surveillance using unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs) deployed from your ship have already determined that the approach to this and four other possible landing sites are free of mines. Suddenly a call-for-fire is received, directing the ship to launch a Tactical Tomahawk (TACTOM) on an artillery/SAM battery targeted by a team of Army Rangers - positioned as forward observers for an air assault - who are under attack. Yours is the only platform close enough to put timely ordnance on the target with impunity. Five minutes later the missile is away, and discussions about the landing resume.

The SSGN Option. One near-term option for addressing the growing mismatch within the Submarine Force between requirements and assets involves converting four Ohio-class submarines to an SSGN configuration. This would allow each of them to carry up to 154 Tomahawk land attack missiles (TLAM) and deploy 66 SEALS or Marines through two nine-man diver lockouts.

As the vehicle for achieving the vision inherent in the Navy's core themes, the five key priorities of Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Vern Clark have been actively emphasized by the Submarine Force: manpower, current readiness, future readiness, quality of service, and alignment of words and deeds. I'd like use the remainder of my space here to focus on just one of the CNO's priorities.

Future Readiness
Because it wasn't based on real peacetime presence requirements and clearly needed further study, we have long decried the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review's decision to reduce the number of attack submarines to 50. Now that we are almost down to that level, with 55 SSNs today, the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets are both facing the reality of that misjudgment. Last year, over 350 SSN intelligence-gathering mission-days went unfilled due to the lack of available ships. In 1999, the Submarine Force contribution to Seventh Fleet's forward presence requirement was met only 50 percent of the time. Much needed maintenance for ships has been pushed into the future as far as it can go. The inter-deployment training cycle (IDTC) has been reduced to the bare minimum. These demands are obviously taking a cumulative toll on the ships and their dedicated crews. What are the alternatives? Presently, all we can do is commit to making the most efficient use of the force we have - while working for more force structure in the future.

One example of our effort to meet requirements with the resources at hand is the initiative to homeport three SSNs in Guam, starting with the USS City of Corpus Christi (SSN-705) in 2002. Transit time to theater is a significant part of any deployment. For the Pacific Fleet, the transit from Pearl Harbor to the Western Pacific, Indian Ocean, and Persian Gulf is especially arduous. Ships in Guam are already inside the Seventh Fleet area of responsibility (AOR) and readily available to conduct ISR missions - and will offer more than twice the number of mission-days per year per ship compared to submarines homeported in Pearl Harbor. These ships will effectively always be on deployment with a continuous 50 percent OPTEMPO and no IDTC - an operating cycle unlike that of any other SSN. It's worth noting that this will be the first time submarines have been forward-based since SSBN operations in Holy Loch, Scotland ceased in 1992.

Forward Presence. The 55 fast attack submarines currently commissioned continue to be integral components of aircraft carrier battle groups around the world - just the threat of an SSN off its coast can be enough to keep a belligerent country's navy in port. Pictured here, the Los Angeles-class attack submarine USS Baltimore (SSN-704) steams alongside the guided missile frigate USS Samuel B. Roberts (FFG-58) and the aircraft carrier USS George Washington (CVN-73).

Potential Force Level Shortfalls
When Jimmy Carter and Virginia enter the fleet in the summer of 2004, they will be the first submarines commissioned since USS Connecticut (SSN-22) in December 1998 and will end a five and one-half year period with no new submarine commissionings. Even considering the military drawdowns following both World Wars and during the Great Depression, this is unprecedented. Only in the infancy of the Submarine Force, with the four-year hiatus between Porpoise and Shark in September 1903 and Viper and Cuttlefish in October 1907, have we come close to going this long without adding new submarines. This concerns me as both a submariner and a military professional who understands the myriad capabilities that modern submarines bring to the table.

As the CNO has stated, it is all too easy to fall into the trap of talking about platform numbers and not focusing on capabilities. At some point, however, there needs to be an objective evaluation that correlates platforms and their capabilities with requirements. In fact, this was done for us by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the 1999 JCS SSN study (see the accompanying sidebar). With the current force level at 55 SSNs and a building rate that barely keeps up with the attrition of able - but aging - ships, we see a growing mismatch between requirements and assets. Even with an optimistic build rate of approximately two to three Virginia-class SSNs per year, we will just meet the JCS minimum 2015 warfighting requirement of 55 SSNs but fall well short of the actual peacetime requirement of 68 SSNs derived from CINC needs.

Operational Flexibility. The new Virginia-class submarine has been designed specifically to fight in the world's littorals and will offer greater operational flexibility in land attack, intelligence gathering, mine reconnaissance, and special forces support.

Force Level Options
There are currently three options for addressing this mis-match: two for the near term, and one for the long term. The first near-term option is to refuel eight first-flight, non-VLS, 688-class submarines. These ships have an average of 13 years of hull life remaining, and the technical risk of such an undertaking is low, since we have been doing submarine refueling overhauls for many years.
The second near-term option is to convert four Ohio-class SSBNs to an SSGN configuration. Starting in fiscal year 2003, four Trident SSBNs will be inactivated in accordance with the 1994 Nuclear Posture Review, which called for a deterrent fleet of 14 ships. These four large, capable submarines are each at only one-half of her 42-year hull life. To scrap these ships at a time when we are struggling to find ways to fill mission requirements and maintain the strike presence specified in the Global Naval Force Presence Plan (GNFPP) would be less than prudent. Each of these four Trident SSBNs could be converted to carry up to 154 Tomahawk land attack missiles (TLAM) and deploy 66 SEALS or Marines through two nine-man diver lockouts. Additionally, the SSGN can attach two Dry-Deck Shelters (DDS), or two Advanced SEAL Delivery Systems (ASDS), or one of each. The SSGN operating cycle would be much like the current two-crew SSBN cycle, except every other crew turnover would be at a deployed site - an evolution regularly practiced in the SSBN force today. While these conversions involve some small technical risk, and there are significant arms control issues to over-come, our greatest challenge is making the required decision in time for the first Trident decommissioning in two years. The longer-term option is to increase the rate of building Virginias. The JCS study specifically calls for 18 of the new class in 2015. Current projections, however, predict only 15 Virginia-class and total of only 57 SSNs at that time. In fact, even with the two near-term options in place, we project that the SSN force level will fall below 55 starting in 2027, as the last of today's newest 688s are inactivated. The ultimate solution will most likely be a combination of all three options, in which we extend the life of ships currently in the fleet and introduce new ones at a faster pace.

Conclusion
The basic warfare capabilities offered by submarines and the Sailors who take them into harm's way are stealth, endurance, and firepower. These attributes enable us to command the seas, provide combat-credible presence, assure sustainable access, and contribute to the transformation of the joint forces for fighting and winning in the 21st century. When it is so clear that the future of naval warfare is going to rest heavily on those distinctive characteristics so intrinsic to submarines, we cannot let them erode away. It's time to bring that nearest submarine even closer.