FY 1994 BUDGET - ARMS CONTROL AND NONPROLIFERATION, 04/28/1993, Testimony
- Basis Date:
- 19930607
- Chairperson:
- T. Bevill
- Committee:
- House Appropriations
- Docfile Number:
- T93AV130
- Hearing Date:
- 19930428
- DOE Lead Office:
- AN
SUB
- Committee:
- Energy and Water Development
- Hearing Subject:
- FY 1994 BUDGET - ARMS CONTROL AND NONPROLIFERATION
- Witness Name:
- V. Alessi
-
Hearing Text:
-
Statement of Dr. Victor E. Alessi
Director for
Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation
Office of Intelligence and National Security
Department of Energy
FY 1994 Appropriations Hearings
INTRODUCTION
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I welcome this opportunity
to present to you the activities of the Office of Arms Control and
Nonproliferation (AN). The Office is incorporated in the newly-formed
Office of Intelligence and National Security under the direction of
Dr. John G. Keliher.
The goal of this organization will be to support, through the most
efficient use of DOE's unique technical and analytical resources, the
arms control and nonproliferation objectives of the Clinton
Administration to: halt the spread of weapons of mass destruction,
strengthen existing international agreements, and pursue new and
effective arms control strategies for the Post-Cold War era.
MISSION
The Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation directs development
and coordination of DOE's policies, plans, and procedures relating to
arms control and nonproliferation; manages DOE's supporting research
and development for verification and monitoring of arms control and
nonproliferation treaties and agreements; integrates DOE's policies
and activities related to arms control and nonproliferation as these
areas become increasingly intertwined; serves as the DOE focal point
for technical support to other government agencies on arms control and
nonproliferation matters and represents DOE in related international
negotiations and consultations. In addition, the Office is playing an
important role in coordinating the Department's efforts in support of
U.S. activities aimed at assisting Russia and other former Soviet
republics in critical areas such as safe, secure nuclear warhead
dismantlement, emergency response capabilities, export controls, and
fissile materials accountability and safeguards. More specifically,
the mission of the Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation is to:
o establish a single effective DOE voice in development and
implementation of U.S. arms control and nonproliferation
policies, including better integration as DOE's activities in
these two policy areas increase;
o represent the Department's interests in and provide technical
support to U.S. Government organizations responsible for
policy-making and implementation in the areas of arms control
and nonproliferation;
o participate in and provide technical representation and
analytical support to U.S. bilateral/multilateral negotiations
and activities with foreign governments, agencies, and
international organizations related to arms control and
nonproliferation;
o identify and appropriately utilize scientific and technological
expertise resident in the Department and its National
Laboratories in order to develop new and improved technologies
to aid the U.S. Government and the international community in
resolving difficult arms control and nonproliferation policy,
implementation, and compliance analysis issues;
o coordinate National Laboratory research, development and
analytical programs in support of U.S. arms control and
nonproliferation activities, with priority to establishing a
baseline studies program at the National Laboratories to support
broader U.S. arms control and nonproliferation objectives, such
as the elimination of chemical and biological weapons and the
reduction of missile systems as well as nuclear weapons;
o implement the Department's arms control and nonproliferation
responsibilities arising from treaties and agreements and
mandated by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Act of 1978, and the US-IAEA Participation
Act of 1957;
o represent the Department's interests in and provide technical
support to all organizations responsible for policy-making and
implementation of export controls, including development of the
U.S. Government's Nuclear Referral List and participation in
international export control activities conducted by the Nuclear
Suppliers Group (NSG); the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of
Nuclear Weapons, or Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), Exporters
Committee (also known as the Zangger Committee); Coordinating
Committee on Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM); the Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR); and the Australia Group on
Chemical and Biological Weapons;
o implement the Department's responsibility to control U.S.
participation in foreign production of Special Nuclear Materials
under 10 CFR Part 810 and refer recommendations to the Secretary
of Energy for decisions;
o represent the Department's interests in and provide technical
support for all Departmental interactions, both within the U.S.
Government and with international bodies such as the
International Atomic Energy Agency IAEA , relating to policy,
technology development and technical implementation for both
international safeguards and physical protection of nuclear
materials;
o represent the Department's interests in and provide technical
support for negotiation of U.S. bilateral and multilateral
agreements concerning cooperation in research and development
on international safeguards and the physical protection of
nuclear materials, and in implementing those agreements; and
o conduct the U.S. support program to develop international
safeguards technologies for use by the IAEA and other
international nonproliferation organizations. Activities
include performing system studies on specific safeguards
methods and operations, research and development of equipment
and techniques for use in nonproliferation activities, and
providing personnel training programs for the IAEA in support
of its international safeguards activities.
FY 1994 FUNDING REQUEST
DOE Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation (AN) programs
presently are funded under the program lines Verification and Control
Technology with a FY 1993 budget of $282,715,000, Nuclear Safeguards
and Security with a FY 1993 budget of $12,024,000 and Department
Administration with a FY 1993 budget of $2,757,000. Beginning in FY
1994, all funding for these activities are included in the Verification
and Control Technology line, with an FY 1994 budget request of
$322,922,000.
This increase in funding profile for the total complement of AN
programs is required to support anticipated increases in AN's
activities, particularly in the nonproliferation area.
Support activity requirements for arms control verification will
continue. However, support activity requirements for nonproliferation
related activities will substantially increase, as will the
requirements for analytical and technical support for new nuclear arms
control negotiations (e.g., comprehensive test ban, special nuclear
material production cutoff).
In addition, the Department and its facilities will be increasingly
involved in the implementation of prospective arms control treaties
and agreements (e.g., overflights under the Open Skies Treaty, on-site
inspections under the Chemical Weapons Convention). The Office of Arms
Control and Nonproliferation will be deeply involved in providing
guidance within the Department of Energy on treaty obligations and the
requirements they impose on the Department of Energy and its
facilities.
VERIFICATION AND CONTROL TECHNOLOGY
DETECTION TECHNOLOGY
Under the Detection Technology Program, for which $217,215,000 is
requested for FY 1994, we have developed, or are developing,
monitoring systems and inspection equipment to verify compliance with
the Limited Test B,an Treaty (LTBT), Treaty on the Nonproliferation of
Nuclear Weapons or Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), Threshold Test Ban
Treaty (TTBT), Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET),
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), and Conventional Forces
in Europe Treaty (CFE), the U.S./Soviet bilateral Chemical Weapons
Destruction Agreement, the Treaty Between the United States of America,
Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus on the Reduction and
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START), and the Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC). In addition, we are investigating arms
control technologies potentially applicable to the Open Skies Treaty
initiative. We are also expanding our Proliferation Detection
Technologies program for monitoring proliferation problem countries.
Our verification and monitoring requirements involve a wide range of
capabilities, many of which are unique. Some of these capabilities are
embodied in new systems drawn from existing technologies. This is
particularly true for near-term verification and monitoring needs. For
example, the DOE built new systems for local seismic measurements in
order to have the capability to verify the recently-ratified Peaceful
Nuclear Explosions Treaty. Similarly, the DOE developed a system to
distinguish between single and multiple warhead missiles for use in
verifying the INF Treaty, making use of equipment constructed from
off-the-shelf components for detecting neutrons.
Other capabilities are applied to development of new technologies,
many of which require advances in the state-of-the-art. For example,
the difficult demands of verifying the Chemical Weapons Convention
require technological capabilities that do not now exist. The DOE
Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation attempts to anticipate
future arms control initiatives by developing technologies to make them
effectively verifiable. Much of the technology that will be used in
current and near-term arms control agreements is the result of long
lead-time research and development. The same will be true of future
agreements.
The Detection Technology Program is organized into four functional
areas: (1) On-Site Verification; (2) Regional Measurements; (3)
Remote Sensing; and (4) Advanced Concepts/Technology Development.
On-site Verification activities are comprised of systems and
technologies that are used to monitor treaties with the
cooperation of the inspected party. A number of DOE-developed on-
site monitoring systems are now being used in implementing
treaties, e.g., the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty.
Since enactment of that treaty, the DOE technical community has
further utilized its broad scientific resources to apply
technological measurements and methods to verification regimes
negotiated for the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, the Peaceful Nuclear
Explosions Treaty and the START Treaty.
Regional Measurement activities include developing seismic
verification systems and data processing capabilities to detect,
identify, locate and characterize underground nuclear explosions,
emphasizing regional rather than teleseismic monitoring. Regional
Measurement activities additionally include all of the projects
associated with the detection and characterization of effluents
associated with the development or production of weapons of mass
destruction.
Remote Sensing activities have been underway for over thirty
years. These activities are comprised of systems and technologies
that are used to monitor treaties and agreements without the
cooperation of the other party. One example of DOE verification
efforts in this area is the satellite instrumentation program
for worldwide monitoring of the Limited Test Ban Treaty and the
Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Another element of
the Remote Sensing activity is the development of new satellite
sensing techniques that cover portions of the electromagnetic
spectrum outside of the visible range for nuclear explosion
detection. New satellite sensing techniques are also being
investigated that would enhance our capabilities for monitoring
the proliferation of other weapons of mass destruction.
In the Advanced Concepts/Technology Development activity we will
continue a modest effort to extend the frontiers of science and
technology in ways that may be useful for future verification
and nonproliferation needs. Under this program, the DOE scientific
community is encouraged to invest its imagination and initiative
in technical concepts. This program generates and tests the
technical feasibility of new concepts and develops technologies
that could improve U.S. verification capabilities for existing
treaties, or that could be useful in helping to verify future
arms control regimes, including those involving bans on the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
It is important to emphasize the versatility and quality of the
Scientific support we receive from the DOE National Laboratories. We
consider their applied technical expertise, which evolved primarily
from nuclear weapons programs at the laboratories, to be a highly
valued national asset for arms control and nonproliferation
verification technology development. While we have attempted to
maintain a stable level of resource allocation to the laboratories, we
have also undertaken a concerted effort, including a life-cycle
planning process, to focus on longer-range issues which allow us to
begin and complete discrete projects in an orderly and efficient
manner. We believe that, because of the opportunity to tap the broad
expertise of the National Laboratories, we at the DOE's Office of Arms
Control and Nonproliferation have a unique opportunity to apply that
expertise to the Nation's arms control treaty verification and
nonproliferation technical and analytical needs.
For nearer-term efforts related to existing arms control and
nonproliferation treaties or those under negotiation, DOE works
closely with other agencies having verification technology programs.
In addition, DOE is a member of the interagency committee responsible
for advising the administration on verification technology. DOE's
cooperation and coordination with other agencies involved in arms
control and nonproliferation enables it to be flexible and responsive
in a timely way to new initiatives that may require adjustments and
additions to our research programs. Where resulting arms control and
nonproliferation verification technology requirements are better
defined and the need is more immediate, we draw upon existing
technology and adapt it to meet those requirements.
Recognizing that policies change as a result of international
events, related public activities, fiscal realities, or legislative
mandates, and given that technology development is time consuming, we
believe it is also prudent to pursue long-term technology development
in support of more generic requirements. For this reason we are
investing a fraction of our resources toward development of future
technologies that are not directly related to current arms control and
nonproliferation agreements in effect or being negotiated.
ANALYTICAL SUPPORT
The Analytical Support activities are managed by the Policy and
Technical Analysis Division and include a full spectrum of activities
in support of U.S. arms control and nonproliferation policy development
and implementation. DOE prepares thorough technical analyses of
options available to the United States, including assessment of impacts
on U.S. and allied security postures and of their effective
verifiability, and contributes them to the U.S. government's
interagency policy process. Of particular significance in this regard
are the nuclear testing deliberations and security policy initiatives
involving nuclear weapons where DOE's National Laboratories and
production facilities are directly affected by the resulting treaties,
protocols, and implementing procedures.
This latter program, for example, provides analytical support for the
development of U.S. policy related to techniques that could be used
for verified and safe transportation, storage and dismantlement of
nuclear warheads plus controlled disposition of associated special
nuclear materials. Although verification of such activities is not
required under current arms control agreements, we are doing our
technical homework now (as we have done on other issues in the past) in
order to prepare options to meet possible future verification
requirements.
AN is also concerned with the human dimension of the proliferation
threat from the collapse of the Soviet Union, that is the possible
"brain drain" of former Soviet nuclear weapons scientists and
engineers. We are reviewing employment options within the Commonwealth
of Independent States (CIS) for scientists and engineers formerly
engaged in weapons design and production. DOE-developed proposals have
been integrated into a package of seven initiatives, two of which were
presented to President Yeltsin by Secretary of State Baker in
mid-February, 1992.
The program also provides analytical support for policy development
related to the implementation of treaties and agreements. One example
is our coordination of the planning and conduct of exercises and mock
challenge inspections at sensitive DOE facilities that may be subject
to on-site inspection under the Chemical Weapons Convention. We are
evaluating the relative merits of alternative approaches to
inspections and sharing the results with other departments and
agencies.
Analytical support activities also include the conduct of more far-
reaching studies, such as the integration of nonproliferation and arms
control analyses as a result of the changed global environment.
One of the Division's key FY 1994 priorities is to establish a baseline
long-term program of arms control/nonproliferation studies. A
corollary study involves the integration of analysis on proliferation
of chemical and biological weapons and missiles with analysis of arms
control related to chemical and biological weapons and missiles. Also
in FY 1994, the Policy and Technical Analysis Division plans to
institute an integrated review of Asian arms control and
nonproliferation issues, centered on China and its neighbors.
NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION POLICY
The Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy request for FY 1994 is $7,779,000,
which includes $5,854,000 for Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy
activities and $1,925,000 for the Reduced Enrichment Research Test
Reactor (RERTR) Program. The DOE has a major role in developing and
implementing U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy, including: support
for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); support for the
Department of State in its efforts to promote regional nuclear
nonproliferation regimes; support to the Department of State in
negotiation of new international "agreements for cooperation" in
peaceful uses of nuclear energy; review and approval of "subsequent
arrangements" under the Nuclear Nonproliferation and Atomic Energy
Acts; and managing implementation of the Reduced Enrichment Research
and Test Reactor (RERTR) program aimed at reducing the amount of high
enriched uranium in international commerce. The IAEA and other
international organizations face major challenges to their previous
capabilities because of developments in Iraq, South Africa, and North
Korea. We will continue to coordinate DOE involvement with other offices
and agencies to strengthen and support the IAEA and the United Nations
in facing these new tasks. We also develop DOE policy positions and
coordinate DOE support for Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT) matters with other Departments and Agencies including
State, Defense, Commerce, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and
the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA).
The NPT has been a cornerstone of U.S. nonproliferation efforts,
creating a norm of nonproliferation, and providing a foundation for
export controls and safeguards. In 1995, the parties to the NPT will
meet to determine whether to extend the NPT indefinitely or for a fixed
period or periods. Many issues will be raised, including the extent to
which the nuclear weapon states have met the NPT's arms control and
disarmament goals. In that regard, the very extensive progress now
being made in the nuclear arms control field, the prospect of further
stabilizing nuclear reductions, and the initiation of a comprehensive
test ban negotiation, strongly demonstrate our commitment to meeting
those goals. For our part, the Office of Arms Control and
Nonproliferation has already begun to think about the issues likely to
be raised at this Extension Conference and how best to make the case
for indefinite or long-term NPT extension. AN's integrated
responsibilities for arms control and nonproliferation will strengthen
DOE's ability to continue to play a constructive role in U.S.
Government planning for a successful NPT Extension Conference in 1995.
Regional nonproliferation problems are increasingly the focus of
concern. In the Middle East, South Asia, North Asia, and the Far East,
DOE is working with the State Department to provide technical support
and recommendations which further nonproliferation and arms control
efforts.
- International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA):
Support for the IAEA is provided in three major areas: (1)
policy and funding; (2) conferences and meetings; and, (3)
recruitment support for the IAEA Secretariat and for Technical
Programs and Technical Assistance projects.
The AN is the primary focal point for DOE participation in and
support of IAEA programs. Recently, a key issue has been
assisting the State Department in providing coordinated
technical assessment of complex information relating to
activities of proliferation concern in problem states. Other
activities include coordination of interagency technical
reviews of IAEA programs, arranging of technical support
from the public and private sectors for these activities,
and administration of State Department funds which are
transferred to DOE to support IAEA training, fellowships,
contributions in kind, safeguards and other nonproliferation
activities.
We can expect the IAEA's role in addressing global problems in
the areas of safeguards, safety, nuclear fuel cycle, and the
environment to continue increasing. The IAEA is now facing
unprecedented challenges which will tax its human, technical, and
financial capabilities. These include activities relating to
Iraq, Iran, South Africa, North Korea, and the former Soviet
Union. With regard to the UN military denuclearization plan for
Iraq, AN's nonproliferation programs played a critical role in
formulating the U.S. Government's plan for eliminating Iraq's
future capability to develop nuclear weapons. in addition, DOE
and its laboratories provided most of the U.S. experts for the
IAEA inspections conducted under the auspices of the UN Special
Commission on Iraq. DOE continues to be involved deeply in the
continuing inspections and long term monitoring of Iraq.
The Secretary of Energy traditionally heads the U.S. Delegation
to the IAEA General Conference and we participate at senior
levels in Board of Governors meetings. These commitments require
extensive preparation, advance planning, scheduling and preparing
briefing and issue papers as well as significant pre-meeting
interagency consultations.
- Agreements for Cooperation
The AN coordinates DOE's technical support and advice to the
Secretary of State in negotiating nuclear "agreements for
cooperation" for peaceful uses of nuclear energy with other
countries. Renegotiation of present agreements is a principal
mandate of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978. DOE has
participated in negotiating agreements with Japan, Australia,
Canada, Sweden, China, Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.
Continuing work is required to develop and implement
administrative arrangements for bringing these agreements into
effect.
During 1994, we will continue to cooperate with the Department
of State on negotiations for a new agreement with EURATOM as the
present one expires in 1995. It is very likely that new republics
in the Commonwealth of Independent States, as well as other
Eastern European countries, will want to reach agreement with the
United States on nuclear cooperation, following the Polish.
Hungarian and Czechoslovakian leads.
- Subsequent Arrangements
The DOE is responsible for analyzing and processing requests for
"subsequent arrangements" under provisions of the Atomic Energy
and Nuclear Nonproliferation Acts. These typically involve
requests for international sale or transfers of U.S.-origin
nuclear materials or retransfers and reprocessing of U.S.-origin
spent fuel and recovery of uranium and plutonium. Retransfer and
reuse of plutonium to Japan, or as plutonium-uranium oxide fuels
in Swiss power reactors, are sensitive issues. These cases
require extensive coordination among DOE National Laboratories
tracking nuclear materials and with other government agencies,
and often attract the attention of Congress and public interest
groups.
- Policy Development and Support
Traditionally, the United States has relied on nonproliferation
and technology denial as an approach to preventing the spread of
weapons of mass destruction. Current efforts seem to be moving in
two new directions: counter-proliferation which goes beyond
technology denial; and confidence-building between regional
adversaries, which gets at the roots of proliferation. AN is
prepared to assist the U.S. government in both areas.
- Reduced Enrichment Research and Test Reactor (RERTR) Program
Established in 1978, the purpose of the Reduced Enrichment
Research and Test Reactor (RERTR) program is to contribute to
U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy by minimizing access by
non-nuclear-weapon-states to highly enriched uranium (HEU);
reducing the risk of theft or seizure of HEU by terrorist or
other subnational groups; and reducing the demand for HEU for
civil uses, which could be invoked to justify construction or
operation by non-nuclear-weapon-states of enrichment facilities
to produce HEU. This has been one of our most successful
nonproliferation activities.
More specifically, the program has developed, tested and
demonstrated high density, low enriched uranium (LEU) fuels which
will allow conversion of all but three foreign reactors fueled
with U.S.-origin HEU. A major effect has been substantial
reductions in the level of U.S. exports of HEU, further
minimizing possible international transportation risks. Our
success in obtaining substantial participation and cooperation
from other foreign countries in implementation of the program is
exemplified by a series of successful annual international RERTR
meetings and continuing close cooperation among lead RERTR
program people at Argonne National Laboratory and many foreign
laboratories and research institutes.
During the coming year, one issue related to the RERTR program
will be the implementation of DOE's proposed policy on accepting
HEU fuel for disposition. Another issue will be overseeing
conversion from HEU to LEU fuel for the Pitesti Research Reactor,
under an agreement successfully negotiated with Romania during
1991. In 1992, the U.S. shipped five LEU fuel elements prepared
under the RERTR program to Romania and actual reactor restart
took place under Argonne oversight. The five LEU fuel elements
will keep the Pitesti Research Reactor in operation until DOE
completes conversion of Romanian-owned HEU into LEU fuel.
EXPORT CONTROLS AND INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS
DOE remains a key participant in the development and implementation of
controls on U.S. nuclear, nuclear related, and dual-use items under
the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act
(NNPA). DOE is firmly committed to President Clinton's goal of
arresting nuclear proliferation and cooperating with other U.S.
government agencies to undertake major efforts to achieve this
objective. DOE plays a vital role in U.S. nonproliferation export
control, and international safeguards policy by providing technical
expertise to the interagency forum. DOE's technical assets found at the
DOE National Laboratories are indispensable in contributing to U.S.
export control policies and in determining that the export of specific
commodities is not inimical to U.S. national security.
- Nonproliferation-related Assistance to the Former Soviet Union
Assessing proliferation implications of the collapse of the
Former Soviet Union (FSU) is another critical area of my
office's involvement. DOE is actively engaged in U.S.
Government efforts to prevent diversion of nuclear weapons,
materials, and technology from the FSU to proliferant
countries. DOE is examining measures to assist the newly
independent states of the FSU to establish effective
accounting and control systems for fissile materials, as
well as export control systems.
For FY 1994 the Export Control and International Safeguards budget
request is $37,628,000. Of this sum, $21,351,000 is for International
Safeguards Program and $16,297,000 is for Export Control Program and
related interagency and international nonproliferation activities.
EXPORT CONTROL PROGRAM
- Interagency Nonproliferation Activities/ Dual-Use Exports
Dual-use exports are items that could have nuclear as well as
non-nuclear applications. Mandated by the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Act of 1978, the Departments of Commerce
and Energy jointly develop and maintain a list of dual-use
items, known as the Nuclear Referral List. Whenever the
Department of Commerce receives an application to export an
item on the Nuclear Referral List (NRL) to a country of
proliferation concern, it refers the application to DOE for
review and recommendation.
Whenever DOE's review determines that export of a dual-use
item may raise a potential proliferation concern, that case
is referred to the interagency Subgroup on Nuclear Export
Coordination (SNEC). The Department of State chairs the SNEC,
while DOE provides the Secretariat and maintains a classified
computerized data base that includes all export cases
addressed by the SNEC. Other members are the Departments of
Defense and Commerce, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,
and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The Central Intelligence
Agency and National Security Agency have observer status.
Referrals to the SNEC may be made by any member agency but, in
practice, the vast majority, about 90 percent are made
by DOE. In 1992, DOE reviewed about 6,700 dual-use export
license applications. About 500 were referred to the SNEC
which recommended denial of 45.
- Export Control Computer Network
AN has taken the lead role in the development of a
nonproliferation data base, known as the Proliferation
Information Networked System (PINS). PINS is a nation-wide
computer network dedicated to real-time sharing of export
licensing and nonproliferation information among involved
U.S. government agencies. Presently PINS is being
utilized by DOE and the Department of Commerce to process
dual-use cases. The network will allow comprehensive exchanges
of proliferation data including identification of procurement
patterns by clandestine procurement networks. A large number
of databases in support of U.S. government nonproliferation
policy, including supporting, technical analysis, will be
available on the system. In the future, PINS workstations
will be made available at the State Department, the Department
of Defense, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, DOE's
National Laboratories, as well as other U.S. government
agencies.
- Statutory Requirements/DOE 10 CFR Part 810.
Any U.S. firm or individual seeking to engage, directly or
indirectly, in the production of special nuclear material
outside the United States must obtain authorization from the
Secretary of Energy. DOE regulations implementing this
statutory requirement are set out in 10 CFR Part 810. When
an 810 application is submitted to my office a staff analysis
is conducted, with DOE's findings being circulated for
concurrence to the Department of State, and to the Departments
of Defense and Commerce, the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for their views.
The Secretary then makes an authorization determination.
My office has published in the Federal Register on March 11,
1993, a proposed revision of DOE 10 CFR Part 810 that will
speed authorization of U.S. assistance to improve the safety
of Soviet designed nuclear-powered reactors. This revision
also removes Eastern European countries from the list that
currently require specific authorization by the Secretary of
Energy for power-reactor assistance, thereby, making such
assistance generally authorized and more readily obtainable
for legitimate end-users.
- International Nonproliferation Activities
The effectiveness of U.S. export control efforts requires
that the U.S. Government seek and obtain the cooperation of
other supplier countries. In this regard, DOE has been an
active participant in various international export control
mechanisms -- including the Coordinating Committee on
Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), the NPT Exporters
Committee (or Zangger Committee) and the Nuclear Suppliers
Group (NSG).
The collapse of communism, the breakup of the Soviet Union
into independent states, and political transformations in
Eastern Europe have led to liberalization of COCOM export
controls. DOE has been an active participant in formulating
U.S. Government positions regarding these changes.
With regard to the NPT Exporters committee, DOE provides the
technical resources, to upgrade the Zangger Committee's
"trigger list," that is, items if exported, trigger the
initiation of safeguards under the International Atomic
Energy Agency.
DOE has taken an active role in the rejuvenated Nuclear
Suppliers Group, taking the lead in developing the Dual-Use
List of controlled commodities. One of the NSG's goals is to
address the issue of achieving international nonproliferation
control over dual-use exports. During this year, AN has
provided recommendations for additions to the NSG's specific
"trigger list" regarding controls of equipment and processes
for the enrichment of uranium. DOE also is set to begin work
on a comprehensive guide to the NSG Dual-Use List.
AN has also taken the lead role in developing an information
sharing system for NSG members. At the March 1993, NSG
Plenary meeting of the NSG, in response to member nations
concerns for a strong need for information exchange under
the dual-use regime, DOE presented a concept for a
computerized information sharing system. Thus, US/DOE
will lead a NSG sponsored Technical Working Group to examine
issues associated with information sharing, including the
possibility of a computerized system. A prototype system is
being developed by DOE which would allow NSG member
nations to share on a timely basis notifications of export
denials of NSG controlled items. This would ensure the
concept of no "economic undercutting" as well as reaffirming
a strong commitment to controlling proliferation.
INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS PROGRAM
The International Safeguards Program supports U.S. nonproliferation
and national security objectives under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,
as amended, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978, the Omnibus
Diplomatic Security and Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986, and related
Executive Orders and Presidential directives.
The primary program objective is to provide a sound technical basis to
support U.S. nonproliferation policies, and to strengthen
international safeguards and physical security to prevent misuse of
nuclear materials, through technical support to the IAEA and
cooperative efforts with other nations. This requires management of the
Department's policy and technology development programs for
international safeguards. These programs are implemented through
strong technical leadership and active participation in negotiations
and collaboration with other U.S. agencies, foreign nations, and
international organizations to strengthen international safeguards.
- International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
New challenges increasingly face the IAEA which is responsible
for implementing the regular international safeguards regime.
Recent examples are the withdrawal of North Korea from the
Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and
South Africa's declaration of having produced at least six
nuclear weapons. In addition, one result of the Gulf War was
agreement on the need for the IAEA to undertake so-called
"special inspections" and long term monitoring under its
existing rights. Moreover, the IAEA faces new responsibilities
resulting from the acceptance of full-scope safeguards by
Argentina, Brazil and South Africa, the eventual expected
acceptance of full-scope safeguards in the Republics of the
former Soviet Union, and the need to strengthen safeguards
worldwide in order to maintain confidence in the
nonproliferation regime. IAEA budget constraints from a "zero
real growth" budget policy that has existed since 1981 and
because the republics of the former Soviet Union and a number
of other countries are having difficulty paying their IAEA
budget assessments heighten the importance of DOE's program to
support development of state-of-the-art technologies that will
enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of IAEA safeguards.
In that regard, as part of our nonproliferation obligations
and responsibilities, the Department provides technical and
financial assistance to the IAEA to strengthen international
safeguards and physical protection of special nuclear
materials. DOE recently established a 5-year cooperative
arrangement which we used to transfer $1 million of
extrabudgetary assistance to support safeguards. Under this
arrangement DOE will continue to provide in-kind support to
the IAEA in the way of training and technical assistance. In
addition, DOE's long-range base program for technology
research and development to strengthen international safeguards
develops new technology and concepts and includes international
technology exchanges with other nations. Tasks focus on the
implementation of IAEA safeguards at DOE facilities pursuant
to the U.S.-IAEA Safeguards Treaty and technology
development for IAEA safeguards at advanced nuclear facilities
(e.g. reprocessing, enrichment, plutonium fuel fabrication) and
new inspection scenarios, long term monitoring, special
inspections, and environmental sampling.
Technology developed by DOE is transferred to the IAEA through
the U.S. Program of Technical Assistance to IAEA Safeguards
(POTAS), the DOE/IAEA cooperative arrangement, and DOE
cooperation with other countries. POTAS is a voluntary support
program managed by the interagency Technical Support
Coordinating Committee and has been funded through the
Foreign Assistance Act since 1977. We provide technical
leadership for POTAS, which responds to near-term and urgent
needs identified by the IAEA Director General. Through POTAS,
IAEA inspector's use of growing quantities of DOE-developed
equipment to measure nuclear materials or for unattended
surveillance at safeguarded facilities. DOE also trains IAEA
inspectors in effective and efficient use of safeguards
equipment. Since 1979, all IAEA inspectors have attended our
training courses at Los Alamos National Laboratory.
DOE also co-sponsors international training courses with the
IAEA for foreign nationals in physical protection and
national systems for accounting and control of nuclear
materials. Argentine and Brazilian officials have credited
their participation in these courses as an important factor
in helping establish the Argentine-Brazilian Agency for
Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials under a treaty
signed at Guadalajara, Mexico, in July 1991. This agency is
a cornerstone of the IAEA safeguards agreements which in
December 1991 opened all Argentine and Brazilian nuclear
facilities to inspection by a joint safeguards inspection team
patterned after the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM)
and agreed to comprehensive safeguards inspections by the IAEA.
- Physical Protection
DOE also manages the program for U.S. bilateral consultations
on physical protection and leads the U.S. teams in these
consultations. The Departments of State and Defense, the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency participate. These consultations provide
a channel for regular discussions of physical protection
issues and informing other countries of U.S. technical
developments in physical protection. These talks have
contributed to strengthening physical protection worldwide
over the past decade.
- Safeguards Cooperation Agreements
As part of U.S. support for international cooperation in
research and development, testing and evaluation of
technologies, equipment, and procedures to improve nuclear
material control, accountancy, verification, physical
protection and advanced containment and surveillance
technologies worldwide, the Department has a number of
bilateral agreements for cooperation. These agreements
include DOE umbrella agreements, letter agreements, project
specific memoranda of understanding, and agreements in
support of presidential initiatives. The parties to these
agreements include: the Japan Atomic Energy Research
Institute, Japan Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development
Company, German Ministry of Science and Technology, French
Atomic Energy Commission, European Community (EURATOM), and
Australia. The Department also has letter agreements for
cooperation with the Argentine Atomic Energy Commission, the
Brazilian Nuclear Energy Commission, and the United Kingdom
Atomic Energy Authority. We are also negotiating agreements
with Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus.
TREATY IMPLEMENTATION
Funds for arms control and nonproliferation treaty implementation,
$15,000,000.are included in this budget request for FY 1994. The DOE
has developed the hydrodynamic yield measuring technology (CORRTEX)
that will be used for Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) on-site
verification in the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Local
Seismic Network (LSN) for use in on-site verification of the Peaceful
Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET). DOE personnel have been trained and
stand ready to conduct the technical aspects of these verification
activities. As directed by the predecessor of the National Security
Council Arms Control Interagency Working Group, DOE will advise and
provide technical assistance to the On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA)
which has the primary responsibility for TTBT/PNET implementation. The
salaries of all DOE personnel, including contractor personnel, involved
in monitoring and inspection of U.S. and Russian explosions will be
borne by DOE. We presently have a reduced need for technical assistance
to OSIA and for manpower to monitor explosions under TTBT/PNET because
of the Russian testing moratorium. This could change should Russia
resume testing in FY 1993. Should the moratorium continue, portions of
this funding will again be used to support implementation of other
treaties and agreements, especially those in support of nuclear,
missile, chemical, and biological weapons nonproliferation efforts, UN
Security Council Resolution 687 (Iraq), and initiatives pertaining to
former Soviet Union weapon transportation, storage and dismantlement as
consistent with DOE mission responsibilities and capabilities.
PROGRAM DIRECTION
The AN Verification and Control Technology Program Direction, for
which $4,952,000 is requested in FY 1994, is separated into a
Headquarters element which manages and directs the overall DOE Arms
Control effort, and field elements which are responsible for the
implementation of Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) verification
requirements at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) in accordance with federal
and state laws.
CAPITAL EQUIPMENT
The FY 1994 AN capital equipment request of $13,873,000 is consistent
with support for a stable research and development program which
includes advanced concepts and methods, and development of prototypes.
CONSTRUCTION
To support various efforts in verification and control technologies,
we need a facility within the DOE complex that will serve as a focal
point for related technical activities in national security, arms
control and nonproliferation. Accordingly, we are requesting $8,515,000
in FY 1994 to continue work begun in FY 1990 on the Center for National
Security and Arms Control at Sandia National Laboratories in
Albuquerque. When completed in FY 1994, this facility will support
systems analysis, advanced concepts, ground-based verification,
satellite monitoring, intelligence, threat, and countermeasures
activities. It is the only dedicated arms control facility in the DOE
complex.
FUTURE ACTIVITIES
The DOE, utilizing the extensive technical expertise of its National
Laboratories, has established a robust program of technology
development and analytical studies in support of U.S. arms control and
nonproliferation policy formulation and implementation, treaty
verification and implementation, and R&D and technical support for
monitoring and compliance analysis. The consolidation of these major
efforts under the Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation have
permitted a focusing of the Department's extensive assets and a
synergism of activities that has enhanced the Department's
contributions to U.S. and global security efforts. We expect that the
recent consolidation of the Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation
with the Office of Intelligence, Security Affairs, and Emergency
Planning and Operations in the Office of Intelligence and National
Security will further enhance the timely and effective support the
DOE can provide to U.S. and international arms control and
nonproliferation objectives.
As the world continues to shift from an East-West focus to a
multipolar focus on regional issues, it is essential that the DOE and
the U.S. Government configure itself and its programs to meet
effectively the challenges that this new security focus presents. The
Department's consolidation of arms control, nonproliferation and
intelligence activities seeks to meet these new challenges. We believe
that the program we have laid out provides the necessary basis to
maintain and to improve the Department's unique capabilities that can
further enhance the effectiveness of U.S. and international arms
control and nonproliferation efforts.
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