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Republic of the Philippines

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 82562 April 11, 1997

LYDIA VILLEGAS, MA TERESITA VILLEGAS, ANTONIO VILLEGAS, JR., and ANTONIETTE VILLEGAS,
petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ANTONIO V. RAQUIZA, respondents.

G.R. No. 82592 April 11, 1997

ANTONIO V. RAQUIZA, petitioner,

ROMERO, J.:

This case originated from a libel suit filed by then Assemblyman Antonio V. Raquiza against then Manila Mayor
Antonio J. Villegas, who allegedly publicly imputed to him acts constituting violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. He did this on several occasions in August 1968 through (a) a speech before the Lion's Club of
Malasiqui, Pangasinan on August 10; (b) public statements in Manila on August 13 and in Davao on August 17,
which was coupled with a radio-TV interview; and (c) a public statement shortly prior to his appearance before the
Senate Committee on Public Works (the Committee) on August 20 to formally submit a letter-complaint implicating
Raquiza, among other government officials.

The Committee, however, observed that all the allegations in the complaint were based mainly on the
uncorroborated testimony of a certain Pedro U. Fernandez, whose credibility turned out to be highly questionable.
Villegas also failed to submit the original copies of his documentary evidence. Thus, after thorough investigation,
Raquiza was cleared of all charges by the Committee. 1 All these acts of political grandstanding received extensive
media coverage.

On July 25, 1969, an information for libel was filed by the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila with the then Court of
First Instance of Manila against Villegas who denied the charge. After losing in the 1971 elections, Villegas left for
the United States where he stayed until his death on November 16, 1984. Nevertheless, trial proceeded on absentia
by the time of his death the in 1984, the prosecution had already rested its case Two months after notice of his
death, the court issued an order dismissing the crimal aspect of the case but reserving the right to resolve its civil
aspect. No memorandum was ever filed in his behalf.

Judge Marcelo R. Obien 2 rendered judgment on March 7, 1985, the dispositive portion of which was amended on March
26 to read as follows:

WHEREFORE, and in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. The dismissal of the criminal case against Antonio J. Vlllegas, on account of his death on November
16, 1984. is hereby reiterated.

2. Ordenng the estate of Antonio J. Villegas, represented herein by his legal heirs, namely: Lydia A
 Villegas, Ma. Teresita Villegas, Antonio Villegas, Jr., Ma. Anton(i)ette Villegas, and Ma. Lydia Villegas
(sic), to pay plaintiff Antonio V. Raquiza Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200,000,000.00), itemized as
follows:

a) One Hundred Fifty Million Pesos (P150.000.000.00) as moral damages:

b) Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200.000.00) as actual damages:

c) Forty-nine Million Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos (P49,800,000.00) as exemplary damages; and

d) The cost of suit.

SO ORDERED. 3 (Amendments underscored)

The heirs of Villegas (the Heirs), through their father's counsel, Atty. Norberto, Quisumbing appealed the decision on
these three main grounds:

1. Whether the trial court, three months after notice of the death of the accused and before his counsel
could file a memorandum in his behalf, could velidly render judgment in the case?

2. Whether in the absence of formal substitution of parties, the trial court could validly render judgment
against the heirs and estate of a deceased accused?

3 Whether, under the facts of the instant case, deceased Villegas was liable for libel, and assuming he
was, whether the damages awarded by the trial court were just and reasonable?

On March 15, 1988, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming the trial court's judgment modified only with
respect to the award of damages which was reduced to P2 million representing P1.5 million, P300,000.00, and
P200,000.00 in moral exemplary and actual damages, respectively. Both parties elevated said decision to this Court
for review

In their petition (G.R. No. 82562), the Heirs once again raise the very same issues brought before the Court of
Appeals, albeit reworded. On the other hand, petitioner Requiza (G.R. No. 82592) questions the extensions of time
to file appellant's brief granted by the appellate court to the Heirs, as well as the drastic reduction in the award of
damages.

It is immediately apparent that the focal issue in these petitions is the effect of the death of Villegas before the case
was decided by the trial court. Stated otherwise, did the death of the accused before final judgment extinguish his
civil liability?

Fortunately, this Court has already settled this issue with the promulgation of the case of People v. Bayotas (G.R.
No. 102007) on September 2, 1994, 4 viz.:

It is thus evident that as jurisprudence evolved from Castillo 5 to Torrijos, 6 the rule established was that
the survival of the civil liability depends on whether the same can be predicated on sources of obligations other
than delict. Stated differently, the claim for civil liability is also extinguished together with the criminal action if it
were solely based thereon, i.e., civil liability ex delicto.
 xxx xxx xxx

(I)n recovering damages for injury to persons thru an independent civil action based on Article 33 of the
Civil Code, the same must be filed against the executor or administrator of the estate of deceased
accused (undet Sec. 1, Rule 87, infra.) and not against the estate under Sec. 5, Rule 86 because this
rule explicitly limits the claim to those for funeral expenses, expenses for the last sickness of the
decedent, judgment for money and claims arising from contract, express or implied. 7

xxx xxx xxx

From this lengthy dlsquisition, we summarize our ruling herein:

1 Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the
civil liability based solely thereon As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the
accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising
from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."

2 Corollarily the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of (the) accused, if the same
may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code
enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the
same act or omission:

a) Law

b) Contracts

c) Quasi-contracts

d) x x x x x x x x x

e) Quasi-delicts

3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor
may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. 8 This separate civil action may be enforced either
against the executor/administrator o(f) the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon
which the same is based as explained above.

4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action
by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction,
the private offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of
limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case,
conformably with (the) provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any
apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription. (Emphasis supplied).

The source of Villegas' civil liability in the present case is the felonious act of libel he allegedly committed. Yet, this
act could also be deemed a quasi-delict within the purview of Article 33 9 in relation to Article 1157 of the Civil Code. If
the Court ruled in Bayotas that the death of an accused during the pendency of his appeal extinguishes not only his criminal
but also his civil liability unless the latter can be predicated on a source of obligation other than the act or omission
complained of, with more reason should it apply to the case at bar where the accused died shortly after the prosecution had
rested its case and before he was able to submit his memorandum and all this before any decision could even be reached by
the trial court.

The Bayotas ruling, however, makes the enforcement of a deceased accused's civil liability dependent on two
factors, namely, that it be pursued by filing a separate civil action and that it be made subject to Section 1, Rule 111
of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended. Obviously, in the case at bar, the civil action was deemed
instituted with the criminal. There was no waiver of the civil action and no reservation of the right to institute the
same, nor was it instituted prior to the criminal action. What then is the recourse of the private offended party in a
criminal case such as this which must be dismissed in accordance with the Bayotas doctrine, where the civil action
was impliedly instituted with it?

The answer is likewise provided in Bayatas, thus:

Assuming that for lack of express reservation, Belamala's civil civil for damages was to be considered
 instituted together with the crinimal action still, since both proceedings were terminated without finals
adjudication the civil action of the offended party under Article 33 may yet be enforced separately 10
(Emphasis supplied)

Hence, logically, the court a quo should have dismissed both actions against Vilegas which dismissal will not,
however, bar Raquiza as the private offended party from pursuing his claim for damages against the executor or
administrator of the former's estate, notwitnstanding the fact that he did not reserve the right to institute a civil
separate civil action based on Article 33 of the Civil Code.

It cannot be argued either that to follow Bayotas would result in further delay in this protracted litigation. This is
because the resolution of the civil aspect of the case after the dismissal of the main criminal action by the trial court
was technically defective There was no proper substitution of parties, as correctly pointed out by the Heirs and
repeatedly put in issue by Atty. Quisumbing. What should have been followed by the court a quo was the procedure
laid down in the Rules of Court, specifically, Section 17, Rule 3, in connection with Section 1, Rule 87. The pertinent
provisions state as follws:

Rule 3
Sec.17. Death of party. — After a party dies and the claim is not there extinguished, the court shall
order upon proper notice the legal representative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted for
the deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be·granted. . . . The heirs
of the deceased may be allowed to be for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an
executor or administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.

Rule 87

Sec. 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought against or executor or administrator. — No
action upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced against
the executor or administrator; but actions to recover real or personal property, or an interest therein,
from the estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or
property, real or personal may be commenced against him.

Accordingly, the Court sees no more necessity in resolving the other issues used by both parties in these petitions.

WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 82562 is GRANTED and the petition in G.R. No. 82592 is DENIED. The
decisions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 82186 dated March 15, 1988, and of the Manila Regional Trial
Court, Branch 44, dated March 7, 1985, as amended, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, without prejudice to
the right of the private offended party Antonio V. Raquiza, to file the appropriate civil action for damages against the
executor or administrator of the estate or the heirs of the late Antonto J. Villegas in accordance with the foregoing
procedure.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Puno, Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Exhibit "WW." pp. 255-279 of original exhibits.

2 Presiding Judge, Manila Regional Trial Court, Branch 44.

3 Records. p. 621.

4 236 SCRA 239 (1994).

5 People v. Castillo and Ocfemia, 81 SCRA 120 (1978).

6 Torrijos v. Court of Appeals, 67 SCRA 394 (1975).

7 Citing Belamala v. Polinar, 21 SCRA 970 (1967).

8 In states inter alia

"Rule III
 Prosecution of Civil Action

Sec. 1 Institution of criminal and civil actions — When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for
the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party
waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it the civil action prior to the criminal action.

xxx xxx xxx

The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil action shall be made before the prosecution
starts to present its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable
opportunity to make such reservation.

xxx xxx xxx

9 Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action for damages, entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal action may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action
shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence.

10 Belamala, supra.

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