Alexander Baumgarten's Contribution to the Development of Aesthetics

Author(s): Leonard P. Wessell, Jr.

Source: The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 30, No. 3 (Spring, 1972), pp. 333-342
Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The American Society for Aesthetics
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 LEONARD P. WESSELL, JR.

Alexander Baumgarten's Contribution

to the Development of Aesthetics

AESTHETICS, conceived as an autonomous ture. There is, according to this view, one
science of the beautiful in which the object fundamental realm of being relative to
of investigation plays the major role in de- which all other "realms" lose their auton-
termining the ordering process of aesthetic omy and are reducible. Thus, for instance,
theory, was not known in Germany before Leibniz reminds his readers that "besides
the eighteenth century. Indeed, prior to the sensible and the imageable, there is that
this time there was no general theory of which is purely intelligible, as being the
aesthetics distinct from inquiries limited in object of the understanding alone." 3 The
scope to specific problems, e.g., the "cor- truly and primarily "real" for Leibniz was
rect" manner of rhyming. It was not until the realm of the intelligible, and this realm
the development of philosophical thinking was attainable by the intellect. Since reality
by Leibniz (1646-1714) and particularly is fundamentally of one nature, then knowl-
Christian Wolff (1679-1754) that enterpris- edge, too, must be of one basic type, namely
ing thinkers in the early eighteenth cen- intellectual. Furthermore, since intellectual
tury, e.g., J. Chr. Gottsched (1700-1766)1, knowledge consists of clear and distinct
attempted a systematic and comprehensive ideas, the reality known must be of such a
analysis of the aesthetic phenomenon. Para- nature in order to be so known. If that
doxically, however, the very philosophical which appears in consciousness is not imme-
premises that inspired thinkers to analyze diately apprehensible in a clear and distinct
the phenomenon of beauty tended to in- manner, it must (1) be reduced to clear and
hibit the establishment of aesthetics as an distinct ideas mediately, (2) be rejected as
autonomous field of study. Recent investi- in some way unreal, or (3) be an embarrass-
gators of the period, such as Benedetto ment to the logical consistency of the sys-
Croce (1866-1952)2, have noted that the rea- tem. Because Leibniz believed that all real-
sons for this fact are located in the rational- ity was essentially one and that all differ-
istic roots of much of early eighteenth-cen- ences were a matter of degrees not of radi-
tury German thought. cal otherness, he was able to integrate sen-
Leibnizian inspired rationalism tended to sate or contingent truths into his system by
view reality as basically homogeneous in na- assuming that individual facts are similar to
mathematical surds, i.e., they require an in-
LEONARD P. WESSELL, JR., is assistant professor of finite analysis but are, nevertheless, reduci-
Germanic literature at the University of Califor- ble mediately to the demands of the under-
nia, Riverside. His article "Hamann's Philosophy
of Aesthetics: Its Meaning for the Storm and Stress
standing. Thus, while Leibniz was willing
Period" was published in the Summer 1969 issue to grant that sensations are a practical ulti-
of this journal. mate for the human mind, they are still
 334 LEONARD P. WESSELL, JR.

theoretically reducible to clear and distinct able to maintain the qua talis of aesthetics
notions and hence can be rendered "more against the lex continui of rationalism.'0
intelligible."4 For instance, he asserts: The task of my investigation will be to
"What is more, even sensuous pleasures are assess Baumgarten's contribution to the de-
really confusedly known intellectual velopment of aesthetics as an independent
pleasures." 5 science. I will contend that Baumgarten did
Leibniz's principle of continuity made it "liberate" aesthetic theory from the con-
possible for him to integrate sensation into fines of rationalistic intellectualism but
his system. This lex continui, however, also only at the cost of consistency within the
made it difficult for him and his immediate totality of his thought. The procedure to be
followers to construct an aesthetics upon an followed will be (1) an examination of
autonomous basis. This is so because, ac- Baumgarten's metaphysics and his corre-
cording to Leibniz, anything about aesthet- sponding treatment of sensation and (2) an
ics (and aesthetic experience always in- examination of his psycologia empirica (as
volves sensation of some sort), if it is not opposed to rational psychology). From this
immediately clear and distinct itself, must it will become apparent how Baumgarten
be theoretically reducible to an intellectual isolates the constituent elements of aes-
cognition. Concerning such a reduction, thetic experience and how he explains their
Croce comments: "To admit that artists mode of combination in such a way as to
judge with confused perceptions, clear but liberate aesthetics from intellectualism suf-
not distinct, does not involve denying that ficiently to justify our designating him as
these perceptions may be capable of being the "father" of modern aesthetics.
connected and verified by intellectual con- Baumgarten's ontology is what Etienne
sciousness. The self-same object that is con- Gilson has designated a metaphysics of es-
fusedly though clearly recognized by imagi- sentialism,ll according to which to be is to
nation is recognized clearly and distinctly be open to the conceptual power of the in-
by the intellect; which amounts to saying tellect which expresses itself by ascribing
that a work of art may be perfected by predicates to a subject. Thus Baumgarten
being determined by thought." 6 It is ob- defines ontology as the "science of all the
vious that an aesthetic experience fully re- more general predicates of being." 12 Pri-
duced to conceptual knowledge is no longer mary for the predicates of being is the fea-
aesthetic. ture by which they become intelligible,
Credit has usually been given to Alexan- namely their "what-ness": i.e., essentialism
der Gottlieb Baumgarten (1714-1762)7 for identifies being with whatever answers the
the establishment of aesthetics as an inde- question what (quid) something (aliquid) is.
pendent branch of philosophical inquiry.8 That which gives intelligibility to a being
This assertion has, of course, been denied.9 (and, indeed, the being is really not distinct
The reason for this denial is that Baumgar- from its intelligibility) was called the ratio
ten was one of the most brilliant of the (?14). Between any two predicates asserted
rationalists of his time. Thus critics such as of any subject there is, furthermore, a rela-
Croce charge Baumgarten with the "sin" of tionship of ratio and rationatum (i.e., foun-
having surrendered the independence and dation or ground and consequence) con-
uniqueness of aesthetics to the claims of the nected by a nexus.
law of continuity. Baumgarten allegedly In imitation of Leibniz, Baumgarten
did not free himself from the chains of maintained (1) that all predicates have
Leibnizian intellectualism. The fact that their ground in an adequate conception of
Baumgarten viewed aesthetic experience as a subject, and (2) that they stand together
entailing a type of truth that is an inferior as ground and consequence. This is so be-
form of intellectual truth was one proof of cause within any specific being there is a
this for Croce, since such an attitude on hierarchal relationship of determinations.
Baumgarten's part certainly presupposes Those determinations which are not deter-
the principle of continuity. The charge, mined (i.e., that do not have a ratio in an-
then, against Baumgarten is that he was not other) are the basis for further less basic
Baumgarten and the Development of Aesthetics 335

determinations called essentialia (?39). A What else could be expected of Baumgar-

complex of these essentials constitutes the ten, given his rationalistic premises? If all
essence of a thing: i.e., from its essence all knowledge about reality is of one type and
its properties can be deduced. For instance, if this type is exhaustive of the nature of
a triangle consists of lines, a plane, angles, reality, the individual has to have the char-
etc. These are the essentials from which the acteristics of a concept if it were to find a
essence of a triangle is determined. From deductive niche in Baumgarten's dream of
the essence there follows the less primary a logically interconnected reality. This
and more specific determinations or proper- meant of course that that which is individ-
ties (called affectiones by Baumgarten [?41]) ual (indeed, any aspect of reality) could be
of a thing. These lesser determinations traced to the essentilia and then deduc-
form a descending series from general to tively inferred. Baumgarten has apparently
more specific attributes and modes. There is presented his followers with a Leibnizian
no aspect of a being that is isolated, i.e., universe in which the law of continuity
that does not have a ratio that unites it (about which Croce has made such a fuss)
with all the other aspects. Therefore, every reigns. It is quite obvious that Baumgarten
aspect of a being that is not in the essence can integrate sensation into his system in
of the being (i.e., is a ratio) is a rationatum. the same way Leibniz did. But at the same
This means that Baumgarten could not time, it would seem that sensation would be
allow anything to be both ultimately given limited to the same problems that it had in
and irreducible to more primary reasons. Leibniz's theory. It would seem to follow, as
For instance, the very individuality of any Croce has contended, that any cognitive de-
specific being would, of all things, seem termination by sensation could be under-
most likely to transcend the plight of its stood in intellectual terms. In short, sen-
being a consequent, no matter how far re- suous experience would appear to have
moved, of a primitive axiom. But Baumgar- nothing about it that is irreducible and
ten does not allow this. Individuality is but that could be the subject of an autonomous
the most determinate type of essence in a science called aesthetics.
descending series of classes of categories. From the above it is quite obvious that
There is the genus, the generic difference, Baumgarten's metaphysics makes any au-
the specific difference (or species), and fi- tonomy for the field of aesthetics impossi-
nally the numerical difference. The individ- ble. It is, rather, in Baumgarten's psychol-
ual is found in the category of numerical ogy that the roots for his specific contribu-
difference. To this category belongs the tion to aesthetics are to be found. For
"this-ness, or the principle of individuation Baumgarten psychology is the study of that
[haecceitas, principium individuationis]" which is conscious. Now that which is con-
(?151). The haecceitas is reached when all scious is the soul. Hence, psychology is the
the determinations possible to a being are study of the soul (?504). I shall not deal
made. What is of importance here is that with Baumgarten's rational psychology,
Baumgarten, like Leibniz before him, has which is concerned with problems of the
been forced, in his efforts to reduce all metaphysical structure of the soul, e.g., its
knowledge to a conceptual kind, to inter- unity. It will suffice to say that Baumgarten
pret that very aspect of any being that presents his followers with a Leibnizian
would most likely seem to escape from or world of monads. Instead, it is in his psy-
transcend the categories of essence as only chologia empirica that Baumgarten dis-
the lowest form of essence, i.e., the haeccei- cusses the nature of sensible experience.
tas. The abstract Latin suffix -tas shows that The soul is that which is conscious. The
Baumgarten was seeking to reduce that objects of consciousness are representations
which is incommunicable and private about of the universe as they occur in the soul.
every individual thing to that which is com- These representations can be divided into
municable and in some way general, and two basic categories. "I think some things
thereby to bring essentialism to its logical distinctly, some confusedly" (?510). Baum-
conclusion. garten posits two faculties in the soul that
 336 LEONARD P. WESSELL, JR.

enable it to have two types of cognition. Toward the beginning of his major work
They are the facultas cogniscitiva superior on aesthetics Baumgarten wrote: "The end
(??624 ff.) and the facultas cogniscitiva infe- of aesthetics is the perfection of sensitive
rior (??519 ff.). The superior faculty is the cognition as such [qua talis]." 14 On the face
intellect. The intellect knows things dis- value of these words it would seem that
tinctly. "The representation of a thing by Baumgarten has recognized that there is
the intellect is its conception. Hence that something irreducible about the laws of aes-
whose distinct perception can be formed is thetics (both as a theory of sensitive knowl-
conceptually (grasped).. ." (?632). Intellec- edge and as a theory of beauty). If this is so,
tual knowledge is, therefore, per se concep- he has broken with his own metaphysics
tual. The ideal realization or perfection of and ceased being a pure rationalist. This
the intellect is intuitive knowledge of ade- fact allows Baumgarten to attempt a differ-
quate and distinct representations. Here ent type of explanation of sensate order
Baumgarten follows Leibniz. In such an in- than the one open to rationalists like Leib-
tuition the mind cognitively obtains the es- niz or Spinoza. If a thinker believes that the
sence of a thing plus its logical relations to myriads of particulars of the universe are
its properties. explainable as deductions from a set of ax-
Besides knowing reality distinctly and ioms, it follows on principle that the obser-
conceptually, the soul knows it indistinctly vation of particulars as they occur phenom-
or confusedly. "A non-distinctive represen- enologically cannot give adequate knowl-
tation is called sensitive representation" edge about these particulars and their orga-
(?521). Here Leibniz's law of continuity can nization. The ideal would be to discover
be seen very clearly. It is not the object as the relations of the particulars to their
object that is unclear; rather, it is the mind ground (or axiomatic principles), not be-
that is the source of unclarity. The object is tween the particulars themselves. In other
the same in both cases, but the mind is not, words, the relationships between the partic-
in the sense that, given a superior charac- ulars would only be fully understood by
ter, it could clear up the confused percep- reducing them and their interrelationships
tions of an object and make them concep- to something beyond them (cf. Spinoza in
tual. Croce seems to have achieved a victory particular). But, if the particulars are
here. It seems that, on principle, all knowl- viewed as in some way ultimate, and if it is
edge, including aesthetics, would ideally be held that there can be knowledge about
reducible to the formal logic of distinct cog- these particulars qua talis, it means that it
nition. is not necessary to go beyond the particu-
In the face of all this, Cassirer's conten- lars to explain their relationships. In other
tion seems both very odd and false: words, the particulars are not to be viewed
"[Baumgarten] was not only the outstand- as "nothing but" an obscure manifestation
ing scholastic logician who was master of all of that which is totally other in nature. In-
aspects of this discipline ..., but his real stead of explaining the particular in the
intellectual accomplishment consists in the terms of abstract principles, the particulars
fact that through mastery of the subject he should be closely observed. As Cassirer
became especially conscious of both the in-
writes, "The new science of aesthetics
trinsic and the systematic limitations of for-
mal logic. As a result of his consciousness of strives for such recognition. It abandons it-
these limitations, Baumgarten was able to self to sensory appearance without attempt-
make his original contribution to the his- ing to go beyond it to something entirely
toryrof thought which lay in the philosophi- different, to the grounds of all experience.
cal foundation of aesthetics." 13 The ques- For such a step forward would not explain
tion that must be answered is, Did Baum- the aesthetic content of appearance, but de-
garten effectively recognize any limitations stroy it." 15 But Croce has charged that this
to the domain of formal logic and thereby qua talis has no real substance in Baumgar-
give an irreducible standing to sensate cog- ten's thought, but rather that it is allegedly
nition? sacrificed to the lex continui.16 Is there any
Baumgarten and the Development of Aesthetics 337
evidence contradicting Croce? Yes, indeed: are ordered. There must be some form that
some which Croce was very conscious of. determines this order of perceptual or sen-
In his early work, Reflections on Poetry sate experience. It is this form that is the
(1735), Baumgarten distinguished between object of aesthetics. The method for obtain-
logical (or conceptual) knowledge and sensi- ing this form also reveals Baumgarten's tool
tive perception and for the first time in to avoid a reduction of aesthetic experience
modern aesthetic theory used the term aes- to conceptual thought.
thetic. He writes: "The Greek philosophers In the section of his Metaphysica entitled
and the Church fathers have already care- Psychologica empirica Baumgarten defines
fully distinguished between things per- aesthetics: "The science of sensitively know-
ceived and things known. It is entirely evi- ing and proposing is aesthetics, the logic of
dent that they did not equate things known the inferior faculty of knowing, the philoso-
with things of sense, since they honored phy of the graces and the muses, the infe-
with this name things also removed from rior knowledge, the art of thinking beauti-
sense (therefore, images). Therefore, things fully, the art of the analogy of reason"
known are to be known by the superior (?533). The revolutionary character of
faculty as the object of logic; things per- Baumgarten can be seen in his claim that
ceived [are to be known by the inferior fac- aesthetics is an ars analogi rationis. Ration-
ulty, as the object] of the science of percep- alists, such as Descartes, clearly maintained
tion, or aesthetic." 17 It seems clear from the that the same epistemological method was
above quotation that Baumgarten has al- unequivocably to be applied to different
lowed the subject matter of the cognitive fields without any diminution of the
faculty to determine the nature of knowl- method. The term analogy shows Baumgar-
edge. "Things known" (i.e., conceptually ten's break with rationalism. Analogy im-
intuited) are the proper objects of logic and plies that there is something the same and
"things perceived" (i.e., sensitively experi- something different in the sciences of logic
enced) are objects for the science of percep- and aesthetics.19 Aesthetics is the ars
tion which is called "aesthetic." This is a pulchre cogitandi ("the art of thinking
break with rationalistic method. Further- beautifully"), not of logical thinking. I be-
more, early in the same essay, Baumgarten lieve that Baumgarten was unconscious of
writes: "Philosophy and poetry are scarcely the fact that he had broken with Leibnizian
ever thought able to perform the same of- intellectualism and, indeed, with his own
fice, since philosophy pursues conceptual metaphysics on this point.
distinctness above everything else, while po- Aesthetics is a gnoselogia inferior ("infe-
etry does not strive to attain this, as falling rior knowledge"). The fact that Baumgar-
outside of its province" (Reflect., ?14). How ten viewed aesthetics as a form of knowl-
much more clearly can Baumgarten state edge and as an inferior form certainly dem-
his position? Conceptual thinking is beyond onstrates his roots in rationalism. The ra-
the providence of aesthetics. It certainly tionalist, in order to maintain the unity
would follow from this that any attempt by and homogeneity of his method, was forced
the philosopher to reduce aesthetics to con- to attempt to view all forms of conscious-
ceptual knowledge would destroy the aes- ness as degrees of one basic type of con-
thetic experience.18 Is there a tool, so to sciousness. Thus, emotions, passions, sensa-
speak, that Baumgarten gives to the aesthe- tions, etc., are treated as cognitive knowl-
tician that enables him not to reduce aes- edge. Furthermore, the fact that rationalists
thetic experience to conceptual knowledge? were intellectualists caused them automati-
Yes, there is. But first it must be made clear cally to value any other form of knowledge
just what Baumgarten was seeking to inves- as "inferior." Thus far, I must agree with
tigate in his theory of aesthetics. Baumgar- Croce in his criticism of Baumgarten. But
ten was interested in knowledge about ob- Baumgarten widened the concept of knowl-
scure and confused experience, i.e., sensa- edge. It is not exhausted by the content of
tions. Sensations in perceptual experience logic. "Yet there is, according to Baumgar-
are not chaotically perceived. Rather they ten, a field of knowledge where the reduc-
 338 LEONARD P. WESSELL, JR.

tion of phenomena to their basic substance effect, a type of discourse. Indeed, ratiocina-
is subject to a limitation." 20 This field is tion can be defined as a rational discourse.
aesthetics, i.e., sensitive cognition. This is Aesthetics, too, is a type of discourse. The
radically new and is, indeed, Baumgarten's aesthetic experience of most objects in-
great contribution to aesthetics. Aesthetics volves a series of different representations
is not interested in the distinct causes of apprehended by the mind in some sort of
sensation, etc. It remains with the phenom- unity. "By poem we mean the more perfect
enon. Baumgarten writes: "The beauty of discourse" (Reflect., ?9).21 It is the task of
sensory cognition will be the universal the aesthetician to determine what the ele-
agreement of the thoughts as long as we ments of the poem are and how they are
abstract from their order and signs down to ordered together to form the discourse.
the last one, which is the phenomenon" That which contributes to this discourse is,
(Aesthetica, ?18). Aesthetics is not inter- obviously enough, aesthetic (Reflect., ?11).
ested in anything other than the perfection What then is contained in sensate dis-
of phenomena as phenomena. Indeed, this course? "By sensate discourse we mean dis-
is the definition of beauty. "The perfection course involving sensate representations"
of phenomena ... is beauty" (?662). (Reflect., ?4). Baumgarten concludes, "Sen-
Although aesthetic experience is not re- sate representations are parts of the poem
ducible to logical categories, aesthetic expe- and, hence, [are] poetic" (Reflect., ?12).
rience is experience and as such it is a man- Therefore it follows that sensations are the
ifold within a unity. The ideal of intellec- elements of the manifold of the aesthetic
tual knowledge is to discover the nature of experience. This is not enough, however.
the manifold and the nature of the order- Sensations are not homogeneous, or at least
ing principles which cause the unity. The not as far as the human mind is concerned,
rationalists had tried to apply one type of "... since sensate representations may be
ordering principle in all cases. Baumgarten either obscure or clear, poetic representa-
followed this spirit in his treatment of con- tions are either obscure or clear" (Reflect.,
ceptual knowledge. This is why his meta- ?12). Baumgarten goes on to maintain that
physics rules out any possibility of aesthet- these two types of sensation are not of equal
ics as a distinct science. But Baumgarten value for the aesthetic experience. Just as
broke with Descartes and his heritage in not every clear idea is adequate for rational
that he recognized that sensitive knowledge discourse, so not every sensation is adequate
which is involved in aesthetic experience for aesthetic discourse. The type of sensa-
has its own peculiar type of organization tion proper to aesthetics must be more fully
that is definitely non-conceptual. The or- examined.
dering process of aesthetics is not reducible Leibniz distinguished between clear rep-
to logical concepts. And since conceptuali- resentations which are sensations and clear
zation is at the root of intellectual knowl- and distinct ones which are intellectual con-
edge, aesthetics and its type of knowledge ceptions. Baumgarten, as shown above,
are not intellectual. But Baumgarten was a makes the same division, only he makes a
rationalist and aesthetics is an analogy of more subtle distinction, i.e., he distin-
reason. Thus, the ordering process of aes- guishes between two types of clarity.22Clar-
thietics has corresponding elements to those ity occurs when the mind can distinguish
in logical ordering. In logical ordering, the object of cognition from another such
there is the manifold which consists of clear object. For example, the mind might
and distinct logical concepts, and this mani- vaguely perceive a color in a dim light but
fold is ordered together by the principle of not be able to say if it is blue or purple.
sufficient reason. There are, therefore, anal- This would be obscure perception (?528). If
ogous elements in the aesthetic process of the representation becomes distinct enough
organization. These will now be shown. so that the mind can distinguish the object,
Logical thinking is twofold: (1) There is clarity is reached. For example, imagine
the intuition of the elements and (2) there that the light is made just bright enough so
is their combination. Logical thinking is, in that the mind can see that the color is blue,
Baumgarten and the Development of Aesthetics 339

not purple. The clarity would then be min- These determinations, since they are singu-
imal (?528). There is still another aspect to lar, are not subject to abstraction if they are
clarity. "Posit two cognitions that have not at the same time to lose their singular-
equally clear notes, but let there be three ity. Therefore, an artist cannot make a sen-
notes in the first cognition and six in the sate (aesthetic) discourse about an individ-
second: the second cognition is clearer than ual employing abstract or conceptual repre-
the first. Therefore, clarity is increased by sentations. For instance, a specific woman
the number of notes. Clarity ... by means to be beautiful must have a specific height,
of a multitude of notes can be called exten- a specific shape, a specific color of hair or
sively clearer. Extensive clarity is vivid" eyes, a specific skin color, etc. She cannot be
(?531). What Baumgarten means can be reached in her individuality by means of
shown with an example. Imagine that the abstract concepts. Could a poet ever hope
mind has minimal clarity of an object. But to describe the beauty of Helena in the
it is unable to determine this object any terms of Plato's ideas, particularly of the
further than to put it in a specific category. more generic ones, such as "the Good"? No
For instance, say that the mind sees a house wonder Baumgarten concluded: "Since spe-
in the distance. This is minimal clarity. But cific determinations applied to a genus es-
the mind cannot say whether the house is tablish the species, and since generic deter-
colonial or ranch style. There are not minations establish the inferior genus
enough distinguishing notes: e.g., the mind under the superior, the representations of
cannot see the type of roofing, or the mate- the species and of the inferior genus are
rial out of which the walls are made, etc. If more poetic than those, respectively, of the
the mind knew these notes, it would have a genus and the superior genus" (Reflect.,
clearer sensate (not logical) cognition of the ?20). Thus, Baumgarten recommends using
house. The number of notes contained in examples of things in poetry that are "more
the clearer cognition is greater or more ex- determined" (Reflect., ?21) than that which
tensive than in the less clear cognition. they are to clarify. An example might be a
Thus, the second cognition can be said to poet's comparison of the beauty of his loved
be extensively clearer. "When, in represen- one with Helena's beauty rather than an
tation A, more is represented than in B, C, abstract clear and distinct definition of
D, and so on, but all are confused, A will beauty.
be said to be extensively clearer than the Thus far, it is clear that extensively clear
rest." The more notes or determinations of sensations are the material elements of aes-
an object present to the mind, the clearer thetic experience. But these elements do
the object appears. "The more determined not appear in isolation. Instead they are all
things are, the more their representations parts of aesthetic experience. Rational
embrace. In fact, the more that is gathered knowledge is held together by conceptual
together in a confused representation, the categories. Aesthetic or sensitive knowledge
more extensive clarity the representation is held together by something analogous to
has, and the more poetic it is. Therefore, the conceptual categories. It must be re-
for things to be determined as far as possi- stated that Baumgarten specifically guards
ble when they are to be represented in a against the reduction of aesthetic unity to
poem is poetic" (Reflect., ?18). In short, ex- clear and distinct concepts. When a number
tensive clarity presents the individual in all of representations is ordered to form a sen-
his irreducible sensory immediacy. sate discourse, the aesthetic experience
Baumgarten is saying the following: The arises. Indeed, it is from the unity that is
object of aesthetic (or poetic) cognition is involved in the sensate discourse that sensa-
the individual in its immediacy as it is tions lose their isolation and become parts
grasped in sensate experience. Indeed, an of an aesthetic whole. The unity of rational
individual as individual can only be experi- discourse is due to the principle of sufficient
enced in sensation. When an individual is reason. The analogous principle of unifica-
experienced, all the myriads of determina- tion for sensate discourse is the theme. "By
tions that belong to it must be there also. theme we mean that whose representation
 340 LEONARD P. WESSELL, JR.
contains the sufficient reason of other repre- Every judgment of sense is confused. There-
sentations supplied in the discourse, but fore, if judgment A observes more to be
which does not have its own sufficient rea- harmonious or discordant than judgment
son in them" (Reflect., ?66). The principle B, A will be extensively clearer than B,
of sufficient reason states that, if there is to hence more poetic" (Reflect., ?94). The
be an object, all aspects of it cannot exist in perfection of an aesthetic work is, therefore,
isolation from each other-rather that they its beauty.22A work is most perfect when its
must have an intrinsic and logical relation- theme serves as the sole end, so to speak,
ship to one another. Indeed, Baumgarten around and to which all the variety of sen-
tried to prove that the existence of an aspect sate representations are arranged.
without a sufficient reason would be a con- Thus, despite his granting to aesthetics
tradiction. Analogously, if all the sensate its own form of unity, Baumgarten still con-
parts going into a work of art do not con- ceives of this form in analogy to rational
tribute to the work as a whole, there will be notions. The joy of the aesthetic experience
no work of art because it is only in the is derived from the perception of perfec-
perceived unity that sensations are trans- tion. "The state of my soul derived from
formed from isolated and confused percep- the intuition of perfection is pleasure"
tions into being parts of an aesthetic object. (?655). Here Baumgarten does not differ
What Baumgarten is saying certainly from Leibniz. But, and this is important, he
should not raise any objections, not even means the perfection of sensate representa-
from Croce. After all, Croce did maintain tions. It is a perfection the experience of
that the lyrical intuition that produces the which cannot be reduced to the experience
aesthetic experience involves a union of a of clear and distinct unity. Here Baumgar-
specific image and a specific emotion. He ten greatly differs from Leibniz. Because of
certainly would have agreed that the artist this, Baumgarten justifies the artist's look-
must choose the appropriate image for any ing at morality in a way different from the
specific emotion if he is to produce lyrical philosopher's and a shepherd looking at an
intuition. eclipse in a way different from that of an
Baumgarten models the nature of the aes- astronomer (cf. Aesthetica, ??425, 429).
thetic unity after that of the rationalist's
ideal, i.e., unity in variety. This ideal is, of SU M MARY
course, nothing but the ideal of perfection. Baumgarten was a rationalist. He hon-
At this point, the importance of Baumgar- ored the ideals of rationalism. Just as in
ten's rationalism becomes prominent. The his metaphysics the rationalist wanted to
rationalist believed that reality must have a proceed from the general and axiomatic to
sufficient reason, i.e., its theme. Further- the specific, Baumgarten wanted to con-
more, the sufficient reason behind reality struct an aesthetics by first determining his
ultimately meant that the universe should aesthetic axioms and then making his de-
exhibit perfection. Out of the infinite alter- ductions therefrom. He admitted a spe-
nate sets of co-possibles, that set is the best cific type of representation into aesthetics
that allows for the greatest amount of real- only after it had received a deductive sanc-
ity. Reality is most perfect when the great- tion. This type of a priori-ism is in direct
est amount of variety exists with the great- opposition to the empirical methodology of
est degree of order. Similarly, out of the a theorist like Edmund Burke, who first ex-
infinite number of combinations of sensate amined the specific occasions of aesthetic
representations involved in any specific experience and then sought to induce aes-
theme, that combination is best or most thetic laws. Furthermore, Baumgarten, like
perfect which allows for the greatest possi- Leibniz, believed that the object of all cog-
ble number of sensations consonant with nition was the same. As shown above in the
the theme. For instance, concerning music discussion of Baumgarten's metaphysics, the
Baumgarten writes: "The more that is difference in cognitions is rooted in the
marked as harmonious or discordant, the soul's limitations, not in the object itself.
more intense the pleasure or displeasure. Hence, theoretically the same object con-
Baumgarten and the Development of Aesthetics 341
fusedly perceived could, given the proper ed. and trans. Alfred Gideon Langley (La Salle, Ill.,
mind, be conceived in a distinct intellectual 1949), p. 121.
6 The Principles of Nature and Grace, Based on
manner. Also, the very fact that Baumgar- Reason, in Selections, p. 532.
ten viewed aesthetics as an inferior cogni- 6Aesthetic as Science, p. 218.
tion shows his submission to the Leib- 7Baumgarten was not well known during his
nizian principle of continuity. Despite all lifetime. However, those who did read him thought
highly of him. No less a figure than Immanuel
this, however, the fact remains that Baum- Kant praised Baumgarten highly and used his works
garten did, perhaps at the price of philo- for class room lectures. The following is a chronolog-
sophical inconsistency, give the field of aes- ical listing of the works Baumgarten wrote in Latin:
thetic experience an autonomy of its own. Metaphysica (Halle, 1739); Meditationes philosophi-
cae de nonnullis ad poema pertinentibus (Halle,
No matter how much this field was con-
1735); Ethica philosophica (Halle, 1740); Aesthetica,
ceived in analogy to reason, it was neverthe- 2 vols. (1750-58); Initia philosophicae practicae pri-
less only an analogy. As is the case of all mae (1760); Acroasis logica in Christ. Wolff (Halle,
analogies, there is something different in 1761); Jus naturae (Halle, 1765); Sciographia encyclo-
each of the analogues as well as something paediae philosophicae (Halle, 1769); and Philosophia
generalis (Halle, 1769).
the same. It is in this difference that Baum- 8See Frederick Copleston, A History of Philoso-
garten locates the distinctive nature of aes- phy. Vol. 6, Modern Philosophy, Part 1: The French
thetics. To be specific, aesthetics differs Enlightenment to Kant (Garden City, 1964), p. 139.
from logic in two basic ways: (1) The mate- Compare also Ernst Bergmann, Die Begriindung der
deutschen Asthetik durch Alex. Gottlieb Baum-
rial is different. Logic studies conceptual garten und Georg Friedrich Meier (Leipzig, 1911),
knowledge while aesthetics studies sensate pp. 11-12; Herman Hettner, Geschichte der deut-
knowledge. (2) The mode of organization is schen Literatur im achtzehnten Jahrhundert. Vol.
different. Logic organizes its manifold by 2, Das Zeitalter Friedrichs des Grossen, 4th ed.
means of concepts governed by the princi- (Braunschweig, 1893), pp. 74-78; Albert Koster, Die
deutsche Literatur der Aufklarungszeit (Heidelberg,
ple of sufficient reason. Aesthetics organizes 1925), p. 55; Joh. Schmidt, Leibniz und Baumgarten,
its manifold by means of a non-concep- ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der deutschen Aesthetik
tually felt unity of sensate representations (Halle, 1875), p. 48; and Robert Zimmermann,
among one another. The principle of unity Geschichte der Aesthetik als philosophischer Wissen-
schaft (Vienna, 1858), pp. 166 ff.
is called the theme. Inferior as aesthetic 9 Croce, Aesthetic as Science, pp. 212-19; Pierre
knowledge may be, it is autonomous and Grappin, Le Theorie du Genie dans le Preclassi-
irreducible to conceptual knowledge. It is cisme Allemand (Paris, 1952), p. 69; George Saints-
the autonomy and irreducibleness given to bury, A History of Criticism and Literary Taste in
the aesthetic experience that constitutes the Europe. Vol. 3, Modern Criticism (London, 1944),
pp. 148-50; and Rene Wellek, A History of Modern
essence of Baumgarten's contribution to Criticism: 1750-1950. Vol. 1, The Later Eighteenth
aesthetics. It was for this reason that he was Century (New Haven, 1955), pp. 144-46.
accepted as a liberating influence by many 10Some writers who have at least dealt with the
of his contemporaries. kind of problem brought up by Croce are Katherine
Everett Gilbert and Helmut Kuhn, A History of
Esthetics (New York, 1939), pp. 289-95; Alfred Baum-
ler, Kants Kritik der Urteilskraft. Vol. 1, Das Irra-
tionalitatsproblem in der Aesthetik und Logik des
'Gottsched developed a relatively comprehensive 18. Jahrhunderts bis zur Kritik der Urteilskraft
and integrated aesthetics in his Versuch einer crit- (Halle, 1923), pp. 207-31; and Ernst Cassirer, The
ischen Dichtkunst, 1st ed. (Leipzig, 1730), and Erste Philosophy of the Enlightenment, trans. Fritz C. A.
Grunde der gesamten Weltweisheit (Leipzig, 1743), Koelln and James P. Pettegrove (Boston, 1965), pp.
I. Gottsched's Critische Dichtkunst was very influen- 338-60. Baumler does a very good job in presenting
tial in determining aesthetic values in Germany Baumgarten's views in the light of developing
until around 1750. thought in the eighteenth century. Cassirer's dis-
2Aesthetic as Science of Expression and General cussion of Baumgarten involves an excellent analysis
Linguistic, trans. Douglas Ainslie (London, 1922), and defense of Baumgarten's achievements.
pp. 212-19. rBeing and Some Philosophers, 2d ed. (Toronto,
8 See On the Supersensible Element in Knowledge 1952), pp. 112-21. In the pages given above, Gilson
and On the Immaterial in Nature (1702), in Leibniz: discusses in some detail the metaphysics of Christian
Selections, ed. Philip P. Wiener (New York, 1951), p. Wolff, Baumgarten's mentor. What is true for Wolff
358. is also true for Baumgarten.
4 New Essays Concerning Human Understanding, "See Metaphysica, 7th ed. (Halle, 1779; 1st ed.
 342 LEONARD P. WESSELL, JR.

1739), ?1. Hereafter all references to this work will quotation (Aesthetic as Science, pp. 212-13), but
be given in the text according to paragraph number. makes no comment upon it. If anything, this quo-
All translations from Latin into English are mine tation seems to Croce to be a proof of Baumgarten's
unless otherwise indicated. surrender to rationalism. Cf. Cassierer, Philosophy,
18Philosophy, p. 339. p. 346.
14Aesthetica (Frankfort, 1750; reprinted as 2 20Cassirer, Philosophy, p. 343.
vols. in one, Hildesheim, 1961), ?14. Hereafter, all 21Although this work was written primarily about
references to this work will be made in the text as poetry, what Baumgarten says about poetics he also
Aesthetica and paragraph number. believed concerning aesthetics in general as can be
16
Philosophy, pp. 343-44. seen in his later work Aesthetica. Therefore, what
16Cf. Croce, Aesthetic as Science, p. 214. is said of poetics is also true for aesthetics. Indeed,
17 Reflections on Poetry, Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten tends to use the terms interchange-
Baumgarten's Meditationes philosophicae de non- ably. Thus, it is obvious that the definition of a
nullus ad poema pertinentibus, trans. Karl Aschen- poem as a "perfect sensate discourse" corresponds
brenner and William Holther (Berkeley and Los to the definition of aesthetics as a perfect sensate
Angeles, 1954), ?116, p. 78. Hereafter all references cognition. The definition of a poem is just a specific
to this work will be given in the text as Reflect. and application of a more general principle.
paragraph number. 2aConcerning Baumgarten's concept of perfection,
18 Cassirer himself writes concerning the destruc- Bernard Bosanquet writes: "The idea of perfection
tive nature of reductionism: "If, in accordance with had played a great part in the speculation of Des-
the method of exact science, we explain the phe- cartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz, and was directly trans-
nomenon of color by resolving it into a pure proc- mitted from Wolff to Baumgarten. It might be gen-
ess of motion, then we have not only destroyed its erally defined as the character of a whole in so far
sense impression but we have also robbed it of its as this whole is affirmed by its part without coun-
aesthetic significance. The reduction of color to its teraction, and thus, perfection became a postulate
physical concept annihilates, as it were with one of everything real, because reality depended upon
blow, its whole significance as an artistic means of power to harmonize the greatest number of condi-
expression, its whole function in the art of paint- tions. ... Whatever is opposed to the perfection
ing." See Philosophy, p. 343. of sensuous knowledge, that is, to the unity of parts
19Croce seems oblivious to the implications con- in the whole sense-perception, is ugly." See A His-
tained in the term analogy. He quotes this same tory of Aesthetic (New York, 1960), pp. 184-85.