This is an appeal from a judgment of the

that each one of the defendant in said cases

Republic of the Philippines

Court of First Instance of the Province of

appealed from the decision of the justice of

SUPREME COURT

Cagayan, Hon. Charles A. Low presiding,

the peace and deposited P16 as required by

Manila

convicting the defendant of the crime of

law, at the same time giving a bond of P50,

malversation of public funds and

each one of which was approved by the

sentencing him to two months'

court; that on the 12th day of said month

imprisonment, to perpetual disqualification

the plaintiff in said cases presented a

to hold public office or public employment

writing to the appellant as said justice of

G.R. No. 6486

of any kind, and to the payment of the

the peace, alleging that the sureties on the

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-

costs.

said bonds were insolvent and later

EN BANC
March 2, 1911

appellee,
vs.
RAFAEL B.
CATOLICO, defendant-appellant.

demonstrated this to the satisfaction of the

It appears from the proofs of the
prosecution that the accused as justice of
the peace of Baggao, Province of Cagayan,
on the 2d day of October, 1909, had before

B. Pobre for appellant.

him sixteen separate civil cases

Acting Attorney-General Harvey

commenced by Juan Canillas against

for appellee.

sixteen distinct individuals, each one for

damages resulting from a breach of

MORELAND, J.:

contract; that said cases were all decided

by the appellant in favor of the plaintiff;

appellant; that thereupon the latter ordered

the cancellation of the said bonds and, in
the same order, required each of the
appellants to file another bond within
fifteen days, that, inasmuch as none of the
appellants in said causes presented new
bonds within the time fixed, the plaintiff in
said causes applied to the appellant, as said
court, for an order declaring final the
judgment entered in each of the said

sixteen cases and commanding the

actions. Canillas obeyed the order of the

defendants appellants in the

execution of the same, at the same time

court and made the delivery as required.

sixteen actions referred to,

attached for the benefit of the

asking that the sums deposited by the

defendants in said actions be attached (so
called in the record) and delivered to him
in satisfaction of said judgments; that the
accused acceded to the petition of the
plaintiff, ordered said sums attached and
delivered same to the plaintiff, at the same
time requiring of the plaintiff a bond of
P50 for each attachment, conditioned that
he would respond for the damages which
should result from such attachment.

Upon these facts the Acting

Attorney-General recommends the
acquittal of the accused. We are in
entire accord with that
recommendation. The case made
against the appellant lacks many
of the essential elements required
by law to be present in the crime
of malversation of public funds.
The accused did not convert the
money to his own use or to the

After this attachment (so called) the

use of any other person; neither

attorney for the defendants in the said

did he feloniously permit anybody

sixteen cases presented a complaint against

else to convert it. Everything he

the appellant to the Court of First Instance,

did was done in good faith under

by virtue of which said court ordered that

the belief that he was acting

the plaintiff, Juan Canillas, deliver to the

judicially and correctly. The fact

clerk of the Court of First Instance the

that he ordered the sums,

sums deposited by the defendants in said

deposited in his hands by the

plaintiff in those actions, after the

appeals had been dismissed and
the judgments in his court had
become final, and that he
delivered the said sums to the
plaintiff in satisfaction of the
judgment which he held in those
cases, can not be considered an
appropriation or a taking of said
sums within the meaning of Act
No. 1740. He believed that, as
presiding officer of the court of
justice of the peace, he had a
perfect right under the law to
cancel the bonds when it was
clearly shown to him that the
sureties thereon were insolvent, to
require the filing of new
undertakings, giving the parties

ample time within which to do so,

equivalent to criminal intent. The

jurisdiction and power, a question

to dismiss the appeals in case said

maxim is, actus non facit reum,

we do not now discuss or decide,

undertakings were not filed, and

nisi mens rea a crime is not

it was, so far as appears from the

to declare the judgment final. He

committed if the mind of the

record, at most a pure mistake of

believed that after said appeals

person performing the act

judgment, an error of the mind

had been dismissed and said

complained of be innocent.

operating upon a state of facts.

judgment had become final, the

sums deposited were subject to
be applied in payment of the
judgments in the actions in which
said sums had been deposited
and that he was acting judicially
and legally in making such
applications.

Giving the act complained of the

In the case at bar the appellant
was engaged in exercising the
functions of a court of justice of
the peace. He had jurisdictions of
the actions before him. He had a
right and it was his duty to require
the payment by each appellant of
P16, as well as the giving of a

To constitute a crime, the act

proper undertaking with solvent

must, except in certain crimes

sureties. While, in dismissing the

made such by statute, be

appeals and delivering the P256

accompanied by a criminal intent,

to the plaintiff in the said cases,

or by such negligence or

he may have exceeded his

indifference to duty or to

authority as such court and

consequences, as, in law, is

passed beyond the limits of his

signification most detrimental to

the appellant, it, nevertheless,
was simply the result of the
erroneous exercise of the judicial
function, and not an intention to
deprive any person of his property
feloniously. His act had back of it
the purpose to do justice to
litigants and not to embezzle
property. He acted that honest
debts might be paid to those to
whom they were legally and justly
due, and not to enrich himself or
another
by criminal misappropriation. It

was an error committed by a

sense that it would have been

prosecutions for violations of the

court, not an act done by a

declared erroneous and set aside

preceding section, the absence of

criminal-minded man. It was a

on appeal or other proceeding in

any of the public funds or property

mistake, not a crime.

the superior court. It may well be

of which any person described in

that his conduct was arbitrary to a

said section has charge, and any

high degree, to such a degree in

failure or inability of such person

fact as properly to subject him to

to produce all the funds and

reprimand or even suspension or

property properly in his charge on

removal from office. But, from the

the demand of any officer

facts of record, it was not criminal.

authorized to examine or inspect

As a necessary result no

such person, office, treasury, or

presumption of criminal intention

depositary shall be deemed to

arises from the act.

be prima facie evidence that such

It is true that a presumption of

criminal intention may arise from
proof of the commission of a
criminal act; and the general rule
is that, if it is proved that the
accused committed the criminal
act charged, it will be presumed
that the act was done with
criminal intention, and that it is

missing funds or property have

for the accused to rebut this

Neither can the presumption of a

presumption. But it must be borne

criminal intention arise from the

in mind that the act from which

act complained of, even though it

such presumption springs must be

be admitted that the crime, if any,

a criminal act. In the case before

is that of malversation of public

us the act was not criminal. It may

funds as defined and penalized in

have been an error; it may have

Act No. 1740. It is true that that

been wrong and illegal in the

Act provides that "In all

been put to personal uses or used

for personal ends by such person
within the meaning of the
preceding section." Nevertheless,
that presumption is a rebuttable
one and constitutes only a prima
facie case against the person
accused. If he present evidence

showing that, in fact, he has not

personal use thereof by the

accused to turn over the funds at

put said funds or property to

accused, thus affirmatively and

any given time sufficient to make

personal uses, then that

completely negativing the

even a prima facie case. (U.

presumption is at an end and

presumption which, under the act

S. vs.Morales, 15 Phil. Rep., 236;

the prima facie case destroyed. In

quoted, arises from the absence

U. S. vs. Dominguez, 2 Phil. Rep.,

the case at bar it was necessary

of the funds. The presumption was

580.) Conversion must be

for the accused to offer any such

never born. It never existed. The

affirmatively proved, either by

evidence, for the reason that the

facts which were presented for the

direct evidence or by the

people's own pleading alleged,

purpose of creating such

production of facts from which

and its own proofs presented,

presumption were accompanied

conversion necessarily follows. (U.

along with the criminal

by other facts which absolutely

S. vs. Morales, supra.)

charge, facts which showed, of

prevented its creation.

The judgment of conviction is reversed and

themselves, that said money had

not been put to personal uses or
used for personal ends. In other
words, the prosecution
demonstrated, both by the
allegations in its information filed
against the accused and by its
proofs on the trial, that the
absence of the funds in
question was not due to the

On the other hand, if it be

the defendant ordered discharged from

admitted that the crime, if any, is

custody forthwith.

that of estafa, as defined in

paragraph 5 of article 535 of the
Penal Code, then the presumption
just referred to does not arise.

Arellano, C. J., Mapa and Trent, JJ.,

concur.
Separate Opinion

Mere absence of the funds is not

sufficient proof of conversion.
Neither is the mere failure of the

CARSON, J., concurring:

I am strongly inclined to doubt the bona

beyond a reasonable doubt upon this point

fides of the defendant in the transactions

I concur in the judgment of acquittal of the

herein set out, but in the absence of proof

crime charged in the information.