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July 26, 2000

Mister Chairman and distinguished Members of the subcommittee, thank you for giving me the opportunity to submit the following statement to you on the issue of efforts to combat terrorism.

The threats from potential terrorists to U. S. citizens and U.S. national interests, both at home and abroad, cover a broad spectrum of both potential sources - individuals and groups, state-sponsored or not, foreign and domestic - as well as potential agents and devices - chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and conventional weapons and explosives. Unlike our experience during the Cold War, when our primary enemy was the Soviet Union, and our ways and means of keeping track of that enemy's capabilities and intentions was fairly well defined and executed, threats from terrorists are much more diverse, much more vague, and constantly evolving and mutating.

As a result, the old ways of doing business, especially in the context of intelligence collection and dissemination, and the analytical processes that apply in that context, are not in many ways appropriate or effective where terrorism is involved, especially from non-state actors. What is now required are some innovative approaches, some new means of collaboration, potentially the removal of some historical barriers - certainly in the bureaucratic context, perhaps in the legal and regulatory context as well.

I am acutely aware of the potential for over-zealousness, for government over-reaching, for the ostensible justification for intrusive efforts that could trample on the civil liberties of our citizens, as well as those from or in other countries. But I am equally as convinced that, with proper planning, with oversight from the Congress and other entities with responsibilities to ensure the appropriateness and legality of government actions, we can and must move forward on a broad front, to ensure that everything that can be done - within the boundaries of our Constitutional protections - is being done to protect our citizens, our property, indeed our very way of life, from potential perpetrators of terrorist acts.

There are increasingly new programs and new funding - at all levels of government: local, state, and Federal -- for improving our capabilities to respond to a terrorist attack. But I believe few will argue with the proposition that what we want is not to have to respond. First and foremost, our goal should be to deter potential terrorists from wanting to strike in the first place. Failing that, we should have sufficient capabilities to prevent the terrorist incident, which requires sufficient resources and efforts to identify potential terrorists, to detect their nefarious plans far enough in advance to do something about them, and then to preempt or interdict them before they attack. It is only if all of the above fail that our response mechanisms will come into play. Having said that, I fully support efforts to prepare adequately for an effective response, in the event that a terrorist attack does occur.

For despite our very best efforts, it is unlikely that we can ever assure the American people that we will always be able absolutely to identify every individual terrorist or terrorist groups, to detect their plans in advance, and to stop them before they strike. It is unlikely - and most Americans would, I believe, agree with the proposition - that we could have identified Timothy MacVeigh as a potential terrorist, and detected his plans in advance, in order to be able to stop his attack at the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in April of 1995 - certainly not with the processes in place at that time. In the future, and with forethought and innovation, perhaps we can do a better job of identifying the "Timothy MacVeighs" among us.

We can also thank Federal, state, and local officials for uncovering and stopping an attack on two huge propane storage tanks near Sacramento, California by local "militia" members, which could have killed hundreds - perhaps thousands - of their fellow citizens in surrounding communities. And another local "militia" member, alleged to have been plotting to blow up power plants and transmission lines, was arrested in Florida in early December of last year. These are good signs; but we can, in my opinion, do much better.

Mr. Chairman, in your letter of invitation to me to testify today, you asked that witnesses address certain specific questions, the first of which has to do with how terrorist threat assessments are developed and kept current. In the following paragraphs, I will attempt to answer that question, as well as questions about the existence of an "integrated threat and risk assessment, incorporating the terrorist threat to military installations and forces, the international threat, and the domestic terrorist threat against which government-wide funding priorities can be compared," and also the "benefits of having an integrated threat assessment."

Let me state, first of all, that I am generally familiar with the processes used by both of the preeminent Federal agencies responsible for these products: The Central Intelligence Agency for foreign threats, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for threats domestically (from both foreign and domestic sources). That knowledge is based on my prior government service and, more recently, with work that I have done on domestic terrorism issues. In the latter case, that knowledge proceeds from briefings to which I have been party, as well as discussions with several agency officials. I know that Members of this subcommittee have, earlier today, received classified testimony that likely describes those processes in considerably more detail, and which hopefully have addressed the answer to the question much more fully than, perhaps, I can in this testimony.

My general comment about the international threat and risk assessments being done within the Intelligence Community, with respect to threats to U.S. citizens and other U.S. interests abroad, and in connection with potential foreign threats that may be exported to our country, is that the current process for doing that is reasonably good. People, including policy makers and subject matter experts, may - and do on occasion - disagree with some of the conclusions contained in those assessments, but the processes for how the assessments, including National Intelligence Estimates (NIE), are developed and the data used in those assessments is relatively sound. Currency is another question: Given the fluid and ambiguous nature of the potential threats for terrorists, and the fact that new groups and individuals, with both motive and capability to perpetrate some level of terrorist attack, seem to emerge much more frequently, the Congress and other policy makers have every reason to ask whether the assessments are frequent enough. If the current structure and formal processes for conducting such assessments are too rigid or too entrenched in Cold War analytical mechanisms to provide timely assessments, perhaps some different, more streamlined process is in order.

My opinion about how that process works on the domestic front, and on the effectiveness or the timeliness of the products that are intended to flow from that process, is not as sanguine. The FBI has that responsibility; and while it is now taking some steps to fulfill that responsibility more effectively, it has not yet fully accomplished the mission. The General Accounting Office has come to the same conclusion. In its authoritative report last fall, GAO noted that the FBI has not "captured in a formal, authoritative, written assessment" terrorist threats domestically, from both foreign and domestic sources; and I concur in those findings.

The United States will always be vulnerable in almost limitless ways. We are an open society, with relatively open borders to foreign visitors. The length of our borders and the sheer amount of commerce and tourism that floods through our ports each day, makes it virtually impossible to detect every agent or device that a terrorist may try to bring into our country. But just because we are vulnerable in any number of ways, does not necessarily mean that a current threat exists to exploit that vulnerability. That makes good intelligence - appropriately collected and properly analyzed - all the more critical. But that, of course, is not enough. Threat assessments must be matched to vulnerabilities in order to complete valid risk assessments at various points in time. Only through that process will we be able to determine the priorities for emphasis for our efforts and, therefore, the dedication of resources.

Mr. Chairman and Members, part of the problem here is "cultural." The FBI is the foremost law enforcement agency in the world, but therein lies the heart of the cultural issue: Gathering investigative information for prosecution is dramatically different than collecting and analyzing threat information. The FBI clearly has a lot more to learn about intelligence analysis, and threat and risk assessments. But I am heartened by the word that the FBI and the CIA have formed a relatively new collaborative effort, which is designed to help the FBI learn more about the tested and proven methods of intelligence analysis by other entities in the Intelligence Community. And I am convinced that that has been and can continue to be done without crossing the bright line established in law and regulation that prohibits our foreign intelligence collection and analytical agencies from engaging in domestic collection.

I was struck a few months ago by an illustrative story that someone related to me. A few years back, as the story goes, a member agency of the Intelligence Community asked a Federal law enforcement agency if it could have limited access (certain information redacted) to the law enforcement agency's closed drug investigative files. By only looking at closed files, the intelligence agency would not be potentially interfering with an on-going investigation or prosecution. Although the law enforcement agency was puzzled by the request to look at closed files, some good work by seasoned intelligence analysts produced from those files an almost complete picture of the structure and inner-workings of one of the world's largest drug cartels.

Mr. Chairman, I have seen a recent unrestricted and unclassified document produced by the FBI, which purportedly is intended to address part of this problem. It is titled "Chemical and Biological Agent National Level Risk Assessment," and is apparently in at least partial response to earlier GAO findings, questions and specific direction from the Congress, and the FBI's and Department of Justice's own acknowledgements that more needs to be done. That two-page document is, however, only a broad statement of the FBI "mission" and "process" (the two major subheadings in the document) for such an assessment. And that description of mission and process is fatally flawed in one critical area. The document describes an assessment that is directed at evaluating various chemical and biological agents that terrorists may use to "create mass casualties," and analyzing the capabilities of a "non-state sponsored (sic) domestic actor" to use them. The critical element missing is that the plan makes no mention at all of motives or intentions. Assessments that do not consider in depth terrorists' motives and intentions, along with capabilities, are in my opinion virtually worthless.

The FBI document also does not provide any specificity or detail, other than a short list of tasks, as to how a process will be developed and implemented to accomplish the objectives. There needs to be, in my view - and most likely in classified form - a full description of that process, so that every participating entity, to include the field agents of the FBI and other participating or contributing Federal, state, and local agencies, is fully aware of the requirements and the anticipated products. Such a comprehensive description of the process will also allow for appropriate Congressional oversight.

In a recent letter on the subject to the Chairman of your full committee, Assistant FBI Director John Collingwood noted many legal and practical restrictions and difficulties in conducting the type of comprehensive domestic assessment that could be compared to a National Intelligence Estimate in the foreign context. While many of Mr. Collingwood's points may be well taken, the task is not, in my view and the view of others who work this issue almost daily, as seemingly insurmountable as that letter might suggest. It is true that the well-established civil rights and liberties of U.S. persons must be protected as part of that process. It may well be true that certain laws and guidelines need to be reviewed, collaboratively between the Executive and Legislative Branches - perhaps even with some scholarly judicially-based input - to determine if minor modifications or adjustments are in order. In my view, we can make improvements without even raising the suggestion that our government is attempting to be more intrusive. As an example, if current laws and guidelines prevents the FBI or other law enforcement agencies from collecting (even with appropriate judicial oversight) and analyzing information on a single individual terrorist - the "lone wolf" in FBI jargon - such as the "Unabomber," Theodore Kaczynski, then perhaps some tweaking of the rules may be in order. I am convinced that that and other adjustments to authorities can be made, while fully protecting our cherished civil rights.

Fundamentally, therefore, we do not have that integrated threat and risk assessment incorporating terrorist threats to military installations and forces, including international threats and domestic terrorist threats. Hopefully, the benefits from having such an integrated threat assessment are self-evident. Current, comprehensive, well-analyzed information, and the virtually seamless sharing of that information (recognizing the protections and restrictions that must be observed in the process), will likely add to the understanding of the nature of the various threats at any point in time. But the process must be a continual one; in today's global environment, threats may well change at virtually the same speed as changes in technology. Threat and risk assessments must keep pace.

The foregoing may be taken as hypercritical of the FBI. Let me state again my sincere admiration for that agency. I have had the opportunity on more than one occasion to work closely with the FBI. There is no lack of good intention at the Bureau; it will be a learning process, and I am convinced that constant improvement will be made. My comments are intended to be constructive in the continuing pursuit of more effectiveness in the collective efforts to combat terrorism.

Mr. Chairman, I will now briefly answer the Chairman's last question - "How do other countries allocate resources and determine funding priorities to combat terrorism?" - before coming back to the next to last question. While the more extensive work that I have done in this field has been on U.S. domestic efforts to combat terrorism, I have studied several comparative analyses of other countries' efforts in this arena. Israel is perhaps the most instructive, as it is one country that, for obvious reasons, has been required to devote a lot of attention and resources to the issue. Without delving in to all of the specifics, let me simply say that Israel has several advantages and some additional authorities, when compared to the United States, with which to combat its terrorism problems. First, its internal structure - e.g., Israeli law enforcement organized on a national hierarchy, compared to our Federal, state, and local independent entities -- helps to facilitate its efforts against terrorism, from policy, to planning, to resourcing, to command and control during an incident. Second, Israel does not have some of the same civil liberties protections that we enjoy; and we must assume that the American people do not want us to go down a road that would lessen those protections that we have.

A senior official of our national government is purported to have remarked recently that "Americans will willingly give up some of their civil rights" if a catastrophic terrorist event occurs. Mr. Chairman, I believe that, with proper planning and oversight, reasonable men and women, at all levels of government and from the private sector, can find ways to improve our own efforts to combat terrorism without having to resort to such measures.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman and Members, I will also respond briefly in this written submission to the Chairman's next to last question in the letter of invitation to testify today: "Is funding to combat terrorism being properly directed?" My first response to that question is, pardon me, with a question: "How can anyone tell?" In the absence of a true national strategy, ones that has an identifiable end state (or end states over time), with clearly articulated goals and objectives to reach the end state(s), and that specifically identifies priorities to support the accomplishment of those goals and objectives, the Congress is likely to continue to have hearings - ad infinitum and ad nauseum - repeating the same question. If you believe in the premise, as I and many others do, that the initial, and in some cases, the only response will come from the courageous men and women on the front lines of public safety every day - the local responders from fire services, law enforcement, emergency medical technicians, public health, primary medical care, emergency management - then a strategy must be developed with them primarily in mind. We currently have no such strategy. And no amount of touting Presidential Decision Directives (PDDs), the Attorney General's Five-Year Interagency Counterterrorism and Technology Crime Plan, or the recent budget submission jointly compiled by OMB and the NSC staff, nor all of them taking collectively, can amount to a true national strategy.

Moreover, the Executive Branch structure, for dealing with the various aspects of just the Federal efforts aimed at combating terrorism, continues to be in disarray. There is no effective coordination structure in place for overseeing the plans, programs, and budgets of the various agencies involved, which in turn means that Congressional grants of authority and resources are likewise not well coordinated and focused. Unless and until we can get the Federal act together, and provide some coherence and cohesion to all of the Federal processes - threat and risk assessments, Federal assistance to State and local entities, various types and appropriateness of responses by Federal entities (including the U.S. Armed Forces), coordination of the application of all our capabilities - we are unlikely to achieve a truly integrated and fully coordinated national effort.

Mr. Chairman and Members, I could devote many more pages to this latter topic, but I will at this point close with an expression of appreciation to the subcommittee for giving me this opportunity to testify, and with the offer to answer questions from any of you, either orally or in detailed written form.