VALISNO V ADRIANO
FACTS: Plaintiff filed an action for damages against the defendant in CFI of Nueva Ecija.
According to the complaint, the petitioner was the absolute owner and actual possessor of a land
evidenced by TCT . Plaintiff bought the land from defendant-appellee sister. The land which was
planted by friuits and vegetables adjoins that of appellee, Adriano on the bank of Pampanga
River. Both parcel of land had been inherited by Francisco and Adriano from their father. At the
time of sale of land to Valisno, land was irrigated by water from Pampanga River through a canal
traversing the appellees land. Appellee leveled a portion of irrigation canal so that appellant was
deprived of irrigation water and prevented from cultivation of land. Appellant filed in Bureau of
Public Works and Communication a complaint for deprivation of water right. A decision was
rendered in favor of Valisno and ordered the appellee to reconstruct a canal otherwise a judicial
action shall be taken against him. Instead of restoring the canal, he asked for a reinvestigation
which was later on granted. In the meantime, Valisno rebuilt an irrigation canal at his own
expense because his need for water for irrigation was urgent. He filed a complaint for damages
amounting to P8000 in CFI for having failed to plant on his land due to the lack of water, and for
reimbursement from building a canal. However, the Secretary of Public Works and
Communication reversed the Bureaus decision by issuing a final resolution dismissing the
complaint. They argued that Adrianos water rights ceased which was granted in 1923 ceased to
be enjoyed by him when his irrigation canal collapsed. His non-use of water right for 5 years
extinguished it, hence, the water rights did not form any part of his hereditary estate which his
heirs partitioned among themselves. And Valisno, which Honorata received from her father's
estate did not acquire any water rights with the land. In his answer for damages, Adriano
admitted that he leveled the irrigation canal on his land, but averred that neither his father nor his
sister possessed water rights on the land which Valisno purchased, he also argued that he applied
for water rights in 1956 which was obtained later on, he had a perfect right to level his land for
his own use because they merely allowed his sister to use his water rights when she still owned
the adjacent land. He then asked for claim of damages. TC held that plaintiff acquired NO right
to pass through the defendants land to draw water for Pampanga River, and that the decision set
by the Secretary of Public Works and Communication was final, and that there was no evidence
on the part of the plaintiff to show that the resolution was not valid. CA affirmed it.
ISSUE: Which of the provision should be applied in this case, is it the Irrigation Act or the Civil
Code?
HELD: It is the Civil code that must prevail.
Plaintiff argues that while the TC correctly held that Secretary of Public Works and Construction
legally decide the parties who is entitled to apply for water rights under Irrigation Act, but they
ERRED that Secretary of Public Works and Communication has the authority to hear and decide
his claim for damages for defendants violation of his right to continue the easement of aqueduct
or water rights through defendants land. He also invoked Article 642,643, and 646 of the Civil
Code. Moreover, pursuant to Article 624, the existence of the irrigation canal on defendant's land
for the passage of water from the Pampanga River to Honorata's land prior to and at the time of
the sale of Honorata's land to the plaintiff was equivalent to a title for the vendee of land to
continue the enjoyment of easement.
The deed of sale in favor of Valisno included the "conveyance and transfer of the water rights
and improvements" appurtenant to Honorata Adriano's property. By the terms of the Deed of
Absolute Sale, the vendor Honorata Adriano Francisco sold, ceded, conveyed and transferred to
Dr. Nicolas Valisno all "rights, title, interest and participations over the parcel of land and the
water rights and such other improvements appertaining to the property subject of this sale.
According to the appellant, the water right was the primary consideration for his purchase of
Honorata's property, for without it the property would be unproductive.
As an easement of waters in favor of the appellant has been established, he is entitled to enjoy it
free from obstruction, disturbance or wrongful interference (19 CJ 984), such as the appellee's
act of levelling the irrigation canal to deprive him of the use of water from the Pampanga River.
Decision of CFI and CA set aside, and regarding claim for damages a quo, it is remanded
CONSTABELLA CORP V CA
FACTS:
Petitioners owned a lot wherein they started constructing their beach hotel. Before such
construction, the private respondent, in going to and from their respective properties and the
provincial road, passed through a passageway which traversed the petitioners property. As a
result of the construction, this passageway, including the alternative route, was obstructed.
Private respondent filed for injunction plus damages. In the same complaint the private
respondents also alleged that the petitioner had constructed a dike on the beach fronting the
latters property without the necessary permit, obstructing the passage of the residents and local
fishermen, and trapping debris of flotsam on the beach. The private respondent also claim that
the have acquired the right of way through prescription. They prayed for the re-opening of the
ancient road right of way (what they called the supposed easement in this case) and the
destruction of the dike. Petitioner answered by saying that their predecessor in interests act of
allowing them to pass was gratuitous and in fact, they were just tolerating the use of the private
respondents. CA ruled in favor of the private respondents.
ISSUE:
1) Whether or not easement of right and way can be acquired through prescription?
2) Whether or not the private respondents had acquired an easement of right of way in the form
of a passageway, on the petitioners property?
RULING:
1) NO. Easement of right of way is discontinuous thus it cannot be subject to acquisitive
prescription.
2) NO. one may validly claim an easement of right of way when he has proven the: (1) the
dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public
highway; (2) proper indemnity has been paid; (3) the isolation was not due to acts of the
proprietor of the dominant estate; (4) the right of way claimed is at point least prejudicial to the
servient estate. The private respondent failed to prove that there is no adequate outlet from their
respective properties to a public highway; in fact the lower court confirmed that there is another
outlet for the private respondents to the main road (yet they ruled in favor of the private
respondents). Apparently, the CA lost sight of the fact that the convenience of the dominant
estate was never a gauge for the grant of compulsory right of way. There must be a real necessity
and not mere convenience for the dominant estate to acquire such easement. Also, the private
respondents made no mention of their intention to indemnify the petitioners. The SC also
clarified that least prejudicial prevails over shortest distance (so shortest distance isnt
necessarily the best choice.)
EDILBERTO ALCANTARA, [Link] v, CORNELIO RETA
FACTS:
The plaintiffs filed in RTC of Davao a complaint against the defendant for exercise of right of
first ferusal under PD 1517, injunction and preliminary injunction, attys fees and nullity of
amicable settlement. Plaintiffs were tenants or lessees of a land in Davao, evidenced by TCT,
and that owned by Reta, the land were converted into a commercial center, and Reta is
threatening to eject them from land. The plaintiffs asserted that they have the right of first refusal
to purchase the land according to PD 1517 since they are the legitimate tenants or lessees of land.
They also claimed that the amicable settlement executed between Reta and Ricardo Robles is
void ab initio since it is violative to PD 1517. Reta claimed that the land was beyond the ambit of
PD 1517, not proclaimed as an urban land reform zone, and that the applicable law is BP 25 for
failure of the plaintiff to pay rentals of land, and that the amicable settlement was fully explained
to Robles. TC dismissed the complaint, and ordered the plaintiff to pay Reta a certain
representing the rentals and other unpaid balances. CA affirmed it.
ISSUE:
Do have the petitioner have the right of first refusal under PD 1517?
HELD:
No, are have not been proclaimed as Unrban Land Reforn Zone. In fact, the petitioner filed a
petitioner with National Housing Authority declaring the land to to ULRZ. PD 1517 also called
as the Urban Land Reform Act pertains only to the areas proclaimed as ULRZ. Petitioners cannot
claim any right under said law since the land involved is not an ULRZ. They did not meet the
qualifications to be considered as legitimate tenants or lesses, thus, they are not entitled to right
of first refusal to purchase the property should the owner decided to sell the property.. Reta
denies that he has a lease agreement with Alcantara and Robles. Alcantara failed to present proof
other than the testimony that he had bought the land from his father-in-law. It was later shown
that there was a usufruct not lease when he allowed Robles to use his 62 coconuts to gather tuba.
It is immaterial whether the amicable settlement is void or valid, since it is clear that it is not an
easement but a usufruct. Thus, rendering none of the plaintiffs to be entitled for the right of firdt
refusal on the purchase of the property.
