POSTURE STATEMENT OF GENERAL CHARLES E. WILHELM, UNITED
STATES MARINE CORPS
COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND
INTRODUCTION
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you to discuss my strategic assessment of the
U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR). In
September, I will conclude three years as the Commander in Chief of U.S.
Southern Command. During my tenure, I have visited each country in the AOR at
least twice and met with every Minister of Defense, U.S. Ambassador, and many
of the Presidents and other key regional military and civilian leaders. These
visits and meetings have allowed me to gain an in-depth personal perspective
of the region. In this posture statement, I will provide my personal
assessment of security and stability conditions in the hemisphere, outline
U.S. Southern Command's strategic priorities, comment on the status and
effectiveness of our counterdrug and engagement activities, and conclude with
my vision for the future.
STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT
Today, the USSOUTHCOM AOR is a testament to the vision and efficacy of our
National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement. Thirty-one of
thirty-two countries have democratically elected governments and free market
economies. Cuba alone is an isolated vestige of the Cold War era. During the
past twenty years, we have seen the hemisphere shed its robes of military
dictatorships and communist governments and attire itself with cloth cut from
the bolts of democracy, rule of law, and human rights. Despite this success,
I have observed disquieting changes during the past year in the region's
political climate and in the philosophies of new leaders. After a decade in
which democracy flourished in the AOR, there are now subtle -- and not so
subtle -- indications that popular support for democratic ideals is
declining, while misguided tolerance for autocratic government is increasing.
Recent events in several countries raise doubts about the depth and
durability of democracy in the region, as well as the future growth of free
market economies.
Colombia. Shortly after assuming command and making my initial assessment of
security and stability in the region, I stated that I considered Colombia to
be the most threatened nation in the AOR. I stand behind that assessment, but
I am also encouraged by what I see in Colombia today. Served by first class
civilian and military leaders, Colombia demonstrates a level of national
organization not present two years ago. Although the recently reported
upsurge in coca production is cause for concern, that concern is partially
mitigated by the improved performance of Colombia's security forces during
tactical engagements with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC),
the National Liberation Army (ELN), and others who are aiding and abetting
drug traffickers. Cooperation between the armed forces and national police
has improved, with forces demonstrating new levels of competence in
air-ground coordination and intelligence sharing. An aggressive program to
restructure the armed forces is underway and Plan Colombia provides a
comprehensive national strategy to defeat drug traffickers. With our help,
Colombia can succeed; but Colombia is not the only country where democracy
and stability are challenged.
Ecuador. The political and economic crisis in Ecuador has gone from bad to
worse. The military's involvement with Ecuador's recent coup was very
disturbing. Even within the military, confidence in democracy and a free
market economy is at low ebb. In Ecuador, as in other nations in our AOR,
democracy and free market reforms are not delivering tangible results to the
people. Today, many are worse off economically than they were before the
restoration of democracy. Ecuador begs the question: Can democracy survive
without an economic system that produces adequate subsistence and services
for the majority of its citizens?
Panama. In accordance with the Panama Canal Treaty of 1977, we successfully
transferred the Canal to the Government of Panama on 31 December 1999.
Articles IV and V of the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama
Canal Treaty stipulate that the U.S. and Panama ensure the permanent
neutrality of the Panama Canal. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has
assigned the mission of defending the Panama Canal to the U.S. Southern
Command. Pursuant to the provisions of the Neutrality Treaty, we are prepared
to fulfill these responsibilities. Spillover from violence in Colombia
threatens Panama. The threat is most immediate in the Darien and San Blas
Provinces, where insurgents and paramilitary forces rest, resupply, traffic
in drugs and arms, clash with each other, and terrorize Panamanian citizens.
Although these forces present no immediate and direct threat to Canal
operations, the insurgents could easily overwhelm the limited capability of
the Panamanian National Police stationed along the border. While not an overt
threat to Panamanian democracy, Colombian insurgents constitute a localized
threat to Panamanian sovereignty and citizens in the border region.
Venezuela
Venezuela's new constitution, the 26th in its history, won an overwhelming
endorsement of 70 percent of the voters during the national referendum. This
new constitution significantly increases the powers of the president and
permits him to serve two consecutive terms in office. The constitution also
establishes a new unicameral congress and a judiciary to replace previous
institutions widely regarded as corrupt. Venezuela now has an opportunity to
restore the people's faith in government institutions. It remains to be seen
if those goals will be realized.
Peru. In Peru, democracy, while imperfect, survives. We can best support the
positive elements of this democracy by maintaining and sustaining our
engagement initiatives with Peru's security forces and by ensuring that
recent substantial gains made in the campaign against drugs are not lost.
Free and unfettered elections in Peru would be an encouraging sign that
Peruvian democracy will endure.
Paraguay. Paraguay remains one of the youngest and most fragile democracies
in the hemisphere. The present administration is drawing increased fire from
political foes. Authorities in Paraguay and Argentina have been unable to
locate General Oviedo, who may be linked with plots to unseat Paraguay's
current government. To their credit, the Paraguayan Armed Forces have
remained detached from political intrigues. They demonstrated this clearly by
supporting the constitution during the political crisis of March 1999, when
Vice President Argana was assassinated.
Haiti. For the present and immediate future, challenges to Haitian democracy
include abject poverty, a weak economic system, corruption, and a growing
association with the drug trade. During January of this year, the United
States Support Group Haiti was disestablished, ending more than five years of
continued U.S. presence. During this period, U.S. Forces constructed 49
schools, 21 kilometers of roadway, drilled 43 new wells, repaired 203
existing wells, provided medical attention to 140,988 Haitians, trained 250
Haitian health providers and distributed 261 tons of food, medicine, and
clothing. In the foreseeable future, USSOUTHCOM will remain engaged in Haiti
through humanitarian assistance programs. However, Haiti's future remains
uncertain. The upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections will give us
an indication of the nation's future. We must ensure Haiti takes the high
road toward democracy and does not veer away from democratic and free market
reforms.
Assessment Summary
After years of positive trends in the region, both democracy and the future
of free market economies are confronting serious challenges. We have
compelling reasons to increase our vigilance and engagement in the AOR and to
rededicate our commitment and resources to supporting democracy. To this end,
we have developed the following strategic priorities.
STRATEGIC PRIORITIES
Complete the 21st Century Architecture
The withdrawal of U.S. forces from Panama and return of U.S. bases required
us to re-establish an effective theater architecture as a top priority. Our
post-Panama Theater Architecture is sound. All the pieces are now in place
with the exception of our Forward Operating Locations (FOLs). To achieve the
objectives of our Counterdrug (CD) Campaign Plan, we must better position our
assets to conduct sustained CD operations throughout the Source and Transit
Zones. FOLs provide us the required operational reach to conduct these
operations. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) missions
from the FOLs will enhance the effectiveness of U.S. Detection, Monitoring,
and Tracking (DM&T) operations and improve our support for Partner Nation
interdiction operations. The FOL in Manta, Ecuador is my number one priority.
Manta is critical for conducting deep Source Zone air coverage with Airborne
Early Warning aircraft, and it is the only FOL that enables us to achieve
full coverage of Peru, Colombia, and the drug producing areas of Bolivia. On
November 15, 1999, we concluded a 10-year access agreement with the
Government of Ecuador. This agreement addresses congressional concerns and
should clear the way for funding the necessary operational improvements to
allow unconstrained DM&T operations with all types of aircraft used in CD
operations. The design and engineering plan for airfield improvements to
satisfy our own mandated safety requirements were completed this month.
Construction will commence just as soon as funding becomes available. The
FOLs at Aruba and Curacao, funded in the Fiscal Year 2001 budget request, are
required for effective, rapid response DM&T operations in the northern
Source Zone, which includes the Guajira Peninsula of Colombia and the
Venezuelan border region, as well as a large part of the Transit Zone. The
formal 10-year access agreement with the Kingdom of the Netherlands was
signed on March 2, 2000. Having reached long-term accords on Aruba and
Curacao, one of our remaining challenges is to negotiate an FOL site in
Central America. This FOL would provide air coverage in the Eastern Pacific
and Central America to keep pressure on the Transit Zone as we build CD
capability in the Source Zone. We are currently evaluating prospective
sites.
Setting the Command Anchor in Miami
We need to confirm Miami as the permanent site for U.S. Southern Command
Headquarters. We are now in our third year of operation "on the ground" in
Miami. As I stated previously, for a variety of reasons Miami has proven to
be the single "right" location for USSOUTHCOM's headquarters. However, at
this moment we own no physical facilities in Miami, and the network of rental
and lease agreements for the headquarters is becoming increasingly unwieldy,
inefficient and, most importantly, uneconomical. The most cost-effective
option to anchor the headquarters in strategically appropriate Miami is to
purchase the headquarters building and land. We are working with the Office
of the Secretary of Defense to gain approval and funding to purchase the
headquarters building and associated grounds in Fiscal Year 2002. While I do
not believe we need to hold the deed for every facility, I am convinced that
we are best served by owning our headquarters.
Broaden and Expand the Resource Base
Many of the nations in our AOR are burdened with problems that frustrate
internal development and threaten political stability. Nations of this region
do not fear external powers and spend less per capita on arms than any other
part of the world. While we welcome the corresponding low probability of an
arms race or regional conflict, we have growing concerns about the durability
of fragile democracies in the AOR. In last year's posture statement, I
described our need for resources as both unique and critical. Our engagement
mission is to nurture and strengthen thirty-one democracies through combined
operations, combined exercises, training and education, military-to-military
contact, security assistance, and humanitarian assistance programs. In past
years, we have accomplished much with focused, frugal engagement efforts
throughout the AOR. Because of subtle changes in the political climate and
growing economic challenges mentioned earlier, I see a need to increase our
engagement in several areas. First, U.S. Southern Command's available foreign
military financing (FMF) is an excellent security assistance tool, but
totaled only $3 million last year and was earmarked exclusively for the
Caribbean. This level of FMF assistance seems out of balance for an AOR of
this size, particularly as we assist Partner Nations in shoring up democratic
institutions and professionalizing their military. Secondly, I am concerned
about cuts in manpower, specifically the Reserve Component (RC) assistance
that we receive in our engagement programs. Reserve Components support 55
percent of all our exercises and 30 percent of our deployments to the AOR. In
1999, over 25,000 Reserve Component personnel provided more than 550,000
mandays in support of theater engagement activities. Additionally, U.S.
Southern Command used more than 28,000 Reserve mandays for counterdrug
exercises and operations. Our engagement exercise program, which is tethered
to the availability of Reserve and National Guard forces, requires increased
RC support for additional Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS)
directed exercises this year, such as two New Horizon deployments to Haiti
and Medical Readiness Exercises (MEDRETE) for Nicaragua. Third, I am
concerned about the level of support for our Humanitarian and Civic
Assistance Program (HCA). HCA provides excellent mission essential and
austere environment training that includes deployment, command and control,
employment, sustainment, and redeployment for U.S. Reserve and National Guard
forces. HCA projects throughout the AOR improve basic medical,
transportation, and education infrastructure within our Partner Nations.
These efforts support emerging democracies and project a benevolent image of
the U.S. in the eyes of the most deprived citizens of these nations.
Increased funding is needed to sustain the progress we have made. Despite our
many engagement successes throughout the region, corrupting influences of
drug trafficking, domestic and international terrorism, illegal migration,
illicit arms sales, money laundering, and organized crime still pose a
growing danger to the foundations of democracy and economic development. The
recent proposal for a Colombia Emergency Supplemental attests to the
seriousness of our resource needs for counterdrug operations. The proposed
funding will enable us to support the building of significant counterdrug
capabilities in the Source Zone, primarily for Colombia while reinforcing
successes in Peru and Bolivia and addressing some emerging requirements in
Ecuador, Panama, Brazil, and Venezuela. Increased funding, for both
engagement and counterdrug operations, will send a resounding signal to this
region of its importance to the United States.
Resuscitate ISR Capabilities
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance resources support U.S.
Southern Command's engagement activities, force protection, counterdrug, and
contingency operations. ISR capabilities must provide predictive and
actionable intelligence to preclude strategic, operational, and tactical
surprise in the AOR. Our current ISR capabilities fail to meet all of our
requirements, particularly where we need to be proactive rather than reactive
in force protection and counterdrug operations. The lack of adequate ISR
resources is my number one readiness issue. The Joint Staff and the entire
intelligence community are working diligently with the U.S. Southern Command
on this issue. Potential improvements are on the horizon, but the reality is
that we need more and better ISR support today.
Increase National and DoD Strategic Awareness
When viewed in the context of our National Security Strategy and its twin
tenets of Engagement and Enlargement, this hemisphere is our foremost success
story. Whether we got where we are through skill or good fortune is a moot
point. What is important is preserving the significant gains that have been
made over the past 20 years. Historical analysis reveals that in terms of
governance this is a tidal region. Democracy ebbs and flows on about a
20-year cycle. As I have mentioned throughout this report, my concern is that
we may be watching the tide change. Fortunately, the tidal analogy has its
limits. While we can't control oceanic tidal changes, through adequate
attention to the region, thoughtful and selective engagement, and frugal but
sufficient resourcing of worthwhile initiatives, we can effectively influence
important events in Latin America and the Caribbean.
COUNTERDRUG EFFORTS
Regional Threat
The danger of drug trafficking to the Andean Ridge nations is real,
immediate, and growing. The illicit drug industry has become a corrosive
force without precedent, relentlessly eroding the foundations of democracy in
the region, corrupting public institutions, poisoning youth, ruining
economies, and disrupting the social order. Colombia is key to the region's
stability. Colombia's problems are not contained by her borders, and are
spilling over into neighboring countries. Venezuela has deployed 10,000
troops along the Colombian border to prevent intrusions by Colombian
insurgents. Peru and Ecuador also deploy forces along the Colombian border to
deter the FARC, paramilitary forces, and drug traffickers from unwanted
incursions. Ecuador's current economic plight makes it nearly impossible for
the government to deploy sufficient military forces to prevent illegal
border
crossings. FARC and drug trafficker incursions recently prompted the
Brazilian Army to reinforce military garrisons along its border with Colombia
and spurred the government to continue development of the $1.4 billion Amazon
Surveillance System (SIVAM). As I mentioned before, FARC and paramilitary
forces enter Panama with impunity to terrorize and extort Panamanian
citizens, and to traffic in drugs and arms. To wage an effective, long-term
counterdrug campaign, countries of the region must cooperate to develop a
common strategy and coordinate their actions against drug traffickers. A
collective regional response is required to provide effective border security
and to expand and sustain the impressive counterdrug results achieved by Peru
and Bolivia.
U.S. Assistance to Colombia and Neighboring Countries
Counterdrug (CD) Campaign Plan. U.S. Southern Command, as part of the
Interagency team, has developed a three-phased regional CD Campaign Plan that
supports the goals, objectives, and intent of Presidential Decision Directive
(PDD)-14 and the National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS). The focus of Phase I
is on assisting Partner Nations to improve their CD capabilities, and where
required, develop new ones. This approach requires the U.S. to help organize,
train, and where necessary, equip Partner Nations to conduct air, riverine,
and ground CD operations against drug traffickers. Phase II will entail
decisive regional operations to neutralize organizations involved in the
illicit drug trade. During this Phase, Partner Nations will isolate drug
producing areas from traditional markets and transit points and extend
security force presence into production areas. Phase III will sustain
successes achieved during the first two phases by preparing Partner Nation
forces to adapt CD operations to drug traffickers' constantly changing
tactics. Aggressive interdiction efforts in the Transit Zone will be
conducted during all three phases.
Counterdrug Supplemental Bill. The proposed counterdrug supplemental will
assist Colombia in implementing its strategic plan for counterdrug
operations. The supplemental is consistent with the overarching National Drug
Control Strategy (NDCS), supports goals 4 and 5 of the Strategy, and will
enable United States Southern Command to more effectively execute its
Counterdrug Campaign Plan. Colombia and its Andean Ridge neighbors fully
appreciate the regional problems that are caused by the illegal drug
industry, and have demonstrated the willingness to pursue solutions at the
regional level. Success in these efforts will require continued commitment
from the U.S. The United States has provided initial training, limited
infrastructure support, technological support, and equipment to foster
commitment and to improve Partner Nation capabilities to fight drug
trafficking within their borders and throughout the region. Ninety of our 119
CD training support deployments for Fiscal Year 2000 are scheduled for Andean
Ridge countries. In addition, seven of our nineteen Tactical Analysis Teams
(TATs) are located in the five Andean Ridge countries, and more than 100
Joint Planning and Assistance Teams (JPATs) deploy to the region annually,
providing CD training and assessments for host nation security forces. We
also provide support for Andean Ridge ground, air, and riverine programs. If
approved, supplemental funding will enable us to aggressively pursue existing
programs that have already demonstrated their merit, and initiate new ones
such as the Colombia CD Brigade, which can be decisive as we seek a
comprehensive solution to the drug challenge.
Support to Ground Programs.
We have helped the Colombian Army (COLAR) organize, train, and equip their
first Counternarcotics Battalion (CN BN), which became operational December
15, 1999. Manned by more than 900 professional soldiers and based at the
Joint Task Force (JTF)-South headquarters in Tres Esquinas, the CN Battalion
is comprised of a headquarters company and three maneuver companies. The
Battalion completed an extensive three-phase training program conducted by
U.S. Special Forces at a cost of $3.9 million and received $3.5 million in
individual and unit equipment, and medical supplies to enable stand-alone
operations. The CN Battalion is designed to conduct ground and airmobile CD
operations in coordination with the Colombian National Police. Colombian
armed forces and police units will receive integrated intelligence support
from the Colombia Joint Intelligence Center (COJIC). To provide urgently
needed tactical mobility, the Battalion has received 18 refurbished UH-1N
helicopters (and accompanying spare parts), which were provided by the
Department of State (DOS). Based at Tolemeida and Florencia, these
helicopters are crewed by 25 contract pilots and 14 Colombian copilots
trained in the United States. Contract pilots will be phased out as
additional Colombian pilots complete their training. DOS is also providing
follow-on support equipment (armament and portable hangars), and has budgeted
$2.1 million of monthly Operations and Maintenance funds to sustain this
crucial capability. The Colombian Joint Intelligence Center became
operational on December 22, 1999, and is currently supporting national
police, military, and JTF-South CD operations. It produces real-time
targeting information, terrain and weather analysis, force protection
vulnerability assessments, and intelligence estimates. The United States
Government (USG) provided $4.9 million for construction of the COJIC
facility, installation of networked computers and communications equipment,
base infrastructure upgrades, and defrayal of operating expenses through
mid-June 2000. Three U.S. subject matter experts are deployed to the COJIC
through June 2000 to observe and assist COLAR and Colombian National Police
intelligence specialists manning the facility. We are also improving Tres
Esquinas, where Joint Task Force-South, the COJIC, and the CN Battalion are
colocated. Thus far, we have spent more than $600,000 on force protection
improvements alone. Other upgrades are underway, including extension of the
existing aircraft runway and construction of an aircraft parking ramp.
Planning is ongoing to establish, train, and equip two additional CN
Battalions and a COLAR CN Brigade headquarters during 2000. The second CN
Battalion will begin training in April, followed several months later by the
third Battalion, which will complete its training in December 2000. While the
basic organization of the second and third Battalion will closely parallel
the first, some organizational refinements will be made. Improvements will
include the inception of a reinstruction company, to provide a reservoir of
trained replacement forces, and the consolidation of support elements
(reconnaissance, medical, mortars), into a Support Battalion. Soldiers
assigned to all of the new Battalions will be vetted to eliminate human
rights abusers.
Support to Interdiction Programs. We continue to conduct cooperative air
interdiction efforts with Peru and Colombia and are using the security
assistance program to upgrade the capabilities of A-37, Tucano, and C-26
aircraft. We have teamed with the Interagency to develop a CD Air
Interdiction Plan to enhance current Government of Colombia (GOC)
capabilities. This plan will maximize Colombian operational effectiveness
focusing phased air interdiction operations against drug smuggling aircraft
in southern and eastern Colombia. Operations will integrate Relocatable
Over-the-Horizon Radar (ROTHR), U.S. tracker and detection aircraft, and
Colombian air force and national police aircraft. Training began in February
2000 and will be followed by several months of focused air interdiction
operations. The proposed supplemental funds air-to-air radar and an upgraded
communications package for two of the Colombian Air Force's (COLAF) C-26
Merlin aircraft. These modified aircraft will enable the COLAF to track and
intercept aircraft moving cocaine from inland laboratories to the Colombian
coasts for transshipment to the United States. The supplemental also: (1)
improves COLAF tactical surveillance and intelligence capabilities by
providing Forward-Looking Infrared Radar (FLIR) for low-altitude,
long-duration reconnaissance aircraft; (2) improves collection from
ground-based radars (GBR) by funding upgrades to current GBR's and fielding
an additional GBR at Tres Esquinas; and (3) corrects operational and safety
deficiencies at the Forward Operating Location (FOL) in Manta, Ecuador to
allow sustained operations by U.S. Navy, Air Force, and Customs aircraft in
the deep Source Zone and the Eastern Pacific. The proposed supplemental will
go a long way toward correcting one of Colombia's longest standing and most
crucial operational deficiencies -- inadequate tactical mobility. As
previously mentioned, 18 UH-1N helicopters have already been delivered to
Colombia to provide air mobility for the inaugural CN Battalion. These
aircraft were provided through a coordinated effort by the Department of
State and Department of Defense. If the supplemental is approved, 15
additional UH-1N's will be upgraded; brought to standardized configuration
and delivered to Colombia to support expanded mobility needs as the CN
Battalion grows to Brigade strength. Ultimately, these 33 UH-1N helicopters
will be replaced by 30 UH-60 Blackhawks and additional H-60's that will be
purchased by Colombia using its own funds. The selection of the UH-60 as the
standard helicopter for Colombia's armed forces was based on its range,
payload, survivability, versatility, service ceiling, and a variety of other
factors. Other options including non-U.S. aircraft were considered; however,
we support the Colombian decision and believe that important requirements
such as training, maintenance, facilities, and contractor support will be
simplified by the Blackhawk selection.
Support to Riverine Programs.
In the infrastructure-poor regions of Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia where the
drug industry thrives, road networks are sparse to non-existent. The rivers
that feed the Amazon Basin have become the highways that support the drug
trade. To assist partner nations in their efforts to interdict drug
trafficking on the rivers, we have instituted aggressive programs to train,
equip and effectively employ riverine forces in Colombia and Peru. Colombia
has long recognized the importance of its rivers to those who ply the drug
trade. To provide better coverage of the rivers and to achieve greater
operational efficiency, Colombia comprehensively reorganized its riverine
forces during 1999. A fluvial brigade has been created with five organic
battalions. In the past, riverine battalions were assigned to contiguous
operating areas. Under the new concept, each battalion is assigned
responsibility for two or more specific rivers. We subscribe fully to this
approach, predict an upsurge in operational efficiency, and have already seen
improved results from its implementation. The basic operating element within
the Colombian riverine structure is the riverine combat element (RCE). With
U.S. assistance, the Colombian Navy and Marine Corps have now fielded 25 RCEs
against a projected requirement of 45. Simultaneously, seven support bases
required for the support and sustainment of riverine forces have either been
built or refurbished. With current funding, during FY 2000 we will help
Colombia achieve its objective riverine force structure by procuring eight
patrol boats, spare parts, night vision and radio-navigation equipment. While
the Colombian riverine program is relatively mature, Peru's is in its
formative stage. With U.S. Assistance, the Peruvians have established the
Joint Peru Riverine Training Center near Iquitos in the Amazon region. With
our help, Peru is making steady progress. During the past year four of 12
planned Riverine Interdiction Units (RIU) have been fielded and pressed into
service. With currently approved funding we will assist Peru to expand its
riverine capabilities by providing them twelve 25-foot patrol boats, six
40-foot patrol craft, spare parts, night vision devices and essential items
of individual equipment. In tandem with training and provisioning
initiatives, we are working closely with Colombia and Peru to better and more
fully integrate riverine forces into their national interdiction
programs.
U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND ENGAGEMENT
Value of Engagement
I am a strong believer in our National Military Strategy. I am convinced
that the three pillars of the strategy -- shape, respond and prepare -- are
well chosen and are the right ones for these turbulent and unpredictable
times. The potential of the strategy can best be achieved if we place proper
and proportional emphasis and adequately resource each of the pillars. In
this regard, I am convinced that if we shape the international security
environment skillfully, we will respond to fewer crises, and the uncertain
future for which we are preparing will be far less uncertain. Based on this
thesis, and because the U.S. Southern Command AOR is not designated a major
theater of war, we have weighted our effort in the region to the first pillar
of the National Military Strategy. Our theater engagement plan is the roadmap
that guides our shaping initiatives. We group our engagement activities into
two categories: crisis engagement and deliberate engagement. I will comment
on the content and effectiveness of each.
Crisis Engagement
Hurricane Mitch. At a cost of more than $200 million, Southern Command
helped Honduras, Nicaragua, Guatemala, and El Salvador recover from the heavy
damage caused by Hurricane Mitch in 1998. Our disaster relief plan began with
a 30-day emergency phase during which we saved more than 1000 lives and
distributed more than 3 million pounds of food, 131,000 pounds of medical
supplies, and 120,000 gallons of potable water. During Phase II, we began
"rehabilitation" by restoring the infrastructure necessary to meet basic
health and welfare needs of citizens in the affected countries. We
constructed or reconstructed 260 kilometers of roadway, 25 bypasses, 3
clinics, and 4 schools. We also drilled 4 wells and provided medical
attention to over 50,000 people. During the third phase, "restoration," we
consolidated relief efforts with an existing exercise, New Horizons, and
expanded the scope of the effort to include the Dominican Republic, which had
been ravaged earlier by Hurricane Georges. More than 23,000 Guardsmen and
Reservists from 45 states deployed into the region in two-week increments
from February to August 1999. Collectively, the Guardsmen and Reservists
built 7 bridges, 6 low water crossings, 15 culvert bridges, 27 schools, 1
community center, 5 dikes, and 240 km of roadway. They also drilled 21 water
wells, diverted two rivers into their normal beds, and provided medical
treatment to more than 262,000 people.
Operation Fundamental Response.
At the request of the Government of Venezuela, Southern Command provided
emergency assistance to the victims of torrential rains and floods that
ravaged Venezuela's northern coast in December, 1999. During the emergency
phase in late December, we delivered more than 237.5 tons of food and 190
tons of other relief supplies; rescued or relocated more than 5,500 flood
victims; transported more than 363,000 pounds of relief supplies; produced
and distributed thousands of gallons of fresh water; and provided medical
treatment to more than 700 people. During January, we began "rehabilitation"
and focused our efforts on the production and distribution of potable water.
We produced over 2,891,686 gallons of potable water from 13 Reverse Osmosis
Water Purification Units (ROWPU) deployed to Venezuela from the U.S. Virgin
Islands, Puerto Rico, and the United States. The majority of these water
purification units are manned and serviced by dedicated National Guard
personnel from Puerto Rico, West Virginia, North Dakota, and Florida. On
February 11, we began a phased withdrawal of our forces from Venezuela and
will complete the withdrawal in early March.
Deliberate Engagement
Southern Command's strategy of engagement stresses shared ideals to shape
cooperative opportunities in the AOR countries. Our goal is to create the
conditions that support the development of institutions to advance democracy,
promote regional stability, support hemispheric cooperation, and foster
economic opportunities. During 1999, at the modest cost of less than $105
million, we conducted more than 2800 engagement events throughout the AOR in
activities such as disaster relief, professional military training, medical
training and assistance, joint and combined exercises, and counterdurg
operations. On the personal level, these events were conducted by more than
55,000 of our servicemen and women -- America's best ambassadors of democracy
and the subordination of military forces to civilian authority. The long-term
benefits to the U.S. from these engagement activities far outweigh the
costs.
Engagement Payoff
Theater Engagement is the most cost efficient and militarily effective means
for achieving U.S. national security goals and objectives in the AOR. Our
Theater Engagement Plan advances national and regional strategies. In
coordination with our DoD and interagency partners, we provide countries
throughout the AOR with the capabilities and resolve to counter drug
trafficking, international terrorism, and other transnational threats; to
professionalize and restructure their armed forces; and to strengthen
democratic institutions. The development of these capabilities in Partner
Nations reduces the likelihood for U.S. military intervention in crises and
the requirements for U.S. support during disasters. To be truly successful,
our engagement activities require consistency to ensure a balance of programs
for short-term development, mid-term access and growth, and long-term
influence. Military-to-military contacts, combined training, equipment
transfers, foreign military financing, seminars, and exchange programs
provide near-term development and enhance cooperation with security forces in
the region. Resident professional military education at U.S. schools and the
foreign military sales program enable us to shape and influence events in the
region for the long term.
CONCLUSION
I have now served at Southern Command for 29 months. Shortly after assuming
command and making my initial assessment of security and stability conditions
in the AOR, I published my vision for the hemisphere. Succinctly stated, this
vision is of "a community of democratic, stable, and prosperous nations
successfully countering illicit drug activities and other transnational
threats; served by professional, modernized, interoperable security forces
that embrace democratic principles, respect for human rights, and
subordination to civil authority; and are capable and supportive of
multilateral responses to challenges." Today, almost two and a half years
later, I still hold that vision. However, I am not as sanguine today as I was
two years ago that my vision will be realized. During the past year, I have
detected a growing malaise in attitudes toward democratic reform which is
fueled and compounded by the adverse social, economic, and political
conditions, spawned wholly or in part by drug trafficking and the other
transnational threats that it breeds. These forces are weakening the fabric
of democracy in the region. We cannot be discouraged by this turn of events.
Now, more than ever, we need to strengthen our engagement, defeat the scourge
of drugs, and shape the security environment to achieve regional goals and
objectives that support and sustain our national security interests. Our
needs are modest but the return on investments will pay significant dividends
to our children and grandchildren. I urge your continued support for our
theater architecture requirements, anchoring the command headquarters in
Miami, broadening our resource base, and resuscitating our ISR
capabilities.
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