STATEMENT OF
DR. J.D. CROUCH II
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY
BEFORE THE 108TH CONGRESS
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
4 MARCH 2003
COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM
Thank you for inviting me to discuss the Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction program (CTR), and the President's request for fiscal year 2004 CTR funding.
The CTR program is a product of Congressional action - the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991, which directed DoD to assist the states of the former Soviet Union in dismantling, destroying, consolidating and securing Soviet-era weapons of mass destruction and means of their delivery. As we think about how to change CTR to meet changed security challenges, we have to look back carefully over a record of accomplishment, yet one with many hard lessons. As we plan for the future, we must look ahead with a realistic vision of what can and cannot be done with CTR recipients.
This committee has been instrumental in helping DoD focus its CTR efforts on projects with the greatest potential benefit to US security. The oversight role you have played has also helped ensure that our CTR investments have been effective and used for their intended purposes. Your involvement has also helped us convince recipients of CTR assistance that they need to abide by their commitments.
Old and New Factors Guiding CTR. As we look ahead, there are a number of key factors that have not changed since the first days of CTR implementation:
� Russia continues to hold the single largest stock of WMD in the world, representing a significant proliferation risk to the United States, its friends and allies.
� FSU states may be willing to eliminate or secure some of their WMD materials, but are not doing so on their own.
We also note several new factors as we plan for the future, and take account of many lessons learned.
� Proliferation of WMD to terrorist organizations is now as much of a threat as proliferation of WMD to rogue states.
� Porous borders in the FSU offer the potential for illicit transit of WMD and related materials to terrorist organizations and their sponsors.
� The September 2002 National Security Strategy and the December 2002 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction highlighted the significant role nonproliferation and threat reduction programs play in preventing rogue states and terrorists from acquiring WMD and related materials, technology and expertise.
� We now know that every assumption, expectation and schedule for a project must be verified repeatedly.
We have learned that, with respect to Russia in particular, there are difficult challenges to providing assistance that is designed first and foremost to serve United States national security interests.
Confidence and Credibility. The year since I last testified to Congress on CTR has been a difficult one for the program.
At this time last year, Russia had just told us that a facility built with approximately $106 million in CTR assistance would have no use. The missile fuel it was intended to neutralize had been diverted to the Russian commercial space program. The waste in US tax dollars represented by the so-called "heptyl" facility situation was inexcusable.
The heptyl situation was a wake-up call. We impressed on the Russian government at all levels the gravity of the situation that their negligence had created. But more importantly, we looked inward at how the program has been managed, and found ways to better protect CTR investments.
� We asked the DoD Inspector General to review the program. The first phase of the IG's report was completed in September 2002. OSD has worked closely with the IG, which has joined the CTR executive review team in meetings with Russian officials.
� We instituted a program of semi-annual "executive reviews" with Russian agencies that serve as executive agents for CTR projects. These reviews, of which two have already been conducted, revalidate project plans and permit more direct, senior level input on CTR to the Russian bureaucracy.
� We analyzed all pending CTR projects for risks that were similar to the heptyl facility situation - reliance on good faith Russian promises or assumptions - and are currently working to convert such undertakings to formal, legal agreements. At least two of these four agreements should be signed by the end of this month.
� In the wake of the heptyl situation, we reaffirmed some key management practices that have protected US investments in the past: CTR does not provide direct cash grants to recipient governments; most CTR prime contractors are US companies, and when any Russian contractors are used today, they are hired on a firm, fixed-price basis.
� We have also reaffirmed the need for transparency and access to confirm requirements for, and use of, CTR assistance. For example, we pressed the Russian MoD for agreements guaranteeing access to loosely guarded nuclear weapons storage sites and transshipment areas where CTR would like to assist with security and inventory control systems. The site access agreements were recently approved as a prerequisite for CTR assistance.
� In addition, negotiations continue on an agreement guaranteeing DoD access to the fissile material storage facility being built with CTR assistance. This agreement will provide for access during loading of the facility and permanently thereafter to ensure that only weapons-grade material is being stored.
Another illustration of the difficulty of dealing with another country's infrastructure relates to local politics. DoD officials were informed that local leaders in Russia's Udmurt Republic had reversed their prior position and would bar construction of a solid-rocket motor destruction facility. This facility was intended to support the ambitious decommissioning schedule for Russia's mobile SS-24 and SS-25 missiles. CTR had invested some $14 million in the Udmurt site, near the city of Votkinsk. CTR had also invested approximately $85 million in designs and testing for the rocket motor disposal facility to have been built at Votkinsk.
The Votkinsk situation is similar to the heptyl situation in one respect. A significant US non-proliferation investment was jeopardized.
However, the Votkinsk situation is different from the heptyl situation in many other ways. Our information is that the Russian federal government made significant attempts to secure the necessary land and environmental permits from local officials. In addition, the Russian executive agent has come up with its own alternatives to the Votkinsk facility, as well as some of its own funding. Moreover, Russian officials were fully transparent with us regarding the local political problems as soon as they began brewing last year. Finally, over 400 SS-24 and SS-25s are still scheduled to begin decommissioning later this year: as opposed to the heptyl situation, there remains a proliferable commodity that the US has an interest in destroying.
A final decision on whether or how CTR might provide additional assistance to facilitate these goals has not been made. Yet, we are again confronted with a potentially significant loss of CTR investment.
The past year has been extremely frustrating. It serves as a reminder that we need to do better internally; I think we have moved quickly to put better management controls in place. But the past year also highlights how hard it is to pursue this type of program in a state like Russia, even if we do everything correctly.
Implementing Lessons Learned. One of the key lessons learned is that CTR recipients are not always all alike. The Administration's recent implementation of the program recognized that in the case of Russia, we cannot conduct business as usual. For example, for fiscal year 2002, Russia was not certified as eligible for CTR assistance, while all other states for which the funding was requested were certified.
Russia was not certified because the President could not confirm Russian compliance with biological and chemical weapons agreements as required by the National Defense Authorization Act of 1993. This was a departure from years past, and all new assistance for Russia was suspended for much of 2002.
Congress granted the President's request for authority to waive the certification requirements. The President exercised this authority with respect to Russia for 2002 and 2003 because the benefit to US national security of CTR assistance was deemed to outweigh the concerns about Russian behavior. Obviously, we take the authority Congress gave us to waive these restrictions very seriously, and must continually weigh the benefits of executing the waiver against the costs.
This Administration revised CTR's four central objectives last year. The current objectives are:
� Dismantle FSU WMD and associated infrastructure;
� Consolidate and secure FSU WMD and related technology and materials;
� Increase transparency and encourage higher standards of conduct;
� Support defense and military cooperation with the objective of preventing proliferation.
These revised objectives guide CTR activities as we ensure the program also supports the global war on terrorism through defense and military cooperation on border security, and the biological and chemical weapons proliferation prevention initiatives.
CTR can make a valuable contribution to the global war on terrorism. We have taken the expertise developed from WMD dismantlement in the FSU and are turning it toward some of the most important threats President Bush has outlined in the fight against terrorism. We are expanding the biological weapons proliferation prevention program and focusing on the most proliferable types of chemical weapons. We are also leveraging CTR's experience to address the porous borders in the non-Russian former Soviet, a potentially significant trafficking area for WMD.
We are also looking beyond Russia and the Soviet legacy. The Administration is proposing legislation that would give the President authority to use up to $50 million annually in CTR funds outside the FSU to resolve critical proliferation threats, or to take advantage of opportunities to achieve long-standing nonproliferation goals. This proposal recognizes that the world has changed since CTR began and that the program should change with it to best protect US interests. We contemplate using this authority where DoD has a sizable presence, or in close coordination with other departments to maximize the expertise US agencies can bring to bear against a proliferation threat.
Russia. The United States would like to see Russia become a full partner in the Global War on Terrorism and combating WMD proliferation; comply fully with its arms control and nonproliferation obligations; and safely and securely store its nuclear weapons, fissile material and dangerous pathogens. This is a vision for Russia, parts of which CTR may help realize. The reality tells us that we must be very cautious, and find new ways to protect US investment in CTR projects.
Russia: Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination (SOAE). The FY 2004 budget request includes $57.6 million for SOAE, a $12.5 million decrease from FY 2003, reflecting a carryover of unobligated funds from previous years. The carryover results principally from the 2002 delay in certifying Russia for CTR assistance. SOAE assists Russia in eliminating strategic delivery systems and infrastructure. SOAE assistance is framed as an incentive for Russia to draw down its former Soviet nuclear forces. One of the larger project areas under SOAE relates to Solid Propellant ICBM/SLBM and Mobile Launcher Elimination, where $25.9 million is requested for FY 2004. $18.7 million is requested for SLBM Launcher Elimination and SSBN Dismantlement. This is a $7.3 million increase from FY 2003, resulting from our plan to dismantle two SSBNs in FY 2004 as opposed to one in FY 2003.
CTR's Nuclear Weapons Storage Security program assists Russia with safe and secure storage for nuclear warheads. We requested $48.0 million in the FY 2004 budget for this program. The bulk of the funds, $47.9 million, are directed toward the Site Security Enhancements project, which provides urgently needed security enhancements to Ministry of Defense (MOD) nuclear weapons storage sites and temporary transshipment points for movement of deactivated warheads. As noted above, we concluded agreements with the MoD last month that will guarantee CTR personnel the access necessary to oversee security upgrades at these sites.
We have requested $23.2 million for the Nuclear Weapons Transportation Security program, which provides safe and secure transport of nuclear warheads from deployed sites to dismantlement or enhanced security storage sites. This is a $3.6 million increase over the FY 2003 budget. The increase will support Russia's improved efforts to draw down its nuclear stockpile pursuant to the Moscow Treaty. The FY 2004 budget request for the Weapons Transportation Safety Enhancements project area is $5.7 million greater than for FY 2003. This will enhance safe and secure transport, to include purchase of ten replacement warhead transportation cars. Russia agreed to destroy two unusable warhead transport cars at its own expense in exchange for each new car CTR provides.
To assist Russia in providing a secure, centralized storage facility for fissile material removed from nuclear weapons, CTR is building a Fissile Material Storage Facility (FMSF) at Mayak. This project is over 92 percent complete and requires no additional funding. DoD is negotiating a transparency agreement to ensure that only weapons-grade material is stored at the FMSF.
Russia: Biological Weapons Proliferation Prevention (BWPP). Overall funding requested for the BWPP program remains roughly at the FY 2003 level, $54.2 million. FY 2003 increases in BWPP funding reflected the Administration's interest in combating biological weapons proliferation as part of the war on terrorism. DoD anticipates obligating approximately $31 million in FY 2004 for BWPP activities in Russia.
These activities will include additional cooperative research projects with Russian scientists and institutes that are designed to prevent proliferation of BW expertise, enhance transparency, improve standards of conduct and leverage the extensive expertise of the former Soviet bioweapons complex. Additional efforts are planned to dismantle and eliminate BW infrastructure in Russia as well as projects to enhance security against theft or accidental release of dangerous pathogens.
Russia: Chemical Weapons Destruction. The budget request for the Chemical Weapons Destruction (CWD) program in Russia is $200.3 million, an increase of $67.4 million. This reflects the President's direction to accelerate progress at the Chemical Weapons Destruction Facililty (CWDF) project in Shchuch'ye ($190.3 million). The Shchuch'ye project is a CW destruction facility for nerve agent-filled, man-portable, tube and rocket artillery and missile warheads. This facility will be able to destroy 1700 metric tons of nerve agent per year. $126.6 million of FY 2003 funds will be obligated for Shchuch'ye, provided that Russia agrees to destroy all nerve agent weapons at Shchuch'ye. We expect to complete this agreement this month. The President sought and Congress granted authority to waive certification requirements related to the Shchuch'ye project. The President exercised this authority on January 10, 2003 because of proliferation concerns about the types of munitions to be eliminated there. However, the Administration continues to press Russia for a full and complete accounting of its chemical weapons stockpile, in addition to completing a practical plan for eliminating nerve agents.
CTR continues to assist Russia with dismantling and demilitarizing the former CW production facilities at Volgograd and Novocheboksarsk. CTR is also enhancing security for highly proliferable chemical weapons stored at Planovy/Shchuch'ye and Kizner. DoD already has provided interim security enhancements, and is in the process of installing comprehensive security upgrades that will be completed in 2003.
Non-Russian FSU States As with Russia, the vision for CTR assistance in the other FSU states is tempered by a mixed record of responsiveness. There are a number of areas in which certain FSU states have demonstrated a significant commitment to cooperation and transparency. For example, Kazakhstan and Ukraine are free of nuclear weapons with the help of CTR assistance. On the other hand, final elimination of SS-24 missiles in Ukraine has taken far longer than originally foreseen.
Non-Russia FSU States: Elimination of Strategic Offensive Arms and WMD Infrastructure. Ukraine. We have requested $3.9 million for CTR's Strategic Nuclear Arms Elimination program area in Ukraine. This will help fund construction of an SS-24 Propellant Disposition Facility for removal and elimination of solid fuel from SS-24 missile motors. DoD has successfully removed all SS-24 missiles from their silos, and eliminated all launchers and launch centers. The SS-24s have been disassembled and safely stored since January 2002. CTR will use prior year funds to continue elimination of Tu-142 Bear and Tu-22M Backfire bombers and KH-22 nuclear capable air-to-surface missiles.
For DoD's WMD Infrastructure Elimination program area in Ukraine, no new funds are requested for FY 2004. DoD will use FY2003 funds to eliminate nuclear weapons storage sites, liquid missile propellant facilities, and heavy bomber airbase infrastructure.
Kazakhstan. CTR's WMD Infrastructure Elimination program area assists Kazakhstan in providing safe and secure storage of fissile material and in destroying former nuclear weapons and liquid propellant storage sites. We are requesting no additional funding in FY 2004 and will rely instead on FY 2003 funds.
Non-Russian FSU States: Biological Weapons Proliferation Prevention (BWPP). DoD has concluded Biological Threat Reduction Implementing Agreements with Uzbekistan and Georgia and negotiated an agreement with Ukraine. We are also providing BWPP assistance to Kazakhstan under the WMD Infrastructure Elimination agreement. DoD already conducts BWPP projects in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan and is planning to begin activities in Georgia and Ukraine in 2003.
� In Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, CTR's BW Infrastructure Dismantlement and Restructuring program assists with destruction of WMD-related infrastructure. In Kazakhstan, CTR is helping eliminate the anthrax production facility in Stepnogorsk. The project has now entered into phase IV, which includes dismantlement of the facility. In Uzbekistan, CTR has implemented phase I of the destruction of the Soviet BW testing facility on Vozrozhdeniya Island. We belive this phase fully destroyed viable anthrax spores left in approximately 100 tons of anthrax weapons agent the Soviet military buried near the laboratory complex on the island in the late 1980's. DoD is working with Uzbekistan to determine whether additional work at Vozrozhdeniya is required.
� CTR's Collaborative Biological Research (CBR) projects in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan help prevent the proliferation of BW expertise, enhance transparency, improve standards of conduct of former BW scientists and leverage their extensive expertise. There is currently one project in Kazakhstan and two in Uzbekistan. CTR plans to expand CBR projects to Ukraine and Georgia.
� In Kazakhstan, two CTR Biosafety and Biosecurity projects are (1) characterizing and protecting strain collections of dangerous pathogens at the Scientific Research Agricultural Institute in Otar, and (2) designing and constructing an earthquake- proof building to secure dangerous pathogens at the Kazakh Institute for Research on Plague Control in Almaty.
� The FY 2004 request calls for $23 million for CTR's Bioattack Early Warning and Preparedness project. This new program area received 42% of the overall FY 2004 budget request for the BWPP program. Under this project, CTR will expand research cooperation with Ministry of Health institutes in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Georgia and Ukraine to build infectious disease surveillance networks that will allow these countries and the US to better detect, characterize and monitor disease outbreaks and to consolidate pathogen collections in secure, DoD-accessible, institutes.
Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation Prevention Initiative (WMD-PPI). $39.4 million is requested in FY 2004 to support this initiative, which is designed to enhance non-Russian FSU capabilities to prevent, deter, detect and interdict illicit trafficking in WMD and related materials. DoD is collaborating with other US agencies to develop an overarching US government strategic plan for export control and border security assistance to FSU states that will encompass assistance provided through this initiative. This initiative will build on the foundation created by the CTR Defense and Military Contacts program.
The 9/11 terrorist attacks, subsequent discoveries of terrorist plans to obtain WMD, and the need for a rapid expansion of border security efforts in Central Asia underscored the role that DoD could play through CTR in support of the war on terrorism. This initiative is designed to develop self-sustaining capabilities, not merely to provide equipment and services. This vision will require close coordination with other US agencies to ensure that recipient countries are developing the law enforcement and regulatory capabilities necessary for a comprehensive approach to WMD border security.
In implementing the WMD-PPI, DoD has developed projects designed to produce comprehensive operational capabilities based on the interagency approved US strategic plan and country/regional requirements. These projects will provide not only equipment and related training, but also self-sustaining operations and maintenance capabilities.
DoD is developing the following prototype projects through the WMD Proliferation Prevention initiative:
� A Caspian Sea maritime control capability in cooperation with Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan to interdict illicit trafficking in WMD and related materials.
� Supporting Ukraine's plans to develop mobile response teams to address WMD trafficking incidents between ports of entry on the land border with Russia.
� Completing deployment of fissile material portal monitors at key border crossings in Uzbekistan to detect illicit trafficking in nuclear materials.
� Developing a Regional Training Center to provide realistic training on border control operations and procedures to prevent illicit trafficking in WMD and related materials.
Conclusion. Since its inception, CTR has assisted with deactivation or elimination of a total of 6032 warheads and 847 ballistic missile launchers, 101 heavy bombers, 25 ballistic missile submarines, 510 air-to-surface nuclear missiles and 856 ballistic missiles. These are important achievements. The Administration is also acutely aware of the difficulties encountered by the program. The reality is that this program, which we undertake for our own national security purposes, comes with costs that we must bear if we continue to take advantage of this approach to threat reduction. This Administration believes that it is worth the cost. As we urge your continued support we pledge our efforts to ensure that additional non-proliferation achievements within, as well as outside, the FSU are won through responsible stewardship of US resources.
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