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Ad Agency's Private Transition

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630 views5 pages

Ad Agency's Private Transition

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api-254731572
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© © All Rights Reserved
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Available Formats
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  • Firm Overview
  • 1970 Analysis
  • Financials & Ratings
  • Disclosures
  • End Page

GAULTYGER

WATERSTONES





STERLING COOPER PARTNERS





Dropping Out

After three brief years, the Madison Avenue Ad Agency
decides to take itself private. Drastically lowering print
ad revenues lead us to believe SCP is over-valued.
Moreover, FCF inflection will take longer than we
expected (late 72-74). Attractive buyout negotiations
notwithstanding, poor dividend yields keep us SELL.
Our analysis on Sterling Cooper Partners is unchanged
heading into the buyout and 1Q71 results. We continue
to view SCP as a challenging prospect. The company
has come a long way since its IPO at $11.
Agency IPOs are tricky initiatives, be it a law firm, a
consultancy or an advertising firm, and especially
thorny in the ones which had planned to use the capital
to fund an aggressive expansion as SCP did in early
1968. The companys desperate bid to become one of
the big boys on Madison Avenue was stalled after a
series of high profile departures and portfolio losses.
We believe that currently theres almost zero value in
the firm's physical capital; the office space is rented,
and the desks and typewriters are of minimal value. The
brand name may have some value, but it is intimately
linked to the individuals who lead it, which means they
could walk out the door any day of the week; Sterling
Cooper Draper Pryce wouldnt be much of a
powerhouse without Don Draper.
The firms has a poor dividend payout. Those individuals
who are creating value know exactly what they are
worth and has been demanding a high share of the
GAULT YGER WAT ERST ONES RESEARCH
NORT H AMERI CA

Gaultyger, Waterstones & Co. LLC
64 Wall Street
New York, NY 10005
United States of America
Tel: (1) 212 250 2500
Rating
Sell

Industry
Advertising
March 12, 1971
Price at 11 Mar 1971 (USD) 3.14
Price Target 1.80
52-week range 6.31 2.27

Gaultyger Waterstones does and seeks to business with
companies covered in Gaultyger Waterstones Research.
As a result, investors should be aware that the firm may
have a conflict of interest that could affect the objectivity
of Gaultyger Waterstones Research. Investors should
consider Gaultyger Waterstones Research as only a single
factor in making their investment decisions.
or analyst certification and other important disclosures, or analyst certification and other important disclosures, or analyst certification and other important disclosures, or analyst certification and other important disclosures,
refer to the !isclosure "ection, located at the end of this refer to the !isclosure "ection, located at the end of this refer to the !isclosure "ection, located at the end of this refer to the !isclosure "ection, located at the end of this
report. report. report. report.


money they bring in, meaning that money isnt going to
shareholders.
A Troubling 1970
By all accounts, the firm did not have a good year.
Rumors of sleazy deals abound. The firm bungled the
Jaguar account that the firm spent two quarters
coveting. Associate Pete Campells loss of the $9
million Vicks account has immediately entered the
Madison Avenue lore with whispered tales about
brothels, cocaine, and adulterous fathers-in-law.
All in all, it was not a good year for the Madison
Avenue. The series of ad agency IPOs which began
six years before has stalled. Public offering fever
began with Papert, Koenig, Lois, which was followed
by the more familiar likes of DDB, Grey, FCB, J Walter
Thompson and Foote, Cone & Belding. David Ogilvy
took Ogilvy public in 1966 and claimed Warren Buffet
as an early investor. Wells Rich Greene, led by media
darling Mary Wells also went public in 1968, selling
400,000 shares.
None of these eight companies have ratings above
HOLD. SCP is hemorrhaging money and their main
rivals, Cutler, Gleason, and Chaough are in danger
because one of the partners has pancreatic cancer.
This is not a good year. But the ad men are slow
learners. Even as we filed this report, the renowned
Saatchi brothers are mulling to take Saatchi & Saatchi
public through a reverse merger.
Out of Frying Pan
Loss accounts are more troubling, especially for a firm
which aims to rapidly expand, than wider industrial
malaise. After losing Lucky Strike, Jai Alai, and Glo-
Coat, and resigning the North American Aviation and
Clearasil accounts, SCP finished the decade with a
much smaller staff and only 60 percent of the billings
it had when the doors opened.
The birth of Sterling Cooper Draper Pryce (SCDP)
occurred amidst a buyout of Sterling Cooper by
McCann in 1964 and was nothing if not dramatic.
"Last year, our agency was being swallowed whole,"
Don Draper then told the Wall Street Journal. "I could
die of boredom or holster up my guns. So I walked
into Lane Pryce's office and I said, 'Fire us.' Within a
year, we'd taken over two floors of the Time-Life
Building."
The agency opened shop with seven accounts from
predecessor agency Sterling Cooper Lucky Strike,
North American Aviation, Secor Laxatives, Jai Alai,
Samsonite, Clearasil, and Playtex and around $34
million in billings.
Sterling Cooper alum, Ken Cosgrove, bumped that
number up to around the $40 million mark when he
moved to SCDP from McCann.
But the numbers took a hit when Roger Sterling's
longtime account, Lucky Strike, dumped him to join
the rest of British American Tobacco at BBDO and
took its $24 million in billings with it.
In the wake of that account's departure, Glo-Coat also
fled, and the account team of Campbell, Cosgrove,
and Sterling had a hard time finding any brand who
would sign on with the fledgling agency to make up
the difference.
After winning a $2 million contract from Ponds, SCP
had to resign Clearasil on the account of conflict of
interest. In the process, the agency snagged the
larger account of Clearasil's parent company, Vick
Chemical, from Tom Vogel. That account is now gone
too, in a whirlwind of scandal we have resigned to
expect from SCP.
Now remaining at SCP are only smaller accounts:
Samsonite, Playtex, Sugarberry Ham, Life Cereal,
Fillmore Auto Parts, Birds Eye, Mountain Dew, Topaz
Panti-Hose, and Secor Laxatives -- an account
Sterling Cooper had since 1947. Their total billing is
not more than $12 million.
The companys gung-ho partners, however, remain
optimistic. They have decided to buy back the
company cheaply and take it private once more.
A private SCP might actually be a better SCP. While
things look a bit troubling for Sterling Cooper Draper
Pryce, they have their sights set on a few big fish. If
the Life Cereal and Mountain Dew works prove
successful contracts with their parent companies
Quaker Oats, PepsiCo, and Frito Lay are bound to
follow. Although SCP has once lost the Honda
Motorcycles pitch, they had been offered another go
at the company's new product, the Honda cars first
released until 1970.
And lastly, American Cancer Society impressed by
the firms anti-tobacco stunts has been in the
discussions with the creative team at SCP to lead
their advertising campaign. This account will likely be
pro bono, however.


GAULTYGER
WATERSTONES
GAULT YGER WAT ERST ONES RESEARCH

March 12, 1971
Sterling Cooper Partners
STERLING COOPER PARTNERS

Income Statement
(in USD 000)
1971 1972e 1973e
Total Revenue 17,453 17,037 15,202
Operating Cost 10,171 9,953 9,084
Total Costs 11,683 11,438 10,257
EBITDA 5,770 5,599 4,945
Depreciation 1,330 1,202 1,076
Other Income 463 467 465
EBIT 4,904 4,863 4,334
Interest Costs - - 8
Share of Profit in Associates 366 329 221
PBT 5,269 5,192 4,547
Total Tax 1,133 1,116 1,043
PAT 4,136 4,075 3,504
Consolidated PAT 4,136 4,075 3,543
Minority Interest 414 408 358
Profit to Shareholders 3,723 3,668 3,185

Balance Sheet
(in USD 000)
1971 1972e 1973e
Assets
Gross Fixed Assets 31,458 29,058 26,367
Accumulated Depreciation 15,654 14,324 13,122
PPE 15,804 14,734 13,245
Total Non-Current Assets 17,723 16,302 14,470
Cash & Cash Equivalents 10,012 9,378 10,155
Total Current assets 13,535 12,824 13,261
Total Assets 31,258 29,126 27,731
Total Equity incl. Minorities 27,536 25,447 23,389
Minority Interest 2,473 2,060 1,652
Liabilities
Non-Current Liabilities 1,518 1,518 1,518
Current Liabilities 2,204 2,161 2,824
Total Liabilities 3,722 3,679 4,342
Total Equity and Liabilities 31,258 29,126 27,731


Cashflow Statement
(in USD 000)
1971 1972e 1973e
Profit After tax 3,543 4,075 4,136
+ Depreciation 1,076 1,202 1,330
+ Interest paid 8 - -
Cashflow from operations 4,627 5,278 5,466
Change in working capital 977 (1,003) (34)
Net Cash from Operations 5,597 4,260 5,447
Capital Expenditure (2,624) (2,691) (2,400)
Change in Investment (76) (329) (366)
Net Cash from investing (2,681) (3,020) (2,766)
Dividend paid (2,061) (2,017) (2,047)
Net cash from financing (2,069) (2,017) (2,047)
Net Change in cash 848 (777) 634
Beginning cash 9,307 10,155 9,378
Ending cash 10,155 9,378 10,012



Valuation Ratios 1971 1972e 1973e
Consolidated EPS 0.47 0.46 0.40
Cash EPS 0.62 0.60 0.52
Book Value 3.13 2.92 2.72
Dividends 0.3 0.3 0.26
P/E 14.2 14.4 16.6
EV/EBITDA 7.8 8.1 9.0
Price/ Cash 10.7 11.1 12.7
Dividend Yield 3.9% 3.8% 3.9%
Price Book 2.11 2.26 2.43
ROE 15.4% 16.3% 15.1%
Net margin 23.7% 23.9% 23.0%
Asset turnover 0.6 0.6 0.6
Net debt/equity -36.4% -36.9% -43.4%
FCF 5.1% 2.3% 5.5%

Enterprise Value 1971 1972e 1973e
Market Capitalisation 52,800 52,800 52,800
Minus : Net Debt 10,012 9,378 10,155
Add: Minority Interests 2,473 2,060 1,652
Enterprise Value 45,261 45,481 44,297






GAULTYGER
WATERSTONES
GAUL T YGER WATERSTONES RESEARCH

March 12, 1971
Sterling Cooper Partners
Gaultyger Waterstones Modelling is a proprietary analytic framework that helps clients uncover value, adjusting for distortions and
ambiguities created by local accounting regulations. For example, the analysis adjusts for one-time events, capitalizes operating leases
(where their use is significant), and converts inventory from LIFO costing to a FIFO basis. The analysis also emphasizes the separation of
operating performance of a company from its financing for a more complete view of how a company generates earnings.
Disclosure Section
The information and opinions in Gaultyger Waterstones Research were prepared by Gaultyger Waterstones & Co. LLC, and/or Gaultyger
Waterstones C.T.V.M. S.A., and/or Gaultyger Waterstones Mexico, Casa de Bolsa, S.A. de C.V., and/or Gaultyger Waterstones Canada
Limited. As used in this disclosure section, "Gaultyger Waterstones" includes Gaultyger Waterstones & Co. LLC, Gaultyger Waterstones
C.T.V.M. S.A., Gaultyger Waterstones Mexico, Casa de Bolsa, S.A. de C.V., Gaultyger Waterstones Canada Limited and their affiliates as
necessary.
For important disclosures, stock price charts and equity rating histories regarding companies that are the subject of this report, please
contact your investment representative or Gaultyger Waterstones Research at 1385 Broadway, (Attention: Research Management), New
York, NY, 10036 USA.
For valuation methodology and risks associated with any price targets referenced in this research report, please contact the Client Support
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investment representative or Gaultyger Waterstones Research at 1585 Broadway, (Attention: Research Management), New York, NY
10036 USA.
Analyst Certification
The following analysts hereby certify that their views about the companies and their securities discussed in this report are accurately
expressed and that they have not received and will not receive direct or indirect compensation in exchange for expressing specific
recommendations or views in this report: James van Zandt.
Unless otherwise stated, the individuals listed on the cover page of this report are research analysts.
Important US Regulatory Disclosures on Subject Companies
Within the last 24 months, Gaultyger Waterstones managed or co-managed a public offering (or 144A offering) of securities of Sterling
Cooper Partners, Sterling Cooper Draper Pryce.
Within the last 24 months, Gaultyger Waterstones has received compensation for investment banking services from Sterling Cooper
Partners, Sterling Cooper Draper Pryce.
In the next 3 months, Gaultyger Waterstones expects to receive or intends to seek compensation for investment banking services from
Sterling Cooper Partners, Sterling Cooper Draper Pryce.
Within the last 24 months, Gaultyger Waterstones has received compensation for products and services other than investment banking
services from Sterling Cooper Partners, Sterling Cooper Draper Pryce.
Within the last 24 months, Gaultyger Waterstones has provided or is providing investment banking services to, or has an investment banking
client relationship with, the following company: Sterling Cooper Partners, Sterling Cooper Draper Pryce.
Within the last 24 months, Gaultyger Waterstones has either provided or is providing non-investment banking, securities-related services
to and/or in the past has entered into an agreement to provide services or has a client relationship with the following company: Sterling
Cooper Partners, Sterling Cooper Draper Pryce.
Gaultyger Waterstones & Co. LLC makes a market in the securities of Sterling Cooper Partners, Sterling Cooper Draper Pryce.
The equity research analysts or strategists principally responsible for the preparation of Gaultyger Waterstones Research have received
compensation based upon various factors, including quality of research, investor client feedback, stock picking, competitive factors, firm
revenues and overall investment banking revenues.
Gaultyger Waterstones and its affiliates do business that relates to companies/instruments covered in Gaultyger Waterstones Research,
including market making, providing liquidity and specialized trading, risk arbitrage and other proprietary trading, fund management,
commercial banking, extension of credit, investment services and investment banking. Gaultyger Waterstones sells to and buys from
customers the securities/instruments of companies covered in Gaultyger Waterstones Research on a principal basis. Gaultyger
Waterstones may have a position in the debt of the Company or instruments discussed in this report.
Certain disclosures listed above are also for compliance with applicable regulations in non-US jurisdictions.
STOCK RATINGS
Gaultyger Waterstones uses a rating system using terms such as Sell, Hold, Buy. Investors should carefully read the definitions of all ratings
used in Gaultyger Waterstones Research. In addition, since Gaultyger Waterstones Research contains more complete information
concerning the analyst's views, investors should carefully read Gaultyger Waterstones Research, in its entirety, and not infer the contents
from the rating alone. In any case, ratings (or research) should not be used or relied upon as investment advice. An investor's decision to
buy or sell a stock should depend on individual circumstances (such as the investor's existing holdings) and other considerations.



GAULTYGER
WATERSTONES

GAULTYGER 
WATERSTONES 
  
 
 
 
 
STERLING COOPER PARTNERS  
 
 
 
 
 
Dropping Out  
 
After three brief years, the Madi
money they bring in, meaning that money isn’t going to 
shareholders.  
A Troubling 1970  
By all accounts, the firm did n
GAULTYGER 
WATERSTONES 
G A U L T Y G E R  W A T E R S T O N E S  R E S E A R C H  
 
March 12, 1971 
Sterling Cooper Part
GAULTYGER 
WATERSTONES 
G A U L T Y G E R  W A T E R S T O N E S  R E S E A R C H  
 
March 12, 1971 
Sterling Coo
  
 
GAULTYGER 
WATERSTONES

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