[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
THE U.S. HOMELAND SECURITY ROLE IN THE MEXICAN WAR AGAINST DRUG CARTELS
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT,
INVESTIGATIONS, AND MANAGEMENT
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 31, 2011
__________
Serial No. 112-14
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
72-224 WASHINGTON : 2012
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC
area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC
20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Daniel E. Lungren, California Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Michael T. McCaul, Texas Henry Cuellar, Texas
Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Laura Richardson, California
Candice S. Miller, Michigan Danny K. Davis, Illinois
Tim Walberg, Michigan Brian Higgins, New York
Chip Cravaack, Minnesota Jackie Speier, California
Joe Walsh, Illinois Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania Hansen Clarke, Michigan
Ben Quayle, Arizona William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Scott Rigell, Virginia Vacancy
Billy Long, Missouri Vacancy
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania
Blake Farenthold, Texas
Mo Brooks, Alabama
Michael J. Russell, Staff Director/Chief Counsel
Kerry Ann Watkins, Senior Policy Director
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT, INVESTIGATIONS, AND MANAGEMENT
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Billy Long, Missouri, Vice Chair Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Danny K. Davis, Illinois
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York (Ex (Ex Officio)
Officio)
Dr. R. Nick Palarino, Staff Director
Diana Bergwin, Subcommittee Clerk
Tamla Scott, Minority Subcommittee Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Oversight, Investigations, and Management:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 4
The Honorable William R. Keating, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Massachusetts, and Ranking Member,
Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and Management...... 5
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security.............................................. 7
WITNESSES
Panel I
Mr. Luis Alvarez, Assistant Director, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 9
Prepared Statement............................................. 11
Mr. Brian A. Nichols, Deputy Assistant Secretary, International
Narcotics Law Enforcement Affairs, Department of State:
Oral Statement................................................. 15
Prepared Statement............................................. 17
Mr. Frank O. Mora, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Western
Hemisphere Affairs, Department of Defense:
Oral Statement................................................. 20
Prepared Statement............................................. 21
Ms. Kristin M. Finklea, Analyst, Domestic Social Policy Division,
Congressional Research Service:
Oral Statement................................................. 23
Prepared Statement............................................. 24
Panel II
Mr. Jon Adler, President, Federal Law Enforcement Officers
Association:
Oral Statement................................................. 66
Prepared Statement............................................. 68
Mr. David A. Shirk, Director, Trans-Border Institute, University
of San Diego:
Oral Statement................................................. 69
Prepared Statement............................................. 71
Dr. John Bailey, Professor, Government and Foreign Service,
Georgetown University:
Oral Statement................................................. 79
Prepared Statement............................................. 82
Dr. Ricardo C. Ainslie, Department of Educational Psychology,
College of Education, The University of Texas at Austin:
Oral Statement................................................. 86
Prepared Statement............................................. 88
FOR THE RECORD
The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Oversight, Investigations, and Management:
Statement of Thomas M. Harrigan, Assistant Administrator and
Chief of Operations, Drug Enforcement Administration......... 58
APPENDIX
Questions From Ranking Member William R. Keating for Luis Alvarez 99
Questions From Ranking Member William R. Keating for Brian A.
Nichols........................................................ 101
Questions From Ranking Member William R. Keating for Frank O.
Mora........................................................... 102
Questions From Ranking Member William R. Keating for John Bailey. 102
THE U.S. HOMELAND SECURITY ROLE IN THE MEXICAN WAR AGAINST DRUG CARTELS
----------
Thursday, March 31, 2011
U.S. House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and
Management,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:12 a.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Michael T. McCaul
[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives McCaul, Long, Duncan, Marino,
Keating, Thompson, and Clarke.
Also present: Representatives Cuellar, Green of Texas, and
Jackson Lee.
Mr. McCaul. Good morning. The Committee on Homeland
Security Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and
Management will come to order.
First order of business, I see we have three Members that
would like to attend and sit in on this hearing, Mr. Cuellar,
Mr. Green, and Ms. Sheila Jackson Lee, and I ask unanimous
consent that they be allowed to sit on the dais for the hearing
today. Hearing no objection, so ordered.
I now recognize myself for an opening statement.
The hearing today is titled, ``The U.S. Homeland Security
Role in the Mexican War Against Drug Cartels.'' Over the past
year the increase in violence by the Mexican drug cartels has
expanded to include more brutal forms of violence and deaths of
civilians and political leaders.
On March 13, 2010, cartel members killed three individuals,
two of them U.S. citizens, connected to the U.S. consulate in
Juarez, Mexico. On June 28, 2010, a Tamaulipas gubernatorial
candidate was assassinated by a drug cartel.
January through October 2010, 12 sitting mayors were
assassinated. On February 15, 2011, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement Special Agent Jaime Zapata was killed and his
fellow agent, Special Agent Victor Avila, was wounded by the
drug cartel known as the Los Zetas.
March 2011, a law enforcement bulletin warned that cartels
were overheard plotting to kill ICE agents and Texas Rangers
guarding the border using AK-47s by shooting at them from
across the border. These are acts of terrorism as defined by
Federal law.
The shooting of Special Agents Zapata and Avila is a game-
changer which alters the landscape of the United States'
involvement in Mexico's war against the drug cartels. For the
first time in 25 years the cartels are now targeting American
law enforcement.
I had the honor to sit down with Agent Avila and speak to
him personally about the events that took place that tragic
day, and he described the ambush to me as ``pure evil.'' Even
at the Mexican hospital he described the fear he had that they
would come back to finish the job, as they so often do.
The agents were forced off a highway in Central Mexico in
their vehicle bearing diplomatic license plates. Both agents
pleaded for their lives in Spanish, identifying themselves as
United States Federal agents, as Americans, as diplomats. But
the members of the Los Zetas cartel responded by firing more
than 80 rounds from automatic weapons, killing Agent Zapata and
wounding Agent Avila.
I have been in contact with the Department of Justice after
meeting with Agent Avila, who expressed his willingness to
testify here today. However, the Department of Justice objected
to that request as he is a material witness in an on-going
criminal investigation and for his personal safety. Better
judgment, in my view, was to not call him as a witness, but I
do believe that his story needs to be told.
Given this intensified violence--more than 35,000 killings
in the past 5 years since President Calderon declared this war
and the increase in spillover crime into the United States--I
believe it is time for the United States to take decisive steps
to end this war just south of our border. We are spending
billions of dollars halfway across the world, and we talk about
Libya in the press, and yet we have a threat just south of our
border, right in our own backyard. We need to step up to the
plate.
President Calderon should be praised for his efforts to
eradicate these cartels. When Congressman Henry Cuellar and I
met with him in Mexico City in 2008 he told us that security
was his highest priority. He boldly declared war against the
narcoterrorists that were infiltrating his military and local
police forces.
In 2008 Congress passed the Merida Initiative, directing
$1.3 billion in resources to help the Mexican government fight
these cartels. Unfortunately, to date only one quarter of that
amount--over 2 years since that bill passed--only one quarter
has been directed and the violence in Mexico is only getting
worse. In my judgment, the Mexicans are losing this war and so
are we.
The violence is no longer limited to the drug trade.
Cartels are disrupting basic services and expanding their
criminal enterprises.
Mexico, in my judgment, is in danger of becoming a failed
state controlled by criminals. If this happens, Mexico could
become a safe haven for terrorists who we know are attempting
to enter the United States through our porous border.
In the interest of National security, and in trade with our
third-largest partner, and our rich cultural ties with Mexico,
we cannot afford for this to happen. Failure is not an option.
Our hearing today will do the following: Review the
accomplishments of the Mexican government's war against the
drug cartels, examine the U.S. role in the war, determine the
implications for Homeland Security, determine what future
actions the United States needs to take assisting Mexico to win
this war.
In essence, I want to know from these witnesses here today:
What is our plan? What is our strategy in dealing with Mexico?
What is the plan to assist Mexico, our neighbor to the south,
to help them win this important war?
In my judgment, we should explore a joint military and
intelligence operation with Mexico, similar to the 1999 Plan
Colombia, which succeeded in undermining that country's cocaine
trade, disrupting its cartels, and restoring its economic and
national security. In addition, I have introduced legislation
requiring the State Department to classify drug cartels as
Foreign Terrorist Organizations as a means to limit the groups'
financial, property, and travel interests.
This designation would bring separate charges against
anyone providing material support or resources to FTOs. It
would provide an additional penalty of up to 15 years in prison
and a fine, and it would authorize the deportation of any
foreign member of a Foreign Terrorist Organization from the
United States even if they are in this country legally. It
would also require banks to freeze any funds tied to Foreign
Terrorist Organizations.
Cartels kidnap, kill, and mutilate innocent civilians,
elected officials, and law enforcement officers. They use
gruesome tactics--and I have seen many of the videos and the
pictures, and they are so gruesome and so violent and so
graphic that we could not show those pictures at this committee
hearing today.
These tactics intimidate government officials and citizens.
They torture; they use beheadings; they dismember and mutilate.
While not driven by religious ideology, Mexican drug
cartels operate in the same manner as al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or
Hezbollah, each sharing a desire and using similar tactics to
gain political and economic influence. These are acts of
terrorism.
Black's Law defines terrorism as activity that appears to
be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, to
influence the policy of a government by intimidation or
coercion, and to affect the conduct of a government by
assassination or kidnapping. In my judgment, the drug cartels
fall squarely within this definition. President Clinton, in the
1990s, exercised this authority by declaring the FARC as a
Foreign Terrorist Organization.
According to the Congressional Research Service, ``The
massacres of young people and migrants, the killing and
disappearance of Mexican journalists, the use of torture, and
the phenomena of car bombs have received wide media coverage
and have led some analysts to question if the violence has been
transformed into something new, beyond the typical violence
that has characterized the trade.'' Some observers have raised
the concern that the Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations may
be acting more like domestic terrorists.
We must also secure our borders. We must intensify
southbound inspections to seize weapons and cash that arm and
fund Drug Trafficking Organizations. The United States
estimates that somewhere between $25 billion to $30 billion a
year in cash go southbound into Mexico, which funds the
cartels. We should seize this money and the guns going south
and then use it against the cartels to pay for our border
security operations.
You know, I visited our troops in Iraq, in Afghanistan; I
have been to Pakistan. I will tell you, the last time I went to
El Paso to the EPIC Center and requested to go across the
border to Juarez, where 6,000 people had been brutally killed,
I was told that, ``Congressman, we cannot guarantee your
safety.''
It is time for the United States to show a serious
commitment to this war that is right in our backyard and on our
doorstep.
Before I yield back my time I would like for all of us
today here to remember Special Agent Jaime Zapata. Our
sympathies go out to his family and his friends. I also want to
recognize the heroic efforts of Special Agent Victor Avila, who
was wounded.
So on behalf of this committee, I want to thank all the
brave men and women who put themselves in harm's way every day
for this country, both overseas and abroad, at home, and in
Mexico.
With that, I yield to the Ranking Member, Mr. Keating.
[The statement of Chairman McCaul follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chairman Michael T. McCaul
March 31, 2011
Good morning. Welcome to this Oversight, Investigations, and
Management Subcommittee hearing titled ``The U.S. Homeland Security
Role in the Mexican War Against Drug Cartels''.
Over the past year the increase in violence by the Mexican Drug
Cartels has expanded to include more brutal forms of violence and
deaths of civilians and political leaders.
March 13, 2010.--Cartel members killed three individuals
(two of them U.S. citizens) connected to the U.S. consulate in
Juarez, Mexico.
June 28, 2010.--Tamaulipas gubernatorial candidate was
killed by a drug cartel.
January through October 2010.--12 sitting mayors were
killed.
February 15, 2011.--Immigration and Customs Enforcement
Special Agent Jaime Zapata was killed and his fellow Special
Agent Victor Avila was wounded by the Los Zetas.
March 2011.--A Law Enforcement Bulletin warned that cartels
were overheard plotting to kill ICE agents and Texas Rangers
guarding the border using AK-47s by shooting at them from
across the border.
These are acts of terrorism as defined by Federal law.
The shooting of Special Agents Zapata and Avila is a game-changer
which alters the landscape of the United States' involvement in
Mexico's war against the drug cartels.
For the first time in 25 years, the cartels are targeting American
law enforcement. Agent Avila described this ambush to me as ``pure
evil''. Even at the Mexican hospital he feared that they would come
back and finish the job.
The agents were forced off a highway in Central Mexico in their
vehicle bearing diplomatic license plates. Both agents pleaded for
their lives in Spanish identifying themselves as United States Federal
agents. Members of the Los Zetas cartel responded by firing more than
80 rounds from automatic weapons, killing Special Agent Zapata and
wounding Special Agent Avila.
I have been in contact with the Department of Justice. I personally
met with Agent Avila and he expressed his willingness to testify today.
However, given that he is a material witness in an on-going criminal
investigation and for his security, better judgment was to not call him
as a witness. His story still needs to be told.
Given this intensified violence, more than 35,000 killings in the
past 5 years and increased spillover crime into the United States, it
is time for the United States to take decisive steps to end this war
just south of our border. The solution, however, goes well beyond
securing our borders.
President Felipe Calderon should be praised for his efforts to
eradicate the cartels. When Congressman Henry Cuellar and I visited him
in Mexico City in 2008, he told us security was his top priority. He
had boldly declared war against the narcoterrorists that were
infiltrating his military and local police forces.
In 2008 Congress passed the Merida Initiative, directing $1.3
billion in resources to help the Mexican government fight the cartels.
To date only one quarter of that amount has been directed and the
violence in Mexico is only increasing.
The violence is no longer limited to the drug trade. The cartels
are disrupting basic services and expanding their criminal enterprises.
Mexico is in danger of becoming a failed state controlled by
criminals. If this happens, Mexico could become a safe haven for
terrorists who we know are attempting to enter the United States
through our porous border. In the interest of our National security,
trade with our third-largest partner, and our rich cultural ties, we
cannot afford for this to happen.
Our hearing today will:
Review the accomplishments of the Mexican government's war
against the drug cartels;
Examine the U.S. role in the war;
Determine the implications for U.S. Homeland Security; and
Determine what further actions the United States needs to
take assisting Mexico win their war.
We should explore a joint military and intelligence operation with
Mexico, similar to the 1999 Plan Colombia which has succeeded in
undermining that country's cocaine trade, disrupting its cartels and
restoring its economic and national security.
In addition, I have introduced legislation requiring the State
Department to classify drug cartels as Foreign Terrorist Organizations
as a means to limit the groups' financial, property, and travel
interests.
This designation could:
Bring separate charges against anyone providing ``material
support or resources'' to FTOs. This includes but is not
limited to money, identification, lodging, training, weapons,
and transportation.
Provide an additional penalty of up to 15 years in prison
and possible fine for providing material support or resources.
A death sentence may be imposed if their actions resulted in
death. This penalty is levied in addition to penalties for any
associated crime.
Authorize the deportation of any foreign member of an FTO
from the United States even if they are in this country
legally.
Require banks to freeze any funds tied to FTOs.
Cartels kidnap, kill, and mutilate innocent civilians, elected
officials, and law enforcement, using gruesome tactics to intimidate
government officials and citizens to abide by their rules. Torture,
beheadings, dismembering, and mutilation are common.
While not driven by religious ideology, Mexican drug cartels
operate in the same manner as al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or Hezbollah each
sharing a desire, and using similar tactics to gain political and
economic influence. These are acts of terrorism.
Black's Law defines TERRORISM as: activity that . . . appears to be
intended--(i) To intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to
influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, or
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or
kidnapping.
We must also secure our borders. We must intensify southbound
inspections to seize weapons and cash that arm and fund drug
trafficking organizations. The United States funnels an estimated $25-
30 billion a year into Mexico which funds the cartel. We should seize
this money then use it against the cartels by paying for U.S. border
security operations.
I have visited our troops in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. But
the last time I visited the El Paso Intelligence Center and requested
to go across the border to Juarez, the State Department told me they
could not guarantee my safety.
It is time for the United States to show a serious commitment to
this war on our doorstep.
Before I yield my time, I would like for us all to remember Special
Agent Jaime Zapata. Our sympathies go out to his family and friends.
Additionally, I want to recognize the heroic efforts of Special Agent
Victor Avila, who was wounded during the attack. On behalf of this
committee, thank you to all of our brave men and women who put
themselves in harms way for our country.
Also, I'd like to thank our witnesses for being here today. I look
forward to hearing their testimony.
Mr. Keating. I would like to thank Chairman McCaul for
conducting this hearing and giving us the opportunity to
investigate the impact of Mexican drug cartel violence on the
U.S. Homeland Security. As the Chairman noted, this is our
first hearing and I am looking forward to working with him and
our colleagues to tackle the urgent, serious issues challenging
the security of this country.
Let me start by expressing my sympathies and my gratitude
to the family of ICE Agent Zapata, who paid the ultimate
sacrifice when he was killed last month in the line of duty in
Mexico. I wish to also thank Victor Avila, who was wounded
during the same incident, for his great service to our Nation.
Agents like Mr. Zapata and Mr. Avila, along with the scores of
law enforcement and Homeland Security officials work tirelessly
to keep this side of the border safe, and I truly thank them
for their effort.
I would also like to acknowledge the efforts of Secretary
Napolitano and the Obama administration, which announced
yesterday that the Narcotics Rewards Program would pay $5
million to anyone coming forward with information that results
in the arrest of those responsible for the February 15 attack.
I would urge anyone who has information to immediately come
forward and let these families have some closure. It should be
a paramount responsibility and duty for us to bring to justice
the terrible acts of people I would term criminals and thugs
and murderers.
Drug-related crime in Mexico has been labeled an epidemic,
and this hearing will probe further about the reaches of this
epidemic. The bottom line is that there has indeed been a sharp
rise in drug-related violence in Mexico.
It is my understanding that most of the violence could be
construed as a turf battle between rival drug traffickers. The
violence is concentrated; 84 percent of Mexico's drug-related
homicides in 2010 occurred in just four of Mexico's 32 states,
two of which are more than 500 miles from the United States.
One of the questions that is likely to come up today is
whether this violence has a spillover effect on the U.S. side
of the border, and I see that the FBI's Uniform Crime Report
indicates that crime along the Southwest border has actually
declined steadily over the last 10 years, in direct contrast to
what has occurred in Mexico. In fact, in 2009 violent crimes
such as homicides, robberies, assaults, and motor vehicle theft
decreased in metropolitan areas along the Southwest border by 4
percent and homicides were down 14 percent, robberies 3
percent, assaults by 4 percent, motor vehicle theft by 23
percent. These statistics are important to note, especially
because we want to continue to be vigilant in our efforts to
maintain decreasing crime.
One of our strategies reducing violence on both sides of
the border must address drug trafficking. It also must expand
itself to its corollary crime in so many instances, gun
trafficking. Inherent in drug violence is the guns that are
used to perpetuate the violence.
I am disappointed, frankly, here today that a
representative from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms did not make themselves available to testify. I would
have appreciated the opportunity to hear from the Fast and
Furious program, which allowed guns over the border so that the
ATF could track those guns. It has been reported that one of
those guns was used in the shooting of Mr. Zapata and Mr.
Avila.
There are legitimate questions here that require urgent
answers about the interplay of guns from the United States and
Mexico's rising violence.
Last, as a former district attorney I have seen first-hand
the damage caused by methamphetamine consumption in my
district, and I am concerned that as long as the demand exists
here the violence will continue there. As a member of the
Addiction Treatment and Recovery Caucus I am supportive of
various efforts to reduce the demand for drugs in the United
States and I look forward to working with colleagues on both
sides of the aisle to address that issue.
I look forward to the--receiving the testimony of the
witnesses who made themselves available here today. Thank you.
Mr. McCaul. Yes. I want to thank the Ranking Member, and I
very much look forward to working with you in this Congress on
these very important issues.
Let me remind the Members, the focus of this hearing--it is
really a two-part series. This hearing is focused on the role
of the United States in the Mexican war against the drug
cartels. In other words: What is our role in Mexico? The second
hearing that we will have in a few weeks will be: What is the
role in the United States or what are we doing on this side of
the border in the United States to secure our borders?
The Chair sees that the Ranking Member of the full
committee has arrived, Mr. Thompson from Mississippi, and I
recognize him for any statement he may have.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I look
forward to the hearing. I want to recognize Mr. Keating as our
Ranking Member of this subcommittee. We welcome him to the
committee, but also his prosecutorial experience is ideally
suited for hearings like this and others.
But I also want to thank our witnesses for being here today
to discuss the United States' role in responding to drug-
related violence occurring in Mexico.
Over the past few years this committee has conducted
several hearings on violence occurring on the Mexican side of
the Southwest border. We have also examined the numerous
efforts undertaken by our Government to assist our Mexican
allies in disrupting and dismantling Mexican drug trafficking
organizations, otherwise known as DTOs.
In recent years violence in Mexico has reached an all-time
high. However, despite dire predictions, statistics and
concrete evidence show that this violence has not spilled over
into the United States. In fact, the violence occurring in
Mexico is highly concentrated and in many instances limited to
drug trafficking corridors, some of which are hundreds of miles
away from the United States border.
Last week, for instance, Secretary Napolitano visited ports
of entry in El Paso, Texas; during that trip she stated that
security on the southern U.S. border is better now than it has
ever been and that the violence from neighboring Mexico hasn't
spilled over in a serious way. She also assured the public that
border towns are safe for travel, trade, and commerce, and that
violent crime rates have remained flat or decreased in border
communities in the Southwest.
Crime statistics from the Federal Bureau of Investigation
corroborate the Secretary's statement. According to the FBI,
the homicide rate along the U.S. side of the southwestern
border has actually decreased by as much as 14 percent over the
last 3 years.
The Mexican city Juarez sits directly opposite El Paso,
Texas. In 2010 more than 2,700 murders occurred in Juarez,
which has been coined the murder capital of the world, while
there were only four murders in El Paso during the same time
frame. Likewise, there were 472 murders in Tijuana while only
29 occurred on the other side of the border in San Diego,
California.
These numbers show a clear distinction between political
rhetoric and proven facts. Our focus must remain on common
sense strategies that will aid Mexico in responding to this
very serious problem while respecting their status as a
sovereign country, fostering the commerce that exists between
the two nations, and acknowledging that Mexican authorities
have been successful with and without U.S. assistance in
arresting and eliminating the heads of some of the most
dangerous Mexican DTOs.
As Members of Congress we must align our budget priorities
with where we claim help is needed. This Congress the majority
introduced H.R. 1, which cut $350 million from the Department
of Homeland Security's budget for border security, fencing, and
technology.
The Department of Homeland Security must have all the
resources and authorities it needs to protect our border.
Republican efforts to eliminate financial and human resources
from DHS's border security mission will move us backward.
Last month, as we have all said, we were saddened by the
senseless killing of ICE Agent Jaime Zapata and wounding of ICE
Agent Victor Avila. Brave men and women like Agent Zapata and
Agent Avila work tirelessly on our borders 24 hours a day, 365
days a year. I would like to take this opportunity to join the
Chairman, Ranking Member, who have acknowledged their work and
ultimate sacrifice of one, to again commend them for all their
services.
Mr. Chairman, I look forward to this hearing as well as the
information from our witnesses.
Mr. McCaul. We thank the Ranking Member.
Let me just say, as for me, I look forward to working with
you, Mr. Thompson, in a bipartisan way to increase resources
for what I consider should be one of the highest priorities of
the Federal Government, and that is to provide a common
defense, as the Constitution requires, on the border. I hope
that we can do that together in a bipartisan way to increase
resources for this important effort.
Other Members of the committee are reminded that opening
statements may be submitted for the record.
We are pleased to have a very distinguished panel of
witnesses before us here today. First, Mr. Luis Alvarez is the
assistant director of international affairs, homeland security
investigations, at U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement in
the Department of Homeland Security. He has more than 20 years
of law enforcement experience and has served in a variety of
key ICE management positions.
His international experience includes a tour as the ICE
attache for Spain, Portugal, Andorra, and Cape Verde, as well
as a tour as the ICE attache in Mexico City. While in Mexico
City Mr. Alvarez served as the first DHS attache, promoting ICE
and DHS missions and priorities at the U.S. Embassy.
Next we have Mr. Brian Nichols, who is the deputy assistant
secretary in the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs Office at the Department of State. Prior to his current
assignment Mr. Nichols was the deputy chief of mission in
Bogota, Colombia. He also served as the director of the Office
of Caribbean Affairs, coordinating U.S. policy towards 14
Caribbean countries.
Next we have Dr. Frank Mora, who is the deputy assistant
secretary of Western Hemisphere affairs at the Department of
Defense. From 2004 to 2009 Mr. Mora--or Dr. Mora--was professor
of national security strategy and Latin American studies at the
National War College National Defense University. He taught
courses on strategy, global security, and Latin American
politics to senior military and civilian officers.
Last, we have Dr. Kristin Finklea, who is an analyst in
domestic security at the domestic social policy division of the
Congressional Research Service. She focuses on a number of
organized crime and white collar crime issues and has been the
lead analyst on Southwest border violence and potential
spillover violence. She is the coordinator of CRS Report,
Southwest border violence issues, and identifying and measuring
spillover violence.
The Chair now recognizes Assistant Director Alvarez to
testify.
STATEMENT OF LUIS ALVAREZ, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, IMMIGRATION AND
CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Alvarez. Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating,
Ranking Member Thompson, and distinguished Members of the
subcommittee, on behalf of Secretary Napolitano and Assistant
Secretary Morton, thank you for the opportunity to discuss
ICE's efforts to investigate, disrupt, and dismantle criminal
cross-border smuggling organizations. ICE has the most
expansive investigative authority and largest force of
investigators within the Department of Homeland Security, with
more than 7,000 special agents assigned to over 200 cities
throughout the United States and 69 international offices in 47
countries.
As you know, we experienced a terrible tragedy within our
agency last month involving two special agents assigned to our
attache office in Mexico City, an office where I served 5
years, including as the attache. Special Agent Jaime Zapata
lost his life and Special Agent Victor Avila was seriously
injured in service to our country.
These senseless acts as violence against them served as a
painful reminder of the dangers confronted and the sacrifices
made every day by our Nation's law enforcement officers, and
our hearts and prayers continue to go out to the victims and
their families.
Special Agent Zapata died fighting to protect not only the
people of this country but also the people of Mexico from drug
traffickers and organized crime. He will forever be remembered
as a man of courage and honor.
Since the incident our special agents, in conjunction with
the FBI and other U.S. and Mexican law enforcement agencies,
have been working diligently to track down the perpetrators of
the heinous crime. We will continue to assist the on-going
investigation with every resource at our disposal to ensure
that all those responsible for this murder face justice.
The illicit drugs, money, and weapons that fund and arm
criminal organizations operating along the Southwest border are
part of a complex, interconnected system of illicit pathways
controlled by transnational criminal organizations that span
the globe. We target these organizations at every phase in the
illicit cycle--internationally, at the border, and in cities
throughout the United States where criminal organizations earn
substantial profits from their illicit activities.
To accomplish this, our investigation utilized a supply
chain attack strategy designed to trigger cascading failures
within a criminal organization by simultaneously targeting
multiple components within the organization as well as
attacking the criminal proceeds that fund their operation. As
evidence of our commitment to these efforts we have targeted
considerable resources at the Southwest border and now have a
quarter of our personnel assigned to the Southwest border--more
agents and officers along the border than ever before.
Our efforts to dismantle transnational criminal
organizations are producing results. In fiscal year 2010 ICE-
led Border Enforcement Security Taskforce, or BEST, as they are
known, made over 1,600 criminal arrests of individuals engaged
in cross-border criminal activity.
Capitalizing on the domestic success of the BEST to elevate
enforcement efforts against violent criminal organizations, ICE
and the government of Mexico established a Mexico City BEST in
2009 as a U.S.-Mexican operational platform for information-
sharing, joint investigations, and prosecutions. This task
force includes officers from the Secretary of public safety,
the PGR, and ICE agents. The Mexico City BEST, along with our
attache office in Mexico, are key components in ICE's strategic
plan to target transnational criminal organizations operating
in Mexico.
Other ICE efforts include Operation Firewall. This is our
bulk cash smuggling initiative, which has resulted in more than
5,200 seizures totaling more than $504 million and the arrest
of over 1,000 individuals. These efforts include 319
international seizures totaling more than $240 million and 218
international arrests.
Operation Community Shield, our anti-gang program, has led
to the arrest of more than 20,000 gang members and associates,
7,700 of whom had prior violent criminal history. In additional
249 gang leaders have been arrested and 1,646 weapons have been
seized.
In February we complete Project Southern Tempest, our
largest ever National initiative targeting gangs with ties to
Mexican drug trafficking organizations. Southern Tempest was
executed in 168 U.S. cities alongside 173 of our Federal,
State, and local enforcement partners, and led to the arrest of
678 gang members and associates. More than 46 percent of those
arrested during this operation were members or associates of
gangs with ties to the Mexican trafficking organizations.
The success of these efforts and strategy is evident in our
investigations. For example, Operation Pacific Rim, and ICE-led
investigation, dismantled one of the most powerful and
sophisticated bulk cash and drug trafficking organizations in
the world.
This transnational drug trafficking organization was a
prolific cocaine source of supply, responsible for nearly half
of the cocaine smuggled from Colombia, through Mexico, and into
the United States between 2003 and 2009--approximately 912 tons
with an estimated street value of $24 billion. During the
investigation our special agents developed a high level and
strategically positioned source of information, which led to
the seizure of $163 million in illicit bulk currency, 3.3 tons
of cocaine, $179 million in assets, and $37 million in criminal
forfeiture warrants.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today
and for your continued support of ICE and its law enforcement
mission. We are committed to stemming cross-border criminal
organizations through the various efforts I have discussed
today.
I would be pleased to answer any questions.
[The statement of Mr. Alvarez follows:]
Prepared Statement of Luis Alvarez
March 31, 2010
introduction
Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating, and distinguished Members
of the subcommittee: On behalf of Secretary Napolitano and Assistant
Secretary Morton, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to
discuss the efforts of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
to investigate, disrupt, and dismantle criminal cross-border smuggling
organizations. ICE has the most expansive investigative authority and
largest force of investigators in the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS). With more than 7,000 Special Agents assigned to more than 200
cities throughout the United States and 69 offices in 47 countries
world-wide, ICE is uniquely positioned to leverage its broad statutory
authority to combat border violence and support border enforcement by
targeting the illicit pathways and organizations that produce,
transport, and distribute illegal contraband.
The illicit drugs, money, and weapons that fund and arm criminal
organizations operating along the Southwest Border are part of a
complex, interconnected system of illicit pathways and transnational
criminal organizations that span the globe. ICE targets transnational
criminal organizations at every critical phase in the illicit cycle:
Internationally, where the drugs are produced and the aliens originate;
at our Nation's physical border and ports of entry (POEs), where the
transportation cells attempt to exploit America's legitimate trade,
travel, and transportation systems; and in cities throughout the United
States, where criminal organizations earn substantial profits off of
the smuggling of aliens and illicit goods. Additionally, these criminal
organizations manipulate the legitimate banking, financial, and
commercial trade systems to illegally generate, move, and store bulk
cash and purchase weapons that can then be smuggled back across the
border to Mexico and Central and South America.
As you know, we experienced a terrible tragedy within our agency
last month involving two Special Agents assigned to ICE's attache
office in Mexico City. Special Agent Jaime J. Zapata lost his life and
Special Agent Victor Avila, Jr., was seriously injured in service of
our country. The senseless acts of violence against them serves as
painful reminders of the dangers confronted and the sacrifices made
every day by our Nation's law enforcement officers, and our hearts and
prayers continue to go out to the victims and their families. Special
Agent Zapata died fighting to protect not only the people of this
country, but also the people of Mexico from drug traffickers and
organized criminals. He will forever be remembered as a man of courage
and honor.
Since the incident, ICE agents have been working diligently,
supported by a joint task force between the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) and the Department of Justice (DOJ), in cooperation with
our Mexican partners, to track down the perpetrators of this heinous
attack. We will continue to assist the on-going investigation with
every resource at our disposal and to ensure that all those responsible
for this murder face justice.
Addressing the increasing drug cartel-related violence on the
Mexican side of the Southwest Border is vital to the interests of the
United States. DHS border security efforts are based on an overarching
goal: To ensure a safe, secure border zone that is also hospitable to,
and fosters, legal trade and travel. ICE protects America and upholds
public safety by identifying and dismantling criminal organizations
that exploit our Nation's borders in furtherance of their illegal
activity.
ICE's efforts are conducted in close coordination with our partners
at U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA), the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and
Explosives, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the U.S.
Marshals Service, and our State, local, foreign, and Tribal partners.
ICE's work also directly supports the Merida Initiative, which is a
Department of State program to establish a strategic framework to guide
United States and Mexican cooperation. Our growing partnership with
Mexico is critical to our continued success in disrupting criminal
activity along the Southwest Border.
southwest border initiative
In March 2009, the administration launched the Southwest Border
Initiative to bring unprecedented focus and intensity to Southwest
Border security, coupled with a reinvigorated, smart, and effective
approach to enforcing immigration laws in the interior of our country.
In support of this initiative, ICE has targeted considerable resources
at the Southwest Border to interdict contraband, firearms, ammunition,
undeclared currency, and stolen vehicles, and detect cross-border
tunnels, human smuggling activity, transnational criminal
organizations, and other border crime at and between ports of entry
along the Southwest Border. Under this initiative, ICE has doubled the
personnel assigned to Border Enforcement Security Task Forces;
increased the number of intelligence analysts along the Southwest
Border focused on cartel violence; and quintupled deployments of Border
Liaison Officers to work with their Mexican counterparts.
In fiscal year 2010, ICE deployed Special Agents to high-risk
locations, including Tijuana and Monterey. Additionally, with its $80
million share of the $600 million supplemental appropriation passed by
Congress in the summer of 2010, ICE is placing more than 250 Special
Agents, investigators, and intelligence analysts along the border.
Indeed, ICE now has one quarter of its personnel assigned to the
Southwest Border--more agents and officers along the border than ever
before.
ICE continues to expand the Border Enforcement Security Taskforce
(BEST) program, which currently operates in 21 locations, including 11
along the Southwest Border. BESTs bring Federal, State, local,
territorial, Tribal, and foreign law enforcement together to work to
increase security along the border. In fiscal year 2010, ICE-led BESTs
made 1,616 criminal arrests, 907 administrative arrests, and obtained
868 indictments; 689 defendants were convicted in fiscal year 2010.
In 2009, Secretary Napolitano announced the formation of the first-
ever, Mexico-based BEST to facilitate the exchange of law enforcement
information and to support the joint investigation of criminal activity
that falls within ICE's purview. These crimes include weapons and
munitions smuggling, money laundering, human smuggling, human
trafficking, customs fraud, and cybercrime violations. The Mexico City
BEST includes both Mexican law enforcement officers and prosecutors
working collaboratively with ICE and other United States Government
staff to share information and expertise in joint investigations.
Our efforts to dismantle transnational criminal organizations are
producing results. For example, in November 2010, the San Diego Tunnel
Task Force, which is part of the San Diego BEST, discovered two tunnels
and seized more than 50 tons of marijuana. The first tunnel, discovered
on November 2, 2010, was a 600-yard underground cross-border passageway
equipped with rail, lighting, and ventilation systems. Surveillance
operations and collaboration with Mexican law enforcement led to the
discovery of this tunnel and resulted in the seizure of 30 tons of
marijuana. The second tunnel, discovered on November 26, 2010, was even
more sophisticated and included reinforced supports, advanced rail,
electrical, and ventilation systems. This tunnel discovery resulted in
the arrest of eight individuals and the seizure of more than 20 tons of
marijuana. The two discoveries are the result of our collaboration with
other agencies and use of state-of-the-art electronic surveillance
technology to investigate cross-border smuggling by criminal
organizations.
Another example of the success of our efforts to dismantle
transnational criminal organizations is ``Operation In Plain Sight,'' a
targeted operation focused on five transportation companies involved in
human smuggling. The bi-national investigation, which included
unprecedented cooperation with Mexico's Secretaria Seguridad Publica
(SSP) and marked the most comprehensive human smuggling investigation
in ICE history, ultimately implicated high-level members of human
smuggling organizations in Phoenix, Tucson, Nogales, and northern
Mexico that were serviced by shuttle businesses. Specifically,
Operation In Plain Sight resulted in: Nearly 50 criminal arrests and
more than 40 administrative arrests; seizures of illicit weapons, cash,
and vehicles; and the initiation of promising investigations of
criminal organizations in Mexico--effectively dismantling an entire
criminal enterprise engaged in smuggling through Arizona.
targeting transnational criminal organizations and pursuing money
laundering and bulk cash smuggling investigations
One of the most effective methods for dismantling transnational
criminal organizations is to attack the criminal proceeds that fund
their operations. ICE investigations utilize a ``supply chain attack''
strategy designed to trigger cascading failures within a criminal
organization by simultaneously targeting multiple components within the
organization.
The combination of successful financial investigations, reporting
requirements under the Bank Secrecy Act, and anti-money laundering
compliance efforts by financial institutions has strengthened formal
financial systems and forced criminal organizations to seek other means
to transport illicit funds across our borders.
ICE--as the investigative agency with jurisdiction over all crimes
with a nexus to U.S. borders--investigates bulk cash smuggling
violations. From fiscal year 2010 to date, ICE made 262 arrests for
bulk cash smuggling under 31 USC 5332. In that same time period, 198
defendants were convicted in Federal court for this same offense.
Operation Firewall
ICE's Operation Firewall disrupts the movement and smuggling of
bulk cash en route to the border, at the border, and internationally
via commercial and private passenger vehicles, commercial airline
shipments, airline passengers and pedestrians. Since 2005, we have
enhanced Operation Firewall efforts to include surge operations
targeting the movement of bulk cash destined for the Southwest Border
to be smuggled into Mexico. Since its inception in 2005, Operation
Firewall has resulted in more than 5,200 seizures totaling more than
$504 million, and the arrest of 1,020 individuals. These efforts
include 319 international seizures totaling more than $240 million and
218 international arrests.
In addition to our international investigations, domestic Operation
Firewall efforts assist us in documenting and gathering intelligence on
how organizations involved in bulk cash smuggling operate within the
United States. For example, during a routine traffic stop in May 2010,
ICE Special Agents operating out of St. Louis, along with the Illinois
State Police, seized $91,550 that was concealed within several natural
voids in a vehicle which were later determined to be cocaine proceeds
destined for Mexico. Both individuals pled guilty to narcotics-related
offenses. One of the individuals was sentenced to 140 months in prison,
while the other awaits sentencing.
ICE's National Bulk Cash Smuggling Center
On August 11, 2009, ICE officially launched the National Bulk Cash
Smuggling Center (BCSC), a 24/7 investigative support and operations
facility co-located with the Law Enforcement Support Center in
Williston, Vermont. Since its launch, the BCSC has undertaken a full
assessment of the bulk cash smuggling threat and has developed a
strategic plan to address the problem.
The BCSC utilizes a systematic approach to identify vulnerabilities
and disrupt the flow of illicit bulk cash at the Southwest Border and
beyond. By analyzing the movement of bulk cash as a systematic process,
ICE develops enforcement operations to defeat the various smuggling
methodologies currently employed by trafficking organizations. This
approach allows us to more efficiently and effectively utilize our
interdiction and investigative resources.
To date, the BCSC has initiated 348 investigations, which have
resulted in more than 89 arrests and more than 77 seizures. In July and
August 2010, ICE Special Agents working in conjunction with State and
local law enforcement officers seized more than 4,000 pounds of
narcotics stemming from a BCSC investigation into a criminal
organization based in New York City and Philadelphia that was
responsible for the movement of bulk cash across the Southwest Border
to Mexico. To date, this investigation has resulted in four arrests and
the seizure of more than $3 million in proceeds connected to narcotics.
ICE continues to work with its partners in Arizona, Maryland, Texas,
and New York to identify additional associates of this trafficking
organization.
ICE is further cooperating with both foreign and domestic law
enforcement partners to disrupt the criminal organizations that are
smuggling narcotics into the United States and smuggling bulk cash
shipments out. The expanding relationship between ICE's BCSC and DEA's
El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) is a key component of these efforts.
Recognizing each entity's distinct, but complementary roles, the
BCSC and EPIC are currently coordinating the establishment of the Bulk
Cash Smuggling Center Intake & Analysis Section (BCSC I&A) with our law
enforcement counterparts at EPIC. The BCSC I&A will function as a
single point of contact for State and local law enforcement entities to
report bulk currency interdictions and receive immediate real-time
analysis and support. In addition, the BCSC will focus its expertise in
financial investigations on DHS-driven BCS investigations and
initiatives to further strengthen the relationship between the two
centers.
Operation Pacific Rim
Operation Pacific Rim is an ICE-led investigation, with the
assistance of the DEA and FBI. The operation dismantled one of the most
powerful and sophisticated bulk cash and drug trafficking organizations
in the world. This transnational DTO was a prolific cocaine source of
supply, responsible for nearly half of the cocaine smuggled from
Colombia into the United States between 2003 and 2009--approximately
912 tons with an estimated street value of $24 billion.
Operation Pacific Rim originally targeted suspicious containerized
shipments of fertilizer at Colombian seaports in Buenaventura and
Cartagena. In September 2009, ICE Special Agents working closely with
the DEA, Colombian National Police, and the SSP, intercepted $41
million in bundles of shrink-wrapped bulk cash concealed within
shipments of fertilizer intercepted at seaports in Colombia and Mexico.
Subsequent to the $41 million seizure, Special Agents from ICE
Attache offices in Bogota and Mexico City, in coordination with foreign
law enforcement, expanded the scope of the investigation by identifying
the bulk cash and drug smuggling routes utilized by the cartel. The
investigation eventually covered three continents, resulting in the
capture of the top leadership and other high-ranking members of the
Pacific Rim Cartel. During the investigation, ICE developed a high-
level and strategically positioned source of information who led to the
seizure of an additional $122.8 million in illicit bulk currency, 3.3
tons of cocaine, $179 million in assets, and $37 million in criminal
forfeiture warrants. ICE's efforts helped lead to multiple arrests and
convictions.
Transnational Gangs
Operation Community Shield, an ICE-led anti-gang program, combines
ICE's expansive statutory and administrative enforcement authorities
with our law enforcement partnerships. Community Shield increases
public safety by combating the growth and proliferation of
transnational gangs in communities throughout the United States, and
ICE conducts targeted enforcement operations using criminal arrest and
administrative removal authorities against gang members, thereby
disrupting the ability of gangs to operate. In addition, these targeted
enforcement operations lead to the development of information critical
to the successful prosecution of transnational gang members for
conspiracy and racketeering-related violations.
Since its inception in 2005, Operation Community Shield has led to
the arrest of more than 20,000 gang members and associates, 7,699 of
whom had prior violent criminal histories. In addition, 249 gang
leaders have been arrested and 1,646 weapons have been seized.
In February 2010, ICE formally established the first international
Operation Community Shield Task Force (OCSTF) in Tegucigalpa, Honduras,
to work to disrupt criminal gang activity before it reaches our
borders. This task force is comprised of ICE Special Agents and
Honduras National Police (HNP) vetted officers and intelligence
analysts who work full-time to address the proliferation of
transnational gangs.
In May 2010, the OCSTF Honduras conducted a 3-day anti-gang
suppression operation deemed ``Operation Double Impact,'' to target
both the Mara-13 and Mara-18 gangs in Honduras. The first phase of the
operation targeted gang members within the prison system and resulted
in the identification and documentation of approximately 30 gang
members and the seizure of dozens of knives, narcotics, and other
restricted items. The second phase of the operation consisted of
simultaneous search warrants and other enforcement efforts at a market
known as Comayaguela Market. Officers arrested 33 gang members for
numerous Honduras criminal violations, and seized six firearms,
narcotics, one vehicle, and over 1.8 million counterfeit DVDs and CDs
with an estimated street value of more than $2 million.
In February 2011, ICE completed ``Project Southern Tempest,'' the
largest-ever Homeland Security Investigations-led National initiative
targeting gangs with ties to Mexican drug trafficking organizations.
The ICE National Gang Unit initiated Project Southern Tempest under the
auspices of Operation Community Shield to combat the National security
and public safety threats posed by transnational street gangs
conducting business on behalf of Mexican drug trafficking organizations
in the United States. Southern Tempest was executed in 168 U.S. cities
side by side with 173 of our Federal, State, and local law enforcement
partners, and led to the arrest 678 gang members and associates. More
than 46 percent of those arrested during this operation were members or
associates of gangs with ties to Mexican trafficking organizations. Of
those arrested, 447 were charged with criminal offenses and 322 had
previous violent criminal histories. Southern Tempest also led to
several significant seizures from gang members and associates,
including 86 firearms.
initiatives with the government of mexico
In coordination with the Department of State, ICE is expanding its
law enforcement training and outreach programs in Mexico and
strengthening our efforts to curb illicit activity at the border. ICE
coordinates multiple initiatives that involve direct coordination with
the Government of Mexico.
ICE is enabling Mexican law enforcement officials to perform their
duties more effectively by providing training and technical assistance.
We have provided training on numerous topics--including arms
trafficking, cyber crimes, basic criminal investigative methods,
special investigative techniques, global trafficking in persons, child
sex exploitation, information-sharing platform training, ethics, and
gang investigations--to SSP officers, among others. We remain committed
to our cross-training efforts to build the investigative capacity of
Mexican law enforcement entities.
In August 2007, the Mexican Tax Administration Service (SAT),
Mexican Customs, CBP, and ICE signed a Bilateral Strategic Plan to
fight cross-border crime. This Plan enabled ICE to begin an
unprecedented investigative training course for Mexican Customs
enforcement personnel, modeled after the ICE Special Agent training, to
prepare Mexican Customs officials to assume expanded investigative
responsibilities. The training improves bilateral information sharing
and investigative efforts to stem the cross-border flow of illegal
contraband.
ICE is also sharing critical information with Mexican authorities
to assist them in their fight against drug trafficking organizations.
On March 23, 2010, Secretary Napolitano signed an agreement with
Interior Secretary Gomez-Mont and Secretary of Public Safety General
Garcia Luna in Mexico that formalizes DHS's effort to share criminal
history information electronically with Mexican law enforcement
regarding Mexican nationals who have been convicted of certain felonies
in the United States and who are being repatriated from the United
States. We worked closely with DOJ and the FBI to ensure that all
parties adhere to regulations on the sharing of this criminal record
information.
In May 2008, ICE established a Trade Transparency Unit with Mexico
to help identify criminal networks using the trade system to launder
illicit proceeds. Through this initiative, ICE and Mexico Customs,
under the Mexico Finance Ministry, share trade transaction data--
providing critical information that is used to initiate and support
international criminal investigations related to money laundering,
trade fraud, and other criminal activity.
conclusion
Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today and
for your continued support of ICE and its law enforcement mission. ICE
is committed to stemming cross-border criminal organizations through
the various efforts I have discussed today. I appreciate your interest
in these important issues.
I would be pleased to answer any questions you may have.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Alvarez. Let me just personally
say thank you for your service and your colleagues who really
put themselves in harm's way every day. So thank you for that.
Mr. Nichols.
STATEMENT OF BRIAN A. NICHOLS, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF
STATE
Mr. Nichols. Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating, and
other distinguished Members of the subcommittee, thank you for
the opportunity to discuss joint U.S. and Mexican efforts to
combat transnational criminal organizations, build effective
law enforcement institutions, and address the underlying causes
of violence in Mexico. I will make a brief oral statement and
ask that the written statement be entered into the record.
We face an enormous challenge as Mexican cartels control
some 95 percent of the cocaine that reaches our streets. These
cartels have expanded their tentacles into extortion,
kidnapping, car theft, human trafficking, counterfeiting, and
any other illicit enterprise that they can think of. The growth
in Mexican organized crime and its control of the drug trade
from cultivation in the Andes, transshipment through Central
America, and its street-level distribution in our country
presents tremendous challenges.
In the face of brutal violence that has seen over 36,000
murders over the last 4 years, the Mexican government and
people have been unflagging in their commitment to root out
drug trafficking. In doing so they have worked with us in ways
that would have been unimaginable a decade ago.
I spent the majority of my 22 years in the foreign service
working in the hemisphere, including tours in Mexico, Colombia,
El Salvador, and Peru. I can state categorically that the
cooperation between the United States and Mexico in addressing
the threats that we face has never been better.
Mr. Chairman, you and your colleagues have been
instrumental in this effort by providing the resources
necessary to take on these criminal organizations and aid
Mexico in its fight by appropriating over $1.5 billion in
support of the Merida Initiative. To date, we have delivered
over $400 million in assistance; during the course of 2011 we
will deliver another $500 million in assistance. With regard to
international narcotics control and law enforcement funding, we
have already obligated over 80 percent of the just over $1
billion appropriated since Merida began.
Mexico, too, has invested substantial financial resources,
including approximately $10.7 billion in 2011 alone to build
its law enforcement and judicial capacity. The resulting Merida
Initiative includes more than 50 separate assistance projects
implemented by State, USAID, the Department of Justice, and law
enforcement agencies such as ICE, CBP, ATF, and DEA.
It also includes equipment and material resources that the
Mexican government has requested from us. We have already
delivered 11 helicopters with five more aircraft to follow this
year.
We have provided sophisticated computer systems for police,
prosecutors, financial analysis experts, and customs officials.
We have delivered 24 mobile non-intrusive inspection systems.
To build the human capacity that Mexico needs we have
trained over 4,500 federal police as well as thousands of
prosecutors, judges, customs officials, and corrections
officers. In the coming year we will extend our training to
thousands more vetted state police prosecutors and judges.
Homeland Security is a crucial partner in this fight. The
commitment, knowledge, and courage of our colleagues in the
Department of Homeland Security are an inspiration to us and
our Mexican allies.
In response to the brutal and cowardly murder of ICE
Special Agent Jaime Zapata and the attempted murder of ICE
Special Agent Victor Avila the Departments of State, Justice,
and Homeland Security announced a reward of up to $5 million
for information leading to the arrest and conviction of those
responsible. We in the Department of State Bureau of
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement are proud to
administer that program and look forward to swift results. The
government of Mexico has offered its own reward of up to 10
million pesos in this case.
The Merida Initiative is a long-term endeavor that
reaffirms our commitment to improving the security and safety
of citizens in both the United States and Mexico, builds upon
our deep ties, and emphasizes mutual respect and mutual
responsibility in meeting common challenges. We will continue
to work closely with the government of Mexico to defeat and
dismantle these criminal gangs and provide a safe and
prosperous future for both our peoples.
Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating, distinguished
Members, thank you again for this opportunity and your support
for this important initiative. I stand ready to address any
questions that you may have.
[The statement of Mr. Nichols follows:]
Prepared Statement of Brian A. Nichols
March 31, 2011
Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating, and Members of the
subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss the Department
of State's support for and partnership with the Government of Mexico
and its efforts to combat illicit crime, and drug trafficking
organizations (DTOs).
Mexican DTOs control the flow of approximately 95 percent of
cocaine and significant amounts of other drugs that flood neighborhoods
throughout the United States each year. Because U.S. demand for these
drugs is a principal source of revenue for Mexican DTOs, we have a
shared responsibility for, and interest in, confronting this threat.
In 2007, the U.S. and Mexican governments agreed to a significant
collaboration to enhance Mexico's capacity to counter narcotics
traffickers, and build effective justice sector institutions. The
Department of State worked closely with the Government of Mexico (GOM)
to develop programming and resource proposals that would accomplish our
shared objectives. The resulting Merida Initiative includes more than
50 separate assistance projects, implemented by the Department of
State, USAID, and a number of U.S. Government law enforcement agencies,
including U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs
and Border Protection (CBP) within the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives
(ATF) and Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) within the Department
of Justice (DOJ). Under Merida, we have provided significant technical
assistance and equipment ranging from complex IT systems,
communications gear, helicopters, and judicial reform programs that
have strengthened the Government of Mexico's ability to degrade DTO
activity.
situation in mexico and the gom response
The Government of Mexico has tallied over 36,000 cartel-related
deaths since President Calderon took office over 4 years ago, with over
15,000 murders in 2010 alone. The violence is increasingly brazen, as
attacks happen in public spaces and are increasingly targeting women
and children. February's attack on two ICE agents that resulted in the
death of U.S. Special Agent Jaime Zapata also took place in broad
daylight along a busy highway. Certain regions in Mexico have also seen
increased local street gang activity that is less subordinate to the
established cartels, and more indiscriminate in targeting victims. It
was one of these local gangs that murdered three people associated with
the U.S. Consulate General in Ciudad Juarez in March 2010. Difficult
economic conditions provide limited opportunities for Mexico's youth,
which makes criminal activity an attractive option, despite the risks.
Meanwhile, cartel activities have expanded into extortion,
kidnapping, immigrant smuggling, protection rackets, and domestic drug
retailing, making these illicit enterprises more profitable and violent
than ever.
To counter these disturbing trends, President Calderon and his
administration have undertaken the most significant steps in Mexico's
history to confront and dismantle illicit narcotics enterprises,
including the wholesale reform of Mexico's justice sector, building
institutions that will be able to deal with the DTO threat far into the
future. President Calderon's administration has committed significant
political capital and financial resources to this effort. Since the
beginning of the Merida Initiative, the Government of Mexico has grown
its financial commitment to this shared objective, increasing its
spending on order, security, and justice projects from $69.6 billion
pesos (approximately US$5.8 billion) in its 2008 budget to $131.9
billion pesos (approximately $10.7 billion) in its 2011 budget.
Mexico's 2011 budget for order, security, and justice projects is alone
more than six times the $1.5 billion appropriated under the Merida
Initiative.
President Calderon has also made justice sector reforms a priority,
including Federal, State, and local police, prosecutors, judges, and
corrections systems. The centerpiece of these reforms is Mexico's
transition from an inquisitorial civil code judicial system to an
accusatorial system similar to our common law that uses transparent
oral trials and relies more heavily on physical evidence. Under the
constitutional reform, the new system must be implemented by 2016, but
a major push will be needed if this deadline is to be met.
Additional reforms are being implemented to ensure transparency and
public accountability. For example, to mitigate pervasive corruption,
Mexico has systematically removed thousands of government officials
from duty and is developing extensive internal controls, including
background checks and polygraphs, as well as enhanced standards for
recruitment and professional integrity. The Secretariat of Public
Security (SSP) manages Plataforma Mexico, a sophisticated computer
system, which has automated and consolidated much of the public
information records in Mexico to conduct more effective investigations,
track criminals and prevent corruption. Mexican Customs is
restructuring its career paths, instituting additional internal
controls, removing corrupt contract workers and recruiting and training
a higher caliber of officer. These examples are illustrative of the
efforts that President Calderon has championed across all Mexican
Government agencies.
the merida initiative
U.S. foreign assistance to Mexico under the Merida Initiative is
organized around a four pillar strategy that aims to: (1) Disrupt the
capacity of organized crime to operate; (2) institutionalize reforms to
sustain the rule of law and respect for human rights; (3) create a 21st
Century border; and (4) build strong and resilient communities. Under
each of these pillars and at each stage of programmatic development,
the Department of State works directly with our Mexican partners to
meet our shared objectives. While this substantial working-level
coordination prolongs the timeline for program planning and execution,
it is critically important to ensure that the Merida Initiative remains
a Mexico-led program that will be sustainable.
Since its inception, programming under the Initiative has yielded
many concrete results. For example, U.S. and Mexico law enforcement
cooperation against cartels has resulted in over 20 DTO leaders being
arrested or killed since December 2009, including Mexico's operation
targeting La Familia Michoacana in December 2010, which led to the
reported death of its leader, Nazario Moreno. Mexico has also supported
U.S. law enforcement operations named Xcellerator, Coronado, and
Deliverance, that resulted in thousands of arrests of Mexico-linked
traffickers in the United States. Today's unprecedented levels of
bilateral law enforcement cooperation would likely not have been
realized absent the Merida Initiative.
Appropriately trained and vetted police are critical elements of
Mexico's counternarcotics operations, but so too is the enhanced
capability of the Government of Mexico to rapidly respond to law
enforcement intelligence.
Merida assistance has already provided 11 helicopters to Mexico:
Eight Bell-412 helicopters to the Mexican Defense Secretariat (SEDENA)
and three UH-60M Black Hawks to Mexico's Federal Police. A software
package, laptops, and training provided to Mexico's Attorney General's
Office under Merida, a Spanish language version of ATF's eTrace, traces
the origin of captured firearms and has provided evidence that led to
convictions of Arizona gang members who were trafficking weapons.
Building on this initial success, the use of eTrace will soon be
expanded to the Mexican Federal Police.
As these examples illustrate, Merida programming has already
yielded success. The Merida program recognizes that traditional police
functions, while critically important, only represent one piece of the
much larger criminal justice sector that we and our Mexican
counterparts hope to enhance. Since the start of Merida, more than
4,500 Mexican SSP officers have graduated from Merida-supported
investigation training programs. These officers are now deployed
throughout Mexico, transforming the way crimes are investigated and
prosecuted at the Federal level. Merida is implementing a whole-of-
justice sector approach where U.S. foreign assistance funds are used to
train Federal police, prosecutors, and judges, and corrections
officials, with a focus on training trainers. While most of the
training to date has focused on Federal-level officials, we also
recognize that since over 90% of crimes in Mexico are investigated and
tried at the State and local level, significant investment also needs
to be made to transform the institutions at those levels.
Along our shared border we are working together to ensure that
customs and migratory controls expedite the flow of legitimate trade
and travelers, while allowing law enforcement authorities to prevent
the illicit movement of drugs, guns, bulk cash, and people. Both
governments are investing in new and expanded ports of entry. Merida
funds have procured non-intrusive inspection equipment (NIIE),
biometric immigration systems, canine inspection teams, and training
for Mexico's border officials. We are also helping our Mexican partners
establish a new customs academy, which will train customs enforcement
officers.
Finally, our assistance is also helping to support Mexican States
to build strong and resilient communities, including programming
already underway in Ciudad Juarez. USAID programming has already
yielded a comprehensive baseline evaluation on the existing
demographic, health, economic and social conditions in Juarez that has
been shared with the GOM and posted on-line for the general public.
USAID's youth program also provides safe spaces for disadvantaged young
people, strengthening and expanding after-school and summer programs,
and preparing Mexican youth for viable futures through self or salaried
employment. Under the Mexican Government's Todos Somos Juarez program,
the government has engaged local community groups to upgrade common
spaces, keep youth out of criminal enterprises and to create new,
positive role models. Merida programs are being designed for violence
prevention and crime mapping, as well as substantial drug demand
reduction programs that provide training and certification in drug
treatment and prevention. An anonymous citizens' complaints project
will provide more secure means for Mexican citizens to provide crime
and corruption related tips to the Mexican police. In addition, culture
of lawfulness projects are teaching values and ethics to a wide range
of Mexican audiences, including the media, school children, and
government employees.
looking ahead
Managing a program that has increased U.S. assistance to Mexico
from $40 million/year to roughly $500 million/year is a complex
undertaking. Since the Merida Initiative began, $408 million in
assistance has been delivered to Mexico, including training,
conferences, and other events for over 72,000 Mexican justice sector
and civil society actors; 67 advanced non-intrusive inspection
equipment devices; 318 polygraph machines; 11 aircraft; and many other
items. The Mexican government is a full partner in this process, and
our implementation of the Merida Initiative depends on Mexican
concurrence with each and every element.
To support our joint efforts, The State Department has increased
its implementation and program staff from 21 people in 2008 to 112
today in Washington and Mexico City. These officers develop programs,
manage procurements, and coordinate activities with Government of
Mexico counterparts, as well as provide oversight and accountability.
For these reasons, we believe that the Merida Initiative is on a strong
track. This calendar year we expect to deliver $500 million in
assistance, including 5 of the 11 remaining aircraft provided under the
Initiative, up to $100 million in non-intrusive inspection equipment,
and over $100 million in critical IT equipment for Mexican
institutions.
closing
The Four Pillar strategy has provided a balanced and flexible
approach to our work in Mexico, incorporating programs that target
cartels, build institutions, modernize the border, and build strong
communities. It has also advanced our vision of a whole-of-government
effort to provide specialized U.S. expertise to our Mexican
counterparts in a peer-to-peer manner.
Following the Government of Mexico's lead and our joint planning,
we are currently expanding the focus of our assistance to State and
local institutions. And after the delivery of sophisticated and
expensive equipment peaks in 2011, we will begin to see the shift away
from aircraft and other expensive equipment and towards supporting
institutional reforms and capacity building through more training and
technical assistance.
The Merida Initiative is a long-term endeavor that reaffirms our
commitment to improving the security and safety of citizens in both the
United States and Mexico, builds upon our deep ties, and emphasizes
mutual respect and responsibility in meeting challenges. We will
continue to work closely with the Government of Mexico through the
Merida Initiative and other avenues to achieve these goals.
Thank you for your support of this important initiative. I look
forward to your questions.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Nichols.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Mora for his remarks.
STATEMENT OF FRANK O. MORA, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE, WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. Mora. Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating, and
Ranking Member Thompson, and Members of the committee, I would
like to begin by thanking you for the opportunity to testify
today and for your interest in U.S. defense cooperation with
Mexico. I value the insights and work of this committee in
ensuring the security of our homeland and in recognizing that
an important part of this effort is to strengthen our
relationship with critical partners such as Mexico. My hope is
that I can help you in your work and by being--by being
transparent in mine and that my testimony today is responsive
in this regard.
Mr. Chairman, Mexico is facing a serious challenge as it
confronts transnational criminal organizations, also known as
TCOs, and we admire President Calderon's commitment to the
fight. Although we are concerned about the escalating violence
we are confident that Mexico's democracy is strong.
In fact, one important reason why TCOs have increasingly
turned to violence and intimidation of law enforcement officers
and the Mexican public is because the Government of Mexico has
made progress in countering these organizations. As a result of
these efforts several of the major drug trafficking
organizations are fighting with each other to ensure survival
while others have splintered into smaller intra-warring
factions.
Mr. Chairman, as you know, the U.S. Government's principal
vehicle for coordinating security cooperation with Mexico is
the Merida Initiative. The Department of Defense plays a
supporting role to the Department of State and U.S. law
enforcement agencies but is nonetheless working on a number of
fronts to assist the Government of Mexico in its brave fight.
In fact, I am pleased to report that U.S.-Mexico defense
cooperation has reached unprecedented levels as of late.
In February of last year we hosted the first of what we
expect to be regular meetings of a bilateral defense working
group with Mexico. Our hope is that this develops into a robust
mechanism for structured, strategic dialogue. In its first
meeting, for example, the Mexican military recommending the
establishment of a subgroup to discuss the Mexico-Guatemala-
Belize border region, and this group has already met twice.
Increased information sharing and domain awareness
capabilities are also critical components of our cooperation.
We have made particularly impressive strides on this front by
signing a number of agreements that will facilitate information
sharing and improve domain awareness.
The Department continues to partner with Mexican forces in
their efforts to improve tactical and operational proficiency
as well as their air mobility, maritime law enforcement,
communications, reconnaissance, and associated capacity with
training and technical support.
As part of the Merida Initiative we have provided
nonintrusive inspection equipment for mobile checkpoints;
delivered eight Bell 412 transport helicopters for the Mexican
Secretariat of National Defense, SEDENA; and accelerated the
anticipated delivery of three UH-60M Blackhawks for the Mexican
Secretariat of the Navy, SEMAR, accelerated by 2 years to
September of this year. Our delivery of four CASA 235 maritime
surveillance aircraft remains on target.
The U.S. Navy, working with the Coast Guard and other
partners, has improved cooperation with SEDENA and SEMAR on
aerial, maritime, littoral, and amphibious counternarcotics
operations. The frequency of planned U.S.-Mexico maritime
counternarcotics cooperative operations increased from 4 in
2008, 10 in 2009, and 24 last year.
In addition, and as a complement to our efforts under
Merida, the Department of Defense counternarcotics program
estimates that it will program approximately $51 million in
fiscal year 2011 to support Mexico. The Department's C.N.--
counternarcotics--support has concentrated on helping Mexican
forces improve their air mobility, maritime law enforcement,
and reconnaissance capacities.
This allocation is a dramatic increase from the previous
funding levels. Before 2009, for example, funding for Mexico
was closer to $3 million a year.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to close by emphasizing that
this is a snapshot of our cooperation with the Government of
Mexico, but I hope it has provided you and the members of this
committee with a sense of the strategic importance that the
Department of Defense places on its cooperation with Mexico.
Although I believe that the initiatives described above
strongly demonstrate our commitment to supporting the Mexican
government in its efforts to combat these violent transnational
criminal groups, I also want to underscore that the Department
of Defense assists and collaborates with the Government of
Mexico in response to its requests. As Secretary Gates has
noted previously, we will take our lead from the Government of
Mexico on the speed and extent of our cooperation.
Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to your
questions and the questions of this committee.
[The statement of Mr. Mora follows:]
Prepared Statement of Frank O. Mora
March 31, 2011
Mr. Chairman and Members of the committee: I would like to begin by
thanking you for the opportunity to testify today and for your interest
in U.S. defense cooperation with Mexico. I value the insights and work
of this committee in ensuring the security of our homeland and
recognizing that an important part of this effort is to strengthen our
relationships with critical partners such as Mexico. My hope is that I
can help you in your work by being transparent in mine, and that my
testimony today is responsive in this regard.
Mexico is facing a serious challenge as it confronts transnational
criminal organizations (TCOs) that seek to operate with impunity inside
Mexico, and we admire President Calderon's commitment to the fight.
Although we are concerned about the escalating violence, we are
confident that Mexico's democracy is strong. In fact, one important
reason why TCOs have increasingly turned to violence and intimidation
of law enforcement officers and the Mexican public is because the
Government of Mexico has made progress in countering the TCOs. As a
result of these efforts, several of the major drug trafficking
organizations are fighting with each other to ensure survival while
others have splintered into smaller intra-warring factions.
Mr. Chairman, as you know, the U.S. Government's principal vehicle
for coordinating security cooperation with Mexico is the Merida
Initiative. The Defense Department plays a supporting role to the
Department of State and U.S. law enforcement agencies, but is
nonetheless working on a number of fronts to assist the Government of
Mexico in its brave fight. Under Merida and other cooperative programs,
DoD provides training, information sharing, and operational support to
Mexican military and other security forces, as well as to U.S. law
enforcement agencies' activities in Mexico. I am pleased to report that
U.S.-Mexico defense cooperation has reached unprecedented levels as of
late.
In February 2010 we hosted the first of what we expect to be
regular meetings of a Defense Bilateral Working Group with Mexico. Our
hope is that this develops into a robust mechanism for structured,
strategic dialogue. In this first meeting, for example, one promising
initiative that the Mexican military recommended was the establishment
of a sub-group to discuss the Mexico-Guatemala-Belize border region,
and this sub-group has already met twice. Addressing security issues in
this region is becoming even more important as TCOs seek to diversify
their criminal activities and extend their presence throughout the
region, which is why we are working in conjunction with the State
Department, U.S. Northern Command, and U.S. Southern Command to develop
a joint security effort in the border area of these three countries.
Increased information sharing and multi-domain awareness
capabilities are also critical components of our cooperation, and are
indispensable as we work to ensure that our efforts on both sides of
the border and throughout the region are coordinated. We have made
particularly impressive strides on this front by signing a number of
agreements that will facilitate information sharing and improve domain
awareness. The Department also provides training and exchanges of
expertise to help Mexican forces learn how to plan and carry out multi-
agency intelligence driven support to law enforcement efforts against
TCOs.
The Department continues to partner with Mexican forces in their
efforts to improve tactical and operational proficiency, as well as
their air mobility, maritime law enforcement, communications,
reconnaissance, and associated capacity with training and technical
support. As part of the Merida Initiative, we have provided non-
intrusive inspection equipment for mobile checkpoints, delivered eight
Bell 412 transport helicopters for the Mexican Secretariat of National
Defense (SEDENA), and accelerated the anticipated delivery of three UH-
60M Blackhawks for the Mexican Secretariat of the Navy (SEMAR) by 2
years to September of this year. Our delivery of four CASA 235 maritime
surveillance aircraft remains on target.
The U.S. Navy, working with the Coast Guard and other partners, has
increased cooperation with SEDENA and SEMAR on aerial, maritime,
littoral, and amphibious counternarcotics operations. The frequency of
planned U.S.-Mexico maritime counternarcotics cooperative operations
increased from four in 2008 to 10 in 2009 to 24 in 2010. I am also
encouraged that SEDENA posted a liaison officer at U.S. Northern
Command headquarters in 2009, and SEMAR has liaison officers posted at
Joint Inter-Agency Task Force (JIATF)--South and Fleet Forces Command,
in addition to U.S. Northern Command.
In addition, and as a complement to our efforts under Merida, the
Defense Department's counternarcotics (CN) program estimates that it
will program approximately $51 million in fiscal year 2011 to support
Mexico. The Department's CN support has concentrated on helping Mexican
forces improve their air mobility, maritime law enforcement, and
reconnaissance capacities. This allocation is a dramatic increase from
previous funding levels for Mexico. Before 2009, for example, funding
for Mexico was closer to $3 million a year.
Finally, I think it is appropriate to note that the Government of
Mexico recognizes as a priority the protection of the human rights of
its citizens, especially as Mexico's armed forces have joined law
enforcement agencies in the serious fight against violent criminal
organizations. The U.S. Northern Command has therefore partnered with
SEDENA and SEMAR to increase human rights training by conducting
executive seminars.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to close by emphasizing that this is a
snapshot of our cooperation with the Government of Mexico, but I hope
it has provided you with a sense of the strategic importance that the
Defense Department places on its cooperation with Mexico. Although I
believe that the initiatives described above strongly demonstrate our
commitment to supporting the Mexican government in its efforts to
combat these violent transnational criminal groups, I also want to
underscore that the Defense Department assists and collaborates with
the Government of Mexico to address its requests of us. As Secretary
Gates has noted previously, we will take our lead from the Government
of Mexico on the speed and the extent of our cooperation.
Finally, on behalf of the Department of Defense, I would like to
reiterate that thanks to the tireless work of the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, the U.S. Department of Justice, and other U.S.
Federal, State, and local law enforcement and other authorities, we
have no evidence of so-called ``spillover violence'' into the United
States. The Department of Defense is committed to providing continued
support, as requested, to the law enforcement agencies that protect the
safety of U.S. citizens in our country. Thank you, and I very much look
forward to your questions.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Mora.
The Chair now recognizes Dr. Finklea for her testimony.
STATEMENT OF KRISTIN M. FINKLEA, ANALYST, DOMESTIC SOCIAL
POLICY DIVISION, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE
Ms. Finklea. Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating, and
Members of the subcommittee, my name is Kristin Finklea and I
am an analyst at the Congressional Research Service. I am
honored to appear before the subcommittee today. As requested
by the subcommittee, my testimony will provide information on
drug trafficking-related violence and possible spillover
violence along the Southwest border.
Since CRS does not independently collect data the data
referenced in my testimony come from data that are made
publicly available by the FBI Uniform Crime Reporting program.
My testimony today highlights information that is discussed in
CRS report entitled, ``Southwest Border Violence: Issues in
Identifying and Measuring Spillover Violence,'' that I would
like to have included for the record.
My testimony is limited to information contained in this
report as well as analyses that my colleagues and I have done
in relation to this issue. As is our policy, CRS takes no
position on legislative or policy proposals themselves.
As we all know, drug trafficking-related violence within
and between the drug trafficking organizations in Mexico has
escalated. Mexico's most violent city, Ciudad Juarez, sits
directly across the border from El Paso, Texas.
The violence in Mexico has generated concern that it might
spill over into the United States. Although anecdotal reports
have been mixed, U.S. Federal officials have not reported a
measurable spike in drug trafficking-related violence in the
United States.
However, they acknowledge that the prospect is a concern.
In fact, one central concern for policymakers is the potential
for what has been termed ``spillover violence,'' an increase in
drug trafficking-related violence in the United States.
The interagency community has defined spillover violence as
violence targeted primarily at civilians and government
entities excluding trafficker-on-trafficker violence. Other
experts and scholars, however, have recognized trafficker-on-
trafficker violence as central to spillover. Defining spillover
violence is just one challenge is assessing this violence.
CRS is unaware of any comprehensive, publicly available
data that can definitively answer the question of whether there
has or has not been a significant spillover of drug
trafficking-related violence into the United States. However,
CRS has examined violent crime data from the FBI's UCR program
to assess whether it provides insight into the question of
spillover violence. CRS has observed that UCR data cannot
provide evidence for either the presence of spillover violence
or a lack thereof.
Looking at UCR data is like looking through a window. This
window is fairly opaque and relatively narrow.
Through this opaque window you can see one level of data.
However, there are more data with greater levels of specificity
that you cannot clearly see through this window.
The violent crime rate, for example, you can see through
the window. It is a compilation of violent crimes both related
and unrelated to drug trafficking.
But the window does not allow you to see further to
determine the proportion of violent crimes that are related to
drug trafficking. Within the violent crime window an increase
in drug trafficking-related violent crime could be masked by a
decrease in those violent crimes not related to trafficking or
vice versa.
Through this narrow window you can view a specific subset
of crime. You cannot, however, see the full range of crimes.
The UCR window allows you to see data for eight different
offenses--some violent crimes, some property crimes. Data for
other crimes lie outside the narrow window. Kidnapping, one
crime often cited as anecdotal evidence of spillover violence,
is not within the UCR crime window.
In closing, publicly available data at this time do not
allow CRS to draw definitive conclusions about trends in drug
trafficking-related violence spilling over from Mexico into the
United States.
I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today and
I look forward to answering any questions you may have. Thank
you.
[The statement of Ms. Finklea follows:]
Prepared Statement of Kristin M. Finklea
Southwest Border Violence: Issues in Identifying and Measuring
Spillover Violence
January 25, 2011
introduction
There has been an increase in the level of drug trafficking-related
violence within and between the drug trafficking organizations (DTOs)
in Mexico--a country with which the United States shares a nearly
2,000-mile border.\1\ Estimates have placed the number of drug
trafficking-related deaths in Mexico since December 2006 at over
30,000.\2\ Some have placed the death toll for 2010 alone at over
11,600.\3\ Further, Mexico's most violent city, Ciudad Juarez--with
over 3,000 murders in 2010--is located directly across the border from
El Paso, TX. This violence has generated concern among U.S. policy
makers that the violence in Mexico might spill over into the United
States. Currently, U.S. Federal officials deny that the recent increase
in drug trafficking-related violence in Mexico has resulted in a
spillover into the United States, but they acknowledge that the
prospect is a serious concern.\4\ As an extension of its
counternarcotics policy, as well as in response to the possibility of
violence spillover, the U.S. Government is supporting Mexico's
crackdown campaign against drug cartels in Mexico through bilateral
security initiatives, including the Merida Initiative.\5\ It is also
enhancing border security programs and reducing the movement of
contraband (drugs, money, and weapons) in both directions across the
Southwest border.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ See, for example, ``Congress Discusses Increasing Drug Violence
in Mexico,'' Voice of America, March 11, 2009. For more information on
the drug-related violence in Mexico, see CRS Report R41576, Mexico's
Drug Trafficking Organizations: Source and Scope of the Rising
Violence, by June S. Beittel.
\2\ ``Mexican drug war deaths surpass 30,100,'' CNN, December 17,
2010, http://articles.cnn.com/2010-12-17/world/ mexico.violence_1_drug-
war-border-city-drug-related-violence?_s=PM:WORLD.
\3\ Trans-Border Institute (TBI), Justice in Mexico December 2010
News Report. Reforma is the generally respected source of data on drug
trafficking-related deaths in Mexico. For further explanation of why
these data are preferred over other sources, see TBI, ``Drug Violence
in Mexico: Data and Analysis from 2001-2009,'' January, 2010, http://
www.justiceinmexico.org/resources/pdf/drug_violence.pdf. There have
been varying reports about the actual number of drug-related deaths.
For instance, the Washington Post also tracks this number, and the data
are available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/graphic/
2009/04/01/GR2009040103531.html.
\4\ See for example, U.S. Department of Homeland Security,
``Remarks by Secretary Napolitano at the Border Security Conference,''
press release, August 11, 2009, http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/speeches/
sp_1250028863008.shtm and Ramon Bracamontes, ``CBP Chief Assesses the
Border: Alan Bersin, in El Paso, Assures Safety, Backs Mexico's
Fight,'' El Paso Times, January 6, 2011.
\5\ The Merida Initiative is a multi-year initiative for $1.4
billion in U.S. counterdrug and anticrime assistance to Mexico and
Central America. The details of the Merida Initiative will not be
discussed in this report; for more information, please see CRS Report
R41349, U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: the Merida Initiative and
Beyond, by Clare Ribando Seelke and Kristin M. Finklea.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
When discussing drug trafficking-related violence in the United
States, one important point to note is that the mere presence of
Mexican drug trafficking organizations in the United States is not in
and of itself an indication of the spillover of Mexican drug
trafficking-related violence in the United States. While their presence
may be an indication of the drug problem in general, it does not
necessarily reflect activity directly tied to the recent violence seen
in Mexico. The DTOs (Mexican and others) have been developing
sophisticated illicit drug smuggling and trafficking networks for
years. These activities engender violence and associated criminal
activity, not just along the border but in other areas throughout the
country, such as along domestic interstate distribution networks and in
major metropolitan areas.\6\ The United States has experienced levels
of drug trafficking-related crime for many years.\7\ The immediate
question confronting policy makers is whether the increasing violence
between the drug trafficking organizations in Mexico affects either the
level or character of drug trafficking-related violence in the United
States. A related question is whether evidence of spillover violence
would necessitate a policy response from Congress qualitatively
different from the current efforts to combat drug trafficking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Drug Enforcement Administration, Statement of Joseph M. Arabit
Special Agent in Charge, El Paso Division, Regarding ``Violence Along
the Southwest Border'' Before the House Appropriations Committee,
Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science and Related Agencies, March
24, 2009, http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/speeches/s032409.pdf.
\7\ The Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF)
Program, for instance, has been operating since 1982 to combat major
drug trafficking and money laundering organizations. For more
information on the OCDETF Program, see http://www.justice.gov/dea/
programs/ocdetf.htm. The trends in drug trafficking-related crime
across the United States are currently unknown because Federal law
enforcement agencies do not systematically track and report drug
trafficking-related crimes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This report focuses on how policy makers would identify any
spillover of drug trafficking-related violence into the United States.
This report provides: (1) An overview of Mexican drug trafficking
organization structures, how they conduct business, and the
relationship between the drug trafficking organizations in Mexico and
their partnerships operating here in the United States; (2) a
discussion of the illicit drug trade between Mexico and the United
States, as well as a discussion of factors implicated in drug
trafficking-related violence; (3) an analysis of the possible nature of
any spillover violence that may arise, as well as issues involved in
accurately identifying and measuring such violence; and (4) an
evaluation of available crime rate data and a discussion of how this
data may or may not reflect changes in drug trafficking-related crime.
This report does not include a discussion of illicit drug enforcement
issues,\8\ nor does it include specific policy options that may be
considered to stem a potential uptick in drug trafficking-related
violence. The Appendix describes selected U.S. efforts undertaken to
address the possibility of spillover violence and the drug control
problem.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ For more information, see archived CRS Report R40732, Federal
Domestic Illegal Drug Enforcement Efforts: Are They Working? by Celinda
Franco.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
the southwest border region and the illicit drug trade between the
united states and mexico
The nature of the conflict between the Mexican DTOs in Mexico has
manifested itself, in part, as a struggle for control of the smuggling
routes into the United States.\9\ Therefore, the prospects for
spillover violence are most keenly anticipated in the Southwest border
(SWB) region of the United States because the region represents the
arrival zone for the vast majority of illicit drugs that are smuggled
into the country. The size, geography, and climate of the SWB region
have long presented unique challenges to law enforcement. The southern
border with Mexico stretches nearly 2,000 miles in length, is sparsely
populated in some areas, and is dotted with legitimate crossing points
(ports of entry)--both large and small. The National Drug Threat
Assessment, 2008, summarized the illicit drug threat scenario along the
SWB in stark terms:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ In addition, the drug-related violence in Mexico is also
resulting from a struggle between the drug trafficking organizations
and the Mexican government attempting to crack down on the DTOs. For
more information, see Scott Stewart and Alex Posey, Mexico: The War
with the Cartels in 2009, Stratfor Global Intelligence, November 9,
2009, http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20091209_mexico_war_cartels_2009.
``The Southwest Border Region is the most significant national-level
storage, transportation, and transshipment area for illicit drug
shipments that are destined for drug markets throughout the United
States. The region is the principal arrival zone for most drugs
smuggled into the Unites States; more illicit drugs are seized along
the Southwest Border than in any other arrival zone. Mexican DTOs have
developed sophisticated and expansive drug transportation networks
extending from the Southwest Border to all regions of the United
States. They smuggle significant quantities of illicit drugs through
and between ports of entry (POEs) along the Southwest Border and store
them in communities throughout the region. Most of the region's
principal metropolitan areas, including Dallas, El Paso, Houston, Los
Angeles, Phoenix, San Antonio, and San Diego, are significant storage
locations as well as regional and national distribution centers.
Mexican DTOs and criminal groups transport drug shipments from these
locations to destinations throughout the country.''\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ U.S. Department of Justice, National Drug Intelligence Center,
National Drug Threat Assessment, 2008, Product No. 2007-Q0317-003,
October 2007, p. v, http://www.usdoj.gov/ndic/pubs25/25921/25921p.pdf.
Hereinafter, NDTA, 2008.
The most recent threat assessment indicates that the Mexican DTOs
pose the greatest drug trafficking threat to the United States.\11\
Demand for illicit drugs in the United States partly drives this
threat.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ U.S. Department of Justice, National Drug Intelligence Center,
National Drug Threat Assessment 2010, Product No. 2010-Q0317-001,
February 2010, http://www.justice.gov/ndic/pubs38/38661/38661p.pdf.
Hereinafter, NDTA, 2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
demand for drugs in the united states
The United States is the largest consumer of illegal drugs and
sustains a multi-billion dollar market in illegal drugs.\12\ According
to the Central Intelligence Agency, the United States is the largest
consumer of Colombian-produced cocaine and heroin, as well as a large
consumer of Mexican-produced heroin, marijuana, and
methamphetamine.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Oriana Zill and Lowell Bergman, ``Do the Math: Why the Illegal
Drug Business is Thriving,'' PBS Frontline, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/
pages/frontline/shows/drugs/.
\13\ U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, World Fact Book, available
at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/
index.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The latest National Household Survey on Drug Use and Health
(NSDUH),\14\ in 2008, surveyed individuals aged 12 and older regarding
their drug use during the previous month. Survey results indicated that
an estimated 20.1 million individuals were current (past month) illegal
drug users, representing 8% of this population. This percentage of
users had remained relatively stable since 2002.\15\ Among these drug
users, marijuana was the most commonly used drug, with an estimated
15.2 million users (6.1% of the population), followed by nonmedical use
of prescription-type psychotherapeutic drugs (6.2 million users, or
2.5% of individuals). The survey also estimated that there were 1.9
million users of cocaine (0.7% of Americans), as well as 1.1 million
users of hallucinogens (0.4% of the population)--of which 555,000
reported use of Ecstasy. Results also estimated 314,000 methamphetamine
users.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ NSDUH is an annual survey of approximately 67,500 people,
including residents of households, noninstitutionalized group quarters,
and civilians living on military bases. The survey is administered by
the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration of the
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and is available at http:/
/oas.samhsa.gov/NSDUHlatest.htm.
\15\ According to the NSDUH, within the period 2002-2008, the
annual percentage of illicit drug users in the 12 and older age group
ranged from 7.9% to 8.3%.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
supply of illegal drugs from mexico
Mexican DTOs are the major suppliers and key producers \16\ of most
illegal drugs smuggled into the United States across the SWB. Moreover,
Mexico is the major transit country for cocaine, according to the U.S.
State Department; as much as 90% of the cocaine consumed in the United
States comes through Mexico.\17\ According to the National Drug
Intelligence Center's (NDIC's) 2010 National Drug Threat Assessment,
cocaine availability was lower in 2007, 2008, and 2009 (relative to
previous years) in certain areas of the United States for a number of
reasons, including cocaine eradication, cocaine seizures, increased
worldwide demand for cocaine, pressure on drug trafficking
organizations in Mexico, inter-cartel violence, and border
security.\18\ While cocaine availability decreased, the availability of
heroin, marijuana, methamphetamine, and MDMA remained and even
increased in some areas.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ Mexican DTOs distribute cocaine (produced primarily in
Colombia), and they produce as well as distribute heroin,
methamphetamine, and marijuana.
\17\ U.S. Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics
and Law Enforcement Affairs, 2009 International Narcotics Control
Strategy Report (INCSR), vol. 1, March 2009, p. 414.
\18\ NDTA, 2010.
\19\ Ibid., p. 27.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to controlling most of the wholesale cocaine
distribution in the United States, Mexican DTOs also control more of
the wholesale distribution of heroin methamphetamine and marijuana
distribution than other major drug trafficking organizations in the
United States. In 2008, there was an increase in heroin produced in
Mexico and a subsequent increase in its availability in the United
States. With respect to methamphetamine, there was a decline in
seizures of Mexican-produced methamphetamine beginning in 2006 and
continuing in 2007, in part because of Mexican import restrictions on
precursor drugs beginning in 2005, as well as because some Mexican-
based methamphetamine producers have more recently moved their
laboratories into the United States.\20\ However, by 2008, the DTOs had
circumvented the Mexican chemical control laws and were using non-
ephedrine based production methods, including the phenyl-2-propanone
(P2P) method.\21\ This has enabled a subsequent uptick in Mexican
methamphetamine flow into the United States. Marijuana availability in
the United States has also increased due to factors such as rising
marijuana production in Mexico, increasing marijuana cultivation in the
United States led by Mexican DTOs, and decreasing marijuana eradication
in Mexico.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ U.S. Department of Justice, National Drug Intelligence Center,
National Drug Threat Assessment 2009, Product No. 2008-Q0317-005,
December 2008, p. 9, http://www.usdoj.gov/ndic/pubs31/31379/31379p.pdf.
Hereinafter, NDTA, 2009.
\21\ NDTA, 2010, p. 34.
\22\ Ibid., p. 36.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The true quantity of drugs produced and transported by Mexican
DTOs, however, is unknown. Available data provide insight into the
quantity of drugs seized along the SWB, though this data cannot speak
to the total amount of drugs produced and/or transported into the
United States, nor does it provide information about the proportion of
these drugs that are actually seized along the SWB. For instance, Table
1 illustrates Federal seizures of illegal drugs along the SWB for
calendar years 2005-2009. Total drug seizures generally increased
during this time period, despite a decline in 2008. Specifically,
cocaine seizures along the SWB decreased in 2007 and 2008 relative to
previous years when cocaine seizures had been increasing, but seizures
began to increase again in 2009, a year that was marked by an increase
in all major illegal drug seizures except for seizures of MDMA. These
data, however, do not provide insight into the total amount of drugs
illegally produced and transported by the DTOs. Rather, this data
reflect an unknown proportion of drugs that the Mexican DTOs are
bringing into the United States through a variety of transportation
modes.
TABLE 1.--U.S. ILLEGAL DRUG SEIZURES ALONG THE SOUTHWEST BORDER
(In kilograms)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CY2005 CY2006 CY2007 CY2008 CY2009 \1\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cocaine........................................ 22,653 28,284 22,656 16,755 17,085
Heroin......................................... 228 489 404 556 642
Marijuana...................................... 1,034,102 1,146,687 1,472,536 1,253,054 1,489,673
MDMA........................................... 23 16 39 92 54
Methamphetamine................................ 2,918 2,798 1,860 2,201 3,478
----------------------------------------------------------------
Total.................................... 1,059,924 1,178,274 1,497,495 1,272,658 1,510,932
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 2009 data includes data from January 1, 2009, through December 1, 2009.
Source: CRS presentation of data from the U.S. Department of Justice, National Drug Intelligence Center,
National Drug Threat Assessment 2010, Product No. 2010-Q0317-001, February 2010, p. 20, http://www.justice.gov/
ndic/pubs38/38661/38661p.pdf. The NDIC uses data from the National Seizure System.
The 2010 National Drug Threat Assessment indicates that Mexican
DTOs, in addition to being the major supplier of illegal drugs being
smuggled into the United States, have a strong presence within the
United States.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ Ibid, p. 9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
mexican drug trafficking organizations \24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ The terms drug trafficking organization (DTO) and drug cartel
are terms often used interchangeably. Cartel is one of the dominant
terms used colloquially and in the press, but some experts disagree
with using this term because ``cartel'' often refers to price-setting
groups and because it is not clear that the Mexican drug trafficking
organizations are setting illicit drug prices. For the purpose of
consistency, this report uses the term drug trafficking organization.
For more information on the Mexican DTOs, see archived CRS Report
RL34215, Mexico's Drug Cartels, by Colleen W. Cook. For information on
the current violence between the DTOs in Mexico, see CRS Report R41576,
Mexico's Drug Trafficking Organizations: Source and Scope of the Rising
Violence, by June S. Beittel.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mexican DTOs are transnational organized crime groups \25\ whose
criminal activities center primarily around the drug trade. In general,
organized crime groups attempt to fill particular illicit market
niches. Specifically, DTOs respond to the societal demand for illegal
drugs. Some experts have likened drug trafficking organizations to
corporations or even small nation-states. They are influenced by
factors such as geography, politics, economics, and culture.\26\
Geographically, for example, Mexican DTOs are situated between the
world's largest producer of cocaine (Colombia) and the world's largest
consumer of cocaine (United States), leading Mexico to be a natural
drug transshipment route between the two countries.\27\ In addition,
major Mexican criminal organizations focus primarily (though not
exclusively) on drugs, because the drug trade has, to date, generally
proven to be more economically lucrative than other illicit activities
such as kidnapping and extortion.\28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ For more information on organized crime in the United States,
see CRS Report R40525, Organized Crime in the United States: Trends and
Issues for Congress, by Kristin M. Finklea; and CRS Report R41547,
Organized Crime: An Evolving Challenge for U.S. Law Enforcement, by
Jerome P. Bjelopera and Kristin M. Finklea.
\26\ Stratfor Global Intelligence, Mexican Drug Cartels: The Net
Assessment, March 9, 2008, http://www.stratfor.com/podcast/
mexican_drug_cartels_net_assessment.
\27\ Stratfor Global Intelligence, Organized Crime in Mexico, March
11, 2008, http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/organized_crime_mexico.
\28\ Ibid. Refer to the section in the report, ``Activities,'' for
more information on other illicit activities engaged in by the drug
trafficking organizations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mexican DTOs either: (1) Transport or (2) produce and transport
drugs north across the United States-Mexico border.\29\ Figure 1
illustrates the drug trafficking routes within Mexico and at the United
States-Mexico border. After being smuggled across the border by DTOs,
the drugs are distributed and sold within the United States. The
illicit proceeds may then be laundered or smuggled south across the
border. The proceeds may also be used to purchase weapons in the United
States that are then smuggled into Mexico.\30\ This leads to a general
pattern of drugs flowing north across the border and money and guns
flowing south.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ As mentioned, Mexican DTOs distribute cocaine (produced in
Colombia, Venezuela, and Brazil), and they produce as well as
distribute heroin, methamphetamine, and marijuana.
\30\ For more information on gun trafficking on the Southwest
border, see CRS Report R40733, Gun Trafficking and the Southwest
Border, by Vivian S. Chu and William J. Krouse.
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Although Mexican DTOs have been active for some time, they have
become more prominent since the decline of the powerful Colombian DTOs
beginning in the 1980s.\31\ The NDIC estimates that Mexican DTOs
maintain drug distribution networks--or supply drugs to distributors in
at least 230 U.S. cities (as illustrated in Figure 2)--and annually
transport multi-ton quantities of illicit drugs from Mexico into the
United States using a variety of multi-modal transportation
methods.\32\ Estimates are that these drugs generate between $18
billion and $39 billion in U.S. wholesale drug proceeds for the
Colombian and Mexican DTOs annually.\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ Stratfor Global Intelligence, Organized Crime in Mexico, March
11, 2008, http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/organized_crime_mexico. See
also archived CRS Report RL34215, Mexico's Drug Cartels, by Colleen W.
Cook.
\32\ NDTA, 2009., p. 45.
\33\ NDTA, 2009., p. 49. According to ONDCP data, the trafficking
and distribution of cocaine generates about $3.9 billion, marijuana
generates about $8.5 billion, and methamphetamine generates about $1
billion. Jane's, Security, Mexico, February 20, 2009.
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
When conceptualizing Mexican drug trafficking organizations as
businesses, policy makers may question the impact of possible drug
trafficking-related violence spillover (into the United States) on the
drug trafficking business--selling drugs in the U.S. black market.
Although the effects of violence on businesses in the black market may
not mirror those effects on business in the licit market, one way of
examining this question may be to look at the impact that violence or
violent crimes have on business in general. One recent study, for
example, examined the impact of surges in violence on businesses in
various industries in locations of varying crime rates.\34\ Results
suggested that surges in violence had the most negative impact on those
businesses that were service-related (e.g., retail and personal service
industries) and located in typically low-crime areas. Specifically, the
impact on business was in terms of a reduction in the number of new
businesses, a decrease in business expansions, and a lack of overall
business growth. In order to generalize these findings from retail
businesses to drug businesses, one underlying assumption must be that
the locations for buying retail goods and personal services are the
same as those for purchasing drugs. If these findings are generalizable
to the drug trafficking business, this could suggest that any spillover
in drug trafficking-related violence to the United States could
adversely affect those service-related businesses (including drug
trafficking businesses) in cities with relatively (pre-spillover) low
crime rates. On the other hand, if violence affects businesses in the
licit and illicit markets differently, these findings may not apply to
potential effects of drug trafficking-related violence on drug
trafficking business.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\34\ Robert T. Greenbaum and George E. Tita, ``The Impact of
Violence Surges on Neighbourhood Business Activity,'' Urban Studies,
vol. 41, no. 13 (December 2004), pp. 2495-2514.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Already, there have been anecdotal predictions regarding the impact
of violence on drug trafficking business; Douglas, AZ, police chief
Alberto Melis has said that ``spillover violence would be bad for
business . . . and they're [the drug traffickers] businessmen.''\35\
Further, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) has expressed
moderate confidence that there will not be a significant increase in
spillover violence--at least in the short term--because ``Mexican
trafficking organizations understand that intentional targeting of U.S.
persons or interests unrelated to the drug trade would likely undermine
their own business interests.''\36\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\ Brady McCombs and Tim Steller, ``Drug Violence Spillover More
Hype Than Reality: Southern Arizona Lawmen Discount Threat of Cartel
Warfare Crossing Border,'' Arizona Daily Star, April 26, 2009, Tucson
Region.
\36\ Drug Enforcement Administration, Statement of Joseph M. Arabit
Special Agent in Charge, El Paso Division, Regarding ``Violence Along
the Southwest Border'' Before the House Appropriations Committee,
Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies, March
24, 2009, http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/speeches/s032409.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Partnerships in the United States
The NDIC has indicated that in order to facilitate the distribution
and sale of drugs in the United States, Mexican DTOs have formed
relationships with U.S. street gangs, prison gangs, and outlaw
motorcycle gangs.\37\ Although these gangs have historically been
involved with retail-level drug distribution, their ties to the Mexican
DTOs have allowed them to become increasingly involved at the wholesale
level as well.\38\ These gangs facilitate the movement of illicit drugs
to urban, suburban, and rural areas of the United States. Not only do
these domestic gangs distribute and sell the drugs, but they also aid
in smuggling and enforcing the collection of drug proceeds.\39\ For
example, Barrio Azteca is one of at least nine prominent U.S. prison
gangs with ties to Mexican DTOs.\40\ Barrio Azteca primarily generates
money from smuggling marijuana, heroin, and cocaine across the
Southwest border for the DTOs--namely, the Juarez cartel--but they are
also involved in other crimes, such as extortion, kidnapping, and alien
smuggling.\41\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\37\ NDTA, 2009, p. 46.
\38\ Wholesale refers to the sale of goods to retailers for resale
to consumers rather than selling goods directly to consumers.
Retailers, on the other hand, sell goods directly to consumers.
Wholesalers tend to sell larger quantities of goods to retailers, who
then sell smaller quantities to consumers.
\39\ NDTA, 2009., pp. 43-46. See also, National Gang Intelligence
Center and National Drug Intelligence Center, National Gang Threat
Assessment, 2009, Product No. 2009-M0335-001, January 2009, http://
www.fbi.gov/publications/ngta2009.pdf.
\40\ Fred Burton and Ben West, The Barrio Azteca Trial and the
Prison Gang-Cartel Interface, Stratfor Global Intelligence, November
19, 2008, http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/
20081119_barrio_azteca_trial_and_prison_gang_cartel_interface.
\41\ For more information, see Tom Diaz, ``Barrio Azteca--Border
Boys Linked to Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations--Part Three,''
April 17, 2009, http://tomdiaz.wordpress.com/2009/04/17/
barrioazteca%E2%80%93border-bad-boys-linked-to-mexican-drug-
trafficking-organizations-%E2%80%94-part-three/. See also the U.S.
Department of Justice website at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/
gangunit/gangs/prison.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Activities
Like other organized crime groups, Mexican DTOs are profit-driven.
While the primary goods trafficked by DTOs are drugs, some experts have
noted that these organizations do generate income from other illegal
activities, such as the smuggling \42\ of humans and weapons,
counterfeiting and piracy, kidnapping for ransom, and extortion.\43\ If
the DTOs are not able to generate income from the drugs--due to any
number of reasons (increased Mexican or U.S. law enforcement, decreased
drug supply, decreased drug demand, etc.)--they may increase their
involvement in other money-generating illegal activities, such as
kidnapping and home invasions. Take, for example, the number of drug
trafficking-related kidnappings for ransom in Phoenix, AZ.\44\ In 2009,
the NDIC reported 358 such incidents in 2007 and 357 in 2008 (through
December 15, 2008), and indicated that nearly every incident was drug-
related.\45\ These statistics were revised in the 2010 National Drug
Threat Assessment, indicating that kidnappings in Phoenix reached 260
in 2007, 299 in 2008, and 267 in 2009.\46\ This decrease in the number
of reported kidnappings for 2007 and 2008 is due to a reclassification
of certain cases by the Phoenix Police Department. Further, the NDIC
reports that kidnappings may be generally underreported because victims
may fear retaliation for reporting or may expose their own involvement
in drug trafficking. Still, Tucson, AZ, police have reported that
although there has been an increase in kidnappings for ransom and home
invasions, the suspects in the cases are local criminals--not active
DTO members from Mexico.\47\ This disparity in reports indicates that
while there may be an increase in certain illegal activities that may
be tied to drug smuggling and trafficking, these illegal activities are
not necessarily directly related to drug trafficking in general or to
Mexican drug trafficking organizations in particular.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\42\ While drug trafficking organizations may not be directly
involved in alien or gun smuggling, they may tax the smugglers who wish
to use the established drug trafficking routes. Further, the NDIC has
indicated that drug trafficking organizations may engage in violent
confrontations with the smuggling organizations, as the drug
traffickers fear that the smugglers' use of their routes may lead to
the traffickers' apprehension. See National Drug Intelligence Center,
Office of National Drug Control Policy, Arizona High Intensity Drug
Trafficking Area: Drug Market Analysis 2009, Product No. 2009-R0813-
002, March 2009, p. 14, http://www.justice.gov/ndic/pubs32/32762/
32762p.pdf.
\43\ Jane's, Security, Mexico, February 20, 2009. Also, Stratfor
Global Intelligence, Mexican Drug Cartels: The Net Assessment, March 9,
2008, http://www.stratfor.com/podcast/
mexican_drug_cartels_net_assessment.
\44\ Sam Quinones, ``Phoenix, Kidnap-For-Ransom Capital,'' Los
Angeles Times, February 12, 2009. See also, National Drug Intelligence
Center, Office of National Drug Control Policy, Arizona High Intensity
Drug Trafficking Area: Drug Market Analysis 2009, Product No. 2009-
R0813-002, March 2009, http://www.justice.gov/ndic/pubs32/32762/
32762p.pdf.
\45\ Ibid., p. 18.
\46\ NDTA, 2010, pp. 15-16.
\47\ Brady McCombs and Tim Steller, ``Drug violence spillover more
hype than reality: Southern Arizona lawmen discount threat of cartel
warfare crossing border,'' Arizona Daily Star, April 26, 2009, Tucson
Region.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
relationship between illicit drug markets and violence
In an illegal marketplace, where prices and profits are elevated
due to the risks of operating outside the law, violence or the threat
of violence becomes the primary means for settling disputes and
maintaining a semblance of order--however chaotic that ``order'' might
appear to the outside observer. This was a fundamental conclusion
reached by the National Academy of Sciences Panel on the Understanding
and Control of Violent Behavior.\48\ Because illegal drug markets
operate outside the law, no courts or other forms of peaceful mediation
\49\ exist for resolving disputes between drug producers, traffickers,
and their customers. As with other black markets, drug markets are
necessarily governed by the threat of violence, which may lead to
actual violence. Illegal drugs and violence, then, are linked primarily
through the operations of underground drug markets.\50\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\48\ Jeffrey A. Roth, ``Psychoactive Substances and Violence,''
National Institute of Justice (Research in Brief Series), February 1994
(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice).
\49\ Negotiated settlements do occur, although they often feature
intimidation.
\50\ See for example, Peter Andreas and Joel Wallman, ``Illicit
market and violence: what is the relationship?'', Crime, Law, and
Social Change, vol. 52, no. 3 (September 2009), pp. 225-230, and Peter
Reuter, ``Systemic violence in drug markets,'' Crime, Law, and Social
Change, vol. 52, no. 3 (September 2009), pp. 275-285.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Drug trafficking-related violence in Mexico has been on the rise,
and in 2010, there were more than 11,600 drug trafficking-related
murders in Mexico.\51\ Mexican drug trafficking organizations are now
at war with each other as well as with the police and military
personnel who are attempting to enforce the drug laws in northern
Mexico along the U.S. border. The DTOs, as a result of enforcement
actions in Mexico, along with increasing border enforcement measures
taken by the United States, are finding it more difficult and more
costly to control the production zones and smuggling routes. One of the
consequences of this increasingly competitive environment is a rise in
the level of violence associated with the illicit drug trade as the
DTOs struggle for control over territory, markets, and smuggling
routes. Policy makers are thus confronted with the uncomfortable
possibility that increased law enforcement (which leads to increased
difficulty and costs to control production zones and smuggling routes,
and which in turn leads to the need to resolve disputes over such
territories) could result in increased drug trafficking-related
violence. This appears to be the situation that has recently developed
in Mexico.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\51\ Trans-Border Institute (TBI), Justice in Mexico December 2010
News Report. Reforma is the generally respected source of data on drug
trafficking-related deaths in Mexico.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This relationship gives rise to a number of important issues for
policy makers. One such matter is evaluating the relative costs and
benefits of increased enforcement of the current drug policy against
the potentially elevated levels of violence that such increased
enforcement might engender.\52\ Could the drug trafficking-related
violence currently evidenced in Mexico reach a level that would prompt
U.S. policy makers to consider policy actions that could alter the
underpinnings of the illegal drug market? It does not appear as if the
violence has reached such a level as yet. Policy makers, however, have
expressed significant concern over the possibility of the current
violence in Mexico spilling over into the United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\52\ A Mexican study of the cost-effectiveness of using the
military in the drug war (in Ciudad Juarez) has found that there is a
high cost with little success, as murders, kidnappings, extortions, and
other crimes continue to increase. See http://
narcosphere.narconews.com/notebook/kristin-bricker/2009/11/numbers-
dont-add-mexicos-drug-war.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
what is spillover violence?
When assessing the potential implications of increased violence in
Mexico as a result of the increasing tensions between the DTOs located
in Mexico, one of the central concerns for U.S. policy makers is the
potential for what has recently been termed ``spillover'' violence--an
increase in drug trafficking-related violence in United States. Given
this concern, it is critical to develop an understanding of what
``spillover'' is, what it might look like, how it might be measured,
and what potential triggers for policy action can be identified from
this analysis.
To date, Congress has not adopted a formal definition of spillover
violence. Several definitions and/or qualities of spillover violence
have been provided by Government officials, as well as experts and
analysts. For instance, according to the DEA, the interagency community
has defined spillover violence in the following manner:
``[S]pillover violence entails deliberate, planned attacks by the
cartels on U.S. assets, including civilian, military, or law
enforcement officials, innocent U.S. citizens, or physical institutions
such as government buildings, consulates, or businesses. This
definition does not include trafficker on trafficker violence, whether
perpetrated in Mexico or the U.S.''\53\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\53\ Drug Enforcement Administration, Statement of Joseph M. Arabit
Special Agent in Charge, El Paso Division, Regarding ``Violence Along
the Southwest Border'' Before the House Appropriations Committee,
Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science and Related Agencies, March
24, 2009, http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/speeches/s032409.pdf.
This definition of spillover provides a relatively narrow scope of
what may constitute spillover violence. In particular, it excludes the
category of violence--trafficker-on-trafficker violence--in which the
vast majority of drug trafficking-related violence in Mexico has
occurred. If policy makers and law enforcement are concerned that the
drug trafficking-related violence, as seen in Mexico, may spill over
into the United States, they are necessarily concerned with this
predominant category of trafficker-on-trafficker violence that is
excluded from the interagency community's definition of spillover
violence. The boundaries of what may constitute spillover violence, as
defined by the interagency community, thus makes the likelihood that
the United States will experience this form of spillover violence
relatively small. Further, by generally constraining the definition of
spillover violence to those acts that target the government and
innocent civilians, the type of violence necessary to constitute
spillover (according to the interagency definition) may begin to
resemble acts of terrorism.\54\ If so, policy makers and experts may be
challenged with discriminating between spillover violence and
terrorism.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\54\ 18 U.S.C. 2331 defines terrorism as ``activities that (A)
involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a
violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or
that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction
of the United States or of any State; (B) appear to be intended--(i) to
intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the
policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect
the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or
kidnapping; and (C) occur primarily outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States, or transcend national boundaries in
terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they
appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which their
perpetrators operate or seek asylum.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Several experts and scholars have also discussed qualities of drug
trafficking-related violence that may constitute spillover, including
aspects of trafficker-on-trafficker violence. Such qualities are
analyzed in the following section and may provide policy makers with
additional definitions of spillover violence. Of note, this report does
not address non-violent indicators--such as rising corruption of U.S.
officials and law enforcement--that could be related to drug
trafficking-related violence spillover.
Characteristics of Spillover Violence
Some experts have suggested that a spillover of violence into the
United States may look similar to the recent surge of violence in
Mexico. In Mexico, this increasing violence has been seen through a
rise in both the number of drug trafficking-related murders and the
brutality of the murders. It is also taking the forms of increasing
intimidation and fear, attacks on security forces, assassinations of
high-ranking officials, growing arsenals of weapons, and indiscriminate
killing of civilians.\55\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\55\ Stratfor Global Intelligence, Mexican Drug Cartels: Government
Progress and Growing Violence, December 11, 2008, pp. 15-16, http://
web.stratfor.com/images/MEXICAN%20Cartels%202008.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While a potential spillover of violence into the United States
could appear similar to the violence in Mexico, the violence may be
contingent upon numerous factors that differ between the United States
and Mexico. For instance, the U.S. Government may respond differently
to domestic drug trafficking-related violence than the Mexican
government has, and these differences in responses could in turn
influence the nature of the drug trafficking-related violence seen in
each country. This section of the report discusses several factors that
may be of concern as Congress debates the potential spillover of drug
trafficking-related violence. These factors include who may be
implicated in the violence, what type of violence may arise, when
violence may appear, and where violence may occur.
Who May Be Implicated in Violence
If the drug trafficking-related violence were to spill over from
Mexico into the United States, Congress may be concerned with both the
individuals perpetrating the violence as well as the victims of the
violence.
Perpetrators
Reports on the drug trafficking-related violence in Mexico
generally indicate that the perpetrators of violence are active members
of DTOs who are vying for territory, avenging betrayals, and reacting
against the Mexican government's crackdown on the traffickers.\56\ If
violence were to spill into the United States, policy makers may
question whether the perpetrators of the violence will continue to be
active drug trafficking members from Mexico, or whether violence will
be inflicted by others who may be more indirectly tied to the DTOs. As
mentioned, the DTOs have connections with U.S. groups such as street
gangs, prison gangs, and outlaw motorcycle gangs who distribute and
sell drugs, aid in smuggling drugs, and enforce the collection of drug
proceeds.\57\ To date, reports from law enforcement on drug
trafficking-related violence in the United States are mixed; while some
suggest that violence may be carried out by drug traffickers or other
criminals from Mexico,\58\ others indicate that domestic drug
traffickers or gang members may be responsible.\59\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\56\ CRS Report R41576, Mexico's Drug Trafficking Organizations:
Source and Scope of the Rising Violence, by June S. Beittel.
\57\ NDTA, 2009., pp. 43-46.
\58\ See, for example, Randal C. Archibold, ``Mexican Drug Cartel
Violence Spills Over, Alarming U.S.,'' The New York Times, March 22,
2009.
\59\ Brady McCombs and Tim Steller, ``Drug Violence Spillover More
Hype Than Reality: Southern Arizona lawmen discount threat of cartel
warfare crossing border,'' Arizona Daily Star, April 26, 2009, Tucson
Region.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Victims
The violence plaguing Mexico has been directed toward several
groups: Competing DTOs vying for territory, Mexican security forces,
government officials, and those indebted to the traffickers. In fact,
Mexican government officials have estimated that 90% of the murders in
Mexico have targeted members of drug trafficking organizations.\60\
Although there have been reports of civilian bystanders being killed
and isolated events of indiscriminate killing, there are not consistent
reports of the drug traffickers targeting civilians who are unconnected
to the drug trade.\61\ If there were to be a significant spillover of
violence into the United States, policy makers may question whether the
victims would be of a similar group as the victims of violence in
Mexico. To date, the anecdotal reports of drug trafficking-related
violence in the United States indicate that not only the perpetrators,
but the victims of the crimes as well, are all somehow involved in the
drug trade.\62\ If any significant spillover of drug trafficking-
related crime were to follow a similar pattern, policy makers could
expect that individuals on both sides of the violence are connected to
the drug trade.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\60\ See testimony by David Shirk, Director, Trans-Border
Institute, University of San Diego, before the U.S. Congress, House
Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice,
Science, and Related Agencies, Federal Law Enforcement Response to
U.S.-Mexico Border Violence, 111th Cong., 1st sess., March 24, 2009.
\61\ CRS Report R41576, Mexico's Drug Trafficking Organizations:
Source and Scope of the Rising Violence, by June S. Beittel. See also
Stratfor Global Intelligence, Mexican Drug Cartels: Government Progress
and Growing Violence, December 11, 2008, http://web.stratfor.com/
images/MEXICAN%20Cartels%202008.pdf.
\62\ See, for example, Randal C. Archibold, ``Mexican Drug Cartel
Violence Spills Over, Alarming U.S.,'' The New York Times, March 22,
2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There are circumstances, however, under which the drug trafficking
victims in the United States could extend to groups beyond those
involved in trafficking. If there is an increase in violence and the
U.S. Government cracks down on the DTOs similarly to the Mexican
government, the traffickers' reactions in the United States may be
similar to that seen in Mexico--a surge in violence against security
forces and government officials. Federal officials have indicated that
increased targeting of U.S. law enforcement personnel, similar to that
which has occurred in Mexico, would constitute evidence of
spillover.\63\ If, however, the U.S. response differs from that of
Mexico, the reactions from the DTOs may also differ. Further, a change
in the victim pattern--to include innocent bystanders, for instance--
may represent a departure from current patterns of drug trafficking-
related violence and thus could represent a reasonable trigger for
policy action to mitigate the effects of spillover violence.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\63\ Arthur H. Rotstein, ``Bersin: Mexican Drug Violence Threat
Major Concern,'' The Associated Press, July 15, 2009, quoting Alan
Bersin the Department of Homeland Security Special Representative of
Border Affairs. Further, this type of violence would be consistent with
the interagency definition of spillover violence.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
What Type of Violence May Arise
In Mexico, the drug trafficking-related violence most often
reported is murder--over 30,000 since December 2006.\64\ There have
also been reports of kidnappings, home invasions, and assaults, among
other crimes. In the United States, many of the anecdotal reports
citing an increase in violence point to an increase in drug
trafficking-related kidnappings and home invasions. For instance, over
the past 2 years, there have been reports of about 700 recorded
kidnappings in Phoenix, AZ, that are related to drug and human
smuggling.\65\ It is unknown how many of these kidnappings, if any,
also have ties to drug smuggling;\66\ as mentioned, DTOs may supplement
their incomes with crimes other than drug trafficking if it is
profitable. It is also unknown whether or not different types of
violence are more associated with certain crimes (committed by drug
traffickers) than with others. If there were to be a substantial
spillover of drug trafficking-related violence from Mexico, policy
makers and law enforcement may be concerned with what types of violence
may appear. Would the types of drug trafficking-related violence
already seen in the United States to date (i.e., kidnappings and home
invasions) become more prevalent, or would there be a greater emergence
of the types of violence seen in Mexico (i.e., murders)?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\64\ ``Mexican drug war deaths surpass 30,100,'' CNN, December 17,
2010, http://articles.cnn.com/2010-12-17/world/mexico.violence--1--
drug-war-border-city-drug-related-violence?_s=PM:WORLD.
\65\ Randal C. Archibold, ``Mexican Drug Cartel Violence Spills
Over, Alarming U.S.,'' The New York Times, March 22, 2009. The media
has also reported 17 drug-related deaths in El Paso in 2008. See Sara
Miller Llana, ``Crossfire Towns: Eye-To-Eye Across the US-Mexican
Border, Two Communities Confront Drugs, Guns, and Misconceptions,'' The
Christian Science Monitor, June 21, 2009.
\66\ Drug Enforcement Administration, Statement of Joseph M. Arabit
Special Agent in Charge, El Paso Division, Regarding ``Violence Along
the Southwest Border'' Before the House Appropriations Committee,
Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies, March
24, 2009, http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/speeches/s032409.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to the type of violence, a spillover or increase in
violence could also be measured by the nature of the violence. As
mentioned, the rise in the number of murders in Mexico was also
accompanied by increasing brutality, intimidation, and attacks on
individuals other than those directly involved in the illicit drug
trade (i.e., security forces and governmental officials).\67\ If any
spillover of violence into the United States followed a similar pattern
as the violence in Mexico, there may be an increase in the brutality of
crimes in addition to an increase in the pure number of crimes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\67\ Stratfor Global Intelligence, Mexican Drug Cartels: Government
Progress and Growing Violence, December 11, 2008, pp. 15-16, http://
web.stratfor.com/images/MEXICAN%20Cartels%202008.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
When Violence May Appear
Critical to the assessment of whether the United States is
experiencing spillover violence is the establishment of a realistic
time line for measuring the change in drug trafficking-related violence
in the United States. If the policy goal is to determine if any
spillover violence is occurring in the United States as a result of the
increasing violence in Mexico, then it would be logical to look at
trends in drug trafficking-related crime in the United States since the
onset of the conditions that precipitated the recent violence in
Mexico--roughly beginning around when Mexican President Felipe Calderon
took office in December, 2006.\68\ A comparison of the trends in drug
trafficking-related violence (in the United States) before and after
this reference point might shed some light on whether or not the United
States is experiencing spillover violence.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\68\ CRS Report R41576, Mexico's Drug Trafficking Organizations:
Source and Scope of the Rising Violence, by June S. Beittel.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As noted, the United States has experienced and continues to
experience certain levels of drug trafficking-related crime. It may be
difficult to isolate those drug trafficking-related violent crimes that
are occurring either directly or indirectly as a result of the
situation in Mexico. Therefore, it may also be useful for policy makers
to use this same time frame to measure changes in other spillover
indicators, such as changes in the profile of victims of drug
trafficking-related crime, the number and nature of violent attacks on
U.S. law enforcement personnel, and changes in the nature of drug
trafficking-related violence. This could be one means to standardize
the measurement of any potential spillover and to provide policy makers
with a more concrete idea of the trends. The discussion of when the
violence occurs begs the question of where to measure any potential
change in violence.
Where Violence May Occur
As may be expected, the majority of the discussion surrounding the
prospects of spillover violence in the United States has been focused
on the Southwest border (SWB). Initially, this makes intuitive sense.
Even the very term ``spillover'' suggests the spread of violence across
the border from Mexico--almost by osmosis. From a policy perspective,
it is useful to question whether or not a focus exclusively on the
border makes sense. Certainly this is where the analysis should begin
as the SWB region is the primary region that links production and
smuggling operations within Mexico to the United States. As noted,
however, the drug trafficking organizations' operations within the
United States are geographically dispersed throughout at least 230
cities. DTOs are businesses, and they not only maintain their own
presence in the United States but also have relationships with U.S.
groups such as street gangs, prison gangs, and outlaw motorcycle gangs
to facilitate the distribution and sale of drugs within the United
States.
Given that drug trafficking-related violence is prevalent
throughout the United States, the task for policy makers is to
concentrate the geographic analysis of changes in drug trafficking-
related violence around areas that would have the greatest likelihood
of eliciting evidence of spillover. One possible method of
accomplishing this task could be to look at the various factors
discussed above--changes in the levels, nature, and victim pattern of
drug trafficking-related violence in selected geographic locations--
along a time line that corresponds with the escalation of drug
trafficking violence in Mexico. Of course, the critical issue is
selecting those geographic locations. Areas already identified as
strategically important to drug trafficking operations here in the
United States would be an optimal place to start. These locations would
include cities, States, and localities in the SWB region, as well as
along significant in-land distribution routes. Policy makers may also
wish to examine geographic areas that are not currently identified as
strategically important to drug trafficking operations here in the
United States, as a control for comparison.
challenges in evaluating and responding to spillover violence
This section of the report discusses some of the challenges facing
policy makers when considering policy options dealing with drug control
and border security issues in general. These issues are discussed more
generally because they provide the context within which any specific
options for dealing with the potential spillover of drug trafficking-
related violence will be determined. These policy challenges include
the complexity of the issue, defining goals and objectives, and
measuring the problem.
Complexity of the Issue
As evidenced through some of the above discussion, there are many
Federal agencies, State and local entities, task forces, intelligence
centers, and various other groups that are not only involved in drug
control policy in general, but have specific roles in countering
threats posed by the Mexican DTOs. Each of these agencies has different
authorities, budgets, resources, and responsibilities when it comes to
the drug control issue (the Appendix to this report details the recent
drug control efforts of these agencies). This complexity has also been
evident in the Federal Government's current response to the increasing
drug trafficking-related violence in Mexico. The policy implication of
this intricate web of jurisdictions is that it is difficult to
centralize the establishment, implementation, and evaluation of
policies--be they drug control policies in general, or the specific
policy responses to the increased drug trafficking-related violence.
Several Congressional hearings have been held on various aspects of
the drug control and drug trafficking-related violence issues,\69\ and
some Congressional policy makers have voiced their concerns over the
lack of centralized direction on these issues. In particular, Congress
has expressed concern over who is taking the lead--not just among the
involved agencies--but within Congress itself.\70\ Complicated
Congressional jurisdiction spread across a variety of committees in
both houses means that oversight of the drug control and the drug
trafficking violence issues is equally complex. Consequently,
coordination of oversight of the areas is problematic and difficult to
manage.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\69\ See, for example, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Homeland
Security, Subcommittee on Border, Maritime, and Global
Counterterrorism, Combating Border Violence: The Role of Interagency
Coordination in Investigations, 111th Cong., 1st sess., July 16, 2009
and U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, Southern Border Violence, 111th Cong., 1st sess.,
March 25, 2009.
\70\ See for example, Rob Margetta, ``Lawmakers Want to Know Who
Takes the Lead in Battling Border Violence,'' CQ Today Online News,
March 10, 2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Adding further complexity is the fact that few of the agencies
involved in the drug control effort are solely dedicated to a
counterdrug mission (DEA and ONDCP being two of few exceptions). This
presents several challenges in analyzing drug control policy. One
challenge, for example, involves disaggregating an agency's drug
control mission and activities from its other missions and activities.
Take, for instance, interdiction at ports of entry. CBP officers select
people, goods, and conveyances for additional scrutiny based on a
variety of factors. Often, officers have no idea what the ultimate
outcome of a physical inspection might be. The inspection might uncover
illicit drugs, or it might uncover cash, weapons, or any number of
items that are prohibited from entering the country. How then, may one
estimate the portion of CBP officers' time that is spent on the
counterdrug effort? This same question applies to the multitude of
other agencies that also have drug control responsibilities. The
question becomes even more difficult to answer when the aim is to
analyze a specific drug control policy--such as specific policies
targeted toward any potential spillover violence from Mexico.
Disaggregating the drug control mission (or specific policies),
however, is critical on several levels; not only does it affect the
measurement of an agency's progress in implementing drug control
efforts, but it also affects the directing of resources towards these
efforts or specific policies.
Defining Goals and Objectives
The definition of success is a critical aspect of policy
evaluation. As noted above, the existing complexities surrounding drug
control policies in general, and policies to address the potential
spillover violence from Mexico in particular, complicate the evaluation
of these policies. For this reason, it is important to identify
appropriate goals or objectives either for what might be an overall
strategy or for specific policies.
For example, the appropriate domestic policy response to the
increased drug trafficking-related violence in Mexico is difficult to
articulate. This is because several forces are at work; it is tempting
to conflate the response to a specific iteration of the problem (the
change in drug trafficking-related violence in Mexico) with the drug
control problem in general and, at the same time, to disaggregate the
issue down to so many constituent parts (outbound inspections at the
border, kidnappings in Phoenix, straw purchases \71\ in Houston, a drug
trafficking-related shooting in El Paso, etc.). This allows for the
potential to obscure the actual policy problem to be confronted. From a
policy perspective also, the degree to which this conflation or
disaggregation occurs may not matter in the final analysis if the
appropriate metrics are ultimately used to evaluate each.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\71\ Straw purchases occur when guns are purchased from licensed
gun dealers by eligible persons and then knowingly transferred to
prohibited persons. Straw purchases are illegal under U.S. law (18
U.S.C. 924(a)(1)(A)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With particular relevance to the subject of this report, if the
policy task is to identify any potential or actual drug trafficking-
related spillover violence in the United States, and the appropriate
drug activity indicators can be accurately identified, the issue
becomes how to correlate any change in drug activity indicators to the
increased drug trafficking-related violence in Mexico. One potential
complication with such an analysis is uniformly defining what
constitutes drug-related violence.
This could potentially be broken down into three general
categories: Crimes committed by people under the influence of drugs;
economic-compulsive crimes (crimes committed in order to obtain money
or drugs to support drug use); and what are termed systemic drug
crimes--crimes that result from the business of trafficking illicit
drugs.\72\ These definitions are important, because while the
commission of crimes by people who are under the influence of illegal
drugs and economic-compulsive crimes present important policy issues in
and of themselves, changes in these indicators contribute little value
to the determination of whether or not the United States is
experiencing any spillover violence from Mexico particularly related to
the recent increase in drug trafficking-related violence.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\72\ Paul J. Goldstein, ``The Drugs/Violence Nexus: A Tripartite
Conceptual Framework,'' Journal of Drug Issues, vol. 14 (1985), pp.
493-506.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Measuring the Problem
The issue of measurement is important in several different
contexts. There are issues with the collection and reporting of drug
control statistics, as well as questions concerning what value the
reported measures have. Because the drug control issue is complex, and
so many agencies participate in its execution, invariably there are
going to be differences in how agencies collect and report enforcement
statistics. Central to the issue at hand in this report is the question
of how to measure changes in drug-related violence, and specifically
drug trafficking-related violence.
Even an indicator that conceptually could provide some value added
to the central question (to choose an example popularly cited in the
media--violent crimes excluding robberies) is difficult to evaluate.
For example, in Tucson, the number of violent crimes excluding
robberies from January to March of 2009 was 632; for the same period in
2008 the number was 651. So, there were fewer violent crimes in Tucson
in the first 3 months of 2009 than in 2008.\73\ These are not
necessarily drug trafficking-related violent crimes, but if the
premise--that the United States is experiencing spillover violence
stemming from the drug trafficking activity in Mexico--is accurate, one
would expect violent crimes to go up, and drug trafficking-related
violent crimes would be included in the more general violent crime
reporting. On the other hand, a significant drop in non-drug
trafficking-related violence could obscure a rise in actual drug
trafficking-related violent crime. However, the true driver of the
change in drug trafficking-related violent crime cannot be ascertained
from these statistics.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\73\ Gabriel Arana, ``There's No Drug Crime Wave at the Border,
Just a lot of Media Hype,'' The Nation, May 29, 2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Another measurement issue is where to look for changes in drug
trafficking-related violence. This is another area where the problems
with available data are manifested. Ideally, to conduct this analysis,
one would have access to drug trafficking-related violent crime data
from the geographic areas of interest (border and interior locations
with known drug trafficking activity). This data would be available in
small geographic increments so that local differences could be taken
into account, and it would be consistently available in comparable sets
across an adequately long time period so as to conduct a statistically
significant trend analysis. Unfortunately, this and other data are not
readily available for analysis, as detailed in the section outlining
the Congressional Research Service's (CRS's) evaluation of available
data.
Is There Spillover Violence?
As discussed, a multitude of factors are involved in both defining
as well as measuring spillover violence. Currently, there is no
comprehensive, publicly available data that can definitively answer the
question of whether there has been a significant spillover of drug
trafficking-related violence into the United States. Although anecdotal
reports have been mixed, U.S. Government officials maintain that there
has not yet been a significant spillover.
Analysis
In an examination of data that could provide insight into whether
there has been a significant spillover in drug trafficking-related
violence from Mexico into the United States, CRS undertook an analysis
of violent crime data from the FBI's Uniform Crime Report (UCR)
program.\74\ Of note, however, the UCR data does not allow analysts to
determine what proportion of the violent crime rate is related to drug
trafficking or, even more specifically, what proportion of drug
trafficking-related violent crimes can be attributed to spillover
violence. The UCR compiles data from monthly reports from approximately
17,000 local police departments or State agencies, and it provides some
of the most commonly cited crime statistics in the United States. Under
the UCR program, the FBI collects data on the number of offenses known
to police, the number and characteristics of persons arrested, and the
number of ``clearances'' for eight different offenses, collectively
referred to as Part I offenses. Part I offenses include murder and
nonnegligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault,
burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson.\75\ Within the
Part I offenses, crimes are categorized as either violent or property
crimes. Violent crimes include murder and nonnegligent manslaughter,
forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault. Property crimes include
burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson. The UCR,
however, is not a comprehensive source for data on crime in the United
States. It collects offense data on a limited number of crimes (Part I
crimes), which means that offense data are available only for a small
number of all crimes committed in the United States. For instance, it
does not include data on kidnapping--one of the oft-cited drug
trafficking-related crimes discussed as evidence of spillover violence.
Further, the inclusivity of the UCR data is affected by other factors
such as whether or not local law enforcement chooses to report data to
the FBI, the variety in reporting and data classification practices of
local law enforcement agencies, and the imputation methods used by the
FBI to estimate crime in jurisdictions that have not reported for an
entire year.\76\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\74\ The UCR is most commonly referenced when discussing crime
rates, and for the purpose of this report, we present and analyze crime
rates as reported by the UCR program. For more information on how crime
in the United States is measured and on the UCR program, see archived
CRS Report RL34309, How Crime in the United States Is Measured, by
Nathan James and Logan Rishard Council. See also http://www.fbi.gov/
ucr/ucr.htm.
\75\ The FBI also collects data on the number of arrests made for
21 other offenses, known as Part II offenses. Part II offenses include
Other Assaults; Forgery and Counterfeiting; Fraud, Embezzlement; Stolen
Property: Buying, Receiving, or Possessing; Vandalism; Weapons:
Carrying, Possessing, etc.; Prostitution and Commercialized Vice; Sex
Offenses; Drug Abuse Violations; Gambling; Offenses Against the Family
and Children; Driving Under the Influence; Liquor Laws; Drunkenness;
Disorderly Conduct; Vagrancy; All Other Offenses; Suspicion; Curfew and
Loitering Laws (Persons under 18); and Runaways (Persons under 18).
\76\ For more information, see archived CRS Report RL34309, How
Crime in the United States Is Measured, by Nathan James and Logan
Rishard Council.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For the purpose of this report, CRS presents and analyzes violent
crime rates as reported by the UCR program, as policy makers have
repeatedly expressed concern about the possibility of drug trafficking-
related violent crimes increasing.\77\ In addition to providing the
overall National violent and property crime rates annually, the UCR
program also provides these crime rates for metropolitan statistical
areas (MSAs).\78\ In the present analysis of violent crime rate data,
CRS relies upon the violent crime rate data for the MSAs as calculated
by the UCR program. As mentioned, the violent crime rate includes
murder and nonnegligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, and
aggravated assault.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\77\ This does not exclude the possibility that policy makers may
be equally concerned with drug trafficking-related property crimes.
However, this report focuses on violent crimes. For information on
National trends in both violent and property crime rates, see CRS
Report R40812, Federal Crime Control Issues in the 111th Congress, by
Kristin M. Finklea.
\78\ The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) defines MSAs as
having at least one urbanized area of 50,000 or more in population,
plus adjacent territory that has a high degree of social and economic
integration with the core as measured by commuting ties. For more
information, see Executive Office of the President, Office of
Management and Budget, Update of Statistical Area Definitions and
Guidance on Their Uses, OMB Bulletin No. 10-02, December 1, 2009,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/bulletins/b10-02.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As mentioned, the NDIC estimates that Mexican DTOs maintain drug
distribution networks--or supply drugs to distributors in at least 230
U.S. cities (as illustrated in Figure 2).\79\ Because this information
is assimilated based on State and local law enforcement agency
estimations, as well as law enforcement interviews with NDIC staff,
this is not necessarily a comprehensive or nuanced picture of Mexican
drug trafficking presence in cities around the United States. For
instance, while some cities may experience a larger amount of drug
trafficking activity than others, these cities are considered as
equally experiencing drug trafficking presence for the purpose of the
NDIC estimate. In addition, there may be other cities not reporting the
presence of DTOs, even if these organizations are active in those
cities. If drug trafficking-related violence is in fact increasing in
those cities reporting a presence of Mexican DTOs, one may expect to
see an increase in such violence in the 230 cities identified by the
NDIC--or perhaps only in those cities that are situated along the SWB
if the violence is truly spilling directly across the border. Further,
if this increase in violence were to follow a similar time frame as the
escalating violence in Mexico, one may expect to see an increase in
violence since December 2006, when Mexican President Felipe Calderon
took office and began to crack down on the DTOs.\80\ For each of these
230 cities, CRS determined whether there was a corresponding MSA and
violent crime rate reported in the UCR for that MSA. CRS identified 138
such MSAs, 8 of which directly abut the border between the United
States and Mexico.\81\ As illustrated in Figure 3, CRS calculated the
average violent crime rate across the border MSAs and the non-border
MSAs for each of fiscal years 1999 through 2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\79\ NDTA, 2009., p. 45.
\80\ See CRS Report R41576, Mexico's Drug Trafficking
Organizations: Source and Scope of the Rising Violence, by June S.
Beittel.
\81\ These MSAs include the cities of San Diego, CA; El Centro, CA;
Yuma, AZ; Las Cruces, NM; El Paso, TX; Laredo, TX; McAllen, TX; and
Brownsville, TX--all which were identified by the NDIC as having the
presence of Mexican drug trafficking organizations.
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
CRS analysis of available data suggests that the violent crime rate
has not significantly increased in those areas where there is an
identified presence of Mexican DTOs, as well as available data on the
violent crime rate for those MSAs. Further, such analysis suggests
there is no statistically significant difference in the average violent
crime rate in these border and non-border MSAs between fiscal years
1999 and 2009. Since 2001, the average violent crime rate in the eight
selected border MSAs has generally declined, and it has remained below
the National violent crime rate since 2005.\82\ It is unknown, however,
whether trends in the violent crime rate are related to changes in drug
trafficking-related violent crimes. Because the violent crime rate is a
compilation of violent crimes both related and unrelated to drug
trafficking, an increase in drug trafficking-related violent crime
could be masked by a decrease in those violent crimes not related to
trafficking--or vice versa.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\82\ In 2005, the National violent crime rate was 469 and the
average violent crime rate across the selected border MSAs was 465.9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Looking at the aggregate of border and non-border MSAs, however,
may not provide information as to trends in individual MSAs or cities.
For example, Figure 4 illustrates the trends in violent crime rates in
eight border MSAs. As mentioned, if spillover violence were to trend in
time with the escalating violence in Mexico, analysts may expect to see
an increase in drug trafficking-related violence in 2007, 2008, and
2009 relative to previous years. For instance, although one MSA--El
Paso, TX--experienced an increase in the violent crime rate in 2007,
2008, and 2009 compared to 2006, the violent crime rate in the El Paso
MSA remained lower than the violent crime rates in fiscal year 1999-
fiscal year 2004. This may be counterintuitive to some who expect that
a ``spillover'' in violence may touch those cities closest in proximity
to the violence in Mexico; El Paso sits directly across the Southwest
border from one of the most violent Mexican cities--Juarez.\83\
Further, anecdotal reports suggest that while some cities have seen a
spillover in drug trafficking-related violence, El Paso has not.\84\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\83\ Samuel Logan, ``Mexican Drug Cartel Recruitment of Teenagers
in the USA,'' Mexidata.Info, December 14, 2009, http://mexidata.info/
id2495.html.
\84\ Deborah Tedford, ``Mexico Violence Not Spilling Into Texas
Border Cities,'' National Public Radio, March 24, 2009, http://
www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=102256207.
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Spillover violence may not occur uniformly across the entire SWB
during the same time periods. There may be hot-spot ``flare-ups'' in
response to Mexican drug trafficking activity directly across the
border. If this were true, violence would have climbed in Laredo, TX,
in 2004 and 2005 when there was an increase in drug trafficking-related
violence across the border in Nuevo Laredo. It did not. Also using this
hot-spot analysis, the more recent increase in violence in Juarez
should be linked to an increase in violence in El Paso, TX, in 2008 and
2009. In this case, an increase in violence in a Mexican city does
appear to be correlated with an increase in violence in a neighboring
U.S. city. This further illustrates that relying on trends in overall
violent crime rates may not provide an accurate depiction of trends in
violent crime (or more specifically, in drug trafficking-related
violent crime) around the country.
Another possibility is that there may be a time lag between drug
trafficking-related violence in Mexico and any associated violence in
the United States. For instance, after settling territorial disputes in
Mexico, rival DTOs may engage in violent conflict on the U.S. side of
the border. With the data available, however, it is not possible to
separate out a time lag from other factors that may influence levels of
drug trafficking-related violence that may be seen in the United
States.
conclusion
Mexico has experienced an increase in the level of drug
trafficking-related violence within and between the drug trafficking
organizations (DTOs), and the number of drug trafficking-related deaths
in Mexico since December 2006 has been estimated at over 30,000.\85\
Congress remains concerned with the possibility that the current drug
trafficking-related violence in Mexico may spill over into the United
States. One of the primary challenges in assessing this violence is
defining the term spillover. While the interagency community has
defined spillover violence as violence targeted primarily at civilians
and government entities--excluding trafficker-on-trafficker violence--
other experts and scholars have recognized trafficker-on-trafficker
violence as central to spillover. When defining and analyzing changes
in drug trafficking-related violence within the United States to
determine whether there has been (or may be in the future) any
spillover violence, critical elements include who may be implicated in
the violence (both perpetrators and victims), what type of violence may
arise, when violence may appear, and where violence may occur (both
along the Southwest border and in the Nation's interior).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\85\ ``Mexican drug war deaths surpass 30,100,'' CNN, December 17,
2010, http://articles.cnn.com/2010-12-17/world/mexico.violence_1_drug-
war-border-city-drug-related-violence?_s=PM:WORLD.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At present, there is no comprehensive, publicly available data that
can definitively answer the question of whether there has been a
significant spillover of drug trafficking-related violence into the
United States. Although anecdotal reports have been mixed, U.S.
Government officials maintain that there has not yet been a significant
spillover. CRS analyzed violent crime data from the Federal Bureau of
Investigation's (FBI's) Uniform Crime Report program in order to
examine data that could provide insight into whether there has been a
significant spillover in drug trafficking-related violence from Mexico
into the United States. However, this violent crime data does not allow
CRS to determine the proportion of violent crimes that are related to
drug trafficking or, even more specifically, the proportion of drug
trafficking-related violent crimes that are attributable to spillover
violence. In its analysis, CRS calculated the average violent crime
rate across eight selected Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) along
the Southwest border and 130 selected non-border MSAs--identified by
the National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC) as having the presence of
Mexican DTOs--for each of fiscal years 1999 through 2009. CRS analysis
suggests that the violent crime rate has not significantly increased in
those areas where there is an identified presence of Mexican DTOs.
Further, there appears to be no significant difference in the average
violent crime rate in the selected border and non-border MSAs between
fiscal years 1999 and 2009. In conclusion, however, because the trends
in the overall violent crime rate may not be indicative of trends in
drug trafficking-related violent crimes, CRS is unable to draw
definitive claims about trends in drug trafficking-related violence
spilling over from Mexico into the United States.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Dr. Finklea.
Let me just remind Members that the focus, really, of this
hearing is what are we doing in Mexico? What is the United
States' role in Mexico in the war against the drug cartels?
We will be having an additional hearing talking about what
is happening on the U.S. side of the border. I would argue that
you can distinguish between spillover crime and spillover
violence. I think the fact that 450 drug cartel associates were
arrested in the United States directly after the murder of
Agent Zapata signifies that spillover crime is, in fact, here,
and they are here in the United States.
With that, I recognize myself for 5 minutes.
Mr. Alvarez, you supervised Agent Zapata. You are Agent
Avila's supervisor. We have talked before this hearing and I
have discussed what happened that fateful day with you and
Agent Avila.
I know you can't get into the details of what occurred that
fateful day, but can you describe to this committee and to the
American people what the threat level is really like in Mexico
and what ICE agents and DEA agents and FBI agents go through on
a day-by-day basis in terms of the threat level?
Mr. Alvarez. Certainly, Mr. Chairman.
Having been down there for 5 years, I can personally tell
you and also in discussions with some of my agents down in
Mexico, it is a difficult work environment. They are constantly
looking out for their safety, their surroundings. There is a
risk of, or a very difficult working environment down there.
They are concerned about their family members from the time
you wake up in the morning until the time you go to sleep. It
is a very uncomfortable work environment.
Nonetheless, they come down there prepared. We do provide
them training before they deploy. The U.S. Embassy also
provides--at least they provide some sort of security briefings
for the family members for the agents as they operate in
Mexico.
It is a very difficult work environment, as I mentioned.
Nonetheless, the cooperation level with the Mexican government
has been terrific throughout the years. Since I got down there
in 2000 to where we are today, the cooperation has been
excellent.
Unfortunately, I think the violence has increased.
Nonetheless, I think the risk level has increased tremendously
also.
One of the problems that we face now is trying to recruit
ICE agents to actually go down to Mexico and work on our
behalf. It is getting more and more difficult as a result of
the increased violence.
Mr. McCaul. We certainly want to make sure that you are
protected down there. If we are going to put you in harm's way,
into a war zone, we want to make sure you are adequately
protected, you have the resources you need. I can only imagine.
Talking to Agent Avila, he mentioned how he left Mexico
City to come back into the United States and the stress level
just totally decompressed. You are on constant high alert every
day.
I think the exhibit that is on the screen today, which is
the vehicle that Agent Avila and Zapata were riding in that
fateful day, demonstrates how violent the situation has become
down there. If you look at this vehicle, which is a highly
secure vehicle, over 80 rounds from an AK-47 were fired at this
vehicle. It looks like something out--like a Bonnie and Clyde
movie, and this is real, and that is what is happening in
Mexico.
That takes me to Mr. Nichols and Mr. Mora.
Let me say to Mr. Nichols first, we worked very hard on the
Merida Initiative, and I appreciate your efforts, but over 2
years since we passed that critical legislation with $1.5
billion, I must express my disappointment that only 25 percent
of that funding has gone down to Mexico for the intended
purpose, particularly given the increased level of violence and
threats in Mexico. But having said that, the fundamental
question of this hearing is: What is our plan down there and
what is our strategy down there?
Mr. Nichols, the State Department is--basically you are in
charge of what the mission is in Mexico, and I have to be
honest with you, it doesn't seem very comprehensive. It is hard
to tell what the strategy really is other than throwing ICE
agents down there and DEA. We have State Department officials.
But I would like to know from you: What is our plan? What
is our mission? What is our objective?
Because ultimately it comes down to: Are we going to help
them win this war or not? It is a war, and President Calderon
calls it a war.
Mr. Mora, what I would like to hear from you is what is the
Department of Defense doing jointly with the Mexican government
to eradicate these dangerous drug cartels?
In closing, I talked about Plan Colombia, and I know, you
know, that may not be the model, but I think there are lessons
learned from what we did in Colombia that we can be applying in
Mexico to help win this war. I know the sovereignty issues are
great in Mexico, but I think eventually, in my judgment, the
answer is going to be we are going to have to have a joint
intelligence, joint special operations, basically, force down
there to go after these drug cartels.
With that I will open it to the two of you.
Mr. Nichols. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Merida Initiative is a four-pillar strategy that brings
a comprehensive whole-of-government approach to addressing the
problems in Mexico. It is an approach that has been carefully
negotiated with the Mexican government, who is a full partner
in all of its elements.
The first pillar is going after the drug trafficking
organizations. Those transnational criminals have to be
dismantled and I am proud to say that our partners in the
Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Defense
have played an important role in that process.
We, through the State Department, are providing support to
Mexican institutions and strengthening them to take on this
challenge more effectively. That is the second pillar of the
Merida Initiative.
We have trained thousands of police prosecutors and judges
and we will train thousands and thousands more over the course
of this year. Strengthening Mexico's institutions is vital to
the solution.
The resolution rate for crimes--you as a former prosecutor
would know--in the United States, it is about 90 percent when
you can bring somebody to trial, you are going to get a
conviction and the ability of the great police of both the
State, Federal, local in the United States to resolve cases is
something we would like to replicate within----
Mr. McCaul. My time is sort of limited. I want the other
Members to be able to ask questions.
But I know all about Merida. Congressman Cuellar does, too.
We were very involved with that initiative and getting it
passed through the Congress.
But with only 25 percent--you know, my judgment, the
Department of State has not implemented this plan. You know, if
that is the strategy it is failing because we are not winning
down there.
So this Merida Initiative, the way it is being implemented
is not working, and it needs to be ramped up. I hope the State
Department will fully implement this plan and the resources
that we in the Congress and the American people provided to
you.
Mr. Mora, can you tell me about the Department of Defense
and its role in the Mexican war?
Mr. Mora. Certainly, Mr. Chairman.
In addition to the aircraft platforms that I mentioned in
the remarks--the Bell helicopters, the Blackhawks, and the
maritime surveillance aircraft, which we are helping execute as
part of Merida, the U.S. defense Mexico--U.S.-Mexico defense
cooperation also includes a number of training, equipment, and
information exchanges in areas such as tactical and operational
skills, all very much in the tactical operational area--night
operations, aircraft pilot and mechanical training, information
analysis. These are the kinds of things. I can go on and on on
these particular issues.
In addition, one thing that I did not mention in my opening
statement, Mr. Chairman, is that Congress appropriated a little
over $5 million in fiscal year 2010 under FMF to improve SEDENA
special forces rapid reaction teams--night vision capability,
that kind of capacity to provide--and also provide secure
communications as well. So we are executing--we will be
executing that.
So those are the areas in which we are plugged in--the
Department of Defense----
Mr. McCaul. My time is over, but I think we need more of
this down there, and I think we had a crisis situation down
there and it is not getting any better. I don't know who is in
charge of the plan, who is in charge of the strategy.
Do you coordinate at the Department of State? You know, are
the relevant agencies working together? What is the plan and
the strategy? I know Merida is part of it and what you are
doing, but who is in charge of this?
Mr. Nichols. Mr. Chairman, we coordinate extensively under
the direction of the President and the Secretary through the
National security staff. Frank and I talk on a very, very
frequent basis. He is on speed dial on my phone. We are working
on these issues.
Let me run through----
Mr. McCaul. Let me say that Secretary Clinton--I am on
Foreign Affairs as well--I think she understands this, but the
President needs to show leadership on this issue and recognize
that we have a serious issue in our backyard that needs to be
dealt with.
So my time is way over, and with that, let me recognize the
Ranking Member, Mr. Keating.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I understand some of the difficulties, Mr. Alvarez, of
actually bringing some of these difficult cases to trial, but
of the 1,616 criminal arrests made by the BEST teams only a
little over half of the arrests resulted in indictments and a
mere 689 resulted in convictions--not to minimize the work of
those teams, because I know how tough that is and I know how
tough it is to take the next step.
But do you think the indictment and conviction rates that
are low--can you think of things that can be done to improve
that?
Mr. Alvarez. Well, some of the focus of our BEST along the
Southwest border--of the 21 BESTs that we have in the United
States and in Mexico City, 11 are along the Southwest border. A
lot of the arrests are both for criminal and administrative.
Through ICE's statutory and administrative authorities we
are able to remove a lot of these gang members that are
identified during the course of an investigation, so we are
able to get those folks back to their home country that are
here illegally, essentially.
I am a big believer in the BEST. The BEST program, as I
mentioned, includes Federal, State, local, foreign law
enforcement officers working in collaboration with each other,
using their statutory and their experience levels and going
after the transnational gang members that are operating in the
United States. So the expansion, I think, of our BEST program
to include more of them, quite frankly, I think would better
serve the United States.
Mr. Keating. Also, Mr. Alvarez, I agree with you that most
of the effective methods at dismantling some of the DTOs is to
go after the transport of cash. From a Mexican perspective,
some of the things that fuel their ability to work as gangs and
as cartels really are the resources of that cash and the
resources of guns for them to operate.
So viewing it from the fact that those resources are
available to them, what can be done in terms of minimizing
those resources--the cash that is there and the guns that are
there for them to utilize?
Mr. Alvarez. Well, as I mentioned in my initial statement,
ICE is committed to going after the drugs, going after the
weapons, going after the illicit proceeds that they obtain. One
of the things that we have done at ICE is we have actually
stood up our National Bulk Cash Smuggling Center. It is a
strategic approach to really go after the cartels, really go
after the organizations that are picking up the money, the
illicit proceeds in the United States and trying to get it back
to their country, getting back to the sources, back to Mexico.
Operation Firewall, another operation that I mentioned in
my opening remarks--we were able to seize over $120 million
just this fiscal year in drug proceeds, or illicit proceeds, in
that operation. We have extended that operation
internationally.
We continuously work with our CBP partners and other law
enforcement partners at the actual border to conduct outbound
operations in an effort to interdict the cash that is moving
southbound, and that has proven to be very effective in the
past.
Mr. Keating. Mr. Nichols, you know, you have touched upon
the cooperation between Mexico and the United States, but I
think one of the fundamental questions we have is how do we
balance the fact that Mexico is indeed a sovereign nation with
our dual initiatives to work together? How do you strike that
balance?
You know, it seems to be making some progress here, but in
Mexico things are continuing to be even more dangerous than
before. So how do we strike that balance?
Mr. Nichols. Thank you, sir.
I would just like to clarify one point on what our pipeline
is in terms of delivery of assistance. We have obligated over
80 percent of the funds that have been appropriated. We have
delivered nearly 40 percent that is----
Mr. Keating. I am sorry to interrupt, Mr. Nichols, but I
just have limited time. I just wanted you to just touch on my
question.
Mr. Nichols. I will, sir. I just wanted to make sure that I
was able to touch on the other question with the limited time
that the Chairman had.
We balance those concerns with Mexico by working through
them in a partnership. Anything that we are going to do has to
enjoy the support and the leadership of Mexican authorities. We
have to take their concerns into account.
We work with them hand-in-glove. We sit down next to our
Mexican colleagues in a myriad of venues to work through issues
like: How do we promote transition to a new justice system in
Mexico? What are the systems that they are going to use for
customs inspections?
One of the heartening things that I have seen is, in terms
of CBP cooperation with Mexican customs, they want to be
completely interoperable with CBP, so we have been working very
closely with them to get them the same systems that CBP uses in
their work so that they can work seamlessly together. Those are
the types of cooperation that we have, sir.
Mr. Keating. Mr. Mora, I had a question for you, too. You
know, under what circumstances, if any--and I know it is a
difficult question to answer, but--would the military be called
on to actively engage in Mexico, beyond what you have already
stated? For instance, would things be ruled out----
Mr. Mora. Yes, Congressman. Short answer is no. We do not
envision in any way using U.S. military troops deployed in any
way in Mexico. I think the President has been quite clear on
this issue about militarizing both the border as well as our
relationship. So again, the short answer would be no.
Mr. Keating. Thank you.
Again, Mr. Mora, DOD provides the Government of Mexico with
equipment. However, there are some complaints about how long it
takes for the equipment to arrive there. Are you concerned
about that length of time and the time it takes to get the
equipment there and the resources deployed, and do you have any
suggestions about what could be done to speed that?
Mr. Mora. I think there was some initial concern,
Congressman, but I think we have now accelerated. As Brian sort
of indicated, we are now executing, with respect to the
aircraft, all of our equipment under the Merida Initiative; and
we will execute 100 percent of it by this time, probably, next
year, with respect to the CASA surveillance aircraft.
Mr. Keating. Thank you.
Mr. McCaul. Chair now recognizes the gentleman from South
Carolina, Mr. Duncan.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Before we get started, we have heard the term ``war''
thrown out a number of times here this morning, and I want to
ask each panelist, by a show of hands, do you believe we are at
a war--we have a war on drugs in this country?
Do you believe we have a war on drugs?
Okay. In 1971 apparently Richard Nixon did. That is when
the term was first used.
I am amazed that the White House will not use that term. In
fact, the drug czar said--the White House drug czar claims that
to be a counterproductive term. But we have heard that term
used a number of times today about the war against the Mexican
drug cartel.
I am going to go a different line of questioning, but we
are spending $15 billion in 2010 to fight this war on drugs
when there is no war on drugs--that is $500 a day. It is just
amazing to me.
I believe we do have a war on terror, and prior to
September 11, 2001 the terrorist organization Hezbollah was
responsible for the deaths of more Americans around the world
than any other terrorist organization. United States designated
Hezbollah as a foreign terrorist organization in 1997 and a
specially designated global terrorist in 2001.
I am concerned about the relationship between Hezbollah and
the Mexican drug cartel, and there is evidence to prove that.
Not only did we have an IED explosion in July of last year, in
2002 Salim Boughader Mucharrafille--I don't know how to
pronounce the last name there, but he was the owner of a
Lebanese cafe in Tijuana who was arrested for smuggling 200
people, including Hezbollah supporters from Mexico into the
United States. In 2005, Mahmoud Youssef Kourani crossed the
border from Mexico into California and traveled to Dearborn,
Michigan, where he was sentenced to 4\1/2\ years in prison for
conspiring to raise money for Hezbollah.
According to DHS, between 2007 and 2010 180,000 people have
been captured that are other than Mexicans at the Southern
border. Since the fall of 2008 at least 111 suspects of
Hezbollah-linked international network of drug traffickers and
money launderers have been arrested as part of an international
operation coordinated by the DEA.
In July 2010, a Kuwaiti newspaper reported that Mexico
foiled an attempt by Hezbollah to establish a network in South
America. The newspaper said Hezbollah operatives employed
Mexican nationals with family ties to Lebanon to set up a
network designed to target Israel and the West. Chamil Nazar
traveled frequently to Lebanon, made trips to other countries
and Latin America, and was living in Tijuana, Mexico at the
time of his arrest.
In August, 2010, Jamal Yousef, a member of the Syrian
military, was charged in New York with attempting to sell 100
M-16 assault rifles, 100 AR-15 assault rifles, 25,000 hand
grenades, anti-tank munitions, C-4 explosives to FARC, that the
Chairman mentioned earlier, a designated terrorist
organization, in exchange for 1 ton of cocaine. The weapons
were stored in Mexico at the home of Yousef's relative,
according to Yousef, and Yousef is a member of Hezbollah.
I think it is a real issue that we have got that we are
seeing Hezbollah in bed with the Mexican drug cartel. They are
using their tunneling expertise, I think, to help the cartel
bring God knows what into this country. It is a real concern
for us as Americans.
Mr. Chairman, these examples don't even count the
information we have on this issue that is classified.
Many experts believe that Hezbollah and the Mexican drug
cartel have been working together for years. It is well-known
that Hezbollah and the drug cartels have cooperated in
countries in Western Africa, South America, and Central
America.
So with many open-sourced examples and with all the money
involved in drug trafficking, gentlemen and ma'am, do you
believe that the threat of Hezbollah on our Southern border
merits further investigation? That is an open question to all
four of you.
Mr. Nichols. I think it is important to look at all of the
links to transnational actors. These are international criminal
organizations and they forge links with whatever groups can
serve their advantage. We have to work very closely with our
Mexican allies in looking at any of these linkages and make
sure that they are not exploited.
Mr. Duncan. What is DHS, DOD, DOS doing in those
conversations, but beyond those conversations, to protect this
country against this very real threat? What are some of the
steps that have been taken other than just conversations?
Mr. Alvarez. We at ICE--in Mexico we focus on alien
smuggling. We are looking at all the illicit pathways that are
coming in through Mexico into the United States, so we are
working with our Mexican partners as they intercept illegal
aliens as they transit through to identify if they are a part
of a terrorist organization. Where are they originating from?
So there is a good working relationship with our Mexican
counterparts working hand-in-hand, sharing information, sharing
any intelligence we have to try to identify and detect any
suspects coming through their country and eventually trying to
gain entry into the United States.
Mr. Duncan. All right.
Congressman Sue Myrick recommended in a letter to Secretary
Napolitano in June of last year requesting the DHS form a
homeland security task force to engage U.S. and Mexican law
enforcement and border patrol officials about Hezbollah's
presence, activities, and connections to gangs and drug cartel.
To date, I am not aware of any task force that has been
created.
When the lives of Americans are threatened on our very own
border why would not a task force--a true task force to look
into this--be created?
Apparently you all are struggling with the fact that we
have not addressed this very real issue, and so I will let your
lack of an answer just stand as an answer since we are out of
time.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you. Thank you for that question. I think
that this--certainly this committee will be investigating that
connection. Thank you for that question.
Next the Chair recognizes the gentlelady from New York, Ms.
Clarke.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman
and Ranking Member Keating. This is a very important hearing
here today, very wonderful responses, I believe, that we have
received from our panelists that really provide some
transparency and light around our Nation's relationship with
Mexico and the challenge we face with working with a sovereign
nation on an issue that is internal but may have spillover
implications.
What I took from your testimony today is that there is very
close cooperation with the Government of Mexico and our concern
is around drug trafficking, gun trafficking, human trafficking,
and the organized crime that perpetuates that. Is that not
correct?
Mr. Nichols. Absolutely. We have incredibly close and
comprehensive relationships with the full range of Mexican
government actors and a very fluid relationship that is bearing
real fruits.
Ms. Clarke. Let me ask you a question, Mr. Nichols. If
Mexican DTOs are designated as foreign terrorist organizations
what impact would it have on U.S. human rights and
developmental programs in Mexico?
Mr. Nichols. We would need to work very closely with our
Mexican counterparts first of all to ensure their support for
any type of a designation. That has profound implications
politically within Mexico, and under the current framework
where we are using the kingpin framework to go after these
transnational cartels, I think we have made tremendous progress
in going after their assets, in targeting key individuals and
bringing the full force of law enforcement upon them, and I
believe that that is the direction that we need to continue.
Ms. Clarke. Well, let me ask all of you, just based on the
information you have shared, based on the information we have,
do you have any statistical information that would indicate
that there is a spillover that is on the rise in the United
States of America?
Ms. Finklea. As far as CRS knows there is no one that is
systematically collecting this data across the Southwest border
and compiling it so that you can compare it to a baseline. So
though the UCR data can speak to violent crimes it can't parse
apart drug trafficking-related violent crimes and it can't
speak to whether there has definitively been a spillover or
not.
Ms. Clarke. Then how does one truly set parameters on
spillover violence? Can we attribute violent crimes
domestically with homegrown drug gangs and activities to the
spillover of transnational drug cartels? How does one define
the spillover?
Ms. Finklea. The interagency community has defined
spillover violence as: ``Spillover violence entails deliberate,
planned attacks by the cartels on U.S. assets, including
civilian, military, or law enforcement officials, innocent U.S.
citizens, or physical institutions, such as government
buildings, consulates, or businesses.'' This definition does
not include trafficker-on-trafficker violence, whether
perpetrated in Mexico or in the United States.
Ms. Clarke. Okay. So, for instance, if we know that the
point of entry of certain illicit drugs is the border of Mexico
and somehow it makes its way to inner city New York City where
there is a network of drug dealers that are connected to this
distribution route, and they decide to engage in gang violence,
and there is a parent with a child sitting out there at the
moment that this violence erupts, and they are innocent
citizens of the United States, does that fall into the
parameter of a spillover of the Mexican drug cartel scenario
that we are painting here?
Ms. Finklea. Well, I wouldn't be able to definitively
answer whether that would or would not fit into, because the
motivations of the individuals who are involved in the gang
warfare that you described would probably be better assessed by
someone in law enforcement who has been able to investigate
this. But the innocent and bystanders would fit under the
interagency community's definition of spillover violence.
Ms. Clarke. Okay. Well, I appreciate you giving me that
feedback because I am just trying to figure out why we have, I
guess, set such a focus on Mexico when this is a phenomena that
is being played out in cities around this Nation, and I don't
know that we are looking at the entire picture here when we
focus solely on, you know, the event that may occur on the
border.
Certainly I send out my condolences to those who are
fighting on the front line, our officers that--one whose life
was taken and the other who is recovering from an injury. But I
think there is a much larger phenomena that we need to take a
look at because if we limit our scope to simply what is
happening on the border then I think we are mentioning a much
bigger picture when we are talking about this phenomena than we
are giving ourselves credit for.
So I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
I thank you all once again for your testimony here today.
Mr. McCaul. I thank the gentlelady from New York.
Let me just say that this--again, this first part of the
two-part series of hearings--this part is focused on what are
we doing in Mexico; the second part will be discussing your
very issue, which is what is happening in the United States.
Again, I think the arrests of the 450 drug cartel associates in
the United States indicates that they are here and operating
here, so there certainly is a spillover criminal element, and
not to mention the be on the lookout notices that target U.S.
law enforcement on this side of the border as well.
So with that, I yield to the--and recognize the vice chair
of the subcommittee, the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Long.
Mr. Long. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all for your time today as the panelists. Thank
you individually for the joint work that you do in your
particular fields, because I know that all of you work
extremely hard and do the very best that you can, and I
appreciate that.
Mr. Alvarez, let me ask you first, when you say that we are
having trouble recruiting ICE agents to work in Mexico and then
we tell them, ``We want you to work in Mexico but you can't
carry any arms on you''----
Mr. Cuellar. Mr. Chairman?
Well, I think you know what we need to----
Mr. McCaul. This issue is a very sensitive issue that I
would advise the gentleman that there is a classified briefing
available that the Secretary asked that I attend, and I would
ask that you also receive this classified briefing on this very
issue. But certainly I think the line of questioning in terms
of our agents protected down there is a line of questioning
that would be appropriate.
Mr. Long. I will move on to another line of questioning.
How is that?
My understanding is drugs are coming out, money and guns
are going down. Mr. Mora said that the President doesn't want
to militarize the border under any circumstances.
A question for you, Mr. Mora. Defense Secretary Robert
Gates and Joint Chiefs Chairman Admiral Mike Mullen traveled to
Mexico a year ago this month, I believe, along with Secretary
Clinton, to offer increased military assistance and
collaboration to the Mexican counterparts. If the Mexican
officials turn down U.S. assistance what recourse do we really
have?
Mr. Mora. Well, Congressman, I think that we have continued
to engage and enhance the level of cooperation that we do,
particularly with our interlockers, which are SEDENA and SEMAR.
But as I mentioned in my opening remarks, it is important to
keep in mind that DOD's cooperation is requested and approved
by the Government of Mexico.
As I stated--and Secretary Gates has said this in public on
probably two occasions at least--we take our lead from the
Mexicans. Mexicans decide the speed and the depth of our
cooperation and we are prepared to engage on those issues
expeditiously.
Mr. Long. Okay.
Mr. Alvarez, for you, in fiscal year 2010 ICE deported a
little over a quarter million individuals to Mexico and over
half of those had criminal records. What steps has your agency
taken to ensure criminal deportees are not contributing to the
drug trafficking-related violence in Mexico and/or immediately
reentering the United States?
Mr. Alvarez. Last year Secretary Napolitano entered into an
agreement with the government of Mexican--Mexico whereby we
would provide criminal history information to the Government of
Mexico prior to a criminal Mexican national before that
individual is actually deported back to Mexico. So in other
words, Mexican government knows of this individual the
background and individual circumstances as to why that
individual was detained and ultimately removed out of the
country. So for them it is a heightened alert level on this
individual that is operating in their country.
Mr. Long. Okay.
Again, I want to thank you all for your testimony, for what
you do on an individual basis, and I yield back.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you.
If I could follow up on your first question, I think the
issue is, Mr. Alvarez, in light of what happened to the agents
you supervise, Agents Zapata and Avila, they are, I think, in
danger. What security precautions are being taken to make sure
that they are protected down in Mexico and to make sure that
they can adequately defend themselves?
Mr. Alvarez. Well, a few of the steps that we have taken--
and we are working very closely with the Department of State,
Diplomatic Security, the U.S. Embassy on the ground--is we are
providing training and all the tools and equipment that is
needed for our agents to operate in country. Just recently we
brought up our agents from Mexico City. We provided them some
training in the United States--defensive driving tactics and
several other types of training so they can carry out their
mission and be prepared for whatever they are going to
withstand down in Mexico.
Mr. McCaul. I know Agent Avila said that, you know, 10
guides with AK-47s--you know, what can you do in that
situation? Totally outgunned down there and outmanned, and that
is the situation, and I appreciate the gentleman from Missouri
raising that issue.
With that, I am going to recognize my good friend, the
gentleman from Texas, Mr. Cuellar.
Mr. Cuellar. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for having
this meeting--hearing, and Ranking Member, also.
First of all, before I lose my voice I want to say thank
you to all the witnesses that we have. We really appreciate
what you do.
By the way, I am a big supporter of the BEST program. As
you know, Michael McCaul and I have--Chairman McCaul--have
filed legislation and we are hoping by the middle of April we
should get that marked up, and I would love to sit down with
you because it actually started Laredo, and it is one that
works very well because you coordinate, communicate between the
State, Federal, local, and even on the Mexican side.
There are a couple of videos that I have asked the Chairman
if we could see this after the hearing, and--just to give you
an impression that I know some of you all are familiar with
already, but it is videos to show you how the drug cartels
operate in a very efficient way in Mexico. It is a way that--it
is a snapshot that should tell us why we need to do more to
help the Republic of Mexico.
Now, it is a very dynamic situation. There is a lot of
sensitivities, a lot of history, and the reason we can't go in
and send the military is because Mexico is a foreign country.
There is a real estate history between the United States
and Mexico, if I can use that term, and because of that real
estate history between the United States and Mexico, Mexico is
very sensitive. But as the Chairman and I--when we were down
there in Mexico we spoke to President Calderon and other
folks--Secretary Galvan, also, from the defense--we said,
``Look, we can help you as much as you want us to help us--help
you.''
There are a lot of steps. I mean, even the drones are now
flying over there. That took a lot for them to go. There are a
lot of things that can be said out in the open and some that
are classified that we are helping Mexico.
The only thing I ask--and, Mr. Chairman, you are going to
have a separate hearing--look, the drug cartels are in the
United States. If you look at the CRS--and I have got to say,
Doctor, you did a great job--if you look at page 8 of the CRS
report, they are already here in about 250 cities. You give me
your State and they are probably there already.
So they are here already. The issue of spillover violence
is something that we have to look at very carefully. I am from
the border. My family is there.
I have got a brother who worked for DPS for 28 years--
intelligence, narcotics, he is now the border sheriff down
there. You know, we live down there, over there, and we just
have to be very careful when we talk about the spillover of
crime--and there is always that potential. I know we will cover
this over.
But if you look at also the CRS--because there has really
been no study on the drug-related violence over--the best we
can use is the FBI violence rate, and if you look at page CRS
22 and 23, if you look at the border areas and compare it to
non-border MSAs, actually the border areas are--statistically
there is no difference between Austin or Boston and other
places.
In fact, the border areas, my understanding, Doctor, are
below the National rate. Is that correct?
Ms. Finklea. For the eight MSAs that were included in this
particular investigation that is correct.
Mr. Cuellar. Which are the big areas like Laredo, El Paso,
McAllen, the areas that I think you are all familiar with. We
know the numbers. One of the most violent cities in the
Republic of Mexico, Mr. Chairman, Ciudad Juarez--and you look
at El Paso and it is one of the safest cities in the United
States.
So in Laredo back in 2004 and 2005 when they had that hot
spot of crime and they had, like, 54 policemen that went
missing because they didn't want to play ball and they were
killed, or kidnapped, or whatever they did to them. The
spillover crime in Laredo didn't pop up.
So I say that because to my friends, our new Members in the
committee, I would ask you to just be--you know, we have got to
make sure we understand what is happening over there and what
is happening over here. We still have to be mindful of
spillover crime, but----
The only thing I would ask you is, Mr. Chairman, I am in
full agreement with you on what we need to do, and I know the
folks here of the State Department, even though I am--I think
you all need to move a lot quicker and I know some of it is
going to take time--the professionalism of police, the
professionalism of the judiciary, the prosecutors, the
prisons--we saw what happened in--they--about 150 prisoners
went out and the joke was the only reason they took only 150
prisoners from the Nortelavell Prison because that is the only
buses they had available at that time to take them out. So all
those institutions have to be developed, and it is going to
take time.
There are a lot of similarities and differences between the
United States--I mean, between Mexico and Colombia. There are
some areas I think we can work with. In fact, Colombians are
training Mexicans right now, at this time, as we are.
So the only thing I ask for our Members, because my time is
up, is that, you know, we just--we are all on the same page. I
just ask Members to be a little mindful as we go.
If we really want to address it--I will close up with this,
Chairman--if we really want to address the issue of border
violence and all this we need to go and take it to them, take
the fight over. I use the word war--I think the other
gentleman, Duncan--I use the word war.
We have to go in there. We can't send the military. I know,
you know, we can send ICE agents and other officials over
there. I know there are challenges.
But we have to go in and work with them, but we just have
to be mindful of the sensitivity. There is a very sensitivity
because of history and other areas.
Mr. Chairman, I look forward to working with you and the
Ranking Members and the other Members of the committee to how
we can best address this issue.
So to all of you all, thank you.
Members, please take a look at the CRS report. It has some
very good information there.
Thank you.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Cuellar. We always appreciate
your special expertise and experience living down on the border
every day. I think when we visited President Calderon he called
it a war. He said, ``I have declared war on these drug cartels
which threaten the security of my nation.''
So thank you, again, for that.
For any Member interested, Mr. Cuellar does have a highly
sensitive video that he has described involving drug cartel
operations in Mexico taking over checkpoints. For anybody
interested, there will be a closed briefing after this hearing
to view that video.
With that, I see we have Mr. Marino, from Pennsylvania, the
colleague in the Justice Department and a former U.S. attorney.
Mr. Marino. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize profusely
for being late. I have had several committee meetings and I
wanted to make sure--in fact, I left early to get to here.
I want to thank the panel for being here.
But I walked in just at the opportune time because my
colleague is absolutely right. Being a prosecutor at the
Federal level and at the State level, the drugs coming across
the border--the Mexican border--in addition to the violence is
off the Richter Scale at this point.
I have had the chance, as the U.S. attorney, to visit that
border on numerous occasions and actually observe what is
taking place. Our services are called for around the United
States and around the world, more so in Libya, other fronts
that we are on, but I submit to you, we are missing a very
critical war right here on our borders of the United States,
and that is--and I agree with you 1,000 percent. It is a war.
It is a drug war; it is a cartel. They are incredibly
violent. They think nothing of wiping out entire families, not
to mention what has happened crossing the borders into the
United States, not to mention the drug addiction, the death,
not only the misery that this instills upon our life here in
America but the expenses as well.
Again, apologizing for not being here and listening to the
questions, I have a question--just one question and maybe each
of you can take a moment and discuss it. What could we,
Congress, particularly what could I, as a new Member, do to win
this war and to break this stalemate that--it is not even a
stalemate, I think. We are at a disadvantage here at this point
now--concerning the war on drugs, particularly what is
happening between Mexico's border and our border?
Mr. Alvarez, please start.
Mr. Alvarez. Thank you, Congressman.
I think the support that we have gotten thus far has been
tremendous. We appreciated the Merida Initiative, the support
by Congressman Cuellar, Congressman McCaul, on the support you
have given us to our Border Enforcement Security Taskforces,
the BEST task forces along the border, of which, as I mentioned
before, we have 11 on the Southwest border.
Obviously, you know, expanding those to other areas would,
I believe, be crucial to our success. Our partners in--speaking
of the BESTs, we also have five police officials from the SSP,
from the Mexican Federal Police, embedded in some of those task
forces to really facilitate the exchange of real-time
information, being able to really attack the cartels, being
able to go after the transnational criminal organizations on
both sides of the border.
We expanded, as I mentioned, to Mexico City. We are working
hand-in-hand with our Mexican counterparts on the other side of
the border.
So I think the support that we have gotten has been
tremendous. I think we can--obviously there is room for
improvement.
We have 25 percent of our workforce, of our ICE agents,
physically located on the Southwest border, the highest we have
ever had. That support has been tremendous thus far. Obviously
there is more we can do, but to this point we appreciate what
you have done thus far.
Mr. Nichols. I would echo that. You and your fellow Members
have been tremendously generous in your support for our efforts
in collaboration with the Mexican government. I would hope that
you would be able to continue that support.
The Chairman and Mr. Cuellar's comments that whatever the
number we have already delivered we need to do better in
delivering that assistance and do it faster are extremely well
taken, and rest assured that we are going to do that. So thank
you very much for your support for all our efforts.
Mr. Marino. Thank you.
Mr. Mora.
Mr. Mora. Yes, Congressman. I would agree with my
colleagues.
I think, as I said previously, I think the best way we can
support our Mexican partners and ourselves is that we be
prepared to respond to--quickly to their requests for
assistance. I think the support to now has been very positive,
very good, but we need to be prepared, I think, when the
Mexicans are prepared to--as we work together, to establish the
way ahead--further way ahead, I should say--we need to be ready
and willing to respond in an expeditious, quick manner.
Mr. Marino. Thank you.
Doctor.
Ms. Finklea. As a representative of the Congressional
Research Service I can't offer an opinion on policy options,
but I can say that the current data that is available for us to
assess drug trafficking-related violence isn't fine-tuned. It
doesn't have the level of specificity for us to be able to
assess that.
Mr. Marino. I see my time is expired. Thank you.
Mr. McCaul. Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from the
great State of Texas, Ms. Sheila Jackson Lee.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank
you for your courtesies extended.
Thank the witnesses as well for their presence.
Let me put on the record that I had asked Chairman King for
an overall classified briefing on drug cartels and I would like
to again make that request, and I would certainly like to thank
my good friend, Congressman Cuellar, for his first-hand
experience, and also enlightening us so that we have the right
kind of balanced perspective, and working with you, Mr.
Chairman, on your interest--your very keen interest--on this
issue.
I have lived this issue for now almost 2 decades, being on
the Homeland Security Committee for that long period of time,
and I can attest to the fact, visiting the border, of the
astuteness of local law enforcement and their attention to
securing their community, but they need our help. I do want to
thank law enforcement representatives who are there, and
certainly I want to speak directly to Mr. Alvarez and offer, as
I have done in the past, my sympathy for any fallen officer,
and certainly for the loss that we experienced in the wounded
officer in Mexico.
Let me just quickly ask--and I would like to move as
quickly as we could to that classified briefing on drug cartels
because I know there are a lot of answers that can come out of
it.
Mr. Alvarez, would you go back to a management question and
tell me what further cuts in your budget--ICE budget--would
generate? Quickly could you comment on--first of all,
congratulations for finding two tunnels by your officers--what
kind of technology is needed or what you use and whether or not
a $350 million, $400 million cut to the Homeland Security's
security budget might impact the services that you provide and
the men and women that serve in the ICE organization?
Mr. Alvarez. Obviously it would have some sort of impact,
but I will tell you, for the department and specifically for
ICE, Mexico is a big priority. We are focusing a lot of our
resources. We are doubling our presence in Mexico----
Ms. Jackson Lee. So if you had a cut in the dollars that
you have received in that effort would that impact the effort
that you are trying to push in Mexico?
Mr. Alvarez. I would imagine it would have some impact--
yes, definitely would have some impact. But the Southwest
border supplemental that we received we were able to hire and
bring on 250 new agents that we deployed to the Southwest
border.
Again, 25 percent of our workforce, of our agents, are
physically located at the Southwest border. So it is a priority
for us to work in conjunction with our Mexican colleagues.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Any budget cuts that would impact that
effort would have an impact on the work that you are trying to
do.
Mr. Alvarez. Yes, possibly.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me, Mr. Nichols, raise some questions
with you on the idea of how do we attack this whole question of
drug cartel. I am told that the Drug Kingpin Act has a number
of provisions in it that put a lot of restraint or, if you
will, list a lot of elements of these cartels that allow for an
effort to be waged against them.
I think we want to make the strong clarification that the
people on the border, both on the Mexican side and otherwise,
there are innocent victims that are involved, and that what we
want to go after--and I see them because many of them are
housed in my detention center in the heart of my Congressional
district, so I know about the bad guys or the drug cartels.
But I would be interested in whether you thought the
Kingpin Act really gives you the sufficient cover--gives law
enforcement agencies the authority they need to go after the
Mexican DTOs. Are the penalties under the Kingpin Act rule out
the need to try to make DTOs fit into the foreign terrorist
organization category, meaning can you work with the Kingpin
Act and get where you need to be on these drug cartels?
Mr. Nichols. Yes. The Kingpin Act has been very effective
for us and has been a great vehicle for going after drug
trafficking organizations around the world, particularly in
Mexico. It allows us to designate organizations and individuals
for freezing their assets, seizing their assets, prioritizing
prosecutions, and it enjoys the full support and cooperation of
the Mexican government.
Ms. Jackson Lee. If you were to make them terrorist
organizations under the foreign terrorist legislation would it
preclude you from sort of helping those individuals that have
been duped--teenagers, others who have received certain
distinctive aid to get them out, et cetera?
Mr. Nichols. Certainly terrorist designations carry with it
different standards and procedures which would have to be
handled much more intensively, and it would make it very
difficult in the circumstances that you cite. But obviously the
goal is not to miscast or misdesignate any individual under
those types of provisions.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Alvarez, could you just--I will admit
that we believe that Houston, where I come from, has an
unfortunate history of gun running, and that certainly doesn't
help the work that you are trying to do. Let me know what an
impact gun running and gun trafficking coming from the United
States into Mexico has had on your work or either the
enhancement of drug cartels.
Mr. Alvarez. Well, I would defer any questions on arms
trafficking, obviously, to the appropriate agency, which would
be the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms. I think they
would be more suited to handle those questions.
But I will tell you, you know, our experience, especially
on the border, especially--again, I go back to the BEST teams
that we have set up along the Southwest border--their focus is
on the arms smuggling, you know, going after the organizations
that are working on both sides of the border, that are taking
the arms across the border.
They are focused on the money--the money that they are
moving to continue their criminal activity. They are our
essential tool that focus on these organizations as they
operate in the United States.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, you have been kind with your
time. I would just like to be on the record to say that I think
any classified briefing has to focus on the extensive gun
running that travels south of the border, and unfortunately
some of our cities are impacted more so than others.
I believe it will be important to inform all of our
Members, including the Ranking Member, all of you who have
served as U.S. attorneys, those of us who have served as
judges, who have seen some of these activities at lower levels,
depending on the jurisdictional court that we have, realize
that these are the tools of violence. I believe it is very
important that we get to the bottom of it.
If I could, I would like to welcome Mr. Keating as the
Ranking Member, and it is a pleasure to be given the courtesy
of sitting on the committee.
Thank you all very much. I yield back.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you. I look forward to working with you
on that briefing as well.
We had a statement--written testimony--from Assistant
Director Thomas Harrigan of the DEA. I ask for unanimous
consent that it be entered into the record. Without objection,
so ordered.
[The information follows:]
Statement of Thomas M. Harrigan
March 31, 2011
introduction
Drug trafficking and abuse exacts a significant toll on the
American public. More than 31,000 Americans--or approximately ten times
the number of people killed by terrorists on September 11, 2001, die
each year as a direct result of drug abuse. Approximately 7 million
people who are classified as dependent on, or addicted to, controlled
substances squander their productive potential. Many of these addicts
neglect or even abuse their children and/or commit a variety of crimes
under the influence of, or in an attempt to obtain, illicit drugs. Tens
of millions more suffer from this supposedly ``victimless'' crime, as
law-abiding citizens are forced to share the roads with drivers under
the influence of drugs, pay to clean up toxic waste from clandestine
laboratories, rehabilitate addicts, and put together the pieces of
shattered lives. In truth, in order to calculate an actual cost of this
threat, we must explore and examine the impact produced by
transnational drug crime in corrupting government institutions,
undermining public confidence in the rule of law, fostering violence,
fueling regional instability, and funding terrorism.
Drug trafficking is a global enterprise that, according to the U.N.
Office on Drugs and Crime, generates approximately $394 billion per
year. This figure dwarfs the proceeds from other forms of organized
criminal activity and provides a revenue stream for insurgents,
terrorists, and other nefarious activity. In order to put this sum into
perspective, the proceeds of the global drug trade exceed the gross
domestic product of many nations and provide ample motivation to those
who would peddle poison for profit. Some argue that legalization and
regulation--even at the cost of untold human suffering and misery--
would at least strip the traffickers of these enormous profits. But
both common sense and history have taught that those who are displaced
from the drug trade do not move into corporate life; they migrate into
other types of criminal conduct.
Those who organize, finance, direct, and control this criminal
enterprise thrive in areas where government control is weak. While the
drug trade fuels corruption and instability in America, as well as in
foreign countries, it is no coincidence that the so-called ``kingpins''
who run this global enterprise do not reside in the United States,
where they would be most vulnerable to a more highly effective criminal
justice system. Rather, they operate from locations which they perceive
to be safe havens, and from there direct the activity of subordinates
and surrogates who supply drugs to the U.S. market. This model is
intended to not only frustrate attempts to successfully prosecute these
criminals, but also to maximize the autonomy of their organizations in
the countries where they are headquartered.
Perhaps the clearest example of the relationship between drug
trafficking and National security can be found just south of our
border. A stable and secure Mexico is in the best interest of both the
United States and Mexico, but the violent actions and corrupting
influence of drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) threatens that
stability and security. Since President Calderon took office in
December 2006 and set out to bring these cartels to justice, his
government has deployed more than 45,000 military troops to assist
police in combating cartel influence and related violence. Since the
counteroffensive, there have been approximately 34,000 drug-related
murders in Mexico in the last 5 years. More troubling is the fact that
many of these brutal murders were committed with the specific intent of
intimidating the public and influencing the government to suspend its
action against the cartels. Fortunately, the Calderon administration
has been resolute and steadfast in its commitment to break the power
and influence of these criminals.
The Calderon administration has also aggressively investigated
allegations of corruption within its own government, arresting hundreds
of officials for accepting bribes from the cartels. For instance, the
former Deputy Attorney General responsible for prosecuting traffickers
was allegedly protecting them for a fee of $450,000 a month. The
problems uncovered in Mexico during the past few years reflect
increasing threats to the rule of law and regional stability. The
concept of ``plata o plomo,'' either accept ``money or lead''
(bullets), is well documented in Mexican drug trafficking culture and
refers to the choice public and police officials must make when first
confronted by this powerful criminal element. The confluence of brutal
violence and corruption makes it difficult to enforce drug laws and
undermines public confidence in the government. Left unchecked, the
power and impunity of these DTOs could grow to become an even greater
threat to the national security of Mexico. With the consent of the
Mexican government, DEA has had agents assigned in Mexico since our
inception in 1973, which is one of the main reasons why our partnership
with Mexico is so robust. We share the responsibility for challenging
the threat of these DTOs, and our ability to successfully contend with
the threat is vital to both nations.
cooperative efforts with mexico
The United States and Mexico are committed to cooperative action to
reduce the drug threat from which both nations suffer. Drugs are
produced and consumed in Mexico, and are also transited through Mexico
as a result of its strategic location between South America and the
United States. The Government of Mexico is confronting the entrenched,
cross-border smuggling operations and the diversified, poly-drug,
profit-minded DTOs within that country. On the U.S. side of the border,
the desire for illicit drugs prompts the movement of billions of U.S.
dollars and an unknown number of weapons into Mexico annually. Many of
the smuggled weapons are used against the Mexican security forces. The
single objective of those who ply the drug trade is profit. The
National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC) estimates that Mexican and
Colombian DTOs generate, remove, and launder as much as $39 billion in
wholesale drug proceeds annually. For these reasons, the U.S. and
Mexican governments share the responsibility to defeat the threat of
drug trafficking.
The drug trade in Mexico has been rife with violence for decades.
Without minimizing the severity of the problems we are confronted with
today, it is nonetheless critical to understand the background of the
``culture of violence'' associated with Mexican DTOs and the cyclical
nature of the ``violence epidemics'' with which Mexico is periodically
beset. Though no previous ``epidemic'' has exacted as grisly a toll as
the violence seen in years, we do not have to go back very far in
history to recall the cross-border killing spree conducted by Gulf
Cartel Zeta operatives in the Laredo-Nuevo Laredo area during 2004-
2005. However, one thing must remain clear in any discussion of
violence in Mexico, DTOs are inherently violent, and nowhere is this
truer than in Mexico, where Wild West-style shootouts between drug
traffickers against their rivals and law enforcement are far too
common. In fact, according to open source reporting and the PGR, over
90 percent of the homicides in the past few years have been of drug
cartel members or associates vying for market shares and trafficking
routes.
The United States engages in cooperative efforts with our Mexican
law enforcement partners to provide information, training, and
equipment that will allow Mexican authorities to apprehend, prosecute,
and convict these dangerous criminals. The Calderon administration is
taking the fight directly to the cartels. The quantifiable impact of
huge drug, weapons, and money seizures presents part of the picture.
Equally important, although difficult to measure, is the enormous
psychological impact of high-level arrests and the record numbers of
extraditions that have occurred in the last few years. No other action
by the Government of Mexico strikes quite so deeply at cartel fears
than an arrest and extradition. Only weeks after his inauguration,
President Calderon began extraditing high-profile criminals to the
United States. On January 19, 2007, President Calderon took the
politically courageous step of extraditing 15 individuals to stand
trial in the United States, including notorious Gulf Cartel leader and
Consolidated Priority Organizational Target (CPOT) Osiel Cardenas-
Guillen.
Since then, the Government of Mexico has extradited 384 criminals
to the United States, including a group of 10 in December 2008 and 25
during December 2010. These individuals were associated with some of
the most notorious Mexican DTOs, such as the Gulf, Arellano Felix, and
Sinaloa Cartels. Also, on February 25, 2009, Miguel Angel Caro-
Quintero, who assumed control of the family organization after the
arrest of his brother Rafael Caro-Quintero (who was complicit in the
kidnapping, torture, and murder of DEA Special Agent Enrique Camarena)
was extradited.
During the past few years, the Government of Mexico has achieved
unprecedented success in apprehending or eliminating high value targets
(HVT) based in the country of Mexico. For example:
In March of 2009, Sinaloa Cartel leader and DEA fugitive
Vicente Zambada-Niebla (son of Ismael Zambada-Garcia) was
located and arrested in Mexico City. On February 19, 2010,
Zambada-Niebla was extradited to the United States.
In October of 2009, Sinaloa Cartel leader and DEA fugitive,
CPOT Oscar Nava Valencia aka ``El Lobo'' was apprehended and
arrested near Guadalajara, Mexico. Nava Valencia was extradited
to the United States on January 27, 2011 to face drug
trafficking offenses in the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Texas. In December 2009, the ``Boss of
bosses'' CPOT Arturo Beltran-Leyva, a.k.a. ``Barbas'', was
located and killed in Cuernavaca, Mexico after a 2-hour gun
battle with Government of Mexico forces. Beltran-Leyva was
considered one of the most powerful drug lords in Mexico at the
time.
On January 12, 2010, working in cooperation with Mexican
counterparts, DEA and U.S. Marshals Service personnel
identified the residence of one of Mexico's most wanted
fugitives and co-leader of the Arellano Felix cartel, Teodoro
Garcia Simental, a.k.a. ``El Teo'', who was responsible for the
majority of the homicides, kidnappings, and tortures in
Tijuana. The Secretaria de Seguridad Publica (SSP) Sensitive
Investigative Unit (SIU), with support from the Grupo de
Operaciones Especiales (Mexican Army Special Operations Group,
GOPES), initiated the search and arrest of ``El Teo'' at the
target location and he was arrested without incident.
On March 13, 2010, Barrio Azteca (BA) members executed
Lesley Enriquez, a U.S. Consulate employee; Arthur Haycock
Redelfs, husband of Lesley Enriquez and Detention Officer of
the El Paso County Sheriff's Office; and Alberto Salcido
Ceniceros, husband of U.S. Consulate employee Hilda Antillon in
Cd. Juarez, Mexico. After a lengthy and exhaustive
investigation, on March 2, 2011, United States Department of
Justice Trial Attorneys obtained criminal indictments 35 BA
Gang members from Ciudad Juarez, west Texas and southern New
Mexico. On March 9, 2011, the El Paso Field Division with its
law enforcement partners (22 State/local/Federal law
enforcement agencies) executed an operation on the BA criminal
organization in west Texas and southern New Mexico. Of the 35
subjects indicted, 28 are in custody in the United States and
Mexico. On April 21, 2010, the Mexican Military (Secretaria de
la Defensa Nacional or SEDENA) arrested CPOT Jose Gerardo
Alvarez-Vasquez, a.k.a. ``El Indio'' in Mexico City, Mexico.
Alvarez-Vasquez has been operating since the late 1980s and has
continued to assert himself among other Mexican cartel leaders,
and has been responsible for the distribution of multi-ton
cocaine shipments, methamphetamine precursor chemicals, and the
production and distribution of methamphetamine.
On July 24, 2010, SSP arrested Luis Carlos Vazquez-Barragan,
aka ``El 20'', a key lieutenant for CPOT Vicente Carrillo
Fuentes, who is the leader of the Juarez Cartel in Chihuahua,
Mexico. Vazquez-Barragan is a DEA Albuquerque District Office
fugitive and Regional Priority Organization Target (RPOT), who
was indicted for Marijuana Possession on March 30, 2005. DEA
discovered that Vazquez-Barragan was believed to be the person
who gave the order for the detonation of a car bomb in Ciudad
Juarez on July 15, 2010, an event that killed three persons,
one of them an SSP officer, a doctor who responded to the site
of the blast, and an unidentified mechanic.
On July 29, 2010, CPOT Ignacio Coronel-Villareal, a.k.a.
``Nacho'', was killed when Mexican soldiers raided a house in a
wealthy suburb of Guadalajara, Mexico during an operation
conducted in an attempt to capture him. He was one of the four
principal leaders of the Sinaloa Cartel/Federation, a
cooperating group of drug traffickers that occasionally share
resources such as transportation routes and money launderers.
Since early June of 2010, intelligence was shared with SSP/
SIU regarding Edgar Valdez-Villareal, a.k.a. ``La Barbie.''
After numerous attempts to apprehend him, SSP mounted an
operation in the Santa Fe area of Mexico City on August 30,
2010 which resulted in his arrest. Valdez-Villarreal was CPOT
Arturo Beltran-Leyva's Lieutenant until Beltran-Leyva's demise,
after which Valdez-Villarreal split and formed his own DTO,
resulting in escalated violence in Mexico.
On September 12, 2010, Mexican Navy (SEMAR) personnel
responded to information provided by DEA related to the
location of Sergio Barragan-Villareal, a.k.a. ``El Grande'',
and arrested him and two other associates. Barragan-Villareal
had been in a fight for control of the Beltran-Leyva DTO
against Valdez-Villareal.
On November 23, 2010, the SSP/SIU responded to intelligence
regarding Carlos Montemayor-Gonzalez's whereabouts just outside
of Mexico City. That afternoon, he was located and apprehended.
Montemayor-Gonzalez is the father-in-law of ``La Barbie'', and
had taken over leadership of the DTO after ``La Barbie's''
arrest on August 30, 2010.
On November 4, 2010, the Government of Mexico Secretaria de
Seguridad Publica (SSP) Sensitive Investigation Unit (SIU)
arrested CPOT Harold Mauricio Poveda-Ortega in Mexico City,
Mexico. Poveda-Ortega was the primary source of supply for the
Beltran-Leyva DTO. The Poveda-Ortega DTO was responsible for
coordinating the distribution of approximately 20,000 kilograms
of cocaine per month to several Mexican DTOs.
On November 5, 2010, SEMAR, in conjunction with the DEA
Matamoros Resident Office (RO), McAllen District Office (DO),
Brownsville RO, SEDENA, and SSP, mounted an operation against
the Gulf Cartel in Matamoros, Tamaulipas, Mexico, which
resulted in the death of CPOT Antonio Ezequiel Cardenas-
Guillen, a.k.a. ``Tony Tormenta''. Additionally, Sergio
Fuentes, a.k.a. ``Tyson'', the Gulf Cartel Plaza boss in Valle
Hermoso, Tamaulipas, and three other members were also mortally
wounded during the operation.
On December 3, 2010, SSP/SIU received intelligence regarding
the known whereabouts of Antonio Arcos-Martinez in Morelia. As
the result of investigative follow-up by SSP/SIU, Arcos was
located and apprehended. Arcos was one of the founders of La
Familia cartel.
In another blow to La Familia, on December 8, 2010, the SSP/
SIU and GOPES, in conjunction with the DEA Mexico City Country
Office (CO), mounted an operation against La Familia in
Holanda, Michoacan, Mexico, which resulted in the death of CPOT
Nazario Moreno-Gonzalez, a.k.a. ``Chayo''. Moreno-Gonzalez was
one of two principal leaders of the La Familia Cartel, and he
was widely considered the intellectual and spiritual leader of
the organization.
All these high-impact actions--seizures, arrests, and
extraditions--serve to make one important point: Desparate/frustrated
drug traffickers often resort to increased levels of violence.
Vulnerable drug traffickers operating under unprecedented stress are
exceptionally more violent which is why the homicide rates in Mexico
have risen so dramatically over the last couple of years.
cooperative efforts with other federal, state, and local agencies
DEA continuously works with Federal, State, and local law
enforcement counterparts in the United States through joint
investigations and the sharing of intelligence. DEA routinely collects
and shares intelligence pertaining to violent DTOs and armed groups
operating in and around ``hot spots'' along the Southwest Border (SWB).
As of December 31, 2010, with the passage of the SWB emergency
supplemental, DEA now has 29% of its domestic agent positions allocated
to its Southwest Border field divisions increasing total DEA Special
Agent workforce in the region from 1496 to 1546. Additionally, DEA has
the largest U.S. law enforcement presence in Mexico with offices in
Mexico City, Tijuana, Hermosillo, Nogales, Ciudad Juarez, Mazatlan,
Guadalajara, Monterrey, Matamoros, Nuevo Laredo, and Merida, with 60
Special Agent positions. FBI Resolution Six (R-6) Agents, co-located
with DEA Agents, coordinate drug and gang investigations conducted in
Mexico. They are also responsible for supporting domestic cases for
U.S. prosecution, cultivating liaison contacts within Mexico, and
supporting bilateral criminal enterprise initiatives. Working closely
with counterparts assigned to the Mexican Embassy, Legal Attaches, the
El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC), and the Southwest Intelligence
Group, as well as with our Federal partners in the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), and components within the Department of
Justice (DOJ), i.e. the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and
Explosives (ATF) and the United States Marshals Service (USMS), we
leverage all available resources and expertise. Close coordination with
impacted State and local law enforcement and Mexican counterparts allow
real-time access to intelligence and information that facilitated more
than 800 convictions related to Mexican DTOs in 2009 alone.
As the lead U.S. law enforcement agency responsible for enforcing
the drug laws of the United States, DEA has been at the forefront of
U.S. efforts to work with foreign law enforcement counterparts in
confronting the organizations that profit from the global drug trade.
DEA's success is due, at least in part, to its single-mission focus.
DEA is well-positioned to mount a sustained attack on the command and
control elements of DTOs; however, DEA does not operate in a vacuum.
Rather, DEA and FBI, in conjunction with other Department of Justice
(DOJ) components, DHS, the Department of Defense (DOD), the
intelligence community, and other Federal, State, local, and foreign
counterparts plan coordinated attacks against all levels of the drug
trade with the aim of disrupting and dismantling the command and
control elements of these organizations.
The following are several noteworthy interagency efforts being
coordinated along the SWB:
On June 5, 2010 in Albuquerque, New Mexico, Attorney General
(AG) Holder, DHS Secretary Napolitano, and Office of National
Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) Director Kerlikowske released
President Obama's National Southwest Border (SWB)
Counternarcotics Strategy, which is designed to provide a road
map for the Federal drug control program agencies to follow to
stem the flow of illegal drugs and their illicit proceeds
across the SWB and to reduce associated crime and violence in
the region.
The SWB Initiative is a multi-agency, Federal law
enforcement operation that attacks Mexico-based DTOs operating
along the SWB by targeting the communications systems of their
command-and-control centers. The SWB Initiative has been in
operation since 1994. As part of a cooperative effort, DEA,
FBI, CBP, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and U.S.
Attorneys' Offices around the country conduct judicially
approved electronic wire intercepts that ultimately identify
all levels of DTOs. This strategy allows the tracking of drugs
as they flow from source countries to the streets of the United
States.
The Southwest Border Intelligence Collection Plan (SWBICP)
was initiated by DEA in October 2009 to coordinate a regional
intelligence collection framework housed at EPIC to support
enforcement operations on the SWB of the United States. The
SWBICP provides operational, tactical, strategic, and policy-
level intelligence used to support investigations, regional
planning, and resource decision-making. Intelligence gathered
under the guidance of the SWBICP is shared with the
intelligence community, and other Federal, State, and local law
enforcement agencies. The SWBICP also provides a mechanism to
collect information needed to assess counterdrug measures and
security threats along the U.S.-Mexico border.
The Concealment Trap Initiative (CTI) targets those vital
service providers who build concealed trap compartments or use
natural voids in vehicles or other conveyances and residences
for DTOs to conceal bulk cash or other contraband. Drug
traffickers recognize that ``bulk'' currency is subject to
seizure and easily forfeited when discovered by law enforcement
authorities. To counter this, drug traffickers employ a myriad
of techniques, including the use of concealment traps, to
impede and frustrate law enforcement's efforts to discover and
seize illicit drug proceeds. The CTI addresses the challenge of
helping law enforcement officers and agents keep up with the
technology behind these traps, including training them to
identify and locate the traps, and establish probable cause
toward obtaining a search warrant or consent to search the
vehicle or residence in which the trap is located. Through the
CTI program in 2010, DEA seized just under $39 million, in
addition to drugs and weapons.
Bulk Cash Seizures represent the cash proceeds obtained from
the illegal trafficking of drugs, weapons, and persons, and are
targeted by DEA, FBI, ATF, ICE, and other Federal, State, and
local law enforcement partners for use in obtaining valuable
investigative leads and intelligence data. Going forward,
information regarding bulk cash seizures will be simultaneously
shared between ICE's Bulk Cash Smuggling Center (BCSC) in
Vermont and the National Seizure System (NSS) at EPIC. EPIC-NSS
functions as, among other things, a repository for detailed
bulk currency seizure information from both domestic and
foreign law enforcement agencies. NSS analyzes volumes of bulk
currency seizure data and develops investigative lead reports
and responds to requests for bulk currency seizure data from
agents and officers in the field. EPIC provides a broad
spectrum of interagency information and intelligence systems
which are capable of immediately assessing the information and
assisting law enforcement agencies in obtaining probable cause
for search warrants, linking cases together, and following up
on existing cases.
Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF)
Program.--The OCDETF Program was initiated in 1982 to combine
Federal, State, and local law enforcement efforts into a
comprehensive attack against organized crime and drug
traffickers. DEA and FBI are active components of the OCDETF
Program, including OCDETF's nine Co-Located Strike Forces.
OCDETF Co-Located Strike Forces combine the efforts of multiple
Federal law enforcement agencies with State and local law
enforcement to target the largest drug trafficking
organizations that threaten the United States. These Co-Located
Strike Forces often collaborate with the Southwest Border High
Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) regional task forces in
Arizona, California, New Mexico, and West and South Texas.
Southwest Border HIDTA Task Forces represent Federal, State,
and local partnerships that target Mexican drug cartels and
their smuggling and transportation networks, which spawn cartel
violence along the border. The OCDETF Co-Located Strike Forces
and HIDTA Task Forces have had enormous success in dismantling
major Mexican DTOs linked to Mexico-based cartels.
The OCDETF Fusion Center (OFC), a multi-agency law
enforcement intelligence center that is currently led by a DEA
Special Agent, provides investigative and operational
intelligence support to on-going drug-related investigations
through the development of organizational target profiles and
the development of specific investigative leads. These leads
and intelligence products are disseminated to the appropriate
field elements of the Federal agencies through the multi-
agency, DEA-led Special Operations Division (SOD). Intelligence
and leads relating to other criminal activities, including
terrorism, are disseminated through SOD to the appropriate
agencies.
SOD is an operational coordination center with the mission
of establishing seamless law enforcement strategies and multi-
agency operations aimed at dismantling national and
international trafficking organizations by attacking their
command and control communications. SOD is able to facilitate
coordination and communication among law enforcement entities
with overlapping investigations, ensure tactical and
operational intelligence is shared, and that enforcement
operations and investigations are fully coordinated among and
between law enforcement agencies.
DEA is a member of the DHS Border Enforcement Security Task
Force (BEST), an ICE-led initiative designed to increase the
flow of information between participating agencies regarding
transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) and violent gangs
operating along our shared borders. In particular, BESTs target
the underlying sources of cross-border violence along the SWB,
such as weapons smuggling, narcotics, and human smuggling, and
bulk cash smuggling. BESTs commenced operation in Laredo, TX,
in July 2005, and DEA's participation in the Laredo BEST began
on May 3, 2006. BESTs incorporate personnel from ICE, CBP,
USSS, DEA, ATF, FBI, U.S. Coast Guard, and the U.S. Attorney's
Office, along with other key Federal, State, local, and foreign
law enforcement agencies, including the Mexican law enforcement
agency SSP.
The DEA's Drug Flow Attack Strategy (DFAS) is an innovative,
multi-agency strategy, designed to significantly disrupt the
flow of drugs, money, and chemicals between source zones and
the United States by attacking vulnerabilities in the supply
chains, transportation systems, and financial infrastructure of
major DTOs. DFAS calls for aggressive, well-planned, and
coordinated enforcement operations in cooperation with host-
nation counterparts in global source and transit zones.
Operation All-Inclusive (OAI) is the primary DFAS enforcement
component in the source and transit zones. Iterations of OAI
have been staged annually since 2005. A crucial partner in
DEA's Drug Flow Attack Strategy is the Joint Interagency Task
Force South (JIATFS). JIATFS provides operational and
intelligence fusion support to DEA by coordinating the use of
Department of Defense, Department of Homeland Security, and
partner nation air and maritime assets in joint operations.
These 9 operations are designed to stem the drug flow from the
source zone, specifically South America, to the transit zones,
which includes Central America and the Caribbean. These joint
DEA and JIATFS operations are vital not only in assisting our
Central and South American partners, but are designed to
significantly reduce drug flow into the United States and to
other non-U.S. markets such as Africa and Europe. Given the
volume of cocaine moving through the transit zone, DEA remains
committed to a focused, multiagency strategy, working with
JIATFS, U.S. Southern Command and our partner nations to not
only interdict the drug loads, but to identify, disrupt, and
dismantle the transnational criminal organizations trafficking
their illicit drugs throughout the globe. The 2010 SWB
supplemental provided an additional $5.3 million to expand DFAS
to enhance its focus on the SWB region.
Operation Doble Via (ODV), the domestic component of OAI,
was conducted between April and September 2007 to disrupt the
flow of drugs, chemicals, and money across the SWB. ODV took
place on both sides of the border and the main participants
were DEA, CBP, Texas DPS, and several Mexican agencies,
including the Federal Investigative Agency (AFI), Federal
Preventive Police (PFP), Mexican military, and the Deputy
Attorney General's Office of Special Investigations on
Organized Crime (SIEDO). Operation Doble Via II, which
commenced in August 2010 and concluded November 30, 2010,
focused on the Arizona-Mexico border. Through the collection of
law enforcement intelligence information and the development of
investigations specifically targeting the Arizona border
region, ODV-II sought to dismantle DTOs and other armed groups
responsible for the violence in Sonora, Mexico, and the
movement of drugs, weapons, and money across the border with
Arizona. Operation ODV-II resulted in the seizure of 71.8
metric tons of marijuana, 125 kilograms of methamphetamines,
327 kilograms of cocaine, 78 kilograms of heroin, $9,269,509,
and produced 202 arrests.
EPIC is a National tactical intelligence center that focuses
its efforts on supporting law enforcement efforts in the
Western Hemisphere, with a significant emphasis on the SWB.
Through its 24-hour watch function, EPIC provides immediate
access to participating agencies' databases to law enforcement
agents, investigators, and analysts. This function is critical
to the dissemination of relevant information in support of
tactical and investigative activities, deconfliction, and
officer safety. EPIC also provides significant, direct tactical
intelligence support to State and local law enforcement
agencies, especially in the areas of clandestine laboratory
investigations and highway interdiction.
EPIC's Gatekeeper Project is a comprehensive, multi-source
assessment of trafficking organizations involved in and
controlling the movement of illegal contraband through ``entry
corridors'' along the SWB. The analysis of Gatekeeper
organizations not only provides a better understanding of
command and control, organizational structure and methods of
operation, but also serves as a guide for policymakers to
initiate and prioritize operations by U.S. anti-drug elements.
Numerous ``Gatekeepers'' have direct links to Priority Target
Organizations (PTOs) and/or CPOTs.
Implementation of License Plate Readers (LPR) along the SWB
by DOJ and DHS has provided a surveillance method that uses
optical character recognition on images that read vehicle
license plates. The purpose of the LPR Initiative is to combine
existing DEA and other law enforcement database capabilities
with new technology to identify and interdict conveyances being
utilized to transport bulk cash, drugs, weapons, as well as
other illegal contraband. Almost 100 percent of the effort and
cost associated with monitoring southbound traffic is directed
at the identification, seizure, and forfeiture of bulk cash and
weapons, while the effort and cost of monitoring northbound
traffic is both enforcement- and forfeiture-related, in that
suspect conveyances can be identified for later southbound
monitoring. DEA components have the ability to query and input
alerts on license plates via an existing DEA database, and
other law enforcement agencies can do the same via EPIC. DEA
and CBP are currently working together in order to merge
existing CBP LPRs at the points of entry with DEA's LPR
Initiative. In addition, the fiscal year 2010 SWB supplemental
provided $1.5 million to expand the LPR initiative by
purchasing additional devices and barrels and support
maintenance to allow DEA to monitor traffic and provide
intelligence on bulk currency transiting toward Mexico.
The SIU Program is the foundation for building an effective
and trustworthy unit capable of conducting complex
investigations targeting major Mexican DTO's. The program
provides DEA with a controlled and focused investigative force
multiplier that allows DEA access to a global transnational
enforcement and intelligence network which directly supports
DEAs Drug Flow Attack Strategy (DFAS). The additional programs
funded by the Merida Initiative facilitate anti-corruption and
police professionalization efforts in a broader context, which
will serve the public interest. The fiscal year 2010 SWB
supplemental provided an additional $2 million for the SIU
program.
conclusion
The daily challenges posed by DTOs in the United States and Mexico
are significant, but are overshadowed of late by a very specific set of
challenges, such as ensuring that the rampant violence in Mexico does
not spill over our border; closely monitoring the security situation in
Mexico; and, perhaps most importantly, lending our assistance and
support to the Calderon administration to ensure its continued success
against the ruthless and powerful cartels. The Government of Mexico has
realized enormous gains in re-establishing the rule of law in Mexico,
and in breaking the power and impunity of the DTOs which threaten the
national security of both Mexico the United States.
The Calderon administration's gains are contributing to an
unparalleled positive impact on the U.S. drug market as well. From
January 2007 through September 2010 the price per gram of cocaine
increased 68.8 percent from $97.71 to $164.91, while the average purity
decreased by 30 percent. These statistics paint a clear picture of
restricted cocaine flow into the United States and decreased
availability. While spikes--upward or downward--in price and purity
have been observed in the past, these indicators typically normalize
within a few months. Unlike in the past, we are now in the midst of a
sustained, 3-year period of escalating and decreasing purity. Anecdotal
evidence from around the country and closer to home here in the
District of Columbia, including intercepted communications of the
traffickers themselves, corroborates the fact that President Calderon's
efforts have contributed to making it more difficult for traffickers to
supply the U.S. market with illicit drugs.
DEA recognizes that interagency and international collaboration and
coordination is fundamental to our success. It is imperative that we
sustain the positive momentum by supporting President Calderon's heroic
efforts against organized crime. We must also manage expectations, as
we anticipate that the gruesome violence in Mexico may continue to
worsen before it gets better. We must recognize that we are witnessing
acts of true desperation--the actions of wounded, vulnerable, and
dangerous criminal organizations. We also remain committed to working
with our U.S. law enforcement and intelligence partners to stem the
flow of bulk cash and weapons south, while also working to sustain the
disruption of drug transportation routes northward. Bringing to justice
the organizations and principal members of organizations involved in
the cultivation, manufacture, and distribution of controlled substances
appearing in or destined for illicit trafficking in the United States
remains the core of our focus.
Mr. McCaul. Let me just thank all the witnesses here today
for your testimony and your dedication and your service.
With that, I dismiss this panel and we will move on to
Panel Two. Thank you.
If I could ask that the witnesses be seated, and we are
going to begin the next panel. First of all, thank you for
being here, and let me make my introductions.
We are fortunate to have Mr. Jon Adler, who is the
president of the Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association.
Mr. Adler began his career in law enforcement in 1991 and has
served as a Federal criminal investigator since 1994. He has
been an active member since 1994.
Dr. Shirk--David Shirk--is a professor at the University of
San Diego--and where is Dr. Shirk? Okay, I guess nature called.
I want to just briefly get through his bio. He is the author of
the ``Drug Violence in Mexico: Data and Analysis Through
2010.'' He has been quite an expert in this area.
Professor John Bailey is a Georgetown University professor
and author of ``Plan Colombia and the Merida Initiative: Policy
Twins or Distant Cousins?'' Professor Bailey has taught at
Georgetown University since 1970, and following study and field
work in Peru and Colombia his research since the late 1970s
focused largely on Mexico.
Mr. Bailey, thank you so much for being here as well.
From my hometown and home State of Austin, Texas we are
very fortunate to have Dr. Ricardo Ainslie, who is a native of
Mexico City, Mexico, and a U.S. citizen. He earned his Ph.D. in
clinical psychology at the University of Michigan.
He is a professor at UT Austin, and for almost 2 decades
Dr. Ainslie has devoted himself to working in communities in
Texas and Mexico that experience significant conflict and
transformation exploring broader questions about how
communities function and individuals and cultures and groups
live together.
So with that, I recognize Mr. Adler for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF JON ADLER, PRESIDENT, FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT
OFFICERS ASSOCIATION
Mr. Adler. Thank you.
Good morning, Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating,
distinguished Members of the committee. On behalf of the 26,000
members of the Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association I
thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.
I am here to represent the members of the Federal law
enforcement community as well as the memory and the ultimate
sacrifice of Special Agent Jaime Zapata as well as the heroic
performance of Victor Avila.
As evidenced by the hearing's title and the discussion
early, yes, in Mexico there is a war. Make no mistake. There is
clearly a war.
That brings about, as a result of the brutal murder of
Jaime Zapata and attack on Victor, it raises two important
questions--questions that my members would really like answers
to, first question being--and I know Director Alvarez did
address this in part--in light of what happened--and this is a
defining moment for us--what risk assessment was performed to
accurately and realistically measure the risks that U.S. agents
assigned to Mexico confront every day? Second, what steps has
our State Department taken to negotiate the means to
protection, the means for our agents there to better protect
themselves against the violent threats they face?
Those are two critical questions that we would like the
answer to, and I appeal to the committee for your sustained
support.
Early March--March 3rd--President Obama met with President
Calderon and afterwards came out and made some statements that
had a very significant impact on the morale of my membership.
In particular, he recognized that the laws of Mexico prohibit
us from carrying there. Understood. We respect the law of
Mexico and we don't attempt to change their laws.
However, he went on to say that we don't perform law
enforcement activities there and seemingly minimized the risk
we face by describing their role--or our role--there as
advisory. Gentlemen, that is a minimization of the risks that
we face.
We heard it from Director Alvarez. The threats are
increasing. The risk is increasing.
Jaime Zapata was not targeted for what he does. There is no
need to debate the semantics of the specific activities they do
there. Suffice to say, law enforcement activities entails more
than simply putting handcuffs on a suspect.
But to call them advisory--gentlemen, they were targeted
and attacked for who they are--not for what they do, but for
who they are as U.S. law enforcement officials. It is very
important to understand that and not lose sight of that point.
We are imminently concerned on the topic of protection, and
I understand the subtlety and sensitivity of some of these
points. But more so, directing these issues towards the State
Department--and I condone Representative Gramm and his 33
colleagues that addressed a letter to Secretary Clinton to ask
the question, ``What are you doing by way of negotiation to
exert this country's considerable leverage to ensure that our
agents assigned there have the means to protect and defend
themselves?'' We are waiting for an answer to that.
But what we are concerned about also is, as a part of this
protection package, it is not just defensive driving. That is
important. Evasive maneuvers is definitely important.
I am also concerned about diplomatic coverage. Are we
sending agents there on temporary assignment with only partial
diplomatic protection?
Here is my point: My point is, they are no less at risk
because they are only there temporarily. However, if one of my
agents is attacked and killed, like Jaime Zapata, do we have
the legal means to demand extradition and prosecute the killers
for what they have done?
I want to be absolutely sure that if my members endure and
embrace the risks to go over to Mexico and fight this war that
they will have full diplomatic coverage and the peace of mind
knowing that God forbid they make the ultimate sacrifice, and
their killers are caught--and I have every confidence we will
catch them--that they will be brought back here, extradited,
and prosecuted. That is what we are asking.
You know, Chairman, I applaud you for characterizing these
organizations as they should be: Narcoterrorists. It is an
oversimplification to simply view these cartels as either a
drug cartel or a human trafficking organization, gun
trafficking, and even, obviously, with a terrorist angle.
Here is the point: They obviously have demonstrated violent
behavior. They have drawn upon Pablo Escobar's play book by way
of their violent terrorist sort of tactics. We have to
recognize that.
There is both a profit motive as well as a political
motive, and based on their behavior and their conduct we need
to identify and characterize them for what they are. This is
growing into another Afghanistan right on our border, and
unfortunately, as much as I would like to say, ``Don't send my
guys there if we can't protect them,'' we play a critical role
there and we do need to be there.
I can tell you, what Director Alvarez said is true. ICE is
doing phenomenal work. So is the DEA and the FBI. They are
critical to educating and working with our Mexican counterparts
to ensure the proper components are there to sustain an
integrated formidable approach to combat these narcoterrorist
organizations.
On behalf of my members I thank you all for the opportunity
to appear here today. I welcome any and all questions.
I will say one more thing in closing. Regarding all these
statistics that were discussed in terms of the spillover--
which, by the way, it is not a spillover; it is a charge-
through and it goes beyond the border and filters into all of
our cities--but I will say this: While the FBI stats may show
that the overall statistics on violent crime may have gone
down, violent crime committed against us, law enforcement
officers, increased over 41 percent last year and is increasing
beyond that this year with over 50 fatalities, 24 of which law
enforcement officers were killed by gunfire.
So I ask to keep that in the back of your mind when you
consider statistics. Crime against law enforcement is on the
rise, and it is my job, representing the FLEOA members, to
ensure that we are doing everything we can to better protect
our law enforcement officers.
Thank you.
[The statement of Mr. Adler follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jon Adler
March 31, 2011
Good Morning Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating, and
distinguished Members of the subcommittee. On behalf of the 26,000
members of the Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association (FLEOA),
thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. My name is
Jon Adler and I am the national president of F.L.E.O.A. I am proud to
represent Federal law enforcement officers from over 65 different
agencies. My testimony will represent the views of FLEOA members
employed by the Department of Homeland Security, as well as those
employed by agencies that play an active role in combating Mexico's
drug trafficking organizations. I am dedicating my testimony today in
honor of the memory of hero ICE Special Agent Jaime Zapata who was
savagely murdered in Mexico on February 15, 2011.
As evidenced by this hearing's title, there is a ``war'' being
waged in Mexico against the drug cartels. So in considering how the
United States can assist Mexico in this noble campaign, I believe we
must first ask two very important questions. First, why was hero ICE
Special Agent Zapata sent to Mexico in a law enforcement capacity
unarmed, without any practical means of protecting himself? Second, in
light of Agent Zapata's tragic death, why does our country continue to
send unarmed Federal agents to a war zone? To properly answer these
questions, there must be a thorough assessment of the risks which
confront U.S. agents, the duties they perform, and the diplomatic
protections, if any, they are afforded. This is particularly necessary
in light of the President's fiscal year 2012 budget request which seeks
to double--from 20 to 40--the number of ICE Agents assigned to Mexico.
On March 3, 2011, after his meeting with Mexico President Calderon,
President Obama stated, in effect, that Mexican law prohibits U.S.
agents from carrying firearms in Mexico. He seemingly minimized the
importance of this by adding that the role our agents perform in that
country is strictly ``advisory'' in nature and that they do not perform
law enforcement activities there. In terms of articulating a realistic
risk assessment, his words failed.
First, U.S. agents do perform law enforcement activities in Mexico,
albeit unarmed. They are regularly tasked with conducting field
interviews, responding to crime scenes, overseeing training,
participating in investigations, and performing a variety of other law
enforcement duties. Furthermore, published news accounts have made
clear that the cartels have and continue to target U.S. agents for who
they are and what they represent, and not for the specific activities
they may perform. Minimizing their role as ``advisory'' does not
eliminate the deadly risk U.S. agents' face in Mexico.
In addition to a lack of authority to carry firearms, most of our
agents in Mexico also suffer from a lack of proper diplomatic
protection as well. If we send an unarmed agent to Mexico without full
diplomatic status, and they are murdered like Jaime Zapata, how does
our country demand extradition if the killers are caught? I appeal to
this subcommittee to ask the State Department exactly how many of our
agents in Mexico have full diplomatic protection? Furthermore, this
subcommittee should inquire as to what steps the State Department has
taken to exert their formidable leverage to secure gun carrying
authority for all U.S. agents assigned to Mexico--as well as to other
hostile countries. Until the State Department is able to negotiate the
right for U.S. agents to carry firearms in Mexico to protect
themselves, I respectfully ask for this subcommittee's support in
asking all agencies to stop assigning unarmed agents to Mexico. By
continuing this perilous practice, they dishonor the ultimate sacrifice
made by hero Jaime Zapata.
So can Mexico win this war without the support of U.S. agents? The
answer is no. It is important to understand that the cartels, whether
they engage in drug trafficking, gun trafficking, human trafficking, or
terrorism, pose a serious threat to the United States. Cooperation with
the Mexican government is in the interest of both countries, as is an
integrated law enforcement approach to effectively target and defeat
the cartels. And while we understand that the U.S. Government cannot
dictate changes in Mexican law, it is the Government's responsibility
to ensure that our agents can protect themselves while serving in
hostile countries, irrespective of the length of their assignment. We
don't ask our soldiers to go into combat unarmed, and we should not do
the same to our Federal law enforcement agents.
On September 11, 2001, I and many others served as first responders
at Ground Zero. We responded without having the proper safety
equipment, and accepted the risks. Since then, we have all learned the
importance of preparedness and the value of having the proper safety
equipment to effectively respond to critical incidents. So what lesson
has our Government learned from Jaime Zapata's death? I respectfully
ask that this subcommittee continue to seek answers from the State
Department and the heads of our Federal law enforcement agencies, and
to work to give our agents the ability to protect themselves when
placed in harm's way. And of greater importance, please do not let the
memory of our hero, Jaime Zapata, fade away.
Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before the
subcommittee today. I look forward to answering any questions you may
have.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Adler. Let me just say in follow
up to that that I completely agree with you that that
targeting, now, of U.S. law enforcement is a game changer, both
in Mexico and in the United States.
I also agree, we should not be putting our agents down into
Mexico into a war zone without adequate protection and ability
to defend themselves. So we have asked ICE, we have asked State
Department to provide this committee with what those adequate
protections are. There is a classified briefing that we
attended; for those Members who have not attended, I would
encourage you to do so on this issue as well.
With that, I recognize Dr. Shirk.
STATEMENT OF DAVID A. SHIRK, DIRECTOR, TRANS-BORDER INSTITUTE,
UNIVERSITY OF SAN DIEGO
Mr. Shirk. Thank you, Chairman.
On behalf of the Trans-Border Institute at the University
of San Diego I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and other
Members of the subcommittee for the invitation to be here
today. My written testimony summarizes the findings of a recent
report I produced for the Council on Foreign Relations as well
as over 10 years of close monitoring and analysis as part of
the Justice in Mexico Project based at our university.
We are here today because Mexico is in the midst of a
worsening security crisis with severe implications for the
United States. Since President Felipe Calderon took office in
December 2006 more than 36,000 people have died in clashes and
territorial disputes among powerful drug--organized crime
groups--well more than double the number of drug-related
killings since I last testified in Congress almost exactly 2
years ago.
Since then, dozens of Mexican elected officials, scores of
reporters and innocent civilians, hundreds of military and
police personnel, and thousands of organized crime members have
been killed. In addition, dozens of U.S. citizens have been
caught in the crossfire, including Agents Zapata and Avila, who
have been mentioned here today.
The drug trade in general benefits from a vast and
profitable black market caused by the prohibition of drug
consumption in the United States and elsewhere. According to
official estimates, illegal drug production and trafficking in
Mexico produces employment opportunities for an estimated
450,000 people, and perhaps 3 to 4 percent of Mexico's more
than $1 trillion gross national product.
In these difficult economic times the illicit drug sector
involves large numbers of young men aged 18 to 35 who have
neither educational nor employment opportunities, commonly
known in Mexico as ni-nis, los que ni estudian, ni trabajan,
those who neither work nor study--or neither study nor work.
Meanwhile, competition among drug trafficking organizations
has increased dramatically in recent years due to domestic
political changes in Mexico, increased counterdrug efforts, and
other factors. Drug trafficking organizations have become more
fractionalized, decentralized, and dangerous than ever before,
with a pattern of chaotic and unpredictable violence in Mexico.
The cumulative effects of this violence are undesirable to
U.S. National interests because of Mexico's importance as a
trading partner, as an ally, and as a neighbor. Moreover, the
United States bears a shared responsibility to help Mexico
address this threat since it is U.S. drug consumption,
firearms, and cash that have fueled much of Mexico's recent
violence. If we are at war then we are at war with ourselves.
The current framework for U.S.-Mexico security cooperation
has already been discussed--the Merida Initiative. It has four
key pillars in its current framework: Binational collaboration
to combat DTOs, efforts to aid Mexico's judicial sector, more
effective border interdiction efforts, and new social programs
to revitalize Mexican communities affected by crime and
violence.
The effort to create a 21st Century border culminates a 3-
decade effort to beef up U.S. border security. Unfortunately,
more robust border interdiction efforts have been
inconsequential in reducing the overall flow of drugs to the
United States.
Meanwhile, there have been several unintended consequences,
including added hassles and delays that obstruct billion of
dollars in legitimate cross-border trade each year, increased
sophistication on the part of cross-border smuggling
operations--it actually makes drug traffickers strong and more
dangerous--and greater vulnerability in the United States to
corruption by traffickers, as we have recently seen in
Columbus, New Mexico.
I believe that the best hope for near-term progress in this
effort is to bolster U.S. initiatives to strengthen control to
prevent illegal exports of firearms to Mexico; to establish
better controls on money laundering and DTO financial
operations; to strengthen cross-border cooperation and liaison
mechanisms for law enforcement; to make greater efforts to
manage the reentry of deported criminal aliens to Mexico, which
is becoming a major problem; to develop explicit performance
measures for this fight against organized crime that are not
just focused on output measures but on process and
effectiveness; and finally, to seriously evaluate alternatives
to current drug policy, including the possibility of regulating
the legalized consumption of certain drugs.
Thank you again for your time and for the opportunity to
present to this distinguished committee. I believe that we can
help shift the balance in Mexico's battle against organized
crime and should work with Mexico to do so.
[The statement of Mr. Shirk follows:]
Prepared Statement of David A. Shirk
March 31, 2011
introduction
On behalf of the Trans-Border Institute at the University of San
Diego, I would like to thank Chairman McCaul and other Members of this
subcommittee for the invitation to provide testimony on recent drug war
violence in Mexico and the border region. Our organization has been
monitoring Mexico's rule of law challenges through an on-going research
initiative known as the Justice in Mexico Project, which has been
generously supported by The William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, the
Tinker Foundation, and the Open Society Institute. Today, I will
discuss the security situation in Mexico, the interests of U.S.
National security, the specific role of U.S. border security efforts,
and the best approach to reduce the power and impunity of Mexico's
organized crime groups (OCGs). My testimony summarizes the findings of
a recent report I produced for the Council on Foreign Relations, as
well as over 10 years of close monitoring and analysis, personal
interviews with U.S. and Mexican officials, original surveys of
judicial sector personnel, and in-depth field research in such places
as Mexico City, Guadalajara, Monterrey, Ciudad Juarez, and Tijuana.
mexico's security situation
Mexico is in the midst of a worsening security crisis with serious
implications for the United States. Explosive clashes and territorial
disputes among powerful OCGs killed more than 34,500 people from
December 2006 to December 2010, 4 years after President Felipe Calderon
took office (See Appendix). In this year alone, there are have been
more than 2,600 organized crime killings documented by the Mexico City
daily newspaper Reforma, on track to reach at least 10,000 this year by
their very conservative estimates.\1\ The total number accumulated OCG
killings in Mexico now stands at well more than double the number of
drug-related killings since last time I testified in Congress, almost
exactly 2 years ago (see Appendix).\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ In a report I co-authored with Viridiana Rios in February 2011,
we found that Reforma underestimates the number of organized crime-
related homicides by at least 30% compared to Mexican government
figures. Since Mexican government data are reported only sporadically,
Reforma's data provide a useful conservative estimate of the patterns
of violence in Mexico.
\2\ Testimony before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on
Commerce, Justice, and Science, and Related Appropriations, March 24,
2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The geography of Mexico's violence remains highly concentrated,
with two-thirds of drug-related homicides are concentrated in just five
of the 32 Mexican states and roughly 80 percent in just 168 of 2,456
municipalities. The density of violence has made major trafficking
cities like Ciudad Juarez and Culiacan among the deadliest places in
the world. Indeed, with just over 1 million inhabitants, Juarez had
more than 2,000 homicides in 2009 and 2010, a number that exceeds the
combined annual totals for New York (532), Chicago (435), Philadelphia
(304), Los Angeles (297), Washington, DC (131), and Miami-Dade (84).
Meanwhile, throughout Mexico dozens of Mexican elected officials,
hundreds of police and military personnel, and intelligence agents
working with U.S. law enforcement in the fight against organized crime
have been killed.\3\ In addition to these victims, dozens of U.S.
citizens have been caught in the crossfire, including ICE agent Jaime
Zapata, who last month became the first U.S. law enforcement officer
killed on assignment in Mexico in over 20 years.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ In 2010 alone, 14 of the country's roughly 2,450 mayors were
assassinated. Viridiana Rios and David Shirk, Drug Violence in Mexico:
Data and Analysis Through 2010, Trans-Border Institute, 2011 and
Redaccion, ``EU: el narco asesino a 61 enlaces de DEA y FBI,'' Publico,
Ano 14, Numero 4808, December 4, 2010, p. 28.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mexico's security crisis is largely a reflection of the country's
economic struggles over the last few decades. As a result of a series
of economic crises starting in the 1970s, Mexico's total underground
economy--including street vendors, pirate taxis, and a burgeoning
market for ``second-hand'' goods stolen from local sources (such as
auto parts, electronics, etc.)--now accounts for as much as 40 percent
of all economic activity.\4\ According to official estimates, illegal
drug production and trafficking provides employment opportunities for
an estimated 450,000 people, and perhaps 3-4 percent of Mexico's more
than $1 trillion GDP.\5\ Today, the illicit drug sector involves large
numbers of young men aged 18-35 who have neither educational nor
employment opportunities, known commonly in Mexico as ``ni-ni's'' (ni
estudian, ni trabajan). Where other options have failed them, these
young men have found substantial economic opportunities in the illicit
global economy for drugs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Jose Brambila Macias, Modeling the Informal Economy in Mexico.
A Structural Equation Approach, Munich, 2008 http://mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/8504/.
\5\ As Campbell (2009) notes, drug trafficking creates a wide range
of relatively flexible job opportunities at different levels of
specialization: Pilots, drivers, and logistics experts; lookouts,
enforcers, and professional hit men; accountants and financial experts;
and top-level cartel executives in the drug trade. U.S. Government
estimates of the total profits from these activities are between $19
billion to $39 billion, while the Mexican government has long estimated
drug profits to be around $11 billion to $12 billion annually; these
range between 1 to 3 percent of Mexico's $1.4 trillion GDP. A recent
Rand study provides the most careful estimate available to date,
placing annual Mexican drug profits from the United States, not
including other revenues, at around $6-7 billion or half a percent of
GDP. See: Howard Campbell, Drug War Zone. Austin: University of Texas
Press, 2009 and Beau Kilmer, Jonathan P. Caulkins, Brittany M. Bond,
and Peter H. Reuter, Reducing Drug Trafficking Revenues and Violence in
Mexico: Would Legalizing Marijuana in California Help? Occasional
Paper. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This industry grew significantly in Mexico beginning in the 1980s,
due to increases in U.S. consumption of illicit psychotropic substances
(especially cocaine) in the 1970s and tougher counter-drug efforts in
Colombia and the Gulf of Mexico in the 1980s. Initially, the organized
crime groups operating in Mexico benefited from closely knit
organizations that were well protected by corrupt officials within a
highly centralized political system. However, competition among drug
trafficking organizations has increased dramatically in recent years,
due to domestic political changes in Mexico, increased counter-
narcotics efforts, and other factors that have contributed to their
fractionalization, proliferation, and decentralization. The result has
been a much more chaotic and unpredictable pattern of violent conflict
in Mexico.
a shared threat: u.s. security interests
Given these trends, violent organized crime groups represent a real
and present danger to Mexico, the United States, and neighboring
countries. The United States has much to gain by helping to strengthen
Mexico, and even more to lose if it does not. The cumulative effects of
an embattled Mexican state harm the United States, and a further
reduction of Mexican state capacity is unacceptable and raises the
several concerns.
First, the weaker the Mexican state, the greater difficulty the
United States will experience in controlling the nearly 2,000-mile
border. Spillover violence, in which Mexican OCGs bring their fight to
American soil, is a remote worst-case scenario.\6\ However, the
penetration of U.S. institutions by Mexican organized crime presents a
serious problem along the border, as made clear by the recent arrest of
local U.S. authorities in Columbus, New Mexico on gun trafficking
charges, as well as hundreds of criminal allegations and bribery cases
filed within Customs and Border Protection in recent years.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ The U.S. Government defines ``spillover violence'' as DTO
attacks targeting U.S. assets, but excludes DTO-versus-DTO violence on
U.S. territory or elsewhere.
\7\ According to one investigative report by The New York Times, in
2004, the office of internal affairs for the U.S. Customs and
Immigration Service compiled 2,771 complaints against the agency's
employees, including more than 550 that involved criminal allegations
and more than 100 that involved allegations of bribery. From October
2003 to April 2008, there were numerous cases of alleged corruption
identified along the border: 125 in California, 45 in Arizona, 14 in
New Mexico, and 157 in Texas. While incidences were not exclusively the
result of penetration by Mexican organized crime, they illustrate the
vulnerability of U.S. law enforcement agencies to corruption.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Second, weak Mexican government increases the flow of contraband
and immigrants into the United States. As the dominant wholesale
distributors of illegal drugs to U.S. consumers, Mexican traffickers
are also the single greatest domestic organized crime threat within the
United States, operating in every State and hundreds of U.S. cities,
selling uncontrolled substances that directly endanger the health and
safety of millions of ordinary citizens. In addition, recent reports
suggest that high levels of violence in Mexico have caused massive
internal displacement that has led tens of thousands of Mexicans to
seek refuge in the United States.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre issued a report
stating that there are an estimated 120,000 internally displaced people
(IDPs) as a result of the violence from the Mexican Drug War and other
factors. In the press, the figures were widely reported incorrectly at
around 230,000, the number of people who fled their homes in the
troubled city of Ciudad Juarez, not all of whom are properly
categorized as IDPs. However, the report, titled Internal Displacement:
Global Overview of Trends and Developments in 2010, clearly indicates
that the total number was only 130,000 persons formally labeled as
IDPs. The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre asserts that in 2010
``most IDPs originated from the states most affected by violence,
Chihuahua and Tamaulipas.'' Stevenson, Mark. ``Report: 230,000
Displaced by Mexico's Drug War.'' Associated Press. March 25, 2011.
Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, Internal Displacement: Global
Overview of Trends and Developments in 2010. http://www.internal-
displacement.org/publications/global-overview-2010.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Third, widespread violence in Mexico damages an important economic
market for the United States. As a member of the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), it is one of only 17 States with which the
United States has a free trade pact, outside of the General Agreement
on Trade and Tariffs (GATT). The United States has placed nearly $100
billion of foreign direct investment in Mexico. Mexico is also the
United States' third-largest trade partner, the third-largest source of
U.S. imports, and the second-largest exporter of U.S. goods and
services--with potential for further market growth as the country
develops. Finally, Mexican instability threatens other countries in the
region. Given the fragility of some Central American and Caribbean
states, expansion of Mexican DTO operations and violence into the
region has already begun to have a seriously destabilizing effect.
Not only is helping to solve Mexico's crisis in the U.S. National
interest, but the United States also bears a shared responsibility for
resolving it, since U.S. drug consumption, firearms, and cash have
fueled much of Mexico's recent violence.\9\ According to the 2007
National Survey on Drug Use and Health, roughly 8 percent of U.S.
residents over the age of 12--some 19.9 million people--had used drugs
within the past month.\10\ Because of the size of the U.S. black market
for drugs and the inflationary effect of prohibition on prices, Mexican
suppliers enjoy enormous profits, estimated at $6 billion to $7 billion
annually, with at least 70 percent coming from hard drugs like cocaine,
heroin, methamphetamine, and other synthetics and operatives in U.S.
banks like American Express, Bank of America, and Wells Fargo
facilitating drug traffickers' financial operations.\11\ Moreover,
lethal firearms, ammunition, and explosives sold both legally and
illegally in the United States arm the cartels and are a major
contributing factor to Mexico's violence, since an estimated 10 percent
of U.S. gun dealers are located along the U.S.-Mexico border and
powerful U.S. gun lobbies have effectively hamstrung efforts to enforce
existing laws or otherwise regulate access to deadly, high-powered
weapons.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ While there is debate about the exact proportion of U.S.
firearms that are responsible for Mexico's violence, there is no doubt
that these number in the tens of thousands. Eric Olson, Andrew Selee,
and David A. Shirk, Shared Responsibility: U.S.-Mexico Policy Options
for Combating Organized Crime. Washington, DC; San Diego, CA: Mexico
Institute, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars; Trans-
Border Institute, University of San Diego, 2010.
\10\ These drugs included marijuana, cocaine, crack cocaine,
heroin, hallucinogens, inhalants, and nonmedical use of prescription
psychotherapeutic drugs. Marijuana was the most commonly used illicit
drug, with 14.4 percent current users. Over 26 percent of high school
students had tried marijuana by their senior year, compared to 4
percent for cocaine, 35 percent for cigarettes, and 58 percent for
alcohol. Drug use was significantly higher among unemployed persons, of
whom 18.3 percent were current illicit drug users. Results from the
2007 National Survey on Drug Use and Health: National Findings (NSDUH
Series H-34, DHHS Publication No. SMA 08-4343). Substance Abuse and
Mental Health Services Administration, Office of Applied Studies.
Rockville, MD (2008).
\11\ Black markets can make goods either cheaper or more expensive.
When a good is legally available but overpriced (as with pirated music
or cigarettes in Canada), black market prices tend to be lower than the
``free'' market. However, when a good is illegal and, especially,
controlled by a small group or cartel (as with illicit drugs), its
price tends to become inflated relative to what it might be on the free
market. While U.S. official estimates suggest that marijuana represents
60% of drug profits, a recent Rand study places total Mexican DTO drug
profits from the United States at around $6-7 billion, with up to a
third coming from marijuana. Kilmer, et al. (2010). Michael Smith,
``Banks Financing Mexico Gangs Admitted in Wells Fargo Deal,'' In
Bloomberg News, 2010. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-06-29/banks-
financing-mexico-s-drug-cartels-admitted-in-wells-fargo-s-u-s-
deal.html.
\12\ Estimates for the number of drug shops along the border vary
widely. In January 2008, Mexican Ambassador Arturo Sarukhan indicated
that ``[b]etween Texas and Arizona alone, you've got 12,000 gun shops
along that border with Mexico.'' (Corchado and Connolly 2008). More
recent estimates place the figure around 6,700, around three gun
dealers for every mile along the border (Serrano 2008). Estimates for
the total number of gun dealers in the United States also vary, but by
all accounts they have declined dramatically over the last decade--from
245,000 to 54,000--thanks to tighter regulations. Alexandra Marks,
``Why Gun Dealers Have Dwindled,'' Christian Science Monitor, March 14,
2006. See also: Jon S. Vernick, Daniel W. Webster, Maria T.
Bulzacchelli, and Julie Samia Mair. ``Regulation of Firearm Dealers in
the United States: An Analysis of State Law and Opportunities for
Improvement,'' The Journal of Law, Medicine, and Ethics. Volume 34,
Issue 4, pp. 765-775. According to the 2004 National firearms survey
conducted by Hepburn et al. (2007), there are an estimated 218 million
privately owned firearms in the United States. However, only one in
four U.S. citizens (26 percent) and two in five households (38 percent)
actually owned a firearm. This means that the vast majority of firearms
are owned by a small percentage of the population, with nearly half of
all individual gun owners (48 percent) possessing four or more weapons
and only 20 percent of owners holding 65 percent of all guns.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States should therefore take full advantage of the
unprecedented resolve of Mexican authorities to work bilaterally to
address a common threat. In particularly, failure to address money
laundering and gun trafficking with greater commitment undermines
Mexico's trust and has already begun to close the present window of
opportunity for bi-National cooperation. Indeed, recent revelations
about U.S. diplomatic cables and Operation Fast and Furious--an ATF
operation that allowed thousands of guns to pour into Mexico for
investigative purposes--have conveyed to some Mexicans that the United
States is not serious in its commitment, severely damaging U.S.-Mexico
relations and contributing to the recent resignation of U.S. Ambassador
Carlos Pascual.
u.s. assistance and border security
Notwithstanding recent setbacks, the United States and Mexico have
been working together more closely than ever before through the Merida
Initiative, which began as a 3-year, nearly $1.4 billion aid package to
provide U.S. equipment, training and technical assistance,
counternarcotics intelligence sharing, and rule of law promotion
programs in Mexico and Central America (See Appendix).\13\ For Mexico,
direct U.S. financial assistance provides a significant boost on top of
the roughly $4.3 billion spent annually combating drug trafficking.\14\
The current framework for cooperation under the Merida Initiative has
four ``pillars'': More binational collaboration to combat DTOs, greater
assistance to strengthen the judicial sector, more effective
interdiction efforts through twenty-first-century border controls, and
new social programs to revitalize Mexican communities affected by crime
and violence.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ The Government Accountability Office reports that $1.32
billion (84 percent) of Merida Initiative funding was slated for
Mexico, while $258 million (16 percent) was slated for Central America.
United States Government Accountability Office, Merida Initiative: The
United States Has Provided Counternarcotics and Anticrime Support but
Needs Better Performance Measures, Washington, DC, 2010, p. 4.
\14\ Query to Ambassador Arturo Sarukan at presentation to the
Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson Center in 2010.
\15\ Clare Ribando Seelke and Kristin M. Finklea, U.S.-Mexican
Security Cooperation: the Merida Initiative and Beyond, Washington, DC,
2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
My comments in this hearing will focus primarily on ``Pillar
Three,'' the effort to create a 21st Century border. Secretary of
Homeland Security Janet Napolitano and Customs and Border Protection
Commissioner Alan Bersin have been actively engaged in high-level
collaborative efforts to work with Mexico to strengthen border security
measures. Merida funds have been used to strengthen Mexican capacity
for border controls, primarily targeting the southbound flow of weapons
and bulk cash. Less effort has been focused on controlling Mexico's
southern border, which is a major source of land-based shipments of
contraband headed north. Above all, after a three-decade effort to beef
up border security, the U.S.-Mexico divide is more heavily fortified
than at any point since the Mexican revolution, when half of U.S.
forces were stationed there to stave off Mexican insurgent groups.
Indeed, the number of Border Patrol agents grew from 2,900 in 1980
to around 4,000 by 1994, at the start of NAFTA. At the time, public
concerns about drug trafficking and undocumented built support for more
concentrated border-enforcement efforts, such as ``Operation Hold-the-
Line'' and ``Operation Gatekeeper,'' intended to gain operational
control of strategic corridors along the border. With new funding for
these programs, the border was fortified with new fencing and high-tech
surveillance systems, and the size of the Border Patrol more than
doubled to over 9,000 agents in 2000. In the new millennium, the 9/11
attacks placed new urgency on homeland security and led to continue
investments in Southwest border enforcement. By the end of President
Obama's first year in office, the Border Patrol had more than doubled
in size to more than 20,000 agents and annual spending on border
security at more than $40 billion (see Appendix).\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ In addition, more than 3,000 Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) agents were sent to the border to bolster efforts to
combat arms and cash smuggling by drug traffickers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Unfortunately, one of the major flaws of the current U.S.-Mexico
strategy is the false presumption that international trafficking of
drugs, guns, and cash can be effectively addressed through
interdiction, particularly along the nearly 2,000-mile U.S.-Mexican
border. Indeed, while this massive security build-up at the border has
achieved maximum attainable levels of operational control, the damage
to Mexico's drug cartels caused by border interdiction has been
inconsequential. In 2009, U.S. authorities seized about 17,000 kilos of
cocaine, or about $273 million at wholesale prices (roughly $16,000 per
kilo), at the Southwest border. However, authorities spent most of
their time and manpower seizing the nearly 1.5 million kilos of
marijuana that, in bulk terms (total poundage), represented 98 percent
of all illicit drugs seized at the border. According to the best
available estimates, these seizures represented a small fraction, no
more than 9 percent of the $6-7 billion in total proceeds that Mexican
DTOs derive from the United States each year.
Meanwhile, there have been several unintended consequences of
heightened interdiction at the border, including added hassles and
delays that obstruct billions of dollars in legitimate commerce each
year, the expansion and increased sophistication of cross-border
smuggling operations, and greater U.S. vulnerability to attacks and
even infiltration by traffickers.\17\ Because the major urban corridors
along the border have been largely secured, further efforts to beef up
the border through more patrolling and fencing will have diminishing
returns and will likely cause more economic harm than actual gains in
security.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ The number of Border Patrol agents alone increased from 2,900
in 1980, to 9,000 in 2000, to more than 20,000 by 2010. This has
squeezed ``mom-and-pop'' smuggling operations out of the business,
allowing more dangerous and powerful DTOs to take over. As a result,
the Border Patrol has experienced more violent attacks (including
fatalities) and hundreds of cases of corruption in its ranks since
2003. Ralph Vartabedian, Richard A. Serrano, and Richard Marosi, ``The
Long Crooked Line; Rise in Bribery Tests Integrity of U.S. Border,''
Los Angeles Times, October 23, 2006; Arrillaga, Pauline, ``Feds
Struggle with Border Patrol Corruption,'' Associated Press, September
22, 2006; Archibold, Randal C. and Andrew Becker, ``Border Agents,
Lured by the Other Side,'' New York Times, May 27, 2008.
\18\ The U.S. economy to loses $3.74 billion of cross-border
economic activity and over 33,000 jobs each year at the San Diego-
Tijuana corridor alone, the entry point for 12 percent of overall U.S.-
Mexico trade. San Diego Association of Governments, Economic Impacts of
Wait Times at the San Diego-Baja California Border, Final Report,
January 19, 2006. See also: Haralambides, Hercules E. and Maria P.
Londono-Kent, ``Supply Chain Bottlenecks: Border Crossing
Inefficiencies Between Mexico and the United States,'' International
Journal of Transport Economics, Vol. XXXI, No. 2, June 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
policy recommendations
Mexico urgently needs to reduce the power of violent organized
crime groups. The best hope for near-term progress is to bolster U.S.
domestic law enforcement efforts to curb illicit drug distribution,
firearms smuggling, and money laundering. The United States should also
develop and implement a coordinated, National interagency strategy for
identifying, investigating, and disrupting the U.S. financial
facilitators and arms distributors that support Mexican DTOs. To make
progress toward these ends, U.S. authorities should:
(1) Strengthen controls to prevent illegal exports of firearms to
Mexico.--Introducing registration requirements for large-volume
ammunition purchases and unassembled assault weapons kit imports;
strengthening reporting requirements for multiple long arms sales
(similar to those for multiple handgun sales); increasing ATF capacity
for the investigation of straw purchases and trafficking conspiracies;
enforcing the Federal ban on imports of assault rifles not intended for
sporting purposes; and removing obstacles to information sharing among
law enforcement agencies and greater transparency in the public
reporting of aggregate data on gun crimes.
(2) Establish better controls on money laundering and DTO financial
operations.--The United States should provide more resources, training,
and coordination mechanisms for State and local law enforcement
agencies to better target, seize, and trace the proceeds of illicit
drug sales. The United States should aggressively enforce the Foreign
Investment and National Security Act of 2007 to track the investments
of Mexican drug traffickers in the United States. Additionally, the
United States should establish joint operations to share data and
intelligence on possible drug money laundering in Mexican and third-
country financial institutions. Ultimately, the United States needs
greater coordination and stronger initiatives from the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC), Treasury Department, and Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) to conduct careful searches for financial
patterns consistent with drug money laundering. If these institutions
cannot do so, then the United States should create a new agency that
will.
(3) Strengthen cross-border cooperation and liaison mechanisms.--
The Executive branch should establish stronger mechanisms to coordinate
U.S. responses to Mexico's security crisis domestically and abroad,
including a White House office (Special Assistant) to facilitate
sustained, high-level attention to U.S.-Mexico security cooperation,
coordinate inter-agency processes, and monitor developments and
progress. Moreover, the U.S. Government should reinvigorate the
Security and Prosperity Partnership or launch a similar initiative,
creating a permanent, multilateral council of nongovernmental, private
sector, and elected representatives. The United States and Mexico
should also re-activate the Bilateral Commission meetings of cabinet-
level personnel to ensure that bi-national cooperation progresses on
other fronts that are important beyond security. At the State level,
the Federal Government should support collaboration among the U.S.-
Mexico border governors and border legislators. Along the border, the
United States should dedicate greater staff and resources to bi-
national border liaison mechanisms (BLMs), as well as multiagency task
forces and international liaison units within U.S. law enforcement
agencies.
(4) Prevent blowback from U.S. deportations of criminal aliens.--
U.S. law enforcement, prison, and immigration authorities should work
more closely with their foreign counterparts to prevent repatriated
criminal aliens from becoming new recruits for DTOs in Mexico and
Central America. Preventive strategies should include educational and
rehabilitative programs for foreign nationals in U.S. prisons (such as
working with Mexico's education ministry to provide the equivalent of a
general education degree to Mexican criminal aliens during their
incarceration in the United States). In addition, U.S. immigration
authorities should be required to work with Mexican and Central
American authorities to develop better bilateral protocols for managing
the reentry of aliens to their home country.
(5) Develop explicit performance measures for the fight against
organized crime.--Across the board, U.S. agencies should establish
explicit baseline indicators, performance measures, benchmarks,
targets, and timelines for progress toward their strategic objectives
of dismantling organized crime, strengthening rule of law, reducing
illicit flows, and building stronger communities. Assessment efforts
will require dedicated funding for both Congressional oversight and
nongovernmental monitoring efforts, and should go beyond typical
``output'' measures (e.g., arrests, trainings, seizures, and program
activities) to evaluate ``outcomes.'' Specifically, the U.S. Congress
should require the Department of Homeland Security to provide regular
reports and greater detail--including information and statistics on
activities, seizures, apprehensions, and aggregate costs--for current
border security initiatives and programs intended to facilitate
interagency collaboration in combating drug trafficking, money
laundering, and firearms trafficking in border communities, such as
Operation Stonegarden. In addition, the U.S. Government Accountability
Office should carefully assess the corrupting influences of
transnational organized crime networks on U.S. border security and law
enforcement, and ensure that there are adequate resources to address
possible vulnerabilities and breaches in integrity.
(6) Evaluate alternatives to current counter-drug policy.--The U.S.
Congress should commission an independent advisory group to examine the
fiscal and social impacts of drug legalization as well as other
alternative approaches to the war on drugs. The commission should be
provided adequate funding--at least $2 million--to provide a
comprehensive review of existing policies and develop realistic,
clearly defined, and achievable policy recommendations for reducing the
harms caused by drug consumption and abuse. The United States should
simultaneously take a leading role in the international dialogue on the
future of drug policy by collaborating directly with other countries in
the Americas to develop alternative policy approaches to reduce the
harm caused by drugs. Specifically, the United States and Mexico should
work together in promoting the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control
Commission's ``New Hemispheric Drug Strategy,'' with an emphasis on
protections for basic human rights, evidence-based drug policy, and a
public health approach to drug abuse.
conclusions
The opportunity for effective U.S.-Mexico cooperation to address
these shared concerns has grown in recent years, thanks to the resolve
of Mexican leaders to embrace the fight against transnational organized
crime. The United States has a vested interest in helping Mexico
improve its governance, National security, economic productivity, and
quality of life, which are integral to making Mexico a better neighbor
and trade partner in the longer term. Despite some recent tensions,
Mexico is also eager to continue working toward these ends, and it has
embraced unprecedented levels of collaboration thanks to a growing
spirit of cooperation on both sides of the border. Challenges and
setbacks are inevitable, and will require sustained efforts to build
greater trust and cooperation between both countries. In the long run,
the United States can help shift the balance in Mexico's battle against
organized crime and prevent the further spread of violence within
Mexico and to its neighbors. This will require a serious commitment to
U.S. responsibilities at home, long-term investments to make Mexico a
more secure and prosperous neighbor, and a more sensible policy for
managing the harms associated with drugs.
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Dr. Shirk.
Chair now recognizes Mr. Bailey for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF JOHN BAILEY, PROFESSOR, GOVERNMENT AND FOREIGN
SERVICE, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY
Mr. Bailey. Thanks, Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member
Keating, Mr. Cuellar. Thanks for the opportunity to come this
morning and testify. My purpose today is to compare and
contrast the Merida Initiative with Plan Colombia and identify
these relevant policy lessons.
The main lesson to be learned--two very different
countries, different times, different places, and different
problems. Mexico, the base is a lot bigger and a lot more
complicated. Mexico has twice the population, 40 percent more
territory, five times the GDP, and three or four times the
central government budget.
Colombia, on the complexity--I am really very interested in
this issue about using military instruments, and the Colombian
system is very different--designed very differently. That is,
the Colombian system is a unitary system in which the police--
the national police--are a large part of the force and they are
integrated into the armed forces, and they are administered
through one ministry. So it is a much more coherent
organization to operate with.
Mexico is a federal system. It operates through hundreds of
different police forces--350,000 police throughout the
country--and so it is a lot more complicated to get it to be
coordinated.
Further, what is really important is the role of the army--
the Mexican army. It is operating on thin ice. It doesn't have
a legal mandate. It has a questionable legal ground to be
operating on, and so the difficulty of working with the Mexican
military--there are lots of different issues, but one is it is
operating on an ad hoc fashion; it doesn't really have a legal
backing that it really needs to have.
The written statement goes into details about origins,
evolutions of policies, lots of data on finance. If you are
interested we can go back and take a look at those issues. I
thought I would go straight to the lessons and what can we
learn from the Plan Colombia that is relevant to the Merida.
You put your finger exactly on the issue. What is the
strategy?
The Colombians, over time, evolved as strategy, and this is
the case with Alvaro Uribe's ``Plan Patriota.'' So rather than
reacting to the guerrilla initiatives in an ad hoc fashion the
Uribe government expanded the size and strengthened the
operational capacity of its army and police and adopted a
harder, more proactive offensive against insurgent forces.
But the important part is government also developed a more
integrated political military development social agenda which
carries more overtones of integrating these different pieces
into one idea. Part of it draws on the U.S. policies in Iraq--
clear, hold, consolidate--but the key is the Colombians evolved
a strategy. They had priorities, they knew what they wanted to
do, and they integrated their response.
Second point, the politics off all this: In order to move
ahead the Colombians had to come to an agreement--a kind of a
political consensus about the urgency of the issue, and Uribe
was able to do that. He consolidated a political kind of a
consensus to the point that he could implement a tax--a special
tax to carry it out.
I want to emphasize, Mexico is a long way from that kind of
an agreement. There are three main political parties.
Each of the parties uses the public security problem for
partisan advantage. Sixteen months until a presidential
election, we can expect these parties to continue down that
road and so we can't really anticipate important changes, my
opinion, until we get past--we pass those elections.
Mexicans tax themselves amongst the least in the
hemisphere. They rely for a third of their income on a
petroleum company.
Third point, very important: The costs of the Plan Colombia
in terms of human rights. Estimated 20,000 people were killed
by paramilitary, guerrilla, state forces in the period 2000 to
2008. More than 2 million were displaced. We don't know the
exact numbers--some displaced internally, some displaced into
neighboring countries.
The Mexican side, we don't know the numbers that are
displaced and we have to rely on sort of press accounts, but
that is why I come back to this point about using military
instruments. Colombia is 1,000 miles from the U.S. border;
Mexico is our border. So using the military needs to be done in
a very thoughtful way.
Fourth, the Colombians, over time, made very important
improvements in their air mobility and in their innovations
internally with regard to their army and police forces on how
to use those effectively, integrating, especially, intelligence
with operations. This is where the seamless web of police
forces and military forces really works out well.
Mexicans, I think, are a long way from that. The army
operates rather independently, doesn't cooperate very well with
other kinds of forces, and so that has got to be a major
priority. Key in that is operational intelligence.
Fifth--and I will stop with this--the United States, I
think, is focused on institution-building, and that is the
right strategy to take. The key is this kind of institution-
building is going to take years to produce results.
So in terms of--returning to your point about strategy, how
does one deal with the fire that is going on right now while
trying to improve the institutional part of the police justice
system and relying on a military that is operating on dubious
legal grounds? This is where the strategic thinking needs to
come in.
Especially important in that is this operational
intelligence, which is the key, in my mind, to the instrument
of dealing with organized crime. Mexico has a long way to go to
get its operational intelligence to work effectively.
In conclusion, my sense is that useful policy-learning has
taken place over the past decade or so with regard to effective
ways to confront violence and corruption associated with
organized crime. This learning will be especially useful
because the challenges presented by transnational trafficking
organizations have grown more ominous over time.
Mexico's reality in 2011 is quite different from what it
was in 2007 as criminal organizations, as this group has
already heard, branched into many new types of both criminal
and illicit activities and expanded their operations into new
terrain. The key, though, is President Calderon's strategy to
operate against the cartels does not have strong political
support, and in fact, the costs of the violence that we talked
about earlier have really eroded that kind of political
support.
So there is a window that is opening now in the next, say,
14 to 16 months for the Americans and the Mexicans to rethink
their plan--their strategy, and actually develop a strategy,
and then implement it when the new administration comes in in
Mexico in 2012. Thank you very much.
[The statement of Mr. Bailey follows:]
Prepared Statement of John Bailey
March 31, 2011
My purpose today is to compare and contrast the ``Merida
Initiative'' (MI) with ``Plan Colombia'' (PC), and to identify relevant
policy lessons.\1\ Table 1 at the end of the document summarizes key
points. In essence, Mexico is much bigger and more complex than
Colombia. Mexico has more than twice the population of Colombia, over
40 percent more land area, more than five times the gross domestic
product (GDP), and more than three times the central government budget
outlays. Colombia is a unitary system (but with significant
decentralization), with a national police closely integrated with the
armed forces, all operating under a single, civilian-controlled
ministry. Mexico is a federal system with a small national police and
greater reliance on hundreds of state and local police forces. Due to
acute, systemic problems of corruption and incompetence in the civilian
police-justice system, the Mexican armed forces have been assigned a
lead role in anti-drug law enforcement. These, however, operate without
full law enforcement authority and with a weak legal mandate. There are
two other factors to note: First, the Mexican Army is among the most
isolated of national institutions in terms of transparency and
accountability; second, it has a long history of an anti-U.S.
institutional culture as part of its doctrine. The lead role of the
Mexican Army creates a further complication: It reinforces the U.S.
tendency to militarize anti-drug security policies. Above all, Mexico
shares a 2,000-mile land border with the United States, which--among
other things--puts its internal security situation higher on the U.S.
policy agenda.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The statement draws extensively on Bailey 2009. Bridget
O'Loughlin helped with research and Inigo Guevara provided helpful
comments, but neither bears responsibility for the content of the
statement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The problem profiles of the two countries also differ in important
respects. Violence associated with organized crime is a significant
challenge in both countries, but in quite different contexts. If we
take 1948 as a point of reference, Colombia entered (or re-entered) a
phase of profound internal war, while Mexico began to consolidate
internal peace based on the hegemonic rule of the Institutional
Revolutionary party (PRI). Insurgency forces (especially the FARC) have
waged a 40-year armed struggle against the Colombian government, with
varieties of rightist self-defense forces multiplying and complicating
the violence. One estimate suggests that at its height in 2006 the FARC
controlled approximately 30 percent of National territory (CRS 2008b,
p. 6). Colombia's primary challenge is to terminate the internal wars.
In contrast, guerrilla insurgency is not an issue in Mexico. The
Zapatistas were a minor regional rebellion, confined mostly to parts of
the state of Chiapas on the far southern border with Guatemala and have
evolved into a local political force. The Ejercito Popular
Revolucionario (Popular Revolutionary Army) is a shadowy, largely
marginalized group with infrequent operations in the State of Guerrero
and the Federal District. Mexico's key challenge is a sharp upsurge in
criminal violence beginning in about 2004 and escalating in subsequent
years. The government estimates that 34,612 homicides are attributable
to organized crime between December 2006 and January 2011.\2\ Most of
the violence is associated with drug trafficking in the sense of trans-
national smuggling and retail distribution to the rapidly-growing
internal drug markets. The confluence of rivers of drug money, trained
fighters, and high-power weapons has produced well-organized,
politically-effective, hyper-violent trafficking organizations that are
capable of challenging the government's police-justice system and the
army. While most of the violence is concentrated in perhaps six or
eight of the 32 states, the trafficking organizations can strike
anywhere in the country and almost at will. In comparison, the height
of Colombia's drug gang violence was in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
Since that time the trafficking organizations have adopted lower-
profile, less violent methods. In summary, Colombia is a case of a
complicated internal war in which drug production and trafficking play
a significant role; Mexico is a case of hyper-violent criminal
organizations that use terrorist-like methods to challenge the
government and society.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Information provided by the Mexican Presidency, available at
http://www.presidencia.gob.mx/?DNA=119.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The origins of PC and MI are different. As originally proposed by
President Andres Pastrana (1998-2002), Plan Colombia covered five
areas: The peace process, economic growth, anti-drug production and
trafficking, reform of justice and protection of human rights, and
democracy-promotion and social development. Pastrana sought assistance
from the European Union and a number of other countries. Following an
internal debate, the U.S. Government (USG) emphasized the anti-
narcotics theme to the point that other countries were reluctant to
participate. Pastrana's original logic (shared by other international
actors) was that a negotiated peace could set the stage for economic
development, institutional reform, and conditions to reduce drug
trafficking. The USG, in contrast, insisted that solving the drug issue
would starve the resources to FARC and other insurgency groups and
hasten the end to the war. Other themes, such as human rights and the
peace process were secondary (Chernick, 2008, pp. 129-137).\3\ In all
this, the USG played an active--even intrusive--role.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ A U.S.-based human rights group has reported: ``For Planners of
U.S. assistance to Colombia, non-military programs have always been an
afterthought. Four out of five dollars in U.S. aid goes to Colombia's
armed forces, police, and fumigation program'' (CIP, 2006, p. 5).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In contrast, the George W. Bush administration made a conspicuous
effort not to take the lead with respect to MI but to respond to Mexico
(and subsequently to the Central American and Caribbean countries).
This is because, given the long history of intervention (perceived and
real), USG initiatives in sensitive areas of public security and law
enforcement would arouse Mexican nationalist responses that would be
fatal to the Initiative. Also, President Calderon's government was more
narrowly focused on repressing drug-related criminal violence, a focus
that the USG shared. Although initially focused on Mexico and Central
America, MI was subsequently broadened to include Haiti and the
Dominican Republic (Selee 2008; Olson 2008). In August 2010, with the
establishment of the Central American Regional Security Initiative
(CARSI), MI was re-focused on Mexico.
The resulting policies thus differ in scope and targets. Even in
its narrower version, PC included democracy promotion and institutional
development, with more ambitious components of economic development
(e.g., crop substitution), and some attention to human rights. The
policy targets reflect the U.S. interpretation of the problem context.
Originally, PC focused on anti-drugs programs. Following September 11,
2001, the U.S. policy shifted to include strong attention to anti-
terrorism, with more active support for initiatives against the FARC
and self-defense forces. Those targets put more attention on the
Colombian army and police, and themes of air mobility and operational
intelligence. Primary attention in PC went to Colombia, with
comparatively minor funding to Ecuador and Peru.
In the Barack Obama administration, MI remained more narrowly
focused on internal and bilateral security and institution-building in
law enforcement and justice administration. Human rights conditionality
was a sensitive issue because of Mexico's rejection of assistance
conditioned on standards imposed by the USG. Significant changes in the
Obama administration were the ``four pillars'' organizing concept and
the tailoring of individual subregional policies for Mexico, Central
America, and the Caribbean.\4\ The administration also shifted from an
equipment-focused initial phase to the current institution-building
phase. The result is insufficient equipment and programs that will take
years to show positive results.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ The ``four pillars'' refer to: Disrupt the capacity of
organized crime to operate; institutionalize capacity to sustain rule
of law; create a 21st Century border structure; and build strong and
resilient communities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With respect to time and money, PC ran from 2000 to 2006, and was
followed by a similar set of policies in a PC, Phase II (2006-2011).
The USG spent about US$4.5 billion through 2006 and $6.1 billion
through 2008 (CRS 2008b). The current debate in the USG concerns
reducing U.S. support and encouraging greater burden-bearing by the
Colombian government. As originally announced, USG commitment to MI ran
through 2010, although it was extended by the Obama administration. Set
originally in the US$1.5 billion range for 2008-2010, the Obama
administration requested $310 million for Mexico for fiscal year 2011
and $282 million for fiscal year 2012 (CRS 2011, 1).\5\ Given Mexico's
much larger economy and public sector budget, the dollar amounts of
U.S. assistance are small, which reduces USG policy leverage.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ ``In the absence of FY2011 appropriations legislation, the
111th Congress passed a series of continuing resolutions (Pub. L. 111-
242 as amended) to fund government programs, with the latest extension
set to expire on March 4, 2011. The Continuing Resolution, as amended,
continues funding most programs at the FY2010-enacted level, with some
exceptions'' (CRS 2011, 1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, U.S. commitments for its own internal policy are much
greater in the case of MI--at least at the declaratory level--than for
PC. U.S. rhetoric calls for a ``genuine partnership'' with Mexico. This
should be underlined as a significant shift in policy toward much
greater engagement in regional security affairs and a stronger
commitment to make internal adjustments to ameliorate conditions that
feed insecurity. Specifically, the USG commits itself to reduce drug
demand, halt the flows of precursor chemicals and weapons into the
region, and address problems of bulk cash smuggling and money
laundering.
lessons learned from pc relevant to mi
Policy learning occurred in PC's implementation, and Mexican
authorities have shown great interest in the Colombian experience.\6\
Eight ``lessons'' are worth noting.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ In the first days of the Calderon administration, Mexico's
Attorney General Eduardo Medina Mora led a high-level delegation to
Bogota to consult with President Alvaro Uribe and top Colombian
security officials. Medina Mora stated that the purpose of the visit
was to ``exchange experiences, views, and learn reciprocally about
common problems, security problems, about exchange of information about
how to better combat organized crime.'' A high-level contact group
begun in 2003 would be reactivated. ``Mexico usara experiencia de
Colombia en lucha antinarco,'' El Universal on-line (January 26, 2007).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) Colombians emphasize the need for a strategic approach to
addressing internal violence.\7\ An important shift to strategic
thinking and policy development in PC came in 2003, with President
Alvaro Uribe's ``Plan Patriota.''\8\ Rather than reacting to guerrilla
initiatives in an ad hoc fashion, the Uribe government expanded the
size and strengthened the operational capacity of the army and police,
and adopted a harder, more proactive offensive against the insurgent
forces.\9\ His government also developed a more integrated political-
military-development approach, one which carries overtones of U.S.
policy in Iraq (clear, hold, consolidate). Thus, the successor policy
to Plan Patriota is called Plan Consolidacion (GAO, 2008, p. 11-14).
Mexico's government claims to employ a comprehensive strategy against
organized crime, but its real strategy appears simpler and more
straightforward: Use the military to pulverize the trafficking
organizations into smaller, less potent gangs so that State and local
authorities can reclaim effective control over territory (Bailey 2010).
The long menu of institutional reforms encountered delays in
Congressional approval and are being implemented slowly.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ See, for example, a statement by Colombia's defense minister:
`` `Recomendable, tener una politica integral para combatir al narco':
Manuel Santos,'' El Universal on-line (November 29, 2006).
\8\ See the discussion by Gonzalo de Fransico (2006, 97).
\9\ ``[Uribe] voted not to negotiate with any of the armed groups
until they declared a cease-fire and disarmed. In addition, Uribe
implemented new laws giving the security forces increased power, and
instituted a one-time tax to be used to increase the troop strength and
capabilities of the Colombian military. He increasingly equated the
guerrillas with drug traffickers and terrorists, and initiated a
military campaign, called Plan Patriota, to recapture guerrilla-
controlled territory'' (CRS, 2006, p. 3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) President Uribe succeeded in forging strong political support
for his strategy, to the point that he could implement a special tax to
help finance it. Due mostly to extraordinary levels of violence,
President Calderon faces strong opposition to his policies, and the
main political parties use the public security issue for partisan
advantage. Mexico has one of the lowest rates of taxation in the
Hemisphere and relies heavily on income from Pemex, the national
petroleum company.
(3) Human rights violations associated with PC were unacceptably
high. A coalition of human rights organizations reports that during
2000-2008, an estimated 20,000 persons were killed by paramilitary,
guerrilla, and state forces, and more than 2 million were displaced.
Most of the displaced took shelter in precarious camps around larger
cities. Other reports put the number of internally displaced at more
than 3 million, with another 500,000 Colombian refugees and asylum
seekers outside the country (CRS, 2008b, p. 26). In all, ``Colombia
continues to face the most serious human rights crisis in the
Hemisphere, in a rapidly shifting panorama of violence'' (Haugaard,
2008, p. 4). An estimated 230,000 Mexicans are currently displaced,
about half to the United States.\10\ Clearly, effective human rights
safeguards are needed for the MI. This is an area of vulnerability for
the Mexican armed forces, one complicated by the government's weak
public communications ability.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ ``La `guerra' ha expulsado de sus hogares a 230 mil
personas,'' La Jornada, (on-line), March 26, 2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(4) Over time, significant improvements were made in PC in the
operational uses of intelligence, air mobility, communications and
coordination, and organizational capacity (e.g., police special units)
(GAO, 2008). Given the expanse and inaccessibility of much of
Colombia's territory, air mobility is critical. US General (ret.) Barry
R McCaffrey (2007, p. 5-6) emphasizes the key role of U.S. financial
aid `` . . . in funding, training, maintaining, and managing a
substantial increase (total rotary wing assets 260 aircraft [289 as of
2011]) in the helicopter force available to the Colombian Police, the
Army, the Air Force, the counter-drug forces, and the economic
development community.'' The improved mobility was supplemented by the
creation of effective units such as the army's Aviation Brigade and
Counternarcotics Brigade, as well as new mobile units in both the army
and national police (GAO 2008, p. 27-30). With 40 percent more
territory to cover, Mexico's air mobility is much less robust, as is
U.S. assistance for that purpose. To date the USG has delivered eight
Bell 412 helicopters to the Mexican Air Force and six UH-60 Blackhawks
to the Mexican Federal Police. Mexico's armed forces and federal police
have 295 rotary wing assets, and more than half of these (146) are
light helicopters unsuitable for air mobility tasks (IISS 2011, pp.
367-368; 379-380).
(5) With respect to the long-standing U.S. emphasis on supply-side
strategies to reduce drug production and trafficking, there is a
growing awareness that such supply-side, anti-drug approaches are
necessarily limited. Most of the rationale for PC from the U.S.
perspective was to curtail drug production and trafficking from
Colombia. However, the Government Accountability Office (GAO 2008, p.
17) reported bluntly: ``Plan Colombia's goal of reducing the
cultivation, processing, and distribution of illegal narcotics by
targeting coca cultivation was not achieved''. The vast amounts of
resources invested in crop eradication and interdiction have little
lasting effect on the price and purity of illegal drugs in U.S.
markets. The innovation with MI is an explicit commitment to invest
more resources in demand reduction. The commitment, however, was not
reflected in budget requests submitted by either the Bush or Obama
administration.
(6) The United States is increasingly aware that military forces
and approaches have uses and limitations with respect to anti-
trafficking operations and that institution-building with respect to
police and justice administration is a lengthy, expensive challenge.
Thus, the MI grants priority to reform police and justice
administration in the participating countries (CRS 2009, p. 16-19). My
sense, however, is that U.S. policy-makers do not grasp the enormity of
the challenges they confront. There are at least three priority issues.
First, new approaches are needed that can combine military, police,
intelligence, and socio-economic development capacities in a coherent
strategy to deal with heavily armed, mobile, and politically astute
trafficking organizations. Second, due largely to the incapacity and
corruption of the civilian police, the armed forces necessarily take
the lead role in anti-trafficking operations. Third, operational
intelligence is the key instrument against trafficking organizations,
and this capacity is weak Mexico.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ By ``operational'' I mean various types of information that
specific government agencies can use to act against criminal
organizations or activities. Whatever the type of information,
operational intelligence requires organizations that can: (1) Analyze
useful information effectively, (2) communicate the information to the
appropriate law enforcement agency in a timely fashion, and (3) protect
themselves from penetration by criminal organizations through
corruption or infiltration. Ideally, the organizations are accountable
to democratic oversight, operating within a functioning legal
framework.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(7) Approaches that combine military, police, intelligence, and
socio-economic development capacities might lead to institutional
innovation of new types of national and transnational hybrid
organizations (highly unlikely) or to much-improved inter-
organizational coordination within and among the MI governments.\12\
Organizations are profoundly resistant to change. Inter-agency
coordination has been a recurring problem not just for the Mexican
government.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ The U.S. Department of Homeland Security is a testament to the
enormous difficulty of coordinating 22 agencies under one roof in one
country. That said, the organizational experiment underway at the U.S.
Southern Command (Miami, Florida) and its operational task force based
in Key West bears close scrutiny. The task force brings together U.S.
military, intelligence, and police agencies with those from several
Caribbean and out-of-region countries. Southern Command authorities
claim a number of successful joint operations against trafficking
organizations. (Author interviews, December 2008).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(8) Beyond inter-agency and inter-governmental coordination for the
MI is the need to forge a regional security strategy that encompasses
upper-tier South America, Central America, and the Caribbean. A
strategy implies setting priorities among goals over some time period,
then translating the goals into operations and tactics, and linking
these to agency tasks and resources. Even a national strategy, as the
Colombian government eventually developed, would be a signal
accomplishment. Much more common are official documents that list
national goals, or regional operations that target a particular set of
problems.
conclusion
My sense is that useful policy learning has taken place over the
past decade or so with respect to more effective ways to confront the
violence and corruption associated with organized crime. The learning
will be especially useful, because the challenges presented especially
by transnational drug-trafficking organizations have grown more ominous
over time. Mexico's reality in 2011 is quite different from that of
2007, as criminal organizations have branched into many new types of
both criminal and licit activities and have expanded their operations
into new terrain, both in Mexico and other countries. Given the
extraordinary levels of violence since 2006 it is doubtful that
President Calderon's strategy of confrontation with criminal
organizations will continue in the new administration that takes office
in Mexico in December 2012. The Merida strategy will need to be
redesigned and reinvigorated.
TABLE 1.--CONTEXTS AND CHARACTERISTICS OF PLAN COLOMBIA AND THE MERIDA INITIATIVE
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Plan Colombia Merida Initiative
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Country context........................ Population 45 M*; 1.14 M. sq. km.; Population 110 M; 1.97 M. sq. km.;
GDP=US$250B* (2008); GDP/ GDP=US$1,142B (2008); GDP/
cap=US$5,174; budget cap=US$10,747; budget
expend=US$65B; unitary, with expend=US$227B; federal, with 32
significant decentralization; 32 states, 2,400 counties.
departments, 1,100 counties.
Problem profile........................ Major guerrilla insurgencies; Minor regional rebellion; producer
generalized violence; major & major trafficker of illicit
producer & trafficker of illicit drugs; rapid upsurge in
drugs; limited central government trafficking violence; localized
presence; corruption in police- challenges to government
justice system. presence; acute corruption in
police-justice system.
Policy origins......................... 1999-2000; U.S. proactive in policy 2007-2008; U.S. reactive in policy
design. design.
Policy scope: goals & countries........ Internal security & anti- Internal security; law enforcement
trafficking; social justice; & justice admin.; Primary=Mexico;
development. Primary=Colombia; secondary=Central America &
secondary=Peru & Ecuador. Caribbean.
Policy targets......................... Insurgency (FARC; ELN); self- Counter-drug; counter-terror;
defense organizations; drug crop border security; public security
eradication; criminal justice & law enforcement; institution-
system; economic development building & rule of law.
(e.g., crop substitution).
Time commitment........................ 2000-2006; succeeded by similar Fiscal year 2008 through fiscal
follow-on policies. year 2010, with indications of
extension.
U.S. financial commitment.............. US$4.5B; U.S. currently seeks US$1.5 B announced; approx. 10%
reduced commitment. program costs;--appropriated in
2008; negotiations expected in
Congress in 2009.
U.S. commitments for internal policy... Reduce drug demand................. ``Genuine partnership''; Reduce
drug demand; halt: weapons
trafficking, precursor chemicals,
money laundering.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: * M = million; B = Billion.
Sources: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2008; CIA World Factbook https://
www.cia.gov; CRS (2008); GAO (2008).
Mr. McCaul. Well, thank you, Professor Bailey. Let me just
say, that really is kind of the theme of this hearing--What is
our strategy in Mexico? I think we saw from the previous panel
we don't really know. So that was an excellent analysis and I
look forward to the questions.
Dr. Ainslie is now recognized.
STATEMENT OF RICARDO C. AINSLIE, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATIONAL
PSYCHOLOGY, COLLEGE OF EDUCATION, THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT
AUSTIN
Mr. Ainslie. Thank you, Chairman McCaul and Ranking Member
Keating. I think this is an issue of great National importance,
and I am delighted to be part of your deliberations.
My research has focused on two aspects of Mexico's war
against the cartels. At one level I have looked at policy
issues. I have interviewed many of the people who are
formulating and implementing Mexico's strategy, including
several members of President Calderon's security cabinet.
Second, I have spent a great deal of time in Ciudad Juarez
trying to understand the impact of the policies in Juarez but
also the impact of the violence on that city and the community.
I would like to highlight several points that I believe are
key to understand what is taking place on our southern border,
one with regard to Plan Merida. I think as a response to
Mexico's crisis it is anemic at best.
As you know, it calls for approximately $1.4 billion over
the course of 3 years. That is less than we are currently
spending in Afghanistan on any given week, and yet I think the
stakes in Mexico and the relationship in Mexico and the United
States are enormous and certainly of National security
implications.
Second, I don't think we are doing enough to control the
flow of weapons into Mexico. Presently our reporting laws are
actually stricter for handgun purchases than they are for
automatic weapons. It is in our National interest to find
mechanisms for responsible oversight of the sale of these kinds
of weapons.
Third, we need to raise our awareness about what is taking
place in Mexico as part of a National dialogue and a National
awareness. For example, according to the DEA there is
documented evidence of cartel networks in 250 American cities,
yet--this is an elaborate, sophisticated system of
transportation, warehousing, as well as distribution--yet only
two of the FBI's top most wanted people are people related to
the drug war or drug cartels, and I think one of them was only
recently added.
So I think our focus needs to change. The profile that we
give nationally to this issue needs to change.
I want to mention also, briefly, the impact of the violence
in Mexico on Mexico. It is an ever present backdrop and--to
life in Mexico.
The narcoterrorism in Mexico is extremely sophisticated,
well thought out, strategically planned, and they are issues
that everyone in Mexico, and not just in the directly affected
communities, are living, breathing, and very aware of. I think
it has contributed to a certain kind--some of the tensions that
were described to kind of a National mindset that actually
complicates effective engagement with these issues.
The Mexican government has attempted to meet these
challenges in a variety of ways. As you know, when President
Calderon declared war against the cartels in December 2006 the
fact is the Mexican government did not have the resources to
carry this out. The president deployed some 45,000 army troops
because really there were no law enforcement resources adequate
to the task.
Over the last 3 years Mexico has nearly doubled its
expenditures for security and its federal police has grown from
a force of 6,000 officers to 35,000 officers. There is an
effort also--and this is part of an effort to create
professionalized federal police that will become a model for
state police forces. In addition, there is unprecedented
cooperation between United States and Mexican law enforcement,
as others have detailed.
However, much work remains to be done, as evidenced by the
continuing violence. An Achilles heel in the current Mexican
strategy is the fact that the Mexican judicial system is
presently dysfunctional despite a decade of efforts to
modernize.
Current estimates for the state of Chihuahua, for example,
which is really the epicenter of the war, you could say, given
the number of fatalities and so on--and it is supposed to be a
model of judicial reform--currently the estimates are that only
3 to 5 percent of crimes eventuate in conviction and prison
terms. Improvements in law enforcement that are not accompanied
by real judicial reform will mean that most cartel members
continue to act with impunity, a fact which, in turn, has
profound effects on the morale of the citizenry, et cetera.
Last spring Mexico launched a model program, ``Todos Somos
Juarez,'' We Are All Juarez, a strategy that was modeled under
aspects of Plan Colombia, and for the first time the Mexican
government started sending substantial resources toward Juarez
that were related to try to repair the social fabric in Juarez,
in particular, a city that had rampant unemployment, especially
affected by the recession, the highest rates of dropout--
student dropout rates in the country, very high rates of
addictions, and so on.
We have yet to be able to really analyze--those programs
just started coming on in the summer. It is too soon to know
the impact of these programs, but I think that they are part of
the direction in which we need to go. I think the Mexican
government has woken up to the idea that an exclusive law
enforcement strategy is not going to be adequate to deal with
the problems that are related to organized crime.
Our Plan Mexico, if you will, will require continued
support and in expanded relationship with Mexican law
enforcement, but I think to succeed it will also--Mexico it
will--we will need to support Mexico in getting real judicial
reform that is really on-line and working.
Finally, it is clear that a successful response to the
Mexican crisis will require a significant commitment to helping
Mexico restore and strengthen the social fabric, especially in
those areas of the country that are most severely affected by
the violence.
So I look forward to any questions you have and discussion,
and thank you again for putting together this hearing.
[The statement of Mr. Ainslie follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ricardo Ainslie
March 31, 2011
Thank you Mr. Chairman for holding hearings on a question that is
of the greatest National importance. The fates of the United States and
Mexico are deeply entwined for a variety of economic and historical
reasons, and we know that Mexico is presently facing a grave National
crisis that we can no longer ignore.
My research has focused on two aspects of Mexico's war against the
drug cartels. (1) At a policy level, I have interviewed the people who
are formulating and implementing Mexico's national strategy, including
several members of President Calderon's security cabinet; and, (2) I
have focused on Ciudad Juarez, the city that has suffered nearly 25% of
the 34,000 cartel-related deaths over the last 3 years and where the
Mexican government has at times deployed nearly 25% of its forces.
Juarez is the epicenter of this war and its fate will tell us a great
deal of what the outcome of this war will be which is why I have chosen
to spend a great deal of time there.
I would like to highlight several points that I believe are key to
understanding what is taking place across from our Southern border.
1. Plan Merida, as a response to the crisis that Mexico is facing,
is anemic at best. As you know, it calls for approximately $1.4 billion
in aid over the course of 3 years. That is less than we are presently
spending in Afghanistan on any given week. If we want Mexico to
succeed, we will need to do more and it is in our National interest
that we do so.
2. We are not doing enough to control the flow of weapons into
Mexico. Presently our reporting laws are actually stricter with respect
to handgun purchases than they are for purchases of automatic weapons.
It is in our National interest to find mechanisms for the responsible
oversight of the sale of automatic weapons.
3. We need to raise awareness about what is taking place in Mexico
and how it directly affects our National security. For example,
according to the DEA there is documented evidence of cartel networks in
some 230 American cities. This is an elaborate and sophisticated system
of transportation, warehousing and distribution within the United
States. Yet, only two on the FBI's 10 Most Wanted list (Eduardo Ravelo
and Joe Luis Saenz) are individuals associated with Mexican drug
cartels.
4. Finally, the violence and its raw, often sadistic brutality,
form an ever-present backdrop to daily life in Mexico. Cartels are
adept at exploiting various media such as Youtube and the internet to
call explicit attention to their capacity for violence. I think many of
us here have failed to grasp the profound impact of this narco-
terrorism on the lives of Mexican citizens throughout the country.
The Mexican government has attempted to meet the complex challenges
of the country's current crisis in a variety of ways. When President
Calderon declared war against the cartels in December of 2006 the
Mexican government lacked the resources to carry it out. Municipal and
state police forces in the most affected regions of the country were
already under the effective control of the cartels. The Mexican
president deployed some 45,000 army troops because there were no law
enforcement resources on which Mexico could rely. Over the last 3
years, Mexico has nearly doubled expenditures for security, and its
Federal Police has grown from a force of 6,000 officers to 35,000
officers. There is an effort to create a professionalized Federal
Police that will become the model for the state police forces. The
Federal Police are increasingly replacing the Mexican army, such as
happened in Ciudad Juarez in the spring of 2010. In addition, there
appears to be unprecedented cooperation between U.S. and Mexican law
enforcement. In recent years Mexico has also permitted the extradition
of unprecedented numbers of cartel operatives to the United States.
However, much work remains to be done, as evidenced by the
continuing violence in Mexico. An Achilles heel of the current Mexican
strategy is the fact that the Mexican judicial system is presently
dysfunctional despite a decade of efforts at modernization. In 2009,
for example, the year in which 2,607 people were executed in Ciudad
Juarez, there was only one Federal prosecution and only 37 state
prosecutions that resulted in prison sentences. Current estimates for
the state of Chihuahua, which was supposed to be a model for judicial
reform, are that only 3%-5% of crimes eventuate in actual convictions
and prison terms. Improvements in law enforcement that are not
accompanied by real judicial reform will mean that most cartel members
will continue to act with impunity, a fact which, in turn, has profound
effects on the morale of the citizenry.
Last spring Mexico launched a program called ``Todos Somos
Juarez,'' a strategy modeled after aspects of Plan Colombia in which,
for the first time, significant federal resources are being directed
toward programs that aim to repair the social fabric in Juarez. For
example, Juarez has one of the highest rates for drug addiction in the
country, the highest incidence of school dropouts, and rampant
unemployment (especially since the recent economic recession). In one
of the poorest sections of Juarez, where approximately 40 percent of
the city's 1.3 million residents live and where cartel violence has
been especially high, there was only a single high school until
recently. The ``Todos Somos Juarez'' program represents an implicit
understanding that an exclusively law enforcement-driven strategy has
not been sufficient. It will take some time to know if this program is
effective, or where it is effective and where it is not, although
currently Juarez is averaging six executions a day, down from a year
ago when they were averaging 10 and 11.
Our ``Plan Mexico,'' if you will, will require continued support
and an expanded relationship with Mexican law enforcement. To succeed
it will also require real judicial reform in Mexico. Finally, it is
clear that a successful response to the Mexican crisis will require a
significant commitment to helping Mexico restore and strengthen the
social fabric, especially in those areas of the country that have been
most severely affected by the drug violence. At the same time, the
recent assassination of ICE agent Jaime Zapata and the wounding of
Victor Avila in San Luis Potosi, last year's killing of three people
with ties to the U.S. Consulate in Ciudad Juarez, and the attempted
grenade bombing of the U.S. Consulate in Monterrey in 2008 all attest
to the likelihood that greater American efforts to assist Mexico may
well come at a cost.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Dr. Ainslie. Thank you for leaving
sunny, warm Austin, Texas to cold and rainy Washington, DC.
That was a noble effort on your part.
Actually, I enjoyed all the testimony here today.
I liked what you said, Dr. Ainslie, in terms of Plan
Mexico. We had a strategy in Colombia. We had a plan, and
arguably it was successful. But we don't seem to have a plan or
a strategy for Mexico and I think that is the thrust of this
hearing is: What should that plan be?
Professor Bailey and Dr. Ainslie, you two are really
experts on, you know, what we did in Colombia, best practices,
lessons learned.
I understand, Professor Bailey, the politics are what they
are. Taking that out of the equation, which may be hard to do,
what are the lessons learned from Colombia that we could apply
to Mexico to win this war against the drug cartels?
Mr. Bailey. I think important in the Colombian case is the
organizational arrangements that we talked about first. The
critical factor of political will--at some point leadership
steps forward that has a clear idea of how to proceed and is
able to get a backing to do that.
At the institutional level, the reform of the Colombian
police. In the whole hemisphere there really only are two or
three police forces that have good credibility. The Chileans
are probably the most credible, but the Colombians have
improved their police enormously.
So reform of the police, and then there were technical
things done to improve intelligence so that the Colombian--and
then organizational reform within the Colombian police and the
army that creates smaller units that could operate more
effectively. It is the combination of that backing and the
leadership with these changes taking place internally in the
army and in the police and the mobility and the intelligence
that allowed them to target different areas of the country to
operate. First take, then hold, then consolidate.
The strategy was to involve more about social services,
education, justice reform. So it was a way of thinking more
holistically and thinking more sequentially.
The Colombians didn't start with that, by the way, Mr.
Chairman. They evolved into that way of thinking over time.
So I think it is the combination of the politics, and then
the technical things, and then the decision to move
sequentially in different areas that really makes the
difference.
Mr. McCaul. I think the situation has become so dire down
there and such a crisis that it is my sincere hope the politics
will change on this. After all, I think it is in Mexico's best
interest. Certainly as our neighbor to the south and friend it
is in our best interest as well.
So, Dr. Ainslie, do you have any comments on that?
Mr. Ainslie. Well, I would only add that I think the
Mexican political situation is extremely complex, especially
right now with the election coming up. I think lots of the
reforms are beginning to be gummed up in this process,
especially the efforts at judicial reform, again, which I think
are indispensible to a successful solution to the issue of
organized crime violence in Mexico. Those reforms are really
gummed up and there is a series of reasons related to that.
Second, I think that--I think there is no question that
there is the will in Mexico, and certainly I think the
collaborative efforts reflect that. The complex social
processes have helped create a breeding ground for cartel
operatives and so on, it is a very difficult and in some ways
intransigent issue.
But on this side, of course, there are some of the things
that I mentioned a few minutes ago: Better control of weapons
going into Mexico, our consumption issues, raising this as an
issue that we are more aware of here as a problem that really
does affect us. It is not just over there, but it is really
living in our communities now.
Mr. McCaul. Well, you know, I know that Colombia was also--
in addition to everything you stated, they had joint
intelligence, joint military operation. I have heard accounts
down in Mexico of having the heads of these cartels in their
sights but not willing to go in to take them out because they
are outgunned. I mean, the security issue.
I think our country has something to offer in that respect,
whether it be our intelligence or our special operations
forces, if we could get around the politics and they had the
political will to do it we could actually make a lot of
progress.
So, Mr. Adler, I just wanted to ask you about--you know, we
talk about agent protection down there and I am very, very
concerned about the safety of our agents. What would you
propose and recommend to the Justice Department, to Homeland
Security Department, as to what we need to do to better protect
our agents down there?
Mr. Adler. First and foremost, we don't send soldiers into
combat unarmed. One of the things we need to do--and I
understand it all; I am sort of a working class law
enforcement-minded person. I understand the politics of their
being a sovereign nation and I understand the history and the
ramifications behind this--and the sensitivity behind this
issue.
However, I always prioritize officer safety. In doing that
I can't impress upon the Department of State--or having the
Justice Department help me impress upon the Department of
State--the need to exert all leverage necessary to ensure that
our officers, our agents have the means to protect and defend
themselves. That includes what I spoke about earlier, which is
the diplomatic protection as well. It gives you peace of mind,
again, know that while you endure the risk--which we all do--we
know with confidence that if the ultimate sacrifice is made by
one of our agents there will be follow-through by way of
justice.
But what else can we do? Well, it comes down to those
essential points. I mean, I know that we can only get into it
so far in this particular hearing, but it really comes down to
having the equipment, in a general sense, which includes not
just, you know, the means to defend yourself. Obviously there
are other sorts of equipment that could benefit us as well.
You know, we talked about working closely with our Mexican
partners and counterparts, raising the level of sophistication
and their approach to law enforcement, which involves
electronic monitoring and so forth. So having the means to
better equip our agents and working with our Mexican
counterparts as well as the means to defend themselves.
This comes down to negotiation. We can't change their laws,
but we can negotiate the urgency and necessity of making sure
our agents can protect and defend themselves.
Mr. McCaul. I agree. I think the State Department--and we
have had briefings on this, but I think we need greater
clarification as to how they can defend themselves down there.
I think that is a very--as you know--I think you have received
the briefing as well--it is very vague; it is not clear. I
think the clarification is necessary.
Just a last question, Mr. Adler. There has been a
discussion about whether it would be in the National security
interest to designate the cartels as foreign terrorist
organizations. Do you agree with that assessment?
Mr. Adler. Absolutely. Absolutely. As I said earlier, you
know, actions speak louder than words.
You know, we have got to get out of this mindset where we
are only dealing with a phase fanatic that screams--you know,
is a suicide bomber screaming, ``Allahu akbar.'' We have got to
get out of that.
You know, a terrorist, by virtue of what they do--and they
wreak havoc. As I said before, referring to Pablo Escobar, they
are drawing upon those terrorist tactics to accomplish their
objectives.
We need to understand that. We need to call it for what it
is. We need to respond accordingly. I completely support you on
that.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you. I believe we need all the tools in
the toolbox, and designating them as foreign terrorist
organizations would give us that.
So I see my time is expired. I now yield time to the
Ranking Member, Mr. Keating.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
You know, I think collectively your testimony really
brought home the fact that this is not a simplistic problem; it
is a dynamic set of problems.
Mr. Adler, rest assured, I think I speak for the whole
committee that we want to protect our law enforcement agents
first and foremost because that is at a premium--their safety.
But also, I think it is important to remember that Mr. Alvarez
said, should we not do everything we can we won't get the
caliber of officers to go down there and put their lives on the
line for this kind of service.
So we owe that in a personal sense to their families and
their own livelihood, but also from a practical standpoint. If
we are going to be effective we have to be able to do that.
I just, you know, I agree with Dr. Shirk in everything
except one thing. If I could have just a brief answer, because
while I agreed with almost everything you said, looking at a
larger scope of issues and the complementary criminal activity
that goes with this, I don't see the benefit of legalizing
drugs.
I think that is putting up the white flag and making a
problem worse, and I have always felt that. But what drugs do
you--did you allude to when you were talking about legalizing
drugs?
Mr. Shirk. Respectfully, Mr. Keating, I think we don't see
the benefits because we haven't analyzed the question. I think
when we look at 46 percent of California voters who recently
favored the idea of legalizing marijuana, and a growing
proportion of the National population who believes that that
would be an effective measure, I think we should start to
listen and start to ask that question. It has been a taboo
question in U.S. politics for far too long.
But when we consider that 98 percent of the bulk materials
seized at our border, in terms of illicit drugs, are marijuana,
and that $1 billion to $2 billion--that is just the bulk, it is
the mass, but it takes up the majority of the----
Mr. Keating. Is it marijuana, sir?
Mr. Shirk. It is marijuana.
Mr. Keating. That is what you want--okay. A couple of
things and then I have a question for Mr. Bailey.
No. 1, if you really think legalizing marijuana is going to
stop the drug wars in Mexico then it is a different hearing
than I was hearing today. But second, as a district attorney
dealing deeply in prevention, it is a terrible message to send
to our young people.
That is just a difference of opinion. We will agree to
disagree.
Mr. Bailey, you really struck upon the dynamics of the
problem, I think. You know, I had the ability years ago to deal
with people in California that dealt with gang issues, drug
issues. There are a lot of similarities, and it is important to
look at things comprehensively.
In fact, I found out from those people having a stake in
the neighborhood is so important, and you were alluding to
that, to saying that there is not a political will. I don't
know if it is just--it is simplified as politics. I think it is
just getting a stake in the neighborhood, and I think the
economic prosperity in Colombia had a great deal to do with
putting that political will together because it started to call
them--cost them dollars and cents in a large sense.
Now, what can we do, given those constraints--the different
types of government, the different types of police force, the
different types of judiciary, all problems. But specifically,
it is my understanding that Mexican authorities are getting
training from Colombia, and is that being effective, at least
in that narrow sense?
Mr. Bailey. I think yes, it is. The Colombians have had a
close connection with the Mexican government from the outset of
the Calderon government and I think there has been a lot of
sharing going on, a lot of learning, especially about this
business of operational intelligence--how one puts this
together and how one uses it.
Well, the Mexicans face a real problem of
counterintelligence in that their police agencies don't really
protect their information very well and other agencies that are
set up to do that don't protect things very well. I liked your
question of: What can the United States do?
I have had this opinion, and it is a little bit of an
outsider opinion, is if there were a pilot project that
actually worked of showing how a comprehensive policy could
function in a given area--Juarez is supposed to be going
through this process right now and we need to evaluate what
that has done, but watching these issues in Mexico is a little
like watching climate change. People don't know quite where to
cut into it. How do you stop it? Where do you start your
process?
It may be that a pilot project or a couple of pilot
projects to show what works could really deliver a lot of
benefit.
Mr. Keating. That is interesting. I think it is also
interesting in light of the fact that the areas that are most
affected within Mexico are----
Mr. Bailey. On the border.
Mr. Keating [continuing]. Are on the border and they are
discreet. It is just not widespread throughout the whole
country.
Mr. Bailey. Correct.
Mr. Keating. So I think I found that very interesting.
I will, in the sake of time for the rest of the panelists,
yield back my time.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you.
Chair now recognizes Mr. Marino for 5 minutes.
Mr. Marino. Chairman, if I could defer my time--did my
colleague speak yet? If he is ready I would prefer to wait and
hear what he has to say, and it will bring me more abreast of
what is going on.
Mr. McCaul. That is very generous.
Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Cuellar.
Mr. Cuellar. I will buy you lunch right after this----
[Laughter.]
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you, Mr. Marino. I appreciate the work
that you have done as a U.S. attorney also. Appreciate that.
You are right. There are certain areas of Mexico where the
violence is very high. Just last--I think it was last December
I took my family off to Mexico for vacation. I would not do it
across the border, but in certain areas it is considered to be
safe there. But that is why when you look at Mexico it is--you
have got to look at this very carefully.
Let me first of all, Mr. Chairman, thank you. You have two
of my former schools that are represented--Georgetown and UT
also, so I appreciate that. I thank you that.
Let me ask this question, and I appreciate all of the
testimony. I have got three brothers who are peace officers so
I really appreciate what you do. I listen to my brothers and I
just do what--when it comes to law enforcement.
But let me ask you all this question: What do you think the
committee should be looking at? Because you are right--the
Chairman is right--we ought to look at the strategy.
You know, when you look at the strategy, back some years
ago when I filed a piece of legislation before President Bush
and Fox got into this Plan Merida I started, I had a draft, and
I called it Plan Mexico. I spoke to the Mexican ambassador; he
got a little excited also because he didn't want to have that
connection with Colombia--again, a lot of sensitivities.
But one area that I had there that President Bush and--
which is a good friend of ours from Texas, and President Fox
didn't have one part there, was the--I guess it would have to
do with attention, because liberals sometimes have a problem
with law enforcement; conservatives sometimes have a problem
with some of the social programs.
I think one of the things that we should be looking at is
how can we help Mexico with areas like microlending, and jobs
creation? If we invest a little bit of money we would stop a
lot of those people from coming over if we talk about
undocumented aliens.
At that time, when we talked about Plan Merida, the United
States was giving Israel--and I support Israel--about $1
billion; Egypt was getting about $800 million; Colombia was
getting over $500 million. Peru was getting more than Mexico.
I think at that time Mexico was getting $36 million. If we
have a 2,000-mile border with them every day there is about $1
billion of trade between the United States and Mexico.
Connections are so big there.
You know, I thought it was important that we spend a little
emphasis there in Mexico because we have a 2,000-mile border
with, you know, with the Republic of Mexico.
So I want to ask you, what would be your suggestions? I
mean, I am one of those that I wish we could--you know, I know
we are in a deficit situation right now. I understand that.
But a little bit of investment, if we would kind of realign
some of those dollars out there and help Mexico we could create
jobs, take some of those young kids that you talked about, Dr.
Shirk, that don't have jobs so it is easy for the gangs or the
drug cartels to say, ``Look, we will pay you a couple hundred
pesos a day, get you a new car, get you a gun, get you this,''
and all of a sudden they feel empowered and they go into those
drug organizations.
So what would you all suggest that we ought to look at as
part of the strategy the Chairman has been talking about? What
do you suggest we ought to do? You have got a minute and a half
to answer that question.
Mr. Shirk. If I may, we have not invested the same amount
of resources in social and economic development programs that
we did in the Merida Initiative.
Mr. Cuellar. Right.
Mr. Shirk. We spend three times as much on aid for
Colombia, which has one third the population of Mexico, and it
strikes me that if we are going to really strengthen the Merida
Initiative to do what we have done in Colombia that is the area
where there is the greatest room for improvement.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you.
Dr. Ainslie.
Mr. Ainslie. If I could add to that----
Mr. Cuellar. By the way, ``Go Longhorns.''
Mr. Ainslie. Thank you very much. Yes.
Absolutely, this is a critical issue for us. $1.4 billion
over 3 years with no social programming involved is really very
narrow; it is very shortsighted.
This affects the United States in so many ways. I mean, if
these conditions--a lot of the migration out of Mexico is also
violence-related. So if we are concerned about undocumented
workers, for example, this is one dimension to it. It is not
only the economics; it is also the violence.
People in communities all over Mexico are worried, even if
their particular communities are not directly affected like--
one quarter of the businesses in Ciudad Juarez have closed.
Mr. Cuellar. Absolutely. Imagine if that would happen to
Austin, or Laredo, or whatever your town--if one quarter of
your businesses were shut down because of violence imagine what
would happen to the economics. That is what has happened in
Ciudad Juarez.
Mr. Ainslie. Absolutely. Five thousand businesses closed;
80,000 people lost their jobs in 2009. It is almost a perfect
storm of economic violent considerations, and that is something
that is in our best interest to address and support.
Mr. Bailey. On the optimistic side, the timing is good, Mr.
Cuellar, because I think the Mexican business community now is
beginning to focus on these issues and becoming much more
responsive to ideas, and partnership ideas between government
and the private sector would be very important.
Also, as you know, over many years the Mexicans have been
reluctant to have U.S. involvement in social development
programs, and I think that is changing as well.
Mr. Cuellar. Right.
Mr. Bailey. So I don't have a precise idea for you, but I
think the timing is such that these kinds of ideas now can have
more effects than they could, say, 5 years ago.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you.
Anything.
Mr. Adler.
Mr. Adler. Well, from my law enforcement perspective I will
say again, just to reiterate, that I would ask this committee,
in terms of what you could do on this issue, is to stay on top
of the State Department. It was obviously addressed before that
perhaps their strategy needs to be better defines as well as my
appeal to you to have them negotiate those protections that our
agents absolutely deserve.
I will also say, on our end of the spectrum, you know, I
noticed there was a question earlier about wishing somebody
from ATF was here. This obviously is the Homeland Security
Committee, but our approach--what we can control--needs to be
integrated and sustained.
What that means is our DHS assets and our DOJ assets have
to work together. We can't just have one go off after the gun
issue and one go after the narco issue. No. One team, one
fight.
So I would stress that this committee call the respective
leaders of those cabinet agencies together and say, ``What is
your unified mission and approach to dealing with this
situation?''
Mr. McCaul. That is an excellent point, and I will follow
up on that, because so many times we find it is the turf
battles and the breakdown between agencies not working together
that cause so many of the problems, whether not having a
strategy or not having the relevant agencies working together
in a cohesive fashion, I think is a very important point, and
we will follow up on that.
Chair now recognizes Mr. Marino.
Mr. Marino. Thank you, Chairman.
Mr. Adler, I couldn't agree with you more, specifically
because--again, I sound like my father now--when I was a U.S.
attorney or when I did this ATF was with us constantly when we
were doing DEA work because guns and illegal drugs are like
hand and glove. We had a great relationship--a good working
relationship with ATF, along with DEA and FBI and ICE.
If we can do that in Northern Pennsylvania then we
certainly should be able to do it on the Mexican border and
across the country.
But again, my colleague brings up a great point, and I have
just an analogy. I was just in the Middle East visiting our
troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, and there is a strange parallel
here. But if you think about it, the terrorists--the Taliban,
al-Qaeda--they recruit people who are poor, people who are
unemployed, people who have no income; and that is the same
thing that is happening in Mexico with the narcoterrorists.
They are taking our young people and handing them a few
dollars.
I had this happen more than once when I was district
attorney of Willamsport, Pennsylvania, 16, 17, 18-year-old kids
that we would pick up in raids along with, of course, adults,
and I would ask them, ``How did you get involved in this? Why
do you want to get involved in this?'' Well, the dealer bought
this 14-year-old a brand new pair of $150 sneakers and a cell
phone and he got to hold his gun for him.
Now, these are the issues that we are dealing with. We have
to approach this from the aspect of education--certainly
education--but also using our limited resources wisely to
create infrastructures that will create jobs.
But in your statement--and I had to leave a little early to
talk to some constituents, and they did say to me--I told them
I was in a Homeland Security meeting and they said, ``Any money
that you save on cutting, why don't we divert that over to
fighting the war on drugs?'' I said, ``I am going to make that
statement and tell them that a constituent from my 10th
Congressional district made that recommendation and I agree.''
There is absolutely no reason why our agents, no matter who
they are, where they are at, should not be properly equipped
and properly protected. You know something--you said we needed
a risk assessment. As far as I am concerned we don't need a
risk assessment because it is downright dangerous work and
there is no other work more dangerous than dealing with drug
dealers and the narcoterrorists down on the border.
So I have heard what you had to say. I don't have a
question. I am a little bit of a soapbox here, preaching, but
certainly we will watch this very closely. We will do
everything in our power to see that law enforcement has what
they need--the personnel, the resources, the training--because
it is critically important to the youth of this country and to
Mexico, our colleagues--our allies--that we not let these
narcoterrorists take over.
With that, I pledge my support and I yield back my time.
Thank you.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Marino. You are learning quickly
as a freshman, because a lot of Members do preach a lot and
they don't ask questions.
But I want to thank the panelists.
My takeaway--and I will defer to the Ranking Member as well
if he would like to make some closing comments as well--is, you
know, as Congressman Cuellar points out, we are spending so
much money, so many resources on other countries in Latin
America, Libya halfway across the world, and yet we are not
paying any attention to Mexico in terms of focusing on Mexico
with our resources. It is a tough budgetary time but this is
the area that I think we need to step up to the plate, and we
can't allow Mexico to become a failed state.
I really like the idea of this--the idea of this pilot
project that you mentioned, Dr. Ainslie and Professor Bailey. I
would like you to follow up with this committee on the Juarez
experiment, if you will, as to how that is working, because you
are taking the most violent city, arguably in the world, and
6,000 people have been killed there, and if you can turn that
around that seems to me it would be the model to emulate across
the most dangerous parts of Mexico.
So with that, I don't know if the Ranking Member has some
closing comments?
Mr. Keating. Well, I would just like to again thank you,
and I would like to say this, that I hope everyone has learned
that this is a complicated and dynamic problem. It is one that
I think can't be looked at in a narrow prism, and it is one
that I think a lot of the testimony reflected that.
I don't think you can look at--and in this panel here there
are three prosecutors sitting here, but you cannot look at the
problem one-dimensionally. You can't look at the crimes one-
dimensionally.
The drug crimes go hand-in-hand with guns, currency
violations, and they go hand-in-hand with an environment where
people do not have a stake in the community. I go back to that
because I learned from our own domestic experience, studying
that in California, among other areas, where once that is
established--and my colleague brought up very strongly the
point that we can do more in those areas to create not just
better criminal and political approach, but also an economic
approach where we can take back neighborhoods, or allow people
in Mexico to take back their own neighborhoods.
We should do that as well. It is in our own security
interest. It is in our own self interest. It is in our own
enforcement interest, because things aren't going to get safer
unless we approach it this way.
So I would like to thank you, and I think what you brought
to this, you know, this hearing, in terms of the panel, really
expressed the breadth of the problem, and I appreciate that.
Mr. McCaul. Let me thank the witnesses for your excellent
testimony here today. Members may have additional questions
that you can respond to in writing.
The hearing record will be open for 10 days, and without
objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:59 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Questions From Ranking Member William R. Keating for Luis Alvarez
Question 1. Given ICE's mission in Mexico, its agents and personnel
are in a position to become intimately familiar with the inner-workings
of Mexican DTOs. Given this familiarity, would you agree that there are
vast differences between DTOs--who are in the business of making money,
at any cost--and terrorist organizations that are more ideological-
based? Please explain those differences.
Answer. While there might be notable distinctions in the motivation
behind the criminal activity or either type of organization, ICE
pursues suspected criminals regardless of this motivation. As for
definitional differences, the Secretary of State in accordance with
section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, may
designate foreign organizations as Foreign Terrorist Organizations.
Accordingly, ICE respectfully defers to the U.S. Department of State
for any discussion on the definitional aspects of terrorist
organizations.
Question 2. It is undisputed that drugs come across the border from
Mexico into the United States. However, it is also true that a great
deal of our legitimate commerce flows across the border on a daily
basis. In fact, Mexico is our third-largest trading partner. Please
explain how ICE and other law enforcement agencies operating on the
border balance the need to prevent illicit goods from entering our
country while allowing licit goods to flow?
Answer. Although the flow of goods into the United States is
primarily an operational area of the Department of Homeland Security's
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) is a functional partner with CBP and all other
Federal, State, Tribal, and local agencies and commercial business
enterprises operating in the region along the United States-Mexico
border. Enforcement through investigation is necessary to protect the
United States' trade, business, and public safety interests from being
put at a competitive disadvantage by criminal organizations that seek
to exploit the volume and types of legitimate commerce to mask their
illicit activities. ICE accomplishes this vital mission by performing
intelligence-driven investigations and applying tactics that minimize
the impact of these investigations on the flow of commerce whenever
possible. ICE respectfully defers to CBP on its operations in this
regard.
CBP narcotics interdiction strategies are designed to be flexible
so that they can successfully counter the constantly shifting narcotics
threat at and between the POEs, as well as in the source and transit
zones.
CBP uses these resources to develop and implement security programs
that safeguard legitimate trade from being used to smuggle implements
of terror and other contraband, including narcotics into the United
States. Under the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT)
program, CBP works closely with importers, carriers, brokers, freight
forwarders, and other industry sectors to develop a seamless, security-
conscious trade environment resistant to the threat of international
terrorism. C-TPAT provides the business community and government a
venue to exchange ideas, information, and best practices in an on-going
effort to create a secure supply chain, from the factory floor to the
U.S. POE. Under C-TPAT, Americas Counter Smuggling Initiative, the
Carrier Initiative Program, and the Business Anti-Smuggling Initiative
remain instrumental in expanding CBP's counternarcotics security
programs with trade groups and governments throughout the Caribbean,
Central and South America, and Mexico.
CBP's Field Operations Intelligence Program provides support to CBP
inspection and border enforcement personnel in disrupting the flow of
drugs through the collection and analysis of all-source information and
dissemination of intelligence to the appropriate components. In
addition, CBP interdicts undeclared bulk currency which fuels
terrorism, narcotics trafficking, and criminal activities worldwide.
CBP officers perform Buckstop Operations, which involves screening
outbound travelers and their personal effects. CBP also supports
Cashnet Operations that focus on interdicting bulk currency exported in
cargo shipments. CBP uses mobile X-ray vans and specially-trained
currency canine teams to efficiently target individuals, personal
effects, conveyances, and cargo acting as vehicles for the illicit
export of undeclared currency. CBP also supports ACTT, which
contributes to CBP's outbound operations directed at detecting and
interdicting bulk currency and illicit funds exports.
Question 3. What percentage of the weapons recovered in Mexico,
including untraceable weapons, would you say are smuggled through the
border between the United States and Mexico?
Answer. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) respectfully
defers to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives for
discussion of the percentage of weapons recovered being traced to the
United States.
ICE remains committed to its on-going partnership with the
Government of Mexico and our other U.S. law enforcement partners to
develop a complete picture of weapons smuggling activities. ICE
continues to employ a comprehensive, collaborative strategy to address
this threat via the Border Enforcement Security Taskforce (BEST) and
other cooperative efforts.
Question 4. Many suggest that the violence in Mexico is fueled in
part by the guns and currency smuggled into Mexico from the United
States. In fact, reports indicate that nearly 90% of all firearms used
by Mexican criminals and drug cartels come from the United States.
Do ICE and CBP officials have the necessary legal authority to: (1)
Search people and vehicles leaving the United States and (2) to
investigate weapons smuggling cases?
What can be done to improve these efforts?
Answer. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), together
with its sister agency, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), have
plenary authority under Title 19 of the United States Code to conduct
inspections of persons, conveyances, and merchandise that have a nexus
with the U.S. border in order to enforce all Federal laws pertaining to
importation, exportation, and immigration. CBP focuses on the
inspection while ICE focuses on the investigations relating to these
matters.
In the course of conducting its law enforcement actions, ICE and
CBP use this broad authority to search people and vehicles entering and
exiting the United States. When CBP discovers illicit merchandise as
part of its inspections, CBP detains or seizes such merchandise, and
the persons responsible for such merchandise, and refers such matters
to ICE for further investigation and prosecution. In addition to the
broad authorities in Title 19, ICE also uses numerous statutes in the
criminal code, Title 18, specifically relating to smuggling into and
out of the United States, namely, 18 U.S.C. 545 and 554. Further
authorities are the export laws (Titles 22 and 50) and 18 U.S.C.
922(g)(5), which ICE uses for both export and alien enforcement
efforts.
These authorities, coupled with ICE's broad employment of a full
range of investigative techniques, enable the agency to investigate
weapons smuggling cases. ICE continues to collaborate with CBP, and
with Federal, State, local, Tribal, and foreign law enforcement
partners to disrupt and dismantle transnational criminal organizations
via the Border Enforcement Security Taskforce (BEST) and other
cooperative efforts.
In January 2006, DHS adopted the BEST initiative to leverage
Federal, State, local, Tribal, and foreign law enforcement and
intelligence resources to identify, disrupt, and dismantle
organizations that seek to exploit vulnerabilities in the border and
threaten the overall safety and security of the American public. BESTs
are designed to increase information sharing and collaboration among
the participating agencies, focusing on the identification,
prioritization, and investigation of emerging or existing threats.
Question 5. ``Plan Colombia'' was developed by the Colombian
government to eliminate drug trafficking, and promote economic and
social development. According to GAO, drug reduction goals were not
met, despite the fact that the U.S. Government provided nearly $4.9
billion to the Colombian military and national police, and GAO
ultimately deemed Plan Colombia a ``failure'' from the United States'
perspective. Would you please elaborate on Plan Colombia, the United
States' role in this program and how the challenges faced by the
Colombian government is vastly different from what is occurring in
Mexico?
Answer. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement respectfully
defers to the U.S. Department of State for discussion of the success of
Plan Colombia and the U.S. Government's (USG) role in the program.
However, it should be noted that since the beginning of Plan Colombia
in 1999, our contribution to which has garnered bipartisan support,
though representing only a small portion of the greater sacrifices
borne by the Colombia people, that country has seen a reduction of 92
percent in kidnappings, 45 percent in homicides, and 71 percent in
terrorist attacks. Moreover, cocaine production potential has fallen 46
percent, and the area under coca cultivation decreased 19.4 percent.
USG programs have provided training, equipment, and funding to the
Government of Colombia, civil society, international organizations, and
non-governmental organizations in the areas of counternarcotics and
counterterrorism, alternative development, law enforcement,
institutional strengthening, judicial reform, human and labor rights,
humanitarian assistance for displaced persons and victims of the war,
local governance, conflict management and peace promotion,
demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants, including child
soldiers, humanitarian de-mining, and preservation of the environment.
In Mexico, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and its
components continue to support the Merida Initiative, which has
significantly contributed to greater collaboration between the United
States and Mexico on a wide range of issues.
Question 6. In April 2009, the Obama administration designated
three of Mexico's most dangerous DTOs--the Sinaloa Cartel, Los Zetas,
and La Familia Michoacana--as Kingpins under the Foreign Narcotics
Kingpin Designation Act--otherwise known as the Kingpin Act. Does the
Kingpin Act give our law enforcement agencies the authorities they need
to go after Mexican DTOs? Are the penalties under the Kingpin Act rule
out the need to try to make DTOs fit into the Foreign Terrorist
Organization category?
Answer. The Kingpin Act is administered by the Department of the
Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control. Pursuant to the Kingpin
Act, the President, in consultation with the interagency, is required
to submit to Congress an annual list identifying significant foreign
narcotics traffickers by or before June 1. The Kingpin Act also applies
to foreign persons who are determined to be: (1) Materially assisting
in, or providing financial or technological support for or to, or
providing goods or services in support of, the international narcotics
trafficking activities of a person named pursuant to the Kingpin Act;
(2) owned, controlled, directed by, or acting for or on behalf of, a
person named pursuant to the Kingpin Act; or (3) playing a significant
role in international narcotics trafficking. The Kingpin Act blocks
assets of named persons and prohibits U.S. persons from conducting
financial or commercial transactions with them. Corporate criminal
penalties for violations of the Kingpin Act range up to $10 million;
individual penalties range up to $5 million and 30 years in prison.
Civil penalties of up to $1.075 million may also be imposed
administratively. There is no relationship between the penalties under
the Act and the definition of a Foreign Terrorist Organization. Since
the Kingpin Act was enacted, the President has identified 40
significant Mexican drug traffickers, and OFAC has designated 304
individuals and 182 entities tied to Mexican traffickers. ICE
respectfully defers to the Department of Treasury for comment as to the
sufficiency of the Kingpin Act.
Questions From Ranking Member William R. Keating for Brian A. Nichols
Question 1. Last year Secretary Clinton referred to a Plan Colombia
model for Mexico and it caused an outcry among the members of the
Mexican Congress and Secretary Patricia Espinosa--Secretary Clinton's
counterpart--stated she disagreed. Given the Mexican response to this
statement, isn't it bad for our continued relations to consider Plan
Colombia as a comparable solution for addressing Mexico's violent
activity?
Answer. We respect the Calderon administration for its commitment
to confront the narco-traffickers directly, and we stand by Mexico as a
partner in its fight to guarantee the rule of law for all Mexican
citizens. The assistance that the United States provides to Mexico
under the Merida Initiative is part of an overall security strategy
developed and led by the government of Mexico (GOM) under President
Calderon's leadership. The GOM is integrally involved in Merida
Initiative planning and execution at every stage, which is essential to
demonstrate and reinforce Mexico's ownership of the programs,
initiatives, and reforms. The $1.5 billion that the United States is
providing through the Merida Initiative supplements the extensive
resources that the Mexican government has dedicated (e.g.,
approximately $10 billion in 2011 alone) to security-related issues.
While Mexico confronts a significantly different situation than
Colombia did, some very important lessons learned about combating TCOs
in Colombia are applicable. For example, one such lesson learned was
the critical importance of air mobility to respond rapidly and
forcefully to TCO activity. Under the Merida Initiative, we placed an
early emphasis on providing Mexico with aircraft to enable them to
effectively confront the TCOs; and in December 2010, we witnessed the
results of this emphasis when the Mexican Federal Police (SSP) killed
the head of the La Familia Michoacana TCO in a large operation that
utilized U.S.-donated UH-60M helicopters. Another lesson learned from
Colombia was the importance of strengthening communities as a key
component of a broad citizen security strategy. Under the Merida
strategy, INL and USAID have partnered with the Mexican Government to
implement Pillar IV, ``Building Strong and Resilient Communities,''
with a strong focus in Ciudad Juarez. A third lesson learned is that
high-value targets (HVTs) and TCO networks must be pursued in tandem.
If our strategy does not simultaneously target the broad networks of
smugglers, money launderers, and other components of TCO logistics and
supply chains, as well as mid-level cartel leadership, apprehended HVTs
will simply be replaced. We are seeking to shut down the cartels in
their entirety.
Question 2. If Mexican DTOs are designated as Foreign Terrorist
Organizations, what impact would that have on U.S. human rights and
developmental programs in Mexico and our diplomatic relationship?
Answer. The United States stands with the people of Mexico in
condemning the criminal organizations that operate within Mexico and
threaten the people of Mexico and the United States; and we remain
concerned about the level of violence in Mexico. Our two governments
share responsibility for confronting these threats, and we will
continue to support the Mexican government's efforts to combat criminal
organizations and the violence that they perpetuate.
The United States Government already has and currently is using the
rigorous designation authorities under the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin
Designation, also known as the ``Kingpin Act,'' and the Specially
Designated Narcotics Trafficker program under Executive Order 12978,
which is administered by the Department of the Treasury. We do not
believe that additional types of designation are necessary at this
time.
Designations under the Kingpin Act freeze any and all assets of
designated drug cartels subject to U.S. jurisdiction, and prohibit U.S.
persons from engaging in transactions with the designated cartels.
Individual penalties can range up to 30 years in prison.
Question 3a. The four goals for the Beyond Merida Initiative
outlined in your testimony focus on: (1) Continuing to disrupt
organized crime, (2) establishing rule of law, (3) creating a 21st
Century border, and (4) building strong communities. Each of these four
pillars is a considerable endeavor by itself, and accomplishing these
objectives will take time and effort from all involved.
How will the lessons learned from the past 3 years of Merida
implementation inform the way forward?
Answer. The major obstacles to Merida Initiative implementation
during the initial years have been identified, addressed, and largely
overcome. Such obstacles included insufficient staffing and procurement
capacity to manage a rapid and sizeable increase in assistance to
Mexico; historic mistrust of U.S. intentions, requiring the careful
building of trust through professional relationships; the challenge of
identifying GOM requirements for sophisticated technology equipment
purchases; and complex U.S. Government contracting and procurement
requirements. In addition, other unavoidable issues that delayed
delivery included our shared insistence that the GOM be involved in the
program development process during every stage of planning; and the
fact that the technologically advanced equipment needed by Mexico is
not off-the-shelf, but rather is custom made to order.
While many of these obstacles have been overcome, and delivery of
assistance has accelerated considerably, we continue to take steps to
ensure that we are managing Merida assistance as efficiently and
effectively as possible. Steps we have taken and continue to take
include:
We increased staffing from 21 to 112 full-time staff in
Mexico and Washington since Merida started in 2008; and plans
are underway to hire more.
We are moving funds toward high-impact programs that can be
executed more quickly. For example, we recently reprogrammed
$2.5 million from a justice sector training program that has
sufficient funds, to a program to improve human rights for
journalists that is ready to implement now.
We are exploring new contracting mechanisms for large
training programs that could move large sums of assistance as
quickly as needs demand.
In August 2010, we consolidated Narcotics Affairs Section
(NAS) program management into the Bilateral Implementation
Office (BIO) in Mexico City, which allows for closer internal
collaboration and coordination on projects directly with GOM
colleagues. The BIO has greatly improved communication with GOM
counterparts who share the space--a first in U.S.-Mexico
bilateral relations.
We recently brought on an experienced INL Senior Advisor to
conduct a full review of International Narcotics Control and
Law Enforcement (INCLE)-funded Merida Initiative programs,
identify bottlenecks, and engage in efforts to implement
programmatic changes.
We are working more closely with Mexican counterparts to
help them develop clear program requirements, which are
required for our contracting and procurement processes. We are
exploring ways to build strategic planning training for Mexican
officials into the Merida programs themselves.
We have developed greatly improved program tracking and
reporting tools for program managers to track procurements in
order to more quickly identify and overcome potential bottle-
necks.
Merida Initiative planners are working with the Department's
Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
(S/CRS), which is the State Department lead for comprehensive
strategic planning and assessment on U.S. National security
interests, to develop a coordinated and comprehensive strategic
plan for Merida programs.
Going forward, we are both increasingly shifting assistance towards
State and local institutions and away Federal institutions; and moving
away from providing large and expensive equipment to more training,
capacity building, and technical assistance focused on justice sector
institution building. As Merida moves in these new directions, we
anticipate that the expertise and strong working-level bilateral
relations that have been created during the past few years will enable
us to expeditiously overcome any new challenges.
Question 3b. What benchmarks and performance metrics has the State
Department established to measure the success of the program, and the
new pillars?
Answer. In the first years of the Merida Initiative, the Department
of State collaborated extensively with the GOM to develop a set of
performance measures based around the original vision for and goals of
the Initiative. Since then, however, the U.S. Government and GOM
developed and agreed to the Merida Initiative Four Pillar Strategy,
around which a new set of performance measures needed to be developed.
The Department of State has begun developing outcome-based
performance measures and more detailed implementation plans as part of
an overall strategic plan that mirrors and complements the Four Pillar
Strategy for the Merida Initiative. As part of this effort, Department
of State Merida coordinators reached out to experts in strategic
planning from within the Department as well as from outside
organizations. These consultations have led us to formally engage with
both the Office of the Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction
(CRS), which is the State Department lead for comprehensive strategic
planning and assessment on U.S. National security interests, and Blue
Law International, a private consulting firm. Both of these entities
have undertaken similar successful efforts in other countries.
State has asked CRS and Blue Law to work together in developing a
coordinated and comprehensive strategic plan that includes the
following:
A review of the government of Mexico's strategic plans for
both reforming its justice sector and reducing the threat posed
by transnational criminal organizations;
An explanation of how U.S. assistance under the Merida
Initiative integrates into and bolsters the GOM's strategy.
This narrative will also develop short- and longer-term goals
and anticipate potential obstacles to meeting them;
A framework of performance measures which mirror and
complement the four-pillar strategy defined by the United
States and the government of Mexico;
A strategy for how the department might best organize its
efforts to meet the goals outlined in the strategic plan; and
An outline of a program-level strategic plan which lays out
U.S. Government engagement across a number of individual
projects with the Mexican Federal Police, and which includes
program level performance measures.
CRS and Blue Law have begun this effort, including meeting with
stakeholders throughout the State Department, the interagency
community, NGOs, academics, and others. They will also spend a
substantial period of time meeting with Merida implementers on the
ground in Mexico. We expect to have the first products in June.
Question 3c. How do you envision the status of program 1 year from
now?
Answer. In 1 year, we will have been operating at full staff for a
full year; and these staff will have orchestrated a significant
increase in the pace of deliveries. For 2011, we have set a goal of
delivering $500 million in Merida assistance, which is 40 percent more
than was delivered during the previous 3 years combined. During this
year, we will deliver almost all of the large and expensive equipment,
including non-intrusive inspection equipment (NIIE), aviation, and IT
equipment, and shift towards provision of training and technical
assistance, focused primarily on justice sector capacity-building and
reforms.
We are currently exploring new contracting mechanisms for large
State and local training programs that will facilitate the reform and
professionalization of Mexico's over 2,000 State and local police
entities. In addition, we hope to see more progress on judicial reform
at both the Federal and State levels.
Question 4. Mr. Nichols, after the United States trains Mexican
Federal officials under the Merida program, what steps, if any, are
taken to ensure that this training trickles down to the Mexican State
and local level, where it is needed most since crime in Mexico is
traditionally investigated and prosecuted at that level?
Answer. During the first years of the Merida Initiative, our
assistance primarily targeted Federal institutions for multiple
reasons, including: U.S. foreign assistance is often primarily
government-to-government bilateral assistance; performance at the
Federal level reaches and sets the standard for the entire country; and
the most trusted and able partners could be found at the Federal level
at that time. Furthermore, it was the Federal Government, under the
leadership of President Felipe Calderon, that took the lead in
launching broad institutional reforms and focusing attention on taking
town the transnational criminal organizations (TCOs).
More recently, however, we and Mexican Federal officials have
agreed that it is essential to expand training assistance to strengthen
State and municipal institutions, because the vast majority of crime
and violence in Mexico occurs at the State and local jurisdictional
level. In some cases, for example with judicial reforms, it is the
States that are in the lead in implementing Constitutionally-mandated
reforms. In other cases, State and municipal police, prosecutors,
corrections staff, and other justice sector officials are on the front
lines of combating TCO-related crimes. Beginning in fiscal year 2010,
Merida Initiative budgeting has shifted towards supporting these State
and local institutions. We are targeting those local institutions in
regions where crime and violence are the most extreme, notably near
Mexico's Northern border with the United States. All of this State-
level work is being closely coordinated with the Mexican Federal
Government.
Questions From Ranking Member William R. Keating for Frank O. Mora
Question 1. There were recent media reports concerning the use of
U.S. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles inside Mexico. However, the reports were
unclear regarding whether the assets were owned by DoD or DHS. Are DoD
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles being used in Mexico and if so what benefits,
if any, have been achieved by their use?
Answer. Unfortunately, we are unable to address in an unclassified
forum the global deployment status of any of our Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance assets. Such information is routinely
provided to the Armed Services Committees at the appropriate
classification level. We are also unable to provide any insight into
what assets the Department of Homeland Security may have deployed,
either currently or in the past.
Question 2. What results, if any, have been achieved by DoD-led
Defense Bilateral Working Group, and other DoD-related programs?
Answer. On June 14, 2011, Mexico will host the second U.S.-Mexico
Defense Bilateral Working Group (DBWG) meeting in Mexico. This annual
forum was established last year as a venue for structured, strategic
dialogue between our defense ministries to coordinate on security and
defense issues. In addition to our traditional areas of cooperation
such as human rights and counter-narcotics training, we plan to discuss
increasing our collaboration on cybersecurity, energy security, and
chemical and radiological response capabilities. DoD hopes to establish
working groups to develop specific courses of action to enhance
collaboration in the areas of bilateral and regional security
cooperation, counternarcotics cooperation, disaster response and
preparedness, and science and technology. Additionally, through the
DBWG, we are exploring ways to partner more closely with Mexico to
address emerging threats along Mexico's southern border with Guatemala
and Belize.
Questions From Ranking Member William R. Keating for John Bailey
Question 1. Human rights complaints regarding Plan Colombia were
widespread. Some reports stated that over 20,000 people were killed by
the Colombian Government and millions more were displaced and
ultimately Plan Colombia was a human rights disaster. To that end,
given the high level of complaints associated with both initiatives,
shouldn't those issues be resolved before we begin recommending a Plan
Colombia-like solution in Mexico?
Answer. ``Plan Colombia'' is a broad category with lots of
different pieces. So it's not a very useful label. That said, human
rights concerns ought to weigh heavily in the choice of strategy and
instruments in an anti-crime program in Mexico. The Colombian
government and its police and armed forces improved their performance
on this matter over the years, though at a very high cost. The big
human rights offender is the armed insurgency, especially the FARC.
Fortunately, Mexico does not have an armed insurgency of any
significance. The dilemma is that Mexico will have to rely on its armed
forces in its anti-crime strategy for some time to come, and the armed
forces are not well trained for police-type work.
Question 2. By your own admission, ``Mexico is much bigger and more
complex than Colombia.'' Further, when you compare and contrast the
Merida Initiative with Plan Colombia, the result has far more contrasts
than comparisons. Therefore, isn't comparing the two essentially
comparing apples with oranges?
Answer. The contrasts are important, but there are also important
lessons to be learned from the Colombian case. I mention those in the
paper, but want to underline the importance of political consensus
around an anti-crime initiative; development of a strategy; respect for
human rights; and development of effective operational intelligence.
Question 3. In February 2009, you published a white paper titled:
``Plan Colombia and Merida Initiative: Policy Twins or Distant
Cousins?'' In this paper you wrote ``violence associated with organized
crime is a significant challenge in both countries, but in quite
different contexts.'' You also stated that unlike Colombia ``guerilla
insurgency is not an issue in Mexico.'' Clearly, the type of crime that
is being perpetrated should frame the solution to combating that crime.
Wouldn't these differences indicate that a Plan Colombia model is not
the best solution for Mexico's problems?
Answer. Mexico suffers from two different types of criminality, one
which is typical and ordinary of virtually any Latin American country,
and another that is well organized and heavily armed. Mexico needs some
type of well-organized and well-armed police force that can work with
specific and trained elements drawn from the armed forces. Colombia has
several advantages in the ways its police and armed forces are
organized and can cooperate.
Question 4. If Mexico followed the Plan Colombia model, it would
militarize the response to drug trafficking and violent crime--which
are traditionally addressed at the State or local level. Wouldn't this
disrupt the success that the Mexican law enforcement has already
achieved with the arrest and elimination of many of the major DTO
leaders?
Answer. Actually, Mexico's armed forces have carried the brunt of
the work in confronting the DTOs, much more so than the police. The
police have suffered recurring problems of corruption and
ineffectiveness. The important lesson from Colombia is that it reformed
its police in terms of effectiveness and integrity (although the police
still have serious problems). Police reform is Mexico's top priority,
and it isn't clear that the reform is going well. The pressing dilemma
is the pressure to remove the armed forces from policing but without
sufficient progress in police reform to replace them.
Question 5. The FARC was considered a political organization with
political objectives and at one point nearly 40% of Colombia was under
some level of FARC control. On the other hand, approximately 84% of the
violence in Mexico occurs in just 4 of Mexico's 32 states and DTOs seek
to make money, not political statements. Doesn't this distinction rule
out classifying DTOs as terrorist as well as rule out a Plan Colombia
model for Mexico?
Answer. A point to underline is that Mexico's anti-crime strategy
is highly politicized. The political parties use the crime problem to
their electoral advantage. The idea of classifying DTOs as terrorist
organizations will further politicize the strategy. Actors will be
tempted to pin the terrorist label on their political adversaries or on
problem groups, such as street youth. I oppose classifying Mexico's
DTOs as terrorist organizations.
Question 6. It appears from your testimony that you believe that
Merida may not be the most effective solution for Mexico's drug battle
against DTOs. You suggest that it should be ``redesigned and
reinvigorated.'' What changes would you make to Merida to achieve the
effective results?
Answer. The most important changes in Merida is for the United
States Government to deliver on its pledges of reducing domestic drug
consumption, stopping the flows of weapons southward, and adopting more
effective anti-money laundering operations in the United States itself.
Mexicans have the perception, correct in my view, that the United
States is only marginally committed to fighting drugs and is delivering
half-measures. Also, I would underline again the need for well-designed
pilot projects (the ``resilient community'' pillar) in selected cities
along the border (e.g., Juarez, Tijuana) in order to find out what
works with respect to repressing armed gangs and rebuilding the social
fabric of communities.
|
NEWSLETTER
|
|
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list
|
|
|
