[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
FEDERAL PROTECTIVE SERVICE: WOULD
FEDERALIZATION OF GUARDS IMPROVE
SECURITY AT CRITICAL FACILITIES?
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HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
APRIL 14, 2010
__________
Serial No. 111-61
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
__________
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, Chairman
Loretta Sanchez, California Peter T. King, New York
Jane Harman, California Lamar Smith, Texas
Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon Mark E. Souder, Indiana
Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of Daniel E. Lungren, California
Columbia Mike Rogers, Alabama
Zoe Lofgren, California Michael T. McCaul, Texas
Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas Charles W. Dent, Pennsylvania
Henry Cuellar, Texas Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida
Christopher P. Carney, Pennsylvania Paul C. Broun, Georgia
Yvette D. Clarke, New York Candice S. Miller, Michigan
Laura Richardson, California Pete Olson, Texas
Ann Kirkpatrick, Arizona Anh ``Joseph'' Cao, Louisiana
Ben Ray Lujan, New Mexico Steve Austria, Ohio
William L. Owens, New York
Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
Emanuel Cleaver, Missouri
Al Green, Texas
James A. Himes, Connecticut
Mary Jo Kilroy, Ohio
Dina Titus, Nevada
Vacancy
I. Lanier Avant, Staff Director
Rosaline Cohen, Chief Counsel
Michael Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Robert O'Connor, Minority Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on
Homeland Security.............................................. 1
The Honorable Peter T. King, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security.............................................. 2
The Honorable Laura Richardson, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Californina:
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
WITNESSES
Panel I
Mr. Gary W. Schenkel, Director, Federal Protective Service,
National Protection and Programs Directorate, Department of
Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
Mr. Mark L. Goldstein, Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues,
Government Accountability Office:
Oral Statement................................................. 7
Prepared Statement............................................. 9
Mr. Clark Kent Ervin, Director, Homeland Security Program, The
Aspen Institute:
Oral Statement................................................. 14
Prepared Statement............................................. 16
Panel II
Mr. David L. Wright, President, National FPS Union:
Oral Statement................................................. 46
Prepared Statement............................................. 47
Mr. Stephen D. Amitay, Federal Legislative Counsel, National
Association of Security Companies:
Oral Statement................................................. 51
Prepared Statement............................................. 54
For the Record
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on
Homeland Security:
The National Treasury Employees Union, Statement of............ 43
Appendix
Questions From Chairman Bennie G. Thompson of Mississippi for
Gary W. Schenkel............................................... 63
Questions From Honorable Charles W. Dent of Pennsylvania for Gary
W. Schenkel.................................................... 65
Question From Honorable Charles W. Dent of Pennsylvania for Mark
L. Goldstein................................................... 65
Questions From Honorable Charles W. Dent of Pennsylvania for
Clark Kent Ervin............................................... 66
Questions From Honorable Charles W. Dent of Pennsylvania for
David L. Wright................................................ 66
Questions From Honorable Charles W. Dent of Pennsylvania for
Stephen D. Amitay.............................................. 67
FEDERAL PROTECTIVE SERVICE: WOULD FEDERALIZATION OF GUARDS IMPROVE
SECURITY AT CRITICAL FACILITIES?
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Wednesday, April 14, 2010
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:02 a.m., in Room
311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Bennie G. Thompson
[Chairman of the committee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Thompson, Harman, Jackson Lee,
Cuellar, Richardson, Kirkpatrick, Pascrell, Green, Himes, King,
Smith, Lungren, Dent, Cao, and Austria.
Chairman Thompson [presiding]. The Committee on Homeland
Security will come to order. The committee is meeting today to
receive testimony on ``Federal Protective Service: Would
Federalization of Guards Improve Security at Critical
Facilities?''
Since 2007, this committee has held three hearings on the
Federal Protective Service. This small agency is a prime
example of the kind of changes this Nation has undergone in the
last 10 years. Once primarily concerned about protecting
Federal buildings from theft, vandalism, and other minor
crimes, the mission of FPS changed significantly after
September 11.
This small agency of 1,200 employees must protect Federal
employees stationed in 9,000 Federal buildings and countless
members of the public seeking information or assistance. Their
vigilance must match our vulnerability. They carry out this
task every day, but they cannot do it alone.
These 1,200 FPS employees are supplemented by 15,000
security guards who are paid by private firms under contract
with the Government. Every year, the costs of these contracts
increase by 20 percent. For most people, the contract guards
are the face of the Federal Protective Service. Unfortunately,
the face has some disturbing features.
In 3 years, this committee's oversight has uncovered FPS'
failure to pay its contractors; security firms hired by FPS who
fail to pay their guards; FPS' failure to require current and
appropriate credentials for guards; FPS' and the security
companies' failure to properly train guards; and FPS' inability
to mandate that Federal tenants comply with security upgrades.
These problems have led to security vulnerabilities that
allowed GAO testers to enter Federal buildings guarded by
contract guards with knives and guns.
To be fair, FPS has tried to respond to each problem
uncovered, and each challenge revealed by the GAO, inspector
general, or this committee. DHS has put forward a transition
plan to help resolve some of FPS' problem. But this cascade of
issues pushes us to ask whether additional piecemeal patches
will be sufficient. The solution to these problems will require
resources, planning, and commitment.
In July 2009, the Office of Management and Budget directed
each agency to consider the use of Federal employees in
positions held by contractors. The Homeland Security Department
identified about 3,200 contractor jobs that will be converted
to Federal positions.
Despite numerous reports of security vulnerabilities, and
the likelihood that Federal facilities may present attractive
targets, none of the 15,000 positions held by FPS contract
guards were considered for in-sourcing. Increased threats on
Federal employees and recent attacks on Federal buildings
demonstrate that safety in Federal facilities can no longer be
taken for granted.
The Chair now yields to the Ranking Member of the full
committee, the gentleman from New York, Mr. King, for an
opening statement.
Mr. King. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I welcome our witnesses, and I look forward to the hearing,
because this hearing will provide another opportunity to
discuss the challenges facing the Federal Protective Service,
and various ways to address and to improve the security at
Federal facilities.
The focus of the hearing is whether or not to Federalize
the contract-guard force. Arguments have been made on both
sides--persuasive arguments on both sides. I look forward to
hearing from the witnesses to get their views on the issue,
especially regarding the costs associated with the proposal,
and what empirical studies, if any, have been conducted in this
area.
Now, the Federal Protective Service is a vital component
within the Department of Homeland Security, and has a critical
mission. The constant threat of terrorism, along with the
recent violent acts at Federal buildings underscores the need
to improve the security of these facilities, and the safety of
the employees that work in them. You know, as we know, the GAO
has identified a number of security lapses within the Federal
Protective Service. I look forward to hearing from the
witnesses today about the agency's ability to protect the
Federal buildings, to effectively oversee the contract guards,
and to provide sufficient training to the guards; and to see
what steps can be taken--if it involves Federalization--to
address the security lapses.
I know that one of our colleagues, Congressman Dent, from
Pennsylvania, is drafting legislation to address deficiencies
identified by the GAO. I look forward to working with
Congressman Dent on this bill.
Also, I would like to bring up the issue of the possible 9/
11 Guantanamo trials.
Mr. Schenkel, when you testified at a previous hearing, you
said that the FPS, ``lacked the sufficient resources to secure
the Federal buildings that will be related to the trials in
lower Manhattan''--that there were not sufficient Federal
Protective Service employees for that trial. Yet, despite that
testimony, President Obama's fiscal 2011 budget for DHS
requested no additional resources for the Federal Protective
Service.
Now, I am opposed to this administration trying the
terrorists in civilian courts, certainly in New York. Having
said that, if the trial should go forward, it is absolutely
essential we have the security that is needed. I urge this
administration to reconsider funding, as far as Federal
Protective Service--as far as what needs to be done. Because,
right now, it just does not appear either the State, local, or
the Federal level has enough security in lower Manhattan for
these trials.
So, with that--I look forward to your testimony.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you for holding the hearing. I yield
back the balance of my time.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
Other Members of the committee are reminded that under the
committee rules, opening statements may be submitted for the
record.
[The statement of Hon. Richardson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Honorable Laura Richardson
April 14, 2010
Mr. Chairman, thank you for convening this very important hearing
today examining the continuing challenges faced by the Federal
Protective Service. I appreciate your commitment to this vital issue. I
would also like to thank our witnesses for being here today.
The committee last examined the challenges facing the Federal
Protective Services back in November. The Federal Protective Service
(FPS) provides law enforcement and security services for almost 9,000
Federal facilities, 2 million people working and visiting in these
facilities, and countless millions in Federal assets. The sheer scope
of this kind of service means that we must do everything we can to
ensure that the FPS has the resources and organizational structure in
place to effectively do their job and keep our Federal buildings and
employees safe in the face of any threats to their security.
As the representative of the 37th Congressional District in
California, which is a target-rich area for terrorists due to its close
proximity to the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, I have a
particular interest in ensuring that this agency has the resources and
structure in place to not only adequately handle its duties but to
excel. Therefore, it is of particular import to me that the Federal
Protective Services is doing the best job it possibly can.
I am disappointed that Government audits, since 2006, have
repeatedly exposed oversight and performance problems in the contract
guard program. FPS is relying on almost entirely on contract guards,
about 15,000 in total, to provide security at Federal facilities.
Unfortunately, the findings of the Government Accountability Office
(GAO) indicate many serious problems with FPS oversight of these
guards.
For example, just recently a man flashed fake credentials and was
permitted to reach the outer office of Health and Human Services
Secretary Kathleen Sebelius. Security was breached because the guards
at the front accepted his credentials without question. Now, more than
ever, we need to make sure that the people in place to protect our
Federal buildings and employees are well-trained, certified, complying
with orders, and adequately performing their duties.
President Obama has stated that converting contractor positions to
Federal positions is a priority. This conversion will allow the
Government to provide better oversight, decrease costs, and ensure that
the Federal Government is a key player in security decision-making. I
would like to hear from Mr. Schenkel, Director of the FPS, as to the
specific plans and details of making this conversion from contract
guards to Federal employees.
I look forward to hearing the ideas and recommendations from the
rest of our distinguished panel of witnesses on improving the Federal
Protective Service to further secure our Nation against threats.
Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for convening this hearing. I yield
back my time.
Chairman Thompson. We will have two panels of witnesses
today.
I welcome our first panel of witnesses.
Our first witness, Mr. Gary Schenkel, was appointed
director of the Federal Protective Service in March 2007. Prior
to joining FPS, he served as assistant Federal security
director for TSA at Chicago-Midway Airport.
Our second witness on the panel is Mr. Mark Goldstein, the
director of physical infrastructure issues at the United States
Government Accountability Office. Mr. Goldstein is
responsibility for GAO's work in the areas of Government
facilities and telecommunications.
Our final witness to this panel is Mr. Clark Kent Ervin,
director of the Aspen Institute's Homeland Security Program.
Before joining the institute, Mr. Ervin served as a first
inspector general of the United States Department of Homeland
Security.
We welcome all of our witnesses here today. We look forward
to your testimony.
Without objection, the witnesses' full statement will be
inserted in the record.
I now recognize Mr. Schenkel to summarize his statement for
5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF GARY W. SCHENKEL, DIRECTOR, FEDERAL PROTECTIVE
SERVICE, NATIONAL PROTECTION AND PROGRAMS DIRECTORATE,
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Schenkel. Thank you, Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member
King, and other distinguished Members of the committee. I am
pleased to appear before you today to discuss the work of the
Federal Protective Service.
As always, the Federal Protective Service shares the common
goal of this committee of protecting Federal facilities and the
proud men and women serving the country and the Federal
Government, as well as the half a million visitors that visit
our buildings every day.
The Department of Homeland Security has been working with--
has been working to transform the Federal Protective Service
from eleven regional organizations into one with its own
operational and business practices, all into a single agency;
and to improve the professionalism and performance of the
Federal Protective Service and the contract workforce. That
process has not been without its challenges. Nobody knows the
hurdles that remain better than the men and women of the
Federal Protective Service.
We have, however, been making considerable progress in the
process and procedures to address GAO's recommendations and
Congressional concerns by enhancing the ability of the FPS to
proactively identify and address performance issues.
As your staff has seen in person, FPS now systematically
measures the effectiveness of all FPS countermeasures through
programs such as Operation Shield, which involves unannounced
inspections to measure the effectiveness of contract guards in
detecting the presence of unauthorized persons, potentially
disruptive or dangerous activities in and around Federal
facilities; and the ability of the guards to prevent the
introduction of prohibited items or harmful substances into
facilities.
In addition, FPS is now conducting covert tests; increasing
the frequency of post inspections; implementing a National
standard for post inspections; and requiring additional
training in magnetometer and X-ray screening.
FPS has also developed a risk-assessment-management program
known as RAMP, a web-based system that calculates facility
risk; a computer-aided dispatch-information system, called
CADIS. That will standardize our--that will standardize our
reporting procedures, consolidate crime-and-incident reporting,
and timestamp our operations; as well as the post-tracking
system that will strengthen the accuracy of post staffing and
billing, and will reduce the administrative burden on our
inspectors.
What these examples demonstrate is that instead of
executing cosmetic or knee-jerk patches, we are in the process
of building permanent solutions that, once fully implemented,
are designed to yield the results that Congress, GAO, and the
Department want in the Federal Protective Service.
In addition, we have not ruled out the possibility of
expanding our Federal workforce, or Federalizing or partially
Federalizing the contract-security-guard workforce. We expect
to complete the bottom-up staffing review currently underway,
in time to inform the fiscal year 2012 budget request. In the
interim, the Department remains committed to ensuring the
organization is appropriately staffed, as evidenced by the
2009, 2010, and 2011 budget requests, which were all equal to,
or exceeding the 1,200 full-time-equivalent staffing level
directed by Congress.
I look forward to a healthy dialogue on how these efforts
can and will provide the foundation FPS needs to start a new
chapter in its history. I want to thank you for holding this
important hearing, and for your continued support of our
mission.
[The statement of Mr. Schenkel follows:]
Prepared Statement of Gary W. Schenkel
April 14, 2010
Thank you Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member King, and other
distinguished Members of the committee. My name is Gary Schenkel, and I
am the Director of the Federal Protective Service (FPS), which is now
within the National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD). I am
pleased to appear before you today to discuss the actions that the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has undertaken to ensure the
safety and security of Federal Government buildings.
fps background
FPS is responsible for the security of more than 9,000 General
Services Administration (GSA)-owned and leased facilities. FPS' primary
tasks are to provide scheduled all-hazard, risk-based facility security
assessments; recommend countermeasures; and implement the
countermeasures approved by the Facility Security Committee
representing each of the 9,000 facilities. FPS offers comprehensive
physical security operations that include installing alarm systems, X-
rays, magnetometers, and entry control systems; monitoring installed
systems around the clock; providing uniformed police response and
investigative follow-up; providing Protective Security Officers (PSOs);
hosting crime prevention seminars tailored to individual agency and
employee needs; conducting facility security surveys; integrating
intelligence gathering and promoting information sharing; and
completing more than 35,000 background investigations annually.
FPS conducts nearly 2,500 Facility Security Assessments annually
and responds to approximately 1,400 demonstrations. In fiscal year
2009, FPS responded to 35,812 calls for service, including 1,242
protests and organized disturbances; made 1,646 arrests; conducted
1,115 criminal investigations; processed 272 weapons violations; and
prevented the introduction of 661,724 prohibited items into Federal
facilities.
This work is made possible by the more than 1,225 Federal law
enforcement and support staff personnel, including 689 Law Enforcement
Security Officers, who possess the authority and training to perform
traditional police functions in connection with the protection of
Federal facilities, including conducting Facility Security Assessments
and implementing and testing security measures. The more than 15,000
PSOs are well-trained individuals who complement the work of the
Federal personnel. PSOs are members of facility security forces and
have the training, equipment, and appropriate certifications to perform
a specific security function.
fps in transition
FPS was transferred from GSA to DHS in 2003. Since 2003, DHS has
been working to transform FPS from 11 different regional organizations,
each with its own business practices, into a single agency. To
establish a systematic, strategic, and professional approach, FPS
identified and shared best practices, developed standardized policies,
identified problems, and developed solutions in its financial,
administrative, and operational program areas. The transition also
required a new strategic approach to the FPS protective mission, and
the resulting FPS Strategic Plan focused on critical issues within the
protective mission, including developing a sound strategic path forward
focused on ensuring that facilities are secure and occupants are safe.
Further, the transfer of FPS from U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) to NPPD requested in the President's fiscal year 2010
budget provided DHS with a single component responsible for the
comprehensive infrastructure security program. The integration of FPS
into NPPD enhanced DHS' overarching strategy and mission to lead the
unified effort to improve our Nation's security.
FPS has taken a number of steps to improve the professionalism and
performance of its Federal and contract workforce. For example, FPS
systematically measures the effectiveness of all FPS countermeasures.
One of our most effective measurement programs is Operation Shield, in
which FPS conducts unannounced inspections to measure the effectiveness
of contract guards in detecting the presence of unauthorized persons;
potentially disruptive or dangerous activities in or around Federal
facilities; and the guards' ability to prevent the introduction of
prohibited items or harmful substances into facilities. Operation
Shield also serves as a visible, proactive, and random measure that may
be used as a deterrent to disrupt the planning of terrorist activities.
Though FPS has robust security activities in place, FPS is focused
on continual improvement. FPS has addressed the 2009 GAO report
regarding contract guard oversight and lapses in screening procedures
by determining the root causes of the lapses and taking the following
measures to prevent recurrence:
Increasing the frequency of post inspections of PSOs;
Requiring additional training in magnetometer and X-ray
screening including a contract modification requiring 100
percent contractor use of FPS-produced training that addresses
screening for improvised explosive devices;
Ensuring that all PSOs are contractually compliant with
certifications and qualifications, by incorporating the
certification system into the Risk Assessment Management
Program (RAMP); and
Developing and initiating a 16-hour magnetometer X-ray
training program, provided to PSOs by FPS Inspectors, titled
National Weapons Detection Program, which began in January
2010.
testing and improving facility security
As a result of a Covert Testing Working Group, FPS developed a
Covert Testing Program, which enhanced and complemented the on-going
overt efforts to improve oversight and promote the attentiveness and
professionalism of the PSO. This program further achieves FPS strategic
goals to effectively and efficiently ensure secure facilities and safe
occupants. While the Covert Testing Program is a discreet investigative
operation used to assess and validate the effectiveness of security
countermeasures, Operation Shield is highly visible measure.
FPS takes an all-hazards approach to the Facility Security
Assessment, which is at the core of the agency's mission requirement.
FPS' new RAMP is a web-based system that calculates risks--including
terrorist, criminal, geologic, or meteorological--into an equation that
is then measured against countermeasures to mitigate those risks. The
Computer Aided Dispatch and Information System will standardize
reporting procedures, consolidate crime and incident reporting, and
time-stamp our operations, thus providing accurate data to support
future staffing models. The Post Tracking System will strengthen the
accuracy of post staffing and billing and will further reduce the
administrative burden on our Inspectors, allowing them more time for
conducting building security assessments, active patrol, and guard
oversight.
The activities I have highlighted have helped accomplish the goal
of improving the FPS workforce and the ability of that workforce to
fulfill the FPS mission. As a testament to our progress, we have closed
or recommended for closure nearly half of the recommendations made by
the GAO.
federal-contract guard mix
We believe that we can effectively secure Federal buildings with
the current mix of Federal staff and highly trained contract guards.
However, as the Department implements the full FPS transition to NPPD
from ICE, NPPD leadership is completing a bottom-up review of FPS that
includes consideration of Federalizing or partially Federalizing the
contract security guard workforce. The study looks at several
operational alternatives including the conversion options regarding the
15,000 contract guards to Federal positions. We expect to complete this
study for inclusion in the fiscal year 2012 budget.
While we believe we can effectively secure Federal buildings with
the current mix of highly trained Federal staff and contract guards, we
have not ruled out the possibility of expanding our Federal workforce
to enhance the ability of our men and women to fulfill the FPS mission.
DHS is currently studying staffing levels to ensure that FPS has the
appropriate level of staffing in the right locations to fulfill its
mission. The Department took immediate action following the
introduction of minimum staffing levels in the Fiscal Year 2008
Consolidated Appropriation Act, and the FPS budget requests in fiscal
year 2009, fiscal year 2010, and fiscal year 2011 were all equal to or
exceeded the 1,200 full-time equivalent staffing level directed by
Congress, demonstrating the Department's commitment to ensuring the
organization is appropriately staffed.
conclusion
The Department will continue to work with public and private
homeland security partners to ensure that Federal facilities are safe
and secure.
Thank you for holding this important hearing. I would be happy to
respond to any questions you may have.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you for your testimony.
I now recognize Mr. Goldstein to summarize his statement
for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF MARK L. GOLDSTEIN, DIRECTOR, PHYSICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE ISSUES, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Goldstein. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Members of the
committee. Good morning. Thank you for the opportunity to
testify about GAO's work on the Federal Protective Service and
the protection of Government facilities.
Over the past several years, GAO has produced a body of
work reviewing the challenges faced by FPS and the Department
of Homeland Security. We have discussed our work before this
committee. To accomplish its mission of protecting about 9,000
Federal facilities, FPS currently has a budget of about $1
billion, about 1,225 full-time employees, and about 15,000
contract security guards. FPS obligated $650 million for guard
services in fiscal year 2009.
This testimony is based on our report issued yesterday,
April 13, 2010, and discusses challenges FPS continues to face
in, No. 1, managing its guard contractors; No. 2, overseeing
guards deployed at Federal facilities; and, No. 3, the actions
FPS has taken to address these challenges.
We have provided preliminary findings on some of these
issues at hearings during the last 8 months. The report issued
yesterday finalizes our report on these issues.
Our major findings are as follows: First, FPS continues to
face a number of challenges in managing its guard contractors
that hamper its ability to protect Federal facilities. FPS
requires contractors to provide guards who have met training
and certification requirements. FPS' guard contract also states
that a contractor who does not comply with the contract is
subject to enforcement action.
GAO reviewed the official contract files for the seven
contractors who, as we testified in July 2009, had guards
performing on contracts with expired certification and training
requirements, to determine what action, if any, FPS had taken
against these contractors for contract noncompliance. These
contractors had been awarded several multiyear contracts
totaling $406 million to provide guards at Federal facilities
in 13 States and Washington, DC.
FPS did not take any enforcement action against these seven
contractors for noncompliance. In fact, FPS exercised the
option to extend their contracts. FPS also did not comply with
its requirement that a performance evaluation of each
contractor be completed annually, and that these evaluations
and other performance-related data be included in the contract
file.
Second, FPS also faces challenges in ensuring that many of
the 15,000 guards have the required training and certification
to be deployed at Federal facilities. In July 2009, we reported
that, since 2004, FPS had not provided X-ray and magnetometer
training to about 1,500 guards in one region. As of January
2010, these guards had still not received training, and
continued to work at Federal facilities in this region. X-ray
and magnetometer training is important because guards control
access points at Federal facilities.
FPS currently does not have a fully reliable system for
monitoring and verifying whether its 15,000 guards have the
certifications and training to stand post at Federal facility.
As Mr. Schenkel has indicated, FPS developed a new risk-
assessment-and-program-management system to help monitor and
track guard certifications and training; however, FPS has
experienced some difficulties with their system--until just a
few days ago, temporarily suspending its use.
In addition, once guards are deployed to a Federal
facility, they are not always complying with assigned
responsibilities. Since July 2009, FPS has conducted a number
of penetration tests, 53 of which were in the six regions we
visited. In nearly two-thirds of those tests, some guards were
not able to identify prohibited items such as guns and knives.
Third, in response to GAO's July 2009 testimony, FPS has
taken a number of actions that, once fully implemented, could
help address challenges it faces in managing its contract-guard
program. For example, FPS has increased the number of guard
inspections at Federal facilities in some metropolitan areas.
FPS has also revised its X-ray-and-magnetometer training;
however, guards will not be fully trained until the end of
2010, although they are deployed at Federal facilities today.
Despite FPS' recent actions, it continues to face
challenges ensuring that a $659 million guard program is
effective in protecting Federal facilities. Thus, GAO believes
that, among other things, FPS needs to reassess how it protects
the Federal facilities it protects, and rigorously enforce the
terms of the contracts.
In GAO's report related to this testimony, we recommended,
among other things, that FPS identify other approaches that
would be cost-beneficial--protecting to the facilities. The
Department of Homeland Security concurred with seven of GAO's
eight recommendations. DHS did not fully concur with our
recommendation to issue a standardized record-keeping format to
ensure contract files have the required documentation.
This completes my testimony, Mr. Chairman. I would be happy
to answer any questions that you and the Members have. Thank
you.
[The statement of Mr. Goldstein follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mark L. Goldstein
April 14, 2010
gao-10-614t
Mr. Chairman and Members of the committee: We are pleased to be
here to discuss the results of our report on the Federal Protective
Service's (FPS) contract guard program, issued April 13, 2010.\1\ As
you are aware, FPS--within the National Protection and Programs
Directorate (NPPD) of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)--is
responsible for protecting the buildings, grounds, and property that
are under the control and custody of the General Services
Administration (GSA), as well as the persons on the property;
authorized to enforce Federal laws and regulations aimed at protecting
GSA buildings and persons on the property; and authorized to
investigate offenses against these buildings and persons.\2\ To
accomplish its mission of protecting Federal facilities, FPS currently
has a budget of about $1 billion,\3\ about 1,225 full-time employees,
and about 15,000 contract security guards (guards) deployed at about
2,360 Federal facilities across the country.\4\ In fiscal year 2009,
FPS obligated $659 million for guard services, which represents the
single largest item in its budget.
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\1\ GAO, Homeland Security: Federal Protective Service's Contract
Guard Program Requires More Oversight and Reassessment of Use of
Contract Guards, GAO-10-341 (Washington, DC: April 13, 2010).
\2\ 40 U.S.C. 1315.
\3\ Funding for FPS is provided through revenues and collections
charged to building tenants of properties protected by FPS. The
revenues and collections are credited to FPS's appropriation and are
available until expended for the protection of Federally-owned and -
leased buildings and for FPS operations.
\4\ While FPS does not use guards at the remaining 6,700 facilities
under its protection, it uses other security countermeasures such as
cameras and perimeter lighting to help protect these facilities.
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FPS's contract guard program is the most visible component of its
operations as well as the first public contact for individuals entering
a Federal facility. FPS relies heavily on its guards and considers them
to be the agency's ``eyes and ears'' while performing their duties.
Guards are primarily responsible for controlling access to Federal
facilities by: (1) Checking the identification of Government employees
as well as members of the public who work in and visit Federal
facilities, and (2) operating security equipment, such as X-ray
machines and magnetometers to screen for prohibited materials, such as
firearms, knives, explosives, or items intended to be used to fabricate
an explosive or incendiary device.\5\ Guards do not have arrest
authority but can detain individuals who are being disruptive or pose a
danger to public safety.
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\5\ Title 41 CFR Sections 102-74.435 and 102-74-440 identify and
list items that are prohibited by law from being introduced into a
Federal facility except for law enforcement purposes and other limited
circumstances. Those items are explosives, firearms, or other dangerous
weapons. In addition, Facility Security Committees, which are composed
of representatives of tenant agencies at Federal facilities, have broad
latitude in determining items in addition to those specifically
prohibited by statute that can be prohibited in their facilities.
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This testimony, based on our report, discusses challenges FPS
continues to face in: (1) Managing its guard contractors, (2)
overseeing guards deployed at Federal facilities, and (3) actions FPS
has taken to address these challenges. Our methodology included site
visits to 6 of FPS's 11 regions. To select these 6 regions, we
considered the number of FPS guards, contractors, and Federal
facilities, and the geographic dispersion of the regions across the
United States. At each region, we observed FPS's guard inspection
process and interviewed FPS's regional manager, contract guard program
managers, inspectors who are responsible for conducting guard
inspections; guards, and contractors. We also randomly selected 663 out
of approximately 15,000 guard training records that were maintained in
FPS's Contract Guard Employment Requirements Tracking System (CERTS)
and/or by the guard contractor and validated them against the
contractual requirements that were in effect at the time of our review.
We also reviewed the contract files for 7 of FPS's 38 guard
contractors. We selected these 7 contractors because our previous work
showed that they had contract compliance issues. In addition, we
analyzed a random sample of 99 FPS contractor evaluations to determine
how FPS evaluated the performance of its contractors on an annual
basis.
We also reviewed new contract guard program guidance issued since
our July 2009 testimony and observed guard inspections and covert
testing done by FPS in August and November 2009.\6\ Because of the
sensitivity of some of the information in our report, we cannot provide
information about the specific locations of the incidents discussed. We
conducted this performance audit from July 2008 to February 2010 in
accordance with generally accepted Government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
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\6\ GAO, Homeland Security: Preliminary Results Show Federal
Protective Service's Ability to Protect Federal Facilities is Hampered
by Weaknesses in Its Contract Security Guard Program, GAO-09-859T
(Washington, DC: July 8, 2009).
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fps faces challenges managing its guard contractors that hamper its
ability to protect federal facilities
Some FPS Guard Contractors Did Not Always Comply with the Terms of
Contracts and FPS Has Not Taken Actions Against Them
FPS has not taken actions against some guard contractors that did
not comply with the terms of the contracts. According to FPS guard
contracts, a contractor has not complied with the terms of the contract
if the contractor has a guard working without valid certifications or
background suitability investigations, falsifies a guard's training
records, does not have a guard at a post, or has an unarmed guard
working at a post at which the guard should be armed. If FPS determines
that a contractor does not comply with these contract requirements, it
can--among other things--assess a financial deduction for nonperformed
work, elect not to exercise a contract option, or terminate the
contract for default or cause.
We reviewed the official contract files for the 7 contractors who,
as we testified in July 2009, had guards performing on contracts with
expired certification and training requirements to determine what
action, if any, FPS had taken against these contractors for contract
noncompliance. The 7 contractors we reviewed had been awarded several
multiyear contracts totaling $406 million to provide guards at Federal
facilities in 13 States and Washington, DC.
According to the documentation in the contract files, FPS did not
take any enforcement action against the 7 contractors for not complying
with the terms of the contract, a finding consistent with DHS's
Inspector General's 2009 report.\7\ In fact, FPS exercised the option
to extend the contracts of these 7 contractors. FPS contracting
officials told us that the contracting officer who is responsible for
enforcing the terms of the contract considers the appropriate course of
action among the available contractual remedies on a case-by-case
basis. For example, the decision of whether to assess financial
deductions is a subjective assessment in which the contracting officer
and the contracting officer technical representative (COTR) take into
account the value of the nonperformance and the seriousness of the
deficiency, according to FPS contracting officials.
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\7\ The Inspector General found that FPS does not always take
deductions against a contractor for services that are not provided in
accordance with contract requirements. Department of Homeland Security,
Office of Inspector General, Federal Protective Service Contract Guard
Procurement and Oversight Process, OIG-09-51 (Washington, DC: April 6,
2009).
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FPS Did Not Always Comply with Its Procedures for Completing Annual
Performance Evaluations of Its Guard Contractors
FPS requires an annual performance evaluation of each contractor
and at the conclusion of contracts exceeding $100,000, and requires
that these evaluations and other performance-related documentation be
included in the contract file. Contractor performance evaluations are
one of the most important tools available for ensuring compliance with
contract terms. Moreover, given that other Federal agencies rely on
many of the same contractors to provide security services, completing
accurate evaluations of a contractor's past performance is critical.
However, we found that FPS's contracting officers and COTRs did not
always evaluate contractors' performance as required, and some
evaluations were incomplete and not consistent with contractors'
performance.
We reviewed a random sample of 99 contract performance evaluations
from calendar year 2006 through June 2009. These evaluations were for
38 contractors. Eighty-two of the 99 contract performance evaluations
showed that FPS assessed the quality of services provided by the
majority of its guard contractors as satisfactory, very good, or
exceptional. For the remaining 17 evaluations, 11 showed that the
contractor's performance was marginal, 1 as unsatisfactory, and
assessments for 5 contractors were not complete. According to
applicable guidance, a contractor must meet contractual requirements to
obtain a satisfactory evaluation and a contractor should receive an
unsatisfactory evaluation if its performance does not meet most
contract requirements and recovery in a timely manner is not likely.\8\
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\8\ As part of DHS, FPS is required to use the Department of
Defense Contractor Performance Assessment System (CPARS) to officially
document its performance evaluations. CPARS requires the use of an
adjectival rating scale by evaluators that includes ratings of
exceptional, very good, satisfactory, marginal, and unsatisfactory.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nevertheless, we found instances where some contractors received a
satisfactory or better rating although they had not met some of the
terms of the contract. For example, contractors receiving satisfactory
or better ratings included the 7 contractors discussed above that had
guards with expired certification and training records working at
Federal facilities. In addition, some performance evaluations that we
reviewed did not include a justification for the rating and there was
no other supporting documentation in the official contract file to
explain the rating. Moreover, there was no information in the contract
file that indicated that the COTR had communicated any performance
problems to the contracting officer.
fps continues to face challenges with overseeing guards that raise
concern about protection of federal facilities
FPS Is Not Providing All Guards with X-ray and Magnetometer Training in
Some Regions
As of February 2010, FPS had yet to provide some of its guards with
all of the required X-ray or magnetometer training. For example, we
reported in July 2009 that in one region, FPS has not provided the
required X-ray or magnetometer training to 1,500 guards since 2004. FPS
officials subsequently told us that the contract for this region
requires that only guards who are assigned to work on posts that
contain screening equipment are required to have 8 hours of X-ray and
magnetometer training. However, in response to our July 2009 testimony,
FPS now requires all guards to receive 16 hours of X-ray and
magnetometer training. As of February 2010, these 1,500 guards had not
received the 16 hours of training but continued to work at Federal
facilities in this region. FPS plans to provide X-ray and magnetometer
training to all guards by December 2010. X-ray and magnetometer
training is important because the majority of the guards are primarily
responsible for using this equipment to monitor and control access
points at Federal facilities. Controlling access to a facility helps
ensure that only authorized personnel, vehicles, and materials are
allowed to enter, move within, and leave the facility.
FPS Lacks Assurance That Its Guards Have Required Certifications and
Training
FPS currently does not have a fully reliable system for monitoring
and verifying whether its 15,000 guards have the certifications and
training to stand post at Federal facilities. FPS is developing a new
system--Risk Assessment and Management Program (RAMP)--to help it
monitor and verify the status of guard certifications and training.
However, in our July 2009 report, we raised concerns about the accuracy
and reliability of the information that will be entered into RAMP.
Since that time, FPS has taken steps to review and update all guard
training and certification records. For example, FPS is conducting an
internal audit of its CERTS database. However, as of February 2010, the
results of that audit showed that FPS was able to verify that about
8,600 of its 15,000 guards met the training and certification
requirements. FPS is experiencing difficulty verifying the status of
the remaining 6,400 guards. FPS has also received about 1,500
complaints from inspectors regarding a number of problems with RAMP.
For example, some inspectors said it was difficult and sometimes
impossible to find guard information in RAMP and to download guard
inspection reports. Thus they were completing the inspections manually.
Other inspectors have said it takes almost 2 hours to log on to RAMP.
Consequently, on March 18, 2010, FPS suspended the use of RAMP until it
resolves these issues. FPS is currently working on resolving issues
with RAMP.
FPS Continues to Have Limited Assurance That Guards Are Complying with
Post Orders once They Are Deployed to Federal Facilities
Once guards are deployed to a Federal facility, guards are not
always complying with assigned responsibilities (post orders). As we
testified in July 2009, we identified substantial security
vulnerabilities related to FPS's guard program.\9\ FPS also continues
to find instances where guards are not complying with post orders. For
example, 2 days after our July 2009 hearing, a guard fired his firearm
in a restroom in a level IV facility while practicing drawing his
weapon. In addition, FPS's own penetration testing--similar to the
covert testing we conducted in May 2009--showed that guards continued
to experience problems with complying with post orders. Since July
2009, FPS conducted 53 similar penetration tests at Federal facilities
in the 6 regions we visited, and in over 66 percent of these tests,
guards allowed prohibited items into Federal facilities. We accompanied
FPS on two penetration tests in August and November 2009, and guards at
these level IV facilities failed to identify a fake bomb, gun, and
knife during X-ray and magnetometer screening at access control points.
During the first test we observed in August 2009, FPS agents placed a
bag containing a fake gun and knife on the X-ray machine belt. The
guard failed to identify the gun and knife on the X-ray screen, and the
undercover FPS official was able to retrieve his bag and proceed to the
check-in desk without incident. During a second test, a knife was
hidden on an FPS officer. During the test, the magnetometer detected
the knife, as did the hand wand, but the guard failed to locate the
knife and the FPS officer was able to gain access to the facility.
According to the FPS officer, the guards who failed the test had not
been provided the required X-ray and magnetometer training. Upon
further investigation, only 2 of the 11 guards at the facility had the
required X-ray and magnetometer training. In response to the results of
this test, FPS debriefed the contractor and moved one of the guard
posts to improve access control.
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\9\ As we testified in July 2009, each time they tried, our
investigators successfully passed undetected through security
checkpoints monitored by FPS guards with the components for an
improvised explosive device (IED) concealed on their persons at 10
level IV facilities in four cities in major metropolitan areas. We
planned additional tests but suspended them after achieving 100 percent
test results, which highlighted the vulnerabilities Federal facilities
face. A level IV facility has over 450 employees and a high volume of
public contact.
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In November 2009, we accompanied FPS on another test of security
countermeasures at a different level IV facility. As in the previous
test, an FPS agent placed a bag containing a fake bomb on the X-ray
machine belt. The guard operating the X-ray machine did not identify
the fake bomb and the inspector was allowed to enter the facility with
it. In a second test, an FPS inspector placed a bag containing a fake
gun on the X-ray belt. The guard identified the gun and the FPS
inspector was detained. However, the FPS inspector was told to stand in
a corner and was not handcuffed or searched as required. In addition,
while all the guards were focusing on the individual with the fake gun,
a second FPS inspector walked through the security checkpoint with two
knives without being screened. In response to the results of this test,
FPS suspended 2 guards and provided additional training to 2 guards.
recent actions taken by fps may help improve oversight of the contract
guard program
In response to our July 2009 testimony, FPS has taken a number of
actions that, once fully implemented, could help address the challenges
the agency faces in managing its contract guard program. For example,
FPS:
Increased guard inspections at facilities in some
metropolitan areas. FPS has increased the number of guard
inspections to two a week at Federal facilities in some
metropolitan areas.\10\ Prior to this new requirement, FPS did
not have a National requirement for guard inspections, and each
region we visited had requirements that ranged from no
inspection requirements to each inspector having to conduct
five inspections per month.
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\10\ GAO-09-859T.
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Increased X-ray and magnetometer training requirements for
inspectors and guards. FPS has increased its X-ray and
magnetometer training for inspectors and guards from 8 hours to
16 hours. In July 2009, FPS also required each guard to watch a
Government-provided digital video disc (DVD) on bomb component
detection by August 20, 2009. According to FPS, as of January
2010, approximately 78 percent, or 11,711 of the 15,000 guards
had been certified as having watched the DVD.
Implementing a new system to monitor guard training and
certifications. As mentioned earlier, FPS is also implementing
RAMP. According to FPS, RAMP will provide it with the
capability to monitor and track guard training and
certifications and enhance its ability to conduct and track
guard inspections. RAMP is also designed to be a central
database for capturing and managing facility security
information, including the risks posed to Federal facilities
and the countermeasures that are in place to mitigate risk. It
is also expected to enable FPS to manage guard certifications
and to conduct and track guard inspections electronically as
opposed to manually. However, as mentioned earlier, as of March
18, 2010, FPS suspended the use of RAMP until it can resolve
existing issues.
Despite FPS's recent actions, it continues to face challenges in
ensuring that its $659 million guard program is effective in protecting
Federal facilities. While the changes FPS has made to its X-ray and
magnetometer training will help to address some of the problems we
found, there are some weaknesses in the guard training. For example,
many of the 15,000 guards will not be fully trained until the end of
2010. In addition, one contractor told us that one of the weaknesses
associated with FPS's guard training program is that it focuses
primarily on prevention and detection but does not adequately address
challenge and response.\11\ This contractor has developed specific
scenario training and provides its guards on other contracts with an
additional 12 hours of training on scenario-based examples, such as how
to control a suicide bomber or active shooter situation, evacuation,
and shelter in place. The contractor, who has multiple contracts with
Government agencies, does not provide this scenario-based training to
its guards on FPS contracts because FPS does not require it. We also
found that some guards were still not provided building-specific
training, such as what actions to take during a building evacuation or
a building emergency. According to guards we spoke to in one region,
guards receive very little training on building emergency procedures
during basic training or the refresher training. These guards also said
that the only time they receive building emergency training is once
they are on post. Consequently, some guards do not know how to operate
basic building equipment, such as the locks or the building ventilation
system, which is important in a building evacuation or building
emergency.
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\11\ Challenge and response refers to being proactive instead of
reactive to an incident.
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FPS's decision to increase guard inspections at Federal facilities
in metropolitan areas is a step in the right direction. However, it
does not address issues with guard inspections at Federal facilities
outside metropolitan areas, which are equally vulnerable. Thus, without
routine inspections of guards at these facilities, FPS has no assurance
that guards are complying with their post orders.
We believe that FPS continues to struggle with managing its
contract guard program in part because, although it has used guards to
supplement the agency's workforce since the 1995 bombing of the Alfred
P. Murrah Federal Building, it has not undertaken a comprehensive
review of its use of guards to protect Federal facilities to determine
whether other options and approaches would be more cost-beneficial. FPS
also has not acted diligently in ensuring that its guard contractors
meet the terms of the contract and taking enforcement action when
noncompliance occurs. We also believe that completing the required
contract performance evaluations for its contractors and maintaining
contract files will put FPS in a better position to determine whether
it should continue to exercise contract options with some contractors.
Moreover, maintaining accurate and reliable data on whether the 15,000
guards deployed at Federal facilities have met the training and
certification requirements is important for a number of reasons. First,
without accurate and reliable data, FPS cannot consistently ensure
compliance with contract requirements and lacks information critical
for effective oversight of its guard program. Second, given that other
Federal agencies rely on many of the same contractors to provide
security services, completing accurate evaluations of a contractor's
past performance is critical to future contract awards.
Thus, in our report we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland
Security direct the under secretary of NPPD and the director of FPS to
take the following eight actions:
Identify other approaches and options that would be most
beneficial and financially feasible for protecting Federal
buildings;
Rigorously and consistently monitor guard contractors' and
guards' performance and step up enforcement against contractors
that are not complying with the terms of the contract;
Complete all contract performance evaluations in accordance
with FPS and Federal Acquisition Regulation requirements;
Issue a standardized record-keeping format to ensure that
contract files have required documentation;
Develop a mechanism to routinely monitor guards at Federal
facilities outside metropolitan areas;
Provide building-specific and scenario-based training and
guidance to its contract guards;
Develop and implement a management tool for ensuring that
reliable, comprehensive data on the contract guard program are
available on a real-time basis; and
Verify the accuracy of all guard certification and training
data before entering them into RAMP, and periodically test the
accuracy and reliability of RAMP data to ensure that FPS
management has the information needed to effectively oversee
its guard program.
DHS concurred with seven of our eight recommendations. Regarding
our recommendation to issue a standardized record-keeping format to
ensure that contract files have required documentation, DHS concurred
that contract files must have required documentation but did not concur
that a new record-keeping format should be issued. DHS commented that
written procedures already exist and are required for use by all DHS's
Office of Procurement Operations staff and the components it serves,
including NPPD. We believe that the policies referenced by DHS are a
step in the right direction in ensuring that contract files have
required documentation; however, although these policies exist, we
found a lack of standardization and consistency in the contract files
we reviewed among the three Consolidated Contract Groups.
Overall, we are also concerned about some of the steps FPS plans to
take to address our recommendations. For example, FPS commented that to
provide routine oversight of guards in remote regions it will use an
employee of a tenant agency (referred to as an Agency Technical
Representative) who has authority to act as a representative of a COTR
for day-to-day monitoring of contract guards. However, several FPS
regional officials told us that the Agency Technical Representatives
were not fully trained and did not have an understanding of the guards'
roles and responsibilities. These officials also said that the program
may not be appropriate for all Federal facilities. We believe that if
FPS plans to use Agency Tenant Representatives to oversee guards, it is
important that the agency ensure that the representatives are
knowledgeable of the guard's responsibilities and are trained on how
and when to conduct guard inspections as well as how to evacuate
facilities during an emergency. Furthermore, while we support FPS's
overall plans to better manage its contract guard program, we believe
it is also important for FPS to have appropriate performance metrics to
evaluate whether its planned actions are fully implemented and are
effective in addressing the challenges it faces managing its contract
guard program.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes our testimony. We are pleased to
answer any questions you might have.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you for your testimony.
I now recognize Mr. Ervin, to summarize his statement, for
5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF CLARK KENT ERVIN, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY
PROGRAM, THE ASPEN INSTITUTE
Mr. Ervin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. King, and Members,
for inviting me to testify today on this important topic.
Investigation after investigation and report after report,
year after year, have documented in detail FPS' apparent
inability to carry out its most critical mission--protecting
Federal buildings against the threat of terrorism in the post-
9/11 age. In my judgment, the time has come to take the
admittedly radical step of Federalization of the agency's
contract-guard force. There are at least two good reasons to
think that taking this step can make FPS more effective.
First, logic: It is inarguable that private contractors are
primarily motivated by the desire to make a profit, and as much
profit as possible. This is not a normative statement; it is a
factual one. The way to maximize profit is to minimize costs.
The less guards are paid in salary and benefits, and the less
money is invested in their training, the more profit their
contractor employees can make.
By way of contrast, the public's interest, needless to say,
is in maximizing security. Security is costly. While not a one-
to-one ratio, certainly, the better guards are paid and
trained, the better they are at providing security, because
they are more qualified and motivated to do so.
Second, experience: The reason we created TSA after 9/11
and Federalized the airport passenger-and-baggage-screener
workforce was the recognition that, left to their own devices
before the attacks, contractors put profit ahead of security.
For all the problems that remain with screeners today, they are
better trained, better motivated, and better paid than they
were before the terror attacks.
Now, that said, let me hasten to add that Federalization in
and of itself is no panacea. Likewise, both logic and
experience make the case. First, logic: If other factors are
equal, there is no good reason to think that merely exchanging
a public paycheck for a private one will improve guard
performance. Those relevant factors--salary and benefits,
including promotion opportunities, training, and the degree of
oversight exercised, and accountability obtained--matter
enormously.
Second, experience: As telegraphed above, and as we all
very well know, the Federalized TSA-screener workforce
continues to have its challenges, to put it charitably.
Recalling my own such reports during my time as DHS inspector
general at the inception of the Department, I continue to
despair every time I see another report that shows little to no
improvement in screeners' ability to spot concealed weapons.
That said, the conclusion to be drawn from TSA's continued
challenges, I would argue, is not that Federalizing the
screener workforce was a mistake. Instead, the conclusion to be
drawn is what I said a second ago--that Federalization in and
of itself is not a panacea. I believe that Federalized
screeners should receive even higher salaries and more
benefits; more promotion opportunities; more intensive
training; and more and better technology.
If this were to be done, in time, it would stand to reason
that results would measurably improve; furthermore, TSA
suffered greatly by the manner in which the screener workforce
was Federalized. Because of Congressional pressure in the wake
of 9/11 to do something quick, we didn't do Federalization
smart. By that, I mean the process was so rushed that some
60,000 screeners weren't properly vetted, much less trained.
So I would urge that Federalization, if done with regard to
FPS guards, be done deliberately, with due time for thorough
planning, vetting, and training. I note in my prepared
statement that a number of airport screeners were hired before
their background checks were complete, only to learn, after the
fact, that a number of them had been convicted of serious
crimes. Even after learning that, TSA, in some instances, took
months to dismiss those guards. So the ultimate size of the
guard force should, needless to say, be driven by security
concerns and not budgetary ones, which was not the case with
TSA.
In short, and to conclude, Federalization, if done right,
would not be cheap, quick, or easy. But with adequate
resources, planning, and deliberation, and due oversight, it
would likely result in making Federal workers safer at a time
when we know that terrorists are working overtime to exploit
security gaps. Thank you.
[The statement of Mr. Ervin follows:]
Prepared Statement of Clark Kent Ervin
april 14, 2010
Thank you, Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member King, and Members for
inviting me to testify today on this important topic, ``Federal
Protective Service: Would Federalization of Guards Improve Security at
Critical Facilities?''
Investigation after investigation, and report after report, year
after year, have documented in detail FPS' apparent inability to carry
out its most critical mission--protecting Federal buildings against the
threat of terrorism in the post-9/11 age. In my judgment, the time has
come to take the admittedly radical step of Federalizing the agency's
contract guard force. There are at least two good reasons to think that
taking this step can make FPS more effective.
First, logic. It is inarguable that private contractors are
primarily motivated by the desire to make a profit, and as much profit
as possible. This is not a normative statement; it is a factual one.
The way to maximize profit is to minimize costs. The less guards are
paid in salary and benefits and the less money is invested in their
training, the more profit their contractor-employers can make. By way
of contrast, the public's interest, needless to say, is in maximizing
security, and security is costly. While not a one-to-one ratio,
certainly, the better guards are paid and trained, the better they are
at providing security because they are more qualified and motivated to
do so.
Second, experience. The reason we created TSA after 9/11 and
Federalized the airport passenger and baggage screener workforce was
the recognition that, left to their own devices before the attacks,
contractors put profit ahead of security. For all the problems that
remain with screeners today, they are better paid, better trained, and
more motivated than they were before the terror attacks.
Now, that said, let me hasten to add that Federalization, in and of
itself, is no panacea. Likewise, both logic and experience make the
case.
First, logic. If other relevant factors are equal, there is no good
reason to think that merely exchanging a public paycheck for a private
one will improve guard performance. Those relevant factors--salary and
benefits (including promotion opportunities); training; and the degree
of oversight exercised and accountability obtained--matter enormously.
Second, experience. As telegraphed above, and as we all very well
know, the Federalized TSA screener workforce continues to have its
challenges, to put it charitably. Recalling my own such reports during
my time as DHS Inspector General at the inception of the Department and
the transition from a privatized screener workforce to a Federalized
one, I despair every time I see another DHS Inspector General, GAO, or
media report that shows little to no improvement in screeners' ability
to spot artfully concealed guns, knives, and explosives, and,
sometimes, even barely concealed ones.
That said, the conclusion to be drawn from TSA's continued
challenges, I would argue, is not that Federalizing the screener
workforce was a mistake. Instead, the conclusion to be drawn is what I
said a second ago--Federalization in and of itself is not a panacea. I
believe that Federalized screeners should receive even higher salaries
and benefits; more promotion opportunities; more intensive training
(including more frequent and more rigorous covert tests); and more and
better technology. The quality of their work should be rigorously
overseen by supervisors and managers, and those supervisors and
managers, and ultimately the employees themselves, should be held
strictly accountable for poor performance. If this were to be done, in
time, it would stand to reason that results would measurably improve.
Furthermore, TSA suffered greatly by the manner in which the
screener workforce was Federalized. Because of Congressional pressure
in the wake of 9/11 ``to do something quick,'' we didn't ``do
Federalization smart.'' By that I mean the process was done so
hurriedly that some 60,000 screeners weren't properly vetted, much less
trained. One of my earliest reports as DHS IG concerned the fact that
some screeners had been hired by TSA before their background checks
were complete, only to learn after the fact that they'd been convicted
of crimes, in some cases, serious ones. And, in some instances, it took
TSA some months even after learning of such instances to fire the
screeners.
So, I would urge that Federalization, if done with regard to FPS
guards, be done deliberately, with due time for thorough planning,
vetting and training. And, the ultimate size of the guard force should,
needless to say, be driven by security concerns, not budgetary ones.
In short, Federalization, if done right, would not be cheap, quick,
or easy. But, with adequate resources; planning and deliberation; and
due oversight, it would likely result in making Federal workers safer
at a time when we know that terrorists are working overtime to exploit
security gaps.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
I would like to thank all of the witnesses for their
testimony. I will remind each Member that he or she will have 5
minutes to question the panel.
I now recognize myself for questions.
Mr. Goldstein, according to your testimony, with the
exception of one item, FPS agreed with your finding?
Mr. Goldstein. Yes, sir.
Chairman Thompson. Mr. Schenkel, some of those findings
were quite revealing. Can you tell the committee why, in those
instances of contractor noncompliance, FPS took no action
against them?
Mr. Schenkel. It was not a case that we did not take any
action. It is that we took what we determined to be appropriate
action. Those were deductions from the pay--invoicing of those
contractors. What we have to do is deal with not only our
perceptions and our paperwork, and our evaluations of the
different contractors. We are also tied by the FAR. They have
different--I wouldn't say ``different,'' but let us say more
stringent criteria for terminating contracts.
We have to look at the contractor's performance as a whole.
If the contractor performed on the positive side--on the
exceptional side, to the right--then we would retain the
contract. If it was not, then we would terminate the contract,
which we had done probably eight or nine times in the last
several years.
Chairman Thompson. Well, Mr. Goldstein, according to your
report--and I could be corrected, but--you were unable to find
any enforcement actions taken?
Mr. Goldstein. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.
There was a combination of no evidence in the files; and in
our discussions with agency representatives who do contract
management. We specifically asked whether there were any fines
or deductions, or whether there were any other kinds of actions
taken. Neither the individuals that we talked to, nor the files
themselves supported any actions, which is how we drew the
conclusion that no actions had been taken.
Chairman Thompson. Mr. Schenkel, you just said to us that
you all took some money from people, and Mr. Goldstein said he
asked you for the records, and they weren't in the records,
so--anything like that. Can you help us out?
Mr. Schenkel. I certainly don't claim to be a contracting
expert, sir, but what I can say is that perhaps we are not
looking at the same records. The individual contracts that Mr.
Goldstein looked at may not have had terminating action or
deductions. There is a term called ``benefit to the
government'' that I understand from the contracting people--
that even if the contract, perhaps, is not complied with to its
fullest, if the Government receives a benefit from it, we are
still obligated to pay.
Chairman Thompson. Well, that is amazing that we are
obligated to pay, even though people don't perform the
contract.
Mr. Schenkel. To the extent that I am familiar with the FAR
and the obligation on that--yes, sir.
Chairman Thompson. Okay. If you would, the testimony you
just offered us about those contractors that have been reduced
in contract amount--we would love to have them--for whatever
period of time you are talking about.
I would hope the GAO would love to have it, too, since you
asked for it and didn't get it.
Who manages the contracts, Mr. Schenkel?
Mr. Schenkel. Right now, we have the consolidated contract
group that falls under FPS. However, the direction is now
controlled by the Office of Procurement at DHS. Previous to
that, it was the Office of Acquisition at ICE. FPS does not
have direct control over it, sir.
Chairman Thompson. The fact that we have several hundred
employees--contract employees--who have not met training
requirements--does that cause concern on your part?
Mr. Schenkel. Yes, it does.
Chairman Thompson. How have you corrected it?
Mr. Schenkel. We have taken on--and to use a term that we
have used over and over in these last several months--is we
want to get it right, rather than ``right now.'' So,
consequently, we have developed some very detailed training
programs.
The one that was described by Mr. Goldstein, the National
Weapons Detection Program, which we have already initiated in
the National Capital Region as of January of this year--this
will ensure that FPS personnel inspectors actually provide the
training to our contract employees. We have also instituted the
National Countermeasures Program to ensure the consistency and
accuracy, and the ability of our equipment to work properly and
to coincide with the----
Chairman Thompson. So, before you did that, what
accountability did we have for our contracts?
Mr. Schenkel. Prior to that, the documentation had to be
provided by the contractor, as well as the obligation to
provide the training still lies with the contractor. We have
taken on that piece of training, internal to the FPS.
Chairman Thompson. But you would have to have some
oversight on the contract to know that they are doing it. Is
that FPS' role?
Mr. Schenkel. Yes, that is FPS' role.
Chairman Thompson. So did you take any personnel actions
against FPS employees who had oversight responsibilities for
the contract--that were in noncompliance?
Mr. Schenkel. Well, we took action against the contractors.
A a good case in point was the White Oak facility that the GAO
had investigated during their audit. As a result of that, we
terminated the contract with White Oak----
Chairman Thompson. That is good you did. But GAO found it,
not FPS.
Mr. Schenkel. It was a combination. It was a combination
that--GAO had identified guards without certifications. When
National Capital Regional went in to further investigate, and
investigate the post, they found that some of the people did
not have the certification, but were not serving on positions
that would require that specific certification.
As they dug deeper, they found even others that did not
have the appropriate certifications for the posts. They were
standing. They were immediately relieved. Consequently, we
ended up terminating the contract.
Chairman Thompson. Mr. Goldstein--and you just heard Mr.
Schenkel talk about White Oak. Is that your understanding of
what happened?
Mr. Goldstein. We actually did not specifically investigate
White Oak. That was something that they did themselves. We
looked more broadly at the certification process.
We remain concerned about this process, as we indicate in
our report, not only because we think it has been very
difficult on a real-time basis for FPS to determine whether
their guards are certified at any one point--in fact, the
agency, as far as we understand, still is unable to certify--
understand that some 6,000 of their guards are fully certified
today, even though this issue has been outstanding now for
nearly a year.
We found, in Operation Shield, when we accompanied FPS,
that many of the contractors on site, when they have gone in
and done these sweeps--many of the contractors are not
certified; and one that we accompanied them--on a level-four
building--only two out of 11 contract employees were certified
at that point in time. So it remains a real problem.
Chairman Thompson. So of the 15,000 contract employees, you
are saying it could be as many as 6,000 that we can't verify
credentials?
Mr. Goldstein. That is correct.
Chairman Thompson. I yield back the balance of my time.
Ranking Member, for 5 minutes.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Schenkel, you know, considering the title of today's
hearing, have you conducted any cost-benefit analysis as to
what would be gained or lost by Federalizing the workforce?
Mr. Schenkel. FPS has conducted numerous bottom-up reviews
of its own organization and restructuring. We have examined
multiple ways of either expanding the Federal force or
contracting the contract force. The answer is yes, sir. We have
multiple options.
Mr. King. Okay. What are the conclusions--you know,
focusing on Federalization--have you reached any conclusions?
Mr. Schenkel. Regardless of who pays the--or who signs the
paycheck--I think that there are some--some qualifying factors
that have to be met. First of all is, the guards themselves
have to have a very clear, concise understanding of the
mission. To accompany that, they need an absolutely supportive
training support. They have to receive the training necessary
to perform that mission.
On top of that, we need a good quality supervision program
in an operational construct that will keep them motivated, and
keep those who would harm us off balance. There are cost
benefits to staying with the contract-guard force. There are
flexibilities that are built into staying with contract-guard
force that may or may not be viable under Federalizing. But
there is also benefits, as Mr. Ervin described, to the
Federalizing of the guard.
Mr. King. Are you in a position to make any
recommendations?
Mr. Schenkel. We have offered several options to the
Department, which are under review right now, sir.
Mr. King. Is the Department giving you any indication when
a decision will be made, if they are considering a decision?
Mr. Schenkel. They are considering a decision prior to the
submission of the 2012 budget, sir.
Mr. King. Okay.
When you conducted these analyses, did you reach out to
TSA? Did you do any comparisons with TSA?
Mr. Schenkel. Yes, sir, as a matter of fact, we did. We
work a lot with TSA. Their missions appear, on the surface,
very similar to ours. Though, as you kind of drill down into
those missions, though, they are significantly different. But
there are some commonalities.
We did work with the TSA, and talk with the TSA about some
of their experiences. When I was with the TSA, I was kind of on
the tail end of the Federalization of that force.
Mr. King. If I can get to the 9/11 trials--your testimony
several months ago--you said that the Federal Protective
Service would not have enough personnel to secure the
perimeters of the court facilities in New York, if the trials
were held. Has that situation improved at all?
Mr. Schenkel. We continue to work with the U.S. Marshals
Service to evaluate where and when these trials may take place.
As I testified previously, if they are protracted to the
periods that we are being told now--up to 20 years--and if they
run simultaneous trials in locations, whether it be New York or
other locations, it would put a definite strain on the Federal
Protective Service to accomplish its primary mission. So we
would have to be augmented.
Mr. King. Okay. But has the situation improved since your
last--you know, since you testified here?
In other words, have you had any increase in personnel
since you----
Mr. Schenkel. Sir, we remain at 1,225, sir.
Mr. King. Okay.
Now, as far as the CIRG teams, which I understand would be
used to fill in if there were shortages--these were the
Critical Incident Response Teams--has there been any increase
in them? Any increase in funding? Can you make better use of
them now than you would have been able to 2 or 3 months ago?
Mr. Schenkel. I am very proud of our Critical Response
Teams. Our inspectors and FPOs provide a service, I think, far
beyond what other law-enforcement agencies can provide, just
because of their training, their background, their dedication.
But our budget remains the same, sir.
Mr. King. So I assume the answer is that you do not have
enough personnel to secure the trials. If the trials began
tomorrow in New York, you would not have enough personnel to
secure the perimeter of the facilities?
Mr. Schenkel. We would be strained after the initial 2
weeks, sir.
Mr. King. After the initial 2 weeks?
Mr. Schenkel. Yes, sir.
Mr. King. Okay.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
Mr. Schenkel, are you aware of the $200 million that is in
the budget that has been allocated for GITMO trials?
Mr. Schenkel. It is my understanding, Mr. Chairman, though,
that that is going to the States. It is in grant money. We,
consequently, can't share any of that.
Chairman Thompson. Oh. Thank you.
Will you provide the committee with copies of those studies
you referenced with Mr. King, that you have done to analyze
whether FPS should stay Federalized--be Federalized, or not to
be? We have, from committee--from staff--we requested some
information relative to any research or studies. We have not
been able to get it. But your testimony today says that you do
have that information. We would like to have it as a committee.
The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from California for 5
minutes.
Ms. Harman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
hearing.
Welcome to the witnesses, especially to my longtime friend,
Mr. Ervin, who I always think speaks truth to power, and I
appreciate it. I am not sure who has power, but I know he has
truth.
I would first like to thank the FPS employees, and the
contractors, who work with you, who try very hard to do their
jobs right. Let us understand that mistakes are made. Some of
the employees are undertrained. Some of them may even, for
other reasons, not perform properly. But I would guess that
most FPS employees and most of the contractors who work for you
try to do a good job every day. Would you all agree with that?
Mr. Goldstein. Certainly.
Ms. Harman. So let us remember to say thank you to those
who try very hard. I don't want them to get the message that we
think the entire place needs to be scrapped.
Having said that--some very dangerous things have happened
in the last year; you all know this. If James Von Brunn had
actually gotten into the Holocaust Museum, beyond the security
perimeter of it, he could have shot and killed many innocent
Americans and foreigners who visit that museum. Is that not
correct? I am asking all of you. Does anyone disagree with
that? No.
If Johnny Wicks, who opened fire with a shotgun in a Las
Vegas Federal courthouse and killed one person, had gotten into
that courthouse, he could have done the same thing. Is that
correct?
Mr. Ervin. Sure.
Mr. Schenkel. Absolutely.
Ms. Harman. If Andrew Stack, who flew his airplane into a
Federal office building in Austin, and killed an IRS employee,
had, perhaps, hit that facility differently, he could have
killed a lot of people, too.
If these death threats against Members of Congress and
others were actually carried out, a lot more people could die,
right?
Mr. Ervin. Right.
Mr. Schenkel. Right.
Mr. Goldstein. Right.
Ms. Harman. So it is critically important that we get this
right.
I am rather moved by Mr. Ervin's point that if we
Federalize the workforce right, we may get to a better place.
But we are not going to do that tomorrow, and it won't be
cheap, right?
Mr. Ervin. Absolutely.
Ms. Harman. So, in the mean time, I think we have some work
to do. I would like to suggest two areas, and make one final
point.
In fact, let me make the final point now so I don't run out
of time. That final point is to Mr. King.
I don't know exactly what the costs are for protecting
court facilities in lower Manhattan, but I would like to put on
this record that the track record for trying people convicted
of terrorism-related crimes in U.S. Federal courts since 9/11
is exemplary. We have charged over 500 people. More than 320
have pleaded ``guilty.'' Virtually 90 percent of those folks
are incarcerated now in supermax prisons, where they are no
danger to the public.
In contrast, we have used military commissions three times.
Two of the people who were convicted are no longer
incarcerated. So we have one conviction in military
commissions. We better be careful before we abandon Article 3
courts as the remedy of choice, among other choices for trying
people convicted of--or charged with terrorism crime--with
related crimes.
At any rate--two of my points here--I think there are two
things. One is better training. The second is better
situational awareness. I think we all agree on better training.
Situational awareness includes understanding what the threats
might be, and in what form they would come. That requires
sharing appropriate intelligence. That is the focus of my
subcommittee on this full committee.
I want to ask you what your own recommendations are for
making certain that our FPS employees and contractors have
better situational awareness. Should we, for example, share, on
a periodic basis, some of the materials that are prepared by
the NCTC through the so-called ITACG, this group of law-
enforcement professionals who come to Washington on a rotating
basis and help advise us? Would that be helpful? Or would some
other form of intelligence-product sharing be helpful? Let me
just leave that as a question for all three of you.
Mr. Schenkel. Do you want me to take that first?
Yes, ma'am. We totally agree with you. We do have a very
robust intelligence and information-sharing program. We
recognized that early on, with our paltry size. In 2007, we
initiated the Regional Intelligent Agent Program, where we have
a dedicated individual in each of our 11 regions. That regional
intelligence agent has one of the more challenging jobs because
he or she has to take the intelligence that--that we get from
our 13-membered--we have a presence on 13 JTTFs directly
related to our primary facilities. We also have membership on
the National JTTF.
We collaborate with State fusion centers--any intelligence
agency that we can draw information from, we draw through that
regional intelligence agent. That regional intelligence agent
then has to sanitize that based on the classification. We are
able to get that threat information in a timely manner, and in
a very specific and detailed target audience, whether it be a
specific facility or a multiple facilities, or a metropolitan
area.
So we are big believers in that concept.
Ms. Harman. Thank you.
My time has expired, Mr. Chairman, but could the other two
panelists answer the question? Thank you.
Mr. Goldstein. Sure.
We have not specifically looked at this, ma'am. I can tell
you that, in the course of our audit, we have heard from many
inspectors out in the field that they did not feel that they
received sufficient information to be able to adequately
protect or understand the threats to the buildings they were
responsible for.
I do think, over the last couple years, it has improved
some, but it may not be sufficient yet.
Mr. Ervin. Likewise, Ms. Harman, I would agree with that. I
definitely think that NCTC should widely share its information
with FPS. Only if they have access to that intelligence, can
the guards there, whether they are Federalized or privatized,
be aware of trends and patterns that are of note. I would
finally note, as you know, that TSA has its own intelligence
unit within itself, which works closely with DHS as a whole,
and the rest of the intelligence community. I would urge the
creation of something like that for FPS.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr.
Lungren, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I have
great respect for my colleague from California, but I could not
disagree with her more with respect to how we ought to try
these individuals. If one thinks that the trial that took place
in Virginia was a successful trial, given the circus that that
was, and the threat to the people in the area, I would be
amazed.
Secondly, with respect to Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and his
comrades, they were prepared to plead ``guilty'' in the trial
in Guantanamo. Our Government did not accept that. To suggest
that is an appropriate place to bring them to New York City, to
be tried in Article 3 courts, because we have to prove
something about our constitution, frankly, I think, is
nonsensical. It is not a partisan thing. As I understand it,
Mayor Bloomberg, Senator Schumer, the other Senator from New
York, also oppose that occurring.
I don't understand this fixation with bringing them to
Article 3 courts, and giving them a different level of justice
than even our men and women in uniform would be if they were
charged with some offense, when they go before military courts
of their own.
I may be very sensitive about today's hearing because it
talks about Federalization of guards, meaning that--the
suggestion is the only way we can improve things--if we
Federalize the workforce. I was just home in my district, where
we have Federalized the student-loan program and the EdFund,
which happens to be headquartered in my district has already
laid off 75 people.
The private industry may lose as many as 31,000 employees
as a result of our vote, just 2 weeks ago, Federalizing that
program. There seems to be a fetish around here about
Federalizing programs, despite the fact it causes people to
lose jobs. When I find 75 have already lost jobs in my
district--hundreds more may, and thousands across the country.
So let us also understand we have people who are working,
doing a very good job for us, who are contractors, whose jobs
would be lost if we Federalized the workforce, No. 1.
No. 2, I note that, for fiscal year 2010, in the
President's budget request, he asks no additional resources for
FPS. Now, I understand he understands we have got a tough
budget situation. But I also understand every study that has
been done about Federalizing this force we are talking about
here would increase the cost per employee to the Federal
budget.
So, perhaps what we should be focusing on is, since we have
limited resources, how we utilize those limited resources in a
better fashion. The testimony here is somewhat critical--at
least, following the questioning of the Chairman--of FPS, and
supervising the contractors. Those who supervise the
contractors are Federal employees, are they not?
Mr. Schenkel. Yes, sir.
Mr. Lungren. How do we Federalize the Federalized
employees, then? I mean, presumably, it is the question of
proper performance on the job, whether you are a Federal
employee or whether you are a contract employee. Perhaps we
need to focus a little bit more on tightening up the oversight
of the contract employees as opposed to saying, ``We are just
going to Federalize the employees, and that is going to solve
all the problems.''
When we have had these tests on TSA, as been pointed out by
Mr. Ervin in the past, we have had some failures; and, in part,
because we didn't have a rigorous-enough screening program or
oversight program for those screening functions that they
undertook, whether they were TSA employees or contract
employees that we have at some of the airports. Isn't that
correct, Mr. Ervin?
Mr. Ervin. That is right.
So, you know, I agree with your point, Mr. Lungren. I said
that in my statement--that Federalization in and of itself
isn't a panacea. There has got to be training. There has got to
be----
Mr. Lungren. Right.
Mr. Ervin [continuing] Adequate salary and promotions.
There has got to be due oversight.
I think it is telling, for example, that, if I may----
Mr. Lungren. Before you go there, I would just have to--I
completely disagree with your point of view that something is
essentially wrong with profit--that the profit motive
essentially takes away from performance, and that, if we had
Federal employees, they would do better because they are not
contractors who work in the world of profit.
I just reject that notion that you stated on the record,
absolutely. Frankly, we heard that argument on the floor of the
House just 2 weeks ago, when we destroyed an entire industry,
which facilitated Ugovernment loan--or facilitated college
loans.
So I am sorry. I just disagree with that.
Mr. Ervin. May I respond to that, sir? May I?
Mr. Lungren. Yes, sir.
Mr. Ervin. I actually did not say that. I specifically said
that by saying that, ``the primary motivation of contractors is
a profit motive--that is not a normative statement,'' meaning,
``That is not a judgment. That is not bad. It is just a
factual''----
Mr. Lungren. Well, you went on to say, ``Therefore, they
are concerned about profit as opposed to doing the job.''
Mr. Ervin. Right--that their primary motivation is profit,
as opposed to security.
I think, for example, sir, that it is telling that we have
a Federalized guard force for the White House, for DOD, for
CIA, and for the Capitol itself. Why is that? I think, because
the judgment has been made that the security of these
facilities is so important that they ought to be overseen by
Federal employees. So the question that that raises is: Why
don't we make the same judgment with regard to other Federal--
--
Mr. Lungren. So what does that have to do with profit?
Mr. Ervin. The point is if the primary motivation of the
employer is profit as opposed to security, then corners will be
cut. I think we have seen that----
Mr. Lungren. Well----
Mr. Ervin [continuing] Both in the pre-9/11----
Mr. Lungren. Well, I appreciate your suggestion--I
appreciate your suggestion that the ultimate conclusion of
profit is cutting corners. I disagree with that in terms of
responsible individuals. Our economic system--our private
economic system is based on profit. Some would suggest that is
the reason why, in the past, we have had the most dynamic
private workforce, with the greatest application of technology
to perform jobs in the history of the world. But thank you very
much.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you--gentleman's time has expired.
Gentleman from Texas, Mr. Green, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Why don't we just have
a mercenary military? We can hire all of the persons who now
serve us bravely and capably, and pay them a salary that
contractors would, and somehow pass on to them? Why not the
police department; mercenary police officers could work as well
in all of our major cities?
I find a great deal of comfort in knowing that the person
who comes to my home as a peace officer has the authority to
arrest. My belief is that the contract employees do not have
this authority. Mr. Ervin, is there some truth in what I have
said?
Mr. Ervin. That is right, Mr. Green.
Mr. Green. Do you find some degree in comfort in knowing
that Federal officers have the authority to arrest and to
detain, and to question, and to do so under the color of law?
Mr. Ervin. Absolutely. There is no question about that.
Mr. Green. Do you also find that it is of benefit to have a
military that is not mercenary? In fact, we didn't start out
with militaries that were in the paradigm that we have today.
Militaries, initially, were mercenaries. We found that it just
wasn't effective to have mercenaries performing the duties of
military officers.
Now, having said this, I want to make it very clear that we
are not, in any way, implying that the contract workers are
mercenaries. I am saying this just to make a point. Sometimes
when you hear extreme rhetoric, you have to use extreme
language to make a point so that people can better understand
that we are at extremes. There is no need to be at these
extremes.
Why not talk about corporate welfare? Corporate welfare--
$60 billion is what we were giving corporate institutions to,
literally, manage a program and take dollars and pass them on
to recipients--persons who were borrowers. This is not within
your--the context of what you are talking about today. Quite
frankly, it is not something that I would have brought up. But
since we are now going to talk about this, let us put it in its
proper context. It is corporate welfare.
Why do we support corporate welfare to this extent, which
is, literally, a waste of money? Those who talk about
eliminating waste, fraud, and abuse would support this kind of
invidious corporate welfare. That is just a--simply a pass-
through. That is all it was--a pass-through that we have
eliminated. Now we will put some of this money at the Pell
grants so that we can better educate people.
Corporate welfare--if corporate welfare is good, then
welfare for some of the least, the last, and the lost, should
not be attacked to the extent that it is.
Now, back to this hearing; and thank you for your
indulgence.
Mr. Ervin, I want to give you an opportunity to vindicate
your statements that you made earlier. My belief is that you
were not given adequate time to state properly what you--
restate properly what you stated earlier. So, if you would,
please?
Mr. Ervin. Well, thank you for that, Mr. Green. I want to
emphasize--and as I say, I did emphasize it in the written
statement that I read--that I am not against the profit motive.
I am simply saying that--as between security and profit, a
private contractor is more concerned with the latter, needless
to say. Further, it is not just a question of logic. It is a
question of experience. The whole reason there is a TSA is
because we recognized after 9/11 that pre-9/11, contractors
were putting profit ahead of security.
The final point I would make is the one that I made just a
second ago. That is that I think it is telling that we think
that certain Federal facilities--the White House, DOD, Central
Intelligence Agency, and the Capitol itself, apparently, are
important enough that the security guards provided should be
Federalized. What is the distinction to be drawn between those
Federal facilities and other Federal facilities?
I think we have learned--or should have learned, after 9/
11, and after these recent spate of domestic-terrorism attack,
that all Federal facilities are at least, potentially, at risk.
Mr. Green. Thank you.
Because my time is nearly up, let me just summarize
something and ask for a quick response.
In the GAO report, you have all of these findings. You
indicate that none of the responsible parties, in terms of the
contracts that were awarded--none of these contracts have been
terminated notwithstanding the findings. It seems to me that if
we should perform as we normally do in corporate America, and
adhere to corporate principles consistently, somebody would
have been fired--meaning a contract would have been terminated.
GAO--am I correct when I read that no contract was
terminated notwithstanding findings?
Mr. Goldstein. Yes, sir. That is our finding; that no
contract was terminated--even more so, that no action was taken
against any of the contractors that we----
Mr. Green. A closing comment would be this: There ought to
be consistency in your philosophy. If you want corporate
standards, then let the corporate standards prevail
consistently. That is what should happen. In corporate America,
somebody would have been fired.
So we can't have it both ways--``When it is convenient, let
us have corporate standards; and when it is inconvenient, then
let us have some other standard that is, at best, quasi-
corporate.''
I thank you and I yield back the balance of my time.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr.
Smith, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Director Schenkel, I would like to address my first
question to you. Let me quote from your testimony: ``We believe
that we can effectively secure Federal buildings with the
current mix of Federal staff and highly trained contract
guards.'' I presume, then, that you don't necessarily think we
ought to Federalize the entire guard staff.
Tell me why you think that current mix works--if you could,
go into a little bit more detail.
Mr. Schenkel. I can't speculate on whether we should
Federalize or go with the contracts. But I do believe that the
clear mission, as I have described earlier, and the
professional training that meets that mission requirement are
the two key objectives. They coincide with what Mr. Ervin is
saying, too. Regardless of who people work for, the standards,
as Mr. Green just said, have to be established and upheld. I
think that is the critical----
Mr. Smith. Whoever does it, it needs----
Mr. Schenkel. Yes, sir.
Mr. Smith. Correct.
Okay. Thank you, Director Schenkel.
Mr. Ervin, I wanted to follow up on a statement of yours in
your testimony as well. Let me read two sentences from it.
``Investigation after investigation, report after report, year
after year, have documented in detail FPS' apparent inability
to carry out its most critical mission--protecting Federal
buildings against the threat of terrorism in the post-9/11 age.
If other relevant factors are equal, there is no good reason to
think that merely exchanging a public paycheck for a private
one will improve guard performance.''
I happen to agree with that. But I think your underlying
basis for saying that is that it is possible to improve
training and oversight without necessarily Federalizing the
guards. If that is the case, do you want to elaborate on that?
Mr. Ervin. Well, thank you for that, Mr. Smith.
I think the answer is it is possible to improve. It is just
I am skeptical as to whether it would happen, in fact, based on
experience. You know, we have had this present regime of
contractors with Federal oversight for a number of years now.
As I say, and as you know, report after report, investigation
after investigation, shows that for whatever reason, the
Federal Government seems incapable of getting the private
sector to perform optimally.
Mr. Smith. That they are capable or not----
Mr. Ervin. Incapable----
Mr. Smith. Incapable?
Mr. Ervin [continuing]. Of getting the private sector to
perform optimally.
Mr. Smith. But go up on your correction a few minutes ago.
You don't necessarily think that that is because of the profit
motive. It is just that that is a fact of life.
Mr. Ervin. Well, what I am saying is that the profit motive
drives the contractor motivation, and----
Mr. Smith. Right. But you don't see anything inherently
evil in that?
Mr. Ervin. Of course not; absolutely not.
But, I mean, the point is, who should be in charge of
security for Federal facilities?
Mr. Smith. Right.
Mr. Ervin. It seems to me that the entity that should be in
charge of that, that should pay the people, is the entity that
has, as its primary, sole, motivation, security. That is the
Federal Government.
Mr. Smith. Yes, I would say that to some extent. But the
problem--and this is a longer conversation, probably. The
reason for the profit motive, and the reason that profit motive
oftentimes works better than the Government is because it sort
of increases efficiency, delivery of goods; it doesn't let
excessive expenses or costs get out of hand--all of which can
be inimical to the underlying mission of protecting lives and
keeping buildings safe.
So I don't maybe think as much as you that the profit
motive is necessarily going to prevent them from doing their
job. I think it might actually enhance it.
When I say ``This is part of a longer discussion,'' I could
give you other examples. You look at the U.S. Postal Office.
There are reasons why that, perhaps, should be a Government
monopoly. But there is no denying the fact that the private
sector could do the same job less expensively and, perhaps,
more efficiently.
Mr. Ervin. But----
Mr. Smith. I think that is what we are trying to get at
here--is you might as well look at the overall picture and see
how we can accomplish the same goal, perhaps, at less cost to
the taxpayer. But please feel free to respond.
Mr. Ervin. Well, thank you for that. I would welcome a
lengthy discussion with you about that privately.
I guess the only thing I would say is--and I would be very
brief--is I would distinguish between the mail service and
security. I think we have seen the effects of the private
sector on TSA--before the creation of TSA.
Mr. Smith. Right.
Mr. Ervin. We are seeing, now, the effects of private
security with FPS. I think the results speak for themselves.
Mr. Smith. Right.
I agree with that--one narrow distinguishing factor. But my
overall broader point was that oftentimes the private sector
can do the same job just as well, and perhaps less expensively,
and perhaps more efficiently. That is my only point.
Mr. Ervin. Right. I guess my point is that the experience
shows that that is not the case as far as security is
concerned.
Mr. Smith. Oh. Well, now, that, I am not sure is the case.
I think there are probably other instances--and we have seen
the mix that we have heard from Director Schenkel--that,
apparently, the private sector can do it as well, in some
instances--perhaps in all, if you keep good oversight of the
private sector--as you need to do with Government employees as
well.
Mr. Ervin. Look forward to the discussion, sir.
Mr. Smith. Okay. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
Mr. Schenkel, from the testimony the committee received, it
indicated that the contracts are going up about 20 percent per
year, with the private contractors. Have you made an analysis--
or your staff--made an analysis of--why that 20 percent
increase?
Mr. Schenkel. Mr. Chairman, we have not seen that 20
percent increase. Our contract-guard program remains fairly
constant at just under $800 million a year. That is for 111
contracts and, I think, it is 55 different contract companies.
Department of Labor establishes the wage rates in the
various parts of the country. I am not quite clear where that
20 percent figure came from, sir.
Chairman Thompson. I will get it. I will get it to you.
The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from California,
for 5 minutes. Ms. Richardson.
Mr. Richardson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
All of my questions will be directed to Mr. Schenkel. I
have got 5 minutes. So we have got to go quick.
Mr. Schenkel, when the Chairman asked you the question,
``Would you provide the analysis of the cost of Federalization
of the guards?'' You kind of looked, but I didn't hear you say
an affirmative, ``Yes.'' Was that, ``Yes,'' you would provide
that report?
Mr. Schenkel. I have handed that to the Department. I
believe the Department will have to provide that, ma'am.
Mr. Richardson. What I saw there was the exchange that I
thought. So are you committing to this committee--you still
haven't answered the question. Are you going to supply this
committee a copy of that report?
Mr. Schenkel. I have to have that through the Department,
ma'am. I don't have the authority to hand it to you directly.
Chairman Thompson. Just a minute. I want you to check that,
Mr. Schenkel, because unless there is something in there over
and above that is covered, it is a public document. I think you
ought to check that.
Mr. Richardson. So will you check that and get back to the
committee?
Mr. Schenkel. Yes, ma'am.
Mr. Richardson. Okay. Thank you.
I thought I saw that. I wasn't sure.
Also, sir, the GAO found that the FPS has an inability to
effectively evaluate their staffing responses. You have a draft
workforce-staffing model that you intend upon using, that you
haven't provided to Congress. Is it possible for you to provide
that as well?
Mr. Schenkel. That is the staffing model that is under
review at the Department level, and will be released, as I have
been told, just prior to the 2012 budget.
Mr. Richardson. Is it one and the same of the cost
analysis, or is it something different?
Mr. Schenkel. No, ma'am. No, ma'am, it is not.
It is no secret on the cost analysis. The cost analysis
runs roughly 30 percent higher for Federalizing the same
workforce that we have----
Mr. Richardson. Mr. Schenkel, I apologize, but I have now
got 3 minutes.
My question is: Are there two different reports? Is there a
cost-analysis report, and is there a staffing-model report? Are
they two separate reports?
Mr. Schenkel. Yes, they would be two separate----
Mr. Richardson. Okay. So the official request of this
committee is that you would supply the committee with those two
reports. As the Chairman mentioned, we believe that that
information is available to this committee. So, if you would,
come back forthright--I would think within 7 working days--to
advise this committee if, in fact, you are able to supply the
report.
Mr. Schenkel. Yes, ma'am.
Mr. Richardson. Okay. Thank you.
No. 3: It is my understanding that FPS does not sit on
committees. You can't demand FC tenants to implement
recommendations. They can refuse things that we want to do. You
talked about contract issues of--if people aren't doing--you
know, fulfilling the contract--you don't really feel
comfortable being able to terminate them.
Could you supply this to the committee--any recommendations
that you might have of how we could do business better--that we
could assist you with in possibly implementing?
Mr. Schenkel. Yes, ma'am, but the ISC has already taken
steps in that direction--the Interagency Security Committee.
They have created a working group with both the GSA and the
Federal Protective Service as the co-chairs of that group--
reason being is that our challenge is far different from the
other 350,000 Federal facilities that the Interagency Security
Committee covers.
Our 9,000 buildings are the only buildings that have what
we call a multi-tenant facility--in other words, multiple
agencies under one roof. So, consequently, that challenge is
unique unto us.
Mr. Richardson. So does that working group include the
concerns that the GAO has brought forward?
Mr. Schenkel. Yes, ma'am.
Mr. Richardson. Okay. So can you supply this committee with
a full list of what those are that you are looking at?
Mr. Schenkel. Yes, ma'am.
Mr. Richardson. Okay. Thank you.
No. 5--I want to talk about the RAMP program. Apparently,
there are some issues with the RAMP program. Do you intend upon
implementing that?
Mr. Schenkel. The Risk Assessment Management Program is not
only meeting, but exceeding our expectations in many cases. I
had heard that there were problems with the program early on.
What I did was I held two town-hall meetings--one in the
National Capital Region and one in Boston--to find out from the
inspectors themselves what they thought of the program.
The program itself is functioning superbly. The challenge
was the backbone that it was riding on--in other words, the
infrastructure that had to not only download the information,
but then pass it through our Toughbook computers. That has been
significantly rectified as of yesterday. Whereas things used to
take hours to download, it now takes minutes. Things that took
minutes now take seconds.
Mr. Richardson. Well, Mr. Schenkel, according to the report
that we have in front of us, in addition to that problem, you
also have a problem of 11 different regions using different
processes for managing, collecting, and reporting of contract-
guard information.
So, Mr. Goldstein has pointed out several issues.
Mr. Goldstein, have you been updated with what Mr. Schenkel
is saying? Do you feel satisfied that the RAMP program can
work?
Mr. Goldstein. We don't know that yet, ma'am. We are about
to start an audit of the RAMP program, which this committee has
requested. So we will be getting back to the committee with
that information in the future.
Mr. Richardson. Okay. What I would say to you, Mr.
Schenkel, is that we cannot afford, in DHS--we have had way too
many programs that we have paid millions and millions of
dollars for that have not worked; and so it is critical, if we
are going to make this investment, that it does.
Finally, my last question I have--Mr. Chairman, would you
give me an additional----
Chairman Thompson. Yes.
Mr. Richardson. Thank you.
Chairman Thompson. Yes.
Mr. Richardson. It is my understanding, according to the
GAO, that you--out of 15,000 contract guards, 8,600--you have
not been able to verify their certification-and-training
status. Is that still true?
Mr. Schenkel. That is not correct, ma'am. We now have
14,600-plus guards that have verified certifications in our
RAMP system.
Mr. Richardson. So you are saying you are almost at 100
percent?
Mr. Schenkel. We are 100 percent for what has put in there.
That 15,000 figure is just the figure that--that mans the
posts, or has historically manned the posts. We operate on
guard posts. We have 6,250 guard posts. How the contractors
staff those, whether they use two 4-hour shifts or one 8-hour
shift is up to the contractor. So we are confident that the
guards' standing posts meet the certification requirements.
Mr. Richardson. Okay. I look forward to further information
on that as well.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
Mr. Goldstein, you just heard Mr. Schenkel's response. I
asked a question earlier about that same issue and was told
that they had some 6,000 people out here who can't--we can't
verify the credentialing. You remember that?
Mr. Goldstein. Yes, sir, I do.
Chairman Thompson. No, Mr. Schenkel just said that that
number must be about 18--the number 18, given his numbers that
he just quoted to the committee.
Mr. Goldstein. He said the number was about 14,000 and some
odd, out of the 15,000--he believes have now been certified.
Based on information that we have--and we discussed this
recently with FPS--that wasn't the case. We will happily look
at that again to be sure that that is the case.
I would add that we do have, and have had for some time,
longstanding concerns, though, about the information that was
going to be put into the RAMP system itself, because a lot of
that information was based on old data. So we need to, as part
of the work that we are doing on RAMP in the coming months for
the committee--we will go back and be sure that the kinds of
information put into RAMP are accurate.
Chairman Thompson. Yes. One of the reasons we asked is this
notion of operational or fully operational--I don't want to get
into how you define one versus the other. But the committee
would expect a program to be up and running to its maximum
capacity, and not just up, so to speak. We have a history of
that.
But, Mr. Schenkel, I do want to say, again, a number of
Members have raised a question about how the certification, the
training, the retention of records, and the documentation of
contract guards--that is a serious issue, because so much of
how you test the system is based on what records you have. If
the records are incomplete, then we have a problem. From what I
have heard, up until your earlier response to Ms. Richardson's
question, your testimonies to the committee is that those
incomplete records are no longer incomplete. Is that correct?
Mr. Schenkel. That is correct, sir. We have taken great
pains to ensure the verification and certification of our
records to include implementing additional policies, where we
go do a 120 percent inspection of the contractors' records, as
well as the inspections--and when we do the guard-post
inspections either through Operation Shield or just regular
post inspections.
The system that we have developed operates on a benefit of
the Government, if you will. It is the responsibility of the
contractor to get the update and current certification
information into our system. If, in fact, that individual does
not, that individual will not be able to stand post. It is a
go/no-go system at this point.
Chairman Thompson. Mr. Goldstein, how old is the report you
are reporting on to this committee?
Mr. Goldstein. The report is--the one that was issued
yesterday--some of the material, of course, was preliminary.
However, when we put this report out, we just, several weeks
ago, sat down with FPS and went through every single fact in
that report and asked them to verify them. So as of a couple of
weeks ago, it was our understanding that this information was
still accurate.
Chairman Thompson. So, Mr. Schenkel, you see we have a
issue of GAO reporting to us that there is significant issues
relative to training and the reports. Your testimony is, within
this short period of time, it was corrected. I just want us to
be sure that we are getting accurate testimony before this
committee.
Mr. Schenkel. Mr. Chairman, I will be more than happy to
have someone come and give you a personal demonstration of the
Risk Assessment Management Program, which includes the guard
certification. I think you will be pleased.
Chairman Thompson. Mr. Goldstein, would you accept that
invitation to attend that meeting?
Mr. Goldstein. Of course.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Louisiana for 5
minutes, Mr. Cao.
Mr. Cao. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
My questions are directed at Mr. Ervin.
Mr. Ervin, I find somewhat of a discrepancy in your
statement. On the one hand, you are saying that a Federal
agency has a problem of overseeing a number of private
contractors, in one statement. But, then, at the very next
statement, now you are saying that a Federal agency would be
able to have a better--would do a better job of overseeing
potentially thousands of people.
So how, on the one hand, are you saying a Federal agency
has problems looking over a few number of people and, now,
doing a better job of overseeing thousands of people?
Mr. Ervin. Right.
Mr. Cao, actually, there is no discrepancy. What I am
saying is a number of things. First of all, I have made it
clear that Federalization, in and of itself, is not a panacea.
Implicit in my recommendation that there be Federalization is
the notion that there be adequate supervision at the Federal
level. We don't have that now in the private context. We would
need to have that in the Federal context for Federalization to
work.
But the point is that we are not talking about a
significantly larger number of people. In theory, the very same
number of private guards that we have now--15,000--could be
Federalized.
Mr. Cao. What is the first thing that, if we were to
implement what you just say--to oversee--you are saying that,
right now, these Federal agencies--does not have the system of
oversight, as you just mentioned. If we were to implement the
system of oversight that you propose, over the private
contractors, with the same result, would we get the same
results?
Mr. Ervin. We could get the same result if we don't do it
properly. That is why I stressed that the TSA experience----
Mr. Cao. But if we were to do it properly, then we would
get good results.
Mr. Ervin. We would likely, yes, because, at the end of the
day, it seems to me what matters a lot, and, perhaps, matters
most----
Mr. Cao. So it seems to me that the problem is not in the
private--at least, the private contractors are not doing its
job. The problem seems to me that we lack, at the Federal
level, of--a system of overseeing these people, as we will lack
a system of overseeing the Federalized employees.
Mr. Ervin. With respect, sir, I don't think it is a
question of a system of oversight. The issue here isn't a
system. It is a question of: What is the primary motivator of
the entity that is employing the guard force?
If it is a private contractor, that primary motivator is
profit. Therefore, there is an incentive built in to cut
corners, not to pay people well; not to train them properly.
Conversely, if the primary motivator is security, which,
presumably, would be the primary motivator of the Federal
Government, then we would likely get the kind of----
Mr. Cao. Now, you seem to be praising the TSA in your
speeches and in your examples. I happen to have a lot of
experience with the TSA. I fly in and out of the District of
Columbia every week. I fly all over the country all year round.
I have extensive experience with the TSA. My experience with
the TSA has not been positive.
I find the employees to be rude. I find the employees to be
inefficient. I find a lot of problems with TSA. At the same
time, I also have had extensive experience with a private
security firm in New Orleans. It is called the New Orleans
Private Patrol. In comparing employees of the New Orleans
Private Patrol with the employees of TSA, I find the New
Orleans Private Patrol employees are a lot more professional.
They greet and treat people with much more respect.
So how can you explain to me the differences in demeanor?
Mr. Ervin. Right.
Well, a couple of things, sir--I have lots of experience
with the TSA also. I was the first inspector general at the
Department of Homeland Security, just right after the
Federalization of TSA. I am not really talking about a question
of demeanor and behavior. I say in my statement that there is a
lot of work that----
Mr. Cao. No, but it goes into their----
Mr. Ervin. But if I could just----
Mr. Cao [continuing]. Their effectiveness as being--in
doing their security work.
Mr. Ervin. I think the main point, sir, that I would stress
to you is that we saw what the performance was when there was a
privatized airport-screener workforce on 9/11. The reason we
have TSA today is because of the recognition on the part of the
Federal Government, of which the Congress is a part, obviously,
that, left to their own devices, contractors will cut corners.
That is why we have Federal----
Mr. Cao. Could I ask you a very quick question? Do you have
the number of Federal dollars that goes into the TSA now,
versus the number of Federal dollars that went into employing
the Federal firms to provide security for----
Mr. Ervin. I don't have the exact figures. I could
certainly find them.
If the point that you are making is that Federalization can
be more costly than a private system, I would concede that. I
say at the conclusion of my statement that Federalizing
security would not be quick, it would not be easy, and it would
not be cheap. But security is not the thing that should be done
on the cheap. I thought--I think we saw the effects of cheap
security before 9/11. As I say, that is why we have TSA.
Final point I would make is--and there has been no response
to my repeatedly saying, ``There is presumably a reason why we
have a Federal guard force for the White House, for DOD, for
the Central Intelligence Agency, and for you and your
colleagues here in the Capitol.'' I think the reason for that
is the recognition that properly supervised, properly
resourced, properly trained Federal employees provide better
security. That is all I am suggesting for FPS.
Mr. Cao. Well, I have issues with your recent statement
also, but I see that I am out of time.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much. The Chair now
recognizes the gentlelady from Arizona, Mrs. Kirkpatrick, for 5
minutes.
Mrs. Kirkpatrick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank the panelists for appearing today.
I represent a huge rural district in Arizona. So my first
question is for Mr. Goldstein.
The GAO report reports that guard posts at rural Federal
facilities are being neglected. This is a particular problem
for a State like Arizona, which is mostly rural, yet contains
the busiest trafficking routes from Mexico and Latin America,
and also has been home to dangerous extremists, including the
person directly responsible for the bomb in Oklahoma City.
Mr. Goldstein, can you elaborate on this assessment of
rural facilities in your report?
Mr. Goldstein. I think, ma'am, it is mainly a question of
resources for FPS. There, you have a limited number of officers
who oversee all of these buildings across the United States.
The regions that they have can stretch some distance. When we
were out in the field on this work, we talked to many
inspectors who said that they rarely got to visit the
facilities they had--say, if they were in Boston, they rarely,
if ever, got to Cape Cod, for instance--maybe once a year--to
look at the Federal courthouse or other buildings in those
areas. So it is a difficulty that they face geographically, and
from a resource perspective.
We also found that most of the work that was being done to
oversee these properties, whether it was inspection of the
guard forces or other kinds of activities, were occurring only
during business hours during--in 9 to 5, which, of course, are
not the hours that terrorists necessarily keep--or other
perpetrators.
We have recognized that FPS has, in recent months, tried to
solve this problem which they face, in part, by having tenant-
agency representatives help them out when inspectors can't get
there. They have put together a new program which would use
people at the agencies themselves to help overseeing guard
forces where they can't get there. But we have some questions
about how effective that program can be, since these are,
frankly, mainly lay people who are being asked to fill these
responsibilities. I am sure Mr. Schenkel could give you more
information about that.
Mrs. Kirkpatrick. Do you think those difficulties make
those facilities more at risk?
Mr. Goldstein. I think it is hard for me to say whether
they are more at risk. A terrorist or someone who is going to
perpetrate a crime may or may not try to attack a level-four
building in a major city for a symbol, or may try what would be
called a ``softer target.'' It is hard to know what they would
try to focus on. It is based on the risk assessments that FPS
and other agencies do. But, by and large, the majority of the
Federal portion of FPS is located in, you know, major
metropolitan regions. There is no question about that.
Mrs. Kirkpatrick. Mr. Schenkel, what are you doing to
improve the situation regarding the security of rural
facilities?
Mr. Schenkel. When we started this testimony, we mentioned
that we came from 11 different police departments, basically,
with 11 different practices, both business and operational.
What we have done is standardize the practices and ensured that
everyone gets their just dessert, if you will, by implementing
policies. There were no policies prior to 2008 that even
dictated how many times a guard post was to be inspected.
Mr. Goldstein is correct. It is a challenge. It is a
challenge, geographically, in many areas, to affect those
guard-post inspections. Consequently, we have incorporated
some--what we call ``Agency technical representation,'' where
we train an individual from the respective agency that resides
in that facility to conduct observations, if you will, of the
performance of the contract guards in that facility.
Mrs. Kirkpatrick. Thank you. It still is a concern of mine.
Maybe, we will work further on that.
My next question is for Mr. Ervin.
I understand that FPS plans to shift some of the oversight
of contractors to the tenants' facilities they are guarding. Do
you feel that these agencies have the appropriate experience
and expertise to successfully monitor the performance of
security operations, and can we expect officers with no
security background to do this properly?
Mr. Ervin. No, ma'am. I don't think it is logical to think
that an agency that doesn't have any background in security can
properly manage the guard force.
Mrs. Kirkpatrick. If the tenants in the building can
oversee the security contractors, as well as--well, what you
are saying is they can't.
Mr. Ervin. Unless they have security experience. In fact,
most of these agencies don't.
Mrs. Kirkpatrick. Well, I guess I wonder why we should even
have FPS.
Mr. Ervin. Well, we certainly need guards for Federal
facilities. I think the issue is whether those guards should be
Federalized or privatized. I am arguing that they should be
Federalized for the reasons I have said.
Mrs. Kirkpatrick. Okay. Thank you.
I yield back my time.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania
for 5 minutes, Mr. Dent.
Mr. Dent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
My good friend, who is not here right now, Mr. Green, had
mentioned that he feels that better knowing that--he felt
better knowing that Federalized law enforcement has arrest
authority. I would like to clarify that the Federalized TSA
workforce has no such arrest authority. Like the FPS, they can
detain only.
Also, I just wanted to comment, too, about the security
contractors. You know, the White House is protected, as we
know, by the Secret Service, and has been for 100 years. But
contractors are responsible for security systems at the White
House. The Capitol Police are a function of a special nature
associated with a separate branch of Government, the
legislative branch. However, contractors have designed and
built many of the security capabilities in this Capitol
complex, you know?
I don't think the contractors who provide security
assistance to the White House and the Capitol are cutting
corners on security just to save a buck. But I just think we
need to be very clear about that. We have security contractors
serving overseas in Iraq and Afghanistan as well. So I think we
should be very clear about how we utilize private contractors
in and around the White House and the Capitol, and elsewhere in
the Federal system.
Mr. Ervin, my question is this: In the testimony before
this committee, on November 14, 2007, as a DHS inspector
general, you testified with regard to the TSA, that, ``The sad
fact is that for all the dollars and attention that has been
focused on screener performance since 9/11, study after study
shows that it is just as easy today to sneak deadly weapons
past screeners as it was on 9/11.''
To address this, you recommended extensive training and
frequent re-training of screeners under simulated real-world
conditions. If extensive training and re-training of screeners
would help TSA employees, why won't it help the FPS guard
force?
Mr. Ervin. Mr. Dent, if you saw my statement, I talk
specifically about that. I acknowledge that in my time as DHS
inspector general, I noted a number of shortcomings and flaws
in TSA as a Federalized workforce. I went on to say, though,
that the reason for that is that TSA hasn't properly been
established as a Federal agency. There isn't adequate pay.
There aren't adequate promotion opportunities, still. There
isn't adequate training. There isn't the adequate deployment of
technology. There isn't the requisite accountability and
oversight that there should be. So there is a right way to
Federalize, and there is a wrong way to Federalize. Needless to
say, here, with regard to FPS, I am arguing that Federalization
take place the right way.
Mr. Dent. So, in your role as the DHS inspector general, do
you recall how much it costs the Federal Government annually to
Federalize the TSA screeners--millions, billions?
Mr. Ervin. I don't remember the figure, but, certainly, it
was expensive. Federalizing FPS would likewise be expensive. I
am sure it would be much more expensive than the present
private system. My point is, though, that security can't be
done on the cheap.
Mr. Dent. While I appreciate your testimony and your being
here today, I need a little more than logic and experience to
justify spending billions of taxpayers' dollars to create
another 15,000 Federal jobs. You know? Just, you know--what
empirical data do you have that supports your conclusion that
Federalized FPS screeners would actually improve security----
Mr. Ervin. Right.
Mr. Dent [continuing] At Federal facilities?
Mr. Ervin. Well, I guess I would say a couple of things.
First, I don't know what there could be, other than logic
and experience. Secondly, experience is empirical. What I am
suggesting is that the experience of a privatized airport-
screener workforce before 9/11 shows that those screeners
failed. That is why we have TSA today.
I don't think anybody would suggest that we turn over the
security-guard function. I think you cited equipment. No one
would suggest that we turn over the guard function at the White
House, at DOD, at the CIA, here at the Capitol, to the private
sector. I don't think you are suggesting that. The reason for
that is the recognition that these facilities are so important,
so critical, that they ought to be guarded by the--by the
Federal Government.
Mr. Dent. The only thing I would say is, before 9/11, there
were a lot of failures that led to the attacks. You know? I
mean, we can blame private contractors, private screeners. But
there was intelligence failures. There were all sorts of
reasons why we failed to connect the dots. I think we would be
overly simplistic to suggest it was just the private screeners
that failed on 9/11.
According to the GAO, TSA screeners have never caught GAO
during a covert testing exercise. Why, then, would you
recommend Federalizing the entire contract-guard staff based on
similar GAO studies conducted on FPS contractors, when there
appears to be no additional benefit to having a Federalized
guard staff?
Mr. Ervin. Again, Mr. Dent, I talked about that in my
statement. The point is that TSA is still a work in progress.
It is not properly resourced. There isn't adequate training.
There isn't adequate supervision.
My argument, though, is that if there were those things,
TSA would be a more effective agency than it is, and it would
be far more effective, and is more effective today, by the way,
than the private system before 9/11.
Mr. Dent. Thank you.
I yield back. My time has expired.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr.
Pascrell, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Pascrell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, the GAO report is pretty conclusive: In many
areas, there are no standardized policies for the FPS.
I associate myself with your statement in the Post article
that, for most people, ``The contract guards are the face of
the Federal Protective Service. Unfortunately, that face has
some disturbing features,'' and it does.
We changed, I think, the TSA--having been on this committee
from its very beginning--because we thought rent-a-cop didn't
work for a lot of reasons. I think the main reason--and I know
he is on the second panel--David Wright, who is the president
of the national FPS union--but he said that, quote--if I might
quote him--``The risk is too high to rely on guards who are
guided by companies whose top priority is to increase profit to
the shareholder.''
So, Mr. Chairman, I think this is an important hearing, to
protect not only the infrastructure of Federal buildings, but
to protect Federal employees. In February, we saw an individual
with an ideological bent, Joseph Andrew Stack--he flew a plane
directly into the Federal building in Austin, Texas. He killed
an IRS employee, injuring others, and causing massive damage.
In January, several individuals led by James O'Keefe
fraudulently entered Senator Mary Landrieu's New Orleans office
dressed as utilities employees and allegedly attempted to
tamper with their phone system.
Then, most recently, numerous Congressional district
offices have been vandalized and threatened with attack during
the debate on our favorite subject, health care.
I worry that almost 15 years to the day, April 19, 1995, of
the attack on the Alfred Murrah Federal Building in downtown
Oklahoma City, which killed 168 Americans, we still don't take
the threat of domestic terrorism nearly serious enough. I have
talked about this with the Chairman. I think that this is
something that we need to look into.
We almost started to look into this at the beginning of
last year--remember, Mr. Chairman, in February--but all hell
broke loose because the new appointee as director of Homeland
Security happened to mention the growing evidence of growing
domestic groups who seek to destroy the very fiber of this
democracy; and that they are no less terrorists than the
murderers of 9/11, by any stretch of the imagination.
My office in Patterson, New Jersey, is located in a Federal
building, which also houses the IRS, the Social Security
Administration, a Federal probation office, a naval recruitment
office--all of which could, individually, be potential targets
of an attack.
So, Mr. Goldstein, let me ask you this: Does the current
system of protection for Federal buildings make sense to you?
Mr. Goldstein. We have not looked at the question of
Federalization yet. We have a report that we have for this
committee that we are about to start working on, looking at a
variety of alternatives. Obviously, FPS has done so. We have
not done that work yet. We are about to start it. So it is just
too early for me to answer that question. There are clearly
alternatives to the current scenario. We are looking forward to
digging into that and getting some empirical evidence.
Mr. Pascrell. Mr. Goldstein, we have the Federal Protective
Services--that is under Department of Homeland Security,
correct?
Mr. Goldstein. Yes, sir.
Mr. Pascrell. But the security contractors are private, and
the buildings themselves are operated by the GSA--the General
Service Administration?
Mr. Goldstein. That is correct.
Mr. Pascrell. Is that correct so far?
Mr. Goldstein. Yes, sir.
Mr. Pascrell. Which means that the DHS can make homeland-
security recommendations, as they have done, and the GSA can
ignore them if they think it is too much work.
Mr. Goldstein. It is a little bit more complicated, in
fact, than that, because the buildings are actually run--the
security of them are run by security committees that the
tenants sit on, and actually, in large part, control. Now, the
ISC--the Interagency Security Committee--is making some
suggestions and changes about how those committees ought to
work.
But, at the moment--we have testified a number of times and
have in a number of our reports that that system does not work
well. It is broken. It is broken when you have three different
entities, one of whom is represented by lay people with no
security background at all, making decisions and actually being
able to thwart security recommendations. It is a problem.
Mr. Pascrell. Well, the environment is--Mr. Goldstein, the
environment has kind of changed over the past 10 years.
Mr. Goldstein. Yes, sir.
Mr. Pascrell. I think that, regardless of where you stand
on the political spectrum, it has become a lot more dangerous--
a lot more dangerous. So we see weapons coming into Federal
buildings through these private contractors who are there. Many
of them do a fantastic job. Many of them are not trained
properly.
You admit this and--and responding in your overview. I
think that this is very serious business.
I don't sense any urgency about this. When I see what has
happened to my fellow mates in different parts of the country,
I think we should be concerned. The life of a Congressman is no
more valuable than the life of an ordinary citizen. But the
fact is that it is no less than an ordinary citizen.
I need attention to these things--very important and very
significant. Your report, I think, sheds some light on this.
Whenever my office has brought up these concerns to the
GSA, all we have gotten is finger-pointing to other agencies,
which bears out what you just said a few moments ago.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for having this hearing today.
Thank you.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Ohio, Mr.
Austria.
Mr. Austria. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you to our committee--our panel for being here today
and testifying. I know many of my colleagues have expressed
concerns about 15,000 jobs of private contractors going to the
Federal Government. I think the No. 1 issue is safety and
security of the Federal buildings. We all agree on that.
But, Mr. Ervin, let me kind of follow up a little bit on
what Mr. Cao was saying earlier. You made a comment that there
is incentives for shortcuts right now, for private contractors.
Safety and security is the most important issue here. Do you
have evidence of private contractors taking shortcuts? If so,
you know, what corrections or actions were taken to correct
those?
Mr. Ervin. Right. Well, the evidence that I have, sir, is
the evidence that we have in the GAO report, which is just the
latest of a number of GAO reports over the years that have
shown such problems. I think there is a reason why----
Mr. Austria. What actions were taken to correct those?
Mr. Ervin. Well, I think Mr. Schenkel has described what
FPS has done to date to try to address it, and I applaud him
for it. I also want to underscore that, as a number of Members
have pointed out, you know, the vast majority of FPS workers
are doing their very best. But their very best, under these
circumstances, is obviously not good enough. So that is why I
am urging Federalization.
Mr. Austria. I guess my next question is: How much of that
would you put towards--you know, and I don't know if you know
the answer to this--not having the proper training or
certification----
Mr. Ervin. Yes, well, I can't quantify it, certainly. But
there is no question but--that the lack of adequate training is
a key part of it. So is the lack of adequate supervision. That
has to happen whether we are talking about a private system or
a Federal system. The question is: Which system is likely,
overall, to produce a better result? I am suggesting, as I say,
based on logic and experience, that the Federal system is
likely to do that.
Mr. Austria. Director Schenkel, let me ask you a question.
You mentioned that there is right now--was it 5,200 guard posts
that--that you were aware of?
Mr. Schenkel. Sixty-two-fifty, sir.
Mr. Austria. Sixty-two-fifty.
How many do you expect the conductor--will that number
increase in 2010, or remain approximately the same?
Mr. Schenkel. Actually, they will probably increase.
Case in point: We just increased by 1,000 temporary posts
just for the IRS.
Mr. Austria. Okay.
Director, let me go back to--I know Mr. King talked about,
and you discussed, the cost-benefit feasibility of this--a
cost-benefit analysis. I believe you mentioned that--in your
testimony--that you have--we have been working on this since
2003--approximately that you have three--DHS has been working
on the transition--FPS, from different regional organizations,
into one agency, as well as establishing a systematic approach
to developing standardized policies and identifying problems.
What I am trying to get at is the pros and cons of
feasibility. Is it feasible to begin the process of
Federalization while FPS is still transitioning into this new
model, even though we haven't seen, you know, any end result to
it or--nor had the opportunity to assess whether the model
works or doesn't work?
Mr. Schenkel. The consistency and standardization of the
organization is the priority. We have to have a baseline and
stringent standards that we can hold people to, whether they be
contractor, or whether it be Federal. We have made great
strides in that in the last couple of years. We have
standardized. We have published over 35 policies for the first
time that are National policies and that have direct National
impact.
Additionally, this new program that we have rolled out--the
Risk Assessment Management Program--will further standardize
many of our projects and programs. So the consistency of the
individual or the----
Mr. Austria. I guess my question is on the cost-benefit
analysis--is it feasible during this transition time period
when we haven't seen that model yet?
Mr. Schenkel. Well, I can't speculate on that. But, as I
said earlier, the cost runs roughly 30 percent more for a
straight transition.
Mr. Austria. Director, are there any other options besides
Federalization of the entire contract-guard staff that is being
considered as another option to ensure safety and security of
Federal buildings?
Mr. Schenkel. We have explored several options, to include
increasing the number of our Federal officers, which we think
is a very positive move in the right direction, as far as
oversight and consistency and standardization.
Mr. Austria. Well, are you able to talk about any of the
specifics as far as other options that are been--have been
looked at?
Mr. Schenkel. I am not quite clear----
Mr. Austria. When you are looking at other options, what--a
little more detail----
Mr. Schenkel. Oh. Well, what we did is we looked at the
option of whether we Federalize the entire force or portions of
the force, or do it by risk facilities, et cetera. I think our
analysis is still under review at this point. However, we can
go to just about any option that either Congress or the
Department would desire.
Mr. Austria. Mr. Chairman, one last question, if I may: If
you could, help me understand--how do FPS inspectors currently
conduct risk assessments, you know, if RAMP is currently not
operational? What is in place right now to conduct risk
assessments?
Mr. Schenkel. Sir, risk-assessment management regarding
RAMP is operational now. It was operational from the start of
the backbone, the infrastructure, that it rode on. Basically,
the pipe, if you will, was not serving it adequately. We made
corrective actions. It is functioning extremely well.
The release was yesterday. So it is not a question that
someone would have known this prior to. But the functionality
has worked from the very beginning. I confirmed that with the
inspectors in the field. It is a transition period. I believe
in my last testimony, in November, I said, ``It will be a year
to 18 months before we get all the bugs out.'' However, at this
point, it is functioning better than we expected.
Mr. Austria. That report was released yesterday?
Mr. Schenkel. That the release of the functionality--the
backbone--increased its speed. That was the challenge for the
Risk Assessment Management Program.
Mr. Austria. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
I thank our first panel of witnesses for their valuable
testimony, and the Members for their questions.
Before being dismissed, I would remind our first panel of
witnesses that the Members of the committee may have additional
questions for you. We will ask you to respond expeditiously in
writing to those questions. There have already been some
commitments in terms of Mr. Schenkel getting back to the
committee on a number of items.
We want to thank you again, witnesses. You have been very
kind and generous with your responses.
I would like to ask the clerk now to prepare the witness
table for our second panel of witnesses.
I now welcome our second panel of witnesses.
Our first witness is Mr. David Wright, President of
American Federation of Government Employees Local 918. Mr.
Wright is a 23-year veteran of the Federal Protective Service.
Welcome, Mr. Wright.
The final witness on the panel is Mr. Stephen Amitay. He is
the Federal legislative counsel for the National Association of
Security Companies, the Nation's largest trade association for
security companies. Welcome, Mr. Amitay.
We thank our witnesses for being here today. Without
objection, the witnesses' full statement, and a statement
provided to the committee by the National Treasury Employees
Union will be inserted into the record.
[The information follows:]
Statement of Colleen M. Kelley, National President, National Treasury
Employees Union
April 14, 2010
Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member King, and distinguished Members
of the committee, I would like to thank you for allowing me to provide
comments on whether Federalization of contract security guards at the
Federal Protective Service (FPS) would increase protection at Federal
facilities. As President of the National Treasury Employees Union
(NTEU), I have the honor of representing over 150,000 Federal workers
in 31 Federal agencies and departments.
Mr. Chairman, recent events including the February 18 attack on IRS
offices in Austin, Texas, and shootings at a Las Vegas Federal
courthouse and the Pentagon have once again raised concerns about the
vulnerability of Federal buildings and the safety and security of
Federal employees who work in them around the country.
These attacks, in which two Federal employees were killed and
several others were seriously injured, serves as a grim reminder of the
great risk that Federal employees face each and every day in service to
this country. They also have further heightened on-going concerns by
many Federal employees that current safety and security standards at
many Federal facilities are insufficient.
federal protective service
Mr. Chairman, as you know, the responsibility for ensuring the
physical safety of Federal employees who work in roughly 9,000
Federally-owned and leased facilities is given to the Federal
Protective Service (FPS), within the Department of Homeland Security.
Part of that responsibility also includes ensuring the security of U.S.
citizens who visit many of the Federal workplaces. On any given day,
there can be well over 1 million people who are tenants of, and
visitors to, Federal worksites Nation-wide.
Unfortunately, recent reports by the Government Accountability
Office (GAO), and numerous conversations with Federal employees
represented by NTEU raise concerns that Government employees and
members of the public are not receiving the proper level of protection
from the FPS. In particular, NTEU believes that inadequate funding,
staffing, and training at the FPS, as well as an over-reliance on
outside contractors, have severely hampered its ability to carry out
its core missions to protect facilities, to complete building security
assessments in a timely and professional manner, and to monitor and
oversee contract guards.
inadequate staffing
According to the GAO, while the FPS workforce has decreased by
roughly 15 percent from 1,400 employees in fiscal year 2004 to about
1,200 employees at the end of fiscal year 2009, the contract guard
force has tripled from 5,000 to 15,000 over this same period. NTEU
believes these drastic cuts to the FPS workforce and explosion in the
number of contract security guards have led directly to shortfalls in
contract guard management, performance, and has seriously impeded FPS'
ability to ensure a safe environment in which Federal agencies can
conduct their business.
While we understand that FPS has met a Congressionally-mandated
staffing level of 1,200 employees, 900 of whom are required to be full-
time law enforcement professionals, NTEU remains concerned that this
number falls far short of the number of Federal law enforcement
officers necessary to secure roughly 9,000 Federal buildings and
maintain proper oversight of the large contract guard workforce.
That is why we were disappointed to see that the administration's
budget request for fiscal year 2011 includes no additional funding for
the FPS above the fiscal year 2010 level and proposes eliminating the
minimum staffing standards previously established by Congress.
overreliance on use of contract security guards
In addition to inadequate staffing and funding, NTEU is greatly
concerned that FPS' overreliance on the use of contract security guards
has severely hampered its ability to adequately protect Federal
facilities. Of particular concern is a 2009 GAO investigation of the
FPS which identified numerous concerns with FPS' use of contract
security guards, including that:
FPS does not fully ensure that its contract security guards
have the training and certifications required to secure Federal
facilities;
FPS does not have a completely reliable system for
monitoring and verifying contract guard training and
certification requirements;
FPS does not have specific National guidance on when and how
contract guard inspections should be performed; and
FPS inspections of contract security guard posts at Federal
facilities are inconsistent, and the quality of the inspections
vary across FPS regions.
Additionally, GAO's investigation identified substantial security
vulnerabilities related to FPS's guard program, including instances
where explosive materials were able to successfully pass undetected
through FPS-monitored security checkpoints.
FPS officials have admitted there are serious problems with the use
of contract security guards and that with limited law enforcement
personnel, the agency is reduced to serving a reactive role, rather
than a proactive force patrolling Federal buildings and preventing
criminal acts. Currently, the majority of contract guards are stationed
at fixed posts, which they are not permitted to leave, and they do not
have arrest authority. FPS has also reduced the hours of operation for
providing law enforcement services at many Federal buildings, resulting
in a lack of coverage when employees are coming and going, and during
weekend hours.
Mr. Chairman, it is clear that FPS' excessive reliance on the use
of outside contractors, part of a larger Government-wide trend under
the previous administration, has eroded their ability to carry out its
core mission of protecting Federal facilities and effectively
monitoring its contract security guard workforce.
in-sourcing contract guard positions
Mr. Chairman, in light of the many problems associated with FPS'
continuing use and overreliance on its more than 15,000 contract
security workforce, NTEU strongly believes that Congress should
consider in-sourcing contract guard positions at the roughly 1,500
Security Level III and IV high-risk facilities located around the
country. Replacing contract guards who lack law enforcement authority
at these facilities with Federal Police Officers that possess the full
authority and training to perform traditional police functions, and
restricting contract guards to solely providing monitoring functions at
lower risk facilities, will ensure FPS is better able to protect
Federal facilities and the employees within them.
Mr. Chairman, the importance of providing adequate security at
Federal buildings is of great concern to NTEU and our members who have
repeatedly voiced their concerns about the safety of their workplaces,
their own personal safety and that of the visiting public. NTEU
strongly believes that by providing FPS with increased staffing and
funding and addressing their overreliance on contract security workers
we can ensure that they are able to carry out their mission of securing
Federal buildings and ensuring the safety of the thousands of Federal
employees they house daily.
federalization of the transportation security administration
Mr. Chairman, as stated previously, NTEU believes FPS' excessive
use of contract security guards has jeopardized its ability to protect
Federal facilities and serves as a warning to other agencies as to the
danger of an overreliance on the use of private contractors. Indeed,
one look no further than the problems associated with the
Federalization of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to
see how a reliance on private contractors can hamper an agency's
ability to carry out its mission.
After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the U.S. Government sought to
assure its citizens by changing the security screening programs at the
Nation's airports. Legislation was passed to create a new agency, the
Transportation Security Administration, and to ``Federalize'' the
screeners at the airports. That legislation also allowed TSA to utilize
the FAA's acquisition system as its own. It was exempt from complying
with the FAR (Federal Acquisition Regulations). Contracts were let with
little or no data on what would be required or what the cost would be.
For instance, in February 2002, TSA awarded a contract to NCS Pearson
Inc. to test, interview, fingerprint, medically evaluate and pre-
certify candidates for the Federal screening jobs. The original
contract was for $104 million. In less than a year, the contract was
costing $741 million. The contract let for airport bomb-detection
machines ballooned from $508 million to $1.2 billion. In a series of
Washington Post articles in 2005, the TSA employee managing the
contract for a state-of-the-art computer network for TSA said he picked
the ceiling amount for that contract ``out of the air''. People within
TSA said they knew the system would cost closer to $3 billion, but
didn't want to say so. In a 2004 report, GAO reviewed TSA's acquisition
procedures and found them lacking. In another report in 2006, GAO found
that TSA had signed contracts with Boeing for explosive detection
systems without any sound estimates of maintenance costs for the
machines. In addition, TSA had paid Boeing $44 million in provisional
award fees without any evaluation of Boeing's performance. A DHS
Inspector General report from November 2009 found that problems persist
today in TSA's management of its assets. The IG found that in some
instances, new equipment is stored for years before TSA figures out
where to send it. In 2007, the TSA Logistics Center received eight
explosive detection systems units at a cost of about $7 million. The
report states, ``As of January 2009, all eight explosive detection
systems units remained in storage at the Logistics Center.'' They
continued, ``As of January 2009, TSA also had 345 explosive trace
detection systems units, which cost about $10.6 million, in storage for
at least a year; some of these units had been in storage for more than
2 years.'' Congress reacted to the perceived shortcomings in the TSA
procurement process and included a provision in Pub. L. 110-161,
revoking TSA's exemption from the FAR.
Unfortunately, the contracts and equipment mistakes are not the
only problems created by forming an agency on an emergency basis. While
both the Bush administration and Congress seemed to say they were
``Federalizing'' the passenger screening system, a footnote placed in
the Aviation Security Transportation Act provided carte blanche power
to the head of TSA to create his or her own personnel system for these
workers. TSA employees are only ``kind of'' Federal employees. They
have no civil service protections. They are not on the General
Schedule. They are prohibited by directive from collective bargaining.
As a result of that footnote, we have a Government agency that is
managed by fear and favoritism. TSA has one of the highest attrition
rates in the Government. Transportation Security Officers are the
lowest paid professional staff in the Federal Government. TSA
consistently ranks as the lowest in morale of all of Government. NTEU
believes that it is time for these valuable employees to become part of
the rest of the civil service, with the rights and benefits due them.
We stand ready to work with this committee to see HR 1881 become a
reality.
If the committee decides to Federalize the contractors now working
for FPS, please do it right way. Bring those employees into the civil
service. Don't try to create something out of whole cloth. The General
Schedule adhered to by almost all of the Federal Government provides a
fair, transparent, and credible system for Federal employees. That's
where these employees should be placed, and that's where TSOs should be
placed.
Chairman Thompson. I now recognize Mr. David Wright to
summarize his statement for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF DAVID L. WRIGHT, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL FPS UNION
Mr. Wright. Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member King, Members
of the committee, my name is David Wright. I am president of
Local 918, the National Federal Protective Service Union,
affiliated with the American Federation of Government
Employees. I have been a law-enforcement officer with the
Federal Protective Service for over 23 years. I have seen this
agency go from a proud, committed, mission-focused agency to
one that seems more focused on saving money, rather than
protecting the employees of, and visitors to, Federal
buildings.
Mr. Chairman, my written testimony includes a detailed
recounting of the history of how FPS came to rely so heavily on
a contract-guard workforce that is inadequately monitored and,
oftentimes, ineffective on the job. In order to save time, I
will focus my remarks today on changes that need to be made to
enable the FPS to effectively perform its mission.
It is evident to us that the Federal Government can no
longer rely on private companies to provide private security
guards, whose training and authority is determined by
individual States and municipalities, to continue to protect
high-profile and high-security Federal properties. The risk is
too high to rely on an individual guard whose authority and
perception of that authority is guided by local Government and
his company's chain of command, whose priority is to minimize
liability to a company.
As in the recent case of badly needed X-ray machine
training, the massive effort needed to modify private security
contracts covering about 15,000 guards for each new training
requirement--is not feasible, and costs the taxpayers money
they can ill afford.
It is AFGE Local 918's recommendation that the FPS use the
model developed by U.S. Capitol Police. The officers that
provide security to the Capitol and Congressional office
buildings are Federal employees. They are law-enforcement
officers trained at the Federal law-enforcement training
center, and possess the authority of arrest on Federal
property. Local 918 also recommends hiring of police officers
for contract-guard monitoring, law-enforcement patrol, and
response. Civilian-mission support staff should be hired and
dedicated to the oversight of any remaining security contracts,
removing those recurring administrative duties from the law-
enforcement inspector.
It is AFGE Local 918's further recommendation that in-
sourcing start with the critical weapons detection and roving
patrol posts at facility security level four's major Federal
office buildings. Our unofficial estimate is that there are
between 5,500 and 6,500 FTE-equivalent positions that provide
weapons screening and roving patrol to our highest-risk
facilities.
The cost per hour that FPS pays low-bid companies for the
services that GAO found deficient approaches $40 an hour, on
average. Starting now with converting these positions with
proper training and supervision is not cheap, as doing the
right thing rarely is.
We estimate a total FTE of approximately 7,000, including
proper supervision, real benefits, and professional training at
a Nation-wide cost increase of almost $600 million. The
incremental costs would be in the range of $20,000 to $25,000
for a full-time position. Now is the time to start this
multiyear process, but it cannot be done at the expense of
needed increases to our inspector and police officer ranks.
Therefore, after FPS FTE is initially increased by at least
300, an additional 100 FTE is needed in fiscal year 2011 to
transition critical guard posts at 20 to 25 major Federal
buildings. The rate would be increased to 200 in fiscal year
2012 and 500 a year thereafter, until the Secretary of DHS can
certify all essential, critical, and high-risk facilities have
implemented protection of Federal employees by Federal law-
enforcement officers.
In conclusion, much has changed in the security of our
Federal workers and workplaces in the last 20 years. Screening
and roving patrol duties that were outsourced in the past no
longer serve as an effective measure. In today's dynamic threat
environment, our high-profile, high-risk Federal workplaces
demand the investment required to use Federal law-enforcement
officers to protect Federal properties. Now is the time to
smart with a--now is the time to start with a small downpayment
in fiscal year 2011, followed by increasing investment in
future years.
AFGE would be delighted to work with Congress to make this
happen.
Finally, I leave you with this thought: The recent high-
profile threats to Congressional figures and Federal employees
fall directly under the purview of Federal Protective Service.
Making the necessary reforms to this agency and increasing the
number of Federal police officers on duty are not a matter of
responding to vague, unsubstantiated warnings. The threat and
immediate danger is quite real. The writing is on the wall. I
am available for questions.
[The statement of Mr. Wright follows:]
Prepared Statement of David L. Wright
April 14, 2010
Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member King, and Members of the
committee: My name is David Wright. I am the president of the National
Federal Protective Service Union affiliated with the American
Federation of Government Employees. I have been a law enforcement
officer at the Federal Protective Service for over 23 years. I have
seen this agency go from a proud, committed, mission-focused agency to
one that seems more focused on saving money than protecting the
employees and citizens who work in Federal buildings.
growth in guard usage over time/reduction in oversight
The ratio of Federal Protective Service law enforcement officers--
with responsibility of monitoring and oversight--to private contract
security guards has steadily decreased:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Guards per
No. of FPS
Guards Officer
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year 2001................................. 5,000 6.3
Fiscal year 2003................................. 7,000 8.1
Fiscal year 2010................................. 15,000 18.3
------------------------------------------------------------------------
When I entered the Federal Protective Service in 1986, GS-083
Federal Police Officers (FPO's) were pay grade GS-5 essentially the
same grade as when buildings were guarded by Federal employees. Much
has changed since then when these officers were responsible for the
day-to-day monitoring of several thousand private contract security
guards (CG's) while also responding to law enforcement and security
calls for service. CG monitoring was a critical part of the day-to-day
oversight which also included daily inspections of all CG personnel on
duty during a given shift. Of course at that time there were less than
2,500 contract guards Nation-wide. Additionally, the year I arrived FPS
was reduced over 800 positions to an equivalent of 1,170 in-service
field staff--almost 200 more than today's minimum.
When guards were inspected each CG would have to provide evidence
of being lawfully present--employed by a security contractor of the
Federal Government, possessing of the appropriate law enforcement
agency commission (city or State) and certification of firearms
qualifications. Inspections also included determinations of the CG's
knowledge of and ability to perform duties according to post orders.
These included proper physical condition (asleep/intoxicated?),
necessary equipment (weapon/equipment/keys), and contraband items
(reading materials or the presence of a television). GS-083's were
responsible to the command for documenting these findings usually on a
daily, shift-to-shift basis--24 hours per day, 7 days per week. In
general, the private security guards--CG's--were only used at GSA-owned
Federal office buildings and complexes. The in-service staff, both
security specialists and Federal Police officers was in marked decline
in the years preceding the April 19, 1995 bombing of the Murrah Federal
Building in Oklahoma City. The assumption was that Federal employees
and buildings could be protected in the same manner as commercial
property with contractors in ``soft'' uniforms. It was dead wrong then
and it is wrong today!
After the Oklahoma City bombing, FPS' reliance on CG's increased
dramatically in an attempt to adhere to the newly established DOJ
Standards--the Security Assessment of Federal Facilities. FPS was
responsible for implementing the standards in GSA-controlled buildings.
The number of Federal Police Officers began to increase once again from
1996-1998, but despite a doubling of contract guards to 5,000, FPS
never approached the 1986 levels. As attempts to institute a more
professional FPO workforce increased, there was recognition that a
better pay scale was needed to draw the needed professionals into the
Agency--focusing so much responsibility on a GS 5 FPO was an
anachronism. The world had changed, our criminal and terrorist enemies
were developing ever more sophisticated strategies and tactics, and
building security and law enforcement became more complicated to
develop countermeasures to these threats.
Attempts to obtain Federal law enforcement status and increased pay
for the overworked FPO's failed. In 1998, plans to combine the GS-083
Police Officer and the GS-080 Physical Security Specialist were started
in order to retain and attract quality Federal employees to accomplish
the myriad of security and law enforcement tasks. The result was the
GS-080 Law Enforcement Security Officer (LESO or Inspector) series
which resulted in a journeyman level GS-12 for our law enforcement
officers that were to serve as community police officers providing both
security and law enforcement services. They were to partner with FPO in
medium and large cities who conducted around the clock patrols and
response in conjunction with the Inspectors.
Instead, the increased responsibilities attendant with the higher
pay grade demanded that the Inspector perform a significantly higher
degree of physical security duties to include building security
assessments and facilitation of the Building Security Committees
(BSC's) along with CG monitoring/oversight/and administrative portions
of Contracting Officer Technical Representative (COTR) duties. Based on
the ``jack of all trades'' and ``more bang for the buck'' mentality of
GSA and FPS management, they cut the FPO positions that are critical to
a realistic community policing strategy. The results of this idiocy
speak for themselves--GAO report after GAO report has documented the
inadequate protection of Federal employees and workplaces. Bottom line:
the lack of adequate staff has led to the decline of effective security
contract oversight. This decline coupled with the reliance on private/
for profit businesses has directly led to the inadequate overall
security screening and effectiveness at Federal properties.
Unfortunately, the concept was never properly resourced and
meanwhile more and more contract guards were added creating a surefire
failure point. GSA was clearly penny-wise and pound-foolish with their
extreme out-sourcing initiatives, meanwhile the Congress, the White
House Complex and the Pentagon continued use of FPO rather than
contract guards. The Federal employees in those facilities have the
full mantle of protection by other Federal employees--shouldn't the
most critical high-risk GSA facilities be protected in the same manner?
Absolutely they should!!!
The dangerous overreliance on contract guards also beget other
issues including that contract security authority is regulated by State
and municipal authorities in each locality. There is NO Federal
standard for law enforcement or arrest authority of private security
contractors in the United States. Consequently, a private CG's
authority varies widely from State to State, city to city. In some
States and cities, because of local regulation, the guards at Federal
buildings can't carry the OC spray or expandable baton intermediate
weapons mandated by National FPS requirements. Private security
companies are also very concerned with civil liability of their company
and employees. The result is a large workforce--without a vested
interest in a Federal career--that varies in dedication to mission of
protection of Federal properties, Federal employees, and visitors to
those properties. It is not a rare occasion that CG's will abandon
their duties due to non-payment by the guard company.
The effectiveness of Federal Acquisition Regulations in the
administration of security contracts has suffered by the repeated
failures to impose any meaningful penalty for contract deficiencies
such as unmanned posts--posts ``guarded'' by uncertified guards, guards
who were asleep, on no guard at all. All too often the only cost to a
contractor for failing to provide a guard is they don't get paid the
hourly rate. As you can expect causing them to save wage and benefit
costs and forgo their profit provides little incentive to curtail the
practice. A private company's ability to dispute and defeat any
attempts at ``cure'' of a Federal contract failure have increased over
the years as oversight has become ineffective and the companies learn
to game the system as part of their ``business plans''.
The resultant failures of an all contractor access control and
patrol force at high-risk buildings were well-defined by GAO in the
preliminary report to Congress in July 2009:
The GAO identified concerns with FPS' use of contract security
guards, including the fact that CG's have authority only for
detention--not arrest--of suspects. GAO also verified that FPS does not
fully ensure that its contract security guards have the training and
certifications required to secure Federal facilities; that there is not
a reliable method for monitoring and verifying contract guard training
and certification requirements; that FPS did not have specific National
guidance on when and how contract guard inspections should be
performed; and that FPS inspections of contract security guard posts at
Federal facilities are inconsistent, and the quality of the inspections
varies across FPS regions.
Findings of the GAO in the preliminary report also include reports
of ill-trained security guards asleep on the job or inattentive to
duties. Introduction and assembly of bomb-making materials into 10
security level 4 facilities across the Nation stunned Congress, the
public, and the media.
There are approximately 750 street-level law enforcement officers
responsible for all CG training, monitoring and oversight, law
enforcement patrol, response to law enforcement/security calls for
service and physical security administration duties. A schedule has
been released to mandate regular inspections of CG's different security
level facilities. These efforts are ineffective in that the schedule
pertains to the facility guard post and is based only on the security
level not the number of individual CG or even the number of posts at a
certain facility. Thus some posts and guards will be inspected every
week, while others may only be inspected two or three times a year. It
is also conceivable that some CG's can evade inspection for years.
Efforts to provide more training to CG's in detection of bomb-
making materials have become a quagmire. Time required for ``train the
trainer'' efforts to instruct FPS Inspectors--who in turn will train
other FPS Inspectors--in order to train CG's--is a luxury that the
American public cannot afford. In order for the increased training to
CG's occur, all private security contracts have to be modified before
Agency policy can be modified. Bottom line--there has been significant
training in a few regions but across the entire guard force the only
training that has occurred since the GAO preliminary report in July
2010 is the mandated viewing of a new video in bomb detection. And that
took several weeks to negotiate and issue a contract modification. Here
again the dysfunctional funding scheme of FPS comes into play. In order
to increase the number of training hours and require all guards to be
retrained on weapons detection FPS must get its DHS contracting section
to determine what price each contractor will charge, FPS must change
the building specific security charge to pay for the cost, and then
(after much red tape and paper) the contracting officers can issue the
modification and training can commence. If these critical guards were
Federal employees the training would already be done.
The result of the mandate for increased monitoring/oversight by FPS
law enforcement officers has also resulted in less proactive patrol,
less law enforcement response capabilities, and less time for proper
physical security assessments. Efforts by FPS to increase private
security contracts and CG monitoring/oversight as result of the GAO
findings have ``robbed Peter to pay Paul''.
The Risk Assessment Management Program (RAMP)--a web-based program
rolled out in November 2009 includes a guard management section that--
to date--has been useless in CG monitoring and private security
contract oversight activities.
The GAO's documentation of the lack of effective oversight of
security contracts speaks to the ``jack of all trades'' mentality of
FPS management in decreasing manpower and combining distinct job duties
into the Inspector position. This is all a direct result of the fee
funding scheme mandated for FPS. Efforts to increase security fees in
order to increase revenue are an exercise in futility.
where do we go from here?
It is evident that the Federal Government can no longer rely on
private companies to provide private security guards--whose training
and authority is determined by individual States and municipalities--to
continue to protect high-profile, high-security Federal properties. The
massive effort needed to modify private security contracts--covering
about 13 to 15 thousand guards--for each new training requirement is
not feasible and costs the taxpayer money they can ill afford.
The risk is too high to rely on an individual guard whose
authority--and perception of that authority is guided by local
government and his company ``chain of command''--whose priority is to
minimize liability and increase profit to the shareholder.
It is AFGE Local 918's recommendation that the FPS use the model
developed by the U.S. Capitol Police and the U.S. Secret Service
Uniformed Division. The officers that provide security at the Capitol
and Congressional office buildings are Federal employees. They are
trained at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) and
possess the authority of arrest on Federal property.
A mandate of Federal GS-083 or GS-1801, grade 6/7 Federal
Protective Officers at entry points of security level 3 and 4 GSA
controlled buildings would provide an increased layer of protection by
Federal law enforcement officers with the requisite authority,
responsibility, and duty to intervene in law enforcement and security
incidents. This agile force could rapidly adapt to change driven by the
dynamic threat environment in which we operate. Changes in training and
other requirements could be immediately implemented without worrying
about the amount a company can gouge the Government with an ``equitable
adjustment''.
A mandate to increase the number of GS-083, grade 7 and 9 FPO's
would provide mobile patrol response and increased CG monitoring at
significantly fewer security level 1 and 2 (lower profile) facilities.
That model would also provide a career ladder to Federal law
enforcement officers of the FPS. Beginning at the GS-6/7 level, the FPO
would compete for the higher-level positions whose duties would include
proactive mobile patrol, response to law enforcement calls for service,
lead/supervisory police duties and eventually an Inspector position.
This concept would lend the added benefit of developing a single ``FPS
culture'' which has been lacking since the inception of FPS.
Local 918 also recommends hiring of civilian security specialist
COTR who would be dedicated to the oversight of remaining security
contracts--removing those recurring administrative duties from the
Inspector--thereby allowing the successful performance of increased law
enforcement response and physical security duties.
In order to facilitate the hiring and maintenance of these
personnel, it is important that Congress mandate a different approach
to the funding FPS. The present system of funding by security fees is
at best ineffective and counterproductive. At worst it is a serious
hindrance to daily security of Federal buildings in this country. In
the past, Agency and Union efforts to seek increased funding through
direct appropriations have gone unheeded and have resulted in the
dilemma that we see today--a reduction of dedicated civil servants in
favor of a disjointed contract security force with hundreds of private
company personnel serving as the ``chain of command'' at each major
Federal property.
how to in-source?
It is AFGE Local 918's recommendation that in-sourcing start with
the critical weapons detection and roving patrol posts at the major
Federal office buildings at Facility Security Level 4 and some Level 3.
Our unofficial estimate is that there are between 5,500 and 6,500
FTE equivalent positions that provide weapons screening and roving
patrol at our highest-risk facilities. The cost per hour FPS pays the
low bidder companies for the service the GAO found deficient approaches
$40 an hour on average. Starting now with converting these positions
with proper training and supervision is not cheap--as doing the right
thing rarely is. We estimate a total FTE of approximately 7,000
including proper supervision, real benefits, and professional training
at a Nation-wide cost of almost $600 million. The incremental cost
would be in the range of $20k to $25K per full-time position.
Now is the time to start this multi-year process, but it cannot be
done at the expense of increases in our inspectors and police officers
for increased service hours. Therefore after FPS FTE is increased by at
least 300, an additional 100 FTE for fiscal year 2011 to transition-
critical posts at 20 to 25 buildings would get us started on the road
to proper protection of our dedicated Federal employees. The rate could
be increased to 200 in fiscal year 2012 and 500 a year thereafter until
the Secretary of DHS can certify all essential, critical, and high-risk
facilities have implemented protection of Federal employees by Federal
employees.
In conclusion, AFGE Local 918 asks this committee to seize this
opportunity--before the next attack--to remedy the FPS dilemma.
Priority 1 is the introduction of the GS-083 FPO (GS 6/7)
workforces that would take over responsibilities for daily weapons
screening and roving patrols at all high security Federal office
buildings.
Priority 2 is that the GS-083 FPO (GS 8/9/10/11) workforce must be
reinvigorated to increase monitoring of the remaining CG workforce and
to perform law enforcement patrols and response.
Priority 3 is the hiring of civilian personnel to reinstitute the
District Contract Guard Program Manager with COTR duties--who would be
responsible for the daily oversight of the remaining CG workforce and
private security contracts.
In conclusion, much has changed in the security of our Federal
workers and workplaces in the last 20 years. The screening and roving
patrol duties that were outsourced in the past no longer serve as an
effective measure. In today's dynamic threat environment our high-
profile, high-risk Federal workplaces demand the investment required to
use Federal employees to protect Federal employees. Now is the time to
start with a small downpayment in fiscal year 2011 followed by
increasing investment in future years. AFGE would be delighted to work
with the Congress to make this happen. The safety of our dedicated
civil servants is too important to continue with a failed structure.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you for your testimony.
I now recognize Mr. Amitay to summarize his statement for 5
minutes.
STATEMENT OF STEPHEN D. AMITAY, FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL,
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITY COMPANIES
Mr. Amitay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
My name is Steve Amitay, and I am Federal legislative
counsel of NASCO, the National Association of Security
Companies. NASCO is the Nation's largest contract-security
trade association, representing private security companies that
employ more than 400,000 security officers across the USA.
Today's hearing asks the question of whether the
Federalization of FPS contract security guards will improve
security. The answer to that question is: No.
What will improve security, though, is better-paid guards
and better training, oversight, accountability, management, and
administration of guards. These improvements can be
accomplished without Federalizing FPS guards, in an efficient
and an effective manner.
In the recently released draft OMB in-sourcing policy
letter, OMB notes that building security is not inherently
governmental in function, and should continue to be performed
by contractors. In the GAO's numerous reviews of the contract-
guard program, GAO has never inferred that the program's
problems and poor guard performance is a symptom of the
contractor nature of the guards.
Mr. Ervin and Mr. Wright, too, have made the argument for
Federalization on the basis that because private contractors
seek to make profits, they will seek to cut costs to maximize
profits, and this translates into providing a lesser service--
in this case, security. Mr. Ervin also asserts that
Federalization of airport screeners was ``in recognition that
before 9/11, contractors put profit ahead of security.''
First, the inference that the use of private screeners at
airports allowed for the tragedy of 9/11 to take place is not
only wrong, but it is offensive. FAA regulations in place on 9/
11 permitted the weapons the 9/11 terrorists used to take over
the planes to be brought on board. The 9/11 Commission Report
found that each security layer relevant to hijackings--
intelligence, passenger pre-screening, checkpoint screening,
and on-board security--were seriously flawed prior to 9/11.
Second, and more generally, to make the assertion that a
private contractor's desire to make a private means a private
security guard will not perform as well as a ``nonprofit
Federal security guard'' is outright false. It is a dubious
indictment of all Government service contractors and, for that
matter, American capitalism.
While cutting costs is one way for a contractor to increase
profits, what also increases a contractor's profits is
providing excellent service in order to retain contracts and to
expand one's customer base. Also, in the private sector,
constant competition from other contractors create an incentive
to perform well, employ best practices, and seek to constantly
improve.
These performance drivers are not present in the Federal
sector. The Federal workplace is beset with a host of
performance and motivation issues.
One such issue is accountability, which Mr. Ervin noted, is
key to better performance. I would note that an FPS contract
guard can be removed immediately by FPS for poor performance.
This is virtually impossible with Federal employees, and
becomes even harder as time goes by.
As to the notion that contract guards would have less
training than Federal guards--as it should be clear by now, it
is the FPS who sets the training requirements for guards. A
Federalized guard will only have the amount of training
required by FPS to stand post. However, as is often the case, a
contract guard has all the required FPS training, and
additional training from his company, if deemed necessary for
proper performance.
The impetus for today's discussion in--calls for
Federalizing FPS contract guards is the admittedly dismal
results of contract guards in the GAO covert-explosion-
detection test. But would Federal guards have fared better in
these tests? In 2007, several years after airports switched
from private screeners to Federal screeners, GAO conducted
covert-explosion-detection tests on TSA Federal screeners that
were virtually identical to the test that the GAO conducted on
FPS contract security guards. The results were also identical
and, perhaps, even more troubling, given the significant
Federal investment in training TSA Federal--that have been
invested in Federal screeners.
Mr. Ervin, though, argues that it would still be better
than pre-9/11 screeners. But what about private screeners after
9/11? In fact, in 2007, TSA commissioned a study of the
performance of private airport screeners, which are allowed to
work at airports under the Screening Partnership Program.
The study found that private screeners' performance was
``equal or better,'' than that of Federal TSA screeners.
Perhaps TSA should be looking more to outsourcing to improve
screener performance. In a more recent real-life comparison of
contractor versus Federal security--in the last year, there
were three incidents where an armed gunman entered a Federal
facility and started shooting. In all three incidents, security
personnel were able to neutralize the gunman before he could
proceed any further. In two of the incidents, the security was
contract security. In the other, it was Federal security.
In looking at the problems of guard performance, one must
look at the root causes--inadequate FPS training for X-ray and
magnetometers is frequently cited. If such training is poor,
then it does not matter if the recipient of the training is
Federal or private. The outcome will be the same. The same goes
for supervision and management.
Federalizing FPS contract guards at Federal facilities
would not only be a massive undertaking and come at a great
expense, but it will create new workforce difficulties for FPS
and, most significantly, as the TSA experience clearly shows,
improvements in security, compared to using contractors could
be non-existent.
Any cost-benefit analysis of Federalizing FPS guards should
consider all the relevant factors and costs and be done on an
equal basis.
Finally, NASCO fully agrees with the notion that the
protection of Federal buildings should be driven by security
concerns and not budgetary ones. We support the inclusion of
higher performance-related standards and contracts to ensure
that the quality of a company's training, personnel,
management, and operational procedures are adequately
considered during the procurement process. This will result in
higher bids, but it will also result in better-trained and
better-paid and better-motivated contract security officers who
will be held strictly accountable.
Money should also be made available for more FPS inspectors
and COTRs to provide the management, oversight, and training
for guards, as the key to any successful program is management
and oversight. Thank you.
[The statement of Mr. Amitay follows:]
Prepared Statement of Stephen D. Amitay
April 16, 2010
background on private performance versus federal performance
In the past year there have been three separate incidents where at
the entrance of crowded Federal facility an armed gunman started
shooting. The first incident was last July at the U.S. Holocaust Museum
in Washington. The second incident was in January at the U.S. Court
House in Las Vegas, Nevada. The third, and most recent incident, was in
March at the Pentagon in Virginia. In all three incidents the gunmen
opened fire at the security personnel stationed at the entrance.
Tragically, in two of the incidents security personnel were killed by
the gunman, but in all three incidents security personnel were able to
neutralize the gunmen before he could proceed any further and without
any additional loss of life.
At the Holocaust Museum, the security personnel who stopped the
gunman were contract security officers. In Las Vegas, the security
personnel were also contract security officers. At the Pentagon, the
security personnel were Pentagon police officers.
However, while it can be shown that contract security officers can
be as proficient in providing security at Federal facilities as Federal
security/police officers; the impetus for today's hearing on the
potential for Federalization of FPS contract security officers stems
directly from the troubling results of GAO's 2009 covert explosive
detection testing at FPS Federal facilities. In these tests, GAO
investigators ``with the components for an improvised explosive device
(IED) concealed on their persons . . . passed undetected through access
points controlled by FPS guards.''\1\ Based on the failure of the FPS
contract guards in these tests, it has been suggested that just as
private screeners at airports were Federalized to increase screener
performance and security at airports, FPS guards should also be
Federalized to increase performance and security at high-risk Federal
facilities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ GAO, Homeland Security: Preliminary Results Show Federal
Protective Service's Ability to Protect Federal Facilities Is Hampered
By Weaknesses in Its Contract Security Guard Program, GAO-09-859T
(Washington, DC: July 8, 2009).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It has been estimated that the cost of replacing a contract
security officer with a Federal officer will be on the magnitude of two
to three times more expensive. But for the time being putting aside the
massive increased cost per officer aside and other inherent management
and workforce problems associated with converting contractors to
Federal employees, today's hearing is about whether Federalizing
security officers at FPS guarded facilities will improve job
performance and thus security.
In 2007, several years after airports had switched from private
screeners to Federal transportation security officers, GAO conducted
covert explosive detection tests on the TSA officers that were
virtually identical to the tests of FPS contract security. How did the
Federal security officers fare? The results were that ``GAO
investigators succeeded in passing through TSA security screening
checkpoints undetected with components for several improvised explosive
devices (IED) and an improvised incendiary device (IID) concealed in
their carry-on luggage and on their persons.''\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ GAO, ``Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities Exposed Through
Covert Testing of TSA's Passenger Screening Process,'' Statement of
Gregory D. Kutz, Managing Director Forensic Audits and Special
Investigations; John W. Cooney, Assistant Director Forensic Audits and
Special Investigations GAO-08-48T, November 17, 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
These were not the first (or last) failed explosive screening tests
by Federal TSA security officers, and in the wake of these and other
failed tests, one of my fellow witnesses, Mr. Clark Kent Ervin, the
former Homeland Security inspector general, told this very committee in
November 2007 that,
``The sad fact is that for all the dollars and attention that has been
focused on screener performance since 9/11 study after study--by the
DHS Inspector General, the Government Accountability Office; news
organizations, and, even, the TSA itself--shows that it is just as easy
today to sneak these deadly weapons past screeners than it was on 9/
11.''\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Statement of Clark Kent Ervin before the House Homeland
Security Committee November 14, 2007 Hearing ``Did TSA Tip Off Airport
Screeners about Covert Testing?''
The above examples of both exemplary and non-exemplary performance
by Federal and contract security demonstrate that it would be
inaccurate to assume that Federalizing security guards at FPS-protected
facilities will lead to greater performance and security at the
facilities. In fact, it bears noting that a 2007 TSA-sponsored study
analyzing the performance of private contractor passenger screening at
airports (permitted under the Screening Partnership Program) found that
private screeners performed at a level that was ``equal to or greater
than'' that of TSA Federal transportation security officers.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Catapult Consultants, Private Screening Operations: Business
Case Analysis, Transportation Security Administration, Screening
Partnership Program, December 14, 2007 SEE ALSO, GAO, ``Aviation
Security: TSA's Cost and Performance Study of Private Sector Airport
Screening'' GAO-09-27R, January 9, 2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
the problem of poor guard performance
In the GAO's numerous reviews of the operation of the FPS
``Contract Guard Program,'' GAO has never inferred that contract
security officers are incapable or unable to fulfill the security
responsibilities of their posts or increase performance. As GAO
accurately describes, ``Guards are primarily responsible for
controlling access to Federal facilities by: (1) Checking the
identification of Government employees as well as members of the public
who work in and visit Federal facilities, and (2) operating security
equipment, such as X-ray machines and magnetometers to screen for
prohibited materials such as firearms, knives, explosives, or items
intended to be used to fabricate an explosive or incendiary
device.''\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ See July GAO report in Footnote 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In commenting on poor performance by FPS guards, the GAO and other
reports often cite weaknesses in the training of contract security
officers in building access control procedures, and particularly in the
obviously crucial area of magnetometer and X-ray machine training. The
FPS has always had the responsibility to conduct training in this area.
In its July 2009 report on the Contract Guard Program the GAO noted
that in some cases the required X-ray and magnetometer training was
simply not provided to contract security officers or in other cases it
was inadequate.
Federalizing contract security forces will not change the outcome
of poor training. When making decisions about Federalizing the force,
one must look at the root causes of the current deficiencies and one
root cause is poor training administered by the FPS, not necessarily
the recipient of the training. What then is needed is what FPS has
started to do, conduct more X-ray and magnetometer training with
improved and consistent procedures across all regions of the country.
The new ``National Weapons Detection Training Program'' will include 16
hours of standardized screening and detection training, and 8 hours
annual refresher training. In the past such crucial training consisted
of a total of 8 hours and it was not uniform, leading to further
problems and confusion. In addition, through its new ``Operation
Shield'' program, FPS has increased the number of internal FPS covert
tests of contract guard performance. NASCO would also like to see
greater development of well-written policies and consistent application
of access control standards across the board (both intra and inter
regional).
Again, quoting from Mr. Ervin's 2007 testimony on airport screener
performance; ``There should be no mystery as to what it takes to
improve screener performance significantly. The recommendations that my
former office made four years ago remain as valid today as they were
then. Screeners need to be trained regularly and stringently, under
conditions that approximate real world ones as closely as possible.''
other efforts and areas to address to improve fps security officer
performance
Training and standards for FPS contract guards (``protective
security officers'') have also been updated and/or improved in other
key areas besides detection (such as firearm qualification, equipment,
physical requirements). These efforts are the result of a comprehensive
``job task analysis'' recently completed by the FPS to produce
``validated'' and ``defensible'' standards that have been carefully
crafted and substantiated that will improve the performance of security
officers. These FPS security officer standards could potentially be
applied to contract security officers throughout the Federal
Government.
NASCO believes the new training procedures and programs and other
improvements currently being implemented by the FPS in partnership with
the contract security community will increase performance given proper
time and resources. FPS is also taking other steps beyond better
training that will improve the contract guard program and lead to
better guard performance. There are also some areas where more work
involving FPS and contractors is still needed.
On the operational level, FPS' new Risk Assessment Management
Program (RAMP)--a centralized interactive database management system--
potentially could provide for a big improvement over the current
unreliable de-centralized CERTS system for collecting and monitoring
training and certification data. RAMP should make the input and
management of data more efficient and provide FPS with access to more
up-to-date and reliable data in one location. However, contractors must
also be able benefit from RAMP's improvements in data management. FPS
has told contractors they will not provide information on the status of
certifications of FPS security officers and that training must be
provided by the company for all officers, even if such officers had
previously received the training while working for a different FPS
contractor. This will mandate higher prices for what could be
unnecessary training and ultimately favor incumbents, who may not have
the same high level of past performance delivery as an outside
competing contractor but will have a pricing advantage. For its own
potential benefit, FPS should share information related to the previous
training and certification of officers when a contract is taken over by
a new contractor.
There are other areas where more work can be done. The GAO noted
that improvements in building-specific and scenario-specific training
are needed and improvements in these areas could be very beneficial.
More guidance is needed on the issue of arrest versus detain and post
orders can be improved in this regard.
The GAO also called for better management and oversight of Contract
Guard Program contracts and the need for more and better trained
Contracting Officer Technical Representatives (COTRs). Efforts are
underway to assign more COTRs. Underlying better management and
oversight is the need for better communication between FPS offices, and
between FPS and contractors. In some instances training has been
affected by a lack of communication between FPS headquarters and the
field. NASCO commends FPS efforts to ascertain the problems and
concerns of contractors with information flow and efficiency issues
that have caused delays and added expenses in the hiring and processing
of officers.
Another issue that was recently the subject of a Congressional
hearing and has been a persistent problem is how the security of
individual Federal buildings is managed. Building security is managed
by what is referred to as a Building Security Committee (BSC) made up
of building tenant representatives, who more often then not do have any
security background. The BSC is commonly chaired by a primary tenant
agency of the building and the FPS COTR may or may not be active in
this committee. Often, the BSC is more interested in ``customer
service'' than building security. This forces the security contractor
to answer to two masters when the BSC does not want to cause any
hindrance to the access to the building through the now more stringent
access control processes as advocated by the FPS.
Improvements in contract oversight and management, data automation,
standardization of policies and guidance, communication, and especially
expanded and more frequent training will definitely improve performance
of contractors and security officers in the Contract Guard Program. The
flaws and weaknesses found in contractor performance by the GAO though
also point to another area in which FPS can take action that will
increase contractor and officer performance. NASCO strongly urges FPS
to take all the necessary steps required so that in the contractor
procurement process quality will play a primary role in the selection
of a private security company and not cost. There are tangible reasons
why higher quality security costs more. Being able to provide high-
caliber officers means the company is paying higher salaries; better
company training and screening costs more; strong company management
and internal oversight are also factors. The FPS contract award process
must continue to be improved to ensure that quality service and
performance, in relation to cost, is properly considered.
NASCO is not alone in believing that awards allegedly based on
``best value'' are more realistically based on lowest cost, and
technical capability and past performance are not being valued as they
should. The FPS is now placing more emphasis on past performance rather
than the ``low bid'' approach but price is still a deciding factor (the
three evaluation criteria are now past performance, technical approach,
and price). NASCO also supports the inclusion of higher performance-
related standards in contracts, as well as taking steps to ensure that
the quality of a company's training, personnel, management, and
operational procedures--which result in a higher bid--are adequately
considered during the procurement process. Companies should not be
essentially penalized for going beyond the minimum training and
management standards required by the contract.
background on nasco and private security
NASCO is the Nation's largest contract security trade association,
representing private security companies that employ more than 400,000
security officers across the Nation who are servicing commercial and
Governmental clients including the Federal Protective Service (FPS).
Formed in 1972, NASCO has strived to increase awareness and
understanding among policy-makers, consumers, the media, and the
general public of the important role of private security in
safeguarding persons and property. NASCO also has been a leading
advocate for raising standards at the Federal, State, and local level
for the licensing of private security firms and the registration,
screening, and training of security officers.
Nearly 2 million people are employed in private security
domestically compared to fewer than 700,000 public law enforcement
personnel. Approximately 75 percent of private security personnel work
for contract security companies, with the balance serving as
proprietary or ``in-house'' security. The vast majority of contract
security firms employ many former law enforcement and military
personnel in senior management. Private security officers are guarding
Federal facilities, businesses, public areas, and critical
infrastructure sites (of which almost 90% are protected by private
security officers).
the transfer of fps from ice to nppd
The transfer of FPS from under ICE to NPPD is a very positive move.
The Federal infrastructure protection mission of FPS aligns with NPPD's
mission to protect all critical infrastructure (of which Federal
buildings is an important element). This alignment should lead to
greater effectiveness for both NPPD and FPS. NPPD also chairs the
operations of the Interagency Security Committee, which is the lead in
the Federal Government for setting Government-wide security policies
for Federal facilities.
concluding remarks
Under the leadership of Director Schenkel, and with the new
initiatives within the Contract Guard Program in the last 18 months,
FPS is making strides to rectify the problems with the program. FPS has
come a long way since its troubled time within ICE, and with the
continued partnering with quality private companies; the security of
Federal buildings will continue to improve. The GAO covert tests and
other field work related to contract security officers was conducted
over a year ago, and much has already improved since then.
The proposition of ``insourcing'' FPS security officers at critical
facilities would not only come at a great expense, impede the current
efforts underway to improve contractor performance, and potentially
create new difficulties for FPS, but as the TSA example clearly shows,
the improvements in security could be marginal. With resources scarce
and tenant agencies resistant to increased fees and security
assessments, there is still much FPS can do within its budget or with
modest realistic increases to improve the quality, selection, and
training for FPS contract security officers to provide better security
at Federal facilities. If more resources are available, an increase in
the permanent number of FPS Inspectors could provide for better
oversight and management of the contract security force, more training,
more building assessments and inspections, and improvements in other
related elements of the FPS mission.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
Mr. Dent has requested to go first because of another
commitment. The Chair has decided to honor the request.
Mr. Dent.
Mr. Dent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for your
continued courtesies. You are always a real gentleman here, and
I appreciate your consideration once more.
My question is to Mr. Amitay. It is just one question.
GAO has issued several reports identifying weaknesses in
the training of contract security guards. In your testimony,
you cite additional steps that can be taken to improve security
in Federal facilities provided by contract guards in light of
the several GAO reports that have identified weaknesses in
contract-guard training and oversight.
What are some examples of steps that can be taken to
improve security at Federal facilities?
Mr. Amitay. Well, I think one step that Director Schenkel
has talked about is the fact that the X-ray and magnetometer
training now has gone from previously 8 hours to 16 hours and,
also, an 8-hour annual refresher course. We also believe
Operation Shield, which provides for red-teaming and covert
tests--that also should be increased. Then, of course, there is
obviously better oversight of guards, better contract
management.
You know, for instance, these companies that are not
performing due to the specifications of the contract, action
should be taken against them, and, perhaps, their contracts--
you know, they should not be awarded these contracts. There is
a lot that can be done within the current system to improve
performance.
Mr. Dent. Thank you.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the consideration.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
The purpose of this hearing, at the full-committee level,
was to look at Federalization as one option, given the GAO
report we recently received. The other question is: Anything
less than 100 percent success is something we have to work
toward, if we don't have it.
The GAO found significant vulnerabilities within the
present system.
Mr. Wright, as an FPS employee, are you any less in a
position to protect a Federal building because you are in a
union?
Mr. Wright. No. I see that, especially in this case, the
union is working towards improved security of Federal
properties. We brought this issue to the committee in 2007. It
is, quite frankly, my union employees that raised this issue.
The mere fact that we are a union is not a problem.
Chairman Thompson. Well, the reason I raised it is one of
the questions that we have had to respond to from time to time
is that, somehow, employees who belong to unions, if a crisis
situation would occur or some other situation, the union
contract would be more of a binding document in that particular
situation.
The response has always been, ``We have policemen who
belong to unions. We have firemen. We have other professional
people in law enforcement. That has never been an issue.'' Even
in this situation, even though you are here to comment, your
testimony comes back to say that you will do your job,
regardless to whatever the circumstances.
Mr. Wright. Correct.
I foresee no instance in an emergency situation,
especially, or any--even exigent circumstances--where a Federal
officer would stand on that union contract and not do his
duties.
Chairman Thompson. Mr. Amitay, I would say to you the same
question for contract employees--do you see that being a
problem in the performance of their security role in Federal
buildings?
Mr. Amitay. No. Many of the FPS contract security officers
are a member of security-officer unions. We don't--whether they
are union or non-union, that is not an issue, in my opinion.
Chairman Thompson. Right.
The framework for the GAO report, we used as the main
support for this hearing. Our question is it FPS' failure to
provide the adequate oversight for private security personnel,
or is it the private security personnel not providing oversight
of the people they employ in performance of those contracts? In
some instances, it works both ways.
We hold FPS directly responsible because they are the
contracting agency. However, there is a responsibility to those
contractors, just as you indicated, Mr. Amitay--that they have
to perform. There is no question that if you have a contract,
you have to do it.
Even though GAO and FPS was at odds in some of the analysis
of the information--and staff will get to the bottom of it--
they are at odds. I am concerned that there are still some gaps
in training, there are still some gaps in certifying of
employees, whether or not it is the collection of the data and
documentation, or the fact that they exist. Both circumstances
are totally unacceptable.
What we are trying to offer the public is that, at any time
you enter a Federal building, that building is secured by the
most professional individuals that we can identify, whether
they are members of the Federal Protective Service or contract-
guard individuals. We just want to make sure that the public is
aware.
We have some challenges. I would say to both of you that
this is our third hearing on this issue. We will look forward
to working with both you and some other interested groups to
try to make sure that whatever we come with, the public at
large is protected. With that, I will yield to the gentlelady
from Texas for 5 minutes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. This is
a very important hearing. I know that we have had
representatives from the Federal Protective Service, the
physical infrastructure issues of the Government Accountability
Office and, of course, the director of the Homeland Security
Program on the Aspen Institute--and familiar with their
testimony. I wanted to probe these points.
Mr. Chairman, I am in a Federal building, and have utilized
the security that is at that building. I would like to put on
the record it is the Mickey Leland Federal Building in Houston,
Texas. I want to pay tribute and compliment the individuals
that are working hard there every day, and the diligence and
attention to their position. However, at the same time, I know
there are questions of hours, there are questions of
compensation, questions of benefits, questions of having enough
persons around the clock. I might say that there might say that
there might be even questions of training.
I think we have to find a way to address those issues,
because our job is to secure America. So I would like to pose a
question to Mr. Wright, and then to Mr. Amitay.
One of the things that disturbs me is the idea that when
you have a contractual relationship for securing a Federal
building, those security personnel may be impacted by State and
local laws--different State and local laws, which would also
speak to the difficulty of having consistent training.
Mr. Wright, what do you think about the idea of
Federalization--that it would cure the disparate laws that have
to be utilized, and also maybe different standards, as it
relates to training?
Mr. Wright. Yes, I have said all along and I think Mr.
Green alluded to it a bit earlier. The authority of private
contract security comes from State and local municipalities.
There is no Federal standard for these certifications.
We have to rely on companies to comply with--I come from
Kansas City. We have to rely on the companies to comply with
Kansas City standards, and come to FPS and show us that
certification. So I think that is a lot of the problem with the
documentation going on in these files. It is not FPS working
with the Kansas City Board of Police Commissioners. It is a
private company working with the Board of Police Commissioners
and, thereby, that information flows back to us. So that is a
huge problem.
Ms. Jackson Lee. In the Federalization, if that was to
occur--because I worry about people's jobs and hardworking
individuals that I see working every day--in the
Federalization, would we be able to recruit from those existing
individuals?
Mr. Wright. Yes, absolutely. I think that is really--given
experience, that is the way to go. Please, this is not a
denigration of our contract security officers at all. This is
really a denigration of the lack of a Federal authority, the
lack of State and local governments that send these individuals
over to guard our Federal buildings.
I would like to clarify one other thing, earlier, in
regards to oversight. We have been told--or the testimony was
made at the committee that FPS supervises these security
officers. We do not. We can supervise in an actually emergency
situation.
Ms. Jackson Lee. But not otherwise?
Mr. Wright. Correct.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me move to Mr. Amitay.
Thank you. I am glad you clarified that on the record.
Mr. Amitay, I think there are probably some very good
contractors. I have worked with them. But we do find that the
GAO found that contractors continued to send guards to stand
posts without ensuring that they have had certification.
There may be a balance between Federalization and some
contractors being used. But the key element is: How do you
train and certify, and have you been inconsistent in your
organization, or the contractors, with that training and
certification?
Mr. Amitay. Well, two points--first of all, the training
requirements and certification requirements are set by FPS. A
lot of these certification requirements and training
requirements are pretty clear--you know, weapons training,
vision certification, first aid certification. These are things
that, objectively, can be obtained.
The problem is, though--you are right. Some of these
contractors are not--they are not doing it correctly. I mean,
maybe there is a problem with the system. But I think the GAO
has made it pretty clear that there are instances where the
contractors are not living up to the requirements that are set
by FPS.
In those instances, corrective action should be taken and,
if need be, these contractors should not be getting these
contracts, especially not being then--you know, given them
again, which is sometimes the case. There are plenty of FPS
contractors out there who have very good records of
performance, very good records of certification; very good
relationships with FPS.
But if we have a contracting process that goes to the
lowest bidder and we have an oversight process that is
inadequate, then you are going to have these instances of
faulty contractor performance, just as, if there were all
Federalized guards, and there wasn't adequate oversight, you
could have instances of faulty Federal-guard performance.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, let me, as I yield back to
you, really thank Mr. Amitay for his straightforwardness and
directness that there are some Achilles' heels and some
failures on lack of training and certification. As you well
know, we have the obligation of Federal buildings and securing
them.
So I would just hope, as we go forward and we look at the
legislation, that we take into consideration maybe there is a--
as we do in other Federalization--there is probably a balance
where there are some private contractors. Mr. Chairman, I just
want to make sure that those who are working may have the
opportunity to apply--that legislation includes the opportunity
for those existing individuals to apply to the Federal system,
because many of them are dedicated and committed to their
profession and to their jobs.
With that, I yield back to the Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
As you know, the Department is proposing to in-source 3,500
contract jobs this fiscal year.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Right.
Chairman Thompson. But none of them are with FPS. So, at
this point, everything is as is. But I agree with you that,
going forward, if in-sourcing would occur within FPS, those
individuals who are private would, in fact, have some priority
status for placement.
But I also would want to indicate to Mr. Amitay that his
support of contractors doing what they contract for goes a long
way with this committee.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Yes.
Chairman Thompson. I raised it in the other panel that
there is no substitute for doing it right. If we are not, as
FPS, performing the necessary oversight on the contracts, shame
on us.
Ms. Jackson Lee. That is right. We have seen the loss of
life.
Chairman Thompson. Absolutely.
So we will continue.
I would like to thank both gentlemen for their valuable
testimony, and the Members for their questions.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, this gentleman had his hand
up. I don't know if you want to recognize him.
Chairman Thompson. Oh.
Mr. Wright.
Mr. Wright. I would like to make a clarification to the
record. The RAMP program is not working. The RAMP program has
not worked since day one. The one program that is absolutely
not working at this time is the contract-guard program--the
certifications of contract guards. I would like that entered
into the record.
We had a fix that came out yesterday--seemed to improve the
speed--some downloading speed; but, other than that, about 10
to 1 on any real improvement of RAMP.
Also, in regards to the Interagency Security Committee--the
Interagency Security Committee is not codified. It is a group
that makes recommendations and recommended standards of--the
Interagency Security Committee has no teeth. That's my
clarification for the record. I appreciate the time.
Chairman Thompson. Well, I appreciate your clarification.
Ms. Richardson raised a question of the RAMP program--
committee has already asked GAO to look at it in its next
review of FSP. I think they have agreed, based on what Mr.
Goldstein said to the committee today.
So we will see what the facts present themselves on the
RAMP program.
But also, I would again like to thank you for your
testimony. If, in fact, there is additional information that
the committee will need--that you will get it back to us in
writing as expeditiously as possible.
There being no further questions, the committee stands
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:16 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Questions From Chairman Bennie G. Thompson of Mississippi for Gary W.
Schenkel
Question 1a. FPS has increased inspections at high-risk facilities
in metropolitan areas, but rural areas often do not get inspected.
What are the major risks of not inspecting these facilities?
Answer. Rural facilities are inspected. As is the case with all
Federal facilities, it is necessary to test the countermeasures
utilized at these facilities to ensure that they are designed and
functioning appropriately to mitigate vulnerabilities to the identified
credible threats. If the countermeasures in place at these facilities
are not tested, then it is more likely that technical, operation, or
design problems will not be readily identified. As a result, the
ability to provide appropriate recommendations for repair or
replacement and oversee the implementation of those remedial measures
through to completion would be inhibited.
Question 1b. What should FPS do to increase inspections in rural
locations?
Answer. The Federal Protective Service (FPS) has already instituted
an increase in both post inspections and file audits, and works to
ensure that all Federal facilities are safe and secure. This
responsibility includes numerous aspects of physical security and
protective countermeasures to protect Federal employees. FPS achieves
this goal through a risk-based approach to conducting security
assessments, offering emergency planning services, and providing
physical security to these facilities. The increase in the frequency of
post inspections and file audits properly assesses contract
performance, facility risks, and countermeasure effectiveness.
FPS has also increased the requirements of Directive 15.9.1.3,
Contract Protective Security Force Performance Monitoring, for
administrative audits of records from 10 percent of the files annually
to 10 percent of the files monthly. This directive established
organizational responsibilities for post, site, and administrative
inspections by field representatives and annual contractor performance
evaluations conducted by the FPS Contracting Officer's Technical
Representatives (COTR). A 20 percent increase in these inspections took
place across all facilities, including rural locations.
Question 2a. It is the understanding of this committee that, in
rural areas, tenant agencies sometimes conduct post inspections.
How often does this happen?
Answer. FPS personnel conduct post inspections in accordance with
Directive 15.9.1.3, Contract Protective Security Force Performance
Monitoring. This Directive requires the inspection of all posts and
shifts twice a year, including evenings, weekends, and holidays, to
ensure contractor compliance. There are further requirements that
prescribe that all posts and all shifts at Level I and Level II
facilities receive inspections twice a year, that at least two posts at
Level III facilities receive inspections every 2 weeks, and that at
least two posts at Level IV facilities receive inspections every week.
At all of our facilities, tenants also have a high level of
interaction on a daily basis with the security force personnel as they
enter and exit their facilities. The tenants frequently provide
feedback to FPS on the security force performance. At those locations
where tenants have requested that FPS appoint an Agency Technical
Representative (ATR) to assist the FPS COTR with limited on-site
contract monitoring and administration, the ATR may conduct post
inspections, but it is not required. As an employee of the tenant
agency, an ATR may report to FPS anytime they observe problems
associated with security posts on an as needed basis.
Question 2b. Do you believe that FPS should rely on tenant
representatives for this task?
Answer. FPS does not and should not put the tenant agencies in the
role of oversight support of the contract security force; however, as
the daily ``users'' of the security force services in the facilities,
the tenants are a legitimate source of information for FPS on how the
security officers perform their designated functions.
Question 3a. You found that RAMP is not fully operational and that
it is not effective because it does not contain reliable information
that is available on a real-time basis.
Why is the information in RAMP unreliable?
Answer. The information in the Risk Assessment and Management
Program (RAMP) is reliable. RAMP is designed to provide real-time
access to information that is constantly being modified and updated
through an iterative process to ensure that the most up-to-date
information is available. A challenge of this process is ensuring that
the information is verified, and the method of verification will vary
depending on the type of information. Accordingly, RAMP is functioning
correctly by readily highlighting gaps in information that previously
took extensive research to identify.
Accordingly, the Federal Protective Service (FPS) is working to
institute a process for making corrections to information that will
benefit the General Services Administration, FPS, and tenant agencies.
Since RAMP incorporates a wide range of information into a single
system, as FPS identifies needed corrections, it is taking appropriate
action to determine, verify, and load the correct information.
Question 3b. In your opinion, should FPS continue to invest in RAMP
or should it pursue another alternative?
Answer. Yes, FPS should continue to invest in RAMP. The system is
now being implemented and is ahead of schedule in developing and
instituting its planned functionality. As discussed above, RAMP is
doing one of the major tasks it was designed for--fusing information
from multiple sources to identify inconsistencies so that they can be
corrected. As such, RAMP is proving itself as a solid solution to
support FPS operations well into the future.
Before making the initial decision to invest in RAMP, FPS evaluated
200 other risk assessment tools, methodologies, and programs and none
of them were able to meet even 20 percent of the stated requirements.
This led FPS to determine that the best option was to invest in
building the RAMP system to meet all of FPS' requirements. In doing so,
RAMP is the only tool available that adheres to FPS business processes,
the baseline criteria for risk assessment methodologies in the National
Infrastructure Protection Plan, and Interagency Security Committee
standards.
Question 4. If FPS were to Federalize guards at the highest-risk
facilities, approximately how many new Federal positions would this
likely create?
Answer. At the Government Accountability Office's suggestion, the
Federal Protective Service (FPS) has explored several possibilities
from converting the entire contract guard force of nearly 15,000
persons to Federal positions and numerous variations within that
number. On average, conversion costs approximately 35-40 percent more,
not including recruiting and hiring costs. FPS does not believe this
would be an efficient use of resources. However, to be responsive, FPS
estimates that to fully staff the high-risk facilities (level 3 and
level 4) and replace contract guards with full-time Federal FPS
employees, the following number of Federal positions would be created
(the numbers below reflect a one-to-one replacement of contract guards
with Federal positions:
ESTIMATED FULL TIME EQUIVALENT (FTE) TO REPLACE PROTECTIVE SECURITY
OFFICERS AT LEVEL 3 AND LEVEL 4 FACILITIES
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Level 3 Level 4 High Risk
Facility Facility Total
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Federal Security Officers.............. 1,341 7,007 8,348
Supervisors and Management............. 76 397 473
Mission Support and Compliance......... 105 577 682
--------------------------------
Total Estimated FTE.............. 1,522 7,981 9,503
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question 5. You found that in 53 penetration tests FPS performed
since July 2009, guards failed to detect guns, knives, and fake bombs
in 35 tests. What disciplinary action was taken against guards or their
employers responsible for these failed penetration tests?
Answer. A variety of actions were taken in regards to the 35 failed
penetration tests and the application of remedies varied as well,
ranging from whether or not there was evidence of a systematic
performance problem to the feasibility and success of the contractor's
submitted mitigation plans. The actions and remedies employed under
these contracts included the revision of post orders in cases where
inaccurate or ambiguous post orders may have contributed to the
penetration; request and receipt of mitigation plans from the
contractor by the Contracting Officer; documentation of inspection
results in contractors' annual performance assessments; or in the most
severe cases, the cancellation of a contract or an election not to
exercise additional option periods.
Questions From Honorable Charles W. Dent of Pennsylvania for Gary W.
Schenkel
Question 1a. One criticism of FPS is that it does not share
training and certification information of previous contract guards when
a contract is taken over by a new contractor.
Does FPS currently have any mechanism by which it can share
training and certification information when a contract is taken over by
a new contractor?
Answer. The Federal Protective Service (FPS) does not provide any
training and certification information to new contractors. Protective
Security Officers (PSOs) are employees of the contract security vendor.
It is the contractor's responsibility to provide PSOs who meet the
training, certification, and clearance requirements to work on the
contract and maintain copies of the associated documentation. FPS does
not maintain copies of the training and certification documents.
FPS has recently updated its National Statement of Work (SOW) to be
included in all new PSO contracts. The updated SOW will require any
out-going incumbent contractor to provide a successor contractor with
personnel records of existing PSOs--such records will include but are
not limited to training, medical, suitability, and security records.
These records must be provided to the successor at least 45 days prior
to the date of contract expiration. The contracts will stipulate that
any failure to provide all records to the successor contractor as
required may result in FPS withholding final payment to the out-going
contractor until completion of this action and may also negatively
impact the out-going contractor's performance assessment.
Question 1b. To what extent does FPS consider past contractor
performance in awarding new contracts?
Answer. FPS' standard practice and policy is to evaluate past
performance in all source selections. This is generally the most
important factor of all non-price evaluation factors. When evaluating
past performance, FPS considers the relevance and quality of past
projects performed and reviews project data and responses to the
provided questionnaires. In addition, the Federal Acquisition
Regulation provides that the Government may consider information from
any other sources when evaluating past performance, and FPS does so.
This may include a review of performance assessments maintained in the
Past Performance Information Retrieval System, the Federal Government's
repository of contractor performance information, first-hand knowledge
of the Source Selection Official, and communications with anyone with
information concerning the contractor's past performance.
Question From Honorable Charles W. Dent of Pennsylvania for Mark L.
Goldstein
Question. What specific factors would you like FPS to consider when
undertaking this reassessment?
Answer. Overall, we think it is important for FPS to consider other
alternatives to protecting Federal facilities. For example, FPS could
consider Federalizing the entire contract security guard workforce or
guard posts at key Federal facilities.
Specifically, we think that FPS should consider the following
factors when undertaking this reassessment:
Risk management--A comparative analysis of risk across GSA's
entire Federal facility portfolio, which FPS could use to guide
resource allocation decisions.
Cost--An understanding of the comparative costs of each
alternative.
Coordination--Outlining the steps needed to clarify roles
and responsibilities and information-sharing mechanisms to
ensure full Federal agency coordination.
Guard capability & training--Evaluation of the guard
capabilities needed and training requirements for each option.
Guard supervision--Consideration of the types of guard
supervision models needed to ensure effective oversight of
contract security guards.
Technology--Identification of other technologies to
supplement and enhance contract guard workforce.
Questions From Honorable Charles W. Dent of Pennsylvania for Clark Kent
Ervin
Question 1a. Media reports last year criticized the TSA for having
testing requirements that were too difficult, particularly when it came
to identifying IED components in X-ray machines. Too many screeners
were failing on their first test, though the vast majority ultimately
passed. Some groups criticized TSA's testing processes as being overly
burdensome.
What are your thoughts on TSA's statutorily required annual testing
process for its transportation security officers?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 1b. Is it too difficult?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 1c. Should we consider extending it to FPS employees?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. Some critics claim that FPS awards contracts to the
lowest bidders and fail to reflect past contractor performance or
higher wages and training some contract guard companies provide for
their employees, thus making their bids much higher.
In your experience as Inspector General, did you find that FPS
awarded contracts solely based on the lowest bidder?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Honorable Charles W. Dent of Pennsylvania for David L.
Wright
Question 1a. In your testimony in November you recommend that FPS
begin Federalizing contract guards at level IV facilities. In your
testimony today you recommend that FPS also Federalize some Level III
facilities.
In your view, what is the major benefit in having a Federalized
guard staff at Level III and IV facilities?
Answer. Federal Police Officers have a predictable cost,
standardized training, can be easily adapted to changing standards, can
be held individually accountable by their supervisors, and are clearly
mission-focused. This method has been chosen rather than contractors
for the White House, Congress, and DOD Installations because it works
and provides the best predictable level of protection.
Contract guards have constantly escalating costs, recent Service
Contract Act wage adjustments have been as high as 20% in Washington,
DC and other areas. Training is conducted by the company and has not
been equal even among different branches of the same company (there
have been cases of fraudulent certification). Adaptation to emerging
threats requires contract modification, negotiation of ``equitable
adjustments'' to pay the contractor for his differences, disciplinary
requirements differ greatly between companies and they fear liability
for wrongful termination, and most contract guards do not see the field
as a career, resulting in excessive turnover.
With Federal Police Officers, the overall major benefit is improved
protection and a much stronger likelihood that an attack will be
deterred or detected before major loss of life or property.
Question 1b. Why not have Federalized guards at Level I and II
buildings?
Answer. Local 918 believes that ultimately all guards should be
Federalized. For example on Capitol Hill even the parking garage (non-
Capitol Police) security are Federal. When one of our members asked one
of these security staff if they were contractors, he replied ``of
course not security at any Congressional facility is too important to
trust to a contractor''. Eventually security at these lower-risk
buildings should be considered for conversion, our position is to
convert at the higher-risk facilities first.
Question 2. In your testimony you cite the need for Congress to
provide a different approach to the funding of FPS. You claim that the
present system of funding by security fees is ineffective and
counterproductive.
In what way would a direct appropriation improve FPS operations and
thus improve security in Federal buildings?
Answer. Currently, each Federal Agency must pay out of their
appropriation, FPS Basic Security Charges, FPS Building Specific
Security Charges and FPS Security Work Authorizations. FPS Basic
Security Charges represent law enforcement and security services
provided to all GSA Buildings.
The current arrangement would be similar to requiring the Allentown
Fire Department, Public Works Department, Water Department, and Solid
Waste Department each being required to pay the Police Department for
law enforcement/security services. Under this scenario the Police
Department would have to collect the charges, while the other
departments would be forced to pay the charge out of their operating
funds. It would clearly undermine the ability of the Police Department
to complete its support mission to these other departments and be very
inefficient. It surely wouldn't make sense in Allentown and it doesn't
make sense in the Federal Government either. In fact one of the major
reasons for creating a DHS was to have a central point responsible for
security--the current system undermines the very purpose of the
Department.
FPS Operations would be improved because we could request specific
resources matched to required security needs. This would prioritize law
enforcement and security services to match criminal and terrorist
threats, as opposed to a standard ``charge'' across all agencies. The
security required to mitigate the risk of attack for each facility
would be provided in one appropriation and the Department and FPS would
be accountable to Congress, our supported tenant agencies and the
public for protecting Federal buildings. Providing adequate funding
based on specific requirements and priorities, rather than a intra-
government funding scheme seemingly designed to diffuse responsibility
and accountability, would provide clearer visibility of protection
needs and shortfalls. This would be a clear path to properly protecting
Federal facilities.
At a minimum, the actual operating costs for basic law enforcement
should be appropriated followed by building specific security required
by minimum ISC standards would enhance the protection of both Federal
employees and buildings by providing these services on the same basis
they are provided at all levels of government.
Questions From Honorable Charles W. Dent of Pennsylvania for Stephen D.
Amitay
Question 1. With regard to FPS contracts oversight and management,
in your testimony you testify that quality should always play a primary
role when selecting a private security company. You also cite tangible
reasons why higher-quality security costs more money.
In your experience, does FPS accurately assess the quality of
contract guard security by considering past performance or does FPS
award contracts solely based on cost in awarding of contracts?
Answer. A typical FPS contract for guard service is awarded for a
base period (or year) with four option periods (years). It therefore
takes at least 5 years to cycle through a contract and if a poor
performer is chosen on price, it is difficult to terminate that
contract. However, it has recently been done here in the Washington
Region (Region 11) on more than one occasion. The FPS procurement
policy is evolving and they have made significant strides toward moving
away from cost as the primary reason for award. However, as there may
have been more importance put on price on contracts awarded in the
recent past and some of those contractors may still hold their
contracts. There is also the issue of regionalization. Not all FPS
regions pursue quality with the same vigor and some may give more
credence to cost (in comparison to quality) than others.
Question 2a. In your previous testimony you cited significant
reductions in the FPS inspector and law enforcement officer force
having exacerbated problems at FPS.
Given shortages in FPS staffing that remain uncorrected, going
forward, do you believe FPS has the resources it needs to make strides
to rectify the contract guard program?
Question 2b. If not, what increase in resources would you
recommend?
Answer. With its current level of resources, FPS can take various
actions and implement improvements to rectify problems of the contract
guard program. Improvements can be made through better and more
consistent training, better oversight and contractor management, full
utilization of RAMP, better communication with contractors and in other
ways that do not necessarily require increased resources to undertake.
Additionally, taking more effective action in cases of underperforming
contractors and completing required performance evaluations are ways to
improve that are not dependent upon having more resources. However, it
does seem that if more resources were available and could be used to
hire more COTRS and inspectors, who are vital to procurement,
oversight, and management of the contract guard program, that would
lead to improvement. More resources could also provide for more awards
(and higher contracts) to companies that can and will provide better-
trained, -paid, and -qualified officers.
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