Statement by:
William Ledwith
Chief of International Operations
Drug Enforcement Administration
United States Department of Justice
Before the:
House Government Reform Committee, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice,
Drug Policy, and Human Resources
Date:
August 6, 1999
Note: This document may not reflect changes made in actual delivery.
Chairman Mica and members of the Committee. It is a pleasure for me to
appear here today to testify on counterdrug issues in Colombia. We believe
that the international drug trafficking organizations based in Colombia who
smuggle their poison into our country are, indeed, a threat to the national
security of the United States.
As a law enforcement agency, DEA holds itself to a high standard of
evidence. Our investigations aim to gather evidence sufficient to indict,
arrest, and convict criminals. When DEA operates in foreign posts, we work
within the legal systems of our host nations, and of course within the
strictures of the U.S. legal system, and in cooperation with our host nation
police agency counterparts. Our evidence must be usable in a court of law,
and must withstand severe scrutiny at every level of the criminal justice
process. With that in mind, my testimony will be limited to presenting DEA's
view of the drug threat in Colombia today and a brief statement of how we
work to counter that threat.
I. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME
DEA's mission is to target the powerful international drug syndicates
which operate around the world, supplying drugs to American communities,
employing thousands of individuals to transport and distribute drugs. The
most significant international drug syndicates operating today are far more
powerful and violent than any organized criminal groups that we have
experienced in American law enforcement. Today's major international
organized crime drug syndicates are simply the 1990's versions of traditional
organized crime mobsters U.S. law enforcement officials have fought since the
beginning of this century.
Members of international groups headquartered in Colombia and Mexico today
have at their disposal sophisticated technology -- encrypted phones, faxes,
and other communications equipment. Additionally, they have in their arsenal
aircraft, radar-equipped aircraft, weapons and an army of workers who oversee
the drug business from its raw beginnings in South American jungles to the
urban areas within the United States. All of this modern technology and these
vast resources enable the leaders of international criminal groups to build
organizations which reach into the heartland of America, while they
themselves try to remain beyond the reach of American justice. The
traffickers also have the financial resources necessary to corrupt enough law
enforcement, military, and political officials to create a relatively safe
haven for themselves in the countries in which they make their
headquarters.
These international drug traffickers use sophisticated, high tech
equipment and are proficient in the use of cell phones, pagers, faxes and
other conveniences. The cell structure of the organizations necessitates a
complex system of communications to enable the organization's leaders to know
where every kilo of cocaine is located, how much profit is being made, and
where and when deliveries will take place. By using cell phones and pagers,
the leaders communicate with different segments of the organization, and
provide only pieces of information to each segment, thereby reducing the
vulnerability of individuals and the entire organization.
As complex as these communications arrangements of organized crime groups
are, U.S. law enforcement agencies have been able to exploit their
communications by using court-approved telephone interceptions. With the top
leadership of these organizations in hiding beyond the immediate reach of
U.S. law enforcement, we have directed our resources at their organizational
structure, and their transportation and distribution elements in the United
States.
We have been able to identify, indict, and in many cases arrest,
international drug traffickers because the very feature of their operations
which makes them most formidable -- the ability to exercise effective command
and control over a far flung criminal enterprise -- is the feature that law
enforcement can use against them, turning their strength into a weakness.
However, it must be noted that the spread of non-recoverable encryption
technology threatens to remove this essential investigative tool from our
arsenal, and poses, in our view, a threat to the national security of the
United States because it will hamper law enforcement efforts to protect our
citizens from drug trafficking organizations operating abroad.
II. EVOLUTION OF ORGANIZED CRIME IN COLOMBIA
The international drug syndicates who control drug trafficking today from
the source zone, through the transit zones in the Caribbean and through
Mexico, and into the United States, are interconnected. We cannot discuss the
trafficking situation today without looking at the evolution of the groups
from Colombia --- how they began, what their status is today, and how the
groups from Mexico have learned important lessons from them, thereby becoming
major trafficking organizations in their own right.
Throughout the 1980's and into the early 1990's, the Medellin Cartel
dominated the international cocaine trade. In the late 1980's, the Ochoa
brothers (Juan David, Jorge Luis, and Fabio) ran the most powerful of the
Medellin Cartel drug trafficking organizations. Taking advantage of
Colombia's lenient sentencing provisions, the Ochoa brothers voluntarily
surrendered to the Colombian Government in late 1990 and early 1991.
Following their surrender and the violent deaths of Jose Rodriguez Gacha
(December 1989) and Pablo Escobar (December 1993), the Medellin Cartel
fragmented and gradually lost its secure lock on the international cocaine
market.
In the early 1990s, as their predecessors from the Medellin cartel
surrendered to avoid extradition, the loose association of five independent
drug trafficking groups collectively known as the Cali Cartel dominated the
international cocaine market. Where the Medellin cartel was brash and
publicly violent in their activities, the criminals who ran their
organization from Cali, labored behind the pretense of legitimacy, by posing
as businessmen carrying out their professional obligations. The Cali leaders
--- the Rodriguez Orejuela brothers, Jose Santacruz Londono, Helmer "Pacho"
Herrera Buitrago--- amassed fortunes and ran their multi-billion dollar
cocaine businesses from high-rises and ranches in Colombia. Miguel Rodriguez
Orejuela and his associates comprised what was, until then, the most powerful
international organized crime group in history. They employed a wide range of
aircraft, including Boeing 727s, to ferry drugs to Mexico, from there the
drugs were smuggled into the United States, and then the money from U.S. drug
sales was returned to Colombia with. Using landing areas in Mexico, they were
able to evade U.S. law enforcement officials and make important alliances
with transportation and distribution experts in Mexico.
With intense law enforcement pressure focused on the Cali leadership by
the brave men and women in the Colombian National Police during 1995 and
1996, all of the top leadership of the Cali syndicate ended up either in
jail, or dead. The capture of the Rodriguez Orejuela brothers in 1995, the
death of Jose Santacruz Londono in March 1996, and the surrender of Helmer
Herrera in September 1996--have accelerated the decentralization of the drug
trade. Since the Cali leaders' imprisonments (on sentences that in no way
matched the severity of their crimes) traffickers from Mexico took on greater
prominence. The alliance between the Colombian traffickers and the
organizations from Mexico benefitted both sides. Traditionally, the
traffickers from Mexico have long been involved in smuggling marijuana,
heroin, and cocaine into the United States, and had established solid
distribution routes throughout the nation. Because the Cali syndicate was
concerned about the security of their loads, they brokered a commercial deal
with the traffickers from Mexico in order to reduce their potential
losses.
This agreement entailed the Colombians moving cocaine from the Andean region to the Mexican organizations, who then assumed the responsibility of delivering the cocaine to the United States. As the arrangement evolved, trafficking groups from Mexico now are routinely paid for their services in multi-ton quantities of cocaine, making them formidable cocaine traffickers in their own right.
Drugs at The Source
The international drug syndicates discussed above control both the sources
and the flow of drugs into the United States. The vast majority of the
cocaine entering the United States continues to come from the source
countries of Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru. Virtually all of the estimated six
metric tons of heroin produced in Colombia in 1998 is destined for the U.S.
market. For nearly two decades, crime groups from Colombia have ruled the
drug trade with an iron fist, increasing their profit margin by controlling
the entire continuum of the cocaine market. Their control ranged from the
coca leaf production in Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia, to the cocaine
hydrochloride (HCl) production and processing centers in Colombia, to the
wholesale distribution of cocaine on the streets of the United States.
Colombian traffickers continue to import cocaine base from the jungles of
Bolivia and Peru, but in ever decreasing amounts. Coca leaf production
continues to grow within Colombia itself. The traffickers move the cocaine to
the large cocaine HCl conversion laboratories in southern Colombia. The vast
majority of the cocaine base and cocaine HCl destined for the United States
is produced in these laboratories throughout Colombia. Many of these
activities take place in the southern rain forests and eastern lowlands of
Colombia. Most of the coca cultivation in Colombia occurs in the Departments
of Guaviare, Caqueta, and Putumayo. This cultivation occurs in areas that are
effectively under control of insurgent groups. Cocaine conversion
laboratories range from smaller "family" operations to much larger
facilities, employing dozens of workers. Once the cocaine HCl is
manufactured, it is either shipped via maritime vessels or aircraft to
traffickers in Mexico, or shipped through the Caribbean corridor, including
the Bahamas Island chain, to U.S. entry points in Puerto Rico, Miami, and New
York.
Drugs in Transit
Over half of the cocaine entering the United States continues to come from
Colombia through Mexico and across U.S. border points of entry. Most of this
cocaine enters the United States in privately-owned vehicles and commercial
trucks. There is new evidence that indicates a few traffickers in Mexico have
gone directly to sources of cocaine in Bolivia and Peru in order to
circumvent Colombian middlemen. In addition to the supply of cocaine entering
the U.S., trafficking organizations from Mexico are responsible for producing
and trafficking thousands of pounds of methamphetamine.
Drug trafficking in the Caribbean is overwhelmingly influenced by
Colombian organized criminal groups. The Caribbean had long been a favorite
smuggling route used by the Cali and Medellin crime groups to smuggle cocaine
to the United States. During the late l970's and the l980's, drug lords from
Medellin and Cali, Colombia established a labyrinth of smuggling routes
throughout the central Caribbean, including Haiti, the Dominican Republic and
the Bahamian Island chain to South Florida, using a variety of smuggling
techniques to transfer their cocaine to U. S. markets. Smuggling scenarios
included airdrops of 500-700 kilograms in the Bahamian Island chain and off
the coast of Puerto Rico, mid-ocean boat-to-boat transfers of 500 to 2,000
kilograms, and the commercial shipment of multi-tons of cocaine through the
port of Miami.
After Miguel Rodriguez Orejuela and his confederates in the Cali crime
syndicate were brought to justice by Colombian authorities in 1995, new
groups from the North Valle del Cauca began vying for control of the
lucrative markets on the United States East Coast, previously dominated by
Rodriguez Orejuela. Experienced traffickers who have been active for
years--but worked in the shadow of the Cali drug lords-- have more recently
proven adept at seizing opportunities to increase their role in the drug
trade. Many of these organizations began to re-activate traditional
trafficking routes in the Caribbean to move their product to market.
DEA's focus on the Cali organization's command and control functions in
the U.S. enabled us to build formidable cases against the Cali leaders, which
allowed our Colombian counterparts to accomplish the almost unimaginable--
the arrest and incarceration of the entire infrastructure of the most
powerful crime group in history. Although Miguel Rodriguez Orejuela and his
confederates continue to direct a portion of their operations from prison
they are no longer able to maintain control over this once monolithic giant.
Now, independent groups of traffickers from the Northern Valle del Cauca have
replaced the highly structured, centrally controlled business operations of
the Cali group. These new groups tend to be smaller and less monolithic;
however, they continue to rely on fear and violence to expand and control
their trafficking empires.
III. ORGANIZED CRIME SYSTEMS BASED IN COLOMBIA
Despite the rise to power by the Mexican crime syndicates and their
increasing control of the wholesale cocaine trade in the United States,
Colombian traffickers still control the manufacture of the vast majority of
cocaine in South America and their fingerprints are on virtually every
kilogram of cocaine sold in U.S. cities and towns.
DEA has identified major organizations based on the northern coast of
Colombia that have deployed command and control cells in the Caribbean Basin
to funnel tons of cocaine to the United States each year. Colombian managers,
who have been dispatched to Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic, operate
these command and control centers and are responsible for overseeing drug
trafficking in the region. These groups are also directing networks of
transporters that oversee the importation, storage, exportation, and
wholesale distribution of cocaine destined for the continental United
States.
Colombian trafficking organizations have potentially produced an estimated
165 metric tons of cocaine HCl, some six metric tons of heroin, and over
4,000 metric tons of marijuana in 1998. The bulk of these illicit drugs is
destined for the United States. Colombian traffickers continue to control the
supply of cocaine at its source and dominate the wholesale cocaine market in
the eastern U.S. and Europe.
As indicated above, traffickers from Colombia supply almost all of the
cocaine to the Mexican crime syndicates. The Mexican organizations purchase
cocaine, as well as accepting cocaine in payment for services, from Colombian
groups. This change in the manner in which business is conducted is also
driven by the new trafficking groups in Colombia, who have chosen to return
to the Caribbean to move their cocaine to the United States.
Mexican organized crime syndicates now control the distribution of cocaine
in the western half and the Midwest of the United States. Moreover, the
Colombians have franchised to criminals from the Dominican Republic a
substantial portion of the mid-level wholesale cocaine and heroin trade on
the East Coast of the U.S. The Colombian groups remain, however, in control
of the sources of supply. The Dominican trafficking groups, already firmly
entrenched as low-level cocaine and heroin wholesalers in the larger
Northeastern cities, were uniquely placed to assume a far more significant
role in this multi-billion-dollar business.
The Dominicans in the U.S., and not the Colombians, are the ones subject
to arrest, while the top level Colombians control the organization with
increasingly encrypted telephone calls. This change in operations reduces
profits somewhat for the syndicate leaders. It succeeds, however, also in
reducing their exposure to U.S. law enforcement. When arrested, the
Dominicans will have little damaging information that can be used against
their Colombian masters. Reducing their exposure, together with encrypted
communications, puts the Colombian bosses closer to their goal of operating
from a political, legal, and electronic sanctuary.
IV. COLOMBIAN CRIME GROUPS IN THE U.S.
Colombian cocaine trafficking groups in the U.S. -- consisting of
mid-level traffickers answering to the bosses in Colombia -- continue to be
organized around "cells" that operate within a given geographic area. Some
cells specialize in a particular facet of the drug trade, such as cocaine
transport, storage, wholesale distribution, or money laundering. Each cell,
which may be comprised of 10 or more employees, operates with little or no
knowledge about the membership in, or drug operations of, other cells.
The head of each cell reports to a regional director who is responsible for the overall management of several cells. The regional director, in turn, reports directly to one of the drug lords of a particular organization or their designee based in Colombia. A rigid top-down command and control structure is characteristic of these groups. Trusted lieutenants of the organization in the U.S. have discretion in the day-to-day operations, but ultimate authority rests with the leadership in Colombia.
Upper echelon and management levels of these cells are normally comprised
of family members or long-time close associates who can be trusted by the
Colombian drug lords -- because their family members remain in Colombia as
hostages to the cell members' good behavior -- to handle their day-to-day
drug operations in the United States. The trusted personal nature of these
organizations makes it that much harder to penetrate the organizations with
confidential sources. That difficulty with penetration makes intercepting
criminal telephone calls all the more vital. They report back to Colombia via
cell phone, fax and other sophisticated communications methods. Colombian
drug traffickers continually employ a variety of counter-surveillance
techniques and tactics, such as fake drug transactions, using telephones they
suspect are monitored, limited-time use of cloned cell phones (frequently a
week or less), limited use of pagers (from 2 to 4 weeks), and use of calling
cards. The top level managers of these Colombian organizations increasingly
use sophisticated communications and encryption technology, posing a severe
challenge to law enforcement's ability to conduct effective
investigations.
V. TERRORIST INVOLVEMENT IN THE DRUG TRADE
There is deep concern in DEA, as in the rest of the Administration and in
the Congress, about the connection between the FARC and other terrorist
groups in Colombia and the Drug Trade. This summer's events in Colombia
demonstrate the danger posed to the Colombian people by the terrorists. The
Colombian government is now engaged in responding to this armed challenge.
DEA will continue to pay close attention to FARC involvement in the drug
trade. We will, together with our Colombian partners, take whatever steps are
necessary to attack the international organized crime groups that are the
driving force behind the drug trade and the armed groups that may be
protecting them.
DEA has in the past demonstrated its ability and willingness to fight drug
trafficking. For example, we participated in the struggle with Pablo Escobar
in Colombia, a trafficker who turned to terrorism when the net was closing
around him. DEA worked openly with the Colombian Police to hunt him down. We
will work alongside our long-term colleagues in the CNP to indict and bring
to justice any drug trafficker, FARC or otherwise, as long as the charges can
be proven in court. DEA carries out its operations in partnership with the
CNP.
An alliance of convenience between guerillas and traffickers is nothing
new. Since the 1970s, drug traffickers based in Colombia have made temporary
alliances of convenience with leftist guerillas, or with right wing groups.
In each case, this has been done to secure protection for the drug interests.
At other times, the drug traffickers have financed their own private armies
to provide security services.
General reporting indicates that many elements of the FARC and the ELN
raise funds through extortion, or by directly selling security services to
traffickers. Their actions are by no means limited to dealing with the
traffickers. The terrorists extort from all manner of economic activity in
the areas in which they operate. In return for cash payments, or possibly in
exchange for weapons, the terrorists protect cocaine laboratories, drug
crops, clandestine airstrips, or other interests of the drug traffickers.
The terrorists are not the glue that holds the drug trade together. It is,
however, certainly true that the "cash cow" represented by the drug trade has
taken on a big, and probably growing role in financing the terrorists. If the
traffickers did not buy security from the FARC or ELN, they would buy it from
elsewhere -- as they have done in the past.
The frequent ground fire sustained by CNP aircraft when engaged in
eradication missions over FARC or ELN controlled areas is indicative of the
extent to which the terrorists will go to protect the drug interests. Some of
these shootings may well have been angry peasants lashing out at a government
target. In either case, these shooting incidents pose a threat to personnel
conducting counter-lab or eradication operations.
VI. LAW ENFORCEMENT ACCOMPLISHMENTS
The Colombian National Police is a major law enforcement organization with
a long and honored tradition of integrity. The CNP had some corruption
problems in the 1980s and early 1990s, but took the needed steps to address
that corruption and have moved on to aggressively attack the drug menace.
Under the direct command of General Rosso Jose Serrano, the CNP has become
recognized for its dedication, patriotism and commitment to integrity. The
CNP has introduced fundamental changes in the force in order to make it a
thoroughly modern and efficient institution within the context of Colombia
and the international community.
General Serrano has been an advocate on behalf of the thousands of loyal
and dedicated Colombian National Police officers within the ranks. He has
encouraged their motivation, even in the face of the tragic losses of over
900 fellow police officers in the last three years alone. The fact that the
CNP, and other members of Colombia's law enforcement community, were able and
willing to pursue operations against the drug underworld is a testament to
their professionalism and dedication.
All of the top Cali drug lords either have been captured by the CNP, have
died, were killed, or have surrendered to Colombian authorities. These
unprecedented drug law enforcement successes were the culmination of years of
investigative efforts by the CNP, with active support from DEA.
Unfortunately, Miguel Rodriguez Orejuela and his associates, who comprised
the most powerful international organized crime group in history initially
received shamefully short sentences for their crimes. In January 1997,
Gilberto was sentenced to 10 and 1/2 years in prison on drug trafficking
charges. As a result of Colombia's lenient sentencing laws, however, Gilberto
may serve only five years. Miguel, originally sentenced to nine years, was
later sentenced to 21 years on Colombian charges based on evidence supplied
by the United States Government in the Tampa, Florida, evidence-sharing case.
Miguel is expected to serve less than 13 years in prison. The Colombian
judicial system must be strengthened to that the traffickers, once convicted,
are sentenced to terms commensutate with their crimes.
The CNP continues to pursue significant drug investigations in cooperation
with the DEA. The CNP is also aggressively pursuing significant counterdrug
operations against cocaine processing laboratories, transportation networks,
and trafficker command and control elements. We expect these operations will
result in prosecutions in both Colombia and the United States.
VII. CONCLUSION: HOPE FOR THE FUTURE
By way of conclusion, we can and should continue to identify and build
cases against the leaders of the new criminal groups from Colombia. These
criminals have already moved to make our task more difficult by withdrawing
from positions of vulnerability and maintaining a much lower profile than
their predecessors. A number of initiatives hold particular promise for
success:
- The U.S. Embassy's Information Analysis/Operations Center (IAOC) will be increasingly utilized to coordinate and analyze tactical information regarding the activities of drug trafficking groups active in the Colombian territories south and east of the Andes Mountains. The IAOC is comprised of Embassy personnel from the DEA Bogota Country Office and U.S. Military's Tactical Analysis Team. Support and staffing also are provided by the Defense Attache Office and the State Department. This organization should be the central clearinghouse for counterdrug law enforcement cooperation in Colombia.
- The special unit program, funded under the Andean Initiative, will make it possible to convert existing partially vetted units of the CNP into fully vetted teams. These teams of investigators will work closely with DEA and will conduct high level drug investigations.
- There are several cutting-edge, sophisticated investigations currently underway, which benefit from the closest possible cooperation between the DEA and CNP. In the very near future these investigations should lead to the dismantling of major portions of the most significant drug trafficking organizations operating in Colombia today.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify before the Subcommittee today. I will be happy to respond to any questions you may have.
|
NEWSLETTER
|
| Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list |
|
|
|
