FY 1996 BUDGET FOR NATION SECURITY PROGRAM, 04/04/1995, Testimony
- Basis Date:
- 19950420
- Chairperson:
- S. Thurmond
- Committee:
- Senate Armed Services
- Docfile Number:
- T95AA095
- Hearing Date:
- 19950404
- DOE Lead Office:
- S
- Hearing Subject:
- FY 1996 BUDGET FOR NATION SECURITY PROGRAM
- Witness Name:
- H. O'Leary
-
Hearing Text:
-
Statement of Hazel R. O'Leary
Secretary of Energy
Department of Energy
Before the
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
April 4, 1995
INTRODUCTION
Good afternoon Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for
inviting me to appear before the committee to discuss the important
national security activities carried out by the Department. These
activities continue to experience profound change, change that no one
could have predicted only a few years ago. Our ability to respond to
change in a timely and effective manner is testament to the
importance placed by our Administration on DOE's national security
activities. It also reflects the enormous talent and dedication of DOE
employees.
Before proceeding with the specific national security activities of DOE
I would like to briefly describe the self-examination and reform
activities that we have been pursuing for the past two years.
CREATING A NEW DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
The past two years have been an intense period of internal reform,
organizational change, and fundamental rethinking at the Department of
Energy. Never in the history of the Department has such an ambitious
set of initiatives been pursued for the purpose of improving the
performance, cutting costs, and fundamentally reshaping our business
activities. Six separate yet overlapping initiatives have served as
the embodiment of our desire to create a new Department of Energy.
1) Strategic Plan: Fueling a Competitive Economy
In the spring of 1993, we initiated the most comprehensive strategic
planning effort ever undertaken by the Department. Through a lengthy
and intensive process involving hundreds of employees from all parts of
the Department, its laboratories and facilities, a strategic plan was
developed which presents a shared vision for the Department into the
21st Century. Through this process, we achieved broad recognition of
the centrality of the Department's science and technology programs to
the successful execution of all our missions. As a result of the plan,
it became increasingly clear to all that the DOE laboratories provide
our primary capacity for mission accomplishment. In addition, we
sharpened the strategic focus and priorities for our core missions in
national security, energy, environment, and fundamental science.
2) Strategic Alignment
The Strategic Alignment initiative represents Phase-II of our strategic
planning process, and is expected to introduce some of the most
dramatic changes in the way the Department conducts its business since
the DOE was established in 1977. This intensive 120-day effort will
culminate in May with recommendations on how to minimize layers and
complexity of management in the Department, eliminate unnecessary and
redundant functions, reduce the cost of DOE programs, restructure the
Department, and align our organization with the Strategic Plan--so as
to better serve our customers. The Strategic Alignment process is one
of the mechanisms for implementing the recommendations of the Galvin
Task Force. The Department is committed to saving $1.4 billion from
efficiency improvements and cuts to lower priority programs over five
years through Strategic Alignment.
3) Contract Reform: Making Contracting Work Better and Cost Less
Through our contract reform initiatives, begun in spring 1993, we have
made enormous strides in carrying out the missions of the Department at
lower cost and with fewer employees. This effort has consisted of an
intensive examination of how we managed and what we expected from the
management and operations (M&O) contractors of the Department's
numerous labs and facilities. In June 1993, we established a Contract
Reform Team, under the leadership of Deputy Secretary Bill White, to
develop a plan for significantly improving the Department's contracting
practices. The Contract Reform Team produced a report in February 1994
which has set the stage for a shift to performance-based management
contracting and for enhanced competition for contract continuation.
Over the next few years, we will complete and/or restructure more than
$40 billion worth of contacts in all. On the basis of the contact
reforms already implemented at some of our facilities--such as Idaho
National Engineering Laboratory--significant savings have already been
achieved.
4) Galvin Task Force on Alternative Futures for the DOE National
Laboratories
As the Strategic Plan was nearing completion, we formed the Task Force
on Alternative Futures for the Department of Energy National
laboratories and tasked it with the job of conducting the first
post-Cold War assessment of the National Laboratories. We
intentionally constituted the Task Force with independent thinkers from
industry, academia, and the public. My selection of Bob Galvin was
specifically aimed at ensuring that an experienced business perspective
be brought to questions involving the future of our largest
laboratories. The Galvin Task Force was formed on February 2, 1994. I
asked Bob to report back to the Department within one year. On
February 1, 1995, he met that deadline by presenting the results of his
Task Force's efforts to the Secretary of Energy Advisory Board. I
address these results and our responses below.
5) Yergin Task Force on Strategic Energy Research and Development
In the search for a similarly-independent assessment of the
Department's energy R&D programs, in October 1994 we established a Task
Force of senior energy experts under the leadership of Daniel Yergin,
the Pulitzer prize-winning author and President of Cambridge Research
Associates, Inc. The Yergin Task Force is deep in the process of
examining the Department's $1.8 billion portfolio of applied energy
programs, and is committed to report in June 1995. The Department is
committed to saving $1.2 billion in our applied energy programs over
five years, as part of the $10.4 billion in savings over five years
announced by the President in December 1994.
6) Advisory Committee on External Regulation
The final initiative in this package of reform efforts is the Advisory
Committee on External Regulation of DOE Nuclear Safety, announced on
February 16, 1995. There is a growing sentiment within the Department,
at DOE laboratories and facilities, and by external
observers--including the Galvin Task Force--that the Department should
excise itself from its historic role of self-regulation. The
Department's existing complex system of self-regulation emerged from
the Manhattan Project, Atomic Energy Commission, and Congress in
response to the urgency of the nuclear weapons mission and the need for
secrecy at the weapons production complex and affiliated laboratories.
However, with the end of the Cold War and the consolidation of the
nation's weapons production complex, maintenance by the Department of a
separate apparatus for self-regulation appears to many as unnecessary.
It will not be a simple matter, however, to achieve the transition to
external regulation. Headed by John Ahearne, former Chairman of the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and Gerard Scannell, former Assistant
Secretary for Occupational Safety and Health, this Committee has been
tasked to provide recommendations to the Department regarding external
regulation in an interim report within six months and a final report by
the end of the year.
These six major initiatives demonstrate dramatic departures from the
past. The actions flowing from them are facilitating historic change
at the Department. Each of these initiatives is an action-oriented
assessment, resulting in commitments, deadlines, and assignments that
will contribute to continued improvements in delivering on the
Department's missions.
GALVIN TASK FORCE
Last year I chartered the Task Force on Alternative Futures for the
Department of Energy National Laboratories and tasked it with the job
of conducting the first post-Cold War assessment of the National
Laboratories. Unlike the numerous other studies that have been
conducted on the National Laboratories we have no interest in putting
the Galvin report on a shelf and continuing with the status quo. The
Task Force has developed a series recommendations that challenge the
Department and the laboratories to reach new levels of performance in
meeting the needs of the Nation. The Department is pleased with the
Task Force's strong support for the DOE's fundamental science mission
and view that the laboratories' research role is part of an essential,
fundamental cornerstone for continuing leadership by the United
States."
The Department embraces and will act on the overwhelming majority of
the Task Force's recommendations. It is our expectation that these
actions, as implemented through our report to the National Science and
Technology Council will result in a laboratory system that is more
efficient, cost effective, and mission focused. We anticipate that the
Department's management burden will be reduced and the performance of
the laboratories will improve. Success will be measured in terms of
lower overhead costs, streamlined oversight systems, reductions in the
number and burden of audits and appraisals, and increased productivity.
In the area of national security we are pleased by the Task Force's
support for the Department's science-based stockpile stewardship
program, including support for the National Ignition Facility. The
Task Force correctly observes that the focus of our national security
programs has changed dramatically as a result of the end of the Cold
War, cessation of nuclear testing, consolidation of most of our nuclear
weapons production complex, and new threats posed by the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction.
We agree with the Task Force that one of the most important priorities
for our stockpile stewardship mission is to attract and retain skilled
scientists, engineers, and managers over the years ahead with the
expertise required for the complex and demanding stewardship role. We
also agree that the starting point for assessing the future size,
budget levels, mission focus, and configuration of the Department's
three weapons laboratories must be the national security requirements
established by the President. The Department will closely evaluate the
Task Force's recommendations regarding a reduction of some of the
nuclear weapons functions at Lawrence Livermore and their transfer to
Los Alamos. We have an initial favorable disposition for a careful
phase-down of some of Livermore's nuclear weapons work, combined
with a re-emphasis on non-proliferation, counter-proliferation, and
verification activities. However, our actions proceeding down this
path--the timing and the details--must depend on assessments of how
best to meet our continuing national defense requirements in a wholly
new era.
The Task Force includes a critical assessment of the Department's
Environmental Management program. We do not believe that sufficient
effort was made by the Task Force to develop a full understanding of
the strides we have made in directly addressing problems we inherited
from the past. Over the past two years, we have worked to assess and
to quantify the vulnerabilities at each site and have established both
a national advisory board--which includes world-class scientists--and a
host of site-specific advisory boards. We have taken--and are
continuing to take--bold actions to cut costs, reinvent the program,
and accelerate clean-up activities. We already have successful
implemented several of the Task Force's recommendations in this area,
of which the Task Force apparently was unaware.
DISMANTLEMENT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
In recent months there have been a number of calls to eliminate the DOE
and transfer its national security responsibilities to the Department
of Defense (DOD), all in the name of saving money. A similar proposal
was offered by the Reagan Administration in 1982. Analysis by the
Congressional Budget Office and the General Accounting Office found
that no significant savings would be realized if DOE was dismantled.
We believe that there is a more important consideration. What is in
the best interest of the Nation's defense requirements?
The DOE, its laboratories, and contractors are the preeminent
authorities in this country regarding the production of nuclear weapons
and the associated materials. The horizontal integration of the
nuclear weapon activities within DOE and its "cradle-to-grave"
responsibilities for nuclear weapons results in a commitment,
continuity, and management flexibility important to program success.
There are clear distinctions between the nuclear weapons activities of
DOE and the DOD, distinctions which go back to the end of the World War
II and the McMahon Act. These distinctions include not only the
differences in size, but also in organization, management approach, and
unity of mission. Presidential decision-making concerning weapons has
profited from the Department of Energy's and the laboratories technical
independence from the military. The current separation of roles and
responsibilities ensures that safety issues are not subordinated to
weapons performance considerations. The Galvin Task Force reinforces
this perspective by concluding that "there is much value at this time
in maintaining an independent and technically expert organization to
focus on nuclear stockpile issues and continue to ensure that decisions
regarding the safety, control, and stewardship of nuclear weapons are
raised to the high policy level that they deserve."
Finally, the success of Stockpile Stewardship program will largely be
dependent upon the continued vitality and expertise of the nuclear
weapons laboratories. Shifting these laboratories to the Department of
Defense would risk the laboratories being sub-optimized to meet a
narrower defense-only mission, thus eroding the vitality of the
laboratories at an important and historic juncture in the weapons
program. Secretary Perry has said that "with the new technical
challenges of providing stewardship of the stockpile in the absence of
underground testing, this is not the time to be fundamentally
restructuring the management of these activities." The Galvin Report
concludes "there is no compelling reason for DOD to manage the national
security functions" at the weapons laboratories. Experts, including
the Chairman of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, John
Conway, and Dr. Edward Teller of Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory, have recently testified before the Congress against
transferring these functions to DOD.
OVERVIEW
Nuclear deterrence remains a cornerstone of the nation's defense
strategy. As President Clinton has stated "we will retain strategic
nuclear forces sufficient to deter any future hostile foreign
leadership with access to strategic nuclear forces from acting against
our vital interests and to convince it that seeking a nuclear advantage
would be futile. Therefore, we will continue to maintain nuclear
forces of sufficient size and capability to hold at risk a broad range
of assets valued by such political and military leaders."
The U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile is undergoing dramatic changes as
this Nation has taken steps to reduce the global nuclear danger.
Thanks to unprecedented arms control agreements between the United
States and the former Soviet Union, nuclear forces are being
dramatically reduced. Implementation of the START I and START II
protocols will result in a total U.S. nuclear weapons reduction of 79%
by the year 2003. In 1992, the United States halted the development
and production of new nuclear weapons, and began closing portions of
the weapons complex no longer needed to support the significantly
smaller, less diverse stockpile of the future. The Department now has
the challenging responsibility of ensuring the safety, security and
reliability of the enduring nuclear weapons stockpile in the absence of
testing and in the absence of an active production program.
DEFENSE PROGRAMS
For Defense Programs we are requesting $3.5 billion in FY 1996, to
carryout our Stockpile Stewardship and Stockpile Management
responsibilities. In the past, our confidence in the stockpile was
ensured through weapon research and development in the laboratories and
underground nuclear testing at the Nevada Test Site. In July 1993, the
President announced a moratorium on underground nuclear testing that he
recently extended until September 1996. No U.S. tests have been
conducted since October 1992. The President has challenged the
Department "to explore other means of maintaining our confidence in the
safety, reliability and performance of our own weapons." The President
also directed that "the plan include stockpile surveillance;
experimental research, development and engineering programs; and the
maintenance of a production capability to support these efforts." This
challenge was codified when the Congress passed the FY 1994 National
Defense Authorization Act that directed the Secretary of Energy "to
establish a stewardship program to ensure the preservation of the core
intellectual and technical competencies of the United States in nuclear
weapons." It was also substantiated in the Department of Defense's
Nuclear Posture Review, completed in October 1994.
The current stockpile is safe, secure, and reliable. However the
history of the stockpile has shown that continuous surveillance,
repair, and replacement of components and subsystems is commonplace.
In fact, the seven weapons that will be in the enduring START II
stockpile have already been retrofitted to varying degrees and some
have had major components of the nuclear system replaced. We cannot
predict with any certainty whether or when such problems will arise in
the future, but we must be equipped to respond effectively should they
materialize.
To reach the program envisioned, and be consistent with presidential
and congressional direction, the Department has restructured the
weapons activities account into two closely related and interdependent
programs --Stockpile Stewardship and Stockpile Management.
STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP
Our science-based stockpile stewardship program will provide the
capability to respond to any problem concerning the safety or
reliability of the stockpile in a timely manner by maintaining the
necessary skill and judgement bases. Specifically, the program must:
1) develop the means to ensure confidence in the safety and performance
of the stockpile without testing; 2) maintain the safety, security,
reliability of the stockpile and ensure the capability to replace
weapons and weapons components in a timely and cost-effective manner;
3) maintain the nuclear weapons knowledge and skill bases at the
laboratories; 4) provide a sufficient scientific understanding of the
principles that underpin the safety and performance of nuclear weapons;
5) fill critical gaps in knowledge about age-related changes that might
affect weapons system safety, reliability or performance; and 6) ensure
the capability to resume nuclear testing if directed to do so by the
President.
Basic to the program is the need for improved scientific understanding
of age-related changes that might affect system safety or performance,
and the ability to respond to new requirements. Improved understanding
of warhead behavior over time will be obtained from computer
simulations and analyses benchmarked against past data and new, more
comprehensive diagnostic information obtained from appropriate
laboratory experiments. An improved scientific understanding of the
behavior of nuclear weapons will allow our scientists and engineers to
have a better basis for anticipating, identifying and solving new
problems or to remedy defects that may occur in the enduring stockpile
as it ages. This approach will allow the United States to maintain
confidence in the stockpile during a nuclear test ban, in a manner
consistent with our nonproliferation objectives and arms control
commitments.
Implementing these principles will transform the nuclear weapons
complex from capacity-based to capability-based. The new enterprise
will rely more on scientific understanding and manufacturing agility
than test empiricism and manufacturing capacity. The weapons
laboratories must assume more responsibility for production capability
in addition to their responsibilities for scientific understanding.
Having a capability of creating a larger stockpile in an emergency
could permit the U.S. to further reduce its active stockpile if
international conditions so warrant.
To meet the objectives of the Stockpile Stewardship program we have
three major new initiatives for Fiscal Year 1996.
1) Advanced hydrodynamic testing capabilities and new experimental
facilities. These new capabilities and facilities would improve our
understanding of the underlying physics of nuclear weapons, acquire new
data and add it to existing data bases, and test and evaluate computer
modeling that will provide the future basis for ensuring safety,
reliability, and performance of nuclear components. Advanced
Hydrodynamic Testing Capabilities provide the closest non-nuclear
simulation of the operation of the primary in a nuclear weapon, one of
the most crucial, and complex parts of every nuclear weapon. Its
properties are central to safety as well as reliability and
performance. Advanced hydrodynamic experiments capabilities are
crucial to resolve issues associated with weapons safety and aging and
can provide benchmarks for computer code calibration. Funding of $16
million is included in the FY 1996 budget for advanced hydrodynamic
testing capabilities.
One of the most important new experimental facilities is the National
Ignition Facility (NIF). The NIF will simulate, on a very small scale,
the extraordinary temperatures and pressures that occur during the
detonation of a nuclear weapon. NIF will have 192 laser beams which
will compress a small target filled with isotopes of hydrogen to
pressures greater than 100 billion times earth's atmosphere and heat to
temperatures of 100 million degrees the hydrogen isotopes to produce
fusion reactions. Understanding and controlling fusion in NIF's
laboratory setting will enhance our studies of the physics of nuclear
weapons by verifying predictions of extremely complex computer models.
NIF will help us maintain and improve our core competencies to evaluate
the high temperature phase of weapons performance, make the necessary
repairs/modifications and subsequently evaluate and recertify those
nuclear components. The challenges and research opportunities will
make the NIF a powerful draw for world-class scientists and engineers,
thus helping ensure that the Nation's continuing national security
challenges will be addressed by experts second to none.
Last year I approved Key Decision-1 (KD-1) for the NIF project. As a
result of that decision, the FY 1996 budget requests a total of $61
million for Title I design activities and related operating expenses.
The KD-1 process examined the role of the NIF in stockpile stewardship,
nonproliferation, the overall DOE energy strategy, and fundamental
science while considering lifecycle costs and environmental aspects.
The environmental issues associated with the NIF will be considered as
part of the Department's Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS.
I also established a new project milestone, KD-1 Prime. The new
milestone will focus on the nonproliferation, international cooperation
and basic science questions associated with the NIF. I expect to make
a KD-1 Prime decision this summer.
2) Revolutionary improvements in computer capabilities. Thousand fold
increases in computer speed and data storage capacity are needed. New
computer software for weapons analysis, referred to as weapon codes,
must be developed to incorporate 3-dimensional geometries, provide
higher spatial resolution in critical areas, and eliminate empirical
calibrating factors. Increased capabilities are required so that
critical data from previous nuclear tests, design and production
activities and skills from retiring scientists and engineers can be
archived for future use by weapons experts. This challenge will be met
through the Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative (ASCI). The FY
1996 budget includes $45 million to support this initiative. Without
underground testing, numerical simulation and computer modeling will be
the principal means of recertifying the safety and performance of
nuclear primaries and secondaries, predicting full-system behavior, and
validating reliability. This initiative will create the leading-edge
computational modeling and simulation capabilities critically needed to
promptly shift from nuclear test-based methods to computational-based
methods for assuring the safety, reliability and performance of
the stockpile. Computer models of manufacturing processes are also
needed to ensure highly reliable component production in small lots and
the ability to make replacement components to original specifications
for the foreseeable future.
3) New stockpile surveillance capabilities. To certify the stockpile
in the future we will have to depend on better surveillance tools,
scientific data, and computer modeling. We must measure the
degradation of safety and reliability as weapons age beyond their
design lifetime and beyond our experience. New nondestructive
surveillance techniques must be developed to improve our understanding
of weapons aging and remanufacture.
A high priority initiative for stockpile surveillance is advanced
noninvasive imaging by using x-rays or neutrons to examine the internal
components of nuclear weapons without disassembly, in essence a CAT
scan for nuclear weapons. The Los Alamos Neutron Scattering Center
(LANSCE) will allow our weapons scientists and engineers to develop an
improved scientific understanding of weapons design and weapons
materials behavior. These data, coupled with improved computational
models form part of the basis for weapons certification without nuclear
testing. The FY 1996 budget includes $25 million for conducting these
activities at the LANSCE.
Testing
President Clinton has instructed the Department of Energy to maintain,
as a contingency, the capability to resume underground testing. Our FY
1996 budget includes $206 million, a decrease of $11 million from FY
1995 (as adjusted), to provide for test readiness. The FY 1996 budget
for nuclear testing reflects the shift from a 6 month readiness posture
to a 2-3 year readiness posture consistent with presidential direction.
On going and planned nonnuclear experiments in support of stockpile
stewardship and other programs will provide the necessary technical
expertise to resume underground testing if so directed by the
President. There are no plans to conduct hydronuclear experiments
during FY 1996 unless directed by the President, in which case we will
notify Congress before proceeding.
STOCKPILE MANAGEMENT
The most important new activity within the Stockpile Management program
is initiation of work on a new tritium production source. An integral
part of ensuring confidence in the stockpile is providing an adequate
supply of tritium, a radioactive gas used in all U.S. nuclear weapons.
Tritium greatly increases the explosive force of the warhead. Tritium
however has a radioactive half life of 12 years, and must be
replenished periodically in order for the weapons to work as designed.
The United States has not produced any tritium since 1988, and
currently has no production source for this important material. Based
on a stockpile consistent with the START II agreement, the United
States will need to have new tritium by about 2011 in order to meet
requirements, and maintain a 5 year reserve supply. During the interim
the United States will continue to rely on tritium recycling to meet
our requirements.
The Department released on March 1, 1995, the draft Tritium Supply and
Recycling PEIS consistent with our commitment last year to the
Congress. The PEIS analyzes four different technologies: Accelerator
Production of Tritium (APT), an Advanced Light Water Reactor (ALWR), a
Heavy Water Reactor (HWR), and a Modular High Temperature Gas-Cooled
Reactor (MHTGR) for tritium production. All four new tritium supply
technologies are currently judged to be capable of meeting the 2011
date for new tritium and all could meet the required quantities. Five
candidate sites are under consideration for the new tritium facility
include: the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, the Nevada Test
Site, the Oak Ridge Reservation, the Pantex Plant and the Savannah
River Site. The draft PEIS has been published for public review and
comment. The PEIS includes an analysis of the so-called triple play
reactor -- a reactor that can produce tritium and generate electricity
while "burning" plutonium. The PEIS also discusses the environmental
impacts of using an existing commercial reactor to make tritium,
whether as a contingency in the event of a national emergency or should
the Department choose to purchase such a reactor and convert it to
defense purposes. The Department does not have a preferred alternative
at this time for tritium supply or recycling sites, or for tritium
supply technology; however a preferred alterative may be announced
prior to completion of the Final PEIS. The Department is holding
public hearings in Washington, D.C. and at potentially affected sites
in April, and will issue a final PEIS in October 1995. A Record of
Decision is expected in November 1995.
Dismantlement is another important activity within the Stockpile
Management account. Since the end of World War II, the Department and
its predecessors have disassembled some 50,000 nuclear warheads in a
safe, secure, and efficient manner. Since the beginning of the current
fiscal year we have dismantled 837 warheads, and expect to complete
about 1500 total for FY 1995. In FY 1996, Defense Programs plans for
the safe dismantlement of approximately 2000 nuclear warheads at the
Pantex Plant. Unlike the mission workload at most other weapons
complex sites, the Pantex workload is expected to remain stable for the
next several years as we reduce to the START II nuclear stockpile.
The Stockpile Management program is also responsible for the hands on,
day-to-day functions and operations involved in maintaining the
enduring nuclear weapons stockpile. The core activities of this
program include: producing operational and logistic spares; quality
assurance and reliability testing; and weapon repair, retrofit,
modifications and conversions. The Stockpile Management program is
also responsible for the transportation and storage of nuclear weapons
and nuclear materials and for the dismantlement of retired weapons and
safe storage or disposal of the resulting materials. Consistent with
our commitment to the Department of Defense to support the enduring
stockpile, the FY 1996 budget request will allow us to deliver the
following products and services: conducting 100 destructive and
nondestructive tests of weapons components; delivering 711 limited life
component kits to the Department of Defense, and filling and replacing
1,000 tritium reservoirs; and dismantling nuclear warheads. The
program provides support for the military on routine field maintenance
operations as well as radiological/nuclear accident response
capabilities. These functions must be provided as long as the United
States relies on nuclear weapons for deterrence.
FISCAL YEAR 1996 BUDGET SUMMARY
The following table (1) breaks out the FY 1996 budget requirements for
Defense Programs in the Weapons Activities appropriations account. The
request of $3.6 billion, reflecting our total obligational authority
requirements, is allocated among three major program areas: Stockpile
Stewardship ($1.6 billion); Stockpile Management ($1.9 billion); and
Program Direction ($0.1 billion). When adjustments are made for the
use of prior-year unobligated balances ($86 million) and the
application of cost savings ($25 million), the total new obligational
authority required is reduced to $3.5 billion. This represents a 9%
increase over our FY 1995 budget.
TABLE 1
DEFENSE PROGRAMS
FY 1996 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET
($'s IN MILLIONS)
FY 1995 FY 1996
Stockpile Stewardship
Core Stockpile Stewardship $1,045 $1,110
Inertial Confinement Fusion 176 241
Technology Transfer & Education 236 249
Subtotal $1,457 $1,600
Stockpile Management
Core Stockpile Management $1,433 $1,556
Radiological/Nuc. Accident Response 69 71
Reconfiguration 152 121
Tritium Source 0 50
Materials Surveillance & Tech Support 103 106
Subtotal $1,757 $1,904
Program Direction $141 $117
Weapons Activities (Total Obligational Authority)$3,356 $3,621
Adjustments:
Use of Prior-Year Balances (143) (86)
"Reinventing Government" Savings 0 (25)
Weapons Activities (New Obligational Authority) $3,213 $3,509
OFFICE OF NONPROLIFERATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY
President Clinton has made the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons one
of the Nation's highest priorities. As the preeminent agency for
providing technological and analytical support to guard against the
spread of nuclear weapons and weapons-usable materials, the Department
of Energy is a major participant in our federal and international
nonproliferation efforts.
The challenges are clear: the collapse of the Soviet Union has offered
new potential for nuclear transparency and verified reductions, while
raising real concerns about where their former weapons scientists will
be employed and over the adequacy of security of their nuclear
materials; managing the nuclear heritages of others of the Newly
Independent States, such as Kazakhstan and Ukraine; Iraq and North
Korea; and concerns over terrorism, perhaps involving stolen fissile
materials.
Our nonproliferation focus is five-fold: 1) secure nuclear materials in
the former Soviet Union; 2) assure safe, secure long-term storage and
disposition of surplus fissile materials; 3) establish transparent and
irreversible nuclear reductions; 4) strengthen the nuclear
nonproliferation regime, and 5) control exports of nuclear technology
and materials. The Department's active nuclear nonproliferation
program is augmented by aggressive research and development activities,
technical and analytical support to treaty development and
implementation, and providing timely and customized intelligence to
support these efforts.
Over the past year, we have made significant accomplishments in
reducing the global nuclear danger:
o We lead a program of cooperation between DOE laboratories and
nuclear research facilities in Russia to improve the protection,
control, and accounting of nuclear materials which could be used
to make nuclear weapons. A demonstration project was successfully
undertaken to upgrade and enhance the protection of the Kurchatov
Nuclear Research Center in Moscow during 1994 and plans are in
place for follow-on demonstrations at several more sites during
1995.
o Project Sapphire, a formerly-secret operation, successfully
transferred approximately 600 kilograms of highly enriched uranium
from the Ulba Metallurgical Plant in Kazakhstan to the
Department's Oak Ridge facility in Tennessee for safe and secure
interim storage. By gaining ownership of this material, the
United States has effectively removed the material from potential
acquisition by those who could develop weapons of mass
destruction. The uranium is currently in interim storage at the
Y-12 plant in Oak Ridge until it can be moved to a commercial
facility where it will be converted to low enriched uranium for
use in commercial nuclear power plants in the future.
o We have completed development and deployment of space-based
sensors capable of detecting atmospheric and near-Earth nuclear
explosions. These sensors, on Defense Department satellites,
provide a system for the United States to continuously
detect nuclear explosions and verify treaty compliance world-wide.
o During 1994, the responsibility for research and development of
technologies to support U.S. requirements to monitor a future
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was transferred from the
Department of Defense to the Department of Energy (specifically to
the Office of Nonproliferation and National Security). We have
enlisted four of our National Laboratories -- Livermore, Los
Alamos, Sandia, and Pacific Northwest -- to develop technological
options for verification of arms control policy.
o We have also been providing, and will continue to provide,
technical expertise and policy recommendations in support of
diplomatic efforts to achieve an indefinite extension of the
Non-Proliferation Treaty, a cornerstone of U.S. national security
policy. Our support included development of overall strategy,
initiatives for transparency and irreversibility (including
placing excess materials under International Atomic Energy Agency
safeguards), technical and analytical support to Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty negotiations, and the establishment of nuclear
technology programs designed to assist in the fulfillment of U.S.
obligations for peaceful nuclear cooperation.
However, with all of these accomplishments, there is still much more to
do. In FY 1996, we must accelerate our efforts to protect fissile
materials and redirect nuclear expertise in the former Soviet Union to
peaceful projects. The Department will expand its efforts to end the
civilian production and use of weapons-usable fissile materials through
promotion of alternative energy sources, the Reduced Enrichment for
Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) Program, and nuclear material
purchases. Also in FY 1996, the Department will continue its efforts
to monitor U.S. and Russian inventories of plutonium and highly
enriched uranium from weapons dismantlement through inspections and
other activities that make dismantlement transparent and irreversible.
Among other measures, we will advance nonproliferation: by our efforts
in North Korea; by continuing support of negotiations of a
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and an international fissile material
cutoff convention; and by facilitating International Atomic Energy
Agency inspections in the United States. Reflecting this need to
accelerate our nonproliferation efforts, our budget for FY 1996 is
increased by more than $86 million over FY 1995.
Our unique expertise in support of national and international
nonproliferation policies is augmented by our efforts to develop more
effective, cost-efficient safeguards and security of the DOE complex.
Over the past year, we have reduced department-wide safeguards and
securities costs by 12 percent through consolidation of sensitive
holdings (e.g., nuclear material), elimination of redundancies,
effective use of state-of-the-art technology, reduction of security
clearances because of the Department's changing missions, and improved
safeguards and security planning. All major safeguards and security
reductions are subjected to thorough vulnerability analyses to assure
that they do not compromise security. We are learning to meet the
security challenges of today with less, and are successful in this
endeavor.
FISCAL YEAR 1996 BUDGET SUMMARY
The FY 1996 request for nonproliferation and national security
activities is $573.7 million, less an offset of $13 million of prior
year balances for a net FY 1996 Congressional Budget Request of $560.7
million. The following table (2) summarizes the FY 1996 budget request
for the Office of Nonproliferation and National Security.
TABLE 2
OFFICE OF NONPROLIFERATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY
FY 1996 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET
($'s IN MILLIONS)
Appropriation/Activity FY 1995 FY 1996
Other Defense Activities
Nonproliferation and Verification (R&D) $226,037 $226,142
Arms Control and Nonproliferation 76,799 162,364
Intelligence 43,061 42,336
Nuclear Safeguards and Security 88,816 89,516
Security Investigations 33,399 33,247
Subtotal, Other Defense Activities $468,112 $553,605
Emergency Management (Weapons) 17,336 20,056
Subtotal, Atomic Energy $485,448 $573,661
Use of Prior Year Balances 11,210 13,000
Congressional Budget Request $474,238 $560,661
MATERIALS DISPOSITION
The end of the Cold War has brought the arms and nuclear materials
production race to a close and, as a result, significant quantities of
plutonium and highly enriched uranium have become surplus to defense
needs in both the U.S. and Russia. Today, there exists a serious risk
that the growing stockpiles of surplus weapons materials could fall
into the hands of terrorists or non-nuclear nations through theft
or diversion in the former Soviet states. The National Academy of
Sciences in its report last year on excess weapons plutonium
characterized this threat as a "clear and present danger".
Within the Department of Energy, the Fissile Materials Disposition
Program directs the technical and management efforts to provide for the
safe, secure, environmentally sound long-term storage of all
weapons-usable fissile materials and the disposition of those fissile
materials declared surplus to our national defense needs. The Program
also provides the lead technical support to the President's Interagency
Working Group on Plutonium Disposition and is conducting joint
technical studies with the Russians on options for plutonium
disposition.
The FY 1996 budget request for the Program is $70 million, an increase
of $20 million from the Program's initial budget appropriation in FY
1995. These funds will be used to complete technical, schedule, and
cost analyses as well as environmental analyses that are necessary to
support decisions on long-term storage and disposition of
weapons-usable fissile materials. The increased funding will also
enable us to begin the preparation of the specific designs necessary to
implement storage and disposition decisions.
In June of last year, the Department issued a Notice of Intent to
prepare a Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS) on the
long-term storage and disposition of weapons usable fissile materials.
Subsequently, 12 public scoping meetings were held across the country
with the aim of determining the appropriate scope of the PEIS. The
meetings were attended by over 1,200 people and generated thousands of
comments and suggestions. In addition, numerous written comments
were received. These scoping efforts provided for substantial
dialogue, and direct public and industry involvement in establishing
the scope of the environmental analysis.
Technically viable and available alternatives which can achieve the
spent fuel standard are appropriate for further evaluation as surplus
plutonium disposition options under the Programmatic Environmental
Impact Statement. Since such options have a path forward for ultimate
disposal along with spent fuel from commercial nuclear power plants and
defense high level waste, options that achieve the spent fuel standard
are adequate and would not require additional steps or processes to
increase the level of proliferation resistance. Options which go
beyond the spent fuel standard, such as deep burn reactors and
accelerators would require substantial additional research and
development, with attendant increased costs and time, in order to
provide assurance of technical viability and ultimate disposal.
From the 37 disposition options initially identified, 11 have been
selected for further evaluation in the PEIS. All of these plutonium
disposition alternatives would have paths forward for ultimate
disposal, either in a high-level waste repository or in a deep
borehole. Five involve reactor options; four involve immobilization;
and two involve direct geologic disposal. The reduction in the number
of options being considered also results in significant savings of cost
and time in the PEIS process.
The Department has also identified, and will now proceed with a
separate Environmental Impact Statement addressing the disposition of
surplus Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU). Proceeding with separate
environmental analyses is appropriate because unlike plutonium, surplus
HEU can be promptly rendered non-weapons-usable by blending it down
with other uranium materials. Decisions on surplus highly enriched
uranium disposition do not impact or preclude other decisions which may
be made regarding disposition of surplus plutonium. The blending of
HEU does not require further study or technology development.
Consistent with the President's nonproliferation policy, blending it
down to low enriched uranium is the most rapid path for making the
material non-weapons-usable and would demonstrate the United States'
nonproliferation commitment to other nations.
Accordingly, the Department will soon issue a formal notice of this
process to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement on the Disposition
of Surplus Highly Enriched Uranium. The draft EIS will be published
this summer with a final EIS and subsequent Record of Decision (ROD)
following by early 1996.
Once blended down, some of the surplus uranium could be used in
commercial reactor fuel. This is the course of action initiated by the
U.S. and now underway in Russia to eliminate some 500 metric tons of
HUE from their military stockpiles. The EIS will also address the
proposed transfer to the United States Enrichment Corporation of
approximately 50 metric tons of surplus HEU and other uranium materials
for blending and subsequent use as low enriched uranium in commercial
power plants. When the United States Enrichment Corporation is
privatized, receipts from the sale will accrue to the U.S. Treasury.
This would include an estimated $400 million from the value of the
transferred surplus uranium materials.
Within the next several weeks, we intend to issue an implementation
plan for the scope of options to be addressed in the Programmatic
Environmental Impact Statement. This will be followed by the
completion of a draft PEIS for public comment near the end of this
year. After public meetings and comment on the draft, a final PEIS
will be prepared and issued late in 1996. The PEIS, together with
other technical, cost, schedule and nonproliferation policy
assessments, will provide the information to subsequently support a ROD
by late next year. This ROD will address both long-term storage
options and plutonium disposition options.
The Department's technical efforts and analyses and its ROD will
provide the President with a credible basis and the flexibility to
initiate disposal of surplus plutonium, either multilaterally or
bilaterally through negotiations, or unilaterally as an example to
other nations. The success of the Department's efforts will contribute
to advancing U.S. and international nonproliferation interests and will
help improve the cost-effectiveness of the management of our stockpiles
of weapons-usable fissile materials.
FISCAL YEAR 1996 BUDGET SUMMARY
The FY 1996 request for the Fissile Materials Disposition Program (MD)
totals $70.0 million in new spending authority as reflected in the
following table (3).
TABLE 3
FISSILE MATERIALS DISPOSITION
FY 1996 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET
($'s IN MILLIONS)
FY 1996
REQUEST
Long-Term Storage Options 10.9
Disposition Options 21.7
Technical Integration, Support
& Associated Technologies 19.7
NEPA Compliance 9.0
Program Management 6.7
Pantex Safety Studies 2.0
Total $70.0
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT
Last year the Department submitted a budget request for the
Environmental Management program that was essentially flat, halting the
trend of increasing budget requests that had occurred since the program
was established in 1989. This trend is being reversed with our FY 1996
budget request, which represents a 4% reduction from last year given a
comparable work scope. We have made substantial progress in changing
the way we do business and have achieved increased cost savings,
efficiency gains, and productivity. All this translates into safer
work conditions, better protection of public health and safety, and a
cleaner environment, all at less cost to the taxpayer.
The Environmental Management program is playing a large role in
contributing to a leaner federal government and deficit reduction in
line with the President's proposed budget. The entire Departmental
budget is being reduced by $8.4 billion over the next five years, and
we have promised the President another $5.7 billion in savings from
asset sales for a total contribution of $14.1 billion over five years.
The Environmental Management program budget request will account for a
large portion of this reduction. For fiscal years 1997 through 2000
the Environmental Management program request is being reduced by $4.4
billion in outlays, which translates into approximately $5.5 billion
less in budget authority requests from previous Administration plans.
These reductions are significant, but I believe achievable. The
reductions have been carefully planned to allow the Department continue
its Environmental Management missions while achieving greater
efficiency. We believe these significant reductions are achievable if
we follow this carefully planned ramping down. However, an abrupt,
precipitous cut to these funding levels would jeopardize our ability to
maintain public safety, achieve savings, and meet our legal
commitments.
However, notwithstanding our commitment to continually improve
efficiency and increase productivity, there are limits to how much the
Environmental Management budget can be reduced without jeopardizing
public health and safety and our ability to comply with applicable laws
and agreements. The Environmental Management program has broad
responsibilities, one of which is securely storing more than 25 metric
tons of plutonium -- the stuff of nuclear weapons -- to prevent theft,
sabotage, or diversion. Although the environmental and waste
management programs have responsibility for traditional environmental
activities to protect public health and safety, a mistake in
safeguarding this nuclear material could result in incalculable
calamity on a global scale. Fortunately, the Department has been
successful in preventing such acute problems. Nonetheless, nearly
fifty years of nuclear weapons production have left us with a massive
environmental legacy for which we have a moral and legal obligation to
address.
The FY 1996 Environmental Management request reflects an increased
commitment to resolving the environmental and safety problems we face
as well as a continued commitment to improve the way the Department has
historically done business. The request includes funding for
significant new added responsibilities: management of the Savannah
River Site in South Carolina, the Mound Site in Ohio, and the Pinellas
Plant in Florida and nearly 50 other high risk facilities. The base
budget, not including this additional scope of work, for Waste
Management, Environmental Restoration, Nuclear Materials and Facilities
Stabilization, Technology Development and other programmatic activities
is actually four percent less than the amount appropriated in FY 1995.
BACKGROUND ON THE ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT PROGRAM
To fully understand the Environmental Management budget request, it is
necessary to understand that the scope of the program involves far more
than just "cleanup." The Department's Office of Environmental
Management, established in 1989, manages the largest environmental
stewardship program in the world -- with over 130 sites and facilities
in over 30 states and territories -- estimated to cost several hundred
billion dollars over several decades. The number of sites and
facilities under our management continues to grow as more buildings
become surplus. The nuclear weapons production complex alone is spread
over thousands of square miles in 13 states. This complex shut down
its nuclear weapons production operations in the late 1980's, leaving a
legacy of thousands of contaminated areas and buildings, huge waste
volumes, and a large amount of hazardous nuclear materials still "in
the pipeline" of their production processes. The Environmental
Management program's job is to address the most immediate, urgent risks
to human health and the environment as well as manage the long-term
contamination and safety threats.
Simply said, the Environmental Management program's job is to safely
administer the sites, facilities, and operations under its management.
However, the task is far easier described than carried out. To
illustrate, we deal with a wide variety of threats and risks such as:
o Hundreds of large, underground high-level radioactive waste tanks,
many of which have leaked, and some of which may pose danger of an
explosion;
o Thousands of metric tons of highly radioactive spent nuclear fuel
in various types of storage, some corroding; and
o Thousands of radioactively contaminated buildings that must be
stabilized and eventually decontaminated.
o Contaminated drinking water, soils, and surface water;
o Worker exposure to radiation and chemicals;
o Theft or diversion of nuclear weapons material (e.g., plutonium
and highly enriched uranium);
o Industrial and transportation accidents;
The Environmental Management program simultaneously satisfies a wide
variety of demands:
o Compliance with state and federal laws and regulations;
o Compliance with negotiated agreements stemming from those
regulations or court orders;
o International Atomic Energy Agency nuclear nonproliferation
safeguards requirements;
o Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board "Recommendations";
o Worker safety and health protection expectations derived from
OSHA, nuclear industry, and Departmental practices;
o Short- and long-term technology development needs; and
o Worker and community development needs (e.g., training and land
reuse);
The task ahead remains formidable, and yet presents many opportunities
for improving upon how we, as a nation, respond to the challenges of
remediating the environmental legacy of almost five decades of nuclear
weapons production. While the full nature and extent of contamination
at the sites may not be fully known for many years, we are taking some
tangible steps now to identify and mitigate their environmental and
health risks.
MAKING PROGRESS
The Department of Energy's Environmental Management program is making
significant strides in reducing the environmental and public health
risks and hazards from more than fifty years of nuclear weapons
production, testing, and research. These results not only demonstrate
significant progress, but also reflect a new way of doing business by
addressing urgent risks first while simultaneously managing the
long-term contamination and health risks present at our sites. For
example, in the last year we have addressed urgent risks in the
following areas:
o Completed safety improvements to a building and begun to stabilize
inventories of pyrophoric plutonium contained inside it at the
Rocky Flats Plant in Colorado in FY 1995. This material poses a
fire hazard since, under certain conditions, plutonium ignites in
air;
o Safely transferred 199 spent nuclear fuel elements to safer
storage facilities in Idaho; and
o Returned 153 spent nuclear fuel elements containing weapons-grade
uranium of United States origin from foreign research reactors.
Accepting these fuel elements helps support the Nation's nuclear
nonproliferation policy because they contain weapons-usable
highly-enriched uranium;
o Began routine operation of a pump that has virtually eliminated
the threat of explosion in a high-level waste tank at our Hanford
site.
We have also achieved impressive cumulative results that begin to
reduce the backlog of accumulated waste and long-term contamination
problems across the country:
o Decommissioned approximately 100 facilities across the complex;
o Cleaned up 16 former nuclear weapons and industrial sites and 14
sites associated with uranium mining and milling;
o Remediated over nearly 5,000 public and private properties
contaminated with uranium tailings;
o Treated 2.4 billion gallons of ground water and 1.8 billion
gallons of surface water;
o Recycled 16 million pounds of scrap metal;
o Safely transported roughly one million tons of hazardous materials
in 140,000 shipments; and
o Saved over $115 million through the use of new technologies.
CHANGING THE WAY WE DO BUSINESS
These achievements demonstrate real progress in meeting our legal and
moral obligations. However, inefficiencies still exist in our system,
and there is room for more improvement. Also, given the downward trend
in funding for the Department's Environmental Management program, we
cannot afford to become complacent. To make up for this year's real
budget reductions, and to continue to seize opportunities for
increasing productivity, we must continue to be smarter about the way
we operate through increasing efficiency and eliminating wasteful
spending by hiring experienced federal project managers, streamlining
our contractor workforce, reducing indirect and overhead labor costs,
and reforming our contracts. For example:
o We have hired 1,200 experienced project managers, cost estimators,
safety and health professionals, and environmental engineers to
provide greater accountability and oversight at our sites. Years
of Congressional oversight and hearings on wasteful spending and
poor health and safety practices were the impetus. In return for
additional staff, field office managers have committed to specific
productivity savings.
o We are reducing the number of contractor employees by a total of
about 17,500 -- about 34 percent -- from FY 1994 to FY 1996. We
are downsizing our workforce in accordance with Section 3161 of
the Defense Authorization Act of 1993 to mitigate adverse effects
of such layoffs. In making these cuts, we have tried to the
extent possible to be equitable across our sites.
However, there are particular sites where significant productivity
improvements are possible to correct particularly inefficient
operations. The Rocky Flats Plant in Colorado and the Idaho
National Engineering Laboratory are taking about 35 and 30 percent
reductions of their total workforce, respectively; the Hanford
Site in Washington and the Savannah River Site in South Carolina
are reducing their workforce by 26 and 22 percent, respectively.
o We are recompeting and renegotiating 30 billion dollars worth of
contracts to include greater incentives for outstanding
performance and to ensure that the contractors -- not the
taxpayers -- take on a larger share of the risks associated with
doing business with the Department. A recently completed
consolidation of our Idaho contract is projected to save $500
million over the next five years.
By instituting these changes, we believe that the Environmental
Management program will be able to meet its legal commitments during FY
1996, with a few exceptions that we have already begun working with
State regulators to resolve.
The Environmental Management program will continue to be driven by a
results-oriented, risk-based approach that seeks to address the most
urgent public health and safety problems first. However, after this
fiscal year, even with the continued productivity savings that are
expected, there will be a gap between available resources and
requirements in the future. In order to continue to meet our
obligations, we will need to address these outyear challenges with new
analytical tools, renegotiation of some of our compliance agreements,
and through statutory changes.
"BASELINE REPORT" ON TOTAL ESTIMATED COSTS
As part of our effort to increase managerial and financial control, the
Department recently completed an estimate of the total long-term costs
of the Environmental Management Program. The Baseline Report was
required by Congress in the Fiscal Year 1994 National Defense
Authorization Act (section 3153), with annual updates to follow. The
Baseline Report includes descriptions of projects, activities,
remedies, schedule, and estimated costs for addressing environmental
problems at Department of Energy sites. The results are very
instructive. We found that the estimated total costs, using current
assumptions, is approximately $230 billion. This includes not only the
cleanup, waste management, nuclear materials and facility stabilization
costs for the Cold War legacy from nuclear weapons production, but also
the costs for the variety of energy research and nuclear energy
programs conducted by the Department and future costs to support the
ongoing program. The report is based on completion of cost estimates
and assumptions collected from thousands of individual activities. It
provides estimated costs for meeting current compliance agreements.
The bottom line is that the single most important factor affecting our
cost will be the decisions regarding the future use of the land and
facilities. The Administration has already proposed changes to the
Superfund law that would allow for greater consideration of future land
use.
These managerial initiatives are bold and necessary to increase
productivity, and the tools we are using to plan for a better future
will reduce costs. But these are not sufficient to ensure success in
the future. We still face a real reduction in budget relative to scope
of work this year, and even deeper reductions in later years.
Therefore, another way in which we are ensuring that we continue to
meet our legal obligations is by working with regulators to make
appropriate changes to compliance agreements and asking for appropriate
changes in laws that apply to the Department such as the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act or "Superfund"
law. Changing this law to account for future land uses will help
promote faster turn around times in some cleanup actions, and will save
money.
Let me emphasize that the Department is committed to complying with the
laws that apply to its sites and operations. The Environmental
Management program will be in substantial compliance in FY 1996 with
these agreements if Congress appropriates the President's budget
request. However, many of our compliance agreements were signed during
a climate much different from the one we have today. Some of the
milestones and schedules for completion are unworkable. Recognizing
this, it is a reasonable, and indeed sensible, thing to do to work
cooperatively with the States, stakeholders, and EPA to renegotiate
those agreements as appropriate to align them more with current fiscal
reality. Also, our goal in renegotiating these agreements is to ensure
that they will achieve the greatest risk reduction and risk prevention
per dollar spent.
THE FY 1996 ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT BUDGET REQUEST
The FY 1996 budget request is being proposed under three separate
appropriations accounts: the Energy Supply and Research Development
appropriation (roughly 10 percent of the budget request); the Defense
Environmental Restoration and Waste Management appropriation portion of
the Atomic Energy Defense Activities account (roughly 87 percent of the
budget request); and the Uranium Enrichment Decontamination and
Decommissioning (D&D) Fund appropriation (roughly 3 percent of the
budget request).
The Department's FY 1996 budget request for the Environmental
Management program totals $6.5 billion. This includes $843 million for
new responsibilities primarily at three sites -- Mound, Pinellas, and
Savannah River -- transferred to the Environmental Management account
from the Defense Programs account. Management responsibility for the
Savannah River Site, Mound, and Pinellas was transferred to
Environmental Management in January, 1995. Given a comparable work
scope, this request represents a reduction of 4 percent from the FY
1995 baseline appropriation. Table 4 outlines the FY 1996 budget
request for EM.
TABLE 4
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT
FY 1996 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET
($'s in MILLIONS)
FY 1995 FY 1996
Waste Management
Defense $2,673.1 $2,501.6
Non-Defense 243.0 206.1
Total 2,916.1 2,707.7
Corrective Activities
Defense $0.5 $3.4
Non-Defense 26.7 5.4
Total 27.2 8.8
Environmental Restoration
Defense 1,379.9 1,576.0*
Non-Defense 388.6 417.8
Total 1,768.5 1,993.8
Uranium D&D Fund
Non-Defense 301.3 288.8
Nuclear Materials and Facilities Stabilization
Defense 765.5 1,596.0
Non-Defense 73.4 83.7
Total 838.9 1,679.7
Technology Development
Defense 417.4 390.5
Transportation Management
Defense 20.7 16.1
Compliance and Program Coordination
Defense 0 81.3
Analysis Education and Risk Management
Defense 84.9 157.0
Use of Prior Year Balances and Other Adjustments
Defense -249.3 -313.9
Non-Defense -8.2 -68.1
Total -257.5 -382.0
Transfer Government Contribution to Uranium
Enrichment D&D from ER Defense -133.7 -350.0
Appropriation Breakdown
Defense 5,092.7 6,009.0
Energy Supply 723.5 689.9
Uranium D&D Fund 167.6 -106.2
TOTAL** 5,983.8 6,591.7
* Includes $350 million for Government contributions to the Uranium
Enrichment D&D Fund. Actual change from 1995 to 1996 for the
Defense budget is -2%.
** This includes $843 million for newly transferred responsibilities.
The base budget request without these new responsibilities is
$5,748 billion, a 4 percent reduction from last year's enacted
amount.
The Environmental Management program has been integrally involved with
the significant changes in the Department and has, in fact, spearheaded
some of them. Openness, focus on a new mission, new motivations, and
accountability are characteristics that the Environmental Management
program has attempted to develop, and will continue to nurture. The
Environmental Management program is dedicated to meeting its
responsibilities in reducing risks, creating a safe work environment,
and protecting public safety.
Our proposed FY 1996 budget for the Environmental Management Program is
a declining budget given an equal work scope but it will still allow us
to fulfill legal and moral commitments while simultaneously
streamlining our program. This streamlining, however, has limits
beyond which further cuts in funding will trade off savings against
safety. We are engaged in a daunting effort to redirect the national
commitment from production of nuclear weapons for our national security
strategy to resolving the resulting widespread environmental and safety
problems at thousands of contaminated sites across the country. We
have an obligation to do no less and we are dedicated to producing
meaningful results.
WORKER AND COMMUNITY TRANSITION
The Worker and Community Transition Program was established to support
the President s commitment to assist the transition of the employees
and communities of the Department s nuclear weapons production complex
in the Post Cold War Era, and to oversee the Department s compliance
with section 3161 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY
1993. Initially these responsibilities were performed by a Secretarial
Task Force, but as the scope of the task expanded as a result of the
Department s efforts to down size our contractor work force to achieve
greater cost effectiveness and efficiency in operations, I determined
that a more stable organization was required. This determination led
to the establishment of the Office of Worker and Community Transition
in September, of 1994.
The core mission of the Office of Worker and Community Transition is to
provide policy guidance and oversight of the Department s efforts to
mitigate the impacts of work force reductions on the workers at the
Department s facilities and the communities that host them. The Office
will oversee work force restructuring plans, these plans are mandated
by section 3161 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1993.
The purpose of these plans is to set out the strategy by which each
site will achieve its work force restructuring. Among the mechanisms
that are commonly used in these plans are voluntary separation
programs, retraining and education assistance, relocation assistance,
out placement assistance, and medical benefit extensions.
To date, the Department has approved plans and actions that have
resulted in the elimination of over 11,000 contractor positions. As a
result of an extensive planning and consultation process that involved
employees, elected officials, and union representatives at each
affected facility, only about 20 percent of these reductions resulted
in involuntary layoffs. The average cost of each position eliminated
thus far is less that $27 thousand. This figure is consistent with the
experience of the Department of Defense, and of many private sector
down sizing efforts.
We estimate that the cost savings in salary to the Department from
these reductions is approximately $600 million per year. The Office of
Worker and Community Transition will play a critical role in securing
future savings through work force restructuring by assisting each site
in performing work force planning that is based on future skill
requirements and current skill levels.
The President and the Congress have issued a challenge to create a
Federal Government that works more efficiently and costs less. The
Department has committed to meeting this challenge by saving some $14.1
billion over the next five years. The Department is planning to
eliminate the contractor work force by approximately 19,000, or 14
percent of our overall management and operating contractor work force,
by the end of FY 1996. A detailed illustration of the employment
history and anticipated reductions at major Departmental sites is
attached to my testimony in Tables 5 and 6.
This downsizing is possible, prudent and desirable for a number of
reasons. First, the Department cannot afford the levels of employment
that we currently sustain. Second, current level of employment are
excessive. Our contractor employment at several sites actually exceeds
levels that existed during the height of nuclear weapons production.
In fact, between 1988 and 1992, as environmental clean up spending
increased, layers of contractor employees were added to the existing
defense production work force. The Department s environmental clean up
programs sustain excessive numbers of management and oversight
personnel compared to the people who actually perform remediation work.
The Department of Energy FY 1996 Budget Request includes $100 million
for the Office of Worker and Community Transition. This is a reduction
of $15 million from the funding provided in FY 1995. This request will
fund restructuring costs associated with the cessation of the nuclear
weapons production mission. When work force restructuring results from
efforts to achieve cost savings and increased efficiency in a specific
program, the affected program will fund the cost of the restructuring.
In FY 1995 and 1996, these reductions will occur primarily in the
Environmental Management Program, and up to $200 million has been
identified in that program s FY 1996 Budget Request for this purpose.
Overall, including funding from FY 1995 and the FY 1996 request,
approximately $500 million (or $25,000 per separated employee) will be
available to fund the restructuring of 19,000 contractor employees An
illustration of recent budget levels is attached to my testimony in
Table 7.
The Department remains committed to the men, women and communities of
the former nuclear weapons production complex. When the costs of the
Worker and Community Transition Program are weighed against the
resources that these people and communities represent, it is in the
Department s view a wise investment. Just as the Department must
invest in its stewardship of other portions of the Cold War legacy such
as non-proliferation, stockpile management, materials disposition, and
environmental management so to must it invest in the individuals who
maintained our Nation s nuclear deterrent as they make the transition
necessitated by the end of Cold War, and the down sizing of the
Department s budget and programs .
CONCLUSION
The United States continues to face a broad spectrum of nuclear
dangers--theft or accident involving nuclear weapons, direct military
attack, proliferation, poorly controlled excess of nuclear
materials--in a changing world. We must continue to deal with the
environmental legacy of our weapons production mission that poses a
serious environment, safety, and health problem. The challenge for the
Department and its laboratories is to apply, in the most cost-effective
manner, its unique capabilities and resources to reduce the nuclear
dangers. To this end the Department will continue to work on a number
of parallel and complimentary programs. The first program is stockpile
stewardship. This program is structured to maintain our high level of
confidence in the safety, security and reliability of the nuclear
deterrent while pursuing the Administration's goal of extending the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and completing work on the
Comprehensive Test Ban. We will continue our active nuclear
nonproliferation program through aggressive research and development
activities at the laboratories. We will continue to provide the
necessary technological and analytical support to guard against the
spread of nuclear weapons and weapons-usable materials. We will
aggressively pursue the technical and management efforts to provide for
the safe, secure, environmentally sound long-term storage of all
weapons-usable fissile materials and the disposition of those fissile
materials declared surplus to our national defense needs. The
Department will continue to provide the lead technical support to the
President's Interagency Working Group on Plutonium Disposition and is
conducting joint technical studies with the Russians on options for
plutonium disposition. Mr. Chairman, for the Department to succeed in
meeting these and other daunting challenges we need the continuing
support of this committee.
****TABLE 5; WORKER AND COMMUNITY TRANSITION APPROVED WORK FORCE
RESTRUCTURING PLANS is attached to original document****
****TABLE 6; DOE MANAGEMENT AND OPERATIONS CONTRACTOR EMPLOYMENT BY
SELECTED SITES (END OF FISCAL YEAR HEAD COUNT) is attach to original
document****
****TABLE 7; BUDGET is attached to original document****
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NEWSLETTER
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