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I am Sam Ray, a uranium enrichment worker formerly employed at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant in Portsmouth, Ohio. I reside at 128 Overlook Drive, Lucasville, OH.

I was hired at Portsmouth in 1954 when the Atomic Energy Commission's uranium enrichment plant first commenced operations. I worked as a production operator and instrument mechanic until May 1994 when I contracted a rare type of bone cancer-- chondrosarcoma. As a result, I had to have my larynx removed. My understanding is that there are two things that can cause my type of cancer. One is Paget's Disease, which I didn't have, and the other is radiation, which I did have. I have never smoked a day in my life. It is well documented that certain uranium and transuranic compounds are bone seekers, and I encountered these in my job. I realize, however, that I am more fortunate than many of my former co-workers and friends, who have passed away from different types of cancers, respiratory problems, and other work related illnesses. After my surgery, I was forced to stop work and take a disability retirement.

DOE investigation reports show that workers have not been adequately protected from radiation exposure in many parts of the Portsmouth plant. This led to the ingestion of enriched uranium, fission products such as technetium-99, and transuranics such plutonium and neptunium. Exposure to heavy metals such as mercury, ingestion of highly corrosive chemicals such as uranium hexafluoride, and inhalation of asbestos and solvents have taken their toll, as well. Even though certain areas had very high levels, workers were not routinely tested for exposure to transuranic elements such as neptunium and plutonium until the 1990s. Radiation exposures were systematically undercounted, due to improper bioassay procedures, in vivo body counting techniques that could not detect transuranics, and failure to conduct extremity monitoring for 30 years. Even in 1990s, there is confirmed evidence of a worker having his radiation dose records "zeroed out" due to liability concerns, doses being arbitrarily assigned, and neutron doses never being monitored. DOE continues to be exempted from external regulation by agencies such as the Occupational Safety & Health Administration and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. DOE has functioned as a self-regulating enterprise, and this lack of accountability facilitated a well documented pattern of placing production ahead of safety.

If and when a worker gets cancer that could be considered work related, few will bother to file state worker compensation claims because the burdens of proof are nearly insurmountable, and admitting that an illness is occupationally related could jeopardize health insurance coverage for the costs of treating the occupational disease. Medical benefit plans uniformly exclude coverage for occupational illnesses and injuries. For those of us who were made ill, or suffered an untimely death, legislation is needed to cover 100% of medical costs, lost income or a lump sum payment. Nuclear workers were placed in harms way to help win the Cold War. A federal remedy is needed for harms created by the federal government. I hope your Committee will see to it that we are not left out in the Cold and that legislation will be enacted this year. At a minimum, such legislation should mirror that adopted by the Senate in the Defense Authorization Act at HR 5189. This will provide a building block for more comprehensive coverage in the future.

In prosecuting the Nation's cold war mission, workers were kept in the dark about the hazards they faced. Information was provided based on a "need to know" basis--and production imperatives determined what you needed to know. Breach of secrecy, even where safety was at issue, could result in the loss of a security clearance. Even to this day, we don't know what we confronted. For example, when we started feeding irradiated recycled uranium back into the process system, we never knew we were introducing contaminants (e.g., technetium, plutonium, neptunium, etc.), nor were we adequately protected. Over 400 releases of uranium process gases or fluorine have been documented and many more went undocumented.

A. The Portsmouth Oxide Conversion Plant (705-e) Caused Massive Internal Radiation Doses

The Oxide conversion facility, which operated from 1957-1978, converted highly enriched uranium (HEU) oxides into feed material. This was considered one of the most hazardous operations at Portsmouth. Unacceptably high levels of radiation exposures were documented when the Oak Ridge Operations Office made one of its infrequent inspections to this plant, including high airborne contamination in the work areas, employees allowed to eat in the contaminated cold trap room, lack of respirator protection and increasing radiation lung burdens for chemical operators. A DOE reports notes:

"The operating contractor was aware of safety problems in X-705-E; however, production schedules were viewed as more important."

Health physics concerns prompted the contractor to install gloveboxes in 1967 to isolate workers from ingesting the fine uranium oxide powders, however, even these glove boxes failed to protect workers adequately, as the gloves deteriorated from exposure to corrosive fluorides. Airborne uranium contamination problems continued caused by the "burn through" of the fluorination tower, leaks from cold traps and product withdrawal and breaches into the system. Two workers were put on permanent work restriction due to ingestion of insoluble forms of uranium and had measured lung burdens over 50% of the allowable limits many years later.

A good friend of mine--Robert Elkins-worked in the X705-E oxide plant from 1962-65. By 1965 he was placed on permanent work restriction due to high internal body counts of radiation. He had enriched uranium, technetium-99, neptunium-237, potassium and cesium in his body. When he retired in 1985 he was still on permanent restriction. In the 15 years since his retirement, the plant management has never contacted him to check on his health or suggest that he be monitored after retirement.

However, the government didn't ignore Mr. Elkins. He was contacted by an individual from Hanford (presumably the transuranium registry) who wanted to pay him $500 for his cadaver so the government could study what happened to the radiation in his body after he passed away. He wife was also offered $500. They both declined the offer. It appears that the government is more interested in what happens to Mr. Elkins after he is dead than what happens to him while he is still alive.

Mr. Elkins' over exposures to radiation were not the exception, they were the rule. A 1985 DOE report states:

"the oxide conversion facility was not able to maintain adequate containment of the radioactive materials during operating periods."

"As such, the decision was made in the 1977 time frame to shut down that facility pending modifications to provide adequate containment measures. These modifications were never funded, and the facility has not operated since."

In vivo body counts (an insensitive method of measuring the amounts of radiation in the lung) taken after 1965 found eight employees with radiation counts above DOE's 15 rem lung standard and two other employees had more than 7.5 rem (50% of the maximum permissible body burden). Since 1972, another 7 were found with more than 7.5 rem. Of the 17 employees listed above, 11 had worked in the oxide conversion facility, underscoring the point that workers in the oxide conversion facility were subjected to intolerable, if not barbaric working conditions.

B. Neutron Doses Were Not Measured Between 1954 and 1992

The Portsmouth plant's radiation dosimetry programs were woefully inadequate. NIOSH discovered that between 1954 and 1992 the site never measured for neutron exposures. Worker dose records, consequently, do not exist for neutrons. "Slow cooker" effects from the concentration of uranium deposits in the cascade, as well as in uranium storage and feed operations results in chronic low level neutron exposures. Workers who were called in to clean-out "freeze ups" of uranium inside of the cascade would be particularly at risk. When high dose readings were found on badges, they were routinely determined to be equipment failures and summarily discarded.

C. Workers Ingested Technetium-99

Technetium-99 (Tc-99), a fission product, was introduced into the cascades beginning in 1955 from recycled uranium reactor tails, most which had been first processed at Paducah. Worker urine dose records from CY 1976, 1977 and 1978 indicate that 27% of the chemical operators at Portsmouth tested positive for Tc-99 (66% tested positive for uranium). In vivo lung monitoring established that 2 of the 45 maintenance mechanics had positive confirmed doses of Tc-99 to the lungs. Curiously, 563 mechanics were tested for uranium over a three year period, but only 45 were tested for Tc-99 or neptunium-237. Depending on whether the Tc-99 was in a vapor or solid form, special personal protective equipment (such as supplied air respirators) was required, but not provided until the early 1980s. One pregnant worker had a calculated dose 800 millirem to the fetal thyroid of her 10-11 week old fetus, providing further evidence of inadequate worker protection. Although workers were likely exposed to Tc-99, a beta emitter, beginning in 1955, DOE has found that workers were not monitored until 1975. In 1979, a Tc-99 release in the convertor maintenance area caused the internal contamination of six workers as high as five times the plant restriction levels.

D. Exposures to Neptunium and Plutonium were not Monitored or Disclosed Until The 1990s

At the production level, we were never told about or tested for exposure to plutonium, neptunium or other transuranics until the 1990s, even though recycled reactor were fed into the Portsmouth cascade beginning in 1955, and the AEC knew that the reactor "tails" at Paducah contained neptunium in 1957. It is disturbing that workers were not tested until 40 years after plant operations commenced. DOE's own reports reveal that "transuranics were a special problem in 1965, 1966, 1975 and 1976 when recycled foreign reactor feed in the form of uranyl nitrate was converted to oxide in the calciner." A 1979 analysis of two cascade deposits revealed relative high concentration of neptunium-237 (55 and 60 percent of total alpha activity), however, DOE notes that there was no change in procedure to protect workers. Management was basing its radiation protection program on worker exposure to uranium even though the specific radioactivity of neptunium is 2000 times higher than depleted uranium.

E. Dose Records Have Been 'Zeroed' Out Over Liability Concerns

A Senate Government Affairs hearing held in March 2000 confirmed that management directed that a guard's radiation dose records be "zeroed" out after he had an uptake and was hospitalized, because of the concern that he would bring a worker comp claim. We have no idea if this was an isolated case or a regular management practice on the part of Lockheed; however a DOE report stated, "an internal Lockheed martin Utility Services investigation concluded improprieties may have existed in the Plant's dosimetry program that resulted in the assignment of inaccurate exposures."

F. Radiation Doses Were Arbitrarily "Assigned" (Instead of Being Counted), and Significant Radiation Doses were Never Counted

OSHA was called into Portsmouth after complaints filed by OCAW and the Guards union disputed the accuracy of radiation doses. OSHA has jurisdiction over USEC, the government corporation that took over enrichment operations in 1993. Doses were administratively "assigned" when the health physics staff had trouble reading dose badges. One practice involved pinning a dose badge to the wall and running a scanner over it and assigning this dose to any person whose dose badge didn't read out on a scanner. A settlement of this OSHA complaint resulted in a reconstruction of doses between 1993-1995. While management was generally conservative in assigning doses, at least 103 doses were undercounted. We have no idea how far back management was simply administratively "assigning" doses, instead of counting them.

Goodyear Atomic failed to perform any extremity monitoring for radiation exposure until the 1980s, even though operators handled valves with beta emissions as high as 1 rad/hour and feed production plant ash receiver areas had floor readings of 5/rad per hour beta. DOE's investigators found that we were not tested in a timely fashion for uptakes of uranium during the 1950's and 1960's and concluded that "some uranium uptakes were likely not identified or properly investigated." Air sampling methods for radioactivity were also found deficient by DOE.

G. Workers Were Overexposed to Mercury, Arsenic, Fluorine and Trichloroethylene

Between 1981 and 1990, decontamination workers in the 705 building were exposed to mercury at up to 175 times the OSHA threshold limit values, largely from open vats of solvents. A 1990 DOE investigation found "workers were exposed at least once per shift, after sodium hydroxide was added tanks" and that Martin Marietta's plant doctor trivialized the hazards of ingesting mercury.

Arsenic contaminated feed was fed into the Portsmouth cascades in the late 1980's. Arsenic, which is a known carcinogen, migrated towards copper instrument lines causing them to plug up. Air samples detected arsenic in excess of OSHA limits. In 1993 inorganic arsenic was discovered, and the union subsequently requested a health hazard evaluation over concern that there were inadequate controls.

Fluorine gases from the fluorine plant stack were frequent and resulted in numerous complaints from workers in the area, especially during temperature inversions, fog, rain or when the vented gases are forced to ground level.

Trichloroethylene (TCE) was used as a degreaser and chiller. A 1986 special survey found levels of TCE in excess of the OSHA permissible levels in a process building (X-326).

H. Respiratory Protection Depended on WWII-Era Gas Masks for Many Years, Contamination Was Widespread and Vented to the Atmosphere

I worked at the Extended Range Product (ERP) station on and off for a number of years. On one occasion while connecting the production process into an empty cylinder, the copper tubing pigtail ruptured. Although I immediately valved off the system, the room was filled with a thick fog of uranium oxide gases. I donned an army assault mask for protection. After the all clear signal, management sent me to the hospital for urinalysis. Today, we know that you should wait for 3-4 hours to give the material time to get into your system before urinalysis. For that reason, my dose records from this accident is going to be suspect, at best.

Indeed, until the mid 1970's, our respirator protection consisted of World War II army assault masks. It was years later that we learned that these were not adequate to block radionuclides or toxic chemicals.

In the late 50's and early 60's, we had big layoffs. As a result, the preventative maintenance program went down hill, causing the equipment to not be properly maintained. Prior to this layoff, the lab handled all sampling equipment, and assured that there was <10 ppm uranium hexafluoride in the system--called a "negative"--prior to it being opened up for maintenance work.

Due to cutbacks, operators had to take over this work of the lab technicians, however, we were required to use a new system for testing that consisted of pulling a sample through a tube of salicylic acid (white powder). If the powder didn't change color in three (3) minutes, then it was assumed the system was <10 ppm UF6. We now know this was never an approved method, and there was no research done on this approach. Consequently, we put maintenance workers in harm's way when we issued a hazardous work permit stating that system was safe to enter (<10 ppm UF6).

Process gases were routinely vented to the atmosphere to obtain "negatives" to prepare the cascade cells for maintenance. Records show 23,000 lbs of uranium and 27 curies of technetium-99 were released to the atmosphere, and many more releases went unrecorded because vent emissions were not continuously recorded until the mid 1980s.

I. Workers Were Kept in The Dark on Contamination Controls

Early on, we were told that the buildings would be so clean, we could eat off the floors. In reality, some eating areas became so contaminated that management had to build designated lunch rooms that were surveyed on a regular basis and kept clear (1980's).

Due poor contamination control, certain buildings were becoming more contaminated. For example, leaks from the ERP station had spread contamination in the X-326 building. Compressors would malfunction and process gases (UF6) would leak to the atmosphere. On one occasion, it was so bad that it looked like a fog moving up the � mile long building. When I working as an instrument mechanic, I had to work in areas that I knew or suspected were contaminated. I often felt we should have radiation surveys to see if the area was contaminated, but at the time it was a hassle to get your supervisor to request a survey. Today, the story is different.

We have had many small releases which were never reported, as well as documented large releases. Inside of the withdrawal room we had a major release. There were green "icicles" hanging in the room from crystalized uranium Hexafluoride. Management had declined to install safety measures to prevent this release.

Goodyear Atomic issued a Health Physics Philosophy as a Guide for Housekeeping Problems in the Process Areas, which it distributed to all supervisors on August 27, 1962. While management assured workers there was no hazard at the uranium enrichment facility in Portsmouth, Ohio, it warned supervisors:

"We don't expect or desire that the philosophy will be openly discussed with bargaining unit employees. Calculations of contamination indices should be handled by the General Foreman and kept as supervisional information in deciding the need for decontamination."

Until the 1980's, there were few or no personal radiation monitors (frisking devices). This technology was available, but apparently for DOE the cost outweighed the risk. In the 90's, this all changed. In certain buildings and certain areas, you have to monitor clothing and shoes. Without a doubt, if we tried to operate today, as we did the first 25 to 30 years, NRC would have cited the plant for violations.

When I was hired in 1954, process operators were not allowed to wear coveralls or safety shoes. If clothing became contaminated, we took this contamination home with us on our clothing and shoes. To my knowledge, crafts (such as electricians, maintenance mechanics, etc) were allowed to wear coveralls and safety shoes. Sometime in the 60's, coveralls became optional for process operators like myself; however, it wasn't until the 90's when contamination controls were implemented that coveralls became mandatory. In reality, they should have always been mandatory.

Current workers benefit greatly by the present safeguards in place. Primarily, the problem lies in the first 35 years. What were the former workers exposed to unknowingly or may be knowingly? We know that they are having many health problems, such as cancers, respiratory problems, etc. and in numbers far greater than would be expected.

2. INSPECTIONS WERE INFREQUENT UNDER DOE'S POLICY OF SELF REGULATION

A July 1980 Comptroller General report, Department of Energy's Safety and Health Program for Enrichment Plant Workers Is Not Adequately Implemented (EMD-80-78), found that DOE's Oak Ridge Office, which had oversight responsibility for health and safety, had not conducted a safety inspection at Portsmouth for 3 years and was not adequately responding to worker safety complaints. Unannounced safety inspections were supposed to occur annually at each plant, but even when they were inspected, the Oak Ridge Office "does not, as part of an inspection or any other visit to an enrichment plant, monitor for radiological contamination." Oak Ridge explained the absence of inspections on a staff shortage, which the Comptroller General noted was attributable to Oak Ridge paying safety inspectors at a lower grade than elsewhere in the DOE complex.

Currently, I am a retiree representative for the Worker Health Protection Program. Funded by DOE, this program gives former workers a one-time complete physical, and lung cancer screening will be added this fall. When I talk to former workers and retirees, I find out how little they knew about what they were exposed to. I get calls from widows whose husbands have passed away with cancers. They want to know if their spouse's exposure in the workplace caused their illness.

In 1987 NIOSH reported that Portsmouth workers had experienced excess stomach cancer and hematopoietic cancers (including leukemia). In 1992, the study was updated, in part due to a request from Senator John Glenn. In 1996, the study summary was presented to the workforce. It indicated that there were no statistically significant elevations of any cancer deaths and the elevations of stomach and hematopoietic cancers identified in the 1987 study had diminished. These results were presented to the media in September 1999. However, the NIOSH officials releasing this information apparently chose to delete the page explaining the study's limitations Moreover these workers are protected by some other factors associated with their employment at this facility, such as lower alcohol and smoking rates as a consequence of their security clearance requires. This further complicates the interpretation of any harmful effects there might have been suffered.". We obtained the deleted text from another source. One of the key uncertainties is the fact that the population is still relatively young and that the poor quality of exposure data makes it difficult to establish cause and effect relationships. What motivated this apparent censorship is beyond our knowledge. What is clear is that the study is far from conclusive.

4. RECOMMENDED ACTIONS FOR CONGRESS

# Congressmen Ed Whitfield and 23 others introduced HR 4398, a comprehensive bill that provides a federal worker compensation remedy for those exposed to radiation, beryllium and toxic chemicals at DOE nuclear facilities and suppliers. It stands out amongst other bills seeking compensation for radiation exposed workers because, unlike the Administration's bill (HR 3418), it expands coverage beyond the Paducah workforce and 55 workers in Oak Ridge to cover the entire DOE nuclear complex.

# HR 5189, which was introduced by Representative Mark Udall, covers radiation, beryllium and silicosis through a program administered by the Department of Labor. It is funded as "direct spending" and replicates Title 35 to the FY 2001 Defense Authorization Act (S.2549) that was adopted by the Senate is before the House-Senate Conference Committee. While Title 35 is not as comprehensive as HR 4398, Title 35 is a very, very important building block that addresses some of the most glaring problems confronted by nuclear workers in the worker compensation system. Allow me to be clear: this provision should be included in the House-Senate Conference Report. Waiting another year to take action--as some have suggested-- is not fair to those who are suffering today.

# Any successful bill must shift the burden of proof to the government in determining causation where the exposure data is missing or of poor quality, because the failure to properly monitor for radiation and toxic hazards unfairly imposes an insurmountable burden of proof on a victim. HR 5189 and Title 35 create a special category of workers at Portsmouth, Paducah and Oak Ridge K-25 sites where the dose data cannot be reconstructed to establish proof. Some types of dose estimation to compensate for missing data can be useful, but the threshold for establishing "proof" must take account of the wide errors inherent in even the best dose estimates. Good science relies upon good data. As NIOSH noted in a 1993 report, that "prior to 1981, the amount of quantitative industrial hygiene data is scant to non existent."

# A single agency, such as the Labor Department's Office of Worker Compensation Programs, should administer a federal workers comp program. An ideal program provides one-stop shopping for addressing occupational illnesses regardless of whether it is beryllium, radiation, toxic chemicals or heavy metals. Shifting claims for toxic exposures to the states is ill-advised. HR 5189 and the Title 35 provide for a report to Congress by the GAO to evaluate whether state programs can be made to work in cooperation with an Office of Worker Advocacy with DOE. Again, we would prefer a comprehensive bill to be passed this year, but the approach provided in the Senate lays a foundation upon which Congress can build in the future.

# The current medical screening program carried out by DOE under Section 3162 of the FY 93 Defense Authorization Act should go even further, with lifetime annual medical screening, and fully paid medical insurance for displaced or retired workers. A Medigap supplement should be fully funded by the government for nuclear workers.

# Workers at Portsmouth and Paducah face a unique problem with retiree health care benefits. Since USEC was privatized, it has assumed responsibility for the Lockheed Martin retiree health care benefits program. However, these benefits could be in jeopardy if USEC, as many predict, will fall into bankruptcy or be liquidated in several years. Unlike pensions, retiree health care benefits are not guaranteed under ERISA. We need legislation to guarantee that the funds which the DOE has already transferred to USEC to cover the retire health care liability are placed in a safe harbor and these benefits will be delivered as intended.

On January 29^th of this year, the New York Times reported: "After decades of denial, the government is conceding that workers who helped make nuclear weapons ... were exposed to radiation and chemicals that produced cancer and early death." In the article, Energy Secretary Bill Richardson said, "In the past, the role of government was to take a hike,....and I think that was wrong." Nuclear workers have paid a price and deserve a fair remedy. The Senate has passed a provision that would spend a portion of the budget surplus to help those made ill in the service to our national security. We urge your Committee to help make that provision become law this year.