CONSTI 1 REVIEWER August 6, 2015

I. THE NATIONAL TERRITORY

Art. I, 1987 Constitution

The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters
embraced therein, and all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or
jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial, and aerial domains, including its territorial
sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters
around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth
and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines.

The Philippine Archipelago

Basis of Art. 1 of the 1987 Constitution [PIL, I. Cruz]

1- All the waters within the limits set forth in the:

a) Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898 (Cession of the Philippine Islands
by Spain to the U.S.),
b) between Spain and U.S., The Treaty of Spain and U.S. at Washington,
November 1, 1900 (Cagayan, Sulu & Sibuto),
c) Treaty between U.S. and Great Britain, January 2, 1930 (Turtle and
Mangsee Islands);

2- All the waters around, between and connecting the various islands of the Philippine
Archipelago, irrespective of their width or dimension, have always been considered as
necessary appurtenances of the land territory, forming part of the inland or internal waters
of the Philippines;

3- All the waters beyond the outermost islands of the archipelago but within the limits of
the boundaries set forth in the aforementioned treaties comprise the terr itorial sea of the
Philippines.

4- The baselines from which the territorial sea of the Philippines is determined consist of
straight lines joining the appropriate points of the outermost islands of the archipelago
(straight baseline method);

ARCHIPELAGIC DOCTRINE

Outermost points of the archipelago shall be connected by straight baselines

and all islands and waters therein are regarded as one integrated unit

Treaty Limits (Treaty of Paris, Art. III; Treaty between Spain and the US concluded at
Washington DC, on November 7, 1900 and that between US and Great Britain on January 2,
1930)
1. Treaty of Paris of 10 December 1898.

Article 3 defines the metes and bounds of the archipelago by longitude and latitude,
degrees and seconds. Technical descriptions are made of the scope of the archipelago as
this may be found on the surface of the earth.

2. Treaty of Washington of 7 November 1900 between the United States and Spain.

Ceding Cagayan, Sibuto and Sulu.

3. Treaty of 2 January 1930 between the United States and Great Britain.

Ceding the Turtle and Mangsee Islands.

The SPRATLEYS group of islands is not a part of the Philippine archipelago but it is a
part of our national territory. It belongs to the 2nd part of the composition of the national
territory [All other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction]

REPUBLIC ACT N0. 3046

AN ACT DEFINE THE BASELINES OF THE TERRITORIAL SEA OF THE

PHILIPPINES.

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 5446

AN ACT TO AMEND SECTION ONE OF REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED THIRTY

HUNDRED AND FORTY-SIX, ENTITLED "AN ACT TO DEFINE THE BASELINES OF
THE TERRITORIAL SEA OF THE PHILIPPINES"

P.D. No. 1596 (Declaring Certain Areas Part of the Philippine Territory and Providing for
Their Government and Administration), promulgated on June 11, 1978.

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1596

DECLARING CERTAIN AREA PART OF THE PHILIPPINE TERRITORY AND

PROVIDING FOR THEIR GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION

WHEREAS, by reason of their proximity the cluster of islands and islets in the South China
Sea situated within the following:

KALAYAAN ISLAND GROUP

From a point [on the Philippine Treaty Limits] at latitude 740' North and longitude
11600 East of Greenwich, thence due West along the parallel of 740' N to its intersection
with the meridian of longitude 11210' E, thence due north along the meridian of 11210' E
to its intersection with the parallel of 900' N, thence northeastward to the intersection of
parallel of 1200' N with the meridian of longitude 11430' E, thence, due East along the
parallel of 1200' N to its intersection with the meridian of 11800' E, thence, due South
along the meridian of longitude 11800' E to its intersection with the parallel of 1000' N,
thence Southwestwards to the point of beginning at 740' N, latitude and 11600' E
longitude are vital to the security and economic survival of the Philippines;

WHEREAS, these areas do not legally belong to any state or nation but, by reason of history,
indispensable need, and effective occupation and control established in accordance with
the international law, such areas must now deemed to belong and subject to the
sovereignty of the Philippines;

WHEREAS, while other states have laid claims to some of these areas, their claims have
lapsed by abandonment and cannot prevail over that of the Philippines on legal, historical,
and equitable grounds.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the

powers in me vested by the Constitution, do hereby decree as follows:

P.D. No. 1599 (Establishing an Exclusive Economic Zone and For Other Purposes),
promulgated on June 11, 1978.

There is established an exclusive economic zone extending "to a distance of two hundred
nautical miles beyond and from the baselines from which the territorial sea is measured.
Provided, that, where the outer limits of the zone as thus determined overlap the exclusive
economic zone of an adjacent or neighboring state, the common bou ndaries shall be
determined by agreement with the state concerned or in accordance with pertinent
generally recognized principles or international law on delimitation." (Sec. 1 thereof.)

Other states shall enjoy in the exclusive economic zone freedoms with respect to
navigations and overflight, the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and other
internationally lawful uses of the sea relating to navigation and communications. (Sec. 4
thereof.)

Purposes:

1. Sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve and manage the natural resources, living
or non-living, renewable or non-renewable of the seabed, subsoil, and superadjacent
waters.

Economic exploitation and exploration of the re-sources of the zone such as the
production of energy from the water, currents and winds.

2. Exclusive rights and jurisdiction with repect to the establishment and utilization of
artificial islands, off-shore terminals, installations and structures; the preservation of the
marine environment, including the prevention and control of pollution and scientific
research.
 3. Such other rights as are recognized by international law.

Other states are prohibited from using the zone to:

1. Explore or exploit any resources;
2. Carry out any search, excavation or drilling opera-tions;
3. Conduct any research;
4. Construct or operate any artificial island, off-shore terminal, installation, or other
structure;
5. Perform any activity which is contrary to, or in derogation of, the sovereign rights and
jurisdiction herein provided.

Other states are allowed to use the zone for:

1. Navigation and overflight;
2. Laying of submarine cable and pipelines;
3. Other lawful uses related to navigation and communi-cation.

In case of overlapping of EEZs, the common boundaries are to be detemined by (i)

agreement and (ii) international rules on delimitations.

UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (30 April 1982.)

The exclusive economic zone which shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured, is recognized in the
UNCLOS, of which the Philip-pines is a signatory. Its concept is that although it is not part
of the territory, exclusive economic benefit is reserved for the country.
CIR V RUEDA
42 SCRA 23 Political Law Definition of State
FACTS:
1. In January 2, 1955, Maria Cerdeira (or Estrella Soriano Vda. De Cerdeira) died in Tangier,
Morocco (an international zone [foreign country] in North Africa). At the time of her death,
she was a Spanish citizen, by reason of her marriage to a Spanish citizen, and was a resident
of Tangier. She however left some personal properties (shares of stocks and other
intangibles) in the Philippines. The designated administrator of her estate here is Antonio
Campos Rueda.
2. In the same year, the Collector of Internal Revenue (CIR) assessed the estate for deficiency
tax amounting to about P161, 874.95. Campos Rueda refused to pay the assessed tax as
he claimed that the estate is exempt from the payment of said taxes pursuant to section 122
of the National Internal Revenue Code which provides:

That no tax shall be collected under this Title in respect of intangible

personal property (a) if the decedent at the time of his death was a resident
of a foreign country which at the time of his death did not impose a transfer
tax or death tax of any character in respect of intangible person property of
the Philippines not residing in that foreign country, or (b) if the laws of the
foreign country of which the decedent was a resident at the time of his
death allow a similar exemption from transfer taxes or death taxes of every
character in respect of intangible personal property owned by citizens of
the Philippines not residing in that foreign country.

3. Campos Rueda was able to prove that there is reciprocity between Tangier and the
Philippines.
4. However, the CIR still denied any tax exemption in favor of the estate as it averred that (a)
the law of Tangier is not reciprocal to Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code;
and (b) Tangier is not a foreign country as contemplated by Section 122 of the same Code
and that the Philippines does not recognize Tangier as a foreign country.
5. CA decided in favour of Campos Rueda, stating that
ISSUE:
1. WON the requisites of statehood, or at least so much thereof as may be necessary for the
acquisition of an international personality, must be satisfied for a foreign country to fall
within the exemption of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code
2. WON Tangier is a foreign country as defined in the Section 122 of the National Internal
Revenue Code
DECISION:
1. Pounds definition of the state must be followed
2. Yes. For purposes of the Tax Code, Tangier is a foreign country.
REASON/ RATIO DECIDENDI:
1. POUNDS DEFINITION OF THE STATE
A foreign country to be identified as a state must be a politically organized sovereign
community independent of outside control bound by penalties of nationhood, legally supreme
within its territory, acting through a government functioning under a regime of law.
It is a sovereign person with the people composing it viewed as an organized corporate
society under a government with the legal competence to exact obedience to its commands.
The stress is on its being a nation, its people occupying a definite territory, politically
organized, exercising by means of its government its sovereign will over the individuals within
it and maintaining its separate international personality.
2. RULING ON KIENE V CIR
The Supreme Court noted that there is already an existing jurisprudence (Kiene v CIR)
which provides that even a tiny principality, that of Liechtenstein, hardly an international
personality in the sense, did fall under the exempt category provided for in Section 22 of the
Tax Code. Thus, recognition is not necessary. Hence, since it was proven that Tangier provides
such exemption to personal properties of Filipinos found therein so must the Philippines honor
the exemption as provided for by our tax law with respect to the doctrine of reciprocity.

CONCLUSION:
CA decision affirmed; Campos Rueda not liable for the defrayment of deficiency taxes.
Republic vs. Villasor G.R. No. L-30671, November 28, 1973, 54 SCRA 83

Petitioner: Republic of the Philippines

Respondent: Guillermo P. Villasor

FACTS:

The Republic of the Philippines in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding

challenges the validity of an order issued by respondent Judge Guillermo P. Villasor,
then of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch I
o declaring a decision final and executory and of an alias writ of execution
directed against the funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
subsequently issued in pursuance thereof, the alleged ground being excess of
jurisdiction, or at the very least, grave abuse of discretion
On July 3, 1961, a decision was rendered in Special Proceedings No. 2156 -R in favor
of P.J. Kiener Co., Ltd., Gavino Unchuan, and International Construction Corporation,
and against the petitioner, confirming the arbitration award in the amount of Php
1,712,396.40, subject of Special Proceedings.
On June 24, 1969, the respondent issued an order declaring the decision of July 3,
1961 final and executory, directing the Sheriffs of Rizal Province, Quezon City and
Manila to execute the said decision.
On the strength of the afore-mentioned Alias Writ of Execution dated June 26, 1969,
the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal (respondent herein) served notices of garnishment
dated June 28, 1969 with several Banks, especially on the "monies due the Armed
Forces of the Philippines in the form of deposits sufficient to cover the amount
mentioned in the said Writ of Execution"; the Philippine Veterans Bank received the
same notice of garnishment on June 30, 1969
The funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines on deposit with th e Banks,
particularly, with the PVB and the PNB or their branches are public funds duly
appropriated and allocated for the payment of pensions of retirees, pay and
allowances of military and civilian personnel and for maintenance and operations of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, as per Certification dated July 3, 1969 by the
AFP Controller
Respondent Judge, Honorable Guillermo P. Villasor, acted in excess of jurisdiction
[or] with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in granting the
issuance of an alias writ of execution against the properties of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, hence, the Alias Writ of Execution and notices of garnishment issued
pursuant thereto are null and void.
Total award was in the amount of Php 2,372,331.40
The Republic of the Philippines, as mentioned at the outset, did right in filing
this certiorari and prohibition proceeding. What was done by respondent
Judge is not in conformity with the dictates of the Constitution.

ISSUE:Whether or not the order issued by Judge Guillermo Villasor is valid

RULING:
"The State may not be sued without its consent."A corollary, both dictated by logic
and sound sense from a basic concept is that public funds cannot be the object of a
garnishment proceeding even if the consent to be sued had been previously granted and
the state liability adjudged. Government funds and properties may not be seized under
writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments. Disbursements of public funds
must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by law.

(1) The State, by virtue of its sovereignty, may not be sued in its own courts except
by express authorization by the Legislature, and to subject its officers to garnishment
would be to permit indirectly what is prohibited directly.

(2) Moneys sought to be garnished, as long as they remain in the hands of the
disbursing officer of the Government, belong to the latter, although the defendant in
garnishment may be entitled to a specific portion thereof.

(3) Every consideration of public policy forbids it.

Wherefore, the writs of certiorari and prohibition are granted, nullifying and setting
aside both the order of June 24, 1969 declaring executory the decision of July 3, 1961 as
well as the alias writ of execution issued thereunder. The preliminary injunction issued by
this court on July 12, 1969 is hereby made permanent.
QUA CHEE GAN V. DEPORTATION BOARD
GR L-10280
SEPTEMBER 30, 1983

FACTS:
- May 12, 1952 - Special Prosecutor Emilo Galang charged Qua Chee Gan et. al. before the
Deportation Board, having purchased US dollars in the sum of $130,000.00, without the
necessary license from the Central Bank of the Philippines, which was then secretly
remitted to Hong Kong
- Petitioners Qua Chee Gan and Chua Lim Pao alias Jose Chua and Basilio King attempted to
bribe officers of the PHL and US governments (Antonio Laforteza, Chief of the Intelligence
Division of the Central Bank, Capt. A.P. Charak of the OSI, US Air Force) to evade prosecution
for the unauthorized purchase.
- A warrant of arrest of petitioners was issued by the presiding member of Deportation
Board. They filed a surety bond of P10,000.00 and cash bond for P10,000.00, thereby
provisionally setting them at liberty
- Sept 22, 1952 - Petitioners filed a joint motion to dismiss in the charges against them in the
Deportation Board because the Board does not constitute legal ground for deportation of
aliens, and that it has no jurisdiction to entertain such charges. Motion was denied by the
Board.
- Petitioners then filed a petition for habeas corpus and/or prohibition to the Court, but made
returnable to the Court of First Instance of Manila.
- After securing and filing a bond for P5,000.00 each, a writ of preliminary injunction was
issued by the lower court, restraining the DB from hearing deportation charges against
petitioners, pending final termination of the habeas corpus and/or prohibition proceedings.
- The DB then filed its answer to the original petition, saying as an authorized agent of the
President, it has jurisdiction over the charges filed, and the authority to order their arrest.
The Court upheld the validity of the delegation by the president to the Deportation Board of
his power to conduct investigations. It also sustained the power of the DB to issue warrant
of arrest and fix bonds for the aliens temporary release pending investigation of charges
against him, pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code.

ISSUES:
1. WON the President has powers to deport aliens (specifically the petitioners)
2. WON the delegation to the DB of the power to order the arrest of the alien complained of
(pursuant to EO No.398, series of 1951) is valid

DECISION:
1. Yes. The President has the power to deport aliens.
2. No. Court declared EO No. 398, series of 1951 to be illegal

REASON/RATIO DECIDENDI:
1. SEC 69 OF ACT NO. 2711 ( THE REVISED ADMINISTRATIVE CODE)

Under the present and existing laws, deportation of an undesirable alien may be
effected in two ways:
a. By order of the President, after due investigation, pursuant to Sec 69 of the
Revised Administrative Code
 b. By the Commissioner of Immigration, upon recommendation by the Board of
Commissioners, under Sec 37 of Commonwealth Act No. 613 as amended

SECTION 69, ACT NO. 2711, PROVIDES:

SEC. 69 Deportation of subject to foreign power. A subject of a foreign power

residing in the Philippines shall not be deported, expelled, or excluded from
said Islands or repatriated to his own country by the President of the
Philippines except upon prior investigation, conducted by said Executive or his
authorized agent, of the ground upon which Such action is contemplated. In
such case the person concerned shall be informed of the charge or charges
against him and he shall be allowed not less than these days for the preparation
of his defense. He shall also have the right to be heard by himself or counsel, to
produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to cross-examine the opposing
witnesses.

While it does not expressly confer on the President the authority to deport these aliens, the
fact that such a procedure was provided for before the President can deport an alien is a
clear indication of such power. The President may order their deportation if after
investigation, they are shown to have committed the act charged.

2. SEC 2, ART III, BILL OF RIGHTS

PROVIDES:

The right of the People to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated,
and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Under our Constitution, such provision is declared a popular right of the people
and, indisputably it equally applies to both citizens and foreigners in this country.
Under the express terms of our Constitution, it is, therefore, even doubtful whether the
arrest of an individual may be ordered by any authority other than the judge if the
purpose is merely to determine the existence of a probable cause, leading to an
administrative investigation. In fact, the Constitution does not distinguish between
warrants in a criminal case and administrative warrant in administrative proceedings.

CONCLUSION:
Order of arrest is declared null and void
Republic vs. Feliciano G.R. No. 70853, March 12, 1987

Petitioner-appellee: Republic of the Philippines

Respondents-appellants: Pablo Feliciano and Intermediate Appellate Court

FACTS:

Petitioner seeks the review of the decision of the Intermediate Appellate

Court dated April 30, 1985 reversing the order of the Court of First Instance
of Camarines Sur, Branch VI, dated August 21, 1980, which dismissed the
complaint of respondent Pablo Feliciano for recovery of ownership and
possession of a parcel of land, consisting of 4 lots with 1,365 hectares in
Barrio Salvacion, Municipality of Tinambac, Camarines Sur on the ground of
non-suability of the State.
January 22, 1970, respondent Feliciano filed a complaint against the Republic
of the Philippines, represented by Land Authority
Feliciano alleged he bought the property from Victor Gardiola by virtue of
Contract of Sale dated May 31, 1952, Deed of Absolute Sale on October 30,
1954
Gardiola acquired the property by purchase from the heirs of Francisco
Abrazado whose title to the said property was evidenced by an information
posesoria
The property was surveyed in July 1952 and approved by Director of Lands
on October 24, 1954
November 1, 1954, Pres. Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 90
reserving for settlement purposes, under the administration of the National
Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration
o A tract of land situated in the Municipalities of Tinambac and Siruma,
Camarines Sur
o NARRA (Land Authority) started sub-dividing and distributing the
land to settlers
Feliciano contested that he is the rightful owner and that the Land Authority
order to cancel and nullify all awards to the settlers.
August 29, 1970, Judge Sison declared Lot 1 as private property. Lots 2, 3,
and 4 excluded. 86 settlers intervened alleging that they have been in
possession of the land for more than 20 years under claim of ownership.
January 25, 1971, case reopened and directed intervenors to file their
pleadings and present evidences
The decision of August 29, 1970 was reiterated since the intervenors motion
to postpone and reset the hearing was denied. Case reopened by Judge
Navarro.
On August 31, 1970, intervenors filed a motion to dismiss, principally on the
ground that the Republic of the Philippines cannot be sued without its
consent and hence the action cannot prosper. The motion was opposed by
the plaintiff.
 On August 31, 1970, intervenors filed a motion to dismiss, principally on the
ground that the Republic of the Philippines cannot be sued without its
consent and hence the action cannot prosper. The motion was opposed by
the plaintiff.
On August 21, 1980, the trial court, through Judge Esteban Lising, issued the
questioned order dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.
Solicitor General filed opposition, dismissal was proper on the ground of
non-suability of the State and authenticity of the possessory information title
of respondent.

ISSUE: Whether or not the State can be sued due to an action for recovery of ownership
and possession of a parcel of land

RULING:
There is no such showing in the instant case. Worse, the complaint itself fails to
allege the existence of such consent. This is a fatal defect, and on this basis alone, the
complaint should have been dismissed.

Private respondent contends that the consent of petitioner may be read from the
Proclamation itself, when it established the reservation" subject to private rights, if any
there be. " We do not agree. No such consent can be drawn from the language of the
Proclamation. The exclusion of existing private rights from the reservation established by
Proclamation No. 90 cannot be construed as a waiver of the immunity of the State from
suit. Waiver of immunity, being a derogation of sovereignty, will not be inferre d lightly but
must be construed in strictissimi juris. 5 Moreover, the Proclamation is not a legislative act.
The consent of the State to be sued must emanate from statutory authority. Waiver of State
immunity can only be made by an act of the legislative body.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered reversing and setting aside the

appealed decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court, dated April 30, 1985, and affirming
the order of the court a quo, dated August 21, 1980, dismissing the complaint filed by
respondent Pablo Feliciano against the Republic of the Philippines. No costs.
Begosa v. Chairman, Philippine Veterans Administration G.R. No. L-25916, April 30, 1970

Plaintiff-appellee: Gaudencio A. Begosa

Defendants-Appellants: Chairman, Philippine Veterans Administration, and Members of the Board
of Administrators, Philippine Veterans Administration

FACTS:

Plaintiff, now appellee, sought the aid of judiciary to obtain the benefits he believe he is
entitled to under the Veterans Bill of Rights, having been "an enlisted man in good
standing of the Philippine Commonwealth Army, inducted in the service of the USAFFE"
and having taken "active participation in the battle of Bataan" as well as the "liberation
drive against the enemy" thereafter having become "permanently incapacitated from
work due to injuries he sustained in line of duty. Defendants objected.
The lower court, presided by Judge Edilberto Soriano found for plaintiffs. Defendants
appealed, relying once more on the principal grounds raised by the plaintiff should have
exhausted his administrative remedies before coming to court and that he was in fact
suing the State without its consent.
Then came the allegation that there was an approval on his claim on September 2, 1964
but effective only as of October 5 of that year, and for amount much less than that to
which he was entitled under the law. 4 The relief sought was the payment, as of the date
to which he believed his right to pension should have been respected, of the sums,
which he felt were legally due and owing to him.
Defendants set up the following affirmative and special defenses:
(1) payment of disability pension under Republic Act No. 65, as amended, by the
Philippine Veterans Administration commences from the date the proper application
therefor is approved;
(2) plaintiff has not exhausted all administrative remedies before resorting to court
action, hence the present action is premature;
(3) inasmuch as the instant action pertains to money claim against the Government,
it must first be presented before the Auditor General as provided by existing law on the
matter (C.A. 327); and
(4) plaintiffs claim is in reality a suit against the Government which cannot be
entertained by this Court for lack of jurisdiction because the Government has not given
its consent.

ISSUE:Whether or not the claim of the plaintiff is in effect a suit against the State which has not
given consent thereto.

RULING: Doctrine of non-suability. It has no application, however, where the suit against such a
functionary had to be instituted because of his failure to comply with the duty imposed by statute
appropriating public funds for the benefit of plaintiff or petitioner. Such is the present case. the suit
is not one against the Government, or a claim against it, but one against the officials to compel them
to act in accordance with the rights to be established by the contending architects, or to prevent
them from making payment and recognition until the contending architects have established their
respective rights and interests in the funds retained and in the credit for the work done.
LOIDA SHAUF and JACOB SHAUF vs. COURT OF APPEALSG.R. No. 90314 November 27,
1990

Petitioners: Loida Q. Shauf and Jacob Shauf

Respondents: Hon. Court of Appeals, Don E. Detwiler and Anthony Persi

FACTS:
Petitioner, Loida Shauf, a Filipino by origin and married to an American who is a member of
the US Air Force, was rejected for a position of Guidance Counselor in the Base
EducationOffice at Clark Air Base.According to applicable regulations, where there are
qualifieddependents of military or civilian personnel, who are locally available,
appointments topositions shall be limited to the dependents. As per records, she possessed
all thequalifications for the job at that time. Instead of hiring Shauf, however, one Mr.
Isakson wasselected for the position who was not a dependent of a military or civilian
personnel. Inaddition, Mr. Isakson apparently lacked certain qualifications. Shauf was
offered a temporary position as a temporary Assistant Education Adviser for a 180 -day
period with the condition that if a vacancy occurs, she will be automatically selected to fill
the vacancy. Shauf accepted the offer. During that time, Mrs. Mary Abalateos was aboutto
vacate her position. But Mrs. Abalateos appointment was extended. Thus, Shauf was never
appointed to said position. She claims that the Abalateos stay was extended indefinitely to
deny her the appointment as retaliation for the complaint that she filed against Persi.
Persidenies this allegation. He claims it was a joint decision of the management & it was
inaccordance of with the applicable regulation. By reason of her non-selection, she filed a
complaint for damages and an equal employmentopportunity complaint against private
respondents, Don Detwiler (civillian personnel officer)and Anthony Persi (Education
Director), for alleged discrimination by reason of her sex(female), color (brown) and
national origin (Filipino by birth).RTC ruled in favor of Shauf. Both parties appealed to the
CA. Shauf prayed for the increaseof the damages to be collected from defendants.
Defendants on the other hand, continuedusing the defense that they ar e immune from suit
for acts done/statements made by them inperformance of their official governmental
functions pursuant to RP-US Military BasesAgreement of 1947. CA reversed RTCs decision.
According to the CA, defendants areimmune from suit.Shauf claims that the respondents
are being sued in their private capacity thus this is not a suitagainst the US government
which would require consent. Respondents still maintain theirimmunity from suit. They
further claim that the rule allowing suits against public officers &employees for criminal &
unauthorized acts is applicable only in the Philippines & is not partof international law.

ISSUE: Whether or not private respondents are immune from suit being officers of the US
ArmedForces

HELD:
No, the respondents cannot rely on the US blanket of diplomatic immunity for all its acts
orthe acts of its agents in the Philippines. Private respondents are personally liable
inindemnifying petitioner Shauf.
Republic v. Sandoval G.R. No. 84607, 84645, March 19, 1993

Petitioners: Republic of the Philippines, et al

Respondents: Hon. Edilberto G. Sandoval, et al

FACTS:
The heirs of the deceased of the January 22, 1987 Mendiola massacre (background:
Wiki), together with those injured (Caylao group), instituted the petition, seeking
the reversal and setting aside of the orders of respondent Judge Sandoval (May 31
and Aug 8, 1988) in "Erlinda Caylao, et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines, et al."
which dismissed the case against the Republic of the Philippines
May 31 order: Because the impleaded military officers are being charged in their
personal and official capacity, holding them liable, if at all, would not result in
financial responsibility of the government
Aug 8 order: denied the motions filed by both parties for reconsideration
In January 1987, farmers and their sympathizers presented their demands for what
they called "genuine agrarian reform"
The Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP), led by Jaime Tadeo, presented their
problems and demands such as:giving lands for free to farmers, zero retention of
lands by landlords, stop amortizations of land payments
Dialogue between the farmers and then Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR) began
on January 15, 1987
On January 20, 1987, Tadeo met with MAR Minister Heherson Alvarez
Alvarez was only able to promise to do his best to bring the matter to the attention
of then President Cory Aquino during the January 21 Cabinet meeting
Tension mounted the next day
The farmers, on their 7th day of encampment, barricaded the MAR premises and
prevented the employees from going inside their offices
On January 22, 1987, following a heated discussion between Alvarez and Tadeo,
Tadeo's group decided to march to Malacanang to air their demands
On their march to Malacanang, they were joined by Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU),
Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN), League of Filipino Students (LFS), and
Kongreso ng Pagkakaisa ng Maralitang Lungsod (KPML)
Government intelligent reports were also received that the KMP was heavily
infliltrated by CPP/NPA elements, and that an insurrection was impending
Government anti-riot forces assembled at Mendiola
The marchers numbered about 10,000 to 15,000 at around 4:30 pm
From CM Recto, they proceeded toward the police lines. No dialogue took place;
"pandemonium broke loose"
After the clash, 12 marchers were officially confirmed dead (13 according to Tadeo)
39 were wounded by gunshots and 12 sustained minor injuries, all belonging to the
group of marchers
Of the police and military, 3 sustained gunshot wounds and 20 suffered minor
physical injuries
 The "Citizens' Mendiola Commission" submitted its report on the incident on
February 27, 1987 as follows
The march did not have any permit
The police and military were armed with handguns prohibited by law
The security men assigned to protect the government units were in civilian attire
(prohibited by law)
There was unnecessary firing by the police and military
The weapons carried by the marchers are prohibited by law
It is not clear who started the firing
The water cannons and tear gas were not put into effective use to disperse the
crowd; the water cannons and fire trucks were not put into operation because:there
was no order to use them, they were incorrectly prepositioned, and they were out of
range of the marchers
The Commission recommended the criminal prosecution of four unidentified,
uniformed individuals shown either on tape or in pictures, firing at the direction of
the marchers
The Commission also recommended that all the commissioned officers of both the
Western Police District (WPD) and Integrated National Police (INP) who were
armed be prosecuted for violation of par. 4(g) of the Public Assembly Act of 1985
Prosecution of the marchers was also recommended
It was also recommended that Tadeo be prosecuted both for holding the rally
without permit and for inciting sedition
Administrative sanctions were recommended for the following officers for their
failure to make effective use of their skill and experience in directing the dispersal
operations in Mendiola:
Last and most important recommendation: for the deceased and wounded victims
to be compensated by the government
It was this portion that petitioners (Caylao group) invoke in their claim for damages
from the government
No concrete form of compensation was received by the victims
On January, 1988, petitioners instituted an action for damages against the Republic
of the Philippines, together with the military officers, and personnel involved in the
Mendiola incident
Solicitor general filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the State cannot be
sued without its consent
Petitioners said that the State has waived its immunity from suit
Judge Sandoval dismissed the case on the ground that there was no such waiver
Motion for Reconsideration was also denied

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the State has waived its immunity from suit (i.e. Whether or not
this is a suit against the State with its consent)
Petitioners argue that by the recommendation made by the Commission
for the government to indemnify the heirs and victims, and by public
addresses made by President Aquino, the State has consented to be sued
 (2) Whether or not the case qualifies as a suit against the State

RULING:

(1) No. This is not a suit against the State with its consent.

Art. XIV, Sec. 3, 1987 Constitution: The State may not be sued without its consent:
The recommendations by the Commission does not in any way mean that
liability automatically attaches to the State
The Commission was simply a fact-finding body; its findings shall serve
only as cause of action for litigation; it does not bind the State
immediately
President Aquino's speeches are likewise not binding on the State; they
are not tantamount to a waiver by the State

(2) No.

Some instances when a suit against the State is proper:

When the Republic is sued by name;
When the suit is against an unincorporated government agency;
When the suit is on its face against a government officer but the case is
such that the ultimate liability will belong not to the officer but to the
government;
o Although the military officers and personnel were discharging
their official functions during the incident, their functions ceased
to be official the moment they exceeded their authority
o There was lack of justification by the government forces in the use
of firearms.
o Their main purpose in the rally was to ensure peace and order, but
they fired at the crowd instead
o
No reversible error by the respondent Judge found. Petitions dismissed.
Auditor General, Commissioner of Public Highways v. San Diego G.R. No. L-30098,
February 18, 1970

FACTS: In this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, the Court declares null and
void the two questioned orders of respondent Court levying upon funds of petitioner
Bureau of Public Highways on deposit with the Philippine National Bank, by virtue of the
fundamental precept that government funds are not subject to execution or garnishment.

Before WWII, the Philippine Government filed an action for the expropriation of a
parcel of land owned by Hashim for the construction of a public road. Government took
possession over the property after the deposit of the amount of 23, 413.64. Records of the
case were destroyed during the WWII. After the war, Hashim filed an action for money
claims before the CFI against Bureau of Public Highways.

The parties entered into a compromise agreement wherein the Bureau shall pay
almost half of the amount claimed. The bureau failed to pay so Hashim filed a motion for
the issuance of a writ of execution. Respondent judge granted the motion. The sheriff
served the writ with a Notice of Garnishment to PNB against the Bureau's funds. Hashim
further filed a motion for issuance of an order ordering the release of the amount. It was
granted. PNB released the amount. Petitioner filed this petition for certiorari with
mandatory injunction to reimburse the amount released.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the State may invoke its immunity from suit

2. Whether or not the State may impugn the validity of the compromise agreement

3. Whether or not the orders were valid

RULING:

In expropriation proceedings, the State submits to the court's jurisdiction and asks the
court to affirm its right to take the property sought to be expropriated. State immunity does
not apply.

Only the principal can question the authority of the counsel to enter into a compromise
agreement. The state cannot raise it.

The assailed orders are void. Government funds are not subject to garnishment.
PNB v. CIR G.R. No. 112800, April 26, 2005
Sayson v. Singson G.R. No. L-30044, December 19, 1973

The real party in interest before this Court in this certiorari proceeding to review a
decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu is the Republic of the Philippines, although
the petitioners are the public officials who were named as respondents 1 in a mandamus
suit below. Such is the contention of the then Solicitor General, now Associate Justice, Felix
V. Makasiar, 2 for as he did point out, what is involved is a money claim against the
government, predicated on a contract. The basic doctrine of non-suability of the
government without its consent is thus decisive of the controversy. There is a governing
statute that is controlling. 3 Respondent Felipe Singson, the claimant, for reasons known to
him, did not choose to abide by its terms. That was a fatal misstep. The lower court,
however, did not see it that way. We cannot affirm its decision.

As found by the lower court, the facts are the following: "In January, 1967, the Office of the
District Engineer requisitioned various items of spare parts for the repair of a D-8
bulldozer, ... . The requisition (RIV No. 67/0331) was signed by the District Engineer,
Adventor Fernandez, and the Requisitioning Officer (civil engineer), Manuel S. Lepatan. ... It
was approved by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, Antonio V. Raquiza. It
is noted in the approval of the said requisition that "This is an exception to the telegram
dated Feb. 21, 1967 of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications." ... So, a canvass
or public bidding was conducted on May 5, 1967 ... . The committee on award accepted the
bid of the Singkier Motor Service [owned by respondent Felipe Singson] for the sum of
P43,530.00. ... Subsequently, it was approved by the Secretary of Public Works a nd
Communications; and on May 16, 1967 the Secretary sent a letter -order to the Singkier
Motor Service, Mandaue, Cebu requesting it to immediately deliver the items listed therein
for the lot price of P43,530.00. ... It would appear that a purchase order s igned by the
District Engineer, the Requisitioning Officer and the Procurement Officer, was addressed to
the Singkier Motor Service. ... In due course the Voucher No. 07806 reached the hands of
Highway Auditor Sayson for pre-audit. He then made inquiries about the reasonableness of
the price. ... Thus, after finding from the indorsements of the Division Engineer and the
Commissioner of Public Highways that the prices of the various spare parts are just and
reasonable and that the requisition was also approved by no less than the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications with the verification of V.M. Secarro a representative of
the Bureau of Supply Coordination, Manila, he approved it for payment in the sum of
P34,824.00, with the retention of 20% equivalent to P8,706.00. ... His reason for
withholding the 20% equivalent to P8,706.00 was to submit the voucher with the
supporting papers to the Supervising Auditor, which he did. ... The voucher ... was paid on
June 9, 1967 in the amount of P34,824.00 to the petitioner [respondent Singson]. On June
10,1967, Highway Auditor Sayson received a telegram from Supervising Auditor Fornier
quoting a telegraphic message of the General Auditing Office which states: "In view of
excessive prices charge for purchase of spare parts and equipment shown by vouchers
already submitted this Office direct all highway auditors refer General Office payment
similar nature for appropriate action." ... In the interim it would appear that when the
voucher and the supporting papers reached the GAO, a canvass was made of the spare parts
among the suppliers in Manila, particularly, the USI (Phil.), which is the exclusive dealer of
the spare parts of the caterpillar tractors in the Philippines. Said firm thus submitted its
quotations at P2,529.64 only which is P40,000.00 less than the price of the Singkier. ... In
view of the overpricing the GAO took up the matter with the Secretary of Public Works in a
third indorsement of July 18, 1967. ... The Secretary then circularized a telegram holding
the district engineer responsible for overpricing." 4 What is more, charges for malversation
were filed against the district engineer and the civil engineer involved. It was the failure of
the Highways Auditor, one of the petitioners before us, that led to the filing of the
mandamus suit below, with now respondent Singson as sole proprietor of Singkier Motor
Service, being adjudged as entitled to collect the balance of P8,706.00, the contract in
question having been upheld. Hence this appeal by certiorari.

1. To state the facts is to make clear the solidity of the stand taken by the Republic. The
lower court was unmindful of the fundamental doctrine of non-suability. So it was stressed
in the petition of the then Solicitor General Makasiar. Thus: "It is apparent that respondent
Singson's cause of action is a money claim against the government, for the payment of the
alleged balance of the cost of spare parts supplied by him to the Bureau of Public Highways.
Assuming momentarily the validity of such claim, although as will be shown hereunder, the
claim is void for the cause or consideration is contrary to law, morals or public policy,
mandamus is not the remedy to enforce the collection of such claim against the State but a
ordinary action for specific performance ... . Actually, the suit disguised as one for
mandamus to compel the Auditors to approve the vouchers for payment, is a suit against
the State, which cannot prosper or be entertained by the Court except with the consent of
the State ... . In other words, the respondent should have filed his claim with the General
Auditing Office, under the provisions of Com. Act 327 ... which prescribe the conditions
under which money claim against the government may be
filed ...." 5 Commonwealth Act No. 327 is quite explicit. It is therein provided: "In all cases
involving the settlement of accounts or claims, other than those of accountable officers, the
Auditor General shall act and decide the same within sixty days, exclusive of Sundays and
holidays, after their presentation. If said accounts or claims need reference to other
persons, office or offices, or to a party interested, the period aforesaid shall be counted
from the time the last comment necessary to a proper decision is received by
him." 6 Thereafter, the procedure for appeal is indicated: "The party aggrieved by the final
decision of the Auditor General in the settlement of an account or claim may, within thirty
days from receipt of the decision, take an appeal in writing: (a) To the President of the
United States, pending the final and complete withdrawal of her sovereignty over the
Philippines, or (b) To the President of the Philippines, or (c) To the Supreme Court of the
Philippines if the appellant is a private person or entity." 7

2. With the facts undisputed and the statute far from indefinite or ambiguous, the
appealed decision defies explanation. It would be to disregard a basic corollary of the
cardinal postulate of non-suability. It is true that once consent is secured, an action may be
filed. There is nothing to prevent the State, however, in such statutory grant, to require that
certain administrative proceedings be had and be exhausted. Also, the proper forum in the
judicial hierarchy can be specified if thereafter an appeal would be taken by the party
aggrieved. Here, there was no ruling of the Auditor General. Even had there been such, the
court to which the matter should have been elevated is this Tribunal; the lower court could
not legally act on the matter. What transpired was anything but that. It is quite obvious
then that it does not have the imprint of validity.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu of September 4, 1968 is
reversed and set aside, and the suit for mandamus filed against petitioners, respondents
below, is dismissed. With costs against respondent Felipe Singson.
Merritt v. Government of the Philippine Islands G.R. No. L-11154, March 21, 1916

FACTS:
Plaintiff was involved in an accident concerning him and a General Hospital ambulance
resulting in him being incapacitated. He sustained severe injuries rendering him unable to
return to work. Act No. 2457 was enacted in his favor which reads:

An act authorizing E. Merritt to bring suit against the Government of the Philippine
Islands and authorizing the Attorney-General of said Islands to appear in said suit.
"Whereas a claim has been filed against the Government of the Philippine Islands by
Mr. E. Merritt, of Manila, for damages resulting from a collision between his
motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital on March twenty-fifth,
nineteen hundred and thirteen;
"Whereas it is not known who is responsible for the accident nor is it possible to
determine the amount of damages, if any , to which the claimant is entitled; and
"Whereas the Director of Public Works and the Attorney-General recommend that
an act be passed by the Legislature authorizing Mr. E. Merritt to bring suit in the
courts against the Government, in order that said questions may be decided: Now,
therefore,
"By authority of the United States, be it enacted by the Philippine Legislature, that:
"SECTION 1. E. Merritt is hereby authorized to bring suit in the Court of First
Instance of the city of Manila against the Government of the Philippine Islands in
order to fix the responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle and the
ambulance of the General Hospital, and to determine the amount of the damages, if
any, to which Mr. E. Merritt is entitled on account of said collision, and the attorney-
General of the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized and directed to appear at the
trial on the behalf of the Government of said Islands, to defend said Government at
the same.
"SEC. 2. This Act shall take effect on its passage.
"Enacted, February 3, 1915."

ISSUE: Whether or not the State is immune from suit.

RULING:
The accident was due to the negligence of the ambulances chauffeur. As the
negligence was committed by an agent or employee of the government involving tort, the
inquiry arises whether the government is legally liable for damages. The State is not liable
for the torts committed by its officers or agents whom it employs, except when expressly
made so by legislative enactment. The government does not undertake to guarantee to any
person the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it employs since that would involve it in
all its operations in endless embarrassments, difficulties and losses, which would be
subversive of the public interest. By consenting to be sued, a state simply waives its
immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede its liability or create any cause of action in
his favor, or extend his liability to any cause not previously recognized. It merely gives a
remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court,
subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense. The State is not responsible for the
damages suffered by private individuals in consequence of acts performed by its employees
in the discharge of the functions pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor
negligence can be presumed on the part of the state in the organization of branches in the
public service and in the appointment of its agents. The responsibility of the State is limited
to that which it contracts through a special agent, duly empowered by a definite order or
commission to perform some act or charged with some definite purpose which gives rise to
the claim.
SSS v. CA G.R. No. L-41299, February 21, 1983
US v. Ruiz G.R. No. L-35645, May 22, 1985

FACTS:
Sometime in May 1972, the United States organized an auction by invitation
for the repair of itsequipment and facilities in at the US Naval Station Subic
Bay in Zambales, which was one of those provided in the Military Bases
Agreement between the Philippines and the US.
Eligio de Guzman & Co., Inc. responded to the invitation and submitted bids.
Subsequent thereto,the company received from the United States two
telegrams requesting it to confirm its priceproposals and for the name of its
bonding company; the company, thereby, complied.
In June, 1972, the company received a letter which was signed by Wilham I.
Collins, Director for Contracts Division of the Navy Department of US, saying
that the company did not qualify toreceive an award for the projects because
of its previous unsatisfactory performance on a repair contract and that the
projects had been awarded to third parties.
The company sued the US and its officers in the US Navy who were
responsible for rejecting their services to order the defendants in allowing
the company to perform the work for the projects,and in the event that
specific performance was no longer possible, to order the defendants to
paythe damages. The company also asked for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction torestrain the defendants from entering into contracts
with third parties for work on the projects.
The defendants entered their special appearance for the purpose only of
questioning the jurisdiction of this court over the complaint being acts and
omissions of the individual defendantsas agents of defendant United States of
America, a foreign sovereign which has not given her consent to this suit or
any other suit for the causes of action asserted in the complaint.
Subsequently a motion to dismiss the complaint was filed by the defendants,
who included anopposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction.
The trial court denied the motion and issued the writ.
The defendants moved twice to reconsider but to no avail. Hence the instant
petition which seeksto restrain perpetually the proceedings in Civil Case No.
779-M for lack of jurisdiction on the partof the trial court.

ISSUES: (1)Whether or not US is suable? (2) Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction
over the case?

RULING:
 (1) NO. The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in
the courts of another State without its consent or waiver. It is however contended that
when asovereign state enters into a contract with a private person, the state can be sued
uponthe theory that it has descended to the level of an individual from which it can be
impliedthat it has given its consent to be sued under the contract. Stated differently, a State
maybe said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to
havetacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does
notapply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case
theprojects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both
theUnited States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of
thehighest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business
purposes.

(2) The correct test for the application of State immunity is not the conclusion of a
contract bya State but the legal nature of the act is shown in Syquia vs. Lo pez. In that case
theplaintiffs leased three apartment buildings to the United States of America for the use of
its military officials.
Santiago v. Republic G.R. No. L-48214, December 19, 1978

FACTS:
Petitioner Ildefonso Santiago donated a parcel of land to the Bureau of Plant
Industry on the terms that the Bureau should construct a building and install lighting
facilities on the said lot.

When time passed and there were still no improvements on the lot, Santiago filed a
case pleading for the revocation of such contract of donation but the trial court dismissed
the petition claiming that it is a suit against the government and should not prosper
without the consent of the government.

ISSUE:Whether or not the respondent government has waived its immunity from suit.

RULING:
Yes. The government's waiver of immunity was implied by virtue of the terms
provided in the deed of donation. The government is a beneficiary of the terms of the
donation but it did not comply with such terms. Thus, the donor Santiago has the right to
be heard in the court. Also, to not allow the donor to be heard would be unethical and
contrary to equity which the government so advances. The Court of First Instance is hereby
directed to proceed with the case.
--------------------------------
FACTS:
Santiagos plea was for the revocation of adeed of donation executed by him and
hisspouse with the Bureau of Plant Industry asthe donee. As alleged in such complaint,
suchBureau, contrary to the terms of the donation,failed to "install lighting facilities and
watersystem on the property donated and to buildan office building and parking [lot]
thereonwhich should have been constructed and readyfor occupancy. That led him to
conclude thatunder the circumstances, he was exempt fromcompliance with such an
explicit constitutionalcommand.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Bureau is immune from suit.

HELD: YES.If an order of dismissal would suffice,then the element of unfairness enters,
thefacts alleged being hypothetically admitted. Itis the considered opinion of this Court
thenthat to conform to the high dictates of equityand justice, the presumption of consent
couldbe indulged in safely. That would serve toaccord to petitioner as plaintiff, at the
veryleast, the right to be heard.The doctrine of governmental immunityfrom suit cannot
serve as an instrument forperpetrating an injustice on a citizen.Under the circumstances,
thefundamental postulate of non-suability cannotstand in the way. It is made to
accommodateitself to the demands of procedural dueprocess, which is the negation of
arbitrarinessand inequity. The government, in the finalanalysis, is the beneficiary. It
therebymanifests its adherence to the highest ethicalstandards, which can on ly be ignored
at therisk of losing the confidence of the people, therepository of the sovereign power.

Froilan v. Oriental Plan Shipping G.R. No. L-6060, September 30, 1954
US v. Dorr G.R. No. 1051, May 19, 1903

FACTS:
The defendants were charged of scurrilous libel against the Government of the
United Statesand the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands because of an editorial it
published in theissue of Manila Freedom. The defendants were convicted for said offense
basing uponSection 8 of Act. No. 292 of the Commission. Defendants then appealed for
reversal of judgment made by the lower courts.

ISSUE:Is the editorial published by the defendants directed towards the Government of the
UnitedStates and the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands?

RULING:
No, the editorial was not directed towards the government itself but towards the
aggregate of individuals who were administering the government at that time.We
understand, in modern political science, by the term government, that institution
oraggregate of institutions by which an independent society makes and carries out those
rulesof action which are unnecessary to enable men to live in a social state, or which are
imposedupon the people forming that society by those who possess the power or authority
of prescribing them. Government is the aggregate of authorities which rule a society.
By"administration, again, we understand in modern times, and especially in more or less
freecountries, the aggregate of those persons in whose hands the reins of government are
for thetime being (the chief ministers or heads of departments)." (Bouvier, Law Dictionary,
891.) Butthe writer adds that the terms "government" and "administration" are not always
used in theirstrictness, and that "government" is often used for "administration. In this
case, the editorial published by defendants where directed towards the personnel of the
Commission whom they described as "notoriously corrupt and rascally, and men of
nopersonal character". This as being ruled out by the Supreme Court was an attack not to
thegovernment system but to the aggregate of individuals by whom the government is
beingadministered.

NOTES:
The final judgment of the convictions of the defendants was reversed by the Supreme
Courtacquitting the defendants with costs against the officials.
Agustin v. Edu, 88 SCRA 195

FACTS:
Leovillo Agustin, the owner of a Beetle, challenged the constitutionality of
Letter of Instruction 229 and its implementing order No. 1 issued by LTO
Commissioner Romeo Edu. His car already had warning lights and did not
want to use this.
The letter was promulgation for the requirement of an early warning device
installed on a vehicle to reduce accidents between moving vehicles and
parked cars.
The LTO was the issuer of the device at the rate of not more than 15% of the
acquisition cost.
The triangular reflector plates were set when the car parked on any street or
highway for 30 minutes. It was mandatory.
Petitioner:
1. LOI violated the provisions and delegation of police power, equal
protection, and due process/
2. It was oppressive because the make manufacturers and car dealers
millionaires at the expense f car owners at 56-72 pesos per set.
Hence the petition.
The OSG denied the allegations in par X and XI of the petition with regard to
the unconstitutionality and undue delegation of police power to such acts.
The Philippines was also a member of the 1968 Vienna convention of UN on
road signs as a regulation. To the petitioner, this was still an unlawful
delegation of police power.

ISSUE:Is the LOI constitutional? If it is, is it a valid delegation of police power?

RULING:
Yes on both. Petition dismissed.
Police power, according to the case of Edu v Ericta, which cited J. Taney, is nothing
more or less than the power of government inherent in every sovereignty.The case also
says that police power is state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with
personal liberty or property to promote the general welfare.
Primicias v Fulgoso- It is the power to describe regulations to promote the health,
morals, peace, education, good order, and general welfare of the people.
J. Carazo- government limitations to protect constitutional rights did not also intend
to enable a citizen to obstruct unreasonable the enactment of measures calculated to insure
communal peace.
 There was no factual foundation on petitioner to refute validity.
Ermita Malate Hotel-The presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the
absence of factual record in over throwing the statute.
Brandeis- constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation in
overthrowing the statute.
Even if the car had blinking lights, he must still buy reflectors. His claims that the
statute was oppressive was fantastic because the reflectors were not expensive.
SC- blinking lights may lead to confusion whether the nature and purpose of the driver is
concerned.
Unlike the triangular reflectors, whose nature is evident because its installed when
parked for 30 minutes and placed from 400 meters from the car allowing drivers to see
clearly.
There was no constitutional basis for petitioner because the law doesnt violate any
constitutional provision.
LOI 229 doesnt force motor vehicle owners to purchase the reflector from the LTO.
It only prescribes rge requirement from any source.
The objective is public safety.
The Vienna convention on road rights and PD 207 both recommended enforcement
for installation of ewds. Bother possess relevance in applying rules with the decvlaration
of principles in the Constitution.
On the unlawful delegation of legislative power, the petitioners have no settled legal
doctrines.
Kuroda vs. Jalandoni 83 Phil 171

FACTS:
Shinegori Kuroda, a former Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army and
Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines was charged
before the Philippine Military Commission for war crimes. As he was the commanding
general during such period of war, he was tried for failure to discharge his duties and
permitting the brutal atrocities and other high crimes committed by his men against
noncombatant civilians and prisoners of the Japanese forces, in violation of of the laws and
customs of war.

Kuroda, in his petition, argues that the Military Commission is not a valid court
because the law that created it, Executive Order No. 68, is unconstitutional. He further
contends that using as basis the Hague Conventions Rules and Regulations covering Land
Warfare for the war crime committed cannot stand ground as the Philippines was not a
signatory of such rules in such convention. Furthermore, he alleges that the United States is
not a party of interest in the case and that the two US prosecutors cannot practice law in
the Philippines.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Executive Order No. 68 is constitutional
(2) Whether or not the US is a party of interest to this case

RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that Executive Order No. 68, creating the National War
Crimes Office and prescribing rules on the trial of accused war criminals, is constitutional
as it is aligned with Sec 3,Article 2 of the Constitution which states that The Philippines
renounces war as an instrument of national policy and adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the nation. The generally accepted
principles of international law includes those formed during the Hague Convention, the
Geneva Convention and other international jurisprudence established by United Nations.
These include the principle that all persons, military or civilian, who have been guilty of
planning, preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the commission of crimes and
offenses in violation of laws and customs of war, are to be held accountable. In the doctrine
of incorporation, the Philippines abides by these principles and therefore has a right to try
persons that commit such crimes and most especially when it is committed against its
citizens. It abides with it even if it was not a signatory to these conventions by the mere
incorporation of such principles in the constitution.

The United States is a party of interest because the country and its people have been
equally, if not more greatly, aggrieved by the crimes with which the petitioner is charged
for. By virtue of Executive Order No. 68, the Military Commission is a special military
tribunal and that the rules as to parties and representation are not governed by the rules of
court but by the very provisions of this special law.

Ichong v. Hernandez 11 Phil 115

FACTS:
The Congress of the Philippines enacted the act which nationalizes theretail trade
business, Republic Act No. 1180 entitled An Act to Regulate theRetail Business,
prohibiting aliens in general to engage in retail trade in ourcountry.Petitioner, for and in
his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents,corporations and partnerships
adversely affected by the provisions of RA No.1180, brought this action to obtain a judicial
declaration that said Act isunconstitutional.

ISSUES: Whether Congress in enacting R.A. No. 1180 violated the UN Charter, theUN
Declaration of Human Rights and the Philippine-Chinese Treaty of Amity.

RULING:
The UN Charter imposes no strict or legal obligations regarding the rightsand
freedom of their subjects, and the Declaration of Human Rights containsnothing more than
a mere recommendation, or a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all
nations. The Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of
China guarantees equality of treatment to the Chinese nationals upon the sameterms as
the nationals of any other country. But the nationals of China are notdiscriminated against
because nationals of all other countries, except those of the United States, who are granted
special rights by the Constitution, are allprohibited from engaging in the retail trade.But
even supposing that the law infringes upon the said treaty, the treaty isalways subje ct to
qualification or amendment by a subsequent law, and the samemay never curtail or restrict
the scope of the police power of the State.

CASE AND ISSUE, IN GENERAL:

This Court has before it the delicate task of passing upon the validity and
constitutionality of a legislative enactment, fundamental and far -reaching in significance.
The enactment poses questions of due process, police power and equal protection of the
laws. It also poses an important issue of fact that is whether the conditions which the
disputed law purports to remedy really or actually exist. Admittedly springing from a deep,
militant, and positive nationalistic impulse, the law purports to protect citizen and country
from the alien retailer. Through it, and within the field of economy it regulates, Congress
attempts to translate national aspirations for economic independence and national
security, rooted in the drive and urge for national survival and welfare, into a concrete and
tangible measures designed to free the national retailer from the competing dominance of
the alien, so that the country and the nation may be free from a supposed economic
dependence and bondage. Do the facts and circumstances justify the enactment?
People v. Lagman 66 Phil 13

FACTS:
Appellants Tranquilino Lagman and Primitivo de Sosa are charged with a violation
of section 60 of Commonwealth Act No. 1, known as the National Defense Law. It is alleged
that these two appellants, being Filipinos and having reached the age of twenty years in
1936, willfully and unlawfully refused to register in the military service between the 1st
and 7th of April of said year, even though they had been required to do so. The two
appellants were duly notified to appear before the Acceptance Board in order to registe r
for military service but still did not register up to the date of the filing of the information.
Appellants argue that they did not register because de Sosa is fatherless and has a mother
and a brother eight years old to support, and Lagman also has a father to support, has no
military learnings, and does not wish to kill or be killed. The Court of First Instance
sentenced them both to one month and one day of imprisonment, with the costs.

ISSUE: Whether or not the National Defense Law (Sec 60, Commonwealth Act No. 1) was
constitutional by virtue of Section 2, Article II of the Constitution which states that: SEC. 2.
The defense of the state is a prime duty of government, and in the fulfilment of this duty all
citizens may be required by law to render personal military or civil service.

HELD:
YES. Decision of CFI affirmed. The National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes
compulsory military service, does not go against this constitutional provision but is, on the
contrary, in faithful compliance therewith. The duty of the Government to defend the State
cannot be performed except through an army. To leave the organization of an army to the
will of the citizens would be to make this duty of the Government excusable should there be
no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist therein.
Aglipay v. Ruiz 64 Phil 201

FACTS:
In May 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would
order the issuance of postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila
of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Chu rch.
The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent
Church, in the fulfillment of what he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto,
Esq., member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the President of the
Philippines. In spite of the protest of the petitioners attorney, the Director of Posts publicly
announced having sent to the United States the designs of the postage for printing. The said
stamps were actually issued and sold though the greater part thereof remained unsold. The
further sale of the stamps was sought to be prevented by the petitioner.

ISSUES: Whether the issuance of the postage stamps was in violation of the Constitution.

RULING:
There has been no constitutional infraction in the case at bar, Act No. 4052 grants
the Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, discretion to misuse postage stamps with new designs. Even if we were
to assume that these officials made use of a poor judgment in issuing and selling the
postage stamps in question still, the case of the petitioner would fail to take in weight.
Between the exercise of a poor judgment and the unconstitutionality of the step taken, a
gap exists which is yet to be filled to justify the court in setting aside the official act assailed
as coming within a constitutional inhibition.

The court resolved that petition for a writ of prohibition is hereby denied, without
pronouncement as to costs.
Ondoy v. Ignacio 97 SCRA 611

FACTS:
Jose Ondoy, son of Estrella Ondoy, drowned while in the employ of Virgilio Ignacio.
According to thechief engineer and oiler, Jose Ondoy was aboard the ship as part of the
workforce. He was invited byfriends to a drinking spree, left the vessel, and thereafter was
found dead. Therefore, Estrella wasasking for compensation from the death of her son
while in the respondents employ. However, thestatement given by the chief engineer and
oiler was ignored by the hearing officer and thereforedismissed the claim for lack of merit.
Even when a motion for reconsideration was filed, this was alsodenied by the Secretary of
Labor for the same reason, that is, lack of merit.

ISSUES: Whether or not the compensation for the death of Jose Ondoy is constitutional; is
social justiceapplicable in this case?

RULING:
Yes.Firstly, there was no due diligence in the fact finding of the Department of Labor.
It merely disregardedthe statements made by the chief engineer and oiler. Secondly, the
principle of social justice applied inthis case is a matter of protection, not equality. The
Court recognized the right of the petitioner to theclaim of compensation because her son
was shown to have died while in the actual performance of hiswork. To strengthen the
constitutional scheme of social justice and protection to labor, The Court quoted another
case as between a laborer, usually poor and unlettered, and the employer, who
hasresources to secure able legal advice, the law has reason to demand from the latter the
stricter compliance.
Salonga v. Farrales 105 SCRA 359
Meyer v. Nebraska 262 US 390

Brief Fact Summary. Plaintiff was convicted for teaching a child German under a Nebraska
statute that outlawed the teaching of foreign languages to students that had not yet
completed the eighth grade.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from creating
legislation that restricts liberty interests when the legislation is not reasonably related to
an acceptable state objective.

FACTS:
Plaintiff was convicted for teaching a child German under a Nebraska statute that
outlawed the teaching of foreign languages to students that had not yet completed the
eighth grade. The Supreme Court of Nebraska upheld the conviction.

ISSUE: Does the statute as construed and applied unreasonably infringe on the liberty
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment?

RULING:
The statute as applied is unconstitutional because it infringes on the liberty
interests of the plaintiff and fails to reasonably relate to any end within the competency of
the state.
The Fourteenth Amendment encompasses more than merely the freedom from bodily
restraint. The state argues that the purpose of the statute is to encourage the English
language to be the native tongue of all children raised in the state. Nonetheless, the
protection of the Constitution extends to those who speak other languages. Education is a
fundamental liberty interest that must be protected, and mere knowledge of the German
language cannot be reasonably regarded as harmful.

Discussion. Liberty interests may not be interfered with by the states when the
interference is arbitrary and not reasonably related to a purpose which the state may
permissively regulate.
Pierce v. Society 262 US 510

Brief Fact Summary. Appellees, two non-public schools, were protected by a preliminary
restraining order prohibiting appellants from enforcing an Oregon Act that required
parents and guardians to send their children to public school. Appellants appealed the
order.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The 14th Amendment provides a liberty interest in a parents or
guardians right to decide the mode in which their children are educated. States may not
usurp this right when the questioned legislation does not reasonably relate to a viable state
interest.

FACTS:
Appellee the Society of Sisters, a corporation with the power to establish and
maintain academies or schools and Appellee Hill Military Academy, a private organization
conducting an elementary, college preparatory, and military training school, obtained
preliminary restraining orders prohibiting appellants from enforcing Oregons Compulsory
Education Act. The Act required all parents and guardians to send children between 8 and
16 years to a public school. The appellants appealed the granting of the preliminary
restraining orders.

ISSUE: Does the Act unreasonably interfere with the liberty of parents and guardians to
direct the upbringing and education of children under their control?

RULING:
The Act violates the 14th Amendment because it interferes with protected liberty
interests and has no reasonable relationship to any purpose within the competency of the
state. The Appellees have standing because the result of enforcing the Act would be
destruction of the appellees schools. The state has the power to regulate all schools, but
parents and guardians have the right and duty to choose the appropriate preparation for
their children.

Discussion. While the state has the right to insure that children receive a proper
education, the 14th Amendment provides parents and guardians with a liberty interest in
their choice in the mode in which their children are educated.
Oposa v. Factoran 224 SCRA 792

FACTS:
Plaintiffs, who are minors represented by their parents, alleged that the then DENR
Secretary Fulgencio Factoran, Jr.s continued approval of the Timber License Agreements
(TLAs) to numerous commercial logging companies to cut and deforest the remaining
forests of the country will work great damage and injury to the plaintiffs and their
successors. Defendant, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), avers that the
plaintiffs failed to state a specific right violated by the defendant and that the question of
whether logging should be permitted in the country is a political question and cann ot be
tried in the Courts. The RTC of Makati, Branch 66, granted defendants motion to dismiss.

The principal petitioners are all minors duly represented and joined by their
respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological
Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the
purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our
environment and natural resources. The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S.
Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR).

The complaint was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit and alleges that the plaintiffs
"are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit,
use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical
forests." This instant petition was filed to seek for the cancelation of all existing timber
license agreements (TLAs) in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements.

Minor petitioners contend that continued granting of timber license constitutes a

misappropriation or impairment of the natural resource property and violates their
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology (Art. II, Sec. 16, 1987 Constitution)
and the protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae. Petitioner s likewise rely on
the respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the
people's right to a healthful environment.

ISSUE:Whether or not the case at bar subject to the judicial power of the Court

RULING:
 Being impressed with merit, the Supreme Court granted the petition and set aside
the Order of the RTC which dismissed the case.

The case at bar is subject to judicial review by the Court. Justice Davide, Jr. precisely
identified in his opinion the requisites for a case to be subjected for the judicial review by
the Court. According to him, the subject matter of the complaint is of common interest,
making this civil case a class suit and proving the existence of an actual controversy. He
strengthens this conclusion by citing in the decision Section 1, Article 7 of the 1987
Constitution.

Although concurring in the result, Justice Feliciano penned his separate opinions on
a number of topics pointed by Justice Davide, Jr. in this Court decision. Justice Feliciano said
that the concept of the word class is too broad to cover the plaintiffs and their
representatives alone, and that the Court may be deemed recognizing anyones right to file
action as against both the public administrative agency and the private entities of the
sector involved in the case at bar, to wit:

Neither petitioners nor the Court has identified the particular provisions of the
Philippine Environment Code which give rise to a specific legal right which petitioners are
seeking to enforce.

Justice Feliciano further stated that the Court in the case at bar in effect made
Sections 15 and 16 of Article 2 of the 1987 Constitution to be self-executing and judicially
enforceable even in its present form, and that these implications are too large and far
reaching in nature ever to be hinted in this instant case.
Basco v. PAGCOR 197 SCRA 52

FACTS:
Petitioners seek to annul the PAGCOR charter PD 1869 for being allegedly
contrary to morals, public policy and order, monopolistic & tends toward crony economy,
waiving the Manila City governments right to impose taxes & license fees, and violating the
equal protection clause, local autonomy and other state policies in the Constitution.

PD 1869 is the charter which created the Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation. PAGCOR was created to enable the government to regulate and centralize all
games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law. Section 13 par 2 of
the decree exempts PAGCOR, franchise holder from paying any tax of any kind or form,
income or otherwise whether national or local. According to the petitioners, this waived
the Manila City governments right to impose taxes and license fees which is recognized by
law.

ISSUES: Whether PD 1869 is valid.

RULING:
Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. For a law to be
nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear & unequivocal breach of the Constitution.
The grounds for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt. The question of
wether PD 1869 is a wise legislation is up for Congress to determine.

The power of LGUs to regulate gambling through the grant of franchises, licenses or
permits was withdrawn by PD 771, and is now vested exclusively on the Nation al
Government. Necessarily, the power to demand/collect license fees is no longer vested in
the City of Manila.

LGUs have no power to tax Government instrumentalities. PAGCOR, being a GOCC, is

therefore exempt from local taxes. The National Government is supreme over local
governments. As such, mere creatures of the State cannot defeat national policies using the
power to tax as a tool for regulation. The power to tax cannot be allowed to defeat an
instrumentality of the very entity which has the inherent power to wield it. The power of
LGUs to impose taxes & fees is always subject to limitation provided by Congress.
 The principle of local autonomy does not make LGUs sovereign within a state, it
simply means decentralization.

A law doesnt have to operate in equal force on all persons/things. The equal
protection clause doesnt preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded
different treatment under the law as long as the classification is not
unreasonable/arbitrary. The mere fact that some gambling activities are legalized under
certain conditions, while others are prohibited, does not render the applicable laws
unconstitutional.

San Fernando, La Union v. Firme Bania 195 SCRA 692

San Miguel, Bulacan v. Fernandez 130 SCRA 54

Petitioner: Municipality of San Miguel, Bulacan

Respondents: Hon. Oscar C. Fernandez

FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING:
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is granted and the order of respondent judge, dated July
27, 1982, granting issuance of a writ of execution; the alias writ of execution, dated July 27,
1982; and the order of respondent judge, dated September 13, 1982, directing the
Provincial Treasurer of Bulacan and the Municipal Treasurer of San Miguel, Bulacan to
comply with the money judgments, are SET ASIDE; and respondents are hereby enjoined
from implementing the writ of execution.
Municipality of Makati v. Court of Appeals 190 SCRA 206

FACTS:
Petitioner Municipality of Makati expropriated a portion of land owned by private
respondents, Admiral Finance Creditors Consortium, Inc. After proceedings, the RTC of
Makati determined the cost of the said land which the petitioner must pay to the private
respondents amounting to P5,291,666.00 minus the advanced payment of P338,160.00. It
issued the corresponding writ of execution accompanied with a writ of garnishment of
funds of the petitioner which was deposited in PNB. However, such order was opposed by
petitioner through a motion for reconsideration, contending that its funds at the PNB could
neither be garnished nor levied upon execution, for to do so would result in the
disbursement of public funds without the proper appropriation required under the law,
citing the case of Republic of the Philippines v. Palacio.The RTC dismissed such motion,
which was appealed to the Court of Appeals; the latter affirmed said dismissal and
petitioner now filed this petition for review.

ISSUE: Whether or not funds of the Municipality of Makati are exempt from garnishment
and levy upon execution.

RULING:
It is petitioner's main contention that the orders of respondent RTC judge involved
the net amount of P4,965,506.45, wherein the funds garnished by respondent sheriff are in
excess of P99,743.94, which are public fund and thereby are exempted from execution
without the proper appropriation required under the law. There is merit in this contention.
In this jurisdiction, well-settled is the rule that public funds are not subject to levy and
execution, unless otherwise provided for by statute. Municipal revenues derived from
taxes, licenses and market fees, and which are intended primarily and exclusively for the
purpose of financing the governmental activities and functions of the municipality, are
exempt from execution. Absent a showing that the municipal council of Makati has passed
an ordinance appropriating the said amount from its public funds deposited in their PNB
account, no levy under execution may be validly effected. However, this court orders
petitioner to pay for the said land which has been in their use already. This Court will not
condone petitioner's blatant refusal to settle its legal obligation arising from expropriation
of land they are already enjoying. The State's power of eminent domain should be exercised
within the bounds of fair play and justice.
Aglipay vs. Ruiz

Facts:

Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, seeks the issuance from
this court of a writ of prohibition to prevent the respondent Director of Posts from issuing and selling
postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress.

In May 1936, the Director of Posts announced that they would release a post stamps
commemorating the celebration of 33 rd international Eucharistic congress organized by the Catholic
Church. Petitioner argues that the release of the stamp is in violation of the principle of the
separation of state and the Church.

Respondent argues that if the petition is granted the government would lose money if not able to sell
the commemoration stamp. Respondent also argues that It does not authorize the appropriation, use
or application of public money or property for the use, benefit or support of a particular sect such as
Roman Catholic Church.

Issue:

Whether or not the issuance/release of the commemorative post stamps violates the Article 6
Section 23 of the Philippine Constitution, Separation of Church and State

Held:

Denied. The petition for a writ of prohibition is denied due to the fact that it does not violate the
Principle of the separation of the State and Church, Article 6 Section 23 . The issuing or the release
of the said stamps does not benefit a particular religion of a church. Thus the only purpose in issuing
and selling the stamps was "to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourists to this country and
to give publicity to the Philippines and its people.
Makati vs. Court of Appeals

Facts:

An expropriation proceeding was filed by the Municipality of Makati against the private
property of Arceli Jo (private respondent) regarding a parcel of land in San Antonio Village,
Makati
appraised value of the expropriated property at P5,291,666
advanced payment was made in the amount of P338,160 leaving a balance of P4,953,506
notice of garnishment was thereafter issued by the court to the PNB account
A manifestation was filed by the petitioner informing the court that the private respondent
was no longer the true owner of the expropriated property
Philippine Savings Bank (PSB) was the lawful owner of the said parcel of land
private respondent and PSB agreed to divide the compensation due f rom
the expropriation proceeding
judge ordered PNB to immediately release to them the sum of P4,953.506 corresponding to
the balanceof the appraised value of the expropriated property
PNB bank manager refused as he is waiting for the approval of their head office
Municipality of Makati contends that its fund with DBP could neither be be garnished or
levied upon execution for to do so would result to the disbursement of public funds without
the proper appropriation required under the law
lower court denied the motion for reconsideration of the petitioner ruling that the account with
PNB of the petitioner was an account specifically opened for the expropriation proceeding

Issue:

Whether or not the PNB funds may be levied in the expropriation proceeding ?

Held:

The petitioner belatedly informed the court that there are two existing accounts with
PNB. Account A was the one intended for the expropriation proceeding and account B is
primarily intended for financing governmental functions and activities. Because account A
has a fund that is insufficient to meet the remaining amount of its balance for the
expropriation proceeding, it is unlawful to get the remaining balance from Account B without
an ordinance appropriating said funds for expropriation purpose. Thus the court ruled
that account A maybe levied but not account B. The respondents are without recourse
however should the petitioner refuse to pay its remaining obligation. Where a municipality
refuses without justifiable reason to effect payment of a final money judgment rendered
against it, the claimant may avail the remedy of mandamus in order to compel the enactment
and approval of the necessary appropriation ordinance and the corresponding disbursement
of municipal funds for such purpose.