- ASSESSMENT OF CHECKPOINT SECURITY: ARE OUR AIRPORTS KEEPING PASSENGERS SAFE?

[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]

ASSESSMENT OF CHECKPOINT SECURITY: ARE OUR AIRPORTS KEEPING PASSENGERS
SAFE?

=======================================================================

HEARING

before the

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION

of the

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

__________

MARCH 17, 2010

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Serial No. 111-57

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Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TONGRESS.#13

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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, Chairman
Loretta Sanchez, California Peter T. King, New York
Jane Harman, California Lamar Smith, Texas
Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon Mark E. Souder, Indiana
Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of Daniel E. Lungren, California
Columbia Mike Rogers, Alabama
Zoe Lofgren, California Michael T. McCaul, Texas
Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas Charles W. Dent, Pennsylvania
Henry Cuellar, Texas Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida
Christopher P. Carney, Pennsylvania Paul C. Broun, Georgia
Yvette D. Clarke, New York Candice S. Miller, Michigan
Laura Richardson, California Pete Olson, Texas
Ann Kirkpatrick, Arizona Anh ``Joseph'' Cao, Louisiana
Ben Ray Lujan, New Mexico Steve Austria, Ohio
William L. Owens, New York
Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
Emanuel Cleaver, Missouri
Al Green, Texas
James A. Himes, Connecticut
Mary Jo Kilroy, Ohio
Dina Titus, Nevada
Vacancy
I. Lanier Avant, Staff Director
Rosaline Cohen, Chief Counsel
Michael Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Robert O'Connor, Minority Staff Director
------

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION SECURITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION

Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas, Chairwoman
Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon Charles W. Dent, Pennsylvania
Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of Daniel E. Lungren, California
Columbia Pete Olson, Texas
Ann Kirkpatrick, Arizona Candice S. Miller, Michigan
Ben Ray Lujan, New Mexico Steve Austria, Ohio
Emanuel Cleaver, Missouri Peter T. King, New York (Ex
James A. Himes, Connecticut Officio)
Dina Titus, Nevada
Vacancy
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi (Ex
Officio)
Michael Beland, Staff Director
Natalie Nixon, Deputy Chief Clerk
Joseph Vealencis, Minority Subcommittee Lead

C O N T E N T S

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Page

Statements

The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on
Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection.......... 1
The Honorable Charles W. Dent, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Pennsylvania, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection.......... 28
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on
Homeland Security.............................................. 4

Witnesses

Mr. Robin Kane, Assistant Administrator, Security Technology,
Transportation Security Administration:
Oral Statement................................................. 5
Prepared Statement............................................. 7
Mr. Bradley I. Buswell, Deputy Under Secretary, Science and
Technology Directorate, Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 11
Joint Prepared Statement of Mr. Bradley Buswell and Ms. Susan
Hallowell.................................................... 13
Mr. Stephen Lord, Director, Homeland Security and Justice Team,
Government Accountability Office:
Oral Statement................................................. 17
Prepared Statement............................................. 19
Mr. Kenneth J. Dunlap, Director of Security, International Air
Transport Association:
Oral Statement................................................. 50
Prepared Statement............................................. 52
Mr. Charles Barclay, President, American Association of Airport
Executives:
Oral Statement................................................. 56
Prepared Statement............................................. 57
Col. Eric R. Potts (Ret), Interim Aviation Director, Houston
Airport System:
Oral Statement................................................. 60
Prepared Statement............................................. 62
Mr. Marc Rotenberg, Executive Director, Electronic Privacy
Information Center:
Oral Statement................................................. 66
Joint Prepared Statementof Mr. Marc Rotenberg and Ms. Lillie
Coney........................................................ 67
Mr. Hasbrouck B. Miller, Vice President, Government Affairs,
Smiths Detection:
Oral Statement................................................. 68
Prepared Statement............................................. 70
Mr. Mitchel J. Laskey, President and CEO, Brijot Imaging Systems,
Inc.:
Oral Statement................................................. 73
Prepared Statement............................................. 75

For the Record

ASSESSMENT OF CHECKPOINT SECURITY: ARE OUR AIRPORTS KEEPING PASSENGERS
SAFE?

----------

Wednesday, March 17, 2010

U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Transportation Security and Infrastructure
Protection,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:00 p.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Sheila Jackson Lee
[Chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Jackson Lee, Thompson, Lujan,
Himes, Titus, Dent, Lungren, and Austria.
Ms. Jackson Lee [presiding]. The subcommittee will come to
order. This subcommittee is meeting today to receive testimony
on checkpoint security. Our witnesses will help us assess how
effectively we are deploying processes, procedures, and
technologies to enhance security at airports both at home and
abroad.
These meetings that you have consented to participate in
are so much a part of securing America.
Let me thank the witnesses ahead of time for their
commitment to this Nation. When we give testimony and hold
hearings, many times it is thought that it is perfunctory, that
information goes into large records, and that actions are not
generated.
This is a serious issue both in terms of the incident that
occurred at Newark Airport that showed an individual going in
the wrong direction, but creating sufficient havoc to shut down
the airport, then, of course, a very renowned incident that
occurred on Christmas day. That, too, is in the eye of not only
America, but around the world, and those who intend to do us
harm.
Your testimony is crucial today, and we appreciate that.
I am interested in making everyone aware that as we proceed
through this process, we will be holding a series of hearings
to constantly be engaged in how we can secure America. I yield
myself now time to give my opening statement.
We are here today to discuss how we are increasing the
security of airport checkpoints in the wake of the Christmas
day terrorist attack in the skies over Detroit. Given the risks
to our aviation sector, it is imperative that we take a
critical look at how DHS is integrating an effective layered
security approach into our aviation security program.
Today we will examine DHS processes to acquire and deploy
effective passenger screening technologies and procedures. This
includes the testing, evaluation, and approval of machines and
equipment designed for use at airport security checkpoints.
Coordination between DHS' Science and Technology Directorate
and the Transportation Security Administration is essential to
ensuring that the best technology is deployed in a systematic
way to address current and emerging threats to the aviation
system.
The need for effective coordination was once again made
plain by the incident on Christmas day. It is clear that our
adversaries still believe that our aviation sector is the point
of attack and that they would develop novel approaches to carry
out their objective. Accordingly, we must stay at least one
step ahead, and this coordination is an essential prerequisite
for doing so.
However, the strength of coordination between TSA and S&T
has been called into question by the Government Accountability
Office and developers of innovative technologies. The breach
cannot exist. It can no longer exist. The hand in glove
relationship between S&T and TSA and the inventiveness of the
American people and many others is crucial to securing the
millions of people that use the modes of transportation which
we are responsible for securing.
Not on my watch will we allow the slowness of the process
or even the potential unworkableness of the process stop the
ability of this committee to secure America. That is the
responsibility of the Homeland Security Committee under the
leadership of Chairman Bennie Thompson.
We have heard that navigating the DHS labyrinth of testing,
evaluating, and certifying technology has dissuaded the
acquisition and production of cutting-edge technology. Earlier
this year I directed staff to take a close look at the
relationship between TSA and S&T. This examination raised
concerns about the cohesion between both components.
Specifically, there appeared to be an almost incoherent
process for testing and deploying technologies and security
protocols. It is just plain slow. Roles and responsibilities
were not clearly defined, and it was clear from briefings that
increased oversight of this area is imperative. Components of
DHS must work in tandem in order to keep the American people
safe, and that is why I am happy that TSA, S&T, and GAO are
here today.
Again, as I begin this hearing, I thank all of you for the
public service that you render and your commitment to securing
America. How can we do it better together?
Last summer the House overwhelmingly supported H.R. 2200,
an authorization bill for TSA, which included a provision that
TSA and S&T develop a plan to more effectively deploy processes
and technologies to improve airport security.
We have passed that legislation in the House. We are
waiting patiently for this bill to move so it can be passed in
the other body and so the President can sign this innovative
and important legislation. We cannot wait much longer. The
question is how long will we wait? The answer is not long. This
provision will ensure that both organizations are operating
under the same parameters when developing measures to bolster
checkpoint security.
It must be noted that the Flight 253 incident also
highlighted vulnerabilities at foreign airports with direct
flights to the United States. The security at the last point of
departure airports is as critical to our aviation security as
the security of our domestic airports.
We know that work has been done. We know that there have
been international visits to assess those ports that many
Americans are leaving from overseas. There has been work, but
there needs to be partnership in the work that includes
technology, inventiveness and, yes, the bottom line of: How do
we secure America?
I would like to take this opportunity to congratulate the
Secretary for her dedication to strengthening our relationship
with foreign partners. This diplomacy is important to ensuring
that all airports meet an acceptable standard for checkpoint
security. TSA has been working with foreign airport operations
and air carriers in implementing stronger security screening
protocols, but challenges remain. Today we will hear about
these international challenges and the ways to best address
them.
This hearing will also afford us with an opportunity to
talk about the much-discussed advance imaging technology or
whole body imaging machines. Nearly all relevant stakeholders
are present today, so we will glean several important
perspectives about the efficacy of the AIT and the deployment
plan.
The administration has announced its intent to ultimately
deploy 1,000 of these machines by the end of fiscal year 2011.
While I applaud this development, we will look forward to
fleshing out the particulars that will make this decision an
even better decision.
We want to work with the administration. We are partners in
being able to secure this Nation. For example, the cost of this
deployment is significant, and it brings with it the need for
increased TSA personnel and potentially significant costs to
modify airport terminals and checkpoints. Let me clarify when I
say increased TSA personnel. Increased, proficiently trained
personnel is the key to helping us secure America.
Today we will discuss AIT and how it fits into DHS' plan
for deploying technology and how to address the operational
challenges associated with this deployment. We will also learn
about the Secretary's attempt to have similar technology
located abroad.
Today's hearing offers more than just an opportunity to
discuss the status quo in aviation security. It is an
opportunity to envision where we want to be. Technologies have
their limitations, but empowering our TSA workforce with
adequate training, information, and innovative technologies
will undoubtedly lead to the next generation of checkpoint
security.
I know that this is the first of many examinations of this
important topic. We need the commitment and resources of
Government and industry to promote more efficient airport
security. Accordingly, I was pleased to learn about the recent
establishment of a blue ribbon panel by the travel industry
aimed at providing recommendations on how to secure the
aviation sector in the 21st century.
Today's hearing affords us with an opportunity to see how
we can efficiently deploy security technologies and procedures.
These require the relevant components of the Department to work
together, and it also requires the Department to work with
relevant stakeholders, many of which are represented today.
The Chairwoman now recognizes the Chairman of the full
committee, the gentleman from Mississippi, who has been a major
leader on both the fixing of the system, but also the pushing
of the system to be able to expeditiously and absolutely secure
America, Mr. Thompson of Mississippi, for his opening
statement.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman, and
let me thank you for holding this important hearing.
The work we do today will help to inform us of DHS' effort
to keep the flying public safe and secure. In addition, the
preparation for such a hearing may also help the relevant
components of DHS--in today's case, S&T and TSA--to move more
effectively to cooperate.
With that said, I would like to thank the witnesses for
appearing before us today.
In January the full committee held a hearing that took a
close look at the events surrounding the attack on December 25.
The attack on December 25 was a reminder that terrorists
continue to plot against our aviation system, so we must remain
vigilant and aggressive. That hearing shed light on the
counterterrorism efforts and the information-sharing processes
that must be improved across the Government as we address the
very real terrorist threat. Likewise, the hearing highlighted
some of the steps taken by the Department soon after the
December 25 incident, particularly in the aviation sector.
The Department has made great efforts to enhance airport
security in the aftermath of that attack by strengthening
relationships with international partners and enhancing
checkpoint security here at home. I look forward to an update
from the Department on its development in partnering with
foreign countries and how those efforts will bolster security.
In addition, we are taking another step today to evaluate
the processes in the Department that are in place to develop,
procure, and deploy innovative technologies and procedures at
our airports. Without robust and clear processes, we will never
be one step ahead of those wishing to do us harm. GAO has
called into question whether the process DHS has in place is
effective, and we will hear more about that from all the
stakeholders today.
Obviously, there is no single technology or procedure that
we can rely on to mitigate all the risks. However, through a
strategic and transparent framework, we can ensure that our
checkpoints are able to incorporate a layered security program
that successfully identifies people wishing to cause us harm. I
hear a lot about our layered security approach, and I believe
it has the potential to make us more secure.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses and am
committed to improving our checkpoint security in order to meet
the changing challenges we face. There is clearly a lot of work
to do to improve how the Department deploys small technology
and procedures so I am pleased this hearing will help to begin
this process. I now yield back.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I want to acknowledge the presence at the time of the gavel
of Mr. DeFazio and to acknowledge Members, Mr. Lujan, Mr.
Himes, and Ms. Titus, for their presence here today as we begin
this hearing. Thank you so very much.
Other Members of the subcommittee are reminded that under
committee rules opening statements may be submitted for the
record.
I welcome our first panel of witnesses. Our first witness
is Mr. Robin Kane, the assistant administrator in the Office of
Science Technology at TSA. Mr. Kane oversees the development
and implementation of security technologies across multiple
modes of transportation.
Our second witness, Mr. Bradley Buswell, is a deputy under
secretary at the S&T Directorate at DHS. He is accompanied by
Dr. Susan Hallowell, who is the director of Transportation
Security Laboratory, which is a part of S&T. Dr. Hallowell will
assist with any technical elements of our discussion.
Our third witness, Stephen Lord, is the director of GAO's
Homeland Security and Justice Issues Division and is
responsible for directing numerous GAO engagements on aviation
and surface transportation issues. We welcome him back.
Without objection, the witnesses' full statements will be
inserted in the record. I now ask each witness to summarize his
statement for 5 minutes, beginning with Mr. Kane.
I have indicated in my statement, as the Chairman has, we
do this hearing in the backdrop of what took the attention and
the breath of the world and the United States of a Christmas
day bomber on one of our most special and sacred days to
penetrate, if you will, the sanctity of our security and to
send signals that we want to correct. We are not beginning
today, but this is a continuing, to ensure that these kinds of
incidences are stopped.
Mr. Kane, we are prepared to hear you at this time for 5
minutes.

STATEMENT OF ROBIN KANE, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, SECURITY
TECHNOLOGY, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

Mr. Kane. Good afternoon, Chairwoman Jackson Lee, Chairman
Thompson, distinguished Members of the subcommittee. Thank you
for the opportunity to appear today to discuss aviation
security technology at passenger screening checkpoints in the
United States.
TSA procures and deploys all of the screening technologies
for people and their bags in U.S. airports. Approximately 1.8
million people and their belongings are screened by these
technologies every day. TSA operates and maintains over 10,000
pieces of equipment used by our transportation security
officers to conduct this screening.
The attempted attack on Northwest Flight 253 on December 25
was a powerful reminder that terrorists will go to great
lengths to defeat the security measures that have been put in
place since September 11, 2001. The Department of Homeland
Security's review of the Flight 253 incident produced five
recommendations that Secretary Napolitano presented to the
President.
Technology plays a critical role in three of those
recommendations. We are accelerating the deployment of advanced
imaging technology in U.S. airports and seeing an international
move in the same direction. We have built on our partnership
with the Department of Energy to establish a new initiative to
engage the National laboratories in developing emerging
aviation security technologies. And we are working with our
international partners to strengthen international security
measures, particularly technology requirements.
Advanced imaging technology, or body scanners, as they have
become more commonly described, is the most promising current
technology for detecting small quantities of explosives
concealed on passengers. We expect to deploy almost 500 units
that will be operating in the airports by the end of this
calendar year. The President's fiscal year 2007 budget request
includes funding for an additional 500 AIT units, which would
bring the total to nearly 1,000 Nation-wide. This will provide
screening of nearly 65 percent of passengers for metallic and
nonmetallic threats.
The other primary screening device at the checkpoint is the
X-ray machine. Advanced technology X-ray machines are the
latest technology to screen carry-on bags. An upgraded version,
which is ready for field testing, includes automated detection
algorithms for explosives, a capability that we retrofitted to
the over 900 AT X-rays that are currently deployed to 81
airports Nation-wide. TSA will procure approximately 1,300
additional machines, and we will deploy them to nearly every
checkpoint by the end of 2011.
Explosive trace detection equipment, or ETDs, have been the
workhorse of the TSA technology fleet since the agency's
inception. ETDs detect a wide range of explosives. TSA has been
expanding the use of ETDs at checkpoints and gates in airports
to enhance the unpredictability of screening and increase
overall effectiveness.
The President's fiscal year 2011 budget includes a request
for 800 portable ETD units to complement the approximately
2,000 tabletop units we have at these checkpoints today.
We are fielding these technologies that are effective
against known and emerging threats. However, terrorists are
agile and determined. TSA works closely with DHS Science and
Technology to ensure we have a solid process to identify and
develop additional promising technologies. TSA uses
intelligence and operational feedback to identify requirements
that assist S&T in prioritizing research and development
efforts.
TSA works with the technology industry to drive improved
detection capabilities. We issue formal requests for
information and requests for proposals to provide direction on
TSA's intents for future purposes. TSA also hosts industry days
and meets regularly with vendors to refine requirements and
identify potential new solutions.
Part of the procurement process is a rigorous testing
regime to ensure those technologies meet the requirements and
are ready to perform in an operational environment. We test
equipment in three settings: A lab environment such as the
Transportation Security Lab, at TSA's systems integration
facility, and in the field or operational test and evaluation.
Technologies that pass this rigorous three-part testing are
included on our qualified products list. TSA leaves this
process open so vendors may enter the testing and qualification
process when they are ready, resulting in what we call a
rolling QPL. TSA competitively purchases equipment off these
QPLs, resulting in better value to the taxpayer.
TSA and S&T also work closely with our international
partners and numerous working groups to improve aviation
security technology. These groups focus on coordinating R&D
efforts and harmonizing technology standards and processes.
TSA's qualified products lists are considered the gold
standard by many countries. Sharing this type of information
with those countries offers greater options for determining the
mix of technology, processes, and people to meet international
security standards.
Technology is critical to aviation security; however, it is
just one element in the multi-layered strategy that includes
the behavior detection officers, bomb appraisal officers,
Federal air marshals, canine teams, well-trained personnel, and
a ready and engaged traveling public. While new technologies
offer great promise in DHS' on-going efforts to secure our
homeland, no technology provides a guarantee against the threat
of a terrorist attack. We need the layered security regime.
Thank you for your continued assistance and support of TSA
and for the opportunity to speak with you today. I welcome any
questions when it is appropriate.
[The statement of Mr. Kane follows:]

Prepared Statement of Robin Kane
March 17, 2010

Good afternoon Chairman Jackson Lee, Ranking Member Dent, and
distinguished Members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the
opportunity to appear today to discuss the technology utilized at
passenger screening checkpoints at United States airports. The
attempted attack on Northwest Flight 253 on December 25 was a powerful
reminder that terrorists will go to great lengths to defeat the
security measures that have been put in place since September 11, 2001.
As Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano has testified at
recent hearings regarding the attempted attack, this administration is
determined to thwart terrorist plots and disrupt, dismantle, and defeat
terrorist networks.
Today I will give an overview of passenger screening technologies
currently in place and discuss the Transportation Security
Administration's (TSA) on-going development and deployment of new
technologies, in coordination with the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) Science and Technology Directorate (S&T), the Transportation
Security Laboratory (TSL), and other key Federal agencies and academic
and private sector centers of research. I will discuss some of the
promising technologies we are currently developing, and how we are
working to ensure that the technological advances we are making in the
United States become available to enhance screening by our partners
abroad.

RESPONSE TO NORTHWEST FLIGHT 253

Following the attempted attack on Northwest Flight 253, President
Obama made clear that we need to take additional actions to address the
systemic vulnerabilities highlighted by that failed attack. At the
President's and Secretary Napolitano's direction, to enhance the safety
of the traveling public, DHS will pursue several key steps in which
technology plays a critical role:
Accelerate deployment of advanced imaging technology to
provide greater explosives detection capabilities and encourage
foreign aviation security authorities to do the same.
Establish a partnership on aviation security between DHS and
the Department of Energy and its National laboratories in order
to develop new and more effective technologies to deter and
disrupt known threats and proactively anticipate and protect
against new ways by which terrorists could seek to board an
aircraft.
Work with international partners to strengthen international
security measures and standards for aviation security.

ACCELERATE TECHNOLOGY DEPLOYMENT

TSA has already made great strides in accelerating the deployment
of technology to enhance both checkpoint screening (for passengers and
carry-on baggage) and checked baggage screening. The $1 billion in
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) funds provided to TSA in
2009 has played a major role in this effort. Of the $1 billion
allocated to TSA for aviation security projects, approximately $700
million was dedicated to checked baggage screening technology,
including in-line Explosives Detection Systems (EDS), and approximately
$300 million was allocated for checkpoint explosives detection
technology.
TSA uses a comprehensive research, testing, and deployment process
to ensure that technology deployed to U.S. airports is effective in
detecting threats and can withstand the operational and environmental
rigors of a system that screens nearly 2 million passengers each day.
The technology development lifecycle takes time--several years in some
cases. While TSA and its vendors are working to deploy the latest
aviation security technology to U.S. airports as quickly as possible,
there are development logistical limits to how quickly new technologies
become available.
As is the case with TSA's approach to overall security, the
objective in technology development and deployment is to find the most
effective means to detect threats while facilitating travel and
commerce and respecting personal privacy. The following are some of the
technologies that we are deploying in pursuit of that goal.

Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT)
One of the most promising current technologies for detecting small
quantities of explosives concealed on passengers is AIT. AIT safely and
effectively screens passengers for metallic and nonmetallic threats,
including weapons and explosives, without physical contact. TSA has
assessed multiple types of AIT systems, including backscatter X-ray and
millimeter wave.
Currently, 40 AIT units are deployed at 19 U.S. airports for both
primary and secondary screening. Through ARRA funding, we procured 150
additional units, which will be deployed principally for primary
screening purposes starting in early 2010, and we are in the process of
procuring an additional 300 AIT units in fiscal year 2010. TSA has also
budgeted for an additional 500 AIT units in fiscal year 2011, which
will bring the total to approximately 1,000 Nation-wide.
In its deployment of AIT across the country, TSA has implemented
strong safeguards--reviewed by the DHS Privacy Officer--to ensure the
protection of passenger privacy and anonymity. TSA requires
manufacturers to include software algorithms in AIT systems that blur
the face on the image of the body during screening. Additionally, TSA
requires that AIT machines in operation at airports cannot store images
of screened passengers; storage capability is activated only for
testing purposes. Furthermore, the Transportation Security Officer
(TSO) who views the AIT image is located separately from the TSO at the
screening location who assists the passenger through screening, to
avoid a specific individual from being associated with the image.
Finally, the passenger may choose whether to undergo screening by this
technology or proceed through a walk-through metal detector (WTMD)
followed by a pat-down. Current data shows that over 98 percent of
passengers opt for AIT screening.
TSA continues to explore additional privacy protections through
automated threat detection, which would transmit images only when an
alarm is triggered. In collaboration with DHS S&T, the security
technology industry, and our international partners, software
development is currently underway and will be followed by testing to
ensure effective detection with minimal false alarms.

Explosives Trace Detectors (ETD)
ETD equipment can detect a wide range of explosives, including
Pentaerythritol tetranitrate (PETN), a key explosive used in the
attempted attack on Northwest Flight 253. ETDs have previously been
used to examine carry-on baggage for the presence of explosives residue
and are currently being piloted at five airports for use on passengers'
hands. Approximately 2,000 units are currently deployed in airports
Nation-wide for passenger screening and the President's fiscal year
2011 budget includes a request for $60 million for approximately 800
portable ETD machines ($39 million) and associated checkpoint
consumables ($21 million). Expanding the use of ETD beyond checkpoints
and throughout airports will enhance the unpredictability of screening
and increase overall screening effectiveness.

Advanced Technology (AT) X-Ray
Advanced technology (AT) X-ray machines are the latest technology
to screen carry-on baggage. AT X-ray provides multiple views and a
greatly enhanced display that is much clearer and more detailed than
that provided by current X-ray technology. The latest version, which is
ready for testing in the field, includes automated detection algorithms
for bulk explosives and liquid explosives--capabilities that will be
retrofitted to the 922 AT X-ray machines currently deployed to 81
airports Nation-wide. TSA anticipates having contracts in place by the
end of fiscal year 2010 to purchase approximately 1,300 machines,
enough to cover remaining U.S. airports, with deployment to be
completed in early 2011. In fiscal year 2011, we plan to buy 25
additional units and will upgrade the existing fleet with new software
algorithms that bring that equipment in line with the new equipment.

Next Generation Bottled Liquid Scanner (BLS-2) Technology
Bottled liquid scanners provide TSA with enhanced liquid detection
capability by screening carry-on luggage to detect potential explosive
liquid or gel threats. BLS-2 systems can work either in conjunction
with AT X-ray screening or as stand-alone devices to conduct primary
screening of liquids. TSA has already purchased 500 units and has
started deployment to airports, with plans to procure and deploy an
additional 800 BLS-2 systems to all U.S. airports by the end of 2010.

DHS AVIATION SECURITY PARTNERSHIP WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND ITS
NATIONAL LABORATORIES

As a result of the President's directive on aviation security
following the attempted attack on Christmas day, DHS has built on its
partnership with the Department of Energy (DOE) and its National
Laboratories in order to develop new and more effective technologies to
deter and disrupt known threats and proactively anticipate and protect
against new ways by which terrorists could seek to board an aircraft.
We have established joint working groups to bring the laboratories'
technical expertise to bear on three critical areas: Aircraft
vulnerabilities, systems analysis of our approach to detection and
screening, and new technology with potential application to aviation
security.
In addition, a number of interagency initiatives are already
underway including: Research and development to increase screener
efficiency and effectiveness; enhanced detection of passengers who
intend to do harm and personnel who may pose insider threats; next-
generation fully automated checkpoints for detecting weapons and
explosives on individuals for aviation, mass transit, large public
venues or other potentially high-risk buildings; enhanced automatic
imaging systems and trace explosives detection equipment that screen
for explosives and other prohibited items; and new tools for biometric
identification and credential validation.
Many of these projects are expected to show significant progress in
the near-term as similar or related projects were already underway.
Other projects, such as developing next-generation fully automated
checkpoints for detecting weapons and explosives on people, will likely
take several years to become operational.

WORKING WITH OUR INTERNATIONAL PARTNERS

DHS is also working with international partners, law enforcement,
and the aviation industry to enhance international aviation security
standards and practices--particularly for international flights bound
for the United States. The fiscal year 2011 budget requests funding to
further expand TSA's international presence and enhance support to
countries that seek assistance, including $40 million and 74 positions
(37 FTE) to manage international programs at 15 of our 19 existing
offices around the globe. The 74 new positions, which include 34
Transportation Security Specialists, 10 International Industry
Representatives, and a 10-person Rapid Response Team, will be
strategically placed in high-risk areas such as the Middle East and
Africa.
In January, Secretary Napolitano dispatched Deputy Secretary Lute
on an international trip during which she and other senior Department
officials consulted with dozens of ministers, deputy ministers, and
senior officials from 13 countries across six continents to review
security procedures and technology being used to screen passengers on
flights bound for the United States and work with our international
partners on ways to collectively bolster our international aviation
security system.
As a result of this trip, the Spanish Minister of Interior Minister
invited Secretary Napolitano to participate in the first organizational
meeting of the Spanish EU Presidency of Justice and Home Affairs
ministers, a plenary of 33 countries in Toledo, Spain. At this meeting,
there was broad consensus and a clear sense of urgency to take
immediate action to strengthen security measures. Specifically,
Secretary Napolitano and her European counterparts signed a joint
declaration affirming their collective commitment to strengthening
information sharing and passenger vetting, deploying additional proven
security technologies, and bolstering international aviation security
standards. Secretary Napolitano found a similarly strong consensus in
Geneva where she met with the leaders of the airlines that are part of
the International Air Transport Association--which represents
approximately 230 airlines and more than 90 percent of the world's air
traffic. All attendees agreed that government and the private sector
must work collaboratively both to develop enhanced international
security standards and--most importantly--to effectively implement
them.
These meetings were the first in a series to bring about
international agreement on stronger aviation security standards and
procedures. For example, the International Civil Aviation Organization,
the United Nations agency that focuses on international civil aviation,
has facilitated several regional aviation security meetings--including
one in Mexico City, jointly hosted by Mexico and Brazil and one in
Tokyo--to build on the progress made in Toledo and Geneva.
The discussions from these meetings and the deputy secretary's trip
will culminate in an international ministerial meeting, being planned
for later this year, to develop, review, and ultimately adopt key
measures and proposals for increasing aviation security worldwide.
TSA and S&T also work closely with our international partners
through a number of working groups, task forces, and other committees
focused on improving aviation security, identifying promising
technologies, and harmonizing technology standards and processes. These
groups include:
DHS Explosives Standards Working Group (ESWG).--The ESWG is
co-chaired by TSA and the DHS Office of Infrastructure
Protection, Protective Security Coordination Division (PSCD).
This group provides DHS agencies a forum for collaboration and
information exchange with other Federal, State, and local
government agencies and non-government entities on explosives
countermeasure standards and conformity assessment measures.
This group also drives explosives standards requirements and
policy.
European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) Technical Task
Force.--ECAC is an intergovernmental organization comprised of
44 Member States throughout Europe. TSA meets with ECAC
representatives multiple times throughout the year to partner
on technology standards and policy development related to
aviation security.
Technical Support Work Group (TSWG).--TSA participates in
the TSWG, a group sponsored by the Defense Department, with an
emphasis on technology research, engineering, and development
for aviation security-related projects. The group has
significant influence internationally and funds projects
submitted from both U.S. and non-U.S. members.
NATO Explosives Detection Group.--TSA meets with other NATO
member countries to collaborate on next generation explosives
detection technology and to share best practices.

CONCLUSION

Technology is critical to aviation security; however, it is just
one element in a multi-layered strategy that includes Behavior
Detection Officers, Bomb Appraisal Officers, Federal Air Marshals,
canine teams, well-trained personnel, and a ready and engaged traveling
public. The attempted attack on Christmas day failed due in no small
part to passengers and crew members who acted quickly and courageously
to subdue the attacker and gain control of the situation.
While new technologies offer great promise in DHS's on-going
efforts to secure our homeland, no technology is a silver bullet
against the threat of a terrorist attack. This reality makes it all the
more critical that we are working together at all levels--Federal,
State, and local governments, our international partners, and the
American public--to counter threats.
The Department of Homeland Security and the Transportation Security
Administration are using every tool at our disposal to prevent, detect,
and deter terrorism and protect the traveling public.
Thank you for your continued assistance to TSA and for the
opportunity to speak with you today. I would be pleased to respond to
your questions.

Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you for your testimony.
I now recognize Mr. Buswell to summarize his statement for
5 minutes.

STATEMENT OF BRADLEY I. BUSWELL, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY,
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DIRECTORATE, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY

Mr. Buswell. Good afternoon, Chairwoman Jackson Lee,
Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member Dent, distinguished Members
of the committee. I am honored to appear before you today to
report on the Science and Technology Directorate's research,
development, test, and evaluation efforts relating to airport
passenger screening technology.
First, I would like to personally thank the committee
Members and the staff for their continuing support of S&T in
our mission to deliver technology to protect the American
people. S&T is charged with providing technical support and
tools to the major DHS operating components and our Nation's
first responders, all of whom are on the front lines of
homeland security every day.
S&T funds basic research and technology development and
supports the Department's major acquisition programs through
testing, evaluation, and the development of standards. As Mr.
Kane said, the Transportation Security Administration has the
lead role in defining the performance requirements of equipment
that are installed at our airports as part of our security
measures. DHS, S&T, and TSA coordinate closely on research
efforts and equipment test and evaluation to ensure that the
Department is investing in technologies that meet TSA's
operational needs to protect the traveling public.
The Department's research and development priorities are
primarily customer-driven through the Capstone Integrated
Product Team process. The customers and stakeholders in this
process play a key role in informing DHS S&T's decision-making
about research and development investment. DHS customers chair
the Capstone IPTs and establish their desired capability
priorities based on their assessment of risk in their
respective mission areas. TSA leads the Transportation Security
Capstone IPT. Mr. Kane does that personally.
Our research priorities in aviation security have been and
continue to be to improve the capability of currently fielded
screening equipment and procedures in the near term and develop
and deploy new equipment and procedures that are more effective
in the long term.
All three of our research portfolios, the product
transition portfolio focused on the near-term deliverables, the
basic research portfolio focused on long-term discovery and
invention, and the innovation portfolio led by the Homeland
Security Advanced Research Projects Agency, or HSARPA,
participate in this IPT process.
While the IPT members drive the selection of the near-term
product transition projects, the expressed needs that arise
from this process also inform the selection of projects in our
basic research portfolio and the higher risk, high payoff
innovation portfolio undertaken by HSARPA.
The Capstone IPT process is effective at identifying high-
priority technology needs, but we are constantly looking for
ways to better meet those needs. In response to the President's
direction, as Mr. Kane described, we have recently established
the Department of Homeland Security/Department of Energy
aviation security enhancement partnership as an under
secretary-level governance mechanism for managing the
partnership between DHS and DOE National laboratories to
advanced technical solutions to key aviation security problems.
Now, partnering with the National laboratories is not new
for us. Since its inception DHS has worked in close
collaboration with the DOE National laboratories in pursuit of
technology supporting the operational needs of DHS, but this
particular partnership is unique in its focus and will allow us
to extend and leverage this long-standing relationship to
accelerate the delivery of key advanced aviation security
technologies and knowledge.
DHS S&T also plays an important role in the test and
evaluation of equipment in advance of major acquisition
decisions. S&T's director of test and evaluation standards
approves the test and evaluation master plans that describe the
necessary developmental and operational testing that must be
conducted in order to determine system technical performance
and operational effectiveness and suitability throughout the
development process.
The director of operational test and evaluation is
responsible for reviewing and approving the operational test
plan for each major DHS acquisition program and providing
independent assessments to the DHS acquisition review board
prior to major acquisition decisions.
As Mr. Kane said, for aviation security technologies, the
actual testing is led by TSL, the Transportation Security
Laboratory in Atlantic City. TSL conducts independent
verification and validation tests, including certification
tests, qualification tests, and laboratory assessments,
depending on the maturity of the type of the detection
equipment.
I am delighted to have alongside me today Dr. Susan
Hallowell, director of TSL, to whom I will promptly refer all
of your difficult questions.
Ladies and gentlemen, aviation security is clearly an
endeavor of global importance, and success will require the
full involvement of the Homeland Security research enterprise,
Government, academia, the private sector, and our international
partners. In addition to the DHS-DOE aviation security
enhancement partnership, we are also utilizing our intra-
Government partnership with DOD to ensure that we are fully
utilizing their research investments as we pursue capabilities
to keep the traveling public safe.
Academia is a critical partner in long-term research and
development of the science and technology workforce that
America will need to maintain its security. Our university-
based centers of excellence are leading long-term efforts to
ensure we are keeping the technology pipeline full.
The December 25 event made it clear that terrorism knows no
borders. Similarly, the directorate continues to look to the
international community for technologies and techniques
critical to bolstering aviation security, and I am personally
engaged with the 10 countries with which we have formal
bilateral S&T agreements to ensure we have identified the most
promising aviation security technologies and techniques around
the globe.
Finally, I am acutely aware that American innovation also
resides outside of the Federal Government. That is why we are
fully engaged with the private sector to ensure we are hearing
their technological ideas across a broad range of mission areas
that we support, including aviation security.
Members, thank you for your dedicated efforts to improve
the safety of air travel for all Americans, and I appreciate
the opportunity to be here and look forward to your questions.
[The joint statement of Mr. Buswell and Ms. Hallowell
follows:]

Joint Prepared Statement of Bradley I. Buswell and Susan Hallowell
March 17, 2010

INTRODUCTION

Good afternoon, Chairwoman Jackson Lee, Congressman Dent, and
distinguished Members of the subcommittee. I am honored to appear
before you today on behalf of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
to report on the Science and Technology Directorate's (S&T) research,
development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) efforts relating to airport
passenger screening technology.

Passenger Screening Capability Development
S&T has a variety of roles in the Department. S&T provides
technical support and tools to the major DHS operating components and
the Nation's first responders; funds basic research and technology
development; and supports the Department's major acquisitions through
testing, evaluation, and the development of standards.
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) protects the
Nation's transportation systems to ensure freedom of movement for
people and commerce. While TSA has the lead role in defining the
performance of airport security equipment, S&T and TSA coordinate
closely on research efforts and equipment test and evaluation to
advance capabilities that best protect the traveling public. These
efforts have yielded numerous technical improvements that enhance the
effectiveness of screening techniques and technologies while moving
increasing numbers of people more quickly through security.
The Department's research and development priorities are primarily
customer-driven through our Capstone Integrated Product Team (IPT)
process. DHS customers--such as TSA--chair the Capstone IPTs and
establish their desired capability priorities based on their assessment
of risk in their respective mission areas. Three IPTs--Transportation
Security, Counter Improvised Explosive Devices (C-IED), and People
Screening--are dedicated to identifying and delivering technological
solutions for detecting and countering threats to the safety and
security of the traveling public. Our Transportation Security IPT, led
by TSA with support from S&T's Explosives Division, strives to identify
and deliver technologies to improve our layered approach to aviation
security. TSA is also an integral member of the People Screening IPT,
providing valuable input as a user of proposed screening technologies.
Finally, the Counter-IED IPT works to identify and develop trace
detection and standoff imaging technologies that will impact the next
generation of checkpoint technologies.

[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

All three DHS S&T portfolios--Product Transition, Innovation/
Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency (HSARPA), and Basic
Research--participate in the IPT process. While the IPT members drive
the selection of Product Transition projects, the expressed needs that
arise from this process also inform the selection of projects in our
Basic Research portfolio and similarly inform the higher-risk/high pay-
off initiatives undertaken by our Innovation/HSARPA portfolio. The more
insight we gain regarding current and future threats and the capability
gaps of our stakeholders, the better positioned we are to identify
promising areas of research and explore innovative solutions that are
outside the development time frame for the nearer term-focused Product
Transition portfolio.
In addition to the Capstone IPT process, we have recently
established the DHS--Department of Energy (DOE) Aviation Security
Enhancement Partnership to advance technical solutions to key aviation
security problems in support of priorities announced by the President
following the failed December 25 bombing attempt. While DHS has always
worked in close collaboration with the DOE National Laboratories, this
new partnership allows an unprecedented level of access between the
research community and operators that conduct aviation security efforts
in DOE, DHS, and TSA. We have now agreed to create a senior-level (at
the Under Secretary level) governance mechanism to manage ways to
extend and leverage this relationship with a focus on improving
aviation security by:
Delivering key advanced aviation security technologies and
knowledge;
Conducting analyses to assess possible vulnerabilities and
threats and support/inform technology requirements, policy,
planning, decision-making activities; and
Reviewing the use of existing aviation security technologies
and screening procedures, and the impact of new or improved
technologies using a systems analysis approach to illuminate
gaps, opportunities, and cost-effective investments.

Research and Development Priorities
There is no single technological solution to aviation security. A
layered security approach to passenger screening features multiple
passenger and baggage screening tools and integrates human factors
considerations, metal detectors, Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) with
X-rays and millimeter waves, trace explosives detection, and canines.
S&T's R&D Program is focused on improving the performance of currently
deployed screening equipment and procedures in the near-term, and
developing and deploying new technologies and procedures in the long-
term. Future improvements aim to screen passengers and carry-on baggage
for an increasing range of threats and streamline travel by easing
certain restrictions, such as the need to remove shoes during screening
or limits on carrying liquids onto the plane.
We develop technologies and techniques that maximize DHS and other
end users' operational flexibility as well as ensure the privacy, civil
rights, and civil liberties of our citizens are protected. Our
screening research programs are developed and executed in close
cooperation with the DHS Chief Privacy Officer as well as the Office of
Civil Rights and Civil Liberties to ensure that we consciously consider
and address their impacts or risk to the public. S&T conducts in-depth
analyses of such efforts through on-going dialogue with the DHS Privacy
Office and the DHS Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties and
related documentation such as Privacy Impact Assessments or Civil
Liberties Impact Assessments.
We continuously evaluate and improve the capabilities of currently
deployed technologies against new threats and seek to develop state-of-
the-art threat detection technology for TSA passenger checkpoints to
screen out evolving threats while improving the passenger experience
with higher throughput and minimal restrictions. The highest-priority
effort in this area is improving detection software algorithms,
including effective automatic target recognition, in our currently
deployed imaging systems, particularly AIT and Advanced Technology (AT)
X-ray screening devices. AIT is one of the most promising technologies
for detecting non-metallic weapons and small quantities of explosives
concealed on individuals. AT X-ray provides an enhanced detection
capability with multi-dimensional visual screening and improved image
resolution of carry-on bags. Both of these technologies would greatly
benefit from algorithm improvement and other systems research and
engineering approaches that consider human factors to optimize security
officer performance in threat detection and identification.
Efforts dedicated to suspicious behavior detection could also
provide near-term benefit in passenger screening. The Suspicious
Behavior Detection Program strives to improve screening by providing a
science-based capability to identify unknown threats indicated by
deceptive and suspicious behavior. This program addresses operational
needs for real-time, non-invasive detection of deception or hostile
intent that are applicable across the DHS mission. In the longer term,
a continuing, robust RDT&E program across the three S&T portfolios is
necessary.
The Explosives Research Program funds multidisciplinary basic
research in imaging, particle physics, chemistry, material science and
advanced algorithm development to develop enhanced explosive detection
and mitigation capabilities.
The transition program, guided by the Capstone IPT process, is
comprehensive and encompasses:
Automated imaging systems to screen for weapons,
conventional explosives, and home-made explosives (HME) in
carry-on bags;
Trace explosives detection capabilities for identifying
explosives on people and in carry-on baggage;
A next generation fully automated checkpoint for detecting
weapons and explosives on people for aviation, mass transit,
public gathering venues, or other potentially high-risk
buildings;
Human performance research and technology development for
increased security officer efficiency and effectiveness;
A science-based capability to derive, validate, and automate
detection of observable indicators of suicide bombers;
A science-based capability to identify known threats and
facilitate legitimate travel through accurate, timely, and
easy-to-use tools for biometric identification and credential
validation;
Technologies and methods for identifying insider threats.
The innovation program, managed by HSARPA, is looking at ``leap-
ahead'' technologies such as:
Future Attribute Screening Technology (FAST) to determine if
it is possible to detect malintent (the mental state of
individuals intending to cause harm) by utilizing non-invasive
physiological and behavioral sensor technology, deception
theory, and observational techniques. Though we have
established an initial scientific basis for the technology,
this project is still in the early stages as we work on both
the science and theory to support the concept.
MagViz is looking at the possibility of using technology
similar to hospital MRI machines to look for and identify
liquids. The magnetic fields in MagViz are much lower power
than its medical counterparts, allowing operation without the
restrictions and high costs of traditional MRI. We demonstrated
this technology with a small-scale prototype at the Sunport
Airport in Albuquerque, NM, in December 2008. MagViz was
successful at identifying a dangerous liquid in a small bottle
among many non-hazardous liquids in a standard TSA checkpoint
bowl. The project is still in the research phase, and we are
now trying to prove the technology using a larger-size
container and a broader array of both non-hazardous and
potentially hazardous liquids.

S&T Role in Test & Evaluation
Section 302 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 charges S&T with
the responsibility for ``coordinating and integrating all research,
development, demonstration, testing, and evaluation activities of the
Department.'' To carry out these and other test and evaluation (T&E)-
related legislative mandates, the Directorate established the Test and
Evaluation and Standards Division (TSD) in 2006 and created the
position of Director of Operational Test & Evaluation in 2008.
TSD develops and implements robust Department-wide T&E policies and
procedures. Working with the DHS under secretary for management, TSD
approves Test and Evaluation Master Plans (TEMP) that describe the
necessary Developmental Test and Evaluation (DT&E) and Operational Test
and Evaluation (OT&E) tasks that must be conducted in order to
determine system technical performance and operational effectiveness
based upon vetted Operational Requirements Documents.
Many of the Department's airport security technologies begin
testing at the Transportation Security Laboratory (TSL). Test and
evaluations activities at the TSL encompass two independent functions
and complies with the robust Department-wide T&E policies and
procedures. First, the Independent Test and Evaluation (IT&E) function
is responsible for evaluating mature technology that may meet TSA's
security requirements and is suitable for piloting or deployment.
Second, the research and development function has responsibilities
ranging from applied research to prototype development to technology
maturation that produces prototypes suitable for evaluation by the IT&E
Team. I am joined today by the TSL Director, Susan Hallowell.
The IT&E group works closely with TSA's Office of Security and
Technology to determine testing requirements, priorities, and results
of evaluations. At TSL, IT&E activities, which include certification,
qualification, and assessment testing, are generally performed to
determine if detection systems meet TSA-defined requirements. Results
help define key program milestones, benchmarking, and investment
strategy as well as support decisions of DHS operating components (such
as TSA) for field trials, production, or deployment. RDT&E activities
are designed to verify that a prototype or near-commercial off-the-
shelf system has met performance metrics established within the R&D
program such that it can proceed to the next R&D stage.
The Certification Test Program is reserved for detection testing of
bulk and trace explosives detection systems (EDS) and equipment under
statutory authority 49 U.S.C. 44913 for checked baggage. Before
mature EDS are deployed, it must be certified that salient performance
characteristics are met.
Qualification Tests are designed to verify that a security system
meets requirements as specified in a TSA-initiated Technical
Requirements Document. This test, along with piloting (field trials),
generally results in a determination of fitness-for-use. This process
is modeled after the certification process and is defined within the
Qualification Management Plan. Unlike the Certification Test, the
requirements of the Qualification Management Plan typically expand
beyond detection functions to include operational requirements. The
result of Qualification Testing is a recommendation of whether
candidate systems should be placed on a Qualified Products List.
Laboratory Assessment Testing is conducted to determine the general
capability of a system. These evaluations of candidate security systems
are carried out in accordance with interim performance metrics, and the
results drive future development efforts or operational deployment
evaluations. While the IT&E group practices best scientific principles
in test design, execution, and evaluation of data, assessment criteria
are determined by the DHS component's needs.
Developmental Test and Evaluation is performed by the R&D team at
the TSL and involves testing in a controlled environment to ensure that
all system or product components meet technical specifications. These
tests are designed to ensure that developmental products have met major
milestones identified within the R&D project and DT&E testing at the
TSL assesses the strengths, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities of
technologies as they mature and gain capability. The primary focus is
to ensure that the technology is robust and ready for Certification or
Qualification tests.
Following completion of the IT&E, an Operational Test Readiness is
conducted to determine whether the certified or qualified systems are
ready for operational testing. OT&E for systems occurs in several
airports, by trained TSA operators using test plans that are approved
by S&T's Director of Operational T&E. Testing in an operationally
accurate environment identifies issues in system operations before
deployment is contemplated.
TSD currently provides oversight to major acquisition programs,
including TSA programs, by: Participating in T&E working groups;
approving TEMPs, and Operational Test Plans; participating in
Operational Test Readiness Reviews; observing testing; and
participating in Acquisition Review Boards.

Public and Private Sector Engagement
To maximize the effectiveness of our resources and leverage the
scientific work being done in both the public and private sectors, we
have made concerted efforts to form partnerships throughout the
Government and across the academic, business, and international
communities. In addition to the DHS-DOE Aviation Security Enhancement
Partnership, we are also utilizing our intra-government partnership
with Department of Defense (DOD) in the form of the Capability
Development Working Group (CDWG). Co-chaired by the DHS Under
Secretaries for S&T and Management, as well as the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, the CDWG will
ensure that investments in explosive detection made by DOD are
considered as we pursue capabilities to keep the traveling public safe.
Academia is a critical partner in long-term research and the
development of the science and technology workforce that America will
need to maintain its security. Our university-based Centers of
Excellence (COE) are conducting or have finished approximately 500
research projects. Efforts relevant to transportation security are
underway at our explosives research COE at Northeastern University, our
BORDERS COE at the University of Arizona, and, of course the seven-
institution National Transportation Security COE. These COEs are
leading long-term efforts, such as developing advanced technologies for
detecting a variety of explosive precursors and mixtures; conducting
scientific research related to next-generation screening techniques;
and research to give us fundamental understanding of other counter-
explosive technologies.
The failed December 25 bombing attempt made it clear that terrorism
respects no borders. Similarly, S&T continues to look to the
international community for technologies and techniques critical to
bolstering aviation security. I am personally engaged with the ten
countries with which we have formal bilateral S&T agreements--
Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain, Israel, Mexico, New
Zealand, Singapore, and Sweden--to ensure that we have identified the
most promising aviation security technologies and techniques around the
globe.
Finally, in order to leverage the innovation that resides outside
the Federal Government, we have a standing Broad Agency Announcement
(BAA 09-05) that provides a means for the private sector to submit its
technological ideas for consideration across the broad range of mission
areas that we support, including aviation security.

CONCLUSION

Thank you for your dedicated efforts to improve the safety of air
travel for all Americans. I appreciate the opportunity to meet with you
today to discuss research initiatives to strengthen passenger
screening. I look forward to answering your questions.

Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much for your testimony.
I now recognize Mr. Lord to summarize his statement for 5
minutes.

STATEMENT OF STEPHEN LORD, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND
JUSTICE TEAM, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

Mr. Lord. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, Chairman Thompson.
I am pleased to be here again today to discuss recent steps
TSA has taken to enhance aviation security, including efforts
to deploy advanced imaging technology, or AIT. In response to
the attempted Christmas day attack, TSA has significantly
revised its strategy for deploying AIT, formerly referred to as
whole body imagers.
First, TSA now plans to deploy 1,800 units by 2014, a more
than two-fold increase from the initial plan buy of 878 units.
Second, TSA now plans to use this technology as the primary
rather than secondary screening measure. For the purposes of
this testimony, I think it is important to note that DHS' S&T
and TSA share responsibilities related to research and
development of AIT and other important checkpoint screening
technologies.
As highlighted in our October 2009 report, some
coordination challenges existed because of poor communication
between the S&T and TSA. However, several steps were taken to
address this issue, and I am hoping today's hearing can help
clarify the extent those issues have been resolved.
Our October 2009 report also highlighted several challenges
that TSA faced in deploying advanced technology, specifically
the so-called explosive trace portals, or puffers, which I
believe is a cautionary tale for the AIT acquisition. We found
that TSA had deployed over 100 puffers without fully testing
them in an operational environment. As a result the technology
did not perform as expected, and TSA had to curtail their
deployment.
The good news is TSA officials concurred with our report
recommendations to improve this process and stated that unlike
the puffers, operational testing for the AIT was successfully
completed. However, it is still unclear to GAO whether the AIT
would have detected the weapon used in the attempted Christmas
day attack, based on the preliminary information we have
reviewed to date.
We are currently reviewing TSA testing results to first
assess the AIT's detection capabilities and second to verify
that TSA successfully completed operational testing of this
technology. Also, while TSA has completed a life-cycle cost
estimate and a so-called alternatives analysis for the AIT, it
has not conducted a full cost-benefit study as called for in
our October 2009 report.
While we recognize and appreciate that TSA has taken some
immediate steps to address the vulnerability exposed by the
Christmas day attack, we still believe a cost-benefit analysis
is important, as it would help TSA identify the total cost of
the deployment and how security is enhanced through this
deployment relative to other checkpoint technologies. Again,
this information is especially important, since TSA is
proposing to more than double the number of AITs to be
deployed.
We estimate that the staffing costs alone associated with
the planned increase in AITs from 878 units to 1,800 units
could add up to $2.4 billion in additional costs over the
project life-cycle. Moreover, the total staff cost for the
1,800 units could range as high as $4.7 billion. These costs
were not reflected in TSA's most recent February 2010 life-
cycle cost estimate.
While a lot of recent attention has been focused on
passenger checkpoint technology, and AIT in particular, I think
it is important to also be mindful of the other components of
aviation security. That includes policies and procedures and
the staff you have implementing these procedures.
Also, the checkpoint technology represents only one layer
of many layers of aviation security. Other layers involve air
cargo, the screening of air cargo on passenger aircraft,
airport perimeters, the so-called behavior detection officers.
So when addressing aviation security issues, you have to keep
this full context in mind in reaching any conclusions.
In closing, I look forward to participating in today's
hearing and hope it can help answer three important oversight
questions. First, how effectively will the AIT detect those
seeking to replicate the Christmas day attack? Second, do the
security benefits of AIT outweigh its cost? That is when you
include all relevant costs. Finally, how does the new AIT
deployment plan fit into TSA's broader passenger checkpoint
screening strategy and suite of technologies being deployed at
the checkpoint? As Robin mentioned, TSA is in the process of
fielding a number of highly sophisticated technologies.
Madam Chairwoman, that concludes my statement. Once again,
I look forward to answering your questions.
[The statement of Mr. Lord follows:]

Prepared Statement of Stephen Lord
March 17, 2010

GAO HIGHLIGHTS

Highlights of GAO-10-484T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection, Committee on
Homeland Security, House of Representatives.

Why GAO Did This Study
The attempted bombing of Northwest Flight 253 highlighted the
importance of detecting improvised explosive devices on passengers.
This testimony focuses on: (1) The Transportation Security
Administration's (TSA) efforts to procure and deploy advanced imaging
technology (AIT), and related challenges; and (2) TSA's efforts to
strengthen screening procedures and technology in other areas of
aviation security, and related challenges. This testimony is based on
related products GAO issued from March 2009 through January 2010,
selected updates conducted from December 2009 through March 2010 on the
AIT procurement, and on-going work on air cargo security. For the on-
going work and updates, GAO obtained information from the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) and TSA and interviewed senior TSA officials
regarding air cargo security and the procurement, deployment,
operational testing, and assessment of costs and benefits of the AIT.

What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making new recommendations. In past reports, GAO has
recommended, among other things, that TSA operationally test screening
technologies prior to deployment and assess costs and benefits of
screening technology investments. DHS concurred and is working to
address the recommendations. DHS provided comments to this statement,
which were incorporated.

AVIATION SECURITY.--TSA IS INCREASING PROCUREMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF THE
ADVANCED IMAGING TECHNOLOGY, BUT CHALLENGES TO THIS EFFORT AND OTHER
AREAS OF AVIATION SECURITY REMAIN

What GAO Found
In response to the December 25, 2009, attempted attack on Northwest
Flight 253, TSA revised the AIT procurement and deployment strategy,
increasing the planned deployment of AITs from 878 to 1,800 units and
using AITs as a primary--instead of a secondary--screening measure
where feasible; however, challenges remain. In October 2009, GAO
reported on the challenges TSA faced deploying new technologies such as
the explosives trace portal (ETP) without fully testing them in an
operational environment, and recommended such testing prior to future
deployments. TSA officials concurred and stated that, unlike the ETP,
operational testing for the AIT was successfully completed late in 2009
before its deployment was fully initiated. While officials said AITs
performed as well as physical pat-downs in operational tests, it
remains unclear whether the AIT would have detected the weapon used in
the December 2009 incident based on the preliminary information GAO has
received. GAO is verifying that TSA successfully completed operational
testing of the AIT. In October 2009, GAO also recommended that TSA
complete cost-benefit analyses for new passenger screening
technologies. While TSA conducted a life-cycle cost estimate and an
alternatives analysis for the AIT, it reported that it has not
conducted a cost-benefit analysis of the original deployment strategy
or the revised AIT deployment strategy, which proposes a more than two-
fold increase in the number of machines to be procured. GAO estimates
increases in staffing costs alone due to doubling the number of AITs
that TSA plans to deploy could add up to $2.4 billion over its expected
service life. While GAO recognizes that TSA is attempting to address a
vulnerability exposed by the December 2009 attempted attack, a cost-
benefit analysis is important as it would help inform TSA's judgment
about the optimal deployment strategy for the AITs, and how best to
address this vulnerability considering all elements of the screening
system.
TSA has also taken actions towards strengthening other areas of
aviation security but continues to face challenges. For example, TSA
has taken steps to meet the statutory mandate to screen 100 percent of
air cargo transported on passenger aircraft by August 2010, including
developing a program to share screening responsibilities across the air
cargo supply chain. However, as GAO reported in March 2009, a number of
challenges to this effort exist, including attracting participants to
the TSA screening program, completing technology assessments, and
overseeing additional entities that it expects to participate in the
program. GAO is exploring these issues as part of an on-going review of
TSA's air cargo security program which GAO plans to issue later this
year. Further, while TSA has taken a variety of actions to strengthen
the security of commercial airports, GAO reported in September 2009
that TSA continues to face challenges in several areas, such as
assessing risk and evaluating worker screening methods. In September
2009, GAO also recommended that TSA develop a National strategy to
guide stakeholder efforts to strengthen airport perimeter and access
control security, to which DHS concurred.
Madam Chairwoman and Members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to
be here today to discuss the Transportation Security Administration's
(TSA) progress in securing passenger checkpoints and other areas of
commercial aviation. In response to the December 25, 2009, attempted
bombing of Northwest Flight 253, the Secretary of Homeland Security
announced five corrective actions to improve aviation security,
including accelerating deployment of the advanced imaging technology
(AIT)--formerly called the Whole Body Imager--to identify materials
such as those used in the attempted Christmas day bombing. The AITs
produce an image of a passenger's body that TSA personnel use to look
for anomalies, such as explosives. TSA is deploying AITs to airport
passenger checkpoints to enhance its ability to detect explosive
devices and other prohibited items on passengers. Passengers undergo
either primary or secondary screening at these checkpoints. Primary
screening is conducted on all airline passengers before they enter the
sterile area of an airport and involves passengers walking through a
metal detector and their carry-on items being subjected to X-ray
screening.\1\ Secondary screening is conducted on selected passengers
and involves additional screening of bboth passengers and their carry-
on items. While screening passengers at the checkpoint is a vital layer
of security, it is also important to ensure the security of other areas
of commercial aviation, such as air cargo transported on passenger
aircraft, and airport worker screening and checked baggage screening.
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\1\ Sterile areas are areas of airports where passengers wait after
screening to board departing aircraft.
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TSA's passenger checkpoint screening system comprises three
elements: (1) Personnel responsible for, among other things, screening
passengers and baggage; (2) the policies and procedures that govern the
different aviation security programs; and (3) the technology used to
screen passengers and baggage. All three elements--people, process, and
technology--collectively help determine the effectiveness and
efficiency of passenger checkpoint screening, and our past work in this
area has addressed all three elements of the system.\2\ Similarly,
securing the flying public involves trade-offs between security,
privacy, and the efficient flow of commerce. Striking the right balance
between these three goals is an on-going challenge facing TSA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ See for example, GAO, Homeland Security: Better Use of
Terrorist Watchlist Information and Improvements in Deployment of
Passenger Screening Checkpoint Technologies Could Further Strengthen
Security, GAO-10-401T (Washington, DC: Jan. 27, 2010); Aviation
Security: DHS and TSA Have Researched, Developed, and Begun Deploying
Passenger Checkpoint Screening Technologies, but Continue to Face
Challenges, GAO-10-128 (Washington, DC: Oct. 7, 2009); Homeland
Security: DHS's Progress and Challenges in Key Areas of Maritime,
Aviation, and Cybersecurity, GAO-10-106 (Washington, DC: Dec. 2, 2009);
Aviation Security: TSA Has Completed Key Activities Associated with
Implementing Secure Flight, but Additional Actions Are Needed to
Mitigate Risks, GAO-09-292 (Washington, DC: May 13, 2009); Aviation
Security: Preliminary Observations on TSA's Progress and Challenges in
Meeting the Statutory Mandate for Screening Air Cargo on Passenger
Aircraft, GAO-09-422T (Washington, DC: Mar. 18, 2009); Aviation
Security: Vulnerabilities Exposed Through Covert Testing of TSA's
Passenger Screening Process, GAO-08-48T (Washington, DC: Nov. 15,
2007); and Terrorist Watch List Screening: Opportunities Exist to
Enhance Management Oversight, Reduce Vulnerabilities in Agency
Screening Processes, and Expand Use of the List, GAO-08-110
(Washington, DC: Oct. 11, 2007).
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My testimony today focuses on: (1) TSA's plans to procure, deploy,
and test AITs to enhance the security of the passenger checkpoint, and
any challenges TSA faces in this effort; and (2) TSA's efforts to
strengthen screening procedures and technology in other areas of
aviation security, and any related challenges the agency faces in these
areas.
This statement is based on related GAO reports and testimonies we
issued from March 2009 through January 2010, as well as preliminary
observations based on on-going work--from October 2008 through February
2010--to be completed later this year assessing the progress that DHS
and its component agencies have made in addressing challenges related
to air cargo security.\3\ To conduct all of this work, we reviewed
relevant documents related to the programs reviewed, and interviewed
cognizant Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and TSA officials. All
of this work was conducted in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards, and our previously published reports
contain additional details on the scope and methodology for those
reviews. In addition, this statement contains selected updates
conducted from December 2009 through March 2010 on TSA's effort to
procure and deploy the AIT. For the updates, we obtained information
from DHS and TSA on the AIT and interviewed senior TSA officials
regarding the planned procurement, deployment, operational testing and
evaluation, and assessment of benefits and costs of the AITs. We
conducted these updates in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and
perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide
a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable
basis for our findings based on our audit objectives.
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\3\ GAO-10-401T; GAO-10-128; GAO-10-106; and GAO-09-422T.
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BACKGROUND

Airline Passenger Screening Using Checkpoint Technology
Passenger screening is a process by which screeners inspect
individuals and their property to deter and prevent an act of violence
or air piracy, such as the carrying of any unauthorized explosive,
incendiary, weapon, or other prohibited item on board an aircraft or
into a sterile area. Screeners inspect individuals for prohibited items
at designated screening locations. TSA developed standard operating
procedures for screening passengers at airport checkpoints. Primary
screening is conducted on all airline passengers before they enter the
sterile area of an airport and involves passengers walking through a
metal detector, and carry-on items being subjected to X-ray screening.
Passengers who alarm the walk-through metal detector or are designated
as selectees--that is, passengers selected for additional screening--
must then undergo secondary screening, as well as passengers whose
carry-on items have been identified by the X-ray machine as potentially
containing prohibited items. Secondary screening involves additional
means for screening passengers, such as by hand wand; physical pat-
down; or other screening methods such as the AIT.

Role of DHS Science & Technology Directorate
Within DHS, both the Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) and
TSA have responsibilities for researching, developing, and testing and
evaluating new technologies, including airport checkpoint screening
technologies. Specifically, S&T is responsible for the basic and
applied research and advanced development of new technologies, while
TSA, through its Passenger Screening Program (PSP), identifies the need
for new checkpoint screening technologies and provides input to S&T
during the research and development of new technologies, which TSA then
procures and deploys. Because S&T and TSA share responsibilities
related to the research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E),
procurement, and deployment of checkpoint screening technologies, the
two organizations must coordinate with each other and external
stakeholders, such as airport operators and technology vendors.

Air Cargo Security
Air cargo can be shipped in various forms, including unit load
devices (ULD) that allow many packages to be consolidated into one
container or pallet; wooden crates; or individually wrapped/boxed
pieces, known as loose or break-bulk cargo. Participants in the air
cargo shipping process include shippers, such as manufacturers; freight
forwarders, who consolidate cargo from shippers and take it to air
carriers for transport; air cargo handling agents, who process and load
cargo onto aircraft on behalf of air carriers; and air carriers that
load and transport cargo.\4\ TSA's responsibilities include, among
other things, establishing security requirements governing domestic and
foreign passenger air carriers that transport cargo and domestic
freight forwarders.
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\4\ For purposes of this statement, the term freight forwarders
only includes those freight forwarders that are regulated by TSA, also
referred to as indirect air carriers.
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Airport Perimeter Security and Access Control
Airport perimeter and access control security is intended to
prevent unauthorized access into secured airport areas, either from
outside the airport complex or from within. Airport operators generally
have direct day-to-day responsibility for maintaining and improving
perimeter and access control security, as well as implementing measures
to reduce worker risk. However, TSA has primary responsibility for
establishing and implementing measures to improve security operations
at U.S. commercial airports--that is, TSA-regulated airports--including
overseeing airport operator efforts to maintain perimeter and access
control security.\5\ Airport workers may access sterile areas through
TSA security checkpoints or through other access points that are
secured by the airport operator. The airport operator is also
responsible, in accordance with its security program, for securing
access to secured airport areas where passengers are not permitted.
Airport methods used to control access vary, but all access controls
must meet minimum performance standards in accordance with TSA
requirements.
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\5\ See generally Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L.
No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001).
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INCREASED DEPLOYMENT OF AIT HIGHLIGHTS THE IMPORTANCE OF OPERATIONAL
TESTING AND COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS PRIOR TO DEPLOYMENT

TSA Plans to Procure and Deploy 1,800 AITs by 2014 and Use Them as a
Primary Screening Measure
In response to the December 2009 attempted terrorist attack, TSA
has revised its procurement and deployment strategy for the AIT,
increasing the number of AITs it plans to procure and deploy. In
contrast with its prior strategy, the agency now plans to acquire and
deploy 1,800 AITs (instead of the 878 units it had previously planned
to acquire) and to use them as a primary screening measure where
feasible rather than solely as a secondary screening measure. According
to a senior TSA official, the agency is taking these actions in
response to the Christmas day 2009 terrorist incident. These officials
stated that they anticipate the AIT will provide enhanced security
benefits compared to walk-through metal detectors, such as enhanced
detection capabilities for identifying nonmetallic threat objects and
liquids. TSA officials also stated that the AIT offers greater
efficiencies because it allows TSA to more rigorously screen a greater
number of passengers in a shorter amount of time while providing a
detection capability equivalent to a pat-down. For example, the AIT
requires about 20 seconds to produce and interpret a passenger's image
as compared with 2 minutes required for a physical pat-down. A senior
official also stated that TSA intends to continue to offer an
alternative but comparable screening method, such as a physical pat-
down, for passengers who prefer not to be screened using the AIT.
The AIT produces an image of a passenger's body that a screener
interprets. The image identifies objects, or anomalies, on the outside
of the physical body but does not reveal items beneath the surface of
the skin, such as implants. TSA plans to procure two types of AIT
units: one type uses millimeter-wave and the other type uses
backscatter X-ray technology. Millimeter-wave technology beams
millimeter-wave radio-frequency energy over the body's surface at high
speed from two antennas simultaneously as they rotate around the body.
The energy reflected back from the body or other objects on the body is
used to construct a three-dimensional image. Millimeter wave technology
produces an image that resembles a fuzzy photo negative. Backscatter X-
ray technology uses a low-level X-ray to create a two-sided image of
the person. Backscatter technology produces an image that resembles a
chalk etching.
As of February 24, 2010, according to a senior TSA official, the
agency has deployed 40 of the millimeter-wave AITs and procured 150
backscatter X-ray units in fiscal year 2009. In early March 2010, TSA
initiated the deployment of these backscatter units starting with two
airports, Logan International Airport in Boston, Massachusetts, and
Chicago O'Hare International Airport in Des Plaines, Illinois. TSA
officials stated that they do not expect these units to be fully
operational, however, until the second or third week of March due to
time needed to hire and train additional personnel. TSA estimates that
the remaining backscatter X-ray units will be installed at airports by
the end of calendar year 2010. In addition, TSA plans to procure an
additional 300 AIT units in fiscal year 2010, some of which it plans to
purchase with funds from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of
2009. In fiscal year 2011, TSA plans to procure 503 AIT units. TSA
projects that a total of about 1,000 AIT systems will be deployed to
airports by the end of December 2011. In fiscal year 2014 TSA plans to
reach full operating capacity, having procured a total of 1,800 units
and deployed them to 60 percent of the checkpoint lanes at Category X,
I, and II airports.\6\ The current projected full operating capacity of
1,800 machines represents a more than two-fold increase from 878 units
that TSA had previously planned. TSA officials stated that the cost of
the AIT is about $170,000 per unit, excluding training, installation,
and maintenance costs. In addition, in the fiscal year 2011 President's
budget submission, TSA has requested $218.9 million for 3,550
additional full-time equivalents (FTE) to help staff the AITs deployed
in that time frame. From 2012 through 2014, as TSA deploys additional
units to reach full operating capacity, additional staff will be needed
to operate these units; such staffing costs will recur on an annual
basis. TSA officials told us that three FTEs are needed to operate each
unit.
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\6\ There are about 450 commercial airports in the United States.
TSA classifies airports into one of five categories (X, I, II, III, and
IV) based on various factors, such as the total number of takeoffs and
landings annually, the extent to which passengers are screened at the
airport, and other special security considerations. In general,
category X airports have the largest number of passenger boardings, and
category IV airports have the smallest.
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Because the AIT presents a full body image of a person during the
screening process, concerns have been expressed that the image is an
invasion of privacy. According to TSA, to protect passenger privacy and
ensure anonymity, strict privacy safeguards are built into the
procedures for use of the AIT. For example, the officer who assists the
passenger does not see the image that the technology produces, and the
officer who views the image is remotely located in a secure resolution
room and does not see the passenger. Officers evaluating images are not
permitted to take cameras, cell phones, or photo-enabled devices into
the resolution room. To further protect passengers' privacy, ways have
been introduced to blur the passengers' images. The millimeter-wave
technology blurs all facial features, and the backscatter X-ray
technology has an algorithm applied to the entire image to protect
privacy. Further, TSA has stated that the AIT's capability to store,
print, transmit, or save the image will be disabled at the factory
before the machines are delivered to airports, and each image is
automatically deleted from the system after it is cleared by the
remotely located security officer. Once the remotely located officer
determines that threat items are not present, that officer communicates
wirelessly to the officer assisting the passenger. The passenger may
then continue through the security process. Potential threat items are
resolved through a directed physical pat-down before the passenger is
cleared to enter the sterile area.\7\ In addition to privacy concerns,
the AITs are large machines, and adding them to the checkpoint areas
will require additional space, especially since the operators are
physically segregated from the checkpoint to help ensure passenger
privacy. Adding a significant number of additional AITs to the existing
airport infrastructure could impose additional challenges on airport
operators.
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\7\ TSA stated that it continues to evaluate possible display
options that include a ``stick figure'' or ``cartoon-like'' form to
provide greater privacy protection to the individual being screened
while still allowing the unit operator or automated detection
algorithms to detect possible threats. DHS is working directly with
technology providers to develop advanced screening algorithms for the
AIT that would utilize Automatic Target Recognition to identify and
highlight possible threats.
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TSA Recently Reported Efforts to Strengthen Its Operational Test and
Evaluation Process, But It Is Not Clear Whether TSA Has Fully
Evaluated the Relative Security Benefits and Costs of the AIT
In October 2009, we reported that TSA had relied on a screening
technology in day-to-day airport operations that had not been proven to
meet its functional requirements through operational testing and
evaluation, contrary to TSA's acquisition guidance and a knowledge-
based acquisition approach.\8\ We also reported that TSA had not
operationally tested the AITs at the time of our review, and we
recommended that TSA operationally test and evaluate technologies prior
to deploying them.\9\ In commenting on our report, TSA agreed with this
recommendation. Although TSA does not yet have a written policy
requiring operational testing prior to deployment, a senior TSA
official stated that TSA has made efforts to strengthen its operational
test and evaluation process and that TSA is now complying with DHS's
current acquisition directive that requires operational testing and
evaluation be completed prior to deployment.\10\ According to
officials, TSA is now requiring that AIT are to successfully complete
both laboratory tests and operational tests prior to deployment.
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\8\ http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-128.
\9\ Operational testing refers to testing in an operational
environment in order to verify that new systems are operationally
effective, supportable, and suitable.
\10\ DHS Acquisition Management Directive 102-01, Jan. 20, 2010.
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As we previously reported, TSA's experience with the explosives
trace portal (ETP), or ``puffers,'' demonstrates the importance of
testing and evaluation in an operational environment.\11\ The ETP
detects traces of explosives on a passenger by using puffs of air to
dislodge particles from the passenger's body and clothing that the
machine analyzes for traces of explosives. TSA procured 207 ETPs and in
2006 deployed 101 ETPs to 36 airports, the first deployment of a
checkpoint technology initiated by the agency.\12\ TSA deployed the
ETPs even though tests conducted during 2004 and 2005 on earlier ETP
models suggested that they did not demonstrate reliable performance.
Furthermore, the ETP models that were subsequently deployed were not
tested to prove their effective performance in an operational
environment, contrary to TSA's acquisition guidance, which recommends
such testing. As a result, TSA procured and deployed ETPs without
assurance that they would perform as intended in an operational
environment. TSA officials stated that they deployed the machines
without resolving these issues to respond quickly to the threat of
suicide bombers. In June 2006 TSA halted further deployment of the ETP
because of performance, maintenance, and installation issues. According
to a senior TSA official, as of December 31, 2009, all but 9 ETPs have
been withdrawn from airports, and 18 ETPs remain in inventory.
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\11\ We have previously reported that deploying technologies that
have not successfully completed operational testing and evaluation can
lead to cost overruns and underperformance. In addition, our reviews
have shown that leading commercial firms follow a knowledge-based
approach to major acquisitions and do not proceed with large
investments unless the product's design demonstrates its ability to
meet functional requirements and be stable. The developer must show
that the product can be manufactured within cost, schedule, and quality
targets and is reliable before production begins and the system is used
in day-to-day operations. See http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-128
and GAO, Best Practices: Using a Knowledge-Based Approach to Improve
Weapon Acquisition, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-386SP
(Washington, DC: Jan. 2004).
\12\ TSA deployed the ETPs from January to June 2006.
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Following the completion of our review, TSA officials told us that
the AIT successfully completed operational testing at the end of
calendar year 2009 before its deployment was fully initiated. The
official also stated that the AIT test results were provided and
reviewed by DHS's Acquisition Review Board prior to the board approving
the AIT deployment. According to TSA's threat assessment, terrorists
have various techniques for concealing explosives on their persons, as
was evident in Mr. Abdulmutallab's attempted attack on December 25,
when he concealed an explosive in his underwear. While TSA officials
stated that the laboratory and operational testing of the AIT included
placing explosive material in different locations on the body,\13\ it
remains unclear whether the AIT would have been able to detect the
weapon Mr. Abdulmutallab used in his attempted attack based on the
preliminary TSA information we have received. We are in the process of
reviewing these operational tests to assess the AIT's detection
capabilities and to verify that TSA successfully completed operational
testing of the AIT.
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\13\ The results of TSA's laboratory and operational testing are
classified.
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In addition, while TSA officials stated that the AITs performed as
well as physical pat-downs in operational testing, TSA officials also
reported they have not conducted a cost-benefit analysis of the
original or revised AIT deployment strategy. We reported in October
2009 that TSA had not conducted a cost-benefit analysis of checkpoint
technologies being researched and developed, procured, and deployed and
recommended that it do so. DHS concurred with our recommendation. Cost-
benefit analyses are important because they help decision makers
determine which protective measures, for instance, investments in
technologies or in other security programs, will provide the greatest
mitigation of risk for the resources that are available. TSA officials
stated that a cost-benefit analysis was not completed for the AIT
because one is not required under DHS acquisition guidance. However,
these officials reported that they had completed, earlier in the
program, a life-cycle cost estimate and an analysis of alternatives for
the AIT as required by DHS, which, according to agency officials,
provides equivalent information to a cost-benefit analysis. We are in
the process of reviewing the alternatives analysis that was completed
in 2008 and life-cycle cost estimates which TSA provided to us on March
12, 2010, to determine the extent to which these estimates reflect the
additional costs to staff these units. We estimate that, based on TSA's
fiscal year 2011 budget request and current AIT deployment strategy,
increases in staffing costs due to doubling the number of AITs that TSA
plans to deploy could add up to $2.4 billion over the expected service
life of this investment.\14\
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\14\ To estimate the cost of the additional staff needed to operate
the AIT machines during their service life as a result of TSA's
increased deployment of the AIT, we used information in the President's
budget request for fiscal year 2011 and from interviews with TSA
officials. We identified staffing costs to operate each AIT ($369,764)
and multiplied this figure by the number of additional AITs that TSA
has recently planned to deploy by 2014 (922 units) to calculate the
additional staffing costs, which equaled $340,922,408. We then
multiplied the additional staffing costs of $340,922,408 by 7 years to
calculate the additional staffing cost to operate additional AIT units
during their expected service life, which equaled $2,386,456,856.
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While we recognize that TSA is taking action to address a
vulnerability of the passenger checkpoint exposed by the December 25,
2009, attempted attack, we continue to believe that, given TSA's
expanded deployment strategy, conducting a cost-benefit analysis of
TSA's AIT deployment is important. An updated cost-benefit analysis
would help inform TSA's judgment about the optimal deployment strategy
for the AITs, as well as provide information to inform the best path
forward, considering all elements of the screening system, for
addressing the vulnerability identified by this attempted terrorist
attack.

TSA HAS MADE PROGRESS IN SECURING AIR CARGO AND AIRPORT ACCESS, BUT
CHALLENGES REMAIN

TSA Has Made Progress in Meeting the Air Cargo Screening Mandate, But
Faces Participation, Technology, Oversight, and Inbound-Cargo
Challenges
As we previously reported in March 2009, based on preliminary
observations from ongoing work, TSA has taken several key steps to meet
the statutory mandate to screen 100 percent of air cargo transported on
passenger aircraft by August 2010.\15\ Among the steps that TSA has
taken to address domestic air cargo screening, the agency has revised
its security programs to require more cargo to be screened; created the
Certified Cargo Screening Program (CCSP), a voluntary program to allow
screening to take place earlier in the shipping process and at various
points in the air cargo supply chain--including before the cargo is
consolidated; issued an interim final rule, effective November 16,
2009, that, among other things, codifies the statutory air cargo
screening requirements of the 9/11 Commission Act and establishes
requirements for entities participating in the CCSP;\16\ established a
technology pilot program to operationally test explosives trace
detection (ETD) and X-ray technology;\17\ and expanded its explosives
detection canine program.
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\15\ GAO-09-422T. The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11
Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Commission Act)requires that by August
2010, 100 percent of cargo--domestic and inbound--transported on
passenger aircraft be physically screened. The 9/11 Commission Act
establishes minimum standards for screening air cargo and defines
screening for purposes of the air cargo screening mandate as a physical
examination or nonintrusive methods of assessing whether cargo poses a
threat to transportation security. Solely performing a review of
information about the contents of cargo or verifying the identity of
the cargo's shipper does not constitute screening for purposes of
satisfying the mandate. See Pub. L. No. 110-53, 1602(a), 121 Stat.
266, 477-79 (codified at 49 U.S.C. 44901(g)). For the purposes of
this statement, domestic air cargo refers to cargo transported by air
within the United States and from the United States to a foreign
location by both U.S. and foreign-based air carriers; and in-bound
cargo refers to cargo transported by U.S. and foreign-based air
carriers from a foreign location to the United States.
\16\ See Air Cargo Screening, 74 Fed. Reg. 47672 (Sept. 16, 2009).
\17\ ETD requires human operators to collect samples of items to be
screened with swabs, which are chemically analyzed to identify any
traces of explosives material.
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While these steps are encouraging, TSA faces several challenges in
meeting the air cargo screening mandate. First, although industry
participation in the CCSP is vital to TSA's approach to move screening
responsibilities across the U.S. supply chain, the voluntary nature of
the program may make it difficult to attract program participants
needed to screen the required levels of domestic cargo. Second, while
TSA has taken steps to test technologies for screening and securing air
cargo, it has not yet completed assessments of the various technologies
it plans to allow air carriers and program participants to use in
meeting the August 2010 screening mandate. According to TSA officials,
several X-ray and explosives detection systems (EDS) technologies
successfully passed laboratory testing, and TSA placed them on a
December 2009 list of qualified products that industry can use to
screen cargo after August 2010.\18\ TSA plans to conduct field testing
and evaluation of these technologies in an operational environment. In
addition, TSA plans to begin laboratory testing for ETD, Electronic
Metal Detection (EMD), and additional X-ray technologies in early 2010,
and anticipates including these technologies on the list of qualified
products the industry can use by the summer of 2010, before proceeding
with operational testing.\19\ As we previously reported, based on
preliminary observations from on-going work, X-ray and ETD
technologies, which have not yet been fully tested for effectiveness,
are currently being used by industry participants to meet air cargo
screening requirements.\20\ We are examining this issue in more detail
as part of our on-going review of TSA's air cargo security efforts, to
be issued later this year.
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\18\ EDS uses computer-aided tomography X-rays to examine objects
inside baggage and identify the characteristic signatures of threat
explosives.
\19\ EMD devices are capable of detecting metallic-based
explosives, such as wires, within a variety of perishable commodities
at the cargo-piece, parcel, and pallet level.
\20\ http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-422T.
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Third, TSA faces challenges overseeing compliance with the CCSP due
to the size of its current Transportation Security Inspector (TSI)
workforce. Under the CCSP, in addition to performing inspections of air
carriers and freight forwarders, TSIs are to also perform compliance
inspections of new regulated entities that voluntarily become certified
cargo screening facilities (CCSF), as well as conduct additional CCSF
inspections of existing freight forwarders. TSA officials have stated
that the agency is evaluating the required number of TSIs to fully
implement and oversee the program. Completing its staffing study may
help TSA determine whether it has the necessary staffing resources to
ensure that entities involved in the CCSP are meeting TSA requirements
to screen and secure air cargo.\21\ As part of our on-going work, we
are exploring to what extent TSA is undertaking a staffing study.
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\21\ For additional information on TSA's staffing study, see GAO,
Aviation Security: Status of Transportation Security Inspector
Workforce, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-123R (Washington DC: Feb.
6, 2009).
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Finally, TSA has taken some steps to meet the screening mandate as
it applies to in-bound cargo but does not expect to achieve 100 percent
screening of inbound cargo by the August 2010 deadline. TSA revised its
requirements to, in general, require carriers to screen 50 percent of
nonexempt inbound cargo. TSA also began harmonization of security
standards with other nations through bilateral and quadrilateral
discussions.\22\ In addition, TSA continues to work with Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) to leverage an existing CBP system to identify
and target high-risk air cargo. However, TSA does not expect to meet
the mandated 100 percent screening level by August 2010. This is due,
in part, to challenges TSA faces in harmonizing the agency's air cargo
security standards with those of other nations. Moreover, TSA's
international inspection resources are limited. We will continue to
explore these issues as part of our on-going review of TSA's air cargo
security efforts, to be issued later this year.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ The term harmonization is used to describe countries' efforts
to coordinate their security practices to enhance security and increase
efficiency by avoiding duplication of effort.
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TSA Has Taken Actions to Strengthen Airport Security, but Faces
Challenges That Include Assessing Risk and Evaluating Worker
Screening Methods
In our September 2009 report on airport security, we reported that
TSA has implemented a variety of programs and protective actions to
strengthen the security of commercial airports.\23\ For example, in
March 2007, TSA implemented a random worker screening program--the
Aviation Direct Access Screening Program (ADASP)--Nation-wide to
enforce access procedures, such as ensuring that workers do not possess
unauthorized items when entering secured areas.\24\ In addition, TSA
has expanded requirements for background checks and for the population
of individuals who are subject to these checks, and has established a
statutorily directed pilot program to assess airport security
technology.\25\
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\23\ GAO, Aviation Security: A National Strategy and Other Actions
Would Strengthen TSA's Efforts to Secure Commercial Airport Perimeters
and Access Controls, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-399
(Washington, DC: Sept. 30, 2009).
\24\ For the purposes of this statement ``secured area'' is used
generally to refer to areas specified in an airport security program
that require restricted access. See 49 C.F.R. 1540.5, 1542.201.
\25\ According to TSA officials, the agency established this
program in response to a provision enacted through the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act. See Pub. L. No. 107-71 106(d), 115 Stat.
at 610 (codified at 49 U.S.C. 44903(c)(3)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As we reported in September 2009, while TSA has taken numerous
steps to enhance airport security, it continues to face challenges in
several areas, such as assessing risk, evaluating worker screening
methods, addressing airport technology needs, and developing a unified
National strategy for airport security.\26\ For example, while TSA has
taken steps to assess risk related to airport security, it has not
conducted a comprehensive risk assessment based on assessments of
threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences, as required by DHS's
National Infrastructure Protection Plan. To address these issues, we
recommended, among other things, that TSA develop a comprehensive risk
assessment of airport security and milestones for its completion, and
evaluate whether the current approach to conducting vulnerability
assessments appropriately assesses vulnerabilities. DHS concurred with
these recommendations and stated that TSA is taking actions to
implement them.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-399.
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Our September 2009 report also reported the results of TSA efforts
to help identify the potential costs and benefits of 100 percent worker
screening and other worker screening methods.\27\ In July 2009 TSA
issued a final report on the results and concluded that random
screening is a more cost-effective approach because it appears
``roughly'' as effective in identifying contraband items at less cost
than 100 percent worker screening.\28\ However, the report also
identified limitations in the design and evaluation of the program and
in the estimation of costs, such as the limited number of participating
airports, the limited evaluation of certain screening techniques, the
approximate nature of the cost estimates, and the limited amount of
information available regarding operational effects and other costs.
Given the significance of these limitations, we reported in September
2009 that it is unclear whether random worker screening is more or less
cost effective than 100 percent worker screening. In addition, TSA did
not document key aspects of the pilot's design, methodology, and
evaluation, such as a data analysis plan, limiting the usefulness of
these efforts. To address this, we recommended that TSA ensure that
future airport security pilot program evaluation efforts include a
well-developed and well-documented evaluation plan, to which DHS
concurred.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ To respond to the threat posed by airport workers, the
Explanatory Statement accompanying the DHS Appropriations Act, 2008,
directed TSA to use $15 million of its appropriation to conduct a pilot
program at seven airports. Explanatory Statement accompanying Division
E of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161,
Div. E, 121 Stat. 1844, 2042 (2007), at 1048. While the Statement
refers to these pilot programs as airport employee screening pilots,
for the purposes of this statement, we use ``worker screening'' to
refer to the screening of all individuals who work at the airport.
\28\ Transportation Security Administration, Airport Employee
Screening Pilot Program Study: Fiscal Year 2008 Report to Congress
(Washington, DC, July 7, 2009).
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Moreover, although TSA has taken steps to develop biometric worker
credentialing, it is unclear to what extent TSA plans to address
statutory requirements regarding biometric technology, such as
developing or requiring biometric access controls at airports,
establishing comprehensive standards, and determining the best way to
incorporate these decisions into airports' existing systems.\29\ To
address this issue, we have recommended that TSA develop milestones for
meeting statutory requirements for, among other things, performance
standards for biometric airport access control systems. DHS concurred
with this recommendation. Finally, TSA's efforts to enhance the
security of the Nation's airports have not been guided by a National
strategy that identifies key elements, such as goals, priorities,
performance measures, and required resources. To better ensure that
airport stakeholders take a unified approach to airport security, we
recommended that TSA develop a National strategy that incorporates key
characteristics of effective security strategies, such as measurable
goals and priorities, to which DHS concurred and stated that TSA is
taking action to implement it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ Among other things, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 directed TSA, in consultation with industry
representatives, to establish comprehensive technical and operational
system requirements and performance standards for the use of biometric
identifier technology in airport access control systems. See Pub. L.
No. 108-458, 4011, 118 Stat. 3638, 3712-14 (2004) (codified at 49
U.S.C. 44903(h)(5)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Project Newton May Result in New Explosives Testing Standards for TSA's
Screening Technology
As we discussed in our October 2009 report, TSA and the DHS Science
and Technology Directorate (S&T) are pursuing an effort--known as
Project Newton--which uses computer modeling to determine the effects
of explosives on aircraft and develop new requirements to respond to
emerging threats from explosives.\30\ Specifically, TSA and S&T are
reviewing the scientific basis of their current detection standards for
explosives detection technologies to screen passengers, carry-on items,
and checked baggage. As part of this work, TSA and S&T are conducting
studies to update their understanding of the effects that explosives
may have on aircraft, such as the consequences of detonating explosives
on board an in-flight aircraft. Senior TSA and DHS S&T officials stated
that the two agencies decided to initiate this review because they
could not fully identify or validate the scientific support requiring
explosives detection technologies to identify increasingly smaller
amounts of some explosives over time as required by TSA policy.
Officials stated that they used the best available information to
originally develop detection standards for explosives detection
technologies. According to these officials, TSA's understanding of how
explosives affect aircraft has largely been based on data obtained from
live-fire explosive tests on aircraft hulls at ground level. Officials
further stated that due to the expense and complexity of live-fire
tests, the Federal Aviation Administration, TSA, and DHS collectively
have conducted only a limited number of tests on retired aircraft,
which limited the amount of data available for analysis. As part of
this on-going review, TSA and S&T are simulating the complex dynamics
of explosive blast effects on an in-flight aircraft by using a computer
model based on advanced software developed by the National
laboratories. TSA believes that the computer model will be able to
accurately simulate hundreds of explosives tests by simulating the
effects that explosives will have when placed in different locations
within various aircraft models. As discussed in our October 2009
report, TSA and S&T officials expect that the results of this work will
provide a much fuller understanding of the explosive detection
requirements and the threat posed by various amounts of different
explosives, and will use this information to determine whether any
modifications to existing detection standards should be made moving
forward. We are currently reviewing Project Newton and will report on
it at a later date.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-128.
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Madam Chairwoman, that concludes my statement and I would be happy
to answer any questions.

Ms. Jackson Lee. The gentleman from Pennsylvania, the
Ranking Member.
Mr. Dent. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. Thank you for
getting things started. I appreciate it. Apologize for my
tardiness. I would like to ask unanimous consent to deliver my
opening statement at this time.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Hearing no objection, so ordered. The
gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes for his opening
statement.
Mr. Dent. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, and happy St.
Patrick's Day.
While I am sure----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you. Happy St. Patrick's Day to
everyone. Do you have your green tie?
Mr. Dent. I have my green tie.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Yes, you are.
Mr. Dent. I do.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I am in green, too. Thank you.
Mr. Dent. Well, I am sure many in our--well, I am sure that
many in our panels in the audience and perhaps even our staff
are looking forward to the end of this workday. We have some
pressing business, and I want to commend the Chairwoman for
having such an important hearing. It is really very important.
I think it is critical to recognize, however, that no
matter what screening technologies that we deploy here in the
United States, none of these--none of these would have stopped
Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab from boarding Northwest Airlines
Flight 253 in Amsterdam with powdered explosives concealed on
his person.
That responsibility fell to an overseas airport whose
security, I might add, far exceeded minimum international
security standards. For this reason I want to applaud Secretary
Napolitano for her aggressive outreach to over 2 dozen
countries since the attempted Christmas day attack in hopes of
securing more stringent international minimal standards for
aviation security.
We should never shy away from taking whatever immediate
actions are necessary to protect Americans at home and abroad.
This is why I was pleased to learn that just last week the
Secretary signed a joint declaration of understanding with 16
other nations highlighting the need for the modernization of
international aviation security standards.
Secretary Napolitano said, ``The attempted terrorist attack
on December 25 has global ramifications demonstrating the need
for enhanced security standards, information sharing and
screening measures throughout the international aviation
system.'' I couldn't agree more.
This is an incredibly positive first step, but it is only a
first step. The key is making sure future actions match the
rhetoric, and I hope to see more of this kind of international
engagement in the future. As this Congress, and particularly
this committee, learned the hard way with its ill-advised
international mandates on 100 percent air and maritime cargo
scanning, consultation, and collaboration with our
international partners is absolutely critical to improving
security in the United States over the long term.
With respect to intradepartmental and external
coordination, I recently asked my committee staff to take a
closer examination of how the TSA communicates its needs at the
Transportation Security Lab and the Department's Science and
Technology Directorate. I also asked the staff to examine how
those requirements were developed, how they are risk-informed,
and if they include an open and honest dialogue with private
industry.
The committee staff summarized the process ``convoluted,
confusing, and inconsistent.'' That is unfortunate. Over years
after establishing the TSA with the passage of the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act of 2001, I find this troubling. I
hope we can explore ways to improve this process throughout
this hearing.
Today we have with us representatives of TSA, concerned
stakeholders, and representatives of industry. This is a
diversified hearing with diversified testimony that I hope will
answer one fundamental question. How can we improve the
processes that bring state-of-the-art technology to bear on our
most pressing security threats as expeditiously as possible
without sacrificing quality controls? I would ask each of our
witnesses to answer that question during the course of today's
hearing.
Thank you again to our witnesses for joining us today.
I yield back the balance of my time. Thank you for the
indulgence, Madam Chairwoman.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the Ranking Member.
I thank all the witnesses for their testimony.
I remind each Member that he or she will have 5 minutes to
question the panel, and I will now recognize myself for
questions.
Mr. Dent mentioned that we have a number of principals and
stakeholders who are participating in this hearing today, and I
add that we also are able to have an airport, one of the
Nation's top airports, represented here today to contribute to
what I think is a very vital discussion.
Let me begin the questioning with Mr. Kane. There is
representation, I believe, that you say that the Department of
Homeland Security and TSA intend to purchase 1,000 of the body
scanners. Is that my understanding, or is that projected budget
request?
Mr. Kane. We intend to purchase 500.
Ms. Jackson Lee. You have 500 now, so you intend to have a
total of 500?
Mr. Kane. Then the fiscal year 2011 includes an additional
500 in the administration's----
Ms. Jackson Lee. So there are 1,000 over a 2-year period.
Mr. Kane. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. How do you intend to select the airports
that will be a recipient of the scanners?
Mr. Kane. We have gone through a process. Basically, we
will use our risk prioritization process, but in this case you
do phase constraints at airports. So these first 500 machines
that we will be deploying this year, we have looked at the
footprints, we have pulled out the designs for airports to look
at the checkpoint footprint that they have.
We are spreading them somewhat throughout the system to (1)
get better coverage of people with these 500. We get about 35
percent of passengers. But when you show up in an airport, you
might have about a 90 percent chance of actually going through
an AIT in the airport that you show up at, because we are
targeting some of the larger airports down through the Cat-2s,
so the Cat-Xs through the Cat-2s will have some.
Then we look at how to make sure we don't impact
throughput, and so we have done designs that will set a walk-
through metal detector alongside of the imaging technology, and
we can use that as overflow device. So again, you won't know if
you are going to get offered up to the imaging technology, but
you may end up going through a walk-through metal detector as
well.
After those first 500, we are working with industry to get
auto detection capability that we would like to see the
industry produce that, and (1) retrofit the 500 that we will
put out into the field, and then for the next 500 we would like
to see that capability in place by the time we deploy them.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Do you have the list of the airports, or
are you in the process of reviewing them as we speak?
Mr. Kane. I don't have the list with me. We have announced
11 of those airports. We have a longer list than that, a more
complete list than that. Some of them will probably change
around as reality meets design plans. That is when we go out
and work with them.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, would you provide this committee
with both the process by which you made this election and as
well the list?
Mr. Kane. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. If you could do that as soon as possible,
please.
In October 2009 the GAO reported that inconsistent
communication, the lack of an overarching test and evaluation
strategy has limited S&T's and TSA's ability to coordinate
effectively with one another. What, if anything, has DHS done
to facilitate communication and to improve coordination among
TSA and S&T? What are the challenges that remain?
Mr. Kane. I think we have done a tremendous amount of work
to mature those processes and that relationship with S&T in
that oversight that they provide of our operational test and
evaluation for the AIT in particular. We have worked through
our acquisition process, we have tested it in the labs, we have
tested it in our integration facility, and we have tested it
out in the field.
Those test plans--while some of the testing is done by S&T,
the test plans for out in the field are reviewed, and the
results of those are reviewed before we can make that
investment decision in the investment process that DHS manages.
So I think we have, you know, we are not where GAO reported we
were back in October 2009 in this procurement or in our other
procurements that I talked about.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Do you have a direct point that you can
give to this committee that says that the communication between
S&T and TSA has improved? What is that one point?
Mr. Kane. When I go to the acquisition review board with
the deputy secretary, S&T's representative for test and
evaluation is sitting across the room, and they weigh in on
those results that we are producing for making that investment
decision, so we clearly have the communication sitting right in
the same room with us when we are having our oversight within
the Department.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me quickly thank you.
Mr. Buswell, for AIT, the auto detect technology that is
being piloted at the Amsterdam airport appears to eliminate
most privacy issues that have been raised by introducing human
screeners into the process only when prohibited items are
detected. What is your opinion of the auto detect technology
and what is S&T's current and planned role with this
technology? Will this be piloted in the United States?
Mr. Buswell. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. The decision on
whether or not to pilot the technology is not ours. It will be
TSA's. It will be based upon independent test and evaluation of
those algorithms when they are ready at TSL and in the field
that determine--and I would yield to Mr. Kane--but the criteria
that we have discussed is it has to be as least as good as the
human operator monitoring those images. So we won't deploy and
rely on automatic target recognition algorithms that do a worse
job than the human operators. Security is why we have these
pieces of equipment.
Ms. Jackson Lee. The human operators are the TSO officers?
Let me move quickly to Mr. Lord. My time is running out.
GAO gave a very extensive report.
As I do that, let me submit into the record the statement--
ask unanimous consent to submit into the record the statement
of Colleen M. Kelley, National President, National Treasury
Employees Union. Hearing no objection, this statement is put
into the record.
[The statement of the National Treasury Employees Union
follows:]

Statement of Colleen M. Kelley, National President, National Treasury
Employees Union
March 17, 2010

Madam Chairwoman and Ranking Member Dent, thank you for allowing me
to share some thoughts on checkpoint security. As National President of
NTEU, I represent thousands of TSOs at over 40 airports. Many of my
members came to TSA when it was created, not long after 9/11. They came
to TSA because they wanted to help keep this country safe. Despite the
many hardships endured by TSOs--low pay, high on-the-job injury rates,
terrible morale due to a culture of distrust--I think you would agree
that they do an excellent job keeping us safe.
I believe that people, not technology, are our most important asset
in combating terrorism. We need adequate staff and we need adequate
training for that staff, and we need to treat them with dignity.
I met with my members recently, and we talked about the AIT
machines that TSA is installing as a more efficient method of detecting
objects hidden by terrorists. The TSA budget requests almost $530
million for fiscal year 2011 to purchase, install, and operate these
machines. While we applaud the effort to upgrade technology and the
increased staffing to accompany the machines, we would urge the
committee to ensure that the machines are adequately tested before 500
more are purchased. GAO has indicated that TSA has not been able to
verify how effective AIT scanners will be in detecting hidden
explosives, for example. If AITs are used in primary screening, and
they have vulnerabilities that have not been fully investigated, we
will have wasted a vast sum of money.
With the increased staffing requested in the budget, there should
be a major emphasis on training. I am very concerned about the training
being conducted for these machines and we have not heard from TSA about
the training program they have prepared. For the machines we have now,
both at the checkpoint and in baggage, training is inadequate. Most of
the training is done through on-line computers. In many of the
airports, the number of computers is inadequate. Sometimes they are
very far away from the work area, in a location difficult to get to.
There is very little hands-on training. My members tell me that they
find it much more helpful to be taught by a person, so that you can ask
questions and discuss methods. Computers fulfill the paper requirement
for training, but it is not ideal. If TSA put as much effort into
training its TSOs as it does in evaluating its TSOs, it would have a
stellar training program.
TSOs have a lot of experience in checkpoint screening, but without
collective bargaining, their ideas are not considered, and that is
TSA's loss. We look forward to a permanent administrator at TSA, who
will provide much needed direction and leadership.
Collective bargaining for TSOs remains NTEU's main goal. NTEU
appreciates the effort of your subcommittee in assessing checkpoint
security. We know that you believe, as we do, that the people who work
at TSA are its greatest asset. We are most secure when people drive
technology, rather than technology driving people.

Ms. Jackson Lee. As I put it into the record, Mr. Lord
mentions that on all of this new technology, particularly the
body scanners, AIT, if the personnel are not trained, right now
it is represented the training is done by computers. Can you
comment on the need for the training of the users of this
equipment?
Could you quickly comment on the critical problem of the
relationship between TSA and the DHS S&T Directorate and how
can lawmakers or officials address this problem--training and
the utilization of the product and the communication issue?
Mr. Buswell. Regarding your first question, Madam
Chairwoman, the training is a very important component of AIT
usage. Obviously, it does not have auto alarm capability.
Therefore, it means you have to train people, and train, so it
is very important you have a clear, consistent, systematic
program. That is something that is not included in the hardware
cost of AIT. Obviously, this is something that interests us.
Any time you have a human involved in anything, it
introduces some inconsistencies potentially in your process, as
humans are prone to, you know, error, distractions, et cetera.
So I think a lot of people are focusing on the technology, but
you have to be mindful you need an image operator to interpret
the results. So that potentially introduces some inconsistency.
Your second question--this coordination issue between S&T
and TSA and TSL--this is one we reported on extensively in our
October 2009 report. The Department agreed that the
coordination process needed to be made more transparent and
streamlined. I think it is good news.
Robin is a part of the ARB process. He chairs the IPT
Capstone priority setting process, but this is something we are
going to have to continue to look at. Any time I see an
organization chart with dotted line relationships, it always
raises a question in my mind like who is in charge? That is
what one of the issues we highlighted in our report. The roles
and responsibilities of all the players were not clear. Sounds
like they have taken steps to address that, but I tend to be
conservative on this, so let us give it a little more time.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
Mr. Dent is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Dent. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Although this hearing is really about checkpoint screening,
committee staff has been advised that there is a vendor that
has a promising piece of technology that could be used for the
screening of palletized air cargo, but that S&T has decided not
to invest any further in its development. With the 100 percent
screening mandate for air cargo looming, why has S&T decided
not to expend any funds in development of technologies for
palletized cargo, Mr. Buswell, if you could address that?
Mr. Buswell. Sure. I don't know which technology that you
are specifically referring to, but we are in fact investing a
significant amount of money in air cargo screening, about $11
million this year, and in the President's request for fiscal
year 2011 there is about $15 million for air cargo screening
technology.
The focus of that screening technology is at looking at
palletized and break bulk screening--through trace detection,
primarily in mass spectrometry sorts of devices.
The other aspect of cargo that beyond the technology is
very important is a canine aspect of explosive detection in
cargo. We are investing also in advanced training aids. These
are one of the highest priorities on TSA's list for our
investment--training aids for canines as well as looking at how
do we determine which canines are going to be good explosive
detection instruments.
Are there certain behavioral characteristics that we can
look at as puppies, you know? Are there DNA markers, those
sorts of things that help us identify which, you know, which of
these animals will go through the fairly expensive and
extensive training?
So we are in fact investing. We are interested in all
technologies. That is, you know, the private sector
involvement, I think, is a win-win-win for the Department, the
private sector, and the country, when you can get them
involved.
My experience is the private sector involvement--we get
results more quickly with the private sector involved. They
have a profit motive that gets them to the, you know, gets them
to the end point quickly. In fact under circumstances we can do
this with very minimal investment of Government dollars with
establishing the right kind of requirements and then offering
our services at the TSL or other places to test their
technology when it is ready.
If you have a constituent that thinks they have an answer,
we are ready to listen. In fact, we have a long-range BAA that
is open and provides an easy vehicle for them to get in front
of us to look at their technology.
Mr. Dent. Well, thank you. Thank you, and appreciate that.
Mr. Kane, the President's fiscal year 2011 budget includes
$214 million in funding for an additional 500 AIT machines and
$235 million for an additional 3,700 FTEs to operate the
machines. We are concerned with the funding request for
additional personnel, as we all are.
Does the request for additional personnel take into account
deficiencies that may be gained by eventually reducing the
number of magnetometers that will be removed or replaced with
the AIT machines?
Mr. Kane. The request for personnel includes about an
additional $1.25 person per checkpoint lane that has an AIT
with the walk-through metal detector standing next to it. But
it presumes we will have that auto detection capability as
well.
Mr. Dent. So your funding request does take into account,
then, the fewer personnel that will be needed when the AIT
machines become operational with that auto detect feature?
Mr. Kane. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dent. Okay. Then, finally, did TSA look to identify any
efficiencies in its current staffing models for it opted to ask
Congress for the 3,700 new FTEs?
Mr. Kane. Congressman, yes, sir. TSA has been looking at
those staffing models over the years quite extensively, and
now, if you look at where we were a few years ago with 44,000
people in checkpoints and in the baggage screening rooms, that
number is more like 39,000, and we have invested many of those
resources into the other layers of security.
We continue to get savings with the inline systems that we
are putting into airports, and we always reinvest those savings
into other areas and take into account those savings with the
additional requests that we have.
Mr. Dent. Finally, committee staff has reviewed
correspondence between TSA and a certain vendor that
essentially denied the vendor the opportunity to submit a white
paper in technology for consideration, because a TSA
solicitation was no longer active. The vendor was told to look
on the Federal business opportunities website for future
solicitations. I have a few questions related to this matter,
which I think illustrates the problem.
Isn't TSA potentially missing promising or better and more
efficient technologies by not accepting white papers in
technologies on a rolling basis? Isn't that shortsighted?
Mr. Kane. We need to manage both of those things, Mr.
Congressman. You know, I am a procurement organization to a
large extent, and so most of the solicitations I do are to buy
things already established on those QPLs.
But recognizing your concern and our own concerned with
that, we look to S&T to do a lot of this type of work for us,
so a lot of times I will refer folks back to S&T. But just this
week TSA did issue a broad agency announcement that would allow
such white papers to be submitted, and we would do an
evaluation of them and determine whether they would be an
effective capability that we would want to bring into the TSA
fleet. Then we can explore further through that procurement
process.
Ms. Jackson Lee. The gentleman yields back.
I would now like to recognize the Chairman of the full
committee, Chairman Bennie Thompson.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman. We
have had an interesting set of witnesses, as well as some
questions.
Let me go around very quickly. We are deploying this new
technology for the next thousand machines--500 out of last
year's, 500 out of this. What is the cost? Who will bear the
cost of modifications at airports for these machines? What is
the formula for the modification, Mr. Kane?
Mr. Kane. Mr. Chairman, we are looking at a number of
different designs, and our goal through all of this is to
minimize any infrastructure costs at airports. We think with
the design so that we are working and by getting auto detection
and getting rid of the walk-through metal detector when we get
the auto detection, we will be able to minimize the impact on
airports.
Minor infrastructure costs within the checkpoints, TSA
works with the airports on who funds that. We are not planning
to do major infrastructure programs to put the AITs into
checkpoints.
Mr. Thompson. Okay. If there is a cost, who does TSA expect
to bear that cost for any modifications?
Mr. Kane. I think if we get to the point where we find out
we are going to have major infrastructure costs, we will have
to have that conversation with an airport. TSA does not fund
infrastructure costs at this point, though, and we have not in
the past. So there is not an intent going forward to do that.
The intent is to do designs that don't require that.
Mr. Thompson. But you know we have had very few designs
that don't cost airports money. You are aware of that. Am I
correct?
Mr. Kane. I would say much of the checkpoint technologies
that we have invested in we work with the airports and pay the
cost to install that equipment at the airports with little to
no impact on the airport.
Mr. Thompson. Well, there are some differences. We talk to
airports all the time, and they say that they cost. So what I
would like for you to do for us is take the 10 largest airports
and provide this committee with whether or not those airports
have had to incur costs locally in implementing any of this new
technology.
Mr. Kane. Mr. Chairman, we will definitely do that.
Mr. Thompson. Okay.
Next question is Mr. Lord talked about this same
implementation process that somehow we didn't operationally
test equipment before we installed it. Is he correct?
Mr. Kane. We operationally tested the AIT, both the
manufacturers that are on our qualified products list back in
the late summer, early fall in the airports, and we produced
those test results for the acquisition review board that I
referred to earlier, and they were reviewed by Mr. Buswell's
staff as well.
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Lord, do you care to----
Mr. Lord. Yes, that is correct. The technology I was
referring to was technology that preceded the AIT deployment,
the so-called explosive trace portals or puffers. In contrast
to the experience with the puffers, TSA has subjected them to a
much more rigorous testing process based on the documentation
we have reviewed.
Mr. Thompson. So you are satisfied with it.
Mr. Lord. Yes.
Mr. Thompson. Okay. Thank you.
I am not saying whether this will be Mr. Buswell's question
or Dr. Hallowell. We get comments from small businesses,
medium-size businesses and some large that it just takes
entirely too long to get new technologies through the system.
Have we designed some kind of matrix or model that can give
anybody who is interested in working in this area some idea of
how long it might take?
Mr. Buswell. Mr. Chairman, we can give them an estimate.
Let me just say that when it comes to evaluating technology at
the Transportation Security Laboratory, Dr. Hallowell has
essentially three sources of input.
One, it can come directly from TSA. In other words they
have got a commercial product that they would like evaluated
with respect to their desire, the capabilities, or their
desired requirements. That is first.
Second, we may have a developmental technology within S&T
that is ready for developmental test and evaluation or even
independent test and evaluation, and that would be an input.
The third is industry coming straight to TSL and saying,
``I have got the answer, and I would like you to evaluate my
technology.''
There are really two different paths that, regardless of
where it is referred from, that we go through. One is on the
developmental side, and I will call that research and
developmental assessment or evaluation as opposed to true
independent test and evaluation.
That is very collaborative, done under a Cooperative
research and development agreements generally with people who
are interested in having their technology assessed, or a
bailment, where they will just turn over the equipment, you
know, for our use temporarily. We will be, you know, as I said,
very collaborative with them and providing them test results,
briefing them on the results, the performance of their
equipment.
When it becomes apparent that that equipment could solve a
problem that TSA has or a requirement that TSA has established,
then it enters the independent test and evaluation process.
That is not collaborative. That is independent, and it is
rigorous, and it is to the certification standards or the
qualification standards that TSA has established.
So once a technology enters that process, they may not hear
anything for a few months while it goes through it. The time
that it takes depends on the--depends on the flow of materials
through the TSL. I will let Dr. Hallowell talk about that, if
you would like.
But they are somewhat resource constrained in their ability
to--to throughput technology, so we haven't had to turn anyone
away yet, but with the--with the increasing interest in this
particular area, we are having to look at how we resource the
lab, what kind of capital improvements we need to make at the
lab in order to ensure that we can continue to provide that
service for TSA and for the American people.
So, you know, I appreciate the question, and it is
something that I think about regularly.
Dr. Hallowell, did you want to add anything on the time
line?
Ms. Hallowell. Mr. Chairman, good afternoon. I just wanted
to add that one of the things that is a big criteria in terms
of how fast something travels through the laboratory has to do
with the technology readiness level as well.
We see everything from things that are just beyond research
concepts to bread boards to engineering prototypes, so
depending upon the maturity level, it depends on how long it
takes for that technology to grow and mature to the point where
it is capable of going into independent test and evaluation.
The role of the R&D test and evaluation portion of the
laboratory is really to help our industrial partners mature
technology. We do that very diligently. In many cases we offer
up test articles such as IEDs or weapons or whatnot, so if
there is any training involved so the technology can learn, if
you will, develop the algorithms to actually find the bombs,
that is available to them. So that can take a long time as
well.
Mr. Thompson. Well, ma'am, I apologize for asking questions
that ended up with such lengthy answers, but can you provide
the committee, as best you can--I understand it is dependent on
the situation--the range that a company could expect to work
with you before a decision is reached?
What we hear is some of them have limited resources, and
they are trying their best to comply with the request, but
after they meet one, they say something else pops up. I
wouldn't want us to miss out on some good technology because we
were not clear as to how the vetting process for new technology
goes.
So if you can just provide the committee with your best
experienced guess at the time, it would help.
Ms. Hallowell. Well, let me respond to your question. We
don't want to hinder any technology development, so we will
certainly invite people to the laboratory regardless of how
mature the technology is. But at the end of the day, there is a
very rigorous protocol that is associated with TSA acquisition
standards. That testing is done by the IT&E team, and it is a
fairly rigid benchmark.
We did try to help companies understand what those
requirements are and to help them grow. Sometimes without being
able to go to a classified level, it is difficult. But we do
try to step them through that. My experiences are we have seen
everything from 3 to 4 years in collaborative research and
development agreements to short periods of time--5 or 6 months,
depending upon the technology maturity level, to get to IT&E.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman. I
yield back. Thank you for being patient.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to recognize Mr. Austria for 5 minutes.
Mr. Austria. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
I appreciate our panel being here today and helping to
clarify, I think, some of the concerns that we have had and the
confusion about collaboration and working relationship between
S&T, TSL, and TSA. In my opinion I think the process has not
been clear, and it is not been accurately and practically
defined. I appreciate you being here to help do that.
So let me, if I could, kind of pick up where the Chairman
was with his comments towards Dr. Hallowell, if I could. I
thank you for being here, and I know you are highly regarded by
the staff, and I understand the staff had a very good visit to
the Transportation Security Lab a few months ago.
But, Dr. Hallowell, the committee and I think some of the
Members here are still concerned that despite best efforts and
hard-working people at S&T and TSL and TSA, that the
relationship between these parties is not adequately defined
and working to the best possible extent.
I guess in a perfect world, right, if you had an ideal
situation, how should that relationship be between S&T, TSL,
and TSA? How should that work? Has there been anything that has
changed or caused more urgency since the attempted Christmas
day bombing that between the agencies you are now working even
better or have changed the way you are working? If you could
comment on that, please.
Ms. Hallowell. Yes, sir. I think that relationship is doing
nothing but getting stronger and better even before the
Christmas day incident. We have a program manager that works on
my staff that spends half his time at either TSA or S&T that
can directly communicate input from R&D land, from test and
evaluation land, and at the same time can understand better
what some of the concerns are from TSA. That has been very
helpful.
Obviously, the incident of Christmas day has brought us all
very close together, and it is not just the Capstone meetings
or the sub-IPT meetings associated with checkpoint, but we do
have daily conversations from my laboratory to TSA across all
sectors, including cargo, checkpoint, and checked baggage.
Mr. Austria. If anyone else would like to comment on that
as far as any new or promising technologies that you have been
pursuing since the Christmas day event or any progress that you
can report to this committee of things that you are doing
differently now than prior to that incident?
Ms. Hallowell. In terms of technology or processes? I am
sorry, sir.
Mr. Austria. Both, I think.
Ms. Hallowell. Well, we have certainly accelerated some of
the test and evaluation to accommodate what is required from
TSA. We have been working very hard on the second round
qualification testing for detection performances as it relates
to AIT, which Mr. Kane talked about.
We have been very involved otherwise with test and
evaluation of explosive detection systems for checked baggage
against a new certification standard that TSA has presented to
us. So we have been quite busy in the laboratory and been doing
double shifts, essentially, testing equipment.
Mr. Austria. Thank you for that.
Mr. Kane, let me ask you. TSA finalized a strategic plan
for passenger checkpoint security in 2008, in August 2008. We
understand that TSA has a risk-based approach to securing the
most at-risk airports first. We also understand that the AIT or
the advanced imaging technology has far superior detection
capabilities than traditional metal detectors or detection.
If you think back to 9/11 in the World Trade Center, what
happened there we all know, but it seems as though--and I have
read reports where New York City still remains one of the top
terror targets in the Nation, yet there, you know, there are
concerns about that there is not one AIT machine that has yet
to be deployed in New York City airport.
If you could comment on that and how that a risk-based
approach, how this risk-based approach that you are taking is
better protecting passengers.
Mr. Kane. Congressman, the risk-based approach we are
taking with AIT in particular, we are spreading it throughout
the system, so the New York airports will be on that larger
list that I promised the Chairwoman earlier to some level.
We also need to face the constraints of what the airport,
until we have auto detect capability, you know, being able to
set an AIT next to a walk-through metal detector to make sure
that you can still operate the airports with an AIT in the
lanes. We are very sensitive to that. The folks who testify
after us, I am certain are going to be very sensitive to that.
So we are working with all the airports. The larger
airports, certainly, are high-risk airports on the way we do
our risk models, and we would like to get as many passengers as
possible through AIT, so that drives us to larger airports as
well.
Mr. Austria. My time is up, so I will yield back to the
Chairwoman.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank the gentleman.
I am now pleased to recognize the gentleman from Oregon,
and as I understand it, served as the Chairperson of the
Aviation Committee on T&I for a number of years, Mr. DeFazio.
Mr. DeFazio. No, those were the bad old days. I was Ranking
Member, but I was there when we conceived of the TSA.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Oh, then I am half accurate. The Ranking
Member, in my book, is equally placed. Thank you.
Mr. DeFazio. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
I have a question about the throughput on the AITs, because
there seems to be considerable divergence. We are hearing from
airports and others that they think that it is more like 45
seconds throughput, and TSA is saying 15 seconds. Can someone
address the discrepancy? Mr. Kane, perhaps?
Mr. Kane. Congressman, I will address that, yes. Our
modeling right now is around 20 to 22 seconds for AIT. It takes
a few seconds in the machine--five-ish--and then that image
operator we talked about takes time to review and interpret
that image to determine whether is anomaly or not. So we have
tested as one of the parameters that we measure in our
operational test and evaluation.
Throughput is, obviously, you know, it is not just
important to airports. It is important to TSA operation as
well. We can't do our business if we can't get people through
the checkpoints. So it is around 20 seconds.
If we get that auto detect--when we get that capability,
that will speed that process as well. Then the other thing we
are doing to manage the throughput that maybe I am just not
doing a very good job so far of educating people about is the
configurations for these first 500, and until we have an auto
detection capability, will allow relief for going through the
AIT versus going through a walk-through metal detector to
ensure we managed that throughput at checkpoints and at the
lanes with the AITs at checkpoints in particular.
Mr. DeFazio. Okay. Then, but then there is the third
variant, which is you allow someone who has been designated to
an AIT to choose a pat-down. You are getting a fairly low rate
of refusal for AIT?
Mr. Kane. Yes, all of our testing today has shown over 98
percent acceptance by the passengers that are offered to the
AIT.
Mr. DeFazio. I would be concerned about the 2 percent. Some
it may be a privacy issue but, you know, knowing the pat-down
regime now, I mean, at Heathrow I experienced much more
intrusive pat-downs that are customarily conducted here in the
United States, which probably would have found Mr. whatever-
his-name-was, you know, the explosive.
But the way we do pat-downs, you probably wouldn't. So I
would be concerned about those who were self-selecting out of
the AIT. Now, does that cause you concern? Is there some, shall
we say, more intrusive pat-down going on with those people?
Mr. Kane. Congressman, I would rather talk about that in a
closed session or offline, if I could, sir.
Mr. DeFazio. Okay. Just so you hear my concern and you are
accommodating it, but I would be happy to hear about it later.
Mr. Kane. Yes, sir. We understand your concern very well.
Mr. DeFazio. Okay. This new explosives trace device, the
BLS-2, is that gate deployable?
Mr. Kane. The bottle liquid scanner is a liquid scanner.
Mr. DeFazio. Right.
Mr. Kane. Yes, it is a desktop machine, so you could,
similar to what we are doing with----
Mr. DeFazio. Yes, well, because we have been doing these
random things at gates with people. You acquire water in the
terminal, okay, so you now have what you couldn't have brought
through security outside. There is nothing to identify you
bought it in the airport, and now you are being randomly, you
know, searched with rubber gloves at the gate, and they pull
out your 16-ounce bottle of water, and they put it back in, you
know, if that could be a threat object. It would have been a
threat object at regular security, but it isn't at the gate,
because you could have bought it in the airport.
So my question would be are we going to be deploying these
technologies to the gates, if we are going to do the random
selection at the gates? It seems to me it needs to be
technology assisted, not rubber gloves stadium searches.
Mr. Kane. Congressman, I will take that point as well, if I
may. Any further discussion should probably be offline on that
as well, though, sir.
Mr. DeFazio. Okay.
Mr. Kane. But I will again recognize the concern you
addressed.
Mr. DeFazio. Okay. I will try dogs. Are we optimally
utilizing dogs? I have a friend on the Science Committee, and
they had a very long discussion of the attempt to construct a
dog's nose that was mechanical and how expensive it would be,
how long it would take, and how difficult it is. I guess what
my colleague said was, ``Well, why not more dogs?'' They said,
``Well, dogs get tired.''
You know, I mean, what kind of a shift can a dog do
effectively? Can you address that? I hope that shouldn't be
classified, because, you know, it is like they are not tracking
anything.
Mr. Kane. No, sir, but I am not the canine program manager,
so I do apologize.
Mr. DeFazio. Okay. All right.
Mr. Kane. I am more into the technology realm, and as you--
--
Mr. DeFazio. Okay. All right.
Mr. Kane [continuing]. We haven't made those mechanical
dogs yet.
Mr. DeFazio. All right. But I just want to make sure that,
yes, I am concerned about whether having been, you know, having
dogs and knowing how difficult they are, sometimes the
mechanical dog could be a real problem.
Just one thing is blue sky under Capstone IPT, a next-
generation, fully automated checkpoints for detecting weapons
and explosives on people for aviation, mass transit, public
gathering venues, and other potential areas. I am just
concerned when I see, like, all those things in one place, and
it is going to be fully--it starts sounding like Pentagon
acquisition of stuff that never works.
I am hoping we are not putting, you know, I mean, either we
are out with RFPs, but we are not actually doing the
development or investing in the development ourselves, are we?
Mr. Buswell. I will take one.
Mr. DeFazio. Yes.
Mr. Buswell. We are investing in what we are discussing as
the next generation of checkpoint. That is fundamental science
and technology. We are looking at that from really a standoff
detection standpoint. We have got now checkpoints where we put
our bags through X-ray machines, we put our people through
metal detectors and advanced amateurs. We have behavior
detection officers, who try and assess where there is mal
intent on the part of people as they approach the checkpoint.
So to what extent can we automate those things from a
standoff position? Can we detect explosive traces from a
distance? Can we detect the kinds of things that would be
hidden under clothing that would be detectable at the
checkpoint through the advanced imaging from a distance?
The reason we think that that is so valuable in that it has
application not just to the aviation security checkpoint, but
security checkpoints in general, whether it be mass gatherings
or public transportation, mass transportation, or other kinds
of applications. Secret Service is very interested, obviously,
for, you know, for obvious reasons and those sorts of things--
Customs and Border Protection.
So this, you know, this serves the Homeland Security
enterprise at large to develop this ability to detect people
who mean to do harm and the things that they would mean to do
harm with from a distance. We think that that is the, you know,
if you talk about homeland security 2027, I mean, if our
checkpoints in 2027 look the way that they look today, you
know, I will--you can fire me, because I haven't done my job.
So we are looking at the future.
Mr. DeFazio. Okay. But I just want to make sure, you know,
we have some known technologies we haven't fully deployed. We
are not diverting a lot of money into this future blue sky kind
of thing, which may or may not happen.
You know, I mean, for instance, one last point, Madam
Chairwoman, is I am really pleased to see that we are finally
moving ahead with, you know, virtually, you know, comprehensive
deployment of the advanced, you know, the AT X-ray at baggage
screening.
That is something that the workers have needed for years. I
have been beating on that for years. We threw out the kind of
machines we used in the airports from the Capitol 10 years ago,
because they didn't meet standards, and they slowed everything
down, because you have to put the bags and move the bag that
all that. So I am pleased to see we are finally rolling those
out comprehensively. If we can do it even a little quicker than
that, it would be great. Thank you.
Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank the gentleman for his questions.
Now to the very patient Member from New Mexico, Mr. Lujan.
He is recognized for his 5 minutes.
Mr. Lujan. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, I think.
Thank you to everyone who is also being here today.
Mr. Kane, we know that liquid explosives are posing a
significant risk, a higher risk than ever before as well. Can
you tell me what the S&T Directorate is pursuing in new
technology that could potentially identify explosives? I think
that some of those were mentioned in testimony as well.
In this specific case, can you describe how TSA has worked
with S&T Directorate to define technical requirements and to
coordinate the R&D and testing effort of this promising new
technology?
Mr. Kane. Congressman, yes, sir. First off, just to be
clear, imaging technology that we are rolling out to the field
does detect liquids, so that is a technology that will detect
all nonmetallic threats and metallic threats on passengers,
including liquids, powders, gels, all the things we have been
talking about recently.
The AT X-ray, those auto detect algorithms that we have
been working with the manufacturers on, and S&T has been
working with us and them on, include a liquid detection
capability in there as well. They continue to work on
developing those two an operational product that we can use in
the field.
I can't go too far, because our detection standards are
certainly sensitive, you know, but our explosive detection
systems that we are using down in the bag areas for your
checked baggage, we are also working. S&T is doing a tremendous
amount of data collection and testing to characterize threats
so that we can include those types of threats in those areas as
well.
Mr. Lujan. Whoever wishes to answer this question, there
was some discussion as far as the attention being brought to
the number of metal detectors that will be deployed in other
airports. Are there commercial airports now where passengers
don't have to go through metal detectors to get on a plane?
Mr. Kane. Not in the United States, certainly.
Mr. Lujan. So will those metal detectors that we are
talking about be deployed in the United States?
Mr. Kane. I am sorry, Congressman. I am not sure I
understood the question in terms of more metal detectors.
Mr. Lujan. It sounds like at the beginning of the
conversation today there was a commitment to the deployment of
more metal detectors.
Mr. Kane. No, it is more than leaving them behind for now.
So we would like to replace the metal detectors or incorporate
them into the imaging technology capability, but----
Mr. Lujan. Very good. I just wanted to get that
clarification.
As the Chairman was talking about the importance of the
time frame associated with the amount of time it takes to get
technology through TSA, through TSL to be approved and
certified, Dr. Hallowell, if you could provide a framework
indicating the amount of time it takes for technology to be
certified and approved by TSL and TSA for use in the field, if
you could submit that to the committee.
But if you could touch on as well, either Mr. Buswell or
Dr. Hallowell, on the complexities associated with licensing
and commercialization and how that impacts small business
owners, entrepreneurs, scientists, physicists, other businesses
that may be taking that technology out for deployment?
Mr. Buswell. Yes, sir. I can talk about that little bit.
The small businesses in this market space have a very difficult
time, and it is because we talk about being able to produce,
you know, 1,000 advanced imaging technology devices over a 2-
year period. Small businesses have a very difficult time doing
that.
What they are very good at, and what you point out
correctly, is the innovation. They are excellent at innovation.
That is where true innovation happens. The big companies have
less of a stomach for that. You know, my private sector
history, I worked for General Electric, and one of the things
that I did for General Electric was looked at small businesses
and the technologies that they were developing, because we
truly believed that they were more innovative than we were ever
going to be able to come up with.
So licensing is one of the fundamental transition abilities
that the small business has, working with a big equipment
manufacturer to license their intellectual property or their
ideas.
There are other vehicles or tools that we can use within
S&T to help them. I mentioned cooperative research and
development agreements where we provide something, and they
provide something--whatever can change hands except for the
Government doesn't provide any money. I mean, that is
essentially what a CRADA is.
We can provide laboratory test facilities for their use. We
can provide some technical expertise that can help them move
things along. So there are a number of ways. For small
businesses or for any size business, I would commend--we have
put together a one-sheet piece of paper that--we have entitled
it, ``The Constituent Guide to Doing Business with DHS Science
and Technology.''
So we will fire these off in 100-round bursts, if you like.
We have got many here to help you help your constituents get in
the door, because we don't care where the good ideas come from.
We want to use them.
Mr. Lujan. Thank you. Just, Mr. Buswell, I want to tell you
thank you very much for your positive comments regarding MagViz
as well. I think that will be a game-changing technology.
Mr. Buswell. Mr. Kane just forgot to mention MagViz when he
was talking about the liquid detection. We were all very
enthusiastic about the half-scale testing that we think will go
on this summer for MagViz.
Mr. Lujan. I appreciate that.
Madam Chairwoman, just one thing to point out that Mr.
Buswell brought up is when we talk about the CRADAs, this is an
area where back in the 1990s Department of Energy, National
laboratories, the S&T Directorate, it was working. We saw a
decline in the usage of this. These were where the big ideas
came from. We need to look to see and get answers from inside,
from those entities that are taking advantage of these
programs, and see how we can use them to solve some of these
big, big ideas and make this work again.
Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the gentleman for his very
thoughtful analysis and your challenge that we have to get back
to that. Now using it for the security of this Nation, I think,
is a clarion call. I am disturbed by the suggestions of
communication and the seemingly heavy-laden process that
hinders inventiveness, small businesses, minority-owned
businesses, women-owned businesses. So I join you in that.
I would like to ask Mr. Buswell to provide us--to the
committee--the checklist that you just mentioned to Mr. Lujan
and so that we can review these materials and look--and be
forward thinking.
My pleasure as well to yield to another very patient
Member, which is indication of contributing Member, as I said
for Mr. Lujan, Ms. Titus of Nevada, yielded for 5 minutes.
Ms. Titus. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
I would just like to continue along the same lines of
discussion about helping the private sector, because it seems
that reality is kind of contradictory to what you are espousing
as your approach and your goal.
On November 16 of just this past year, Chairman Thompson
and Chairwoman Jackson Lee sent a letter to the Acting
Administrator Rossides regarding TSA's implementation of the
mandate to screen 100 percent of the cargo transported on
passenger aircraft. This deadline was to be this coming August.
In the letter TSA was asked to consider expanding the
screening technology pilot program in order to provide small
businesses with additional options that don't involve expensive
equipment. Now, it is my understanding that proposals have been
submitted for pilot programs that would assist in developing
certification standards and testing of privately trained
explosive detection canines.
I believe that enabling private canine companies to be
certified would be of great assistance to you as you move
towards this 100 percent cargo screening. That is certainly in
keeping with the remarks of Mr. Buswell both about the value of
dealing with the private sector and this notion that now we
need to profile puppies as we move more into this area.
It is my understanding that a development of these
standards and scheduling of the pilot program have been stalled
at DHS. It has been out there. You have had the information.
Nothing seems to be happening. So I wonder if there is an
explanation for this delay, because it wouldn't involve the
kind of testing that Dr. Hallowell has mentioned, and what
perhaps is the timeline for the completion of the certification
project that--moving forward.
Mr. Kane. Congresswoman, I apologize. I am just not
qualified to talk on the canine subject. I know those
discussions are going on. It is a TSA issue, so I will save my
S&T colleagues here. If I could take something for the record
but if we could take something and get back to you, I would
greatly appreciate that, because I just don't have the
knowledge to answer that.
Ms. Titus. Madam Chairwoman, would that be all right? Could
we ask them to submit an answer to my question here shortly?
Ms. Jackson Lee. Absolutely.
If you would, respond to the gentlelady's question and
inquiry.
Mr. Kane. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Titus. Thank you very much. I yield back.
Ms. Jackson Lee. On this very point, let me just to finish
some questioning, but to make the point, several Members have
asked what potentially may be classified inquiries, so I am
going to ask the staff to set up a classified briefing on in
particular the new screening equipment, body scan, other
analysis that you are using in terms of airport selection and
all of their intended practices around this new effort.
To that point, Mr. Kane, I am going to be interested in
your analysis. I would like to track what Mr. Austria said. I
was a little aghast that New York was not on the list and
further aghast that Texas was not on the list. You have no
Southwest representation, and those airports, many of them are
international. So do you have any response regarding Texas?
Mr. Kane. I don't, Madam Chairwoman, at this time. I would
be happy to offer the full brief on how we came to the airports
we have and any of the classified information that we could
discuss in closed session.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Oh, I don't want you to give classified
information today, but as you indicated to Mr. Austria that New
York will be on the list, what are your plans for--do you have
any way of projecting that Texas will be on the list?
Mr. Kane. Well, I can tell you Cat-X airports are certainly
going to be on the list.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I am sorry. Pardon me?
Mr. Kane. The largest airports will be on the list, and
that is why I can speak to New York. I don't have that list,
and I don't have the full knowledge of exactly what is on the
list at this point for some of the other airports.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, I think, without slighting any of my
fellow cities, I think you might find DFW and IAH on the list
of large airports.
Mr. Kane. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So I would suspect, if that was a fact,
that you would expect to see Texas airports on the list?
Mr. Kane. Oh, yes, ma'am. I just don't know all Texas
airports, but, yes, the large airports in Texas would certainly
be on the list.
Ms. Jackson Lee. All right. That is very important to many
of us, who are well aware of the different security assets that
are in these areas, meaning particular entities that pose some
danger. So we want to make sure that you have that broad
breadth of analysis.
Let me just do two questions here to Mr. Lord.
I submitted to the record a statement of the president of
the NTEU, and I don't know if you heard my question. It is
represented that the training that is going on on technology is
being done by computer. So I guess if I am sitting in the
airport in Arizona and I am a TSO or the airport in Houston and
I am a TSO, I go to a computer and learn.
With this new technology give me your assessment of the
preferable mess of the human training, actual teacher that goes
out and allows a question-and-answer period, the hands-on
training. This is a very important issue for us, and I think it
plays into the combination of man and machine, a woman and
machine. Mr. Lord.
Mr. Lord. I understand the question. Unfortunately, I am
not going to be able to opine on this. What I have evaluated,
the content of the training and collecting a little more
information, I think it is important to point out our own
agency. We provide our employees with a mix of on-line training
as well as self-taught training and teacher-led instructor
training.
So my own agency uses a mix of tools, so I would have to
find out a little bit more about the curriculum and what is
actually being offered.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Of course, the task of your agency and the
task of security officers are somewhat different. Can we pass
you then--I would like to add the request to the GAO for the
analysis of the training, particularly as it relates to
security training and in this instance the equipment that is
under consideration at this hearing.
Mr. Lord. We would be glad to take a look at it.
Ms. Jackson Lee. We would like you to do that.
Dr. Hallowell, then, let me add to the point that Chairman
Thompson made. Are you all sensitive to the problems that small
businesses have with the review of their inventions? The time
is sometimes is the death of inventiveness in terms of the
funding, in terms of what they do next. They are waiting on an
answer.
As you do that, let me put into the record a statement by
Mr. James P. Middleton, CEO and president, Secure Global
Logistics, Houston, Texas.* His testimony--let me make a very
strong statement of appreciation for the work that they do.
They happen to be a CCSF, and we are just acknowledging so many
small companies that are now engaged in serving their country
by being a CCSF, and they had to obviously get the approval.
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* The information was not available at the time of publication.
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But the point is how are you being sensitive to these
smaller companies and the slow process of S&T?
Ms. Hallowell. Yes, ma'am. We are very sensitive to small
businesses. Our doors are open for people who think they have
technology solutions. Particularly in the R&D part of test and
evaluation, we are happy to work with every and all.
However, when you go down the R&D pipeline, you get to the
test and evaluation portion associated with TSA acquisition,
there are certain requirements such as the ability to turn out
multiple copies of a configuration control device that
sometimes small businesses do have problems with. I don't know
that we can help with that part of it.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Okay. Can you stop for a moment? I think
all the small businesses that I hear from are asking us can you
just tell us whether or not S&T has approved it? I know there
are other steps, and certainly I think those are appropriate
steps, which is can you produce the product? But can we have
the first step of having the analysis of S&T so we know whether
it is a viable product? That is where the holdup is. If there
is a second tier of holdup, we will address that. But why is
the S&T taking so long?
Ms. Hallowell. I don't know that I have encountered a
situation where we have had trouble accommodating somebody that
came in, because typically we will meet with them, we will find
out whether or not the concept is feasible, any data, and we
can bring it to the laboratory.
The snafu typically comes when a company offers a product
that sees some subset of the larger mission space of IEDs that
need to be detected, and that is frustrating. We can only help
them by trying to help them mature the technology. But our door
is open.
Ms. Jackson Lee. But are you also assessing the validity of
the technology?
Ms. Hallowell. Yes, ma'am. What we typically do is evaluate
the sensitivity of it and the number of threats it can detect
and give them a read as to whether it is getting close to
something that is viable in terms of some acquisition plan,
because I think that is where everybody ultimately wants to go,
is to be able to provide a solution.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Right. Well, let me quickly move on and
just ask you to present this to us in writing again. Maybe we
need to be better informed. Give us your step-by-step ABC of
the XYZ small business, minority-owned business, woman-owned
business, or business coming into S&T and from A to the
completion. Let us try to see if we can understand that. Then
we can interact with you.
We think there is a bump in the road, if we are continuing
to hear across America that complaint about backlog, not being
able to get through. Let us see how we can work together on
that. So I would like that. I really would like that as
expeditiously as possible, maybe preceding us going into a
classified briefing.
Ms. Hallowell. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me finish with Mr. Kane.
I indicated--I hope I was heard, but I am asking unanimous
consent to submit into the record testimony of Secure Global
Logistics. But I do want to say that one of the testimonial
points that was made is the economic challenge, the financial
burden of purchasing expensive screening hardware, maintaining
it, upgrading it, training of staff, maintaining facility
security, and all the other obligations that go with being a
front-line screening partner with TSA.
Now, we in the Federal Government established this
relationship of a CCSF. Is there any effort to provide some
financial support for the purchase of this equipment through
TSA? Any thought about that? Any way we can think about that?
Mr. Kane. Madam Chairwoman, I know we initially for some of
our pilot programs, we have provided fundings for some of the
freight forwarders. We don't have anything in the budget right
now to continue anything like that forward that I am aware of--
certainly, not within my programs. I don't oversee that air
cargo policy program, but I am unaware of any in TSA's budget
to continue to any of that funding.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Would you take the inquiry back to TSA and
the appropriate persons for a response on whether or not that
is something that we can project into the future? We are
establishing more of these. We are asking more of these
shippers. We are all moving toward 100 percent cargo
inspection. We are moving it off airports into these CCSFs, and
I think we need some kind of response as relates to a
partnership.
Mr. Kane. Yes, ma'am. I will take that back.
Ms. Jackson Lee. All right.
Let me thank all the witnesses. I think----
Mr. Dent. Could I make a comment, Madam Chairwoman?
Ms. Jackson Lee. Yes, you certainly may.
Let me yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Dent.
Mr. Dent. Just a real quick comment. Mr. Kane, when you
provide that information to the Chair on the airports that will
be receiving the AIT machines, could you share that with us as
well?
Mr. Kane. Yes, sir.
Ms. Jackson Lee. It will come to the committee, and we will
share it with you.
Mr. Dent. I just wanted to make sure we are all going to
get that.
Mr. Kane. Whatever the appropriate process is, I will
endeavor to follow. Yes, sir. It will be writ large. It is
sensitive information, you know, when you see a schedule, and
so I know it is a little frustrating, but that is why you saw
those first 11 announced, because pretty soon they will show up
in the airports. There is no secret there anymore. But writ
large, what we do in terms of deployment we do consider
sensitive, because it does offer opportunity to see where we
are in there.
Ms. Jackson Lee. We will work through the staff, and they
will appropriately handle the material that you are submitting
to us. We do appreciate the sensitivity.
Mr. Kane. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I am sorry. I asked Mr. Lord, who is going
to look at it, but I just want to make sure you are aware of
the concern about on-line training for this sensitive
equipment. Let me raise a concern that I would like to see a
movement toward teacher on-site training.
Mr. Kane, do you have any response to that?
Mr. Kane. Yes, thank you for that opportunity, because I
didn't have one earlier. But we absolutely have a robust
Nation-wide rollout plan, and we are sending people to the
sites to do the training. It does involve simulator training,
but it is a 3-day training program, or almost 3 days. It does
include some simulator training, but it also does include on-
the-job training as well. So absolutely it is not just going to
be a simulator training.
One of the very early lessons learned when we first put AIT
out into the field as part of that original pilot was it has to
be a great training program, and you really have to focus on
those image operators to make the technology successful.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, I hope the TSO officers across
America have just heard you make that pronouncement. We will be
monitoring that rollout and those faculty members that you will
be sending out. I will burden you with another request. Please
give us a report on how that is proceeding and when you expect
to complete the training even as you do the rollout.
Mr. Kane. Yes, ma'am. It will be an on-going training
process as we roll out. We will certainly submit you that
report, and it is--obviously it is important to us to have some
of those metrics of how successful we are as we roll that
technology out.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me thank all the witnesses for their
testimony and as well to make the point that I made earlier
that your testimony is enormously valuable and as well that we
will hope if you have additional material that you would like
to submit into the record, we would ask that you would provide
that to the staff.
As I see that there are no further questions for our first
panel, I thank the witnesses for appearing before us today.
Members of the subcommittee may have additional questions for
you, and we ask that you respond to them expeditiously in
writing.
We now welcome our second panel to the witness table. We
understand that because the panel has expanded, we will need to
provide additional microphones, so we will take just a moment
to get that done.
Thank you again for your testimony today.
[Break.]
Ms. Jackson Lee. I welcome our second panel of witnesses.
Our first witness is Mr. Kevin Dunlap, director of security at
the International Air Transport Association. He is responsible
for planning and executing the North American aviation security
strategy of the association on behalf of 230 global airlines.
Mr. Dunlap will discuss security procedures at foreign airports
and the role of DHS.
Our second witness is Mr. Charles Barclay, president of the
American Association of Airport Executives. Mr. Barclay will
discuss how DHS interfaces with airports and how the roll-out
of the new security procedures and technologies impacts
airports.
Our third witness is Mr. Eric Potts, interim aviation
director of the Houston Airport System. Mr. Potts will be able
to discuss how DHS strategies and policies with checkpoint
security have impacted the airports specifically.
Our fourth witness is Mr. Marc Rotenberg. Mr. Rotenberg is
executive director of the Electronic Privacy Information
Center. Mr. Rotenberg will provide perspective on how
developments in screening procedures and technologies may
impact privacy rights. Mr. Rotenberg teaches information
privacy law at Georgetown University Law Center and has
testified before Congress on many emerging privacy and civil
liberties issues.
Our fifth witness, invited by the minority, is Mr. Brook
Miller, vice president for government affairs at Smiths
Detection. Mr. Miller will discuss his firm's interaction with
the Department as it has developed screening technologies.
Our sixth witness, also invited by the minority, is Mr.
Mitchel Laskey, president and CEO of Brijot Imaging Systems.
He, too, will discuss his firm's interaction with the
Department as it has developed screening technologies.
Without objection, the witnesses' full statements will be
inserted in the record. I now ask each witness to summarize
your statement for 5 minutes, beginning with Mr. Dunlap. If any
of you desire to take a shorter period than 5 minutes, we would
take up your time in questioning. We do expect votes to ring,
and we want to give the witnesses their time both in testimony,
but also in questioning.
I would also like to acknowledge the presence of Mr.
Lungren of California, a Member of this committee.
Thank you. Thank you for your presence here. My statement
earlier was that all of us in this room are committed to the
security of America, and your presence here will help us
continue to be on the front lines securing this Nation.
If I may, I would like to begin with Mr. Dunlap. We are now
asking you to summarize your statement, and you are recognized
for 5 minutes.

STATEMENT OF KENNETH J. DUNLAP, DIRECTOR OF SECURITY,
INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION

Mr. Dunlap. Thank you, Chairwoman Jackson Lee, Ranking
Member Dent and distinguished Members of the subcommittee.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify at this hearing.
The International Air Transport Association, IATA,
appreciates the leadership of the subcommittee in addressing
this critical issue. It is our hope that today's hearing
launches a much-needed international dialogue on the future of
passenger screening. IATA and our 230 U.S. and foreign member
airlines have a vision of future passenger screening that is
based on a paradigm shift in the principles behind checkpoint
operation.
We believe that next generation checkpoints must focus on
looking for bad people, and not just bad things. I would ask
that you consider our vision of an effective checkpoint, which
focuses on finding bad people rather than bad things.
Passengers are treated with dignity. Babies and children with
names similar to adults on the no-fly list pass through
screening uneventfully. Toenail scissors and nail clippers do
not trigger an interrogation.
In this scenario the airport security checkpoint is no
longer the first line of defense, but a second look. The dots
are connected by intelligence agencies before passengers reach
the checkpoints. Plots are disrupted long before the airport,
and screeners look for behavioral clues warranting a closer
inspection of the passenger.
The committee is asking today are our airports keeping
passengers safe? The short answer to this question is
absolutely yes. Today's checkpoints work, and we are not
advocating immediately discarding it for a next generation
checkpoint. However, the day is rapidly approaching where the
40-year-old concepts served as the underpinnings of our current
checkpoints will become obsolete.
The next checkpoint should rely on several and pervasive
passenger observation and detection. We believe highly trained
behavior detection officers, who question passengers and
observe their mannerisms throughout the screening process,
would add a strong layer of detection. Tomorrow's checkpoint
would enhance behavior detection by providing screeners with
contextual background information on the traveler to assist in
the questioning process.
This type of intelligence-based behavior detection would
increase both the fidelity and also the objectivity of
passenger screening. The system here envisions security for
tomorrow's passenger as a road bump in the journey rather than
a mountain. We believe the components of this checkpoint are
available, but they require the will to be assembled and
delivered to our airports.
I would like to say a few words about technology in
general. Security and technology are often confused. IATA
remains concerned that new technology is being viewed as the
silver bullet for the future, but there is no silver bullet.
For every technology with exciting detection capabilities,
there are complementary vulnerabilities.
Also we must not overlook the process through which
technology moves from the laboratory to the airport.
Fundamentally, this journey takes too long, it is tainted by
challenging and changing regulatory requirements, and it often
produces a product which doesn't work in the real world. An
unfortunate example mentioned here was the recent failure of
the so-called puffer explosive detection machine.
IATA applauds Secretary Napolitano, Chairman Thompson, and
Chairwoman Jackson Lee for refocusing DHS to a more forward-
thinking and globally oriented department. There are no better
examples than IATA's testimony here today and Secretary
Napolitano's joint global security summit in Geneva with IATA.
IATA has provided Secretary Napolitano with five specific
recommendations to strengthen commercial aviation security. Our
recommendations briefly are: Formal consultation with foreign
airlines, refining existing TSA emergency orders to better
address the international environment, eliminate inefficiencies
in the DHS passenger data collection program, strengthen
government-to-government outreach to harmonize and coordinate
on security issues, and finally, over the long term, focus on
developing the next generation checkpoint.
As this subcommittee reviews the events post-December 25,
we expect many in Washington will seek short-term fixes to
security checkpoints. However, new technology cannot guarantee
better security. It cannot detect bad people and is not the
only solution for the future. The solution lies in a paradigm
shift in how we screen and protect our passengers. Thank you.
[The statement of Mr. Dunlap follows:]

Prepared Statement of Kenneth J. Dunlap
March 17, 2010

INTRODUCTION

Chairwoman Jackson Lee, Ranking Member Dent, and distinguished
Members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify
at this hearing: ``An Assessment of Checkpoint Security: Are Our
Airports Keeping Passengers Safe?'' The International Air Transport
Association (IATA) appreciates the leadership and the foresight of the
subcommittee in addressing this critical issue in the wake of the
attempted bombing on Christmas day. It is my hope that today's hearing
launches a much-needed international dialog on the future of passenger
screening and results in even better screening for this generation and
the next. I urge you and your colleagues to seize this opportunity.
IATA represents some 230 U.S. and foreign air carriers and has
offices in over 70 countries. IATA's mission is to promote safe and
secure air travel. Through our work, we have changed the way people fly
around the globe. In fact, your last trip across the United States or
across an ocean was touched by IATA. The airline on which you flew most
likely participated in the IATA Operational Safety Audit (IOSA). This
is an internationally recognized and accepted evaluation system
designed to assess the operational management and control systems of an
airline. IATA replaced paper tickets with e-tickets which allow you to
fly using just your identification and a boarding pass. IATA has
enabled passengers to check in at home and to use boarding passes
displayed on a Blackberry or PDA through our standard-setting processes
and committees.
These initiatives embody one of IATA's core competencies, which is
to develop the processes that help passengers and their bags move
through airports more efficiently. Through IATA's flagship programs,
Simplifying the Business (StB) and Fast Travel, we work to make
passenger travel through the aviation system faster and simpler.
Through our work in areas such as boarding pass encryption and
checkpoint entry lanes, we work to make travel more secure. This
experience serves as the foundation for the ideas we are presenting to
you this afternoon.

IATA'S VISION OF THE FUTURE

IATA has a vision of future passenger screening that is based on a
paradigm shift in the principals behind checkpoint operation. We
believe next generation checkpoints must focus on looking for ``bad
people'' and not just ``bad things.'' If we have learned anything from
the last decade, it is that a passenger with toe nail clippers is not
automatically a threat to aviation.
As the subcommittee reviews the events post-December 25, we expect
many may seek short-term fixes to security checkpoints. In fact, some
procedural changes may be warranted. However, simply dropping new
technology into a checkpoint is not the answer for the future and does
not guarantee improved security. Even the best technology cannot detect
bad people. This Congress cannot allow calls for new equipment to mask
the fact that a long-term change is required for security checkpoints.
Consider our vision of an effective checkpoint, which focuses on
looking for bad people rather than for bad things: ``Passengers are
treated with dignity. Babies and children sharing a name found on the
no fly-list pass through screening uneventfully. Toe nail scissors and
nail clippers do not trigger an interrogation.''
In this scenario, the checkpoint is no longer the first line of
defense, but a second look. The dots are connected by intelligence
agencies before passengers reach the checkpoints, plots are disrupted
long before the airport, and screeners look for behavioral clues
warranting a closer inspection of the passenger.
IATA believes the key to this future lies in leveraging all of the
passenger information currently collected by a government before the
start of the trip. Data collected in the name of customs and
immigration needs to be merged with data collected for security. Then
this comprehensive data should be analyzed by government intelligence
agencies before a ``cleared to board'' decision is issued. The general
results of this vetting should be made known to the screener at the
checkpoint who will decide if a more thorough physical search is
warranted. This process, combined with advanced behavior detection,
would make for a stronger and more efficient checkpoint.
Certainly, all the parts of this notional checkpoint exist today.
However, Government and industry need to work together to integrate
these elements into a single, useable process. We believe Congress
should make this integration a priority.

TODAY'S DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY (DHS)

IATA applauds Secretary Napolitano, Chairman Thompson, and
Chairwoman Jackson Lee for refocusing DHS to a more forward-thinking
and globally-oriented Department. There are no better examples than
IATA's testimony today and Secretary Napolitano's joint Global Security
Summit in Geneva with IATA. The industry has noticed this new approach
and looks to heightened engagement to make the checkpoint of the future
a reality.
recommendations to congress and to the department of homeland security
During our Summit, IATA offered five principles and recommendations
to DHS to guide commercial aviation security post-Christmas day. We
believe these guidelines apply both locally and also globally. Our five
principles include:

1. Define a Risk-based Approach
Aviation security resources in terms of people and funds are
limited. Regulators and industry must focus these on the most probable
threats to aviation as demonstrated by past threats and future
capabilities. This requires that industry and Government work in
partnership to identify and to prioritize the threats we expect to face
and the responses we expect to implement.

2. Act Globally
Aviation is a globally interconnected enterprise that supports 32
million jobs and $3.5 trillion dollars in economic activity.\1\ As
such, this global network will only be as strong as its weakest link.
Regulators must secure this system with internationally implemented
standards and recognize the comparable security measures of other
States. Security resources should not be wasted duplicating the efforts
of other competent regulators.
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\1\ IATA Economics 2010.
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3. Regulators Must Share and Be Open to Best Practices
Globally, air transport is more secure than ever in its history.
IATA applauds the many States that have raised the bar on their
security programs. However, we often see the ``not invented here''
mentality preventing wider adoption of new and innovative security
methods. IATA encourages States to use the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) more effectively on security to develop harmonized
security policies and to spread best practices.

4. Work With Industry on Practical Solutions
The best security is based on procedures and equipment that work in
concert with the complex operating environment within which global
aviation operates. IATA urges regulators to tap into industry
experience and expertise to deploy efficient and effective security
measures.

5. Act Strategically
Security incidents should not be met with reactive and unilateral
Government actions. Often, the most ineffective measures are written
immediately following a security breach. Industry and Government must
focus on making existing processes and resources even more effective.
At the same time we must not be afraid to look at the whole system when
we have evidence and technology to support generational change to meet
new threats.
Certainly, these are high level principles, but they must form the
cornerstone of aviation security policy and be supplemented with
specific recommendations. To that end, IATA provided Secretary
Napolitano with five specific recommendations to strengthen security in
the future. These are addressed to DHS and TSA, but should serve as the
foundation for the efforts of other regulators as well. Our
recommendations are:

1. Formal consultation with foreign carriers

Regulators must understand that aviation is a globally
interconnected enterprise and must write security regulations that
reflect this reality. Most often, new rules are written without
industry input and review. This deprives the regulatory process of the
operational insight and expertise the airline industry can provide.
Greater collaboration would ensure more effective and more efficient
security measures.
In the long term, consultative public/private partnerships can
define and promote a unifying security vision, which can be reflected
in National policy. In the short-term, stakeholders can create
``playbooks,'' which respond to threats to aviation proactively rather
than reactively.
IATA believes that industry consultation must be regular, formal,
and empowered. Collaboration must be tied into policy, which is then
seamlessly tied into regulation. DHS has a stakeholder body known as
the Sector Coordination Council (SCC), which attempts to provide a
public/private partnership. However, it is neither integrated firmly
into security policymaking nor does it include foreign representation.
Rarely does the SCC process produce more efficient regulations or more
refined National policies.
Finally, we believe other like-minded regulators could benefit from
their own SCC-type National organizations. We believe ICAO is uniquely
positioned to create a template for such organizations and to
promulgate them internationally.
IATA recommends that DHS engage in formal and continuous
consultation on aviation security matters with all air carriers through
a cooperative and deliberative process. We are asking DHS to:
Formally establish an international aviation workgroup under
the DHS Aviation Security Advisory Committee (ASAC);
Revitalize and empower the Sector Coordination Council (SCC)
to play a definitive role in aviation security policymaking;
Allow foreign airlines, under the coordination of IATA, to
join and participate as full members of the SCC.

2. Refine existing TSA emergency orders to better address
the international environment

Airlines operate across the globe under extremely different
environments: Laws, infrastructures, and cultural diversity should all
be taken into account. Airlines have hands-on experience in these
different environments. However, TSA imposes one-size-fits-all measures
on international carriers, which often simply cannot be implemented in
certain airports, countries, or regions.
Moreover, although DHS is using risk management principles in
targeting passengers from a list of 14 States for further screening, we
believe the country ``blacklist'' approach is counter-productive. Our
experience with blacklists in the safety field shows they can do more
harm than good and can lead to diplomatic actions, such as retaliation.
Instead, targeting people for screening should be based on the
individual through the better use of passenger data. IATA recommends
that DHS:
Move toward risk-based and ``performance-based''
regulations, which would be flexible enough in their wording to
allow carriers to make sure DHS's objective is reached in a
way, which complies with local specificities;
Make better use of passenger data rather than subjecting
passengers from whole States to enhanced screening;
Increase security focus on high-risk areas of the world
instead of relying on one-size-fits-all directives.

3. Eliminate inefficiencies in the passenger data
collection process

Under existing U.S. regulation, carriers serving the U.S. market
are required to provide extensive data relating to all persons
traveling on flights to, from, and within the United States. Whether
that information is provided to meet requirements for PNR access, APIS
Quick Query (AQQ) or TSA's Secure Flight, the data provided is largely
the same. We need the ability to transmit data in a consistent format
to a single DHS portal.
As evidenced on December 25, agencies failed to identify the
potential threat, even with the provision of vast amounts of personal
data at least 3 days before the flight. As indicated in the White House
Review Summary to President Obama on January 7, 2009, this failure to
``connect the dots'' was primarily due to fragmentation within the
United States Government and the inability to fully share information
across agencies. We advocate deployment of more robust systems within
DHS that better analyze and synthesize the data already transmitted to
DHS's component agencies. IATA recommends:
DHS collect a single set of information on each passenger
from carriers that can be shared widely and seamlessly among
DHS and intelligence agencies.

4. Strengthen government-to-government outreach to
harmonize and to coordinate on security issues

The United States takes a different approach from most countries,
because it mandates security procedures for incoming flights. The
European Union, for instance, takes the stance that it can only
regulate flights departing its territory.
The extraterritorial approach to security is problematic, mostly
because U.S. requirements can conflict with national norms. One example
of this has been the 2005 U.S. requirement for PNR data, which
conflicted with EU data privacy directives. A similar example with
today's situation is that in many countries, such as Germany, airlines
are not allowed to perform physical screening on passengers. If a
government were to ask an airline to conduct such screening in Germany,
that airline would be caught in the middle and placed in an impossible
situation.
DHS should reach out to governments around the world before
imposing new extraterritorial procedures on the airlines. One way to do
this would be to make full use of ICAO's Aviation Security ``Point of
Contact'' network. This would allow DHS and TSA to evaluate whether a
new procedure is feasible at the world's airports. It would also
increase the readiness of countries to assist airlines in complying
with U.S. requirements.

5. Over the longer term, focus on developing a next
generation checkpoint

The December 2009 Detroit incident demonstrates that in the future
aviation may need smarter and faster, next-generation passenger
screening measures to confront new and emerging threats. While our
current screening systems are serving us well, their underlying
operational concepts and architecture are beginning to show their age,
and they need to be replaced.
IATA is asking DHS to begin to look forward to field a new
checkpoint. In the interim, we need to enhance the capabilities of the
current system to extend its useable lifetime and increase its
detection capabilities.
IATA recommends to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) that
this effort be accomplished in close cooperation and partnership with
industry. Stakeholders at the highest level must develop an integrated
vision and a road map for moving forward.

PRINCIPLES OF NEXT GENERATION SCREENING

The subject of today's hearing is, ``An Assessment of Checkpoint
Security: Are Our Airports Keeping Passengers Safe?'' The short answer
to this question is absolutely, ``yes.'' The American public needs to
understand that their security is the utmost concern of the airlines on
which they fly and the airports in which they transit. Twenty-four
hours a day, 365 days a year, professionals are standing watch to
ensure their security. The procedures, processes, and technology
deployed since 9/11 have made this industry the most secure in its
history.
Yet, those who would do us harm by injuring innocent passengers and
by disrupting our economies are not standing still, and neither should
our checkpoints. Today's checkpoint works and we are not advocating
immediately discarding it for the next generation checkpoint. In fact,
there is still service life left in these checkpoints. However, the day
is rapidly approaching where the 40-year-old concepts which serve as
their underpinning will become obsolete. As Congress discusses novel
drop-in technology for checkpoints, we believe it is essential to not
mask the need for a new philosophy behind checkpoint architecture. For
these reasons, we urge Congress to launch the process to build a next
generation checkpoint capable and flexible enough to handle new and
emerging threats to air transport.
We recommend that the next generation checkpoint be based on
intelligence and supported by technology. Screening would consist of
looking for bad people rather than bad things. We believe the volumes
of passenger data currently collected by governments could be leveraged
to make decisions about boarding pass issuance long before a passenger
arrives at the airport. However, unlike today, the next generation
checkpoint would require the U.S. Government to:
Align passenger data collections programs within DHS and
between DHS and other departments;
Screen passenger data more thoroughly against intelligence
information and law enforcement data;
Develop a ``red flag'' system, which would objectively
identify the level of screening a passenger would require
before boarding.
The next checkpoint should also rely on thorough and pervasive
behavior detection. We believe highly trained behavior detection
officers who question passengers and observe their mannerisms
throughout the screening process would add a strong layer of detection.
Tomorrow's checkpoint would enhance behavior detection by providing
screeners with contextual background information on the traveler to
assist in the questioning process. This type of intelligence-based
behavior detection would increase both the fidelity and also the
objectivity of screening.
Screening technology supports intelligence in the next generation
checkpoint by providing screeners with enhanced baseline methods for
identifying explosives and firearms. This equipment would be in the
primary screening lanes through which all passengers would quickly pass
with little interruption. Additionally, the checkpoint would have
enhanced lanes designed to inspect those passengers of whom little is
known or of whom questions are raised, most likely at a slower rate
with more fidelity.
The system described here envisions security for tomorrow's
passenger as a road bump in the journey rather than a mountain. We
believe the components of this checkpoint are available, but they
require the will to be assembled and delivered to our airports.
Security and technology are often confused. IATA remains concerned
that novel technology is being viewed as the silver bullet for the
future. However, there is no silver bullet in security. For every
technology with exciting detection capabilities there are complementary
vulnerabilities, which can be open to exploitation. We urge this
subcommittee to challenge technology advocates to fairly assess
capabilities against vulnerabilities.
Finally, we must not overlook the process through which technology
moves from the laboratory to the airport. Fundamentally, the journey
takes too long, and it is tainted by changing regulatory requirements,
often producing a product which doesn't work in the real world.
Promising technology needs to pass the O'Hare test before it leaves
the lab: It must perform its functions reliably and accurately under
the same passenger load it would experience at O'Hare the day before
Christmas. Perhaps such a test would have kept the explosive puffers
purchased by the TSA out of long-term storage.

CONCLUSION

The security and safety of the flying public is the top priority of
IATA and the aviation industry as a whole. The procedures, processes,
and technology deployed since 9/11 have made this industry more secure
than ever before. However, there is a clear need for continued
vigilance and constant revision to ensure an even more secure future.
Regulators worldwide must focus on improving intelligence communication
and passenger screening programs in order to stay one step ahead of
those whom would wish harm on our passengers.
As the subcommittee reviews the events post-December 25, we expect
many will seek short-term fixes to security checkpoints. However, new
technology cannot guarantee better security, cannot detect bad people,
and is not the only solution for the future. Any new equipment must be
fully vetted in the operational environment and justified in fulfilling
a clear need and producing a clear enhancement at the checkpoint.
Overall, we urge Congress to promote long-term improvements to
intelligence coordination, to interdepartmental cooperation, and to
security checkpoints in order to achieve the highest level of security
for the flying public.

Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Dunlap, let me thank you for your
testimony.
I now recognize Mr. Barclay to summarize his statement for
5 minutes.

STATEMENT OF CHARLES BARCLAY, PRESIDENT, AMERICAN ASSOCIATION
OF AIRPORT EXECUTIVES

Mr. Barclay. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman and Members. It is
always a privilege to be here before the committee.
I will make just four very brief points from our testimony.
First is that airport executives support the deployment of AIT,
and we commend the efforts of the leaders of DHS and TSA in
both the decision-making and the consulting with industry here
in Washington.
Second, while we are complimentary of their sincere efforts
to coordinate with us and do as much planning as they can here
in Washington, there is still a great need for consultation and
getting the agreement of individual airports at each location.
We have learned that the hard way from the deployment of that
baggage screening technology from 2000 to still today that
there is no substitute for the specific individual airport
knowledge blueprints don't give you as far as getting these
installations actually done. We would recommend strong
consultation language aimed at TSA for all these deployments.
Third, DHS needs to budget realistically for these
deployments. The true costs of the installations do include the
terminal modifications and terminal space that is going to be
necessary, certainly, in some locations. We think they have
done a lot of planning, and they are sincere in trying to find
locations where they can do the initial installations without a
great impact on those locations, but we know that they are
going to run into places where there will be significant
modifications. Again, with the experience from baggage
screening, this is going to be an expensive alteration in a
number of locations, and we think those costs have to be
covered by the Department and included in their planning.
Then finally, airport executives continue to be concerned
about throughput. As the economy comes back, passenger numbers
go back up. We realize they are doing the planning on
throughput of these systems. We continue to be concerned that
all of that proves out realistically in the real world, and we
think we have got, as was mentioned by the previous witness, we
have got to make the screening process one that considers both
security and the efficiency of transportation. Speed is what we
are all about in this business, and we need to provide good
customer service as well. So we hope we will keep our eye on
those throughputs. Thank you.
[The statement of Mr. Barclay follows:]

Prepared Statement of Charles Barclay
March 17, 2010

On behalf of the American Association of Airport Executives (AAAE)
and the thousands of men and women the Association represents who
manage and operate primary, commercial service, reliever, and general
aviation airports across the country, I want to thank the subcommittee
for the opportunity to participate in this important hearing to assess
passenger security checkpoints. Airport executives appreciate your
interest in this topic, and we are eager to work with Congress, the
Department of Homeland Security, and the Transportation Security
Administration to ensure the success of on-going efforts to upgrade the
equipment and protocols in place at screening checkpoints across the
country.
While responsibility for passenger and baggage screening are by law
the sole responsibility of TSA, airports play a critical role in
partnering with the agency to help it meet those core missions. The
significant changes that have taken place in airport security since 9/
11 have been aided dramatically by the work of the airport community,
and we look forward to continuing to serve as a partner to the agency
as it seeks to upgrade its checkpoint capabilities in the wake of the
attempted Christmas day attack on Flight 253.
In addition to partnering with TSA to help the agency meet its
passenger and baggage screening mandates, airports as public entities
with public safety as a key mission, also perform a number of
inherently local security-related functions at their facilities,
including incident response and management, perimeter security,
employee credentialing, access control, infrastructure and operations
planning, and numerous local law enforcement and public safety
functions. These critical public safety duties have long been local
responsibilities that have been performed by local authorities in
accordance with Federal standards under Federal oversight. Airport
operators meet their security-related obligations not with an eye on
profit or loss but with a sharp focus on the need to secure public
safety, which remains one of their fundamental missions.
With that as background, let me begin by complementing DHS and TSA
for their swift response to the attempted Christmas day attack and for
the efforts undertaken since that time to engage airports on charting a
course forward--particularly as it relates to the wide-scale deployment
of Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) at airport checkpoints. As the
subcommittee is well aware, the agency has greatly expedited plans to
deploy AIT equipment, with some 500 machines expected to be deployed by
the end of 2010 and another 500 scheduled to follow in 2011. Many
airports are eager to have AIT equipment in their facilities in
recognition of the security benefits this technology provides in
detecting threats highlighted by the Christmas day attack.
DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano, TSA Acting Administrator Gale
Rossides, and the senior leadership at the Department and at TSA have
made concerted efforts to include AAAE and other industry groups in
discussions regarding AIT deployment plans and to seek airport input on
how best to move forward. In particular, I want to complement and thank
TSA Assistant Administrator Robin Kane, who is testifying today, for
his practical, results-driven approach and for his efforts to seek
input from airport management at key stages in the initial planning
process.

AIRPORTS ARE CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC ABOUT AIT DEPLOYMENT BUT HAVE
CONCERNS

Airport executives are encouraged by these early outreach efforts
on AIT deployment and commend the agency for the thorough work that has
been undertaken to this point with general checkpoint designs and
deployment strategies. While careful planning at headquarters is
certainly important, the greatest challenges lie ahead as TSA attempts
to move from the drawing board to the ``real world'' at hundreds of
widely divergent airport facilities across the country with the
deployment and operation of AIT equipment.
Beyond the limited number of airports that currently have or are
scheduled to soon receive AIT equipment, TSA's outreach efforts have
not yet been widely extended to individual airports to discuss specific
plans for deployment of equipment at their facilities, leaving many
airport executives with significant concerns about potentially costly
structural modifications that may be necessary to accommodate AIT
equipment in already crowded airport terminals. Additionally, airports
have questions about the ability of TSA to efficiently process
passengers through updated checkpoints given the size of the new
machines, the number of TSA personnel required to operate them, the
slower throughput levels of the machines relative to existing
magnetometers, and significant changes to divestiture procedures for
passengers. These challenges will become more acute as passenger levels
continue to rise at airports across the country.
To this point, TSA maintains that there will be minimal impact on
the checkpoint footprint and on passenger throughput levels through
screening checkpoints--particularly at the airports slated to receive
the 500 machines scheduled for delivery during 2010. Airport executives
believe that TSA is earnest in its view that it has considered these
issues, and we readily acknowledge that there won't be significant
challenges at every airport. With that said, it is evident that placing
new equipment, building image viewing rooms, and accommodating teams of
new personnel in already crammed checkpoint screening areas will be
difficult if not impossible at some critical airports across the
country. TSA has acknowledged that the agency will face challenges,
particularly in 2011, as they move toward the end of the deployment
schedule.
Unfortunately, TSA has yet to begin planning to tackle some of
these issues, which we believe are inevitable. Looking forward to
2011--the budget year that Congress is currently considering--the
agency has requested significant resources to procure and install AIT
equipment ($215 million) and to support the additional 5,355 TSO
positions the agency says are necessary to operate the AIT machines
($315 million). The administration has not, however, requested funding
to pay for either the space or terminal modifications that may be
necessary at airports to accommodate AIT equipment. Administration
officials have made clear their view that airports should be required
to pay for some if not all of these costly items.

PREVIOUS EFFORTS ILLUSTRATE THE IMPORTANCE OF AIRPORT INVOLVEMENT AND
FEDERAL FUNDING

To understand the pitfalls of moving forward with the wide-scale
deployment of technology in the airport environment without adequate
airport consultation at the local level and in the absence of
sufficient Federal funding, one need only to consider the experiences
with TSA's roll-out of explosives detection systems (EDS) for checked
baggage earlier this decade. Insufficient airport involvement at
individual facilities with the planning, design, and deployment of that
equipment and a lack of Federal funding to support critical project
elements led to ``temporary'' solutions at numerous airports with bulky
machines being placed in crowded airport terminal areas--a situation
that created numerous safety, security, and efficiency issues. As the
subcommittee knows well, we've spent the better part of the past 8
years trying to clean up the mess at great expense, and we still don't
have it right in many locations.
Airports have seen this movie before, Madam Chairwoman, and we
don't like the ending. The good news is that we are at the beginning of
the AIT deployment process with the opportunity to get it right this
time around. Along those lines, we offer several specific
recommendations for your consideration:
Give Airports a Direct Role in Developing and Approving AIT
Deployment Plans.--Airports have long supported the expedited
deployment of advanced technology as a means of enhancing security and
efficiency, and airports are generally enthusiastic about the
deployment of AIT equipment at their facilities. Airports also believe
strongly that individual airport authorities must be actively involved
in the planning and design of projects at their facilities to ensure
upgrades are completed in a timely manner and in a way that limits
disruptions to checkpoint operations and costly terminal modifications.
Airport professionals have a unique understanding of their
facilities and should be counted on as a resource as TSA seeks to
deploy technology at checkpoints or other areas of an airport. In
addition to their expertise as facility managers, airport professionals
share the same public safety mission as the Federal Government and
should be relied on as a full partner in these efforts.
In recognition of those facts and in an effort to ensure that the
consultation and airport involvement at the local level is meaningful
and productive, we encourage the subcommittee to consider giving
airport authorities a direct role in developing and approving
deployment plans at their facilities. Such a move will ensure that TSA
and its contractors are working directly with airports to establish
realistic plans that take into account unique facility and operational
considerations. Careful coordination and cooperation between the
Federal Government and airport operators is the key to the successful
deployment of technology in the airport environment.
Require TSA to Pay for Space & Terminal Modifications Necessary to
Accommodate AIT.--Not surprisingly, airport executives are very
concerned about a lack of Federal funding to support the acquisition of
space and costly terminal modifications that will likely be necessary
to accommodate AIT equipment in numerous airport locations. As all of
you know as frequent travelers, many airport terminals are already at
their breaking point in terms of space, and adding bigger machines,
personnel, and image viewing rooms--among other necessary changes--will
likely require significant terminal modifications.
Given the acknowledged importance of these projects to National
security, airport executives believe that it is imperative that the
Federal Government step up to the plate to finance necessary space
acquisition and terminal modifications required to accommodate AIT
equipment. The current assumption that airports should be responsible
for those significant expenses ignores reality.
Setting aside the fact that passenger and baggage screening are the
direct responsibility of the Federal Government, airport financing
simply isn't feasible at most airports--many of which have already
deferred major capital projects because of economic realities. Plowing
new resources into helping the Federal Government meet its obligations
in this area would take even more money away from critical safety and
capacity-enhancing projects and put an additional burden on our
partners in the airline industry for an item that everyone acknowledges
is necessary for homeland security. I would also note that airports
collectively have already invested billions of dollars over the past
decade on a number of important security improvements at perimeters and
throughout the airport environment and to assist TSA in its passenger
and baggage screening efforts.
In our view, Federal funding for space and terminal modifications
are unlikely to materialize without support from Congress. That fact is
evident to us based on budget documents and recent discussions with key
Department and agency leaders. With that in mind, we urge the
subcommittee to push for changes requiring TSA to pay for these
critical project elements. Without adequate Federal support, we face a
situation where deployment decisions could be based on where machines
can be accommodated easily in airports as opposed to where they make
sense from a security perspective.
It is worth noting that in the case of checked baggage systems, TSA
acknowledged the problems that a lack of Federal funding would create
with its deployment plans and initially supported paying for terminal
modifications and other costs through a multi-year letter of intent
(LOI) process that was created with the strong support of Congress.
Unfortunately, the important LOI program was opposed by the Office of
Management and Budget, and an important tool in financing projects was
left unutilized--a result that slowed the deployment of in-line baggage
systems at airports across the country. Those experiences illustrate
the importance of placing a provision in law that requires TSA to pay
for space and terminal modifications in airports necessary to
accommodate AIT equipment.
Proactively Address Passenger Throughput Issues.--One of the
biggest concerns that airport executives have with the wide-scale
deployment and utilization of AIT equipment is passenger throughput
levels. While wait times at screening checkpoints are currently
manageable in most cases, airports see a potential storm brewing with
new equipment, new divestiture procedures, and steadily increasing
passenger levels as the economy recovers.
Airport executives question the optimistic assumptions that TSA has
made in this area, and we urge the agency to begin serious contingency
planning to deal with slower processing times and increasing passenger
levels. Airports have long supported the establishment and adherence to
specific wait time thresholds at airports and believe that this
important tool--which TSA no longer measures--should be reinstituted.
On the throughput issue, airport executives have placed a great
emphasis on TSA efficiency to improve the experience of passengers at
airports. Improved customer service is clearly an important
consideration. In our view, however, improving the efficiency of the
screening process goes hand-in-hand with the goal of enhancing the
security and safety of airport facilities and the aviation system. Long
lines and poor customer service do not equate to better aviation
security. To the contrary, long lines in airport terminals and at
security screening checkpoints are targets for terrorists as past
experiences prove.
Long-term, Focus Must Move Beyond Finding Dangerous Things.--It is
clear that terrorists continue to focus on commercial aviation as a
primary target and that the threats are evolving at an increasingly
rapid pace. As local airports and DHS continue to work together to
address these emerging novel attacks, it is a well-established
imperative that the Federal Government maintain an active pipeline of
the latest innovative technologies to stay a step ahead while
supporting a healthy and efficient aviation system. However, our
collective detection, deterrence, and response capabilities, as
advanced and accurate as they are, will only take us so far as we
attempt to combat a new generation of terrorists and methods apparent
in the attempted Christmas day attack.
Looking forward, we must continue our efforts to focus on
identifying dangerous people in addition to dangerous things. With the
deployment of AIT equipment at numerous airport locations, we have
virtually reached the limits of our ability to identify dangerous
things at screening checkpoints. While additional detection
capabilities are certainly critical, we must also seek to do ever more
to identify those who intend to do our aviation system and Nation harm
and to continue to develop a broad array of approaches to subject
potential threats to additional scrutiny. Similarly, we must do more to
better align security resources to address appropriately those in the
traveling public that pose little threat to the system.
Part of the answer in the long-run is to integrate into a seamless
approach the many security tools at our disposal that operate now
largely in isolation. It is no longer enough for TSA to research and
deploy new physical threat detection technologies, vet traveler's
backgrounds against terrorist databases, and unpredictably screen and
observe travelers in terminal and gate areas. While these programs have
made us more secure over the past 8 years, the fact that they currently
operate largely independent of each other creates limitations.
Ultimately, we must tie all of these tools together to create a more
targeted application of screening processes and a true risk-based
approach.
We look forward to working with the subcommittee as efforts in that
regard continue. Again, I appreciate the opportunity to participate in
today's hearing and look forward to answering any questions you have.

Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you for your enormously important
and succinct testimony. We look forward to exploring those
points.
It is my pleasure now to yield to one of my neighbors in
Houston. Colonel Eric Potts is the interim director of the
Houston Intercontinental Airport. As he well knows, I am always
going to make note of the fact that he served 27 years in the
United States Army, retired as a colonel with a number of merit
recognitions for his service to this Nation.
Colonel Potts, you are yielded 5 minutes for your
testimony.

STATEMENT OF COL. ERIC R. POTTS (RET), INTERIM AVIATION
DIRECTOR, HOUSTON AIRPORT SYSTEM

Mr. Potts. Good afternoon, Madam Chairwoman and Members of
the committee. Thank you for inviting me today to testify.
The Houston Airport System is the fourth-largest multi-
airport system and the Nation and the sixth-largest in the
world. Our flagship----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Please turn your mic on, Colonel Potts.
Mr. Potts. Start over--domestic and international
passengers. It is the Nation's eighth-largest passenger
airport, and the world's 16th. In 2009 our airports in Houston
served approximately 48 million passengers, and projections
show about 80 million passengers by 2020.
We generate 151,000 regional jobs and contribute over $24
billion to the local economy. Houston is also a DHS-designated
Tier 1 Urban Area Security Initiative city. According to the
2007 regional threat and vulnerability assessment, IAH is the
highest at-risk asset in the entire Southeast Texas area. Given
that the Houston metropolitan area has the Nation's fourth-
largest population and is home to the essential elements of our
energy supply and refining capacity, effective passenger
screening at our airports is one of our top priorities.
There are four key points I want to share with you today.
First, let me say that over the past 8 years we have seen many
improvements to the aviation security improvements. We work
closely with our Federal counterparts in the Department of
Homeland Security and the Transportation Security
Administration. It is a partnership we value greatly.
For example, in Houston we have recently partnered with TSA
to implement explosive detection system baggage screening
solutions in both the major airports, IAH and William P. Hobby.
We are also actively working with the TSA on the airport
surveillance program, a project which provides funding for the
enhancement to the airport's existing closed-circuit
televisions and related reporting systems. The TSA is preparing
to implement full body scanning equipment at both IAH and
Hobby.
But major impediments remain that need to be addressed, and
soon. It is on these issues that I want to ask for the
assistance today because, as you know, while the Federal
Government plays a key role in airport security matters,
Federal law imposes the responsibility of local airport
operations for securing the National aeronautical domain, the
NDA, within their particular regions.
We have identified impediments that could be minimized by
the procurement of security technologies and the institution of
certain Federal initiatives relative to intelligence sharing,
risk assessment, and in critical infrastructure protection
fielded, based, aviation security compliance technology.
Then there is the issue of the costs associated with the
measures of our first priority in ensuring effective passenger
screening is the lack of timely and consistent dissemination of
National threat intelligence information to airport security
directors.
In Houston we have more than 200 security personnel. They
are on the ground and on the front lines and yet, despite high-
level clearance, they generally do not receive intelligence
sharing from the Federal counterparts to the degree and in a
timely fashion that will allow them to take desired proactive
approaches.
Part of the reason for this gap is the absence of
appropriate secure technology. To correct this, certain
technologies must immediately be made available to the local
airport security directors. This includes security terminal
equipment telephones, a secure fax, and connections to the
Homeland Security data network and the secret internet protocol
router network.
The lack of intelligence sharing is further exacerbated by
the fact that there is no current Federal standard for
utilization of the risk assessment methodology across the air
domain. What is needed is a National intelligence lead risk-
based security doctrine that targets the mitigation of and
vulnerabilities in a proactive and recurrent fashion.
To close the loop and begin the benefits of good, timely
intelligence information and uniform risk assessments into the
field, we also need the prompt implementation of uniform, new
field-based technologies which capture raw data by security
area, category, and department.
The final point I would like to make is that the close
attention needs to be paid to ensuring that the necessary
funding accompanies these and other new measures. For example,
we are encouraged by the TSA's recent announcement of its plan
to install advanced imaging technology, AIT, at security
checkpoints to replace current walk-through metal detection
devices.
Unlike metal detectors, AIT can detect prohibited items
that have little or no metallic content, and AIT will also
allow passengers with surgical implants to avoid the invasive
physical pat-down inspections that come with walk-through metal
detectors.
In addition to the terminal modifications, we are concerned
about the throughput time that may be required to process
passengers through AIT units as opposed to the time it takes to
process them through walk-through metal detectors. TSA has said
that they can process a passenger in 15 seconds. Some airports
that already have the units at these checkpoints have said that
in reality it can take as long as 45 seconds to process one
passenger.
So with that, thank you, Madam Chairwoman and committee
Members, for the opportunity to testify before you. In terms of
priorities, I would like to conclude by asking the committee to
focus on intelligence sharing matters first, the identification
of particular risk assessment methodology second, and the
technology base compliance program to follow.
Finally, please remember that the fragile state of the
aviation industry today cannot sustain the financial impact
that the implementation of overall security strategies will
require. The burdens fall primarily on our Nation's airports,
and considerable additional resources are required.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Colonel, if you can wrap up, I appreciate
it.
Mr. Potts. I would ask the Congress not to impose any
further unfunded mandates on either the commercial aviation
industry or the local airport operators that are the
cornerstone of the industry. Thank you.
[The statement of Colonel Potts follows:]

Prepared Statement of Eric R. Potts
March 17, 2010

Good afternoon, Madam Chairwoman and Members of the committee.
Thank you for inviting me to testify today. The Houston Airport System
is the fourth-largest multi-airport system in the Nation and the sixth-
largest in the world. Our flagship airport--George Bush
Intercontinental or ``IAH''--is one of the country's largest gateways
for both domestic and international passengers. It is the Nation's
eighth-largest passenger airport, and the world's 16th-largest. In 2009
our airports in Houston served approximately 48 million passengers, and
projections show some 80 million passengers by 2020. We generate some
151,000 regional jobs and contribute over $24 billion to the local
economy. Houston is also a DHS designated tier-1 urban area security
initiative city. According to a 2007 regional threat and vulnerability
assessment conducted by Digital Sandbox, Inc., IAH is the highest at-
risk asset in the entire Southeast Texas area. Given that the Houston
metropolitan area has the Nation's fourth-largest population and is
home to essential elements of our energy supply and refining capacity,
effective passenger screening at our airports is one of our top
priorities.
Over the course of the past 8 years many improvements have been
made to the aviation security environment. We work closely with our
Federal counterparts in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and
it's a partnership we value greatly. For example, in Houston we have
recently partnered with the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) to implement Explosive Detection System (EDS) baggage screening
solutions in both major airports (IAH and William P. Hobby Airport
(HOU)). Additionally, the Houston Airport System (HAS) and the TSA are
actively working together on the Airport Surveillance Program, a
project which provides funding for enhancements to the airports'
existing Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) and related recording
systems, and the TSA is preparing to implement full body scanner
equipment at both IAH and HOU.
But while aviation security has improved significantly since 9/11/
2001, the threat is an evolving one and much remains to be done. In the
past year alone there have been numerous plots to destroy U.S. aviation
assets. On an international level, the attempted bombing of a U.S.
airliner on Christmas day reminds us that the aviation sector remains
vulnerable to exploitation and attack, and within the Texas region, an
airport in Dallas was initially assessed as a terrorist target by a
self-radicalized extremist who had overstayed his visa.
Airports face special challenges in ensuring airport security.
While the Federal Government plays a key role in airport security
matters, Federal law imposes principal responsibility on local airport
operators (under 49 CFR 1540 and 1542) for securing the National
Aeronautical Domain (NAD) within their particular region. As such, the
Houston Airport System has identified many impediments that still exist
regarding aviation security--impediments that could be minimized by the
procurement of certain security technologies and the institution of
certain Federal initiatives relative to: (1) Intelligence sharing, (2)
risk assessment/critical infrastructure protection, and (3) field-based
aviation security compliance technology.
There are four key points I want to share with you today, and they
all have to do with essential needs that airports such as ours in
Houston face. They are the need for:
Improved, timely intelligence sharing and acquisition of
appropriate secure communications equipment to facilitate this;
Development by DHS of a standardized computer-based risk
assessment methodology targeted at threats facing airports;
Field-based devices for use by local airport security
personnel that enable real-time, proactive use of current
threat data; and
Funding to cover the associated costs of these measures and
of deployment of TSA's Advanced Imaging Technology units.
Allow me to begin by identifying the single most critical issue for
airport operators and their local security directors: the lack of
timely and consistent dissemination of National threat intelligence
information. This remains a constant frustration--one that even
predates the tragedy of 9/11. On the State and local level,
intelligence sharing has seen some improvement, but obstacles remain.
As the committee well understands, the primary objective of
intelligence sharing in the aviation security industry is to allow for
a proactive approach in driving the security posture and program that
is implemented at the ground level. However, airport security
directors--i.e., the force with the most available security assets at
an airport--generally do not receive the information from Federal
sources that they deem necessary or on a timely basis, even though
airports such as HAS employ personnel cleared to the appropriate
Federal level; at IAH we have more than 200 security personnel, for
example.
As a result, airports often are able only to serve as a reactive
force as opposed to the preferred proactive security model that we seek
to field on a daily basis. The lack of adequate intelligence sharing
renders airport security operators in the position of primarily
conducting random baseline security measures. But if we received timely
and accurate intelligence information we could adjust the airports'
security posture to better counter current and evolving threats.
Equally, understanding the potential efficacy of various threat streams
would enable airport security authorities to proactively devise and
employ appropriate countermeasures. The lack of timely and adequate
information thus severely limits the proactive role that airport
security directors can play, and overall reduces the efficacy of the
available resources. This is a major gap in the system and it needs to
be closed, and now.
The absence of appropriate secure technology is a major impediment
to the sharing of this information, and we understand the challenges
that our Federal counterparts face in this regard. Unfortunately,
comprehending threat, risk, and vulnerability--and thus being able to
act on that information--has been greatly restricted due to technology
and communication gaps caused by the bureaucracy involved in funding
and obtaining the equipment needed to receive classified information.
To correct this, certain technology must be made immediately available
to the local airport security directors. This includes Secure Terminal
Equipment (STE) telephones, a Secure Fax, and connections to the
Homeland Secure Data Network (HSDN) and Secret Internet Protocol Router
Network (SIPRNet). For example, for nearly 4 months now in Houston,
HAS' intelligence coordinator, who possesses a Top Secret/Sensitive
Compartmented Information (TS/SCI) clearance, has been working with DHS
to procure the equipment needed to transact secure communications, but
no DHS entity has been willing to provide the sponsorship needed for
these acquisitions. While in this case both Federal and local
intelligence partners have the desire to work collaboratively in the
exchange of intelligence information, the systems do not appear to
exist that would ensure the prompt and efficient acquisition of the
necessary technology at the local level. This requires immediate
attention.
The lack of intelligence sharing is further exacerbated by the fact
that there is no current Federal standard in the utilization of a
particular risk assessment methodology across the air domain. While
some U.S. airports may have incorporated a risk management program,
there has been no standard risk assessment methodology prescribed by
DHS. What is needed is a National, intelligence-led, risk-based
security doctrine that seeks to target and mitigate vulnerabilities in
a proactive and recurring fashion. We believe that DHS should adopt a
standard risk assessment methodology for use across the NAD in order to
facilitate a fair, equitable, and consistent comparison of commercial
aviation facilities across the United States. The utility of this
security construct is two-fold: (1) It would increase the overall
security posture of the National aviation system, and (2) it would
enable DHS to allocate scarce funding resources more fairly,
consistently, and efficiently in addressing deficiencies from one
airport facility to another. The integration of effective intelligence
technologies and the identification of a particular risk assessment
methodology would ultimately provide a more robust means by which to
identify and implement appropriate countermeasures in the field, a duty
which again is the primary responsibility of the local airport security
operator.
To close the loop and bring the benefits of good, timely
intelligence information and uniform risk assessments into the field,
we also need the prompt implementation of new technology. Therefore, we
believe that an additional critical element of a well-constructed
aviation security program would be the implementation of a standardized
National aviation security compliance technology. For example, we would
support the uniform implementation of a field-based hardware device
loaded with software for data tracking/compliance to capture and data
mine relevant security information throughout the aviation threat
arena. The field-based reporting system we would support should be
capable of capturing instant raw data by security area, category, and
department. This raw data could then be used to generate predictive
trend analysis and, if tied to a National database, could provide
valuable real-time information that could also be analyzed and formed
into risk assessment and compliance verification product at the
National level. The compliance component of this software would ensure
that standard, baseline security protocols mandated by TSA are being
met, as well as any other unique local response protocols developed as
a result of this intelligence-led, risk-based process.
We are encouraged by the TSA's recent announcement of its plan to
install Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) at security checkpoints to
replace current walk-though metal detection devices. This technology
has the potential to enhance security and deserves further
consideration. The airport industry has always been supportive of TSA's
evaluation and installation of new technology to enhance security at
the checkpoint and efficiency for the passenger. Unlike walk-through
metal detectors, AIT can detect prohibited items that have little or no
metallic content. AIT will also allow passengers with surgical implants
to avoid the invasive physical pat-down inspections that come with
walk-through metal detectors. TSA has now deployed the units to more
than 19 airports, and is slated to deploy units at several more
airports throughout this calendar year. Airports have encouraged TSA to
pursue enhancements to checkpoint technology that will increase
effectiveness, efficiency, and passenger throughput while continuing to
provide passengers the option of alternate screening methods, and we
see this development as very positive.
However, several concerns remain that require immediate attention.
First, many airports have severe limitations on the space requirements
needed to install AIT units. Of the airports that responded to a recent
survey conducted by Airports Council International--North America (the
Nation's primary airport trade association), about half reported having
limited checkpoint space. In order to accommodate AIT, some airports
will lose concession space. This will mean a loss of non-aeronautical
revenue during a time when airports are already experiencing extremely
tight budgets and traffic declines due to the economy. For others, it
will mean a complete reconfiguration of their checkpoint areas or
reinforcing their terminal floors in order to support the weight of the
units; this also is very expensive. Where will the funding come from
for these changes? Many airports already face critical financial
challenges, and these will be exacerbated by these additional security
requirements. Airports are already severely limited by law in how they
can fund their operations, and often face severe opposition when they
attempt to increase user fees to accommodate the growing needs of our
air transportation system. It is critical that Congress and DHS fully
understand and provide for the significant costs associated with
additional security requirements; this is not an issue that can be
ignored. We need Congress and the DHS/TSA to work with airports to
provide funding for the airport modifications necessary for
installation of AIT units at airport checkpoints.
In addition to terminal modifications, we are concerned about the
throughput time that may be required to process passengers through AIT
units as opposed to the time it takes to process them through walk-
through metal detectors. TSA has stated that they can process a
passenger in 15 seconds; some airports that already have the units at
their checkpoints have said that in reality it can take as long as 45
seconds to process one passenger. Airports will continue to work with
TSA locally to ensure that passenger queue time remains as efficient as
possible, but ultimately airports have no control over the actual
processing and utilization of TSA's equipment. Congress needs to
provide the direction to DHS/TSA to ensure that these challenges are
addressed speedily.
In response to these concerns raised by airports at a recent
meeting, Secretary Napolitano asked TSA to create a working group
comprised of airport and TSA representatives to develop a coordinated
plan for AIT deployment that considers passenger throughput and the
costs associated with facility modifications. Although TSA, at the
first working group meeting, confirmed that it plans to deploy the
first 500 AIT units only to airports that have available checkpoint
space and do not need facility modifications, the issue of checkpoint
space and modifications will continue to be challenging for other
airports, particularly small airports; this issue requires on-going
attention. Given the lack of available funding necessary for facility
modifications at checkpoint locations where space is limited, we hope
that the working group process will result in a cooperatively developed
technology deployment plan that identifies airport checkpoint locations
where AIT can be readily deployed. We do ask however, that TSA provide
funding, where necessary, for any terminal modifications or
enhancements that may be required in order to properly install AIT
units at airport checkpoints across the Nation. Congress needs to
ensure that the security of our airports does not become an unfunded
mandate left for our local communities.
In conclusion, allow me to thank you for the opportunity to testify
before the committee today. In terms of priorities I would like to
conclude by asking the committee to focus on intelligence sharing
matters first, the identification of a particular risk assessment
methodology second, and the technology-based compliance program to
follow. Finally, please remember that the fragile state of the aviation
industry today cannot sustain the financial impact that the
implementation of this overall security strategy will require; the
burdens fall primarily on our Nation's airports, and considerable
additional resources are required. Consequently, I would ask Congress
not to impose any further unfunded mandates upon either the commercial
aviation industry or the local airport operators that are the
cornerstone of the industry.
Madam Chairwoman and committee Members, thank you for your
attention to these important issues. We greatly appreciate your
consideration of these needs, which affect all of us and our Nation's
security as a whole. We stand ready to work with you as necessary to
achieve the appropriate solutions.

Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much. Thank you for your
testimony.
If the three witnesses would be kind enough to as quickly
as possible summarize your testimony so that we can ask
questions, we expect a series of votes, and we would like to
show consideration of your presence here today. Thank you.
Mr. Rotenberg, you are now recognized for your testimony.

STATEMENT OF MARC ROTENBERG, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, ELECTRONIC
PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER

Mr. Rotenberg. Madam Chairwoman, Members of the
subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to be here today. I
will be brief.
The issue of body scanners in the U.S. airports is one that
my organization has studied since 2005. We began to pay
particular attention in spring 2009 when the TSA announced that
it would become the primary screening device for American air
travelers here in the United States.
We undertook a series of Freedom of Information Act
requests. We brought suit against the Department of Homeland
Security. We were trying to determine whether the privacy
safeguards that had been incorporated in these devices worked
as the TSA claims that they worked.
I think it is very important for this committee to know,
based on the documents that we have obtained from the TSA, that
these devices as per the TSA technical specification
requirements, have the capability to store and record and
transmit the images that are captured on American air travelers
in U.S. airports. This is contrary to what the TSA has told the
American public.
I also would like to share with the committee the
complaints that the agency has received from American air
travelers, who have been told by the agency that American air
travelers much preferred these devices to the pat-down search.
But if you read through the complaints that the agency has in
fact received, you will find that not only do people object to
the use of these devices, in many instances they are not even
told of the alternative of the pat-down search. So we believe
these consumer complaints should be considered as well.
I would also like to point out that last year before the
December incident, more than 30 organizations wrote to
Secretary Napolitano and urged her to undertake a public
rulemaking so that the public would have the opportunity to
comment on the proposed deployment of the body scanners in the
U.S. airports and so that technical experts would also be given
an opportunity to give their independent evaluation of the
proposal.
The Secretary chose not to undertake the public rulemaking
and went ahead with this very expensive, very intrusive, if I
may say, uniquely intrusive technology for airport screening.
We think this is particularly unfortunate.
There is one other document that I would like to call to
the committee's attention, and it was in fact not something we
were looking for when we undertook the Freedom of Information
Act request. Our primary concern is, of course, the privacy
protection for American air travelers. But when we obtained the
technical specification for the devices, we found something
very interesting.
That is that if you look at the requirements--this is the
July 2006 TSA technical specification document, and I will be
pleased to provide copies of this to the committee--you will
see that the devices are intended to target explosives,
weapons, liquids, and other anomalies. But there is no mention
of powders, no mention of PETN, no mention in fact of precisely
the threat that presented itself on December 25.
Our initial conclusion was that in fact these devices were
not designed to detect that type of explosive material, that
the TSA was pursuing other technologies such as the puffer
devices to deal with that risk. Our suspicion, I think, has
been corroborated by the GAO report, which seemed to reach a
similar conclusion about the capability of these devices to
detect the materials that were used on December 25.
If that is the case that the devices cannot detect powdered
explosives and that they are unduly intrusive, then we think it
would be important to reconsider at this point whether the
proposed deployment to U.S. airports really make sense. If they
are not effective, if they are overly intrusive, we think this
is not the best screening technology for U.S. airports. Thank
you.
[The joint statement of Mr. Rotenberg and Ms. Coney
follows:]

Joint Prepared Statement of Marc Rotenberg and Lillie Coney
March 17, 2010

EPIC is non-partisan public interest research organization, based
in Washington, DC. Founded in 1994, EPIC was established to focus
public attention on emerging privacy and civil liberties issues. EPIC
has a particular interest in techniques for screening passengers and
other practices of Federal agencies that implicate privacy interests.
This is a summary of our prepared statement.
First, we are grateful to the subcommittee for holding this
hearing. The recent report of the Government Accountability Office
(GAO) has made clear that there are important questions that need to be
asked about the effectiveness of checkpoint security. EPIC believes
that the deployment of whole body imaging devices in U.S. airports
illustrates the challenges facing DHS.
Second, as a result of an extensive Freedom of Information Act
lawsuit that EPIC has pursued against the Department of Homeland
Security, we have obtained documents concerning the TSA screening
practices and the use of body scanners that we believe are of interest
to the committee. Based on these documents, which include the TSA
Procurement Specifications, the TSA Operational Requirements, and
vendor contracts, we have determined that:
The device specifications for body scanners include the
ability to store, record, and transfer images, contrary to the
representations made by the TSA;
The device specifications include hard disk storage, USB
integration;
Ethernet connectivity that raise significant privacy and
security concerns;
The device specifications include ``super user'' (``Level
Z'') status that allows TSA employees to disable filters and to
export raw images; and
The DHS Privacy office failed to adequately assess the
privacy impact of these devices.
Third, the documents EPIC obtained also raise the question of
whether in fact whole body imaging systems, either millimeter wave or
backscatter X-ray, could detect the powdered explosive PETN that was
involved in the December 25 incident. We noted that the procurement
specifications described devices that were capable of detecting
``explosives,'' ``weapons,'' and ``liquids'' but not ``powders.'' Our
finding is similar to the preliminary conclusion of the GAO and
independent experts.
Fourth, EPIC subsequently obtained from the TSA records of
complaints from travelers who went through the devices. Travelers
reported that they were not told about the pat-down alternative or that
they were going to be subject to a body scan by TSA officials.
Travelers also expressed concern about radiation risks to pregnant
women and the capture of images of young children without clothes. And
travelers have expressed religious objections to body scanners.
Fifth, EPIC and other organizations have recommended that the
deployment of body scanners be suspended, pending an independent review
to evaluate health impacts, privacy safeguards, and effectiveness. We
hope that the subcommittee will have the opportunity to review these
issues in more detail at a subsequent hearing.
In conclusion, we favor the use of airport screening techniques
that are minimally intrusive and maximally effective. Unfortunately,
the body scanners now being deployed in the Nation's airport are almost
the exact opposite--they are uniquely intrusive as they allow the
Government to photograph air travelers stripped naked regardless of
suspicion. And serious questions have been raised about the
effectiveness of these devices to detect and prevent a person from
boarding a plane with a powdered explosive.
EPIC would be pleased to provide to the subcommittee the documents
we have obtained in our open government lawsuit concerning the use of
body scanners in U.S. airports.
Thank you for the opportunity to participate in the hearing today.

REFERENCES

EPIC--Whole Body Imaging Technology and Body Scanners (``Backscatter''
X-ray and Millimeter Wave Screening) http://epic.org/privacy/airtravel/
backscatter/

EPIC--Nader Letter to President Obama Urging Suspension of Body
Scanners (Feb. 24 2010) http://epic.org/privacy/airtravel/backscatter/
EPIC-Nader_WBI_Letter.pdf

GAO, ``Homeland Security: Better Use of Terrorist Watchlist Information
and Improvements in Deployment of Passenger Screening Checkpoint
Technologies Could Further Strengthen Security'' (Jan. 27, 2010) http:/
/www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-401T

[Additional attachments will include documents obtained by EPIC under
FOIA].

Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much. We are very much
interested in Mr. Miller and Mr. Laskey, if they could be
abbreviated so that we can pose questions. Otherwise, we have
five votes that will be at least 45 minutes or so for the
committee to be in recess.
Mr. Miller, you are now recognized.
Thank you, Mr. Rotenberg, for your testimony. I hope that
you will be able to submit the material that you have on the
FOIA request to the committee and if the staff can work with
you on that.
To Colonel Potts, I believe H.R. 2200 has an intelligence
sharing component to it, and we hope the Senate will pass that
legislation.
Mr. Miller, you are recognized.

STATEMENT OF HASBROUCK B. MILLER, VICE PRESIDENT, GOVERNMENT
AFFAIRS, SMITHS DETECTION

Mr. Miller. Thank you very much. Good afternoon, Chairwoman
Jackson Lee, Ranking Member Dent and Members of the
subcommittee. My name is Brook Miller, and I am a vice
president of Smiths Detection. I appreciate the invitation to
testify here today.
As the subcommittee develops policy on checkpoint security,
we urge you to keep in mind three points. First, Smiths
Detection strongly supports a multi-layered approach to
screening checkpoint both in the United States and abroad that
includes a combination of best-in-class technologies. Multiple
layers are important, because despite recent significant
technological leaps forward, there is no one silver bullet.
Second, Smiths believes homeland security and personal
privacy are not mutually exclusive.
Third, while Smiths and DHS are strong and long-standing
partners, we believe there are ways to foster additional
dialogue between us that would promote the development of
security solutions.
Before going into some detail, I will brief you now on
Smiths Detection. We manufacture state-of-the-art detection
products around the world, including Maryland, Tennessee,
Connecticut, and Rhode Island. Having customers around the
globe gives us a new, unique depth and understanding of
security practices and technology use. In the United States DHS
is one of our leading partners. We are pleased to have
customers TSA, CBP, and other DHS components, as well as the
U.S. Military Transit Authority, first responders, among many
others.
To elaborate on the key points for a multi-layered
approach, the first vital layer is disseminating actionable
intelligence to TSA personnel on the front lines.
Second, we must not lose sight of the key role that TSA
screeners play. We share your commitment to ensuring TSA
personnel are recognized for the critical work they do and
receive the best possible training.
Third, and with the combination of advanced technologies,
we can both promote security and address passenger
frustrations. These advanced technologies include advanced X-
ray technology, bottle liquid scanners for carry-on bags,
advanced imaging technology, and expanded use of explosive
trace detection for passenger screening.
For screening of carry-on bags, Science and Technology and
TSA work with Smiths and others to develop the next generation
of AT. Our system, known as atix, allows for multiple angled
views of each carry-on bag with a ready ability to upgrade the
system with advanced software and algorithms. We ask the
subcommittee's support in ensuring continued deployment of AT,
which maximizes the chance of detection on carry-on threats.
Smith has also worked with DHS on developing bottle liquid
scanners, which are being actively installed in airports today
and allow for screening of containers that passengers would
otherwise be barred from taking beyond the checkpoint.
Moving to passenger screening, we applaud the expanded use
of trace detection, which is a well-established and effective
means of detecting explosive residue.
Lastly, on advanced imaging technology, also known as body
scanners, we support TSA's plans to deploy upward of 1,000
units by the end of next year, utilizing the technology for
primary screening. This technology significantly increases the
likelihood of detecting on individuals plastic explosives and
other threats undetectable by conventional metal detectors.
Smiths AT is known as eqo. It currently is in the TSL lab
evaluation stage of approval. This next generation technology
allows for a small physical footprint and real-time imaging
capabilities with the promise of faster throughput.
Smiths is encouraged that travelers have become
increasingly comfortable with AIT when they experience it for
themselves. As with any technology or procedure, both operators
and the traveling public need to get some time to get
comfortable and efficient with its use, including the right of
passengers to opt for an alternative screening method. Near-
term deployment of automated threat detection should further
enhance security needs and address more privacy concerns.
AIT, of course, is an essential component of an effective
multi-layered approach, but we must not lose sight of the
urgent need to coordinate international aviation security
standards. We support DHS and Department of State's continuing
and active efforts to harmonize security standards and
practices around the world, and especially at airports which
originate flights to the United States.
Chairwoman Jackson Lee, Ranking Member Dent and Members of
the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify. I
look forward to your questions.
[The statement of Mr. Miller follows:]

Prepared Statement by Hasbrouck B. Miller
March 17, 2010

I. INTRODUCTION TO SMITHS DETECTION'S ROLE IN U.S. HOMELAND SECURITY

Good afternoon, Chairwoman Jackson Lee, Ranking Member Dent, and
Members of the subcommittee. My name is Hasbrouck ``Brook'' Miller, and
I am vice president for government affairs for Smiths Detection,
Incorporated.
I sincerely appreciate your invitation to testify here today on
aviation checkpoint security. This is always a critical subject for
Smiths Detection, this subcommittee, and the Transportation Security
Administration (``TSA''), and it is one that has rightly garnered
increased media attention after the attempting bombing on Northwest
Airlines Flight 253 on December 25.
Before I delve into how the private sector, the U.S. Government,
and foreign governments have addressed and can address the vital issues
the Christmas day attack brought back to the forefront, I thought I
would start by providing some background on Smiths Detection. Our
company is part of a set of several technology and engineering
enterprises known collectively as Smiths Group. Smiths Detection (or
``Smiths,'' for short) specializes in making best-in-class detection-
oriented products to help bolster our Nation's homeland security and
defense capabilities. Smiths is headquartered in the United Kingdom.
Smiths has customers worldwide, approximately 90 percent of which
are national governments. The U.S. Government is by far our largest
customer. The U.S. Department of Defense has procured several types of
chemical detection equipment from Smiths to help protect our troops in
the field.
The Department of Homeland Security (``DHS'') is an equally
significant partner of Smiths. First, we work closely with the Science
& Technology Directorate (``S&T'') to develop state-of-the-art
detection technologies. When we bring those technologies to market, the
Transportation Security Administration (``TSA''), Customs and Border
Protection (``CBP''), the Federal Protective Service (``FPS''), the
Secret Service and Capitol Police and other DHS components, not to
mention DHS transit authority and first-responder grant recipients at
the State and local level, procure detection equipment from Smiths to
augment our Nation's aviation, mass transit, port, and border security.

II. SMITHS SUPPORTS A MULTI-LAYERED APPROACH TO CHECKPOINT SECURITY

Many airports in the United States and abroad use similar Smiths
equipment to scan carry-on bags at aviation security checkpoints, which
brings us to the subject of today's hearing. To maximize our aviation
security while keeping passengers moving and protecting their privacy,
Smiths strongly supports a multi-layered approach at the screening
checkpoint.
Members of the subcommittee, you have heard other speakers today
mention the importance of one of those layers: Collecting,
coordinating, distilling, and disseminating actionable intelligence to
and within DHS, including to the TSA personnel on the front lines. We
at Smiths could not agree more.
Another vital layer is the human layer. Simply put, Smiths views
those TSOs on the front lines as irreplaceable. Madam Chair and
Congressman Dent, we share in your commitment to ensuring that TSA
personnel are recognized for the critical work they do, including by
working hand-in-glove with technologies every day, and that they
receive the best possible training to do it. Furthermore, to help guide
their efforts and ours, Smiths also shares your desire for the Senate
to confirm a TSA Administrator as soon as possible.
Let me now turn to the layers of checkpoint security Smiths knows
best: Employing the best possible technologies to help detect anomalies
and potential threats on passengers and in carry-on bags.

III. DETECTING THREATS IN CARRY-ON BAGGAGE THROUGH ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY
(AT)

Before examining the headline-grabbing issue of Advanced Imaging
Technology (AIT) ``body scanners'' and other aspects of on-body
detection, I would like to mention the innovations that DHS, Smiths,
and other industry members have undertaken recently with regard to
examining carry-on items. Specifically, Advanced Technology (AT)
systems represents a significant leap forward for screening carry-ons,
as part of a multi-layered approach to checkpoint security.
For the last several years, S&T and TSA have worked with Smiths and
others to develop the next-generation of bag-scanning technology, known
as AT. Smiths' AT equipment is known as the ``atix,'' a type of AT
equipment that uniquely allows for multiple-angled views of each carry-
on bag. Since early 2008, TSA has deployed the atix in multiple U.S.
airports, including Baltimore-Washington, Denver, and Albuquerque.
In Smiths' view, AT and atix offer many new benefits compared to
the alternatives, which include previous-generation X-ray technologies
and more expensive Computer Tomography (CT). In fact, descriptions of
AT from TSA itself may say it best:

``Advantages of AT X-ray include a greatly enhanced image with the
ability to target novel threat items resulting in fewer bag
checks and faster throughput, and the ability to upgrade the
system with enhanced algorithms . . .''.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ www.tsa.gov/press/releases/2008/0715.shtm.

`` . . . smaller than previously available explosive detection
systems.''\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Id.

``AT systems are highly cost-effective . . . AT training is
relatively easy . . .''.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ http://www.tsa.gov/approach/tech/advanced_technology.shtm.

By the end of 2009, TSA was scheduled to have deployed
approximately 900 AT units for the approximately 2,200 commercial
aviation checkpoints in the United States. Smiths strongly supports TSA
continuing to deploy ATs to examine carry-on bags. As part of its
deployment plan, Madam Chairwoman and Ranking Member Dent, we trust you
will join us in looking forward to TSA deploying AT units that maximize
the chances of detection and deterrence of carry-on threats.
Smiths is also excited about our work with S&T and TSA to develop
and deploy another form of Advanced Technology: Bottle Liquid Scanners
(``BLS''). TSA recently decided to procure some of Smiths' portable
``RespondeR'' BLS units, which are manufactured in Danbury,
Connecticut. The RespondeR uses spectrometry technology to look through
passengers' liquid containers without opening or damaging them, in
order to identify and distinguish safe liquids from those containing
threatening substances. BLS will increase both convenience and safety
for the traveling public.

IV. ENSURING SECURITY AND PRIVACY WITH ADVANCED IMAGING TECHNOLOGY
(AIT) AND TRACE

IV.A. Ensuring Security
The final aspect of multi-layered checkpoint security, Madam
Chairwoman and Ranking Member Dent, is the one that may have received
the most attention in the aftermath of the attempted attack on
Northwest Flight 253 on December 25: Scanning the passenger for on-body
threats, including the use of Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT). In
fact, on January 7, 2010, President Obama himself called for `` . . .
greater use of the advanced explosive detection technologies that we
already have, including imaging technology, and working aggressively .
. . to develop and deploy the next generation of screening
technologies.''
Smiths believes the administration's current and future deployments
of AIT, also known as Whole Body Imaging or ``body scanning,'' are a
vital part of a comprehensive, layered detection capability. We
particularly support TSA's new approach of combining AIT deployments
with increased use of other technologies that also can identify non-
metallic, on-body threats at the airport checkpoint, such as trace
explosives detectors.
While AIT and trace are not full-proof, nothing by itself is, they
significantly increase the chances of detecting on-body plastic
explosives, such as the PETN compound allegedly used by Umar Farouk
Abdulmutallab. Those non-metallic threats are simply undetectable by
conventional metal detectors.
As a result, Smiths strongly supports TSA's deployment schedule for
AIT. In 2009, TSA deployed 40 millimeter wave AIT systems, at six U.S.
airports for primary screening and at the other 13 as an alternative to
pat-downs for secondary or random screening. TSA plans to deploy
approximately 450 AITs, using millimeter wave or the alternative
backscatter technology, in fiscal year 2010. In its fiscal year 2011
budget request, DHS has called for $214.7 million to fund the
procurement of 500 additional AIT units. If Congress funds the fiscal
year 2011 request, TSA is expected to have ordered approximately 1,000
AITs by the end of fiscal year 2011, which would cover almost half of
the approximately 2,200 U.S. checkpoints. Industry is fully capable of
meeting, or even exceeding, that deployment schedule, and Smiths
supports the administration's request.
Smiths also supports DHS's $60 million request for portable trace
detection equipment. Trace can augment checkpoint security by detecting
explosive particles on travelers' hands, clothing, or luggage, since
explosives can be sticky enough to remain there, even after repeated
washing.
Smiths also encourages DHS and the Department of State to continue
their important efforts to foster international standardization on and
deployment of AIT, trace, and other checkpoint technologies and
practices. Fortunately, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Ireland,
and other countries are partnering with the administration in this
effort, but it is clearly in its initial stages.
As a company with a global presence, Smiths knows all too well that
many airports, including those hosting U.S.-bound flights and
especially in the developing world, have a long way to go to match up
to the steps that DHS is taking in the United States. It may be time to
examine the possibility of further U.S. assistance to spur upgrades in
the developing world's security infrastructure.

IV.B. Smiths' ``eqo,'' Next-Generation AIT
Madam Chairwoman, let me turn to Smiths Detection's specific work
on AIT. Smiths' AIT product is known as the ``eqo,'' which we developed
after licensing the basic technology from Argonne National Laboratory
several years ago. President Obama was right in his January 7 speech:
Partnering with the National Labs can produce results. The end result
for Smiths in this case is the eqo, a next-generation AIT system that
uses safe millimeter waves to generate three-dimensional images of a
person's body, in order to look for anomalies such as explosives,
weapons, drugs, or other contraband.
The eqo possesses a couple of key attributes that distinguish it as
a next-generation AIT. First, as a flat-panel system with a metal-
detector-like arch, the eqo is small and checkpoint-friendly. This is
an especially important feature for smaller airports where real estate
is tight. Second, the eqo generates real-time, moving images, which
allow for better angles to detect anomalies. Third, those real-time
images, by definition, require no downloading time. Smiths estimates
this development will lead to faster throughput when the eqo undergoes
field testing in U.S. airports.
Prior to field testing, the Transportation Security Lab (``TSL'')
in Atlantic City has been testing the eqo in the lab for several
months. Madam Chairwoman and Ranking Member Dent, we would like to find
out more details about DHS's time line for its lab testing and
subsequent field testing of the eqo.

IV.C. Ensuring Privacy
At the same time, Members of the subcommittee, while Smiths
believes that AIT brings an important new technological capability to
the airport checkpoint, we also believe that homeland security and
personal privacy are not mutually exclusive concepts. The traveling
public deserves to be assured the AIT equipment used by the TSA is
capable of guarding their privacy and their security simultaneously.
Therefore, Smiths also supports the robust dissemination, or even the
codification, of TSA's privacy protections for AIT. These protections
are already in place, but not always widely publicized or consistently
implemented. Again, the traveling public deserves no less.
Smiths is encouraged that travelers become increasingly comfortable
with AIT when they experience it for themselves. According to TSA, over
98 percent of passengers who have experienced AITs prefer them to
alternative screening methods.\4\ In comparison, a January Gallup/USA
Today poll finds 78 percent of U.S. all air travelers, including those
who have not undergone AIT screening, approve of the AIT concept.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ http://www.tsa.gov/approach/tech/imaging_technology.shtm.
\5\ http://www.usatoday.com/travel/flights/2010-01-11-security-
poll_N.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Still, Smiths wants to ensure passengers are as informed as
possible when using AIT technology. Therefore, to supplement the
efforts of TSA and the Congress, Smiths adheres to its own ``Seven
Points of Privacy'' when discussing the use of AIT:

(1) AIT equipment should blur all facial features on its images.
TSA and the Smiths eqo take this approach.

(2) TSA officers should view AIT images at remote locations, where
no cameras or cell phones are permitted. AIT equipment should
transmit all images to that remote location via a secure
connection. TSA and the eqo take this approach.

(3) TSA officers viewing the images from that location should talk
by wireless headset to TSA personnel at the checkpoint to clear
the traveler if nothing suspect appears on the image. TSA and
the eqo take this approach.

(4) TSA should have sufficient resources to support a policy that
would require male TSA personnel to view male images and female
personnel to view female images. TSA does not currently
implement this policy.

(5) TSA should disable AIT equipment for field use to make it
incapable of saving, e-mailing, or printing any images. TSA and
the eqo take this approach, although TSA understandably
temporarily enables AITs to save images during earlier off-
airport training of TSA personnel.

(6) AIT equipment should automatically and irrevocably delete each
image after TSA clears the passenger. TSA and the eqo take this
approach.

(7) TSA should provide travelers with an alternative for primary
screening: A combination of a metal detector, trace detection,
and a pat-down. TSA and S&T should partner with industry to
continue to develop computer-driven auto-detection capabilities
and to provide other comparable technological alternatives. DHS
and Smiths take this approach.

However, as the Members of the subcommittee know, a floor amendment
added last June to the House TSA reauthorization bill (H.R. 2200), if
enacted into law, would bar AIT from serving as a primary screening
option. The language would permit AIT to be used only ``for-cause''
secondary screening. Smiths views the amendment's approach as
problematic. Since metal detectors cannot detect plastic explosives or
other non-metallic weapons, TSA may never pull aside for secondary
screening a potential assailant, especially a professional who does not
appear agitated. That could leave us with a problem comparable to the
one we faced on Christmas when, as has been reported, Mr. Abdulmutallab
never went through the AITs deployed at Amsterdam's Schiphol Airport.
Instead, Smiths urges the Congress to advance alternative language
to enhance security, protect privacy, and codify TSA policy on AIT. We
support legislation to encourage comprehensive deployments of multi-
layered, advanced technologies, with passengers choosing among suitable
options for primary screening.
Chairwoman Jackson Lee, Ranking Member Dent, and Members of the
subcommittee, thank you very much for the opportunity to testify. I
look forward to your questions.

Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much, Mr. Miller.
Mr. Laskey.

STATEMENT OF MITCHEL J. LASKEY, PRESIDENT AND CEO, BRIJOT
IMAGING SYSTEMS, INC.

Mr. Laskey. Thank you, Chairwoman Jackson Lee, Ranking
Member Dent and Members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the
opportunity to address you today.
Brijot Imaging Systems has developed an advanced imaging
technology called the Brijot SafeScreen. It does not reveal any
anatomical detail of the traveler being screened or emit
radiation. Using passive millimeter wave technology, the
solution detects anomalies in temperatures by measuring natural
millimeter wave energy emitted by the human body.
In addition to protecting the privacy of the traveler,
passive millimeter wave technology is better at detecting
hidden objects than the current imaging technologies currently
deployed.
Active millimeter wave scanner technology showers
passengers with either microwave energy or ionizing radiation.
Those systems produce images by looking at the energy reflected
back off the body and searching for any shapes on the body that
don't belong. This technique can run amiss for explosives that
are concealed in certain ways.
Passive millimeter wave technology, on the other hand,
detects the difference between the millimeter waves your body
emits naturally and the hidden object, making it more likely
that a powder or liquid will be found.
As evidence of the public acceptance of our technology, it
has been approved for use as safe by the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia, where more than 90 percent of the population is Muslim.
I have also submitted a letter for the record from the testing
laboratory at the Vatican that approves passive millimeter wave
technology for use.
Compared to the currently deployed advanced imaging
technologies, Brijot's SafeScreen has a smaller footprint,
takes up less than two-thirds of the space that is planned for
TSA requirements. It increases throughput by two-fold and has a
lower total cost of ownership.
In addition to deployments to airports in the United
Kingdom and Indonesia and as evidence of the international
demand for passive millimeter wave technology, we have
responded to multiple requests and conducted trials throughout
both Europe and the Asia-Pacific region. We continue to have
pending requests for future trials in places like France,
Germany, Poland and Romania, Taiwan, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam.
In the mean time we are also moving forward with TSA as
part of their qualified products list process to receive the
necessary approval to deploy systems in the U.S. airports. As a
small company doing business with TSA for the first time, I can
say that the process has sometimes appear daunting. I think
that our colleagues at the TSA will agree that we had a lot to
learn about the process, and they probably have a lot to learn
about passive millimeter wave technology.
Our first opportunity to be considered by TSA for approval
was in 2006 when TSA issued a broad agency announcement for
what was referred to as whole body imagers. Due to the relative
newness of our passive millimeter wave technology at that time,
the specifications that were written did not match up with what
we had to offer, and therefore we were unable to respond.
Two technologies were approved during this initial process,
however, and they remain the only two advanced imaging
technologies that are available for implementation in U.S.
airports today.
In April 2008 TSA reopened and reentered the qualified
products list process. Again, as a small company that had never
done business with TSA, we had a lot of questions and I think
it is fair to say have experienced a couple of snags as we
learned how to navigate through this process.
I am pleased to report that Brijot SafeScreen has been in
testing at TSA in a simulated checkpoint environment to
evaluate how it will perform under various concepts of
operation and to collect operating metrics such as throughput
and false alarm rates.
While we are encouraged with our progress within TSA, the
events of Christmas day have changed the international
landscape and provided an unintended advantage of the two
technologies that were approved as part of the initial
certification process begun in 2006.
Prior to Christmas day our international business prospects
were booming. Governments wanted a security solution that
provides privacy and protect health. However, given the recent
renewed prominence of TSA's role in establishing international
aviation security standards, we are now being told by our
partners overseas that we must first receive TSA approval
before our technology can be deployed at airports. We are, as
you can possibly imagine, anxious for this approval and eager
to work together with TSA toward earning it.
I am very grateful for the opportunity to share our story
with you today and thank you for all your time.
[The statement of Mr. Laskey follows:]

Prepared Statement of Mitchel J. Laskey
March 17, 2010

Chairwoman Jackson Lee, Ranking Member Dent, and Members of the
subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to address you today.
Brijot Imaging Systems was established in 2004. We are a small
business in every sense of the word, with approximately 50 employees
working directly for the company. Brijot Imaging Systems is a global
leader in passive millimeter wave technology, with customers in the
global homeland security, loss prevention, and DoD markets. I expect
our company to triple in size over the next 2 years as the demand for
screening technology that protects both privacy and health continues to
grow domestically and internationally.
We have developed an advanced imaging technology system, called
SafeScreen, for use at airport checkpoints. Passive millimeter wave
technology is unique in that it does not reveal the anatomical details
of the individual being screened, nor does it emit radiation. Instead,
it detects anomalies in temperature by reading the natural millimeter
wave energy emitted by the human body.
In addition to protecting the privacy of the traveler, passive
millimeter wave technology is safe and better at detecting hidden
objects than current advanced imaging technologies.
Active millimeter and backscatter technologies shower passengers
with either microwave energy or ionizing radiation. Those systems
produce images by looking at the energy reflected back off of the body,
and searching for any shapes on the body that do not belong. This
technique can miss explosives that are disguised in certain ways.
Passive millimeter wave technology, on the other hand, detects a
difference between the millimeter waves your body emits naturally and
the energy emitted from a hidden object, making it more likely that a
powder or liquid will be found.
Compared to currently deployed advanced imaging technologies,
SafeScreen has a smaller footprint, taking up less than two-thirds of
the space that is planned for in the Transportation Security
Administration's (TSA) requirements; increases throughput by two-fold;
and has a lower cost of ownership.
We received SAFETY Act certification in April 2009, and have been
tested and approved for use by the Sandia National Laboratories, the
U.S. Air Force Research Laboratory, the U.S. Marshal Services, as well
as by the governments of Israel, France, Germany, Scotland, and Italy.
In September 2007, the U.K. Home Office Scientific Development
Branch also tested and approved our technology for U.K. government
purchase. In December of that year, Brijot received a contract to
deploy systems nationally to U.K. seaports and airports.
We have submitted a statement for the record from John Whyte, the
past Deputy Director of Her Majesty's Revenue & Customs and Chair of
Detection Technology Board, who believed that this technology can
detect not only drugs and currency concealed on the body, but would
also be useful in meeting the other requirements of the U.K. border
agency, including the detection of hidden documents. He said:

``The testing program for this equipment was rigorous and it was clear
that Brijot listened and responded to our needs. This approach was most
welcome and an integral part of our decision to purchase Brijot's
equipment.''

Without releasing sensitive information, I can share that large
currency and drug seizures have resulted from our technology's
deployment at U.K. ports of entry.
Our first system designed for an airport security checkpoint was
deployed to Heathrow Airport in 2006 on a trial basis. Based on the
same passive millimeter wave technology that is currently being tested
by TSA for deployment to U.S. airports, this particular piece of
equipment was designed to meet U.K. border agency requirements. It has
a very small footprint, is mobile, and able to operate on batteries.
Our systems are still deployed at Heathrow, as well as six other
airports in the U.K. today.
As evidence of public acceptance of our technology, it has been
approved as safe to use by the government of Saudi Arabia, where more
than 90 percent of the population is Muslim.
It has also been tested and approved for use by the testing
laboratory of the Vatican.
As further evidence of the continued international demand for
passive millimeter wave technology, we have responded to requests and
conducted trials at airports in China, Italy, India, Malaysia, the
Middle East, and the Philippines. We also have pending requests for
future trials in France, Germany, Poland, Romania, Ireland, Taiwan,
Kenya, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam.
Although not the purpose of this hearing, I think it is worth
briefly mentioning the use of passive millimeter wave technology as a
loss prevention measure in the commercial market, where it is much
easier to identify Return on Investment (ROI). Our systems are deployed
to large distribution centers for global retailers across the country
and typically achieve ROI within 3 months of implementation due to
reduced shrinkage. Brendan Alexander, the Director of Loss Prevention
for Best Buy Canada, said:

``As a retailer that has relied on more traditional security measures
such as metal detectors for the past 20 years, we have evolved our
screening process by incorporating less intrusive, faster and more
accurate technology measures as those offered by passive millimeter
wave systems.''

In the meantime, we are also moving forward with TSA as part of
their Qualified Product List (QPL) process to receive the necessary
approval to deploy systems to U.S. airports.
As a small company doing business with TSA for the first time, I
can say that the process has sometimes appeared daunting. I think our
colleagues at TSA will agree that we had a lot to learn about the
process, and they probably had something to learn about passive
millimeter wave technology.
Our first opportunity to be considered by TSA for approval was in
2006 when TSA issued a Broad Agency Announcement for what was then
referred to as ``Whole Body Imagers (WBIs).'' Due to the relative
``newness'' of our passive millimeter wave technology at that time, the
specifications that were written did not match up with what we have to
offer and we were unable to respond.
Two technologies were approved during this initial process, and
they remain the only two whole body imaging technologies that are
currently available for implementation at U.S. airports today.
In April 2008, TSA reopened--and we entered--the QPL process for
whole body imaging technology. Again, as a small company that had never
done business with TSA, we had a lot of questions and I think it's fair
to say--have experienced a couple snags as we learned how to navigate
the process. By 2008 we developed a new product called SafeScreen,
using the same passive millimeter wave technology, that conformed to
the TSA requirements and specifications.
I am pleased to report that SafeScreen has been in testing this
week at TSA in a simulated checkpoint environment to see how it will
perform under various concepts of operation and to collect operating
metrics such as throughput and false alarm rates.
While we are encouraged with our progress within TSA, the events of
Christmas day have changed the international landscape and provided an
unintended advantage to the two technologies that were approved as part
of the initial certification in 2006. Prior to Christmas day 2009, our
international business prospects were booming--people wanted a security
solution that provided privacy and protected health. However, given the
recently renewed prominence of TSA's role in establishing international
aviation security standards, we are now being told by our partners
overseas that we must first receive TSA approval for our technology
before it can be deployed at their airports.
We are, as you can imagine, anxious for this approval and eager to
work with TSA toward earning it.
I am grateful for the opportunity to share our story, and thank you
for your time today.

[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me thank you all for your testimony.
We are going to stand in recess. We will return for questions
on all the witnesses. Thank you. The committee stands in
recess.
[Recess.]
Ms. Jackson Lee. The hearing is reconvened. Thank you for
your patience. We will now proceed with the questions.
Mr. Dunlap, you have expressed concerns about the
throughput rate of passengers through the AIT machines, but
would you agree that AIT offers better screening technologies
than the current walk-through metal detectors?
Mr. Dunlap. What I agree is that it is an interesting, new,
and novel technology that gives us detection capabilities that
we don't have right now. But AIT is not a new technology, as
you know. AIT has been in various degrees of investigations
since 1994. I believe that the first meeting that was had in
the city under the FAA was in 1995.
So there has been a period of 15 years where we have been
able to examine both the strengths and vulnerabilities of this
technology. Soon we would be putting a technology into our
airports in which the vulnerabilities have been studied by our
adversaries for a number of years. That would give us concern.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Is concern a pathway toward prohibition?
Mr. Dunlap. No, not at all. I think as you take a
technology like AIT and drop it into a checkpoint, you need to
make two fundamental calculations. First calculation is are
there more strengths than weaknesses? The second calculation
would be what is the effect on passenger throughput? You know,
ideally, we would like to see throughput around 200 passengers
an hour, but we understand right now some of the systems are
only at 160 passengers per hour.
Second, the thing that doesn't get talked about is that AIT
is going to require a different way that a passenger will have
to present themselves at the checkpoint. So right now if we
read the TSA's website, it says, ``Please take all the metallic
objects off your body.'' Under AIT you will have to say, ``Take
off your metallic objects. Take off any kind of hard plastic,
non-metallic objects.'' That is going to have to go somewhere.
That is going to have to go into our X-ray machines.
So if you drop AIT in, the next calculation you will have
to have is what is the effect of AIT on the X-ray machines?
Most probably that will mean they will have to deal with more
bins, they will have to deal with more objects. So you will
have to strengthen the screening training of the screeners at
the X-ray machine to take a look at this new range of
nonmetallic objects that are there. So I think there are a
number of factors that you have to think about on how the
overall screening system operates.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Do you think the Department has been
successful in its outreach to foreign airports and airlines
since Christmas day? Do you have any suggestions for
improvement?
Mr. Dunlap. Yes, Madam Chairwoman, we certainly do. One of
the things that we can say is we understand that a Government
needs to have a strong reaction whenever a terrible incident
like this happens. But what we really believe is that the best
response is one that is preplanned with the stakeholders well
in advance so that you have playbooks to rely on, so you have
coordination in place, so that when that incident happens, you
have an effective response and an efficient response.
If there is a criticism that can be made of the response to
December 25, it is that speed won out over efficiency and
effectiveness. What we would ask the Department to do and what
we would ask this committee to do is ask for 360 review of all
those measures that have been implemented since Christmas and
find out what is needless duplication and what are those that
need to be enhanced, so we don't find ourselves in a position
where regulations that are made in the heat of battle wind up
becoming National policy, because we think those are the worst
security regulations that we can have.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Barclay, what are your comments on
what Mr. Dunlap has said? But more particularly, you expressed
concerns about the cost of the modifications, terminal
modifications to accommodate the AIT machine. That may be
perceived as a cost of doing business. How much of that do you
think the airport should bear and what is your assessment about
the comments of, if you will, convenience to a certain extent
or accommodation that Mr. Dunlap has said about the AIT
machines?
Mr. Barclay. Well, on addressing Mr. Dunlap's comments, I
think all of the criticisms you hear have merit to them.
Airport executives look on AIT as one new, enhanced, useful
tool as part of the whole screening process that we need
keeping passengers safe. So we agree with the fundamental
decision to go to more deployment of the AIT.
On the costs of the terminals themselves, currently, what
we think we are hearing is that, well, we don't have any of
that in the budget, so the airports will have to cover
everything in terms of the capital costs of terminal
modifications. At some locations, that will be significant.
Here at Washington, the people on the committee would
recognize you might expect the old terminal at National to
require modification, but according to the director here, even
the brand-new facility at Dulles looks like, under some
assumptions, it won't have all the space needed for putting in
AITs as the primary source for screening.
So we are talking about very significant costs, and
airports have shown in the past we are willing. We have spent
over $4 billion on costs associated with security, but there is
not a lot of money left in the system to direct to this
project, or we are going to be pulling away from runway safety
areas and terminal expansions, meeting capacity and other
things that are needed.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So how valuable do you think this new
technology would be?
Mr. Barclay. Well, we are relying on the experts. We are
not the technical experts in these systems, and we are relying
on them and their valuation that this is a useful new tool. Our
members are treating it like that, that they would like to see
it in their airports as one of the tools used so that we can
continue to enhance security.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Do you think there should be a grant
program for security projects like the FAA programs for
security, safety in airport terminal projects?
Mr. Barclay. Yes, we started out the right way on the
baggage screening installations with--TSA wanted to do letters
of intent with the airports. These are capital construction
projects, so they can get paid out over many years covering
debt service. You don't have to come up with all the money up
front.
That program, which did fund that $2 billion of the cost of
explosive detection systems, was eventually wound down. We have
got strong support from this committee and Congress, got strong
support from TSA initially, but people that OMB and higher up
the food chain kept pushing back against that program, and it
was simply a budget matter of trading off it against other
costs.
Our point is just you can't pretend those costs aren't
there, because they don't fit in your budget. They are real.
Somebody is going to have to cover them. Airports believe it
should be the responsibility of the Department.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So you are saying that a grant program
would be something that you would welcome.
Mr. Barclay. Absolutely, yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Potts, did your airport, which if
you--I didn't hear you say what size it is in the scheme of
National airports, if you would put that into the record for
me, please. But did you all make any effort to be a pilot
program for the AIT?
Terminal modification costs that your airport pays impacts
the rent. I understand that you charge your airlines. If that
is correct, you can add that in your response. Should AIT
installation terminal modifications costs be a cost of doing
business, meaning that you would pass it on to the airlines, or
would you expect to have some compensation from the Federal
Government for reimbursement?
Mr. Potts. I would, No. 1, for the last question, Madam
Chairwoman, would like to see that we have some sort of
reimbursement for the efforts that we would have to do to
adjust our facilities to take on the new technology to be a
grant program as we have had, as mentioned. I think that would
be a fair way of doing it for the airports.
You will have airports that are large airports that might
be able to do it but they, too, have to weigh the terminal
improvement projects. Some of them, if you see one airport, you
see one airport. All of us are configured in a different
configuration, and some of these, because the power
requirements and all of the different sundry things that have
to go on with addition of new material, we would like to see a
grant program.
As far as how big we are, we are still the eighth-largest
at IAH. We are the fourth-largest airport system in the country
and the sixth-largest in the world, so we do see a lot of
international traffic as well, and so we have to consider that
as we go forward.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So did you previously seek to be in the
pilot program for body scanning AIT technology?
Mr. Potts. Yes, ma'am. We were at the front end of the test
case. We had it for about 60 days, and then they take the
machines out, and they were gone.
Ms. Jackson Lee. That was--you were testing, that was the
end of it.
Mr. Potts. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Which we need to beg the question as to
why we have these kinds of fleeting and temporary efforts, and
then we don't come back, return, answer any questions, say what
is going to happen.
The other point, however, I think, to both Mr. Barclay and
Colonel Potts, I know that vast numbers of airports were
obviously built before 9/11, and we understand that, though
CIP, capital improvement projects, in cities sort of on-going
since that time.
I would just offer to say to you--Mr. Barclay, you might
want to comment--airports have to have vision, too. We live in
another world after 9/11, and it is not always the Federal
Government that should take the brunt of non-visioning about
what you may prospectively have to do as it relates to
security.
I do think it is worthy of looking at a construct that is a
match or a grant program, which I am going to be talking to
staff on how we could advocate for that. But airports need to
envision, too, and take some of the responsibility for spacing
that would be required for new technology.
Mr. Barclay. Yes, ma'am. That is why I mentioned that
airports have spent billions on the improvements to security
already and we will continue to do that, but we appreciate any
consideration on a program that sees that this is a shared
responsibility, the Federal Government and local government.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, I would hope and I appreciate what
you are saying, that we could be partners. I think that would
be the best format going forward. We learn from you, and you
learn from us, and we hopefully will be able to be constructive
in providing security for those airports.
Let me finish by asking Mr. Rotenberg, are you wanting to
ban all forms of equipment that require scanning?
Mr. Rotenberg. Not at all, Madam Chairwoman. In fact, we
have made a number of recommendations to promote the use of new
techniques that can help detect, for example, explosive
materials that might not otherwise be located.
Our concern about body scanners is that they are uniquely
intrusive among all of the various airport security techniques.
That is the reason for the focus on this particular technology.
We have looked closely at the privacy safeguards, because the
vendors have said that the privacy concerns have been addressed
through the blurring of images and other techniques, and we
wanted to evaluate those claims.
We concluded that if it was possible to store the raw
images or disable the filters, that in fact the privacy
safeguards weren't adequate. So if those problems can be
solved, I think there are scenarios under which the scanning
technologies could be used.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, I think your input is constructive.
I am sure that we are going to take a look at your analysis and
ask some more probing questions on this issue. I think your
testimony is very helpful to us today.
With that, let me recognize the Ranking Member, Mr. Dent.
Mr. Dent. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Thanks to all of you for being part of this panel this
afternoon. Thank you for waiting for us.
My question is to Mr. Miller. You know, TSA has spent 4
years examining this advanced imaging technology. I understand
the science behind this technology is decades old. While these
new technologies like your ecosystems bring state-of-the-art
applications to that science, the threat it addresses is not a
new threat.
Is the Department of Homeland Security as a whole,
including those agencies represented in our first panel,
dedicating sufficient resources to explore new and emerging
technologies to address these well-documented threats?
Mr. Miller. Thanks for the question. Our observation is
that the trend is very good in terms of how they are addressing
and how they are prioritizing different technologies, so that
that answer is yes, we think that they are looking at an awful
lot of things.
They are somewhat under-resourced--we are living in an
under-resourced world--in many areas, and so by and large they
are trending in the right way by looking at an awful lot of new
technologies, experimental technologies, but they can only do
so much with the laboratory systems and the like that they have
available to them now.
Mr. Dent. How has TSA or S&T communicated the current
threat environment to you?
Mr. Miller. I mean, that is an area for improvement, I
would think, overall. But again, the level of communication
with industry and between Science and Technology or TSA or the
other components of DHS has been better considerably over the
past couple of years. There is a better level of communication
not only on the threats, but what their plans are and how they
would like to see technology development.
Mr. Dent. So would you say they are, then, exploring new
and emergent technologies?
Mr. Miller. They are.
Mr. Dent. Okay. To what extent has TSA and/or the S&T
Directorate had conversations with Smiths, addressing the
threats associated with weapons concealed in body cavities?
Mr. Miller. The conversation started some months ago,
actually, about what the available--in our view, and I am
certain that they asked other industry participants--what was
available to try and address that particular threat area. We
have had conversations with them. We have meaningful
conversations, and they are looking at the efficacy and the
direction of things that might be available here and now and
what might be available in the coming few years.
Mr. Dent. Thank you.
I would like to move to Mr. Laskey right now. Your company
is probably one of the smallest companies trying to navigate
this very complex, convoluted, complicated process between TSA
and the S&T Directorate. I understand that in 2008 you went to
TSA and asked if they would consider your passive millimeter
wave technology, and they wouldn't consider it.
The acting administrator for acquisitions wrote you and
said that since you did not support your tactical data in July
2006, you would be excluded from the process until they
reopened a new solicitation.
Mr. Laskey, are you familiar, I should say, with Moore's
Law, which in general states, computing speed doubles every 2
years?
Mr. Laskey. Yes, sir I am familiar with the law, and I will
tell you that from my own experience and I think the experience
of our company, that is not necessarily the case. Technology
continues to evolve. There is a process, a continuous process
improvement. As we develop new technologies, we implement them
into our systems and into solving the problems that we have to
solve.
You know, the threat environment has continued to evolve
and change, and as we are closing one door, there is another
door that is opening. So you have to continue to evolve your
technology to solve these problems.
Mr. Dent. In the 2 years from your original solicitation
for data in 2006 to your product's development in 2008, were
new and different technologies developed that might have
improved passenger screening capabilities?
Mr. Laskey. You know, I wouldn't say new. I would say
evolving. We have continued to improve the algorithms,
probabilities of detection, the elimination of false alarms,
and the way that we package our solutions to meet the needs of
the customers.
Mr. Dent. Finally, and in your opinion, how might the
solicitation process be improved? Do you believe that
solicitation should be kept open so that emerging, promising
technologies could be considered instead of technologies that
are, as of now, about 4 years old?
Mr. Laskey. Right. Well, certainly, sir, you know, an open
process would be very, very preferable. I do agree with Mr.
Miller that the process over the last couple of years has
gotten much more visibility in terms of the long-term plan and
some of the short-term plans. But certainly, you know, having
the ability to test vendors in a parallel fashion so that there
is an equal opportunity would very much be preferable. Then
have the door open for new and young and emerging companies to
join that process would be much more preferable.
Mr. Dent. Finally, you mentioned that there were snags in
the process to getting your technology certified for possible
inclusion on the qualified products list. Can you please give
us an example of what some of those snags were and how they
affected you as a small business?
Mr. Laskey. I can think of one most particularly, and that
had to do with the requirement for the floor space, the square
footage requirements for this AIT solution. When we answered
our solicitation, our technical data package, we believed that
we met the specification and indeed, we did meet the
specification in terms of the square footage requirement, but
come to find out that the shape of our floor plan was more
rectangular, and TSA was looking for a more square
implementation, so it has to go back and re-craft our solution
set to meet that specification.
You know, frankly, for a small company, that was, you know,
fairly insignificant expenditure. So had the specification, you
know, called out that specific requirement, I think we would
have been able to do it a lot better on the first try around.
Mr. Dent. Mr. Miller, has Smiths had similar experiences?
Mr. Miller. Indeed. You know, an area of improvement which,
again, has gotten better. The trend is okay, but is to get in
front of the data requirements and so forth before they travel
on to the acquisition process. Have industry, large and small,
have more open conversations with what they are really seeking
earlier on in the process would be a marked improvement.
Mr. Dent. Thank you.
I yield back. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much, Mr. Dent.
Let me just finish with Mr. Laskey, see if I understood Mr.
Dent's question to you.
One of your concerns as a small or a large entrepreneur is
the safety of your proprietary information as you would submit
it to the Federal Government. Therefore, are you asking that
everyone who is interested be in the same pool and are assessed
at the same time?
Mr. Laskey. Well, I think certainly, you know, you always
have to have cutoffs. I think that there, you know, there is a
process by which you are going to have testing and
certification for a particular product like the AIT. To the
extent that manufacturers are ready, willing, and able to sit
together to define their answers to the specific requirements,
they should be tested together so that their certifications
will come out together and therefore, you know, inadvertently
give somebody an unfair competitive advantage by having that,
you know, seal of approval by the TSA before others might have
that opportunity.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me thank you. We would welcome an
expansion of your testimony to brief that particular point as
it relates to small businesses and of our emphasis that we are
interested in expanding the opportunities for inventiveness in
technology.
Mr. Barclay, if I could, do you think it is important in
airports, the vast types of airports across America, the
international travel, that a technology is there that is able
to detect the types of explosives and plastics that were
represented to have been utilized or allegedly tried to be
utilized by the Christmas day bomber?
Mr. Barclay. Our members do. To ignore that threat at this
point would just be foolish. Also, to spend all the kingdom's
gold on only that threat would be foolish as well. So taking a
smart approach to utilizing the technology and putting it in in
a discreet fashion is one we agree with. We think the leaders
at TSA and DHS are trying to do that.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Is there any comment, Colonel Potts, that
you want to make on the importance of equipment that may be
utilized for the unknown future or the alleged tactics that the
Christmas day bomber was trying to use?
Mr. Potts. We use a layered approach, and all technologies
that can help us reduce the amount of risk that we are subject
to in this current environment would be helpful to help us do
our job every day.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Rotenberg, how do you think we can
strike a balance between the necessity of screening for
explosives and privacy?
Mr. Rotenberg. Well, Madam Chairwoman, I said in my
statement that obviously techniques that are most effective in
detecting threats are the most valuable, and techniques that
are most intrusive are of the greatest concern. I think we have
had the experience in developing technologies that don't
require us to trade off. I think that is where we get into
trouble. To simply say to passengers, if you give up a lot of
privacy, that will make you safer, with a technology that it in
fact is not more effective is not a good deal.
So we think techniques that focus in particular on threats
and, as other witnesses have said, a multi-layered approach
that involves human observation, baggage screening is the best
approach.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I don't know if we will completely agree
with the totality of your testimony, but I will assure you that
it will be a constructive element of our analysis on the
utilization of these machines and also the points that were
made by witnesses on the funding of technology that airports
need. I think that is extremely important.
I am going to end with Mr. Barclay on the point of training
with TSO officers. I know that there is an integration between
airport staff and TSO officers. They have to work together. Do
you believe enhanced professional training will make their jobs
and their productiveness better and add to the collaboration
between airports and the TSA?
Mr. Barclay. Absolutely. We find that with airport
employees, investments in training just create great payback in
terms of being able to do things, frankly, with fewer staff,
but also with people who enjoy their jobs more. They do better
jobs. Training is one of those things you can always get better
at, and TSA, I think, believes that. But we can keep pushing
them to do even better.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, I would encourage you to be an
advocate for H.R. 2200, which you realize that we passed out of
this Congress, this House, and is waiting for approval in the
Senate, that has a very large component of training that I
think will be very helpful in the Nation's security.
Before I gavel this hearing down to a close and express my
appreciation to the witnesses, since we are in a Homeland
Security hearing, allow me to introduce and have him stand
along with his members, Jeff Caynon, who is president of Local
341 Firefighters from Houston, Texas. If all of them would
stand, be reflected on the record that there are four members
from the Houston firefighters and that we are very grateful for
the service of firefighters both in Houston and in Texas and
around the Nation.
[Applause.]
Ms. Jackson Lee. I want to thank the witnesses for their
testimony and for the opportunity that you have given us to be
able to review some very important points that have been made.
Again, this effort, the war on terror, but more importantly,
securing America is a team effort, and each of you are very
much a part of it. This hearing will show that in its
assessment and how we move forward in providing more security
for the American people.
With that and the acknowledgment that there may be
additional questions by a variety of Members, we would ask that
the witnesses would respond to them expeditiously in writing.
There were several requests that we made in writing. Our
staff--made orally, excuse me--our staff will follow up so that
you can present them in writing, both the first panel and the
second panel.
As I indicated, today's conversation has helped to bring
all of the relevant stakeholders together, and I hope that this
energy can be harnessed so the security of our airports can be
upgraded successfully and efficiently. We want to ask the hard
questions, but we also want them answered quickly so we can
again serve the American people.
Hearing no further business, the subcommittee stands
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:47 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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