Executive Dept.

Philippine Bar Association vs. COMELEC

140 SCRA 455
January 7, 1986

FACTS:

11 petitions were filed for prohibition against the enforcement of BP 883 which calls for
special national elections on February 7, 1986 (Snap elections) for the offices of President
and Vice President of the Philippines. BP 883 in conflict with the constitution in that it
allows the President to continue holding office after the calling of the special election.

Senator Pelaez submits that President Marcos letter of conditional resignation did not
create the actual vacancy required in Section 9, Article 7 of the Constitution which could
be the basis of the holding of a special election for President and Vice President earlier
than the regular elections for such positions in 1987. The letter states that the President
is: irrevocably vacat(ing) the position of President effective only when the election is
held and after the winner is proclaimed and qualified as President by taking his oath office
ten (10) days after his proclamation.

The unified opposition, rather than insist on strict compliance with the cited
constitutional provision that the incumbent President actually resign, vacate his office and
turn it over to the Speaker of the Batasang Pambansa as acting President, their standard
bearers have not filed any suit or petition in intervention for the purpose nor repudiated
the scheduled election. They have not insisted that President Marcos vacate his office, so
long as the election is clean, fair and honest.

ISSUE:

Is BP 883 unconstitutional, and should the Supreme Court therefore stop and prohibit the
holding of the elections

HELD:

The petitions in these cases are dismissed and the prayer for the issuance of an injunction
restraining respondents from holding the election on February 7, 1986, in as much as there
are less than the required 10 votes to declare BP 883 unconstitutional.

The events that have transpired since December 3,as the Court did not issue any
restraining order, have turned the issue into a political question (from the purely
justiciable issue of the questioned constitutionality of the act due to the lack of the actual
vacancy of the Presidents office) which can be truly decided only by the people in their
sovereign capacity at the scheduled election, since there is no issue more political than
the election. The Court cannot stand in the way of letting the people decide through their
ballot, either to give the incumbent president a new mandate or to elect a new president.
 Civil Liberties Union VS. Executive Secretary
FACTS:
Petitioners: Ignacio P. Lacsina, Luis R. Mauricio, Antonio R. Quintos and Juan T. David for
petitioners in 83896 and Juan T. David for petitioners in 83815. Both petitions were consolidated
and are being resolved jointly as both seek a declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive
Order No. 284 issued by President Corazon C. Aquino on July 25, 1987.
Executive Order No. 284, according to the petitioners allows members of the Cabinet, their
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other than government offices or positions in
addition to their primary positions. The pertinent provisions of EO 284 is as follows:
Section 1: A cabinet member, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials
of the Executive Department may in addition to his primary position, hold not more than two
positions in the government and government corporations and receive the corresponding
compensation therefor.
Section 2: If they hold more positions more than what is required in section 1, they must
relinquish the excess position in favor of the subordinate official who is next in rank, but in no
case shall any official hold more than two positions other than his primary position.
Section 3: AT least 1/3 of the members of the boards of such corporation should either be a
secretary, or undersecretary, or assistant secretary.
The petitioners are challenging EO 284s constitutionality because it adds exceptions to Section
13 of Article VII other than those provided in the constitution. According to the petitioners, the
only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in government are those
provided in the Constitution namely: 1. The Vice President may be appointed as a Member of the
Cabinet under Section 3 par.2 of Article VII. 2. The secretary of justice is an ex-officio member of
the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec. 8 of article VIII.

Issue:
Whether or not Executive Order No. 284 is constitutional.

Decision:
No. It is unconstitutional. Petition granted. Executive Order No. 284 was declared null and void.
Ratio:
In the light of the construction given to Section 13 of Article VII, Executive Order No. 284 is
unconstitutional. By restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries
or assistant secretaries may hold in addition their primary position to not more that two positions
in the government and government corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple
offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Sec. 13 of Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987
Constitution itself.
The phrase unless otherwise provided in this constitution must be given a literal interpretation
to refer only to those particular instances cited in the constitution itself: Sec. 3 Art VII and Sec. 8
Art. VIII.
 Funa vs Agra
Case Digest GR 191644 Feb 19 2013
Facts:
Agra was then the Government Corporate Counsel when Pres Arroyo designated him as the
Acting Solicitor General in place of former Sol Gen Devanadera, who has been appointed as the
Secretary of Justice. Again, Agra was designated as the Acting Secretary in place of Secretary
Devanadera when the latter resigned. Agra then relinquished his position as Corporate Counsel
and continued to perform the duties of an Acting Solicitor General.

Funa, a concerned citizen, questioned his appointment. Agra argued that his concurrent
designations were merely in a temporary capacity. Even assuming that he was holding multiple
offices at the same time, his designation as an Acting Sol Gen is merely akin to a hold-over, so
that he never received salaries and emoluments for being the Acting Sol Gen when he was
appointed as the Acting Secretary of Justice.

Issue : W/N Agras designation as Acting Secretary of Justice is valid

No. The designation of Agra as Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his position of
Acting Solicitor General violates the constitutional prohibition under Article VII, Section 13 of the
1987 Constitution.
It is immaterial that Agras designation was in an acting or temporary capacity. Section 13 plainly
indicates that the intent of the Framers of the Constitution is to impose a stricter prohibition on
the President and the Cabinet Members in so far as holding other offices or employments in the
Government or in GOCCs is concerned. The prohibition against dual or multiple offices being
held by one official must be construed as to apply to all appointments or designations, whether
permanent or temporary, because the objective of Section 13 is to prevent the concentration of
powers in the Executive Department officials, specifically the President, the Vice-President, the
Cabinet Members and their deputies and assistants.
Free Telephone Workers Union vs Minister of Labor

In 1981, there was an ongoing labor dispute between the Free Telephone Workers
Union (the Union) and the Philippine Long Distance Company. Eventually, the Minister
of Labor (Blas Ople) assumed jurisdiction over the issue pursuant to Article 264 of the
Labor Code. The Union assailed the provisions of Article 264 as it averred that it is an
undue delegation of power by Congress to the Minister of Labor. They averred that by
granting discretion to the Minister of Labor to whether or not refer a labor dispute for
compulsory arbitration to the National Labor Relations Commission, it also effectively
granted the Minister to make or unmake the law on free collective bargaining.

ISSUE: Whether or not such provision is an undue delegation of power.

HELD: No. In the first place, this issue is not yet ripe for adjudication as the Minister of
Labor was yet to take on the entirety of the case. There is still no ground to rule that
there is an unconstitutional application of the law.
The Union failed to make out a case of undue delegation of legislative power. There
could be, however, an unconstitutional application. For while the Constitution allows
compulsory arbitration, it must be stressed that the exercise of such competence cannot
ignore the basic fundamental principle and state policy that the state should afford
protection to labor. But as to whether or not there is an unconstitutional application of the
law, that is yet to be determined since the Minister of Labor has not yet made a factual
determination of the labor dispute in issue.
There is no undue delegation in this case. The law in issue is complete and it set a
sufficient standard. The law cannot be any clearer, the coverage being limited to strikes
or lockouts adversely affecting the national interest.
Laurel vs Garcia
GR 92013 July 25, 1990.
Facts:

Petitioners seek to stop the Philippine Government to sell the Roppongi Property, which is
located in Japan. It is one of the properties given by the Japanese Government as reparations
for damage done by the latter to the former during the war.

Petitioner argues that under Philippine Law, the subject property is property of public
dominion. As such, it is outside the commerce of men. Therefore, it cannot be alienated.

Respondents aver that Japanese Law, and not Philippine Law, shall apply to the case because
the property is located in Japan. They posit that the principle of lex situs applies.

Issues and Held:

1. WON the subject property cannot be alienated.

The answer is in the affirmative.

Under Philippine Law, there can be no doubt that it is of public dominion unless it is
convincingly shown that the property has become patrimonial. This, the respondents have
failed to do. As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of
man. It cannot be alienated.

2. WON Philippine Law applies to the case at bar.

The answer is in the affirmative.We see no reason why a conflict of law rule should apply
when no conflict of law situation exists. A conflict of law situation arises only when: (1) There
is a dispute over the title or ownership of an immovable, such that the capacity to take and
transfer immovables, the formalities of conveyance, the essential validity and effect of the
transfer, or the interpretation and effect of a conveyance, are to be determined; and (2) A
foreign law on land ownership and its conveyance is asserted to conflict with a domestic law
on the same matters. Hence, the need to determine which law should apply.

In the instant case, none of the above elements exists.The issues are not concerned with
validity of ownership or title. There is no question that the property belongs to the
Philippines. The issue is the authority of the respondent officials to validly dispose of
property belonging to the State. And the validity of the procedures adopted to effect its sale.
This is governed by Philippine Law. The rule of lex situs does not apply.

The assertion that the opinion of the Secretary of Justice sheds light on the relevance of the
lex situs rule is misplaced. The opinion does not tackle the alienability of the real properties
procured through reparations nor the existence in what body of the authority to sell them. In
discussing who are capable of acquiring the lots, the Secretary merely explains that it is the
foreign law which should determine who can acquire the properties so that the constitutional
limitation on acquisition of lands of the public domain to Filipino citizens and entities wholly
owned by Filipinos is inapplicable.
SARMIENTO III VS MISON AND CARAGUE

156 SCRA 549 G.R. No. 79974 December 17 1987 [Appointing Power]

FACTS:

Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and Carague as the Secretary
of the Department of Budget, without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.
Sarmiento assailed the appointments as unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed
by CoA.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appointment is valid.

RULING:Yes. The President acted within her constitutional authority and power in appointing
Salvador Mison, without submitting his nomination to the CoA for confirmation. He is thus entitled
to exercise the full authority and functions of the office and to receive all the salaries and
emoluments pertaining thereto.

Under Sec 16 Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, there are 4 groups of officers whom the President
shall appoint:

1st, appointment of executive departments and bureaus heads, ambassadors, other public ministers,
consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers
with the consent and confirmation of the CoA.

2nd, all other Government officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law;

3rd those whom the President may be authorized by the law to appoint;

4th, low-ranking officers whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.

First group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments, the President appoints.

2nd, 3rd and 4th group of officers are the present bone of contention. By following the accepted rule
in constitutional and statutory construction that an express enumeration of subjects excludes others
not enumerated, it would follow that only those appointments to positions expressly stated in the
first group require the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.

It is evident that the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one
of those within the first group of appointments where the consent of the Commission on
Appointments is required. The 1987 Constitution deliberately excluded the position of "heads of
bureaus" from appointments that need the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointments.
CONCEPCION-BAUTISTA VS SALONGA

G.R. No. 86439 April 13 1989 [Appointing Power]

FACTS:

The President appointed Mary Concepcion Bautista as the Chairman of the Commission on Human
Rights pursuant to the second sentence in Section 16, Art. VII, without the confirmation of the CoA
because they are among the officers of government "whom he (the President) may be authorized by
law to appoint." Section 2(c), Executive Order No. 163, authorizes the President to appoint the
Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights. CoA disapproved Bautista's alleged ad
interim appointment as Chairperson of the CHR in view of her refusal to submit to the jurisdiction of
the Commission on Appointments.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Bautista's appointment is subject to CoA's confirmation.

2. Whether or not Bautista's appointment is an ad interim appointment.

RULING:

1. No. The position of Chairman of CHR is not among the positions mentioned in the first sentence of
Sec. 16 Art 7 of the Constitution, which provides that the appointments which are to be made with
the confirmation of CoA. Rather, it is within the authority of President, vested upon her by
Constitution (2nd sentence of Sec. 16 Art 7), that she appoint executive officials without
confirmation of CoA.

The Commission on Appointments, by the actual exercise of its constitutionally delimited power to
review presidential appointments, cannot create power to confirm appointments that the
Constitution has reserved to the President alone.

2. Under the Constitutional design, ad interim appointments do not apply to appointments solely for
the President to make. Ad interim appointments, by their very nature under the 1987 Constitution,
extend only to appointments where the review of the Commission on Appointments is needed. That
is why ad interim appointments are to remain valid until disapproval by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress; but appointments that are for the
President solely to make, that is, without the participation of the Commission on Appointments,
cannot be ad interim appointments.
QUINTOS-DELES VS COMMISSION ON CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS

G.R. No. 83216 September 4 1989 [Appointing Power]

FACTS:

This is a special civic action for prohibition and mandamus with injunction seeking to compel CoA to
allow Quintos-Deles to perform and ischarege her duties as HoR member representing Women's
Sector and to restrain respondents from subjecting her appointment to the confirmation process.
Quintos-Deles ad three others were appointed Sectoral Representatives by the President pursuant
to Art. VII Sec 16 p.2 and Art. XVIII Sec. 7 of the Constitution.

ISSUE:

WoN the Constitution requires the appointment of sectoral representatives to the HoR to be
confirmed by the CoA.

RULING:

Yes. The seats reserved for sectoral representatives in paragraph 2, Section 5, Art. VI may be filled by
appointment by the President by express provision of Section 7, Art. XVIII of the Constitution, it is
undubitable that sectoral representatives to the House of Representatives are among the other
officers whose appointments are vested in the President in this Constitution, referred to in the first
sentence of Section 16, Art. VII whose appointments are-subject to confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments (Sarmiento v. Mison, supra).

Deles' appointment was made pursuant to Art. VII, Section 16, p.2 which gives the President the
power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory,
but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments
or until the next adjournment of the Congress. The records show that Deles appointment was
made on April 6, 1988 or while Congress was in recess (March 26, 1988 to April 17, 1988); hence, the
reference to the said paragraph 2 of Section 16, Art. VII in the appointment extended to her.
CALDERON VS CARALE

208 SCRA 254

FACTS:

In 1989, RA 6715 was passed. This law amended PD 442 or the Labor Code. RA 6715 provides that
the Chairman, the Division Presiding Commissioners and other Commissioners [of the NLRC] shall all
be appointed by the President, subject to confirmation by the CoA. Appointments to any vacancy
shall come from the nominees of the sector which nominated the predecessor. Pursuant to the law,
Cory assigned Carale et al as the Chairman and the Commissioners respectively of the NLRC, the
appointment was not submitted to the CoA for its confirmation. Calderon questioned the
appointment saying that w/o the confirmation by the CoA, such an appointment is in violation of RA
6715. Calderon asserted that RA 6715 is not an encroachment on the appointing power of the
executive contained in Sec16, Art. 7, of the Constitution, as Congress may, by law, require
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of other officers appointed by the President
additional to those mentioned in the first sentence of Sec 16 of Article 7 of the Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the CoA of appointments
extended by the President to government officers additional to those expressly mentioned in the
first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. 7 of the Constitution whose appointments require confirmation by the
CoA.

RULING:The SC agreed with the Sol-Gen, confirmation by the CoA is required exclusively for the
heads of executive departments, ambassadors, public ministers, consuls, officers of the armed forces
from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in the
President by the Constitution, such as the members of the various Constitutional Commissions. With
respect to the other officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by the law and to
those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint, no confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments is required.

Jurisprudence established the following in interpreting Sec 16, Art 7 of the Constitution

1. Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is required only for presidential appointees

mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII, including, those officers whose
appointments are expressly vested by the Constitution itself in the president (like sectoral
representatives to Congress and members of the constitutional commissions of Audit, Civil Service
and Election).

2. Confirmation is not required when the President appoints other government officers whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law or those officers whom he may be authorized
by law to appoint (like the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights).
Dominador Aytona vs Andres Castillo
Dominador Aytona was one of those appointed by outgoing president Carlos Garcia
during the last day of his term. Aytona was appointed as the ad interim governor of the
Central Bank. When the next president, Diosdado Macapagal took his office, he issued
Order No. 2 which recalled Aytonas position and at the same time he appointed Andres
Castillo as the new governor of the Central Bank. Aytona then filed a quo
warranto proceeding claiming that he is qualified to remain as the Central Bank governor
and that he was validly appointed by the former president. Macapagal averred that the
ex-presidents appointments were scandalous, irregular, hurriedly done, contrary to law
and the spirit of which, and it was an attempt to subvert the incoming presidency or
administration.

ISSUE: Whether or not Aytona should remain in his post.

HELD: No. Had the appointment of Aytona been done in good faith then he would have
the right to continue office. Here, even though Aytona is qualified to remain in his post as
he is competent enough, his appointment can nevertheless be revoked by the president.
Garcias appointments are hurried maneuvers to subvert the upcoming administration
and is set to obstruct the policies of the next president. As a general rule, once a person
is qualified his appointment should not be revoked but in here it may be since his
appointment was grounded on bad faith, immorality and impropriety. In public service, it
is not only legality that is considered but also justice, fairness and righteousness.
JORGE V MAYOR

G.R. No. L-21776 February 28, 1964 [Ad interim appointments]

FACTS:

Nicanor Jorge attained the position of Acting Director in the Bureau of Lands through regular and
successive promotions. He was appointed by President Carlos Garcia ad interim Director of Lands in
December 13, 1961, he took his oath of office on the 23rd, his appointment was transmitted to the
CoA in 26th. In May 1962, CoA confirmed the said ad interim appointment.

President Macapagal issued Administrative Order No. 2 revoking ad interim appointments extended
and released by former Pres. Garcia after the joint session of Congress that ended on December 13
1961.

The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources of Macapagal administration, informed Jorge
that pursuant to a letter from the Asst. Executive Sec., served on Jorge that his appointment was
among those revoked by Admin Order No. 2, and that his position of Director of Lands was
considered vacant. Jovencio Mayor had been designated by the President to be Acting Director of
Lands. Jorge instituted a petition for mandamus and quo warranto, claiming that he is the legally
appointed Director of Lands.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Administrative Order No. 2 of President Macapagal operated as valid revocation of
Jorge's ad interim appointment.

RULING:

No. Jorge's ad interim appointment is dated December 13, 1961, but there is no evidence on record
that it was made and released after the joint session of Congress that ended on the same day. It is a
matter of contemporary history, of which this Court may take judicial cognizance, that the session
ended late in the night of December 13, 1961, and, therefore, after regular office hours. In the
absence of competent evidence to the contrary, it is to be presumed that the appointment of Jorge
was made before the close of office hours, that being the regular course of business. The
appointment, therefore, was not included in, nor intended to be covered by, Administrative Order
No. 2, and the same stands unrevoked. Consequently, it was validly confirmed by the CoA and
thereafter, the office never became vacant.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS VERA
G.R. No. L-45685 November 16 1937 En Banc [Non Delegation of Legislative Powers]

FACTS:
Cu-Unjieng was convicted of criminal charges by the trial court of Manila. He filed a motion for
reconsideration and four motions for new trial but all were denied. He then elevated to the Supreme
Court of United States for review, which was also denied. The SC denied the petition subsequently
filed by Cu-Unjieng for a motion for new trial and thereafter remanded the case to the court of origin
for execution of the judgment. CFI of Manila referred the application for probation of the Insular
Probation Office which recommended denial of the same. Later, 7th branch of CFI Manila set the
petition for hearing. The Fiscal filed an opposition to the granting of probation to Cu Unjieng, alleging,
among other things, that Act No. 4221, assuming that it has not been repealed by section 2 of Article
XV of the Constitution, is nevertheless violative of section 1, subsection (1), Article III of the
Constitution guaranteeing equal protection of the laws. The private prosecution also filed a
supplementary opposition, elaborating on the alleged unconstitutionality on Act No. 4221, as an
undue delegation of legislative power to the provincial boards of several provinces (sec. 1, Art. VI,
Constitution).

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is undue delegation of powers.

RULING:
Yes. SC conclude that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and unlawful delegation of
legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for this reason, unconstitutional and void.
The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: "This Act shall apply only
in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation
officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be
appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office."
The provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for themselves, whether the
Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The applicability and application of the
Probation Act are entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial board does
not wish to have the Act applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the
needed amount for the salary of a probation officer.
The clear policy of the law, as may be gleaned from a careful examination of the whole context, is to
make the application of the system dependent entirely upon the affirmative action of the different
provincial boards through appropriation of the salaries for probation officers at rates not lower than
those provided for provincial fiscals. Without such action on the part of the various boards, no
probation officers would be appointed by the Secretary of Justice to act in the provinces. The
Philippines is divided or subdivided into provinces and it needs no argument to show that if not one of
the provinces and this is the actual situation now appropriate the necessary fund for the salary
of a probation officer, probation under Act No. 4221 would be illusory. There can be no probation
without a probation officer. Neither can there be a probation officer without the probation system.

TORRES v. GONZALES
FACTS:
1978, Torres was convicted of estafa. In 1979, he was pardoned by the president w/ the condition that
he shall not violate any penal laws again. Should this condition be violated, he will be proceeded
against in the manner prescribed by law. Petitioner accepted the conditional pardon and was
 consequently released from confinement. In 1982, Torres was charged with multiple crimes of estafa.
In 1986, Gonzales petitioned for the cancellation of Torres pardon. Hence, the president cancelled the
pardon. Torres appealed the issue before the SC averring that the Exec Dept erred in convicting him
for violating the conditions of his pardon because the estafa charges against him were not yet final
and executory as they were still on appeal.

ISSUE: whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary before the
petitioner can be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional
pardon and accordingly to serve the balance of his original sentence.

HELD: In proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to have
breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has two options: (1) Section 64 (i) of
the Revised Administrative Code, a purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny, or (2) Article
159 of the Revised Penal Code, a judicial act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a
conditional pardon.

Where the President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, no
judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction therefor by
final judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be recommended for the violation of his
conditional pardon.

Under art. 159 of the RPC, parolee or convict who is regarded as having violated the provisions thereof
must be charged, prosecuted and convicted by final judgment before he can be made to suffer the
penalty prescribed.
In the case at bar, President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the
Revised Administrative Code. That choice is an exercise of the Presidents executive prerogative and is
not subject to judicial scrutiny.

*Who determines if violated? The PRESIDENT. When the person was conditionally pardoned it was a
generous exercise by the Chief Executive of his constitutional prerogative. The acceptance thereof by
the convict or prisoner carrie[d] with it the authority or power of the Executive to determine whether a
condition or conditions of the pardon has or have been violated. To no other department of the
Government [has] such power been intrusted.

Barrioquinto vs. Fernandez

G.R. No. L-1278, January 21, 1949

FACTS
Jimenez and Barrioquinto were charged for murder for the killings they made during the war.
The case was proceeded against Jimenez because Barrioquinto was nowhere to be found.
Jimenez was then sentenced to life imprisonment.
 Before the period for perfecting an appeal had expired, the defendant Jimenez became aware
of Proclamation No. 8, which grants amnesty in favor of all persons who may be charged
with an act penalized under the RPC in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against
persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy.
Barrioquinto learned about the proclamation and he surfaced in order to invoke amnesty as
well. However, Commissioner Fernandez of the 14th Amnesty Commission refused to process
the amnesty request of the two accused because the two refused to admit to the crime as
charged. Jimenez & Barrioquinto in fact said that a certain Tolentino was the one who
committed the crime being charged to them.
ISSUE:
Whether or not admission of guilt is necessary in amnesty.
HELD:
Pardon is granted by the President and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded and
proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by
Proclamation of the President with the concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of
which the courts should take judicial notice.
Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of persons or
communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or after the institution
of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction.
Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which
he has been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it
does nor work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage,
unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon, and it in no case
exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the
sentence (art 36, RPC). While amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion
the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the
person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no
offense.
In order to entitle a person to the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation, it is not necessary
that he should, as a condition precedent or sine qua non, admit having committed the criminal
act or offense with which he is charged, and allege the amnesty as a defense; it is sufficient
that the evidence, either of the complainant or the accused, shows that the offense committed
comes within the terms of said Amnesty Proclamation. Hence, it is not correct to say that
invocation of the benefits of amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession and avoidance.
Although the accused does not confess the imputation against him, he may be declared by the
courts or the Amnesty Commissions entitled to the benefits of the amnesty. For, whether or
not he admits or confesses having committed the offense with which he is charged, the
Commissions should, if necessary or requested by the interested party, conduct summary
hearing of the witnesses both for the complainants and the accused, on whether he has
committed the offense in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy, or against persons aiding
in the war efforts of the enemy, and decide whether he is entitled to the benefits of amnesty
and to be regarded as a patriot or hero who have rendered invaluable services to the nation,
or not, in accordance with the terms of the Amnesty Proclamation.
Since the Amnesty Proclamation is a public act, the courts as well as the Amnesty
Commissions created thereby should take notice of the terms of said Proclamation and apply
the benefits granted therein to cases coming within their province or jurisdiction, whether
pleaded or claimed by the person charged with such offenses or not, if the evidence presented
shows that the accused is entitled to said benefits.
Cristobal v. Labrador
Santos was convicted of the crime of estafa. He was given pardon by the president but
even prior to his pardon he was already holding the position as the municipality
president of Malabon notwithstanding his conviction. Cristobal, on the other hand,
averred that Santos should be excluded from the list of electors in Malabon because he
was already convicted of final judgment for any crime against property. This is pursuant
to CA 357 of the New Election Code. The lower court presided by Labrador ruled that
Santos is exempt from the provision of the law by virtue of the pardon restoring the
respondent to his full civil and political rights, except that with respect to the right to hold
public office or employment, he will be eligible for appointment only to positions which
are clerical or manual in nature and involving no money or property responsibility.
ISSUE: Whether or not Santos should not be excluded as an elector.
HELD: It should be observed that there are two limitations upon the exercise of this
constitutional prerogative by the Chief Executive, namely: (a) that the power be
exercised after conviction; and (b) that such power does not extend cases of
impeachment. Subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning
power cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative action. It must remain where the
sovereign authority has placed it and must be exercised by the highest authority to
whom it is entrusted. An absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed, but
removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction. In the present case, the disability is
the result of conviction without which there would be no basis for disqualification from
voting. Imprisonment is not the only punishment which the law imposes upon those who
violate its command. There are accessory and resultant disabilities, and the pardoning
power likewise extends to such disabilities. When granted after the term of imprisonment
has expired, absolute pardon removes all that is left of the consequences f conviction. In
the present case, while the pardon extended to respondent Santos is conditional in the
sense that he will be eligible for appointment only to positions which a e clerical or
manual in nature involving no money or property responsibility, it is absolute insofar as
it restores the respondent to full civil and political rights. Upon other hand, the
suggestion that the disqualification imposed in par (b) of sec 94 of CA 357, does not fall
within the purview of the pardoning power of the president, would lead to the impairment
of the pardoning power of the president, not contemplated in the Constitution, and would
lead furthermore to the result that there would be no way of restoring the political
privilege in a case of this nature except through legislative action.

Pellobello v. Palatino
Palatino was the mayor elect of Torrijos, Marinduque. Pelobello filed a quo warranto
proceeding alleging that Palatino is no longer qualified to hold office because he was
already convicted before and was even imprisoned. Because of such conviction and
imprisonment, Peleobello averred that Palatino is already barred from voting and being
voted upon. Palatino also invoked par (a), sec 94 of the Election Code which supports
his contention.
ISSUE: Whether or not Palatino is eligible for public office.
HELD: Yes, Palatino was granted a conditional pardon by the then Gov-Gen but such
pardon was converted into an absolute pardon by President Quezon who succeeded the
Gov-Gen. The pardon was already after Palatinos election but prior to him assuming
office. The SC then held that since there is an absolute pardon, all the former disabilities
imposed and attached to the prior conviction had been removed and that Palatino is
therefore eligible for the public office in question.

MONSANTO v. FACTORAN
FACTS:
In a decision by the Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto was
accused of the crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents and sentenced them to
imprisonment and to indemnify the government in the sum of P4,892.50 representing the
balance of the amount defrauded and to pay the costs proportionately.
She was given an absolute pardon by President Marcos which she accepted.
Petitioner requested that she be restored to her former post as assistant city treasurer
since the same was still vacant, she also asked for the backpay for the entire period of her
suspension.
Finance Ministry ruled that petitioner may be reinstated to her position without the
necessity of a new appointment
The Office of the President said that that acquittal, not absolute pardon, of a former public
officer is the only ground for reinstatement to his former position and entitlement to
payment of his salaries, benefits and emoluments due to him during the period of his
suspension pendente lite.
In fact, in such a situation, the former public official must secure a reappointment before
he can reassume his former position. And a pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from
payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence.
Petitioner argued that general rules on pardon cannot apply to her case by reason of the
fact that she was extended executive clemency while her conviction was still pending appeal
in this Court. There having been no final judgment of conviction, her employment therefore
as assistant city treasurer could not be said to have been terminated or forfeited.
The court viewed that is not material when the pardon was bestowed, whether before or
after conviction, for the result would still be the same

ISSUE:
(1) Effects of a full and absolute pardon
(2) WON a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive,
is entitled to reinstatement to her former position without need of a new appointment.

HELD:
(1) A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the
offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out of existence
the guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never
committed the offense. If granted before conviction, it prevents any of the penalties and
disabilities, consequent upon conviction, from attaching; if granted after conviction, it
removes the penalties and disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights; it makes him,
as it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity. But unless expressly
grounded on the persons innocence (which is rare), it cannot bring back lost reputation for
honesty, integrity and fair dealing.

A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the past. It
affords no relief for what has been suffered by the offender. It does not impose upon the
government any obligation to make reparation for what has been suffered.
(2) No. To insist on automatic reinstatement because of a mistaken notion that the pardon
virtually acquitted one from the offense of estafa would be grossly untenable. A pardon,
albeit full and plenary, cannot preclude the appointing power from refusing appointment to
anyone deemed to be of bad character, a poor moral risk, or who is unsuitable by reason of
the pardoned conviction.
The absolute disqualification or ineligibility from public office forms part of the punishment
prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for estafa thru falsification of public documents.

The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from holding
public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her former post as assistant city
treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new
appointment.

Llamas v. Executive Secretary

FACTS:
Ocampo III was the governor of Tarlac Province. Llamas together with some other complainants filed
an administrative case against Ocampo III for alleged acts constituting graft and corruption. Ocampo III
was found guilty. He was suspended for office for 90 days hence his vice governor, Llamas, assumed
office. In not less than 30 days however, Ocampo III returned with an AO showing that he was
pardoned hence he can resume office without completing the 90 day suspension imposed upon him.
The petitioner argues that President may grant executive clemency only in criminal cases. They say
that the qualifying phrase after conviction by final judgment applies solely to criminal cases, and no
other law allows the grant of executive clemency or pardon to anyone who has been convicted in an
administrative case, allegedly because the word conviction refers only to criminal cases.

ISSUE: WON the President of the Philippines has the power to grant executive clemency in
administrative cases.

HELD:
Yes. It is not specified in the constitution whether it may be considered under criminal or
administrative cases. , if the law does not distinguish, so we must not distinguish. The Constitution
does not distinguish between which cases executive clemency may be exercised by the President, with
the sole exclusion of impeachment cases. By the same token, if executive clemency may be exercised
only in criminal cases, it would indeed be unnecessary to provide for the exclusion of impeachment
cases from the coverage of Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution. Cases of impeachment are
automatically excluded inasmuch as the same do not necessarily involve criminal offenses.
The do not clearly see any valid and convincing reason why the President cannot grant executive
clemency in administrative cases. It is the courts considered view that if the President can grant
reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much
more reason can she grant executive clemency in administrative cases, which are clearly less serious
than criminal offenses.
The court stressed, however, that when we say the President can grant executive clemency in
administrative cases, we refer only to all administrative cases in the Executive branch, not in the
Judicial or Legislative branches of the government.
In criminal cases, the quantum of evidence required to convict an individual is proof beyond
reasonable doubt. On the other hand, in administrative cases, the quantum of evidence required is
mere substantial evidence to support a decision

Lansang v. Garcia
Facts: In the evening of August 21, 1971, at about 9 p.m., while the Liberal Party of the Philippines
was holding a public meeting at Plaza Miranda, Manila, for the presentation of its candidates in the
general elections scheduled for November 8, 1971, two hand grenades were thrown at the platform
where said candidates and other persons were. Eight persons were killed and many more injured.
Proclamation 889 was issued by the President suspending privilege of writ of habeas corpus stating
that there is a conspiracy of rebellion and insurrection in order to forcibly seize political power.
Petitions for writ of habeas corpus were filed by persons (13) who have been arrested without a
warrant.

It was stated that one of the safeguards of the proclamation was that it is to be applied to persons
caught in flagrante delicto. Incidentally, Proc. 889-A was issued as an amendment, inserting the word
actually staging. Proc. 889-B was also issued lifting the suspension of privilege in 27 provinces, 3
sub-provinces and 26 cities. Proc. 889-C was issued restoring the suspension in 13 provinces and
cities(mostly in Mindanao). Proc. 889-D further lifted the suspension in 7 provinces and 4 cities. Only
18 provinces and sub-provinces and 2 cities whose privilege was suspended. Petitioners maintained
that Proclamation No. 889 did not declare the existence of actual "invasion insurrection or rebellion or
imminent danger thereof, however it became moot and academic since it was amended. Petitioners
further contend that public safety did not require the issuance of proclamations stating: (a) that there is
no rebellion; (b) that, prior to and at the time of the suspension of the privilege, the Government was
functioning normally, as were the courts; (c) that no untoward incident, confirmatory of an alleged
July-August Plan, has actually taken place after August 21, 1971; (d) that the President's
alleged apprehension, because of said plan, is non-existent and unjustified; and (e) that
the Communistforces in the Philippines are too small and weak to jeopardize public safety to such
extent as to require the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

A resolution was issued by majority of the Court having tentatively arrived at a consensus that it may
inquire in order to satisfy itself of the existence of the factual bases for the proclamations. Now the
Court resolves after conclusive decision reached by majority.

Issues:

(1) Whether or Not the authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen requiring suspension (of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus) belongs to the President and his decision is final and
conclusive upon the courts and upon all other persons.

(2) Whether or Not public safety require the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
decreed in Proclamation No. 889-A.

Held: The President has authority however it is subject to judicial review. Two conditions must
concur for the valid exercise of the authority to suspend the privilege to the writ (a) there must be
"invasion, insurrection, or rebellion" or "imminent danger thereof," and (b) "public safety" must
require the suspension of the privilege. President has three (3) courses of action: (a) to call out the
armed forces; (b) to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and (c) to place the Philippines
or any part thereof under martial law. He had, already, called out the armed forces, proved inadequate.
Of the two other alternatives, the suspension of the privilege is the least harsh.
Petitioners contention that CPP-NPA has no ability, is negatived by the killing of 5 mayors,
20 barrio captains and 3 chiefs of police; that there were fourteen (14) meaningful bombing incidents
in the Greater Manila Area in 1970. CPP has managed to infiltrate or establish and control nine major
labor organizations; has exploited the (11) major student or youth organizations; about thirty (30)
mass organizations actively advancing the CPP.

Garcia-Padilla v. Ponce-Enrile
In July 1982, Sabino Padilla, together w/ 8 others who were having a conference in a
house in Bayombong, NV, were arrested by members of the PC. The raid of the house
was authorized by a search warrant issued by Judge Sayo. Josefina, mother of Sabino,
opposed the arrest averring that no warrant of arrest was issued but rather it was just a
warrant of arrest hence the arrest of her son and the others was w/o just cause. Sabino
and companions together with 4 others were later transferred to a facility only the PCs
know. Josefina petitioned the court for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.
ISSUE: Whether or not the arrests done against Sabino et al is valid.
HELD: In a complete about face, the SC decision in the Lansang Case was reversed
and the ruling in the Barcelon Case & the Montenegro Case was again reinstated. The
questioned power of the president to suspend the privilege of the WoHC was once
again held as discretionary in the president. The SC again reiterated that the suspension
of the writ was a political question to be resolved solely by the president. It was also
noted that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus must, indeed,
carry with it the suspension of the right to bail, if the governments campaign to suppress
the rebellion is to be enhanced and rendered effective. If the right to bail may be
demanded during the continuance of the rebellion, and those arrested, captured and
detained in the course thereof will be released, they would, without the least doubt,
rejoin their comrades in the field thereby jeopardizing the success of government efforts
to bring to an end the invasion, rebellion or insurrection.

NOTE: This ruling was abrogated by Sec 18, Art 7 of the 1987 Constitution which
expressly constitutionalized the Lansang Doctrine. Note as well that under Art 3 (Sec 13)
of the Constitution it is stated that the right to bail shall not be impaired even if the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.

Aquino v. Military Commission No. 2

In September 1972, after the declaration of Martial Law, Ninoy was arrested and was
placed under custody. He was brought Fort Bonifacio. He filed for the issuance of the
Writ of Habeas Corpus which was denied by the SC. Ninoy then questioned the validity
of such denial and the declaration of martial law; at the same time he questioned the
authority of the military court [No. 2] created [pursuant to GO 2-A] to try him and his
other companions. He was being charged for illegal possession of firearms, ammunition
and explosives. He was also being charged for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act and
for murder. All were filed before the military court. Ninoy argued that the military court
has no jurisdiction or civilian courts are still operational.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ninoy can be validly charged before the military court.
HELD: The SC upheld the power of the president to create military tribunals or military
courts which are authorized to try not only military personnel but also civilians even at
that time civil courts were open and functioning. The SC basically rejected the open
court theory observed in the USA.

Olaguerv. Military Commission No. 34

In 1979, Olaguer and some others were detained by military personnel and they were
placed in Camp Bagong Diwa. Logauer and his group are all civilians. They were
charged with (1) unlawful possession of explosives and incendiary devices; (2)
conspiracy to assassinate President and Mrs. Marcos; (3) conspiracy to assassinate
cabinet members Juan Ponce Enrile, Francisco Tatad and Vicente Paterno; (4)
conspiracy to assassinate Messrs. Arturo Tangco, Jose Roo and Onofre Corpus; (5)
arson of nine buildings; (6) attempted murder of Messrs. Leonardo Perez, Teodoro
Valencia and Generals Romeo Espino and Fabian Ver; and (7) conspiracy and proposal
to commit rebellion, and inciting to rebellion. On August 19, 1980, the petitioners went to
the SC and filed the instant Petition for prohibition and habeas corpus.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus be granted.
HELD: The petition for habeas corpus has become moot and academic because by the
time the case reached the SC Olaguer and his companions were already released from
military confinement. When the release of the persons in whose behalf the application
for a writ of habeas corpus was filed is effected, the Petition for the issuance of the writ
becomes moot and academic. 18 Inasmuch as the herein petitioners have been
released from their confinement in military detention centers, the instant Petitions for the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus should be dismissed for having become moot and
academic. But the military court created to try the case of Olaguer (and the decision it
rendered) still continues to subsist.
ISSUE2: The issue is then shifted to: Whether or not a military tribunal has the
jurisdiction to try civilians while the civil courts are open and functioning.
HELD: The SC nullified for lack of jurisdiction all decisions rendered by the military
courts or tribunals during the period of martial law in all cases involving civilian
defendants. A military commission or tribunal cannot try and exercise jurisdiction, even
during the period of martial law, over civilians for offenses allegedly committed by them
as long as the civil courts are open and functioning, and that any judgment rendered by
such body relating to a civilian is null and void for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the
military tribunal concerned.

Araneta v. Dinglasan
FACTS:
The five cases are consolidated for all of them present the same fundamental question. Antonio
Araneta is being charged for violating EO 62 which regulates rentals for houses and lots for
residential buildings. Another case is of Leon Ma. Guerrero seeking to have a permit issued for the
exportation of his manufactured shoes. Another is of Eulogio Rodriguez seeking to prohibit the
treasury from disbursing funds pursuant to EO 225, while another is of Antonio Barredo attacking EO
226 which appropriated funds to hold the national elections. They all content that CA 671 or the
emergency Powers Act is already inoperative and that all EOs issued under said Act also ceased

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Emergency Powers Act has ceased to have any force and effect

HELD:
CA 671 does not fix the duration of its effectiveness. The intention of the act has to be sought for in
its nature, object to be accomplished, the purpose to be subserved and its relation to the
Constitution. Article VI of the Constitution provides that any law passed by virtue thereof should be
for a limited period. It is presumed that CA 671 was approved with this limitation in view. The
opposite theory would make the law repugnant to the Constitution, and is contrary to the principle
that the legislature is deemed to have full knowledge of the Constitutional scope of its power. CA
671 became inoperative when Congress met in regular session of May 25, 1946, and that EO Nos. 62,
192, 225 and 226 were issued without authority of law. In a regular session, the power if Congress to
legislate is not circumscribed except by the limitations imposed by the organic law.

Rodriguez v. Gella
FACTS:
On August 26, 1949, the court passed upon the status of CA No. 671 approved on December 16,
1949. Five members held that the Act ceased to be operative in its totality when the Congress
convened in special session. Herein petitioners seek to invalidate EO Nos. 545 and 546 appropriating
the sum of P37, 850, 500 for urgent and essential public works and setting aside the sum of P11,
367, 600 for relief from typhoons, floods and other calamities. Congress passed House Bill 727
intending to revoke CA 671 but was vetoed by the President.

ISSUE:
Whether or not EO 545 and 546 are still operative

HELD:
Act 671 may be likened to an ordinary contract of agency whereby the consent of the agent is
necessary only in the sense that he cannot be compelled to accept the trust, in the same way that
the principal cannot be forced to keep the relation in eternity or the will of the agent. The logical
view consistent with constitutionality is to hold that the power lasted only during the emergency
resulting from the last world war. That emergency, which naturally terminated upon the ending of
the last world war, was contemplated by the members of the National Assembly. Shelter may not be
sought in the proposition that the President should be allowed to exercise emergency powers for
the sake of speed and expediency in the interest and for the welfare of the people because we have
the Constitution designed to establish a government under a regime of justice, liberty and
democracy, and since our government is based on the system of separation of powers. Wherefore,
EO Nos. 545 and 546 are declared null and void.

Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading

FACTS: EST was a shipping company charged in the importation from Japan of onion and garlic into
the Philippines. In 1956, the Commissioner of Customs ordered the seizure and forfeiture of the
import goods because EST was not able to comply with Central Bank Circulars 44 and 45. The said
circulars were pursuant to EO 328 w/c sought to regulate the importation of such non-dollar goods
from Japan (as there was a Trade and Financial Agreement b/n the Philippines and Japan then). EST
questioned the validity of the said EO averring that the said EO was never concurred upon by the
Senate. The issue was elevated to the Court of Tax Appeals and the latter ruled in favor of EST. The
Commissioner appealed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the EO is subject to the concurrence of at least 2/3 of the Senate.

HELD: No, executive Agreements are not like treaties which are subject to the concurrence of at
least 2/3 of the members of the Senate. Agreements concluded by the President which fall short of
treaties are commonly referred to as executive agreements and are no less common in our scheme
of government than are the more formal instruments treaties and conventions. They sometimes
take the form of exchanges of notes and at other times that of more formal documents
denominated agreements or protocols. The point where ordinary correspondence between this
and other governments ends and agreements whether denominated executive agreements or
exchanges of notes or otherwise begin, may sometimes be difficult of ready ascertainment. It
would be useless to undertake to discuss here the large variety of executive agreements as such,
concluded from time to time. Hundreds of executive agreements, other than those entered into
under the trade- agreements act, have been negotiated with foreign governments. . . . It would seem
to be sufficient, in order to show that the trade agreements under the act of 1934 are not
anomalous in character, that they are not treaties, and that they have abundant precedent in our
history, to refer to certain classes of agreements heretofore entered into by the Executive without
the approval of the Senate. They cover such subjects as the inspection of vessels, navigation dues,
income tax on shipping profits, the admission of civil aircraft, customs matters, and commercial
relations generally, international claims, postal matters, the registration of trade-marks and
copyrights, etc. Some of them were concluded not by specific congressional authorization but in
conformity with policies declared in acts of Congress with respect to the general subject matter,
such as tariff acts; while still others, particularly those with respect to the settlement of claims
against foreign governments, were concluded independently of any legislation.

CIR v. Gotamco
FACTS:
The World Health Organization (WHO) decided to construct a building to house its offices, as well as
the other United
Nations Offices in Manila. Inviting bids for the construction of the building, the WHO informed the
bidders of its tax exemptions. The contract was awarded to John Gotamco and sons. The
Commissioner opined that a 3% contractors tax should be due from the contractor. The WHO issued
a certification that Gotamco should be exempted, but the Commissioner insisted on the tax. Raised in
the Court of Tax Appeals, the Court ruled in favor of Gotamco.

ISSUE:
Is Gotamco liable for the tax?

RULING:
No. Direct taxes are those that are demanded from the very person who, it is intended or desired,
should pay them; while indirect taxes are those that are demanded in the first instance from one
person in the expectation and intention that he can shift the burden to someone else.

Herein, the contractors tax is payable by the contractor but it is the owner of the building that
shoulders the burden of the tax because the same is shifted by the contractor to the owner as a matter
of self-preservation. Such tax is an indirect tax on the organization, as the payment thereof or its
inclusion in the bid price would have meant an increase in the construction cost of the building.

Hence, WHOs exemption from indirect taxes implies that Gotamco is exempt from contractors
tax.

Soliven v. Makaslar; Beltran v. Makaslar

Luis Beltran is among the petitioners in this case. He, together with others, was charged
with libel by the then president Corzaon Aquino. Cory herself filed a complaint-affidavit
against him and others. Makasiar averred that Cory cannot file a complaint affidavit
because this would defeat her immunity from suit. He grounded his contention on the
principle that a president cannot be sued. However, if a president would sue then the
president would allow herself to be placed under the courts jurisdiction and conversely
she would be consenting to be sued back. Also, considering the functions of a president,
the president may not be able to appear in court to be a witness for herself thus she may
be liable for contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not such immunity can be invoked by Beltran, a person other than
the president.
HELD: No. The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from
suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance
or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that,
aside from requiring all of the office-holders time, also demands undivided attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office
and may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the
Presidents behalf. Thus, an accused like Beltran et al, in a criminal case in which the
President is the complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to
prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the
privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the
privilege and submit to the courts jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the
privilege or to waive it is solely the Presidents prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be
assumed and imposed by any other person.

Senate of the Philippines v. Eduardo Ermita, et. al.

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused power
by issuing E.O. 464 Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation of Powers,
Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials
Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and for
Other Purposes. Petitioners pray for its declaration as null and void for being
unconstitutional.
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various
Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for,
inter alia, the attendance of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus,
and offices including those employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations,
the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP).
The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive
Department for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway
project, others on the issues of massive election fraud in the Philippine elections, wire
tapping, and the role of military in the so-called Gloriagate Scandal.
Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as provided by
E.O. 464, Section 3 which requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to
secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress.

ISSUE:
Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in Section 2(b) to
secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress, valid
and constitutional?

RULING:
No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the executive
privilege. The doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain information
must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The
privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in
this case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public
interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case.
Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is
sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the
ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must
be respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade
congressional requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so
and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the
power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated.

David, et. al. v. Macapagal-Arroyo, et. al.

In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the discovery of a
plan (Oplan Hackle I) to assassinate the president, then president Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo (GMA) issued Presidential Proclamation 1017 (PP1017) and is to be
implemented by General Order No. 5 (GO 5). The said law was aimed to suppress
lawlessness and the connivance of extremists to bring down the government.
Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the same time
revoked all permits issued for rallies and other public organization/meeting.
Notwithstanding the cancellation of their rally permit, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) head
Randolf David proceeded to rally which led to his arrest.
Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was raided by the
CIDG and they seized and confiscated anti-GMA articles and write ups. Later still,
another known anti-GMA news agency (Malaya) was raided and seized. On the same
day, Beltran of Anakpawis, was also arrested. His arrest was however grounded on a
warrant of arrest issued way back in 1985 for his actions against Marcos. His supporters
cannot visit him in jail because of the current imposition of PP 1017 and GO 5.
In March, GMA issued PP 1021 which declared that the state of national emergency
ceased to exist. David and some opposition Congressmen averred that PP1017 is
unconstitutional for it has no factual basis and it cannot be validly declared by the
president for such power is reposed in Congress. Also such declaration is actually a
declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also averred that the emergency
contemplated in the Constitution are those of natural calamities and that such is an
overbreadth. Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an overbreadth because it encroaches
upon protected and unprotected rights. The Sol-Gen argued that the issue has become
moot and academic by reason of the lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of the declaration of PP
1021. The Sol-Gen averred that PP 1017 is within the presidents calling out power, take
care power and take over power.
ISSUE: Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional.
HELD: PP 1017 and its implementing GO are partly constitutional and partly
unconstitutional.
The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by reason of the lifting of the
questioned PP. It is still in fact operative because there are parties still affected due to
the alleged violation of the said PP. Hence, the SC can take cognition of the case at bar.
The SC ruled that PP 1017 is constitutional in part and at the same time some provisions
of which are unconstitutional. The SC ruled in the following way;
Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its declaration
The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has no factual basis in issuing PP 1017
and GO 5. A reading of the Solicitor Generals Consolidated Comment and
Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP
1017, with supporting reports forming part of the records. Mentioned are the escape of
the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the
military, particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements from the
communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security
Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between the NPA and the
military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary
allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017
calling for military aid. Indeed, judging the seriousness of the incidents, GMA was not
expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she
believed was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. However, the exercise of such
power or duty must not stifle liberty.
Resolution by the SC on the Overbreadth Theory
First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing
on their faces statutes in free speech cases. The 7 consolidated cases at bar are not
primarily freedom of speech cases. Also, a plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not
primarily directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. It is actually a call upon
the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence. Moreover, the overbreadth
doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law that reflects legitimate state
interest in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected
conduct. Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion are considered
harmful and constitutionally unprotected conduct. Thus, claims of facial overbreadth
are entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only
spoken words and again, that overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been
curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to
protected conduct. Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a
spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation.
Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power Doctrine
On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA declared PP 1017. The SC
considered the Presidents calling-out power as a discretionary power solely vested in
his wisdom, it stressed that this does not prevent an examination of whether such power
was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a
manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. The SC ruled that GMA has validly
declared PP 1017 for the Constitution grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a
sequence of graduated powers. From the most to the least benign, these are: the
calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and
the power to declare Martial Law. The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out
power is that whenever it becomes necessary, the President may call the armed forces
to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. And such criterion has
been met.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Care Doctrine
Pursuant to the 2nd sentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution (He shall ensure that the
laws be faithfully executed.) the president declared PP 1017. David et al averred that PP
1017 however violated Sec 1, Art 6 of the Constitution for it arrogated legislative power
to the President. Such power is vested in Congress. They assail the clause to enforce
obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me
personally or upon my direction. The SC noted that such provision is similar to the
power that granted former President Marcos legislative powers (as provided in PP
1081). The SC ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants
GMA the authority to promulgate decrees. Legislative power is peculiarly within the
province of the Legislature. Sec 1, Article 6 categorically states that [t]he legislative
power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate
and a House of Representatives. To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of
rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify GMA[s exercise of legislative power by
issuing decrees. The president can only take care of the carrying out of laws but
cannot create or enact laws.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Over Power Doctrine
The president cannot validly order the taking over of private corporations or institutions
such as the Daily Tribune without any authority from Congress. On the other hand, the
word emergency contemplated in the constitution is not limited to natural calamities but
rather it also includes rebellion. The SC made a distinction; the president can declare the
state of national emergency but her exercise of emergency powers does not come
automatically after it for such exercise needs authority from Congress. The authority
from Congress must be based on the following:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by
Congress.
Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP 1017 is a Martial Law Declaration
The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration and is not tantamount to it. It
is a valid exercise of the calling out power of the president by the president.