Rose Gottemoeller
Acting deputy administrator for defense nuclear nonproliferation
Department of Energy
before the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities
of the Senate Armed Services Committee
March 6, 2000
Mr. Chairman and members of this Committee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today to present this statement on
Department of Energy (DOE) programs to reduce proliferation threats
in
Russia. With your permission, I will provide a more detailed statement
for the record.
I very much appreciate having this opportunity to discuss our
activities with you, Chairman Roberts, and with the rest of the
members of the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities.
It has been more than a decade since the Berlin Wall fell, opening a
new era in history. While the Soviet threat is gone, dangers arising
from the global spread of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons,
and missiles for their delivery, remain with us. As a nation, we may
face no greater challenge than to prevent these weapons from failing
into the hands of those who would use them against us or our allies.
To address this problem, the Clinton Administration has put in place
the Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative (ETRI), a robust multi-agency
and multi-dimensional nonproliferation agenda. The Department of
Energy, under the leadership of Secretary Richardson, plays an
important and unique role in implementing this agenda, drawing on the
vast reservoir of scientific and technical expertise residing in the
Department and its national laboratories. Our contributions are
extensive and I am proud of efforts to promote core American security
interests.
I wish to note up front that a key to ETRI's success is the strong
partnership of the Departments of Energy, Defense, and State and the
complementary nature of the nonproliferation activities we are
pursuing in cooperation with Russia. Department of Defense programs
to
enhance the safety, security, control and accounting of nuclear
weapons fit perfectly with our work to secure fissile materials and
nuclear weapons expertise. Our cooperation to promote nuclear material
control and protection in the Russian Navy is an example of this
partnership. Also, the Department of Energy's "brain drain" prevention
programs build on the efforts of the State Department-supported
International Science and Technology Center to transition former
Soviet weapons scientists to peaceful work. We have all benefited
greatly from the strong working relationships that exist across
agencies.
Our progress to reduce proliferation threats is surpassed only by the
work ahead of us. We know, for example, that it will take years and
substantial financial investments to complete the HEU Purchase
Agreement or to dispose of Russian and U.S. surplus military
plutonium. There are still tens of tons of fissile material to secure
and many thousands of nuclear weapons workers to integrate into
Russia's commercial sector. We also continue to work with Russia to
improve our access to their highly sensitive facilities. It is simply
a fact of life that we need people on the ground in precisely those
places that are among the most closely protected by the Russian
government. Secretary of Energy Richardson, Under Secretary Moniz and
I are committed not just to work the access issue, but to lay the
foundations for long-term success in our cooperation with Russia to
promote nonproliferation.
As a final introductory comment, I would note that my office has
undergone a number of recent organizational changes. In particular,
as
of March 1, 2000, my office, known formerly as the Office of
Nonproliferation and National Security, has been re-designated the
Office of the Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation in the new National Nuclear Security Administration.
In addition, the Department's Office of Fissile Materials Disposition
was incorporated into this new office. I am confident that these
changes will only sharpen our ability to address the proliferation
problem.
ADDRESSING PROLIFERATION RISKS IN RUSSIA
The subcommittee has asked the panelists to address the current threat
posed to U.S. security by Russian nuclear weapons, weapons-usable
materials, and "brain drain"; progress we are making to address this
threat; and key next steps in our work with Russia.
John Lauder of the Central Intelligence Agency can best speak to the
threat, but allow me to offer a few comments.
We must not fall prey to complacency as we work to improve security
for hundreds of tons of nuclear material, or wrestle with the problems
of "brain drain." As long as there are states and organizations
interested in acquiring weapons of mass destruction, we know that
there will be a market for weapons-usable materials and expertise.
Sustaining these nonproliferation efforts is, therefore, a crucial
national security priority for the United States.
In another sense, the proliferation dangers of several years ago
persist today. From systemic problems, such as economic and social
stress and civil unrest faced by Russia and the other Newly
Independent States (NIS) as they transition away from Soviet
structures of governance, to the challenge of working with these
countries to build up their national nuclear security systems to
prevent illicit nuclear trade, diversions, or other types of
proliferation, we have much work to do. There is no room for error
in
our campaign to reduce proliferation threats, and so we all share a
responsibility to continue this work and expand it when opportunities
arise.
Allow me to address Department of Energy progress in addressing these
threats across a number of key nonproliferation programs we are
undertaking in cooperation with Russia and the NIS.
SECURING NUCLEAR WEAPONS EXPERTISE
I wish to start by discussing our flagship "brain drain" prevention
programs: the Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI) and the Initiatives for
Proliferation Prevention (IPP). As you know, Secretary Richardson and
Minister for Atomic Energy Adamov established the NCI in late 1998
to
cooperate with Russian efforts to create peaceful, commercial jobs
for
displaced nuclear weapons scientists and engineers in Russia's ten
"closed" cities. NCI is a new type of "brain drain" prevention program
in that it is focused on nuclear workers who are slated to leave the
nuclear weapons complex as facilities, and their jobs, are eliminated.
Our initial focus has been on three municipalities: Sarov
(Arzamas-16), Snezhinsk (Chelyabinsk-70), and Zheleznogorsk
(Krasnoyarsk-26).
This program is on track. Since April 1999, when my office was first
authorized to spend funds, we have commissioned an Open Computing
Center in Sarov, an International Business Development Center in
Zheleznogorsk (with similar centers to open soon in Snezhinsk and
Sarov), upgraded telecommunications systems in all three cities, and
signed an agreement at the end of December 1999 with the European Bank
for Reconstruction and Development to open small business loan centers
in the three cities, providing access to millions of dollars in
potential financing.
We have also initiated high-level strategic planning efforts with the
Ministry for Atomic Energy to establish goals, costs, and timelines
for workforce reduction and facility closures in each of the three
cities. The Sarov strategic plan was completed last September; it
identifies the reduction of as many as 6,000 employees of the
Institute of Experimental Physics, a nuclear weapons design institute.
Through the plan, we have also agreed to the accelerated shutdown of
weapons assembly and disassembly at the Avangard plant: weapons
assembly will halt by the end of 2000; weapons disassembly will halt
by the end of 2003. To implement this accelerated shutdown, a
commercial agreement for the production of kidney dialysis equipment
was also recently completed, linking Avangard (home of a Russian
nuclear weapons assembly and disassembly plant in Sarov), a
German-American medical equipment company, and the Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory. Similar private industry partnerships are under
development in other closed cities.
I am proud to say that NCI is already working to create jobs. The Open
Computing Center will have 100 new contract research employees this
year, with another 500 jobs expected by 2001. A separate center in
Sarov for nonproliferation analysis has opened and will employ 30 or
so workers displaced by down-sizing in the Russian nuclear weapons
complex. The kidney dialysis equipment project at Avangard could
create more than 100 jobs and has the potential to bring major
investments into Sarov. In all, more than 30 civil projects, equating
to more than 700 jobs, are either funded or under development across
a
range of commercial areas -- from laparoscopy in Sarov, to fiber optic
production in Snezhinsk, to canola oil and seed processing in
Zheleznogorsk. With a funding boost in FY 2001, we expect to create
hundreds of new jobs in each of the three cities.
Like NCI, DOE's IPP program works to secure weapons of mass
destruction expertise and know how. Since the program's inception in
1994, more than 6,000 weapons scientists in Russia and the Newly
Independent States have been supported through 400 non-military
projects. The program partners Russian and NIS scientists with
specialists at the Department's national laboratories, and
concentrates aggressively on the commercialization of projects that
are cost- shared with U.S. industry. Major corporations -- such as
United Technologies, DuPont, and American Home Products -- are
participating in this program. To date, U.S. industry has contributed
$64 million, eclipsing the $38 million provided by the Department of
Energy for cost-shared projects. Six commercial projects have already
been launched with full graduation from U.S. government financing,
and
another thirteen projects are poised for full commercialization by
the
end of 2001.
Improving the commercial thrust of the IPP program is just one of the
recommendations suggested last year by the GAO that we have moved to
implement quickly. All of our IPP projects are now reviewed by the
U.S. Industry Coalition, helping to promote I those having genuine
commercial potential. Other issues raised by the GAO report have been
addressed as well. For example, we now use the Civilian Research and
Development Foundation to avoid the payment of taxes on IPP projects
in Russia; we have the agreement of the governments of Ukraine and
Kazakhstan not to tax IPP payments; we vet all projects through an
interagency screening process to rule out activities that might
further a weapons program; and we cap the amount of IPP budgeted funds
going to DOE's national laboratories at 35 percent.
SECURING FISSILE MATERIALS
Another core DOE activity is our Materials Protection, Control and
Accounting (MPC&A) program, an essential bulwark against the nuclear
weapons aspirations of terrorists and countries of proliferation
concern. Through the MPC&A program, we have built a legacy of trust,
solid working relationships and cooperation with Russian agencies,
institutes and scientists, facilitating our efforts to improve the
security for fissile materials at highest risk throughout the Russian
nuclear complex.
Our MPC&A efforts are progressing well. By the end of this calendar
year, we will have completed security upgrades at 36 sites and
improved protection for 400 metric tons of highly enriched uranium
and
plutonium. Last October, Secretary Richardson and Russian Minister
for
Atomic Energy Adamov signed a government-to-government agreement that
will ensure the job gets done at the remaining 20 sites in Russia.
We
are also nearing completion of a separate implementing agreement with
the Russian Ministry of Defense that will advance our MPC&A work
at a
number of very sensitive Russian Navy sites. Over the last year,
working in cooperation with the Department of Defense, we completed
security upgrades at a highly enriched uranium storage facility in
Murmansk, the home base of the Russian Navy's Northern Fleet. The
Russian Navy has requested our assistance in improving security at
additional storage sites, showing an unprecedented degree of
cooperation and access to Department of Energy employees.
Beyond Russia's Navy, we are enhancing our programs with the Ministry
for Atomic Energy to reduce long-term costs and proliferation risks
by
consolidating and converting material and promoting the sustainability
of our MPC&A operations.
The material consolidation and conversion effort aims to reduce the
number of buildings and sites that store plutonium and highly enriched
uranium and convert the uranium to a low-enriched form, which is not
directly usable in a nuclear weapon. We recently completed a model
project to consolidate and convert more than 200 kilograms of highly
enriched uranium. In the coming fiscal year, we will augment this
effort by converting at least 600 additional kilograms of highly
enriched uranium and clearing out 6 buildings and 2 sites. Over the
next 2 years, our goal is to convert 8-10 additional metric tons of
highly enriched uranium.
Our sustainability program will ensure that Russia has the
infrastructure to maintain and operate MPC&A systems over the
long-term. We must be certain that computers remain operational and
that the locks we help to install do not rust and break away. For this
task, we will establish training centers, identify credible Russian
suppliers of MPC&A equipment, and help in the development of
regulations and security force procedures, as well as a central system
to track amounts and locations for all of Russia's nuclear material.
Some of the expertise DOE has developed in this area will be built
into Department of Defense efforts to safeguard biological materials
and facilities. This is an excellent example of synergy between our
programs.
As you can see, we are making solid progress on the MPC&A front.
Nevertheless, economic turmoil, growing concern that insiders might
sell nuclear material on the black market, and our recognition that
the size and geographic scope of Russia's nuclear complex is larger
than our original estimates in 1994, all suggest that our
nonproliferation work in this area is not yet finished.
Our MPC&A work complements our related cooperative efforts with
Russia
to block illicit nuclear trade. MPC&A is our first line of defense.
Our "second line of defense" program is working to help Russia prevent
unauthorized nuclear trade at nine key border crossing points and
transportation centers -- many of them possible transit points to Iran
or North Korea. By the end of calendar year 2000, we plan to place
radiation detection equipment at all nine points. We are also
developing a detection equipment training manual, which will guide
the
work of more than 30,000 front-line Russian customs officials.
We have additional nuclear material security programs focused on MPC&A
improvements in former Soviet states outside of Russia, as well as
protection of spent fuel at the BN-350 reactor in Aktau, Kazakhstan.
In Aktau, our "on the ground" efforts to can and secure more than
3,000 plutonium-bearing spent fuel rods is proceeding well. The first
phase of the operation is nearly complete. The next phase involves
placing the material in long-term storage. Expert discussions on this
issue are progressing well and we expect to launch a long-term
management program in FY 2001.
FISSILE MATERIALS DISPOSITION
The transfer of the Office of Fissile Materials Disposition to the new
Office Of the Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation is now complete and has gone extremely well. Laura
Holgate, who has served very ably as Director of that Office, is now
Associate Deputy Administrator for Fissile Materials Disposition and
Special Secretarial Negotiator for Plutonium Disposition. There is
a
strong synergy between fissile materials disposition and my Office's
broader mission to demilitarize large stocks of U.S. and Russian
fissile materials surplus to national security requirements. This work
is extremely important and advances our long-term nonproliferation
and
national security goals. By assuring that hundreds of tons of fissile
materials are withdrawn from U.S. and Russian stockpiles and never
used again to build nuclear weapons, we are closing the door on an
era
of the nuclear arms race and improving security for future
generations.
On the international front, we are continuing our efforts in
partnership with Russia to demonstrate a number of plutonium
disposition technologies, demonstrations that will accelerate Russia's
ability to build the facilities needed to dispose of its own surplus
plutonium. We are also continuing extensive negotiations with Russia
on a bilateral plutonium disposition agreement. Implementation of such
an agreement is needed to trigger the start of actual disposition in
both countries. I am pleased to report that U.S. and Russian
negotiators are very close to a final document; both sides are pushing
hard to have an agreement in hand this spring. I would also note that
plutonium disposition was raised internationally as a high priority
issue in 1999, through the "G8" and in our multilateral discussions
on
the Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative. This has laid the groundwork
for attracting international funding for this important effort.
HEU TRANSPARENCY AND IMPLEMENTATION
In addition to plutonium, our work with Russia to convert surplus
highly enriched uranium from the Russian military stockpile into a
non-weapon-usable form is also progressing well. The 1993 U.S.-Russia
HEU Purchase Agreement -- also known by the title "Megatons to
Megawatts" -- remains one of the more impressive nonproliferation
achievements of the last decade. Through the end of calendar year
1999, more than 80 metric tons of weapons grade uranium -- enough
material for 3,200 weapons -- had been removed from the Russian
military program under this Agreement and converted to low enriched
uranium for commercial sale. Already, Russia has received close to
$1.5 billion as compensation for converted HEU. Secretary Richardson
and Under Secretary Moniz have been instrumental in keeping this
complex agreement on track.
My Office administers the HEU transparency and implementation program
to monitor the conversion and processing of this material at Russian
facilities subject to the Agreement. Over 70 teams -- the equivalent
of nearly 43,000 inspection hours -- have visited these facilities-to
monitor conversion operations. During the past year, we installed a
Blend Down Monitoring System (BDMS) at one Russian facility to provide
continuous monitoring data, providing still greater assurance that
our
transparency objectives are being met. Over the next two years, we
plan to upgrade transparency measures at two additional Russian
blending facilities and to explore new opportunities to strengthen
this important activity.
BUILDING FOR FUTURE SUCCESS
As you know, the President's FY 2001 budget request for the Expanded
Threat Reduction Initiative included a proposed $100 million for a
Department of Energy nonproliferation program with Russia. As
Secretary Richardson said last week in Congressional testimony, this
new program improves our ability to respond to the most serious
dangers presented by Russian nuclear facilities and weapons-usable
materials, bringing our cooperation with Russia to a new level.
Activities included in this new program will supplement existing
efforts to reduce proliferation dangers in the Russian military
nuclear complex, while focusing attention on an area that heretofore
has not been addressed, that is, separated plutonium produced in
Russia's civil nuclear sector. This effort should be viewed in the
context of our broader efforts with Russia to end the production of
fissile materials and reduce existing stockpiles, an effort that
includes, among others, the Plutonium Disposition program, the HEU
Purchase Agreement, and the Plutonium Production Reactor Agreement.
The new program has two main elements: the first attempts to plug gaps
in our efforts to manage fissile material from the civil side of the
nuclear fuel cycle; the second part addresses proliferation
vulnerabilities in Russia's nuclear infrastructure.
Under the first part of this new initiative, we propose to work with
Russia to construct a new dry-storage facility for their nuclear power
plant spent fuel to prevent the further accumulation of separated
civil plutonium. The Russian Minister of Atomic Energy, Yevgeniy
Adamov, has agreed to begin talks on a moratorium on the removal of
civil plutonium through its separation from spent fuel. If we
implement this agreement, the stockpile of civilian plutonium in
Russia -- which is currently more than 30 metric tons and growing at
a
rate of two additional tons per year -- would get no larger.
We would also conduct collaborative research into modern nuclear
reactor technologies and fuels, with the aim of devising more
proliferation-resistant systems. Since we continue to have concerns
about Russian nuclear cooperation with Iran, we will undertake no
major investments in area until those concerns are met. Finally, we
would conduct a program of technical cooperation with Russia to
examine the issue of geologic repositories, and the many complicated
questions before us relating to disposition of spent fuel and nuclear
wastes.
The second part of this initiative proposes to expand our excellent
cooperative work addressing problems of the nuclear weapons
infrastructure -- for example working with the Russian Navy to help
secure their stocks of nuclear fuel for the submarine fleet and ice
breakers. As you have most likely read in the newspapers, the Russian
Navy has suffered a series of incidents involving theft and diversion
of fissile materials. As a result, they are eager to work with our
Departmental experts on material protection and control. We will also
expand efforts to consolidate nuclear weapons-usable materials in
fewer sites and fewer buildings and convert these materials to a low
enriched form. New funds will also help accelerate the closure of
nuclear warhead assembly and disassembly plants at Avangard and Penza
19, under the auspices of our Nuclear Cities Initiative.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee: we have an enormous
opportunity to increase the safety and security of our nation. This
Committee has been supportive of our work in the past; now, we need
to
accelerate this work while we have the opportunity to do so. I am
confident that the programs and activities being advanced today by
the
Department of Energy under Secretary Richardson's leadership will have
dramatic payoffs tomorrow by reducing proliferation dangers.
Thank you and I look forward to answering any questions you may have.
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