House of Representatives

Transportation and Infrastructure Committee

Subcommittee on Aviation

 

Hearing on Checked Baggage Screening Systems

Planning for the December 31, 2002 Deadline

Friday December 7, 2001

 

TESTIMONY OF ROGER W. RIMINGTON,

CHIEF AVIATION SECURITY CONSULTANT

GLENEALY INTERNATIONAL LIMITED, UNITED KINGDOM

 

INTRODUCTION

 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

�

I am pleased to appear before you today to testify on behalf of Glenealy International Ltd., on how to scope, develop, and implement systems and procedures to accomplish 100% screening of checked baggage aboard passenger aircraft.� With me today are David Bilcliffe, Director of Operations, Kieran Gracie, Chairman, and Robert Satchwell, Director of Finance.�

 

I thought it would be helpful to give a brief introduction of Glenealy International Ltd., and the experience we can bring to bear on the issue before the subcommittee. Glenealy is a specialist aviation security consultancy based in the United Kingdom. Glenealy's staff has experience in Checked Baggage Screening Systems (known outside of the USA as Hold Baggage Screening) gained over the past ten years mainly at Manchester Airport. I joined Glenealy in August 2001, and my experience is both extensive and recent in Aviation Security (AVSEC) Operations.� That experience has been marked by a need to sort out practical problems at the work site.

 

As a result, Glenealy can provide a high degree of practical input to the developing security and operational situation at airports in the US, even though Glenealy has specialised in the application of the United Kingdom National Aviation Security Programme (UK Security Program) as specified and regulated by the UK Department of Transport, Local Government and the Regions (Department of Transport).

 

In light of the UK's extensive experience with terrorist threats and actions, the UK Security Programme has proved to be very successful in planning and implementing effective procedures to reduce vulnerability and countermeasures to threat. National standards have also been successfully enhanced in other countries through the adoption and implementation of UK Security Programme principles, executed by our staff outside the United Kingdom.

 

We are generally familiar with the Aviation and Transportation Security Act ("Security Act"), which Congress recently passed.� Under Section 110 of the Security Act , "a system must be in operation to screen all checked baggage at all airports in the U.S. as soon as practicable, but not later than the 60th day following the date of enactment of the Security Act".

 

The Secretary of Transportation recently announced that the Department could not meet this ambitious schedule. Attention now focuses on the requirement that 100% Hold Baggage Screening is introduced in the U.S. by the end of 2002. The Security Act presumes a system based on the use of explosive detection system (EDS) equipment, but allows for manual or other systems having a comparable effect. The key questions are: is implementation achievable within the given time scale, and if not, what steps can be taken to ensure aviation safety until it can be achieved?

 

I know you are well aware of the enormity of this task, given the 300+ qualifying airports in the US.� Although difficult, it is Glenealy's view that it can be achieved -- if confirmation is received from EDS suppliers; site evaluation of all the airports can be undertaken as a matter of urgency (and do not reveal the need for significant structural modification of terminals) and the training of staff in Hold Baggage Screening protocols can begin as soon as possible.�� If all this can be linked together, then the Aviation Security Act objective (12/31/02) in our view is achievable using a stand-alone system.

 

However, the resulting impact on the commercial operation will be considerable and passenger queuing times will be unprecedented, due in the main part to the standalone process. Why is this and how can these problems be solved?�� In answer to these important questions:

���

1.      The unprecedented queues refer to a standalone system for check-in baggage. This is why it is critical that a realistic percentage ratio is put in place. Our experience is that the legislators will aim high and the commercial heads will attempt to aim low.� The target percentage has to be achievable, understanding that the impact of 100% Hold Baggage Screening will be to have unprecedented queues at the larger volume airports.

�

2.      An integrated system will bring "normality" back into the check-in process and passengers will hardly be affected because the SMART system and the highly qualified operators that are required will be making their decisions within the restricted zone.

 

An "overload" contingency plan, dependent upon airport operation might be required that scaled down the 100% Hold baggage Screening from time-to-time so that the check-in operation is able to recover.� This would require robust management and specific authorisation under legislation and regulation.

 

However, the major problem is that a� "stand alone" system is an interim solution; it is not sustainable at many airports in the long-term.� Early consideration should be given to achieving inline integrated 100% Hold Baggage Screening and coincidental higher levels of security within a fully integrated system, which builds on international best practice.�

 

It is with these considerations in mind that I would like to share my experience at Manchester Airport with you so that you may come to an informed view on how best to proceed.�

 

MY EXPERIENCE AT MANCHESTER AIRPORT

 

Manchester Airport is one of Britain's, and the world's, principal airports. The third largest international airport in the U.K. after London Heathrow and Gatwick, and the fifth largest in Europe, it is comparable in volume terms with Washington Dulles. Manchester City Council and the other nine Greater Manchester District Councils own Manchester Airport plc.� The airport handles over 18 million passengers each year. Passenger traffic continues to grow: international traffic is growing at over 17% and domestic at over 24% annually. Manchester is served by four American airlines (USAirways, Delta, Continental and American).� Of great importance in the security arena, for decades it has been a prime point of entry and departure for travellers from Northern Ireland and is a gateway to the UK for El Al of Israel.�

 

On December 20, 1988 the U.K. and U.S. shared a common tragedy when terrorists exploded a bomb aboard Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie in Scotland. This gave a massive shock to the U.K. authorities. Ever since, the Department of Transport has adopted a policy to ensure that the systems in place at U.K. airports deter terrorists.

 

Manchester Airport, in accordance with UK Government Directives, set about the design and implementation of an inline 100% Baggage Screening Systems, partly in response to Lockerbie, but also to counter other terrorist threats.� As part of its development strategy, Manchester Airport wanted to develop and implement the very best system available.

 

It took almost four years to get the world's first 100% SMART Hold Baggage Screening System running live at Manchester Airport, largely using American technology. The system came on line in November 1996, operating 12 in-line Z-Scans at level 1 and 12 CTX 5000's at level 2.�� (These functions are explained more fully, below) The task was incredibly complicated and difficult, but eventually, after 3 years, the system worked in cohesion with the baggage delivery system.

�

Fortunately, airports in the U.S. can build on the lessons learned at Manchester to avoid many of the problems that came with implementation of the first system.� Manchester's system now uses 14 in-line Vivids and 14 CTX 5500's. Vivid EDS machines have been installed on a standalone basis to screen arriving Transfer Baggage and items which are Out of Gauge (too large, too heavy, too small, etc) in the check-in areas of all 3 terminals �

 

It is important to note that a baggage screening system alone will not repel the terrorist threat.� Rather, airports need to implement an integrated security system to cover multiple phases of the terrorist threats.� Thus, in addition to implementation of the 100% baggage screening systems, Manchester introduced the following security initiatives:

 

�                    Staff search (1989).

�                    Automatic pass validation (APV) (1989).

�                    Formal vulnerability assessments by the Department of Transport and other government agencies (1995).

�                    Annual audits by the Department of Transport on airports and airlines (1999)

�                    A 1 in 3 search of all passengers and hand baggage (which can be modified based on the level of threat) (1988).

�                    Catering searches (1989).

�                    The inclusion of cargo in the Department of Transport programme (1989).

�                    The introduction of ASIAD (Airport Security In Airport Design) (1990).

�                    Ratio vehicle search (2001).

�                    The screening of retail goods (1995 -- small broken down pallet loads;� larger, still unresolved).

�                    Digital closed circuit TV monitoring of operations and security staff performance (2001).

�                    Threat image projection (T.I.P.) (2001).

�                    Biometrics (facial Recognition) (2000).

�                    Counter Terrorists Checks of security staff (C.T.C.'s) (1997).

 

The above is not an exhaustive list, nor does it guarantee the prevention of acts of terrorism. It does, however, provide a major deterrent when fully integrated with the planning and implementation of the Checked Baggage Screening System.

 

The main uncertainty with the system is the human factor, which is either its greatest asset or its greatest burden; if staff are not performing to the required standards, then everything else becomes insignificant. We cannot overstate the importance of Selection, Training, Management, Auditing Standards and Staff Morale programmes being run in parallel with the planning and implementation of the Hold Baggage Screening System. Much has to be done to ensure that the right calibre of staff are performing properly along with the equipment. This enables the maintenance of consistently high standards in aviation security.

 

Experience in the UK indicates that it is easy to quickly get disillusioned at the prospect of having to achieve new, very high security standards. However, these fears can be overcome. The questions are how much it will cost, and how long will it take to get the system up and running? For example, Manchester Airport expects to be processing 20 million passengers during 2001/2002. The Cost Per Departing Passenger will be approximately �2.42p (roughly $3.60) for a fully integrated Aviation Security Programme containing all of the above.

 

One of the most understated improvements has been the introduction of T.I.P., Trace, Digital CCTV, Biometrics and a Service Level Agreement based on processing between 450 and 550 passengers an hour through one security lane, 550 to 1,100 through two lanes, etc.

 

The experience particularly at Manchester Airport has been a classic win/win solution, providing excellent security standards and the 95% to 98% achievement of a maximum waiting time of 4 minutes, for passengers processing through a search area.

 

Manchester now has a fully integrated airport security system. The bulk of the initial project remains intact although it is continually under review and improvement as projects under test achieve maturity.� Change is inevitable as passenger numbers grow and terminals become reconfigured to accommodate the volumes.

 

The above overview is the product of a number of years' hard experience and conforms to international "Best Practice".� Use of proven technology enables the security management team to concentrate on staff performance and resources in the knowledge that technology will perform properly, and the passenger flow process is not being compromised.

 

 

ASSESSMENT OF MANCHESTER EXPERIENCE

 

We offer the following personal observations based on hard experience with the Baggage Screening System project at Manchester Airport, from a specialist Operating perspective not an Engineering Design perspective.

 

Checked Baggage Screening Machines

 

Manchester initially installed Z Scan at level 1 and CTX 5000 at level 2. ��The Z-Scan did not deliver the manufacturer's claims in terms of bags per hour processed; and after 2 years of frustration, they were replaced with Vivid EDS machines. In addition, in 1999/2000 all CTX machines were upgraded to CTX 5500.

 

����������� EDS Function at Level 1

 

An EDS at level 1 will search for the organic compound of Explosive, hence EDS (Explosive Detection System).� If it traces anything that has any of the compounds found in explosives, it will set off an alarm.�� On an integrated system, the "threat" bag is diverted to the CTX. �If the CTX is not fitted, the bag is held at level 1 and the image is sent to a workstation where a security screener will resolve the image.� If the screener is unable to resolve the image, then passenger and baggage reconciliation is usually the next stage. EDS at level 1 will use different colours to circle and prioritise potential threats i.e. Red (explosive), Yellow (detonator)

 

����������� EDS Function at Level 2

 

EDS at level 2 is Cat Scan technology. There are currently only two FAA approved systems, Invision and L3.� An item sent to a level 2 machine from a level 1 machine is first X-rayed and then subjected to a rotational examination during which mm slices are taken and scrutinised by the CTX.� The CTX will make a decision and either clear a bag or pass it on to level 3, which is to a security screener.� The screener will use the control functions to take mm slices as required to resolve or escalate to level 4, passenger and bag reconciliation, or to level 5 which calls for Police Intelligence and intervention, which can result in a full evacuation of a terminal building.

 

To complete the process for Baggage Screening Systems, all Out-of-Gauge and Transfer points were fitted with 90% Vivid and 10% upgraded Z-Scans.� This accomplished a 100% SMART screening of all checked-in baggage items.� Prior to using EDS certified equipment, we used conventional X-rays and were required to open and physically hand search 1 in 10 bags (i.e. 10%).� This search percentage ratio could be increased or decreased dependent upon threat level. The Department of Transport legislation meant that where SMART EDS was deployed, then a ratio of physical searches was not required.� Instead, the EDS sets off an alarm on approximately 2% of all items, which enables security operator intervention.� The operator of the EDS will use the functions of the EDS control panel to resolve whether or not an object constitutes an actual threat.� If the operator is unable to resolve the potential threat, the operator will physically search the item in the presence of the owner (who remains with them until the item is cleared).� This only applies to Out-of-Gauge items from the check-in process.� For Transfer Baggage, if an operator is unable to resolve an item, a "Level 4" procedure is brought in which requires reconciliation of the item with the owner, usually at the central search area.

 

The whole system is monitored by closed circuit TV, has a baggage tracking system and reconciles bags at the end of the Baggage Screening process, using Triple 'A':

 

���������� Closed circuit TV ensures that there is no interference throughout the ����������� check-in to collection process and alerts Flow Control to any blockages that ����������� occur on the system.

 

���������� The baggage tracking system is called 'Mimic' and it uses photocells to check ����������� that a bag entering the system completes its journey.� If a bag gets stuck, ����������� which is a regular occurrence, then the Mimic using colour coding, will alert ���� the Flow Controllers and Hold Baggage Screening Controllers. Under normal ����������� circumstances, an engineer or other personnel will investigate and clear a ����������� blockage.

 

���������� Triple 'A' is a baggage reconciliation system. It uses the unique Bar Coding of ����������� a flight code and individual number, which is scanned at check-in, to track an ����������� item through the baggage delivery and screening process. When a bag ends up ����������� on its allocated chute, a member of handling staff scans the bag to confirm it ����������� has arrived. The bag is then loaded onto its baggage truck and when ready, the ����������� truck goes out to its aircraft.� Bags are scanned for a final time, as they are ����������� loaded onto an aircraft.� This allows Dispatchers to check that they have the ����������� correct bags loaded, and as far as physically possible, that they have not been ����������� tampered with.

 

 

Problems Encountered

 

The inline Hold Baggage Screening system at Manchester Airport commences when a bag is checked in. The bag is dispatched onto a general feed belt at the rear of check-in.� The collective effect of this is that a general feed belt could have multiple bags on it.� These bags enter the Restricted Zone through a portal and are transported towards an in-line Vivid EDS machine. One by one they are screened with waiting bags in "hold mode" on a series of queuing conveyors, which rotate independently of each other. The bag in the Vivid emerges from the machine and will either go through to the end of the process as a "cleared bag" or it will be ploughed across onto the CTX line as an "uncleared bag".

 

In 1996 the Z-Scan system was claimed to process 1,200 bags per hour with an average reject (or "uncleared bag") rate of 25%. Actual processing capability proved to be closer to 600 bags per hour with a reject rate of between 40 and 50% of all screened bags to the CTX, which could only screen 270 bags an hour. This caused "Dieback" to the system (a choking of the system that rippled back to the baggage entry point), and in the early days this resulted in massive check-in delays..

 

For two years there were serious problems at Manchester, as the system could not cope with the volume of bags, and the manufacturer could not make the necessary modifications within the timescales required by the Airport and Department of Transport.

 

We also found that the airlines' baggage check-in staff created substantial problems in the early days, as new staff was introduced at the beginning of peak travel seasons, primarily because they did not understand which types of bags should be dispatched through baggage screening systems, and which types should be processed by the Out-of-Gauge system described above.� As a result, too many bags which were too heavy, too light, or with straps hanging loose continued to clog up the system. �Improved training of check-in staff in these areas led to significant reduction in these problems, by processing overweight or underweight bags through the out-of-gauge system, and by properly tucking in straps.

 

The United States can avoid these major problems by adopting solutions which are tried and tested, and adapted to meet your requirements.

 

Overcoming Problems

 

It was agreed by the airport's Board through the winter of 1999 to strip out the Z-Scans and replace them with Vivids.� At the same time the CTX 5000's were upgraded to 5500's able to process more bags per hour. Additional queuing conveyors were added within the baggage system in the restricted zone to lines where these were needed due to insufficient queuing capacity, due in turn,� to space constraints in the baggage hall. Using more bends and ultimately more space, additional conveyors were added which allowed the system more recovery time in the event of blockages, and general baggage system faults.

 

The combination of Vivid/CTX 5500 (9000 is bigger, faster and more expensive) has solved most of the problems in Baggage Screening processing.� The system now achieves a rate of between 1,000 and 1,200 bags per hour per line, in real world conditions.� Vivid can process and screen 1,200 items per hour. CTX 5500 can process and screen 384 items per hour. Vivid's reject rate is less than 25% and two Vivids are supported by one CTX.

 

A major consideration is that the Baggage Screening System is merely a part of the overall Baggage Delivery System.� Experience proves that it is absolutely pointless trying to introduce Baggage Screening Systems in isolation; one has to look at the whole process and integrate it properly into the system.�� The point is that the baggage screening system must fit into the entire baggage delivery system (so bags wind up on the right flights, on a timely basis) and the baggage screening system must fit into an integrated security system, so that all known threats are defended against and vulnerability reduced to the minimum.

 

Checked Baggage System Output

 

As the experience at Manchester demonstrates, a fully integrated in-line EDS fitted in conjunction with the baggage system is capable of achieving 1,200 bags per hour per line.

 

There are 14 lines in total at Manchester Airport.� This enables 16,800 bags per hour to be screened; multiply this by a typical 6-hour peak in any one day equates to 100,800 bags daily.� In theory it is possible for the system to operate 365 days per year and handle 36,792,000 departing bags annually. �

 

A vital component of the integrated baggage system at Manchester is the "carousel" which is not accessible by the public.� Bags on busy lines can go around and find a line that has capacity, before eventually finishing up on the final baggage chute. Due to the fact that the Baggage Screening System fits in to a Baggage Delivery System, faults will inevitably occur, such as bags too heavy, loose straps getting caught on the system and snagging, malfunction of Vivid and or CTX, tilt trays breaking, and baggage belts tearing.�� In our view a "Carousel" based design is best equipped to handle this, because if the system breaks down, a Carousel can divert bags from one line to another utilizing redundancy.� There is also the added bonus that transfer baggage can be introduced into the system airside to go through the Baggage Screening Systems. 

 

Important Steps to Implementation

 

The following were considered fundamental steps to achieving successful implementation at Manchester Airport within the UK national legislation and National Security Programme:

 

�                    Having decided what the aims were, choosing the right equipment suppliers, baggage system designers and constructors.

�                    Putting the Project Plan in place with realistic dates and milestones.

�                    Consulting with the Airport Operators Committee (AOC)

�                    Choosing an expert Project Team to help implement the Project Plan.

�                    Allowing a minimum 6-month live trial period.

�                    Training, Protocols and Procedures written and introduced.

�                    Linking all areas i.e. Baggage Screening Systems, Control, Flow Control, Mimic System, closed circuit TV.

 

Learning From the Manchester Experience

 

I understand that a key interest of the Subcommittee is, given the experience at Manchester, what would we do differently in implementing a system of Hold Baggage Screening.� Specifically, given the mandate you have imposed, what should the Transportation Security Administration and U.S. airports/airlines do to plan and implement a 100% Hold Baggage Screening System by December 2002?

 

Manchester Airport was always keen to be at the forefront when it came to installing leading edge technology.� It learned a bitter lesson in trying to be the first to introduce 100% Baggage Screening, and other airports in the UK were able to learn from that experience and introduce Vivid as an alternative to Z-Scan.

 

Achievement of the timescale of December 2002 is unrealistic if the aim is to introduce 100% in-line Baggage Screening System compliance at all U.S. commercial service airports. The physical and operational complexities of each individual airport are unique to that airport.� The unique features of each baggage area and terminal layout are such that consideration has to be given and answers deduced for the following:

o       Baggage Hall Space availability.

o       Structural Load Bearings for EDS/CTX Equipment.

o       Route for EDS/CTX Equipment.

o       Ratio of check-in desks per line.

o       Height of baggage areas.

o       Centralised Baggage Screening System Control Room or dedicated separate terminal (running costs versus Command and Control)?

o       Consider whether to have EDS at level 1 and 2 (which will be less expensive in capital costs and not as thorough, but will add in terms of human resource costs and overtime), or to have EDS at level 1 and� CTX (EDS) at level 2.

�

The CTX, which is EDS technology, has additional features in that it uses an X-ray energy source and multiple detector arrays to create cross sectional images. 512 images are taken and the main drum of the CatScan rotates through 380 degrees and reconstructs slices of variable thickness. When data is presented in a Computer Tomography (CT) slice format, software algorithms can accurately determine the presence of an explosive threat.� This process clears approximately 70% of all bags automatically with no operator intervention.� The remaining bags are presented to the operator who uses the control panel functions to take further slices if necessary or clear the bag.� As noted above, EDS at level 1 & 2 provides a capital saving on CTX equipment but requires substantially more security personnel/operators and technically, is a less capable system.

 

NEXT STEPS: GENERAL APPROACH

 

Past reports indicate that various U.S. government commissions and agencies have made recommendation after recommendation, which, all too often have been ignored.� The U.K. experience has been that it is vital that an EDS/Baggage Screening System forms part of a fully integrated Airport Security Programme.��

 

In the UK, the relationship between the Regulator and the Regulated is critical to the success of the National Aviation Security Programme (National Security Programme) of which the 100% Baggage Screening System is an integral part.

 

The UK Government (Department of Transport) has stated through legislation what the airport has to do. It is not optional, and compliance has to be 100%. Similarly, through the leadership of this Subcommittee, Congress has already mandated the framework for an integrated approach to improving aviation security in the U.S.

 

In the U.K., an Airport/Airline is required to ensure that its own security programme is operating in compliance of the National Security Programme by running its own audit process.

 

Given that each airport has unique characteristics, it is vital that a fully integrated approach is followed.� If that were accepted, then the next waypoint, given experience at Manchester Airport, would be to:

 

�        Install Vivid at Level 1, CTX 5500 (or 9000 if capacity required) with a Carousel designed baggage system that utilized redundancy. Supported by Triple 'A', CCTV, Flow Control, Threat Image Projection and Centralised Baggage Screening System Control Room (dependant upon proximity of all terminals).

 

�        Provide Vivid at Out-of-Gauge and Transfer Baggage points.

 

�        In concert with surveillance and profiling, utilize a system to Radio Frequency (RF) tag bags to ensure that "selected" bags will be rejected at level 1 and sent to level 2 for enhanced search.� R.F. tags need to be recovered at the baggage sortation area and used again. (There are probably better alternatives to R.F. tagging available now)� R.F. tagging of High Risk bags (selected by CAPPS) along with an alarm signal to the Baggage Screening System Room to scrutinise in outside mode ensures� that this does not block or clog the overall system.

 

�        Invision and Perkins Elmer (who now own Vivid) know all of this and are quite able to demonstrate baggage flows on Computer Simulations. They are both U.S. companies and represent the best available Baggage Screening System solutions in the world.

 

 

SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS

 

The published objective in the United States is to introduce 100% Baggage Screening Systems by December 2002.� As currently structured this objective will be extremely difficult to achieve through implementation of in-line, integrated systems, which should be the ultimate goal, given my experience out of Manchester Airport and from ongoing projects elsewhere in the world.� However, if equipment is available, the objective can be met on an interim basis via standalone systems, which should then be replaced by integrated systems as they are tailored to the individual airports that can accommodate them.

 

 In our opinion, the way forward is to work with proven technology in the form of Vivid/CTX.� Earlier testimony reports "under utilization" and that CTX has been operated on a stand-alone basis at check-in averaging fewer than 200 bags per day! This is a big waste of money and technology. The CTX 5000 was designed to process about 270 bags per hour; the 5500, about 384 bags per hour; and the 9000, about 542 bags per hour.  

 

Experience proves that a fully integrated in-line system (fitted in line with the baggage system) is capable of, and can routinely achieve, 1,200 bags per hour per line. The example given above shows that 14 baggage lines can produce 16,800 bags per hour 100% screened; 16,800 times a typical 6-hour peak in any one day equates to 100,800 daily and multiplied by 365 days equates to an annual capability of 36,792,000 departing bags.

 

We believe that standalone systems will serve your purpose until integrated systems are designed and built.� In that event, we would advise using Vivid in bulk and if the security screeners perceive a threat, then they would refer to the CTX and action plan thereafter.� The design formula we use is 1 Vivid per 5 check-in desks and 1 CTX per 4 Vivid.

 

We believe that, through refinement of the process, the United States will ultimately achieve the objective of integrated systems incorporating 100% baggage screening, but not in the time frame given.� However the US could build on regime-tested experience and equipment for standalone systems where integrated systems cannot be deployed by December 31, 2002, while working towards the higher standard of fully integrated Aviation Security.�

 

The integrated approach regulated by the UK Department of Transport significantly improved UK public and industry confidence. It has a demonstrable track record of success at large and small volume airports, meeting UK Security Programme and operator requirements exactly.�

 

Given that US public confidence is of paramount importance, our recommendation would be to immediately adopt the following phased approach:

 

�        Categorise airports into A, B and probably C.

 

Cat A airport = 10 to 100 million passengers per annum

Cat B airport = 1 to 10 million passengers per annum

Cat C airport = 0 to 1 million passengers per annum.

 

�        Install Vivid at Check-in and Baggage Screening screen 100% check-in bags for Cat A.

�        Install Vivid at Cat B airports and screen 50% check-in bags.

�        Install Vivid at Cat C airports and screen 10% check-in bags.

�        Concentrate on equipping Cat A's with 100% in-line Baggage Screening Systems solution.

 

�        After Cat A airports are up and running, transfer standalone Vivid's to Cat B's and increase screening to 100%; transfer Vivid to Cat C's and increase to 50%.

 

�        During this program, Cat C airports would operate Vivid at level 1 and 2 and operate on a standalone basis.

 

�        If the equipment availability was proven, a Cat C airport would be able to function at 100% immediately if it had a Vivid, as the evidence shows that smaller airports can operate with a stand-alone Baggage Screening system.

 

�        We consider that current generation equipment available for operational use has a depreciated lifespan of circa 7 years.

�

It will be necessary to provide High-Visibility Security deterrents such as Digital Recorded CCTV, Command and Control Centre, visible Specialist Police presence, Biometrics, Intelligence Sharing (ultimately controlled by Law Enforcement only), High robust Jumbo Link type fencing all around the Restricted and Control Zones and patrolled 24 hours daily and CCTV monitored (electrified and alarmed).� Some, if not all, of these could be implemented almost immediately.

 

CONCLUSIONS

 

The experience we have gained in practical implementation of EDS/100% Hold Baggage Screening in the UK and elsewhere is that it is only effective when fully integrated within a total Aviation Security System.�

 

National legislation and regulation must work in parallel with experience, design and integration of the whole security operation.� Speed and successful implementation do not necessarily go together, but professional operating experience can enable positive changes to restore public confidence and quickly resolve problems through the delivery of practical solutions.

 

Glenealy International Limited would be pleased to work with the Subcommittee and the Administration and other appropriate parties as specialist consultants to help refine the planned implementation of Checked Baggage Screening Systems towards a cost effective program reflecting U.K. and international experience.� Specifically this program would likely include:

 

�               A practical and achievable implementation plan of action, with the support of the national aviation industry.

�               A rigorous application of existing legislation.

�               Identification, consensus and implementation of precise scope and timescales for each discrete project within the overall program.

�               Federal, state and local budgetary agreement on capital requirements, followed by tight control to ensure sufficient, but not excessive, expenditure.

�               Independent on-going reviews of security performance at each airport within the program, using experienced audit and inspection teams.

 

The Chairman and Board of Directors at Glenealy International Limited would like to thank the Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee for your kind invitation to submit testimony and trust you have found our presentation to be useful.� We would be pleased to respond to any questions you might have.

 

 

�

WITNESS

 

 

Roger W. Rimington

Chief Aviation Security Consultant

Glenealy International Limited

 

 

CONTACTS

 

United Kingdom

 

Mr David G. Bilcliffe

Director of Operations

Glenealy International Limited

 

66 Dane Park Road

Warlingham

Surrey CR6 9NP

United Kingdom

 

Telephone: +44 (0)1883 627974

Facsimile: +44 (0)1883 627974

Mobile: +44 (0)7799 883 978

E-mail: [email protected]

 

 

United States

 

Mr. Thomas R. Devine

Foley & Lardner

888 16^th St., N.W.

Washington, DC� 20008

Telephone: (202) 835-8096

Facsimile (202) 835-8238

E-mail: [email protected]