CEBU ROYAL PLANT (SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION), vs.

THE HONORABLE DEPUTY MINISTER OF LABOR and RAMON PILONES

Subject: Labor Standards
FACTS:
Ramon Pilones, private respondent, was employed on February 16, 1978 on a probationary
period of employment for six (6) months with petitioner CRP. After said period, he underwent
medical examination for qualification as regular employee but the results showed that he is
suffering from PTB minimal. Consequently, he was informed of the termination of his
employment by respondent since his illness was not curable within 6 months.
Pilones complained against his termination before the Ministry of Labor which dismissed the
same. The dismissal was reversed by the public respondent who ordered the reinstatement and
payment of back wages.
Granting reinstatement, the public respondent argues that Pilones was already a permanent
employee at the time of his dismissal and so was entitled to security of tenure. The alleged
ground for his removal, to wit, pulmonary tuberculosis minimal, was not certified as incurable
within six months as to justify his separation and that the petitioner should have first obtained a
clearance, as required by the regulations then in force, for the termination of his employment.
CRP claims that the private respondent was still on probation at the time of his dismissal and so
had no security of tenure. The dismissal was necessary for the protection of the public health, as
he was handling ingredients in the processing of soft drinks which were being sold to the public.
ISSUE: Whether the dismissal was proper.
HELD:
No. The dismissal was not proper. Under Article 282 of the Labor Code, an employee who is
allowed to work after a probationary period shall be considered a regular employee. Pilones was
already on permanent status when he was dismissed on August 21, 1978, or four days after he
ceased to be a probationer. As such, he could validly claim the security of tenure guaranteed to
him by the Constitution and the Labor Code.
The petitioner claims it could not have dismissed the private respondent earlier because the x-ray
examination was made only on August 17, 1978, and the results were not immediately available.
That excuse is untenable. We note that when the petitioner had all of six months during which to
conduct such examination, it chose to wait until exactly the last day of the probation period.
The applicable rule on the ground for dismissal invoked against him is Section 8, Rule I, Book
VI, of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code which states that the employer
shall not terminate his employment unless there is a certification by a competent public health
authority that the disease is of such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be cured within a
period of six (6) months even with proper medical treatment. The record does not contain the
certification required by the above rule. Hence, dismissal was illegal.

It is also worth noting that the petitioners application for clearance to terminate the employment
of the private respondent was filed with the Ministry of Labor only on August 28, 1978, or seven
days after his dismissal. As the NLRC has repeatedly and correctly said, the prior clearance rule
(which was in force at that time) was not a trivial technicality. It required not just the mere
filing of a petition or the mere attempt to procure a clearance but that the said clearance be
obtained prior to the operative act of termination.
Although we must rule in favor of his reinstatement, this must be conditioned on his fitness to
resume his work, as certified by competent authority.
**Another Doctrine under Sec4 of Labor Code on construction:
Concern for the lowly worker who, often at the mercy of his employers, must look up to the law
for his protection. Fittingly, that law regards him with tenderness and even favor and always with
faith and hope in his capacity to help in shaping the nations future. It is error to take him for
granted. He deserves our abiding respect. How society treats him will determine whether the
knife in his hands shall be a caring tool for beauty and progress or an angry weapon of defiance
and revenge. The choice is obvious, of course. If we cherish him as we should, we must resolve
to lighten the weight of centuries of exploitation and disdain that bends his back but does not
bow his head.

MANUEL SOSITO vs. AGUINALDO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

DECEMBER 14, 1987

Facts:
Petitioner Manuel Sosito filed for an indefinite leave from the company on January 16, 1976. Months
later, the company underwent a retrenchment program but offered separation pay to those who had
been in the active service as of June 30, 1976 and had tendered their resignation not later than July
31, 1976. Petitioner, to avail of the benefits, submitted his resignation. The company denied him the
benefits.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner was entitled to the benefits?
Held:
The Court held that the petitioner was not qualified to avail of the benefits because at the time he
submitted his resignation, he was not in the active service, having been on voluntary indefinite leave.
The petitioner cannot just do as he please to the detriment of the company.
The Court expressed that labor disputes arent necessarily immediately tipped in favor of labor. The
Management also has its own rights, which must also be afforded the same protection as that of
labor. The Court held that justice is in every case for the deserving, to be dispensed in the light of
the established facts and the applicable law and doctrine.

PHILIPPINE JAPAN ACTIVE CARBON CORPORATION and TOKUICHI SATOFUKA, petitioners,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and OLGA S. QUIANOLA respondents.
FACTS
The private respondent, who had been employed in petitioner corporation since January 19, 1982,
as Assistant Secretary/Export Coordinator, was promoted on May 20, 1983 to the position of
Executive Secretary to the Executive Vice President and General Manager. On May 31, 1986, for no
apparent reason at all and without prior notice to her, she was transferred to the Production
Department as Production Secretary, swapping positions with Ester Tamayo. Although the transfer
did not amount to a demotion because her salary and workload remained the same, she believed
otherwise so she rejected the assignment and filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.

ISSUE
WON the transfer was valid.

HELD
YES. The private respondent's assignment as Production Secretary of the Production Department
was not unreasonable as it did not involve a demotion in rank nor a change in her place of work, nor
a diminution in pay, benefits, and privileges.
It is the employer's prerogative, based on its assessment and perception of its employees'
qualifications, aptitudes, and competence, to move them around in the various areas of its business
operations in order to "ascertain where they will function with maximum benefit to the company. An
employee's right to security of tenure does not give him such a vested right in his position as would
deprive the company of its prerogative to change his assignment or transfer him where he will be
most useful. When his transfer is not unreasonable, nor inconvenient, nor prejudicial to him, and it
does not involve a demotion in rank or a diminution of his salaries, benefits, and other privileges, the
employee may not complain that it amounts to a constructive dismissal.

ABBOT LABORATORIES PHILIPPINES, INC. V. NLRC154 SCRA 713

FACTS
1.Albert Bobadilla was a professional medical representative (PMR) of petitionerAbbott Laboratories
(Phils.) Inc. and was assigned to cover the sales territorycomprising of Sta. Cruz, Binondo and a part
of Quiapo and Divisoria.
2.It has been a policy and established practice of petitioner that the PMRs hired arethose who are
willing to take provincial assignments. In Bobadillas application foremployment, he agreed that he
will accept assignment in the provinces and/or citiesanywhere in the Philippines and that he is willing
and can move into and live in theterritory assigned to him.
3.Later on, Bobadilla was informed that he was being transferred to the newly openedCagayan
territory comprising the provinces of Cagayan, Nueva Vizcaya and Isabela.
4.Bobadilla objected to the transfer on the ground that it was not only a demotion butalso personal
and punitive in nature without basis legally and factually.
5.Bobadilla was given a deadline to comply with the transfer order otherwise he wouldbe dropped
from the payroll for having abandoned his job but he failed to report tohis assignment.
6.Subsequently, Bobadilla filed a complaint against petitioner. The Labor Arbiterdismissed the
complaint. On appeal, the NLRC entered a new decision ordering Bobadillas reinstatement with full
backwages.

ISSUE
Whether or not Bobadilla could be validly dismissed from his employment on the ground of
insubordination from refusing to accept his new assignment

HELD
YES. As a general rule, the right to transfer or reassign an employee is recognized as anemployers
exclusive right and the prerogative of the management. Abbott, in accordancewith the demands and
requirements of its marketing and sales operations, adopted a policyto hire only sales applicants
who are willing to accept assignments in the provinces anywhere in the Philippines, and to move into
and live in the territory assigned to them,Bobadilla was precisely hired because he manifested at the
outset as a job applicant his willingness to follow the conditions of his employment. Moreover, he
was selected as PMRfor the region primarily because he was a veteran and seasoned PMR who
can operateimmediately with minimum training and supervision. Thus, the judgment to transfer is
validand not attended by malice.Therefore, Bobadilla had no valid reason to disobey the order of
transfer. He has tacitlygiven his consent thereto when he acceded to the petitioners policy of hiring
sales staff whoare willing to be assigned anywhere in the Philippines which is demanded by
petitionersbusiness.

RURAL BANK OF CANTILAN, INC., and WILLIAM HOTCHKISS III, Petitioners,

vs.
ARJAY RONNEL H. JULVE, Respondent.
FACTS
On August 1, 1997, the Rural Bank of Cantilan, Inc., petitioner, hired respondent as a management
trainee. Later, he was appointed as planning and marketing officer.
On June 18, 2001, William Hotchkiss III (also a petitioner), president of petitioner bank, issued a
memorandum addressed to all its branch managers informing them of the abolition of the positions
of planning and marketing officer and remedial officer; that this was undertaken in accordance with
the banks Personnel Streamlining Program; and that the operations officer shall absorb the
functions of the abolished offices.
On July 18, 2001, Hotchkiss sent respondent a memorandum stating that he has been appointed
bookkeeper I at the banks branch in Madrid, Surigao del Sur effective immediately with the same
salary corresponding to his old position. Initially, respondent agreed to accept the appointment, but
eventually, he changed his mind and withdrew because he felt that this was a demotion.
Respondent filed with the Regional Arbitration Branch No. XIII, National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), Butuan City, a complaint for constructive dismissal against petitioners.
ISSUE
WON the transfer was valid.
HELD
YES. Under the doctrine of management prerogative, every employer has the inherent right to
regulate, according to his own discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment, including hiring,
work assignments, working methods, the time, place and manner of work, work supervision, transfer
of employees, lay-off of workers, and discipline, dismissal, and recall of employees.2 The only
limitations to the exercise of this prerogative are those imposed by labor laws and the principles of
equity and substantial justice.
Concerning the transfer of employees, these are the following jurisprudential guidelines: (a) a
transfer is a movement from one position to another of equivalent rank, level or salary without break
in the service or a lateral movement from one position to another of equivalent rank or salary;4 (b)
the employer has the inherent right to transfer or reassign an employee for legitimate business
purposes;5 (c) a transfer becomes unlawful where it is motivated by discrimination or bad faith or is
effected as a form of punishment or is a demotion without sufficient cause;6 (d) the employer must
be able to show that the transfer is not unreasonable, inconvenient, or prejudicial to the employee.7
Constructive dismissal is defined as "quitting when continued employment is rendered impossible,
unreasonable, or unlikely as the offer of employment involves a demotion in rank and diminution of
pay.
Respondent contends that the abolition of his position as planning and marketing officer and his
appointment as bookkeeper I and assistant branch head of the Madrid Branch is a demotion.
However, a look at the functions of his new position shows the contrary. The bookkeeper and
assistant branch head is not only charged with preparing financial reports and monthly bank
reconciliations, he is also the head of the Accounting Department of a branch. Under any standard,
these are supervisory and administrative tasks which entail great responsibility. Moreover,
respondents transfer did not decrease his pay.
Nor was respondents transfer motivated by ill-will or prejudice on the part of petitioners. His position
was not the only one abolished pursuant to the banks Personnel Streamlining Program. We recall
that the position of remedial officer was likewise abolished. Petitioners reason was to acquire
savings from the salaries it would pay to full-time personnel in these positions.
Finally, we note that despite respondents refusal to accept the new appointment, petitioners did not
dismiss him. Rather, it was he who opted to terminate his employment when he purposely failed to
report for work.

Blue Dairy Corp v NLRC

FACTS
Elvira was hired by petitioner corporation as food technologist, a highly technical
position requiring the use of her mental faculty, in its laboratory but was later
transferred without prior notice to the vegetable processing section where she
performed mere mechanical work. The transfer was made after Elvira, as narrated
by the company driver, made use without prior permission of company vehicle
during office hours. Aggrieved by the transfer, she then filed a complaint for
constructive dismissal against petitioners who, however, claimed loss of trust and
confidence on Elvira on account of her dishonesty in using the company car in
scouting for her new residence. The Labor Arbiter found the justification for Elviras
transfer unreasonable, and ordered her reinstatement. Said ruling was affirmed on
appeal by the NLRC. Reconsideration having been denied, petitioners resorted to
this recourse.

ISSUE
WON the transfer was valid

HELD
No. It is the prerogative of an employer to transfer an employee from one office to another, but must
be exercised without grave abuse of discretion and must not be used as a subterfuge to rid an
undesirable worker. It must not be unreasonable, inconvenient or prejudicial to the employee.
Breach of trust and confidence as a ground for dismissal from employment must be related to the
performance of the duties of the employee such as would show him to be thereby unfit to discharge
the same task. Where the ground relied upon by petitioner in transferring an employee has no
bearing at all to her work, the same constitutes constructive dismissal.

PHILIPPINE TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
ALICIA LAPLANA, Hon. RICARDO ENCARNACION, and NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION,
FACTS
Alicia Laplana was the cashier of the Baguio City Branch Office of the Philippine Telegraph and
Telephone Corporation (hereafter, simply PT & T). Sometime in March 1984, PT & T's treasurer, Mrs.
Alicia A. Arogo, directed Laplana to transfer to the company's branch office at Laoag City. Laplana
refused the reassignment and proposed instead that qualified clerks in the Baguio Branch be trained
for the purpose. She set out her reasons therefor in her letter to Mrs. Arogo dated March 27,
1984, viz.:
1. I have established Baguio City as my permanent residence. Working in Laoag will
involve additional expenses like for my board and lodgingly, fare, and other
miscellaneous expenses. My salary alone will not be enough there will be no
savings and my family will spend more on account of my transfer.
2. I will be away from my family. A far assignment would be a big sacrifice on my part
keeping me away from my husband and family which might affect my efficiency.
3. Since I have been with PT & T for more than six years already, I have learned to
work with my co-employees here more effectively. Working in another place with
entirely different environment will require long adjustment period, thereby affecting
performance of my job.
On April 12, 1984, Mrs. Arogo reiterated her directive for Laplana's transfer to the Laoag Branch, this
time in the form of a written Memorandum, informing Laplana that "effective April 16, 1984, you will
be reassigned to Laoag branch assuming the same position of branch cashier," and ordering her "to
turn over your accountabilities such as PCF, undeposited collections, used and unused official
receipts, other accountable forms and files to Rose Caysido who will be in charge of cashiering in
Baguio."
Apparently Laplana was not allowed to resume her work as Cashier of the Baguio Branch when April
16, 1984 came. She thereupon wrote again to Mrs. Arogo advising that the directed transfer was
unacceptable, reiterating the reasons already given by her in her first letter dated March 27, 1984.
On April 30, 1984, Laplana received a telegram from Mrs. Arogo reading as follows:
PLEASE REPORT TO MANILA ON MAY 2, 1984 FOR NEW JOB ASSIGNMENT
IF YOU DON'T REPORT ON MAY 2, 1984, WE WILL CONSIDER THIS AS
ABANDONMENT OF YOUR JOB AND THIS MIGHT CONSTRAIN US TO IMPOSE
DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST YOU
YOU CAN GET YOUR CASH ADVANCE FOR TRANSPORTATION PETITION
FROM MRS. BAUTISTA TODAY.
On May 8, 1984, Laplana in turn sent a telex message to Mrs. Arogo which reads as follows:
I LOVE WORKING FOR OUR COMPANY HOWEVER I AM SORRY I CANNOT
ACCEPT YOUR JOB OFFER IN MANIIA THANK YOU AND RETRENCH ME
INSTEAD. MY BEST REGARDS.
Thereafter, Laplana sent a letter to Mrs. Arogo on May 15, 1984, expatiating on her telex message
and reiterating her request to be retrenched, as follows:
Dear Mrs. Arogo:
Thank you for the job in Manila. However, I cannot accept the said offer because I
have established Baguio City as my permanent residence. Considering the high cost
of living in Manila it will surely involve additional expenses on my part. My salary

alone will not be enough to sustain my expenses. Furthermore, a far assignment will
be a big sacrifice on my part keeping me away from my husband which might affect
my health due to an entirely new environment and climate, thereby affecting my
efficiency.
In view of the above reasons, I hereby request management to retrench me.
xxx xxx xxx
Termination of Laplana's employment on account of retrenchment thereupon followed.

ISSUE
WON the transfer made by the company is acceptable

HELD
Yes. In this case, the employee (Laplana) had to all intents and purposes resigned from her position.
She had unequivocally asked that she be considered dismissed, herself suggesting the reason
therefor retrenchment. When so dismissed, she accepted separation pay. On the other hand, the
employer has not been shown to be acting otherwise than in good faith, and in the legitimate pursuit
of what it considered its best interests, in deciding to transfer her to another office. There is no
showing whatever that the employer was transferring Laplana to another work place, not because
she would be more useful there, but merely "as a subterfuge to rid . . . (itself) of an undesirable
worker," or "to penalize an employee for . . . union activities. . . ." The employer was moreover not
unmindful of Laplana's initial plea for reconsideration of the directive for her transfer to Laoag; in fact,
in response to that plea not to be moved to the Laoag Office, the employer opted instead to transfer
her to Manila, the main office, offering at the same time the normal benefits attendant upon transfers
from an office to another.
The situation here presented is of an employer transferring an employee to another office in the
exercise of what it took to be sound business judgment and in accordance with pre-determined and
established office policy and practice, and of the latter having what was believed to be legitimate
reasons for declining that transfer, rooted in considerations of personal convenience and difficulties
for the family. Under these circumstances, the solution proposed by the employee herself, of her
voluntary termination of her employment and the delivery to her of corresponding separation pay,
would appear to be the most equitable. Certainly, the Court cannot accept the proposition that when
an employee opposes his employer's decision to transfer him to another work place, there being no
bad faith or underhanded motives on the part of either party, it is the employee's wishes that should
be made to prevail. In adopting that proposition by way of resolving the controversy, the respondent
NLRC gravely abused its discretion.

Star Paper Corporation vs. Simbol | Puno Case Digest

Star Paper Corporation vs. Simbol
487 SCRA 228
FACTS: Petitioner was the employer of the respondents. Under the policy of Star Paper the
employees are:
1. New applicants will not be allowed to be hired if in case he/she has a relative, up to the 3rd
degree of relationship, already employed by the company.
2. In case of two of our employees (singles, one male and another female) developed a friendly
relationship during the course of their employment and then decided to get married, one of them
should resign to preserve the policy stated above.
Respondents Comia and Simbol both got married to their fellow employees. Estrella on the other
hand had a relationship with Zuniga resulting to her pregnancy on the belief that Zuniga was
separated. The respondents allege that they were forced to resign as a result of the implementation
of the said assailed company policy.
The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC ruled in favor of petitioner. The decision was appealed to the Court
of Appeals which reversed the decision.
ISSUE: Whether the prohibition to marry in the contract of employment is valid
HELD: It is significant to note that in the case at bar, respondents were hired after they were found fit
for the job, but were asked to resign when they married a co-employee. Petitioners failed to show
how the marriage of Simbol, then a Sheeting Machine Operator, to Alma Dayrit, then an employee of
the Repacking Section, could be detrimental to its business operations. Neither did petitioners
explain how this detriment will happen in the case of Wilfreda Comia, then a Production Helper in the
Selecting Department, who married Howard Comia, then a helper in the cutter-machine. The policy
is premised on the mere fear that employees married to each other will be less efficient. If we uphold
the questioned rule without valid justification, the employer can create policies based on an
unproven presumption of a perceived danger at the expense of an employees right to security of
tenure.
Petitioners contend that their policy will apply only when one employee marries a co-employee, but
they are free to marry persons other than co-employees. The questioned policy may not facially
violate Article 136 of the Labor Code but it creates a disproportionate effect and under the disparate
impact theory, the only way it could pass judicial scrutiny is a showing that it is reasonable despite
the discriminatory, albeit disproportionate, effect. The failure of petitioners to prove a legitimate
business concern in imposing the questioned policy cannot prejudice the employees right to be free
from arbitrary discrimination based upon stereotypes of married persons working together in one
company.
Lastly, the absence of a statute expressly prohibiting marital discrimination in our jurisdiction cannot
benefit the petitioners. The protection given to labor in our jurisdiction is vast and extensive that we
cannot prudently draw inferences from the legislatures silence that married persons are not
protected under our Constitution and declare valid a policy based on a prejudice or stereotype. Thus,
for failure of petitioners to present undisputed proof of a reasonable business necessity, we rule that
the questioned policy is an invalid exercise of management prerogative. Corollary, the issue as to
whether respondents Simbol and Comia resigned voluntarily has become moot and academic.
In the case of Estrella, the petitioner failed to adduce proof to justify her dismissal. Hence, the Court
ruled that it was illegal.