G.R. No.

L-40789 February 27, 1987

INTESTATE ESTATE OF PETRA V. ROSALES, IRENEA C. ROSALES, petitioner,
vs.
FORTUNATO ROSALES, MAGNA ROSALES ACEBES, MACIKEQUEROX ROSALES and ANTONIO ROSALES, respondents.
Jose B. Echaves for petitioner.
Jose A. Binghay and Paul G. Gorres for respondents.

GANCAYCO, J.:
In this Petition for Review of two (2) Orders of the Court of First Instance of Cebu the question raised is whether the widow whose husband
predeceased his mother can inherit from the latter, her mother-in-law.
It appears from the record of the case that on February 26, 1971, Mrs. Petra V. Rosales, a resident of Cebu City, died intestate. She was survived by
her husband Fortunate T. Rosales and their two (2) children Magna Rosales Acebes and Antonio Rosales. Another child, Carterio Rosales,
predeceased her, leaving behind a child, Macikequerox Rosales, and his widow Irenea C. Rosales, the herein petitioner. The estate of the dismissed
has an estimated gross value of about Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00).
On July 10, 1971, Magna Rosales Acebes instituted the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the deceased in the Court of First Instance of
Cebu. The case was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 3204-R. Thereafter, the trial court appointed Magna Rosales Acebes administratrix of the
said estate.
In the course of the intestate proceedings, the trial court issued an Order dated June 16, 1972 declaring the following in individuals the legal heirs of
the deceased and prescribing their respective share of the estate —
Fortunata T. Rosales (husband), 1/4; Magna R. Acebes (daughter), 1/4; Macikequerox Rosales, 1/4; and Antonio Rosales son, 1/4.
This declaration was reiterated by the trial court in its Order I dated February 4, 1975.
These Orders notwithstanding, Irenea Rosales insisted in getting a share of the estate in her capacity as the surviving spouse of the late Carterio
Rosales, son of the deceased, claiming that she is a compulsory heir of her mother-in-law together with her son, Macikequerox Rosales.
Thus, Irenea Rosales sought the reconsideration of the aforementioned Orders. The trial court denied her plea. Hence this petition.
In sum, the petitioner poses two (2) questions for Our resolution petition. First — is a widow (surviving spouse) an intestate heir of her mother-in-law?
Second — are the Orders of the trial court which excluded the widow from getting a share of the estate in question final as against the said widow?
Our answer to the first question is in the negative.
Intestate or legal heirs are classified into two (2) groups, namely, those who inherit by their own right, and those who inherit by the right of
representation. 1 Restated, an intestate heir can only inherit either by his own right, as in the order of intestate succession provided for in the Civil
Code, 2 or by the right of representation provided for in Article 981 of the same law. The relevant provisions of the Civil Code are:
Art. 980. The children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in their own right, dividing the inheritance in equal shares.
Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants of other children who are dead, survive, the former shall inherit in their own
right, and the latter by right of representation.
 Art. 982. The grandchildren and other descendants shag inherit by right of representation, and if any one of them should have died,
leaving several heirs, the portion pertaining to him shall be divided among the latter in equal portions.
Art. 999. When the widow or widower survives with legitimate children or their descendants and illegitimate children or their
descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, such widow or widower shall be entitled to the same share as that of a legitimate child.
There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that a widow (surviving spouse) is an intestate heir of her mother-in-law. The entire Code is devoid
of any provision which entitles her to inherit from her mother-in- law either by her own right or by the right of representation. The provisions of the
Code which relate to the order of intestate succession (Articles 978 to 1014) enumerate with meticulous exactitude the intestate heirs of a decedent,
with the State as the final intestate heir. The conspicuous absence of a provision which makes a daughter-in-law an intestate heir of the deceased all
the more confirms Our observation. If the legislature intended to make the surviving spouse an intestate heir of the parent-in-law, it would have so
provided in the Code.
Petitioner argues that she is a compulsory heir in accordance with the provisions of Article 887 of the Civil Code which provides that:
Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs:
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their legitimate children and descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287;
Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are not excluded by those in Nos. 1 and 2; neither do they exclude one another.
In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved.
The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three classes mentioned, shall inherit from them in the manner and to the extent
established by this Code.
The aforesaid provision of law 3 refers to the estate of the deceased spouse in which case the surviving spouse (widow or widower) is a compulsory
heir. It does not apply to the estate of a parent-in-law.
Indeed, the surviving spouse is considered a third person as regards the estate of the parent-in-law. We had occasion to make this observation
in Lachenal v. Salas, 4 to Wit:
We hold that the title to the fishing boat should be determined in Civil Case No. 3597 (not in the intestate proceeding) because it affects
the lessee thereof, Lope L. Leoncio, the decedent's son-in-law, who, although married to his daughter or compulsory heir, is
nevertheless a third person with respect to his estate. ... (Emphasis supplied).
By the same token, the provision of Article 999 of the Civil Code aforecited does not support petitioner's claim. A careful examination of the said Article
confirms that the estate contemplated therein is the estate of the deceased spouse. The estate which is the subject matter of the intestate estate
proceedings in this case is that of the deceased Petra V. Rosales, the mother-in-law of the petitioner. It is from the estate of Petra V. Rosales that
Macikequerox Rosales draws a share of the inheritance by the right of representation as provided by Article 981 of the Code.
The essence and nature of the right of representation is explained by Articles 970 and 971 of the Civil Code, viz —
 Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the representative is raised to the place and the degree
of the person represented, and acquires the rights which the latter would have if he were living or if he could have inherited.
Art. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and not by the person represented. The representative does not
succeed the person represented but the one whom the person represented would have succeeded. (Emphasis supplied.)
Article 971 explicitly declares that Macikequerox Rosales is called to succession by law because of his blood relationship. He does not succeed his
father, Carterio Rosales (the person represented) who predeceased his grandmother, Petra Rosales, but the latter whom his father would have
succeeded. Petitioner cannot assert the same right of representation as she has no filiation by blood with her mother-in-law.
Petitioner however contends that at the time of the death of her husband Carterio Rosales he had an inchoate or contingent right to the properties of
Petra Rosales as compulsory heir. Be that as it may, said right of her husband was extinguished by his death that is why it is their son Macikequerox
Rosales who succeeded from Petra Rosales by right of representation. He did not succeed from his deceased father, Carterio Rosales.
On the basis of the foregoing observations and conclusions, We find it unnecessary to pass upon the second question posed by the petitioner.
Accordingly, it is Our considered opinion, and We so hold, that a surviving spouse is not an intestate heir of his or her parent-in-law.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit, with costs against the petitioner. Let this case be remanded
to the trial-court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-40789 February 27, 1987

INTESTATE ESTATE OF PETRA V. ROSALES, IRENEA C. ROSALES, petitioner,
vs.
FORTUNATO ROSALES, MAGNA ROSALES ACEBES, MACIKEQUEROX ROSALES and ANTONIO ROSALES, respondents.
Jose B. Echaves for petitioner.
Jose A. Binghay and Paul G. Gorres for respondents.

GANCAYCO, J.:
In this Petition for Review of two (2) Orders of the Court of First Instance of Cebu the question raised is whether the widow whose husband
predeceased his mother can inherit from the latter, her mother-in-law.
It appears from the record of the case that on February 26, 1971, Mrs. Petra V. Rosales, a resident of Cebu City, died intestate. She was survived by
her husband Fortunate T. Rosales and their two (2) children Magna Rosales Acebes and Antonio Rosales. Another child, Carterio Rosales,
predeceased her, leaving behind a child, Macikequerox Rosales, and his widow Irenea C. Rosales, the herein petitioner. The estate of the dismissed
has an estimated gross value of about Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00).
On July 10, 1971, Magna Rosales Acebes instituted the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the deceased in the Court of First Instance of
Cebu. The case was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 3204-R. Thereafter, the trial court appointed Magna Rosales Acebes administratrix of the
said estate.
In the course of the intestate proceedings, the trial court issued an Order dated June 16, 1972 declaring the following in individuals the legal heirs of
the deceased and prescribing their respective share of the estate —
Fortunata T. Rosales (husband), 1/4; Magna R. Acebes (daughter), 1/4; Macikequerox Rosales, 1/4; and Antonio Rosales son, 1/4.
This declaration was reiterated by the trial court in its Order I dated February 4, 1975.
These Orders notwithstanding, Irenea Rosales insisted in getting a share of the estate in her capacity as the surviving spouse of the late Carterio
Rosales, son of the deceased, claiming that she is a compulsory heir of her mother-in-law together with her son, Macikequerox Rosales.
Thus, Irenea Rosales sought the reconsideration of the aforementioned Orders. The trial court denied her plea. Hence this petition.
In sum, the petitioner poses two (2) questions for Our resolution petition. First — is a widow (surviving spouse) an intestate heir of her mother-in-law?
Second — are the Orders of the trial court which excluded the widow from getting a share of the estate in question final as against the said widow?
Our answer to the first question is in the negative.
Intestate or legal heirs are classified into two (2) groups, namely, those who inherit by their own right, and those who inherit by the right of
representation. 1 Restated, an intestate heir can only inherit either by his own right, as in the order of intestate succession provided for in the Civil
Code, 2 or by the right of representation provided for in Article 981 of the same law. The relevant provisions of the Civil Code are:
Art. 980. The children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in their own right, dividing the inheritance in equal shares.
Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants of other children who are dead, survive, the former shall inherit in their own right, and the
latter by right of representation.
Art. 982. The grandchildren and other descendants shag inherit by right of representation, and if any one of them should have died, leaving several
heirs, the portion pertaining to him shall be divided among the latter in equal portions.
Art. 999. When the widow or widower survives with legitimate children or their descendants and illegitimate children or their descendants, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, such widow or widower shall be entitled to the same share as that of a legitimate child.
There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that a widow (surviving spouse) is an intestate heir of her mother-in-law. The entire Code is devoid
of any provision which entitles her to inherit from her mother-in- law either by her own right or by the right of representation. The provisions of the
Code which relate to the order of intestate succession (Articles 978 to 1014) enumerate with meticulous exactitude the intestate heirs of a decedent,
with the State as the final intestate heir. The conspicuous absence of a provision which makes a daughter-in-law an intestate heir of the deceased all
the more confirms Our observation. If the legislature intended to make the surviving spouse an intestate heir of the parent-in-law, it would have so
provided in the Code.
Petitioner argues that she is a compulsory heir in accordance with the provisions of Article 887 of the Civil Code which provides that:
Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs:
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their legitimate children and descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287;
Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are not excluded by those in Nos. 1 and 2; neither do they exclude one another.
In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved.
The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three classes mentioned, shall inherit from them in the manner and to the extent established by this
Code.
The aforesaid provision of law 3 refers to the estate of the deceased spouse in which case the surviving spouse (widow or widower) is a compulsory
heir. It does not apply to the estate of a parent-in-law.
Indeed, the surviving spouse is considered a third person as regards the estate of the parent-in-law. We had occasion to make this observation
in Lachenal v. Salas, 4 to Wit:
We hold that the title to the fishing boat should be determined in Civil Case No. 3597 (not in the intestate proceeding) because it affects the lessee
thereof, Lope L. Leoncio, the decedent's son-in-law, who, although married to his daughter or compulsory heir, is nevertheless a third person with
respect to his estate. ... (Emphasis supplied).
By the same token, the provision of Article 999 of the Civil Code aforecited does not support petitioner's claim. A careful examination of the said Article
confirms that the estate contemplated therein is the estate of the deceased spouse. The estate which is the subject matter of the intestate estate
proceedings in this case is that of the deceased Petra V. Rosales, the mother-in-law of the petitioner. It is from the estate of Petra V. Rosales that
Macikequerox Rosales draws a share of the inheritance by the right of representation as provided by Article 981 of the Code.
The essence and nature of the right of representation is explained by Articles 970 and 971 of the Civil Code, viz —
Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the representative is raised to the place and the degree of the person
represented, and acquires the rights which the latter would have if he were living or if he could have inherited.
Art. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and not by the person represented. The representative does not succeed the
person represented but the one whom the person represented would have succeeded. (Emphasis supplied.)
Article 971 explicitly declares that Macikequerox Rosales is called to succession by law because of his blood relationship. He does not succeed his
father, Carterio Rosales (the person represented) who predeceased his grandmother, Petra Rosales, but the latter whom his father would have
succeeded. Petitioner cannot assert the same right of representation as she has no filiation by blood with her mother-in-law.
Petitioner however contends that at the time of the death of her husband Carterio Rosales he had an inchoate or contingent right to the properties of
Petra Rosales as compulsory heir. Be that as it may, said right of her husband was extinguished by his death that is why it is their son Macikequerox
Rosales who succeeded from Petra Rosales by right of representation. He did not succeed from his deceased father, Carterio Rosales.
On the basis of the foregoing observations and conclusions, We find it unnecessary to pass upon the second question posed by the petitioner.
Accordingly, it is Our considered opinion, and We so hold, that a surviving spouse is not an intestate heir of his or her parent-in-law.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit, with costs against the petitioner. Let this case be remanded
to the trial-court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 82233 March 22, 1990

JOSE BARITUA and EDGAR BITANCOR, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, NICOLAS NACARIO and VICTORIA RONDA NACARIO, respondents.
Domingo Lucenario for petitioners.
Ernesto A. Atienza for private respondents.
SARMIENTO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari assails as erroneous and contrary to existing relevant laws and applicable jurisprudence the decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals dated December 11, 1987 which reversed and set aside that of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XXXII, at Pili, Camarines Sur. 2 The
challenged decision adjudged the petitioners liable to the private respondents in the total amount of P20,505.00 and for costs.
The facts are as follows:
In the evening of November 7, 1979, the tricycle then being driven by Bienvenido Nacario along the national highway at Barangay San Cayetano, in
Baao, Camarines Sur, figured in an accident with JB Bus No. 80 driven by petitioner Edgar Bitancor and owned and operated by petitioner Jose
Baritua. 3 As a result of that accident Bienvenido and his passenger died 4 and the tricycle was damaged. 5 No criminal case arising from the incident
was ever instituted. 6
Subsequently, on March 27, 1980, as a consequence of the extra-judicial settlement of the matter negotiated by the petitioners and the bus insurer
— Philippine First Insurance Company, Incorporated (PFICI for brevity) — Bienvenido Nacario's widow, Alicia Baracena Vda. de Nacario, received
P18,500.00. In consideration of the amount she received, Alicia executed on March 27, 1980 a "Release of Claim" in favor of the petitioners and
PFICI, releasing and forever discharging them from all actions, claims, and demands arising from the accident which resulted in her husband's death
and the damage to the tricycle which the deceased was then driving. Alicia likewise executed an affidavit of desistance in which she formally
manifested her lack of interest in instituting any case, either civil or criminal, against the petitioners. 7
On September 2, 1981, or about one year and ten months from the date of the accident on November 7, 1979, the private respondents, who are the
parents of Bienvenido Nacario, filed a complaint for damages against the petitioners with the then Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur. 8 In their
complaint, the private respondents alleged that during the vigil for their deceased son, the petitioners through their representatives promised them
(the private respondents) that as extra-judicial settlement, they shall be indemnified for the death of their son, for the funeral expenses incurred by
reason thereof, and for the damage for the tricycle the purchase price of which they (the private respondents) only loaned to the victim. The petitioners,
however, reneged on their promise and instead negotiated and settled their obligations with the long-estranged wife of their late son. The Nacario
spouses prayed that the defendants, petitioners herein, be ordered to indemnify them in the amount of P25,000.00 for the death of their son
Bienvenido, P10,000.00 for the damaged tricycle, P25,000.00 for compensatory and exemplary damages, P5,000.00 for attorney's fees, and for moral
damages. 9
After trial, the court a quo dismissed the complaint, holding that the payment by the defendants (herein petitioners) to the widow and her child, who
are the preferred heirs and successors-in-interest of the deceased Bienvenido to the exclusion of his parents, the plaintiffs (herein private
respondents), extinguished any claim against the defendants (petitioners). 10
The parents appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the judgment of the trial court. The appellate court ruled that the release executed by
Alicia Baracena Vda. de Nacario did not discharge the liability of the petitioners because the case was instituted by the private respondents in their
own capacity and not as "heirs, representatives, successors, and assigns" of Alicia; and Alicia could not have validly waived the damages being
prayed for (by the private respondents) since she was not the one who suffered these damages arising from the death of their son. Furthermore, the
appellate court said that the petitioners "failed to rebut the testimony of the appellants (private respondents) that they were the ones who bought the
tricycle that was damaged in the incident. Appellants had the burden of proof of such fact, and they did establish such fact in their testimony . .
. 11 Anent the funeral expenses, "(T)he expenses for the funeral were likewise shouldered by the appellants (the private respondents). This was never
contradicted by the appellees (petitioners). . . . Payment (for these) were made by the appellants, therefore, the reimbursement must accrue in their
favor. 12
Consequently, the respondent appellate court ordered the petitioners to pay the private respondents P10,000.00 for the damage of the tricycle,
P5,000.00 for "complete" funeral services, P450.00 for cemetery lot, P55.00 for oracion adulto, and P5,000.00 for attorney's fees. 13 The petitioners
moved for
a reconsideration of the appellate court's decision 14 but their motion was denied. 15 Hence, this petition.
The issue here is whether or not the respondent appellate court erred in holding that the petitioners are still liable to pay the private respondents the
aggregate amount of P20,505.00 despite the agreement of extrajudicial settlement between the petitioners and the victim's compulsory heirs.
The petition is meritorious.
Obligations are extinguished by various modes among them being by payment. Article 1231 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:
Art. 1231. Obligations are extinguished:
(1) By payment or performance;
(2) By the loss of the thing due;
(3) By the condonation or remission of the debt;
(4) By the confusion or merger of the rights of creditor and debtor;
(5) By compensation;
(6) By novation.
(Emphasis ours.)
There is no denying that the petitioners had paid their obligation petition arising from the accident that occurred on November 7, 1979. The only
question now is whether or not Alicia, the spouse and the one who received the petitioners' payment, is entitled to it.
Article 1240 of the Civil Code of the Philippines enumerates the persons to whom payment to extinguish an obligation should be made.
Art 1240. Payment shall be made to the person in whose favor the obligation has been constituted, or his successor in interest, or any person
authorized to receive it.
Certainly there can be no question that Alicia and her son with the deceased are the successors in interest referred to in law as the persons authorized
to receive payment. The Civil Code states:
Article 887. The following are compulsory heirs:
1. Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants;
2. In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants with respect to their legitimate children and decendants;
3. The widow or widower;
4. Acknowledged natural children and natural children by legal fiction;
5. Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287.
Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are not excluded by those in Nos. 1 and 2. Neither do they exclude one another. (Emphasis ours.)
Article 985. In default of legitimate children and descendants of the deceased, his parents and ascendants shall inherit from him, to the exclusion of
collateral relatives.
(Emphasis ours.)
It is patently clear that the parents of the deceased succeed only when the latter dies without a legitimate descendant. On the other hand, the surviving
spouse concurs with all classes of heirs. As it has been established that Bienvenido was married to Alicia and that they begot a child, the private
respondents are not successors-in-interest of Bienvenido; they are not compulsory heirs. The petitioners therefore acted correctly in settling their
obligation with Alicia as the widow of Bienvenido and as the natural guardian of their lone child. This is so even if Alicia had been estranged from
Bienvenido. Mere estrangement is not a legal ground for the disqualification of a surviving spouse as an heir of the deceased spouse.
Neither could the private respondents, as alleged creditors of Bienvenido, seek relief and compensation from the petitioners. While it may be true that
the private respondents loaned to Bienvenido the purchase price of the damaged tricycle and shouldered the expenses for his funeral, the said
purchase price and expenses are but money claims against the estate of their deceased son. 16 These money claims are not the liabilities of the
petitioners who, as we have said, had been released by the agreement of the extra-judicial settlement they concluded with Alicia Baracena Vda. de
Nacario, the victim's widow and heir, as well as the natural guardian of their child, her co-heir. As a matter of fact, she executed a "Release Of Claim"
in favor of the petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED; the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial
Court is hereby REINSTATED. Costs against the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 83484 February 12, 1990

CELEDONIA SOLIVIO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CONCORDIA JAVELLANA VILLANUEVA, respondents.
Rex Suiza Castillon for petitioner.
Salas & Villareal for private respondent.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision dated January 26, 1988 of the Court of Appeals in CA GR CV No. 09010 (Concordia Villanueva v. Celedonia
Solivio) affirming the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 13207 for partition, reconveyance of ownership and possession and damages, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiff and against defendant:
a) Ordering that the estate of the late Esteban Javellana, Jr. be divided into two (2) shares: one-half for the plaintiff and one-half for defendant. From
both shares shall be equally deducted the expenses for the burial, mausoleum and related expenditures. Against the share of defendants shall be
charged the expenses for scholarship, awards, donations and the 'Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Memorial Foundation;'
b) Directing the defendant to submit an inventory of the entire estate property, including but not limited to, specific items already mentioned in this
decision and to render an accounting of the property of the estate, within thirty (30) days from receipt of this judgment; one-half (1/2) of this produce
shall belong to plaintiff;
c) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff P5,000.00 as expenses of litigation; P10,000.00 for and as attorney's fees plus costs.
SO ORDERED. (pp. 42-43, Rollo)
This case involves the estate of the late novelist, Esteban Javellana, Jr., author of the first post-war Filipino novel "Without Seeing the Dawn," who
died a bachelor, without descendants, ascendants, brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces. His only surviving relatives are: (1) his maternal aunt,
petitioner Celedonia Solivio, the spinster half-sister of his mother, Salustia Solivio; and (2) the private respondent, Concordia Javellana-Villanueva,
sister of his deceased father, Esteban Javellana, Sr.
He was a posthumous child. His father died barely ten (10) months after his marriage in December, 1916 to Salustia Solivio and four months before
Esteban, Jr. was born.
Salustia and her sister, Celedonia (daughter of Engracio Solivio and his second wife Josefa Fernandez), a teacher in the Iloilo Provincial High School,
brought up Esteban, Jr.
Salustia brought to her marriage paraphernal properties (various parcels of land in Calinog, Iloilo covered by 24 titles) which she had inherited from
her mother, Gregoria Celo, Engracio Solivio's first wife (p. 325, Record), but no conjugal property was acquired during her short-lived marriage to
Esteban, Sr.
On October 11, 1959, Salustia died, leaving all her properties to her only child, Esteban, Jr., including a house and lot in La Paz, Iloilo City, where
she, her son, and her sister lived. In due time, the titles of all these properties were transferred in the name of Esteban, Jr.
During his lifetime, Esteban, Jr. had, more than once, expressed to his aunt Celedonia and some close friends his plan to place his estate in a
foundation to honor his mother and to help poor but deserving students obtain a college education. Unfortunately, he died of a heart attack on February
26,1977 without having set up the foundation.
Two weeks after his funeral, Concordia and Celedonia talked about what to do with Esteban's properties. Celedonia told Concordia about Esteban's
desire to place his estate in a foundation to be named after his mother, from whom his properties came, for the purpose of helping indigent students
in their schooling. Concordia agreed to carry out the plan of the deceased. This fact was admitted by her in her "Motion to Reopen and/or Reconsider
the Order dated April 3, 1978" which she filed on July 27, 1978 in Special Proceeding No. 2540, where she stated:
4. That petitioner knew all along the narrated facts in the immediately preceding paragraph [that herein movant is also the relative of the deceased
within the third degree, she being the younger sister of the late Esteban Javellana, father of the decedent herein], because prior to the filing of the
petition they (petitioner Celedonia Solivio and movant Concordia Javellana) have agreed to make the estate of the decedent a foundation, besides
they have closely known each other due to their filiation to the decedent and they have been visiting each other's house which are not far away for
(sic) each other. (p. 234, Record; Emphasis supplied.)
Pursuant to their agreement that Celedonia would take care of the proceedings leading to the formation of the foundation, Celedonia in good faith and
upon the advice of her counsel, filed on March 8, 1977 Spl. Proceeding No. 2540 for her appointment as special administratrix of the estate of Esteban
Javellana, Jr. (Exh. 2). Later, she filed an amended petition (Exh. 5) praying that letters of administration be issued to her; that she be declared sole
heir of the deceased; and that after payment of all claims and rendition of inventory and accounting, the estate be adjudicated to her (p. 115, Rollo).
After due publication and hearing of her petition, as well as her amended petition, she was declared sole heir of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr.
She explained that this was done for three reasons: (1) because the properties of the estate had come from her sister, Salustia Solivio; (2) that she
is the decedent's nearest relative on his mother's side; and (3) with her as sole heir, the disposition of the properties of the estate to fund the foundation
would be facilitated.
On April 3, 1978, the court (Branch II, CFI, now Branch 23, RTC) declared her the sole heir of Esteban, Jr. Thereafter, she sold properties of the
estate to pay the taxes and other obligations of the deceased and proceeded to set up the "SALUSTIA SOLIVIO VDA. DE JAVELLANA
FOUNDATION" which she caused to be registered in the Securities and Exchange Commission on July 17,1981 under Reg. No. 0100027 (p. 98,
Rollo).
Four months later, or on August 7, 1978, Concordia Javellana Villanueva filed a motion for reconsideration of the court's order declaring Celedonia
as "sole heir" of Esteban, Jr., because she too was an heir of the deceased. On October 27, 1978, her motion was denied by the court for tardiness
(pp. 80-81, Record). Instead of appealing the denial, Concordia filed on January 7, 1980 (or one year and two months later), Civil Case No. 13207 in
the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 26, entitled "Concordia Javellana- Villanueva v. Celedonia Solivio" for partition, recovery of possession,
ownership and damages.
On September 3, 1984, the said trial court rendered judgment in Civil Case No. 13207, in favor of Concordia Javellana-Villanueva.
On Concordia's motion, the trial court ordered the execution of its judgment pending appeal and required Celedonia to submit an inventory and
accounting of the estate. In her motions for reconsideration of those orders, Celedonia averred that the properties of the deceased had already been
transferred to, and were in the possession of, the 'Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation." The trial court denied her motions for
reconsideration.
In the meantime, Celedonia perfected an appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA GR CV No. 09010). On January 26, 1988, the Court of Appeals, Eleventh
Division, rendered judgment affirming the decision of the trial court in toto.Hence, this petition for review wherein she raised the following legal issues:
1. whether Branch 26 of the RTC of Iloilo had jurisdiction to entertain Civil Case No. 13207 for partition and recovery of Concordia Villanueva's share
of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. even while the probate proceedings (Spl. Proc. No. 2540) were still pending in Branch 23 of the same court;
2. whether Concordia Villanueva was prevented from intervening in Spl. Proc. No. 2540 through extrinsic fraud;
3. whether the decedent's properties were subject to reserva troncal in favor of Celedonia, his relative within the third degree on his mother's side
from whom he had inherited them; and
4. whether Concordia may recover her share of the estate after she had agreed to place the same in the Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation,
and notwithstanding the fact that conformably with said agreement, the Foundation has been formed and properties of the estate have already been
transferred to it.
I. The question of jurisdiction—
After a careful review of the records, we find merit in the petitioner's contention that the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, lacked jurisdiction to entertain
Concordia Villanueva's action for partition and recovery of her share of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. while the probate proceedings (Spl, Proc.
No. 2540) for the settlement of said estate are still pending in Branch 23 of the same court, there being as yet no orders for the submission and
approval of the administratix's inventory and accounting, distributing the residue of the estate to the heir, and terminating the proceedings (p. 31,
Record).
It is the order of distribution directing the delivery of the residue of the estate to the persons entitled thereto that brings to a close the intestate
proceedings, puts an end to the administration and thus far relieves the administrator from his duties (Santiesteban v. Santiesteban, 68 Phil. 367,
Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank v. Escolin, et al., L-27860, March 29, 1974, 56 SCRA 266).
The assailed order of Judge Adil in Spl. Proc. No. 2540 declaring Celedonia as the sole heir of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. did not toll the end
of the proceedings. As a matter of fact, the last paragraph of the order directed the administratrix to "hurry up the settlement of the estate." The
pertinent portions of the order are quoted below:
2. As regards the second incident [Motion for Declaration of Miss Celedonia Solivio as Sole Heir, dated March 7, 1978], it appears from the record
that despite the notices posted and the publication of these proceedings as required by law, no other heirs came out to interpose any opposition to
the instant proceeding. It further appears that herein Administratrix is the only claimant-heir to the estate of the late Esteban Javellana who died on
February 26, 1977.
During the hearing of the motion for declaration as heir on March 17, 1978, it was established that the late Esteban Javellana died single, without any
known issue, and without any surviving parents. His nearest relative is the herein Administratrix, an elder [sic] sister of his late mother who reared him
and with whom he had always been living with [sic] during his lifetime.
xxxxxxxxx
2. Miss Celedonia Solivio, Administratrix of this estate, is hereby declared as the sole and legal heir of the late Esteban S. Javellana, who died intestate
on February 26, 1977 at La Paz, Iloilo City.
The Administratrix is hereby instructed to hurry up with the settlement of this estate so that it can be terminated. (pp, 14-16, Record)
In view of the pendency of the probate proceedings in Branch 11 of the Court of First Instance (now RTC, Branch 23), Concordia's motion to set aside
the order declaring Celedonia as sole heir of Esteban, and to have herself (Concordia) declared as co-heir and recover her share of the properties of
the deceased, was properly filed by her in Spl. Proc. No. 2540. Her remedy when the court denied her motion, was to elevate the denial to the Court
of Appeals for review on certiorari. However, instead of availing of that remedy, she filed more than one year later, a separate action for the same
purpose in Branch 26 of the court. We hold that the separate action was improperly filed for it is the probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to
make a just and legal distribution of the estate.
In the interest of orderly procedure and to avoid confusing and conflicting dispositions of a decedent's estate, a court should not interfere with probate
proceedings pending in a co-equal court. Thus, did we rule in Guilas v. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, L-26695, January 31,
1972, 43 SCRA 111, 117, where a daughter filed a separate action to annul a project of partition executed between her and her father in the
proceedings for the settlement of the estate of her mother:
The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only after the payment of all the debts and the remaining estate delivered to the
heirs entitled to receive the same. The finality of the approval of the project of The probate court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction to make distribution,
has power to determine the proportion or parts to which each distributed is entitled. ... The power to determine the legality or illegality of the
testamentary provision is inherent in the jurisdiction of the court making a just and legal distribution of the inheritance. ... To hold that a separate and
independent action is necessary to that effect, would be contrary to the general tendency of the jurisprudence of avoiding multiplicity of suits; and is
further, expensive, dilatory, and impractical. (Marcelino v. Antonio, 70 Phil. 388)
A judicial declaration that a certain person is the only heir of the decedent is exclusively within the range of the administratrix proceedings and can
not properly be made an independent action. (Litam v. Espiritu, 100 Phil. 364)
A separate action for the declaration of heirs is not proper. (Pimentel v. Palanca, 5 Phil. 436)
partition by itself alone does not terminate the probate proceeding (Timbol v. Cano, 1 SCRA 1271, 1276, L-15445, April 29, 1961; Siguiong v. Tecson,
89 Phil. pp. 28, 30). As long as the order of the distribution of the estate has not been complied with, the probate proceedings cannot be deemed
closed and terminated Siguiong v. Tecson, supra); because a judicial partition is not final and conclusive and does not prevent the heirs from bringing
an action to obtain his share, provided the prescriptive period therefore has not elapsed (Mari v. Bonilia, 83 Phil. 137). The better practice, however,
for the heir who has not received his share, is to demand his share through a proper motion in the same probate or administration proceedings, or for
reopening of the probate or administrative proceedings if it had already been closed, and not through an independent action, which would be tried by
another court or Judge which may thus reverse a decision or order of the probate or intestate court already final and executed and re-shuffle properties
long ago distributed and disposed of. (Ramos v. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 730, 741-742; Timbol v. Cano, supra; Jingco v. Daluz, L-5107, April 24, 1953, 92
Phil. 1082; Roman Catholic v. Agustines, L-14710, March 29, 1960, 107 Phil. 455, 460-461; Emphasis supplied)
In Litam et al., v. Rivera, 100 Phil. 364, where despite the pendency of the special proceedings for the settlement of the intestate estate of the
deceased Rafael Litam the plaintiffs-appellants filed a civil action in which they claimed that they were the children by a previous marriage of the
deceased to a Chinese woman, hence, entitled to inherit his one-half share of the conjugal properties acquired during his marriage to Marcosa Rivera,
the trial court in the civil case declared that the plaintiffs-appellants were not children of the deceased, that the properties in question were paraphernal
properties of his wife, Marcosa Rivera, and that the latter was his only heir. On appeal to this Court, we ruled that "such declarations (that Marcosa
Rivera was the only heir of the decedent) is improper, in Civil Case No. 2071, it being within the exclusive competence of the court in Special
Proceedings No. 1537, in which it is not as yet, in issue, and, will not be, ordinarily, in issue until the presentation of the project of partition. (p. 378).
However, in the Guilas case, supra, since the estate proceedings had been closed and terminated for over three years, the action for annulment of
the project of partition was allowed to continue. Considering that in the instant case, the estate proceedings are still pending, but nonetheless,
Concordia had lost her right to have herself declared as co-heir in said proceedings, We have opted likewise to proceed to discuss the merits of her
claim in the interest of justice.
The orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, in Civil Case No. 13207 setting aside the probate proceedings in Branch 23 (formerly Branch 11)
on the ground of extrinsic fraud, and declaring Concordia Villanueva to be a co-heir of Celedonia to the estate of Esteban, Jr., ordering the partition
of the estate, and requiring the administratrix, Celedonia, to submit an inventory and accounting of the estate, were improper and officious, to say the
least, for these matters he within the exclusive competence of the probate court.
II. The question of extrinsic fraud—
Was Concordia prevented from intervening in the intestate proceedings by extrinsic fraud employed by Celedonia? It is noteworthy that extrinsic fraud
was not alleged in Concordia's original complaint in Civil Case No. 13207. It was only in her amended complaint of March 6, 1980, that extrinsic fraud
was alleged for the first time.
Extrinsic fraud, as a ground for annulment of judgment, is any act or conduct of the prevailing party which prevented a fair submission of the
controversy (Francisco v. David, 38 O.G. 714). A fraud 'which prevents a party from having a trial or presenting all of his case to the court, or one
which operates upon matters pertaining, not to the judgment itself, but to the manner by which such judgment was procured so much so that there
was no fair submission of the controversy. For instance, if through fraudulent machination by one [his adversary], a litigant was induced to withdraw
his defense or was prevented from presenting an available defense or cause of action in the case wherein the judgment was obtained, such that the
aggrieved party was deprived of his day in court through no fault of his own, the equitable relief against such judgment may be availed of. (Yatco v.
Sumagui, 44623-R, July 31, 1971). (cited in Philippine Law Dictionary, 1972 Ed. by Moreno; Varela v. Villanueva, et al., 96 Phil. 248)
A judgment may be annulled on the ground of extrinsic or collateral fraud, as distinguished from intrinsic fraud, which connotes any fraudulent scheme
executed by a prevailing litigant 'outside the trial of a case against the defeated party, or his agents, attorneys or witnesses, whereby said defeated
party is prevented from presenting fully and fairly his side of the case. ... The overriding consideration is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing
litigant prevented a party from having his day in court or from presenting his case. The fraud, therefore, is one that affects and goes into the jurisdiction
of the court. (Libudan v. Gil, L-21163, May 17, 1972, 45 SCRA 17, 27-29; Sterling Investment Corp. v. Ruiz, L-30694, October 31, 1969, 30 SCRA
318, 323)
The charge of extrinsic fraud is, however, unwarranted for the following reasons:
1. Concordia was not unaware of the special proceeding intended to be filed by Celedonia. She admitted in her complaint that she and Celedonia had
agreed that the latter would "initiate the necessary proceeding" and pay the taxes and obligations of the estate. Thus paragraph 6 of her complaint
alleged:
6. ... for the purpose of facilitating the settlement of the estate of the late Esteban Javellana, Jr. at the lowest possible cost and the least effort, the
plaintiff and the defendant agreed that the defendant shall initiate the necessary proceeding, cause the payment of taxes and other obligations, and
to do everything else required by law, and thereafter, secure the partition of the estate between her and the plaintiff, [although Celedonia denied that
they agreed to partition the estate, for their agreement was to place the estate in a foundation.] (p. 2, Record; emphasis supplied)
Evidently, Concordia was not prevented from intervening in the proceedings. She stayed away by choice. Besides, she knew that the estate came
exclusively from Esteban's mother, Salustia Solivio, and she had agreed with Celedonia to place it in a foundation as the deceased had planned to
do.
2. The probate proceedings are proceedings in rem. Notice of the time and place of hearing of the petition is required to be published (Sec. 3, Rule
76 in relation to Sec. 3, Rule 79, Rules of Court). Notice of the hearing of Celedonia's original petition was published in the "Visayan Tribune" on April
25, May 2 and 9, 1977 (Exh 4, p. 197, Record). Similarly, notice of the hearing of her amended petition of May 26, 1977 for the settlement of the
estate was, by order of the court, published in "Bagong Kasanag" (New Light) issues of May 27, June 3 and 10, 1977 (pp. 182-305, Record). The
publication of the notice of the proceedings was constructive notice to the whole world. Concordia was not deprived of her right to intervene in the
proceedings for she had actual, as well as constructive notice of the same. As pointed out by the probate court in its order of October 27, 1978:
... . The move of Concordia Javellana, however, was filed about five months after Celedonia Solivio was declared as the sole heir. ... .
Considering that this proceeding is one in rem and had been duly published as required by law, despite which the present movant only came to court
now, then she is guilty of laches for sleeping on her alleged right. (p. 22, Record)
The court noted that Concordia's motion did not comply with the requisites of a petition for relief from judgment nor a motion for new trial.
The rule is stated in 49 Corpus Juris Secundum 8030 as follows:
Where petition was sufficient to invoke statutory jurisdiction of probate court and proceeding was in rem no subsequent errors or irregularities are
available on collateral attack. (Bedwell v. Dean 132 So. 20)
Celedonia's allegation in her petition that she was the sole heir of Esteban within the third degree on his mother's side was not false. Moreover, it was
made in good faith and in the honest belief that because the properties of Esteban had come from his mother, not his father, she, as Esteban's nearest
surviving relative on his mother's side, is the rightful heir to them. It would have been self-defeating and inconsistent with her claim of sole heirship if
she stated in her petition that Concordia was her co-heir. Her omission to so state did not constitute extrinsic fraud.
Failure to disclose to the adversary, or to the court, matters which would defeat one's own claim or defense is not such extrinsic fraud as will justify or
require vacation of the judgment. (49 C.J.S. 489, citing Young v. Young, 2 SE 2d 622; First National Bank & Trust Co. of King City v. Bowman, 15 SW
2d 842; Price v. Smith, 109 SW 2d 1144, 1149)
It should be remembered that a petition for administration of a decedent's estate may be filed by any "interested person" (Sec. 2, Rule 79, Rules of
Court). The filing of Celedonia's petition did not preclude Concordia from filing her own.
III. On the question of reserva troncal—
We find no merit in the petitioner's argument that the estate of the deceased was subject to reserva troncal and that it pertains to her as his only
relative within the third degree on his mother's side. The reserva troncal provision of the Civil Code is found in Article 891 which reads as follows:
ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant,
or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the
third degree and who belong to the line from which said property came.
The persons involved in reserva troncal are:
1. The person obliged to reserve is the reservor (reservista)—the ascendant who inherits by operation of law property from his descendants.
2. The persons for whom the property is reserved are the reservees (reservatarios)—relatives within the third degree counted from the
descendant (propositus), and belonging to the line from which the property came.
3. The propositus—the descendant who received by gratuitous title and died without issue, making his other ascendant inherit by operation of law. (p.
692, Civil Law by Padilla, Vol. II, 1956 Ed.)
Clearly, the property of the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., is not reservable property, for Esteban, Jr. was not an ascendant, but the descendant
of his mother, Salustia Solivio, from whom he inherited the properties in question. Therefore, he did not hold his inheritance subject to a reservation
in favor of his aunt, Celedonia Solivio, who is his relative within the third degree on his mother's side. The reserva troncal applies to properties inherited
by an ascendant from a descendant who inherited it from another ascendant or 9 brother or sister. It does not apply to property inherited by a
descendant from his ascendant, the reverse of the situation covered by Article 891.
Since the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., died without descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, surviving spouse, brothers, sisters, nephews
or nieces, what should apply in the distribution of his estate are Articles 1003 and 1009 of the Civil Code which provide:
ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire
estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles.
ART. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of brothers or sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them by reason of relationship by the whole blood.
Therefore, the Court of Appeals correctly held that:
Both plaintiff-appellee and defendant-appellant being relatives of the decedent within the third degree in the collateral line, each, therefore, shall
succeed to the subject estate 'without distinction of line or preference among them by reason of relationship by the whole blood,' and is entitled one-
half (1/2) share and share alike of the estate. (p. 57, Rollo)
IV. The question of Concordia's one-half share—
However, inasmuch as Concordia had agreed to deliver the estate of the deceased to the foundation in honor of his mother, Salustia Solivio Vda. de
Javellana (from whom the estate came), an agreement which she ratified and confirmed in her "Motion to Reopen and/or Reconsider Order dated
April 3, 1978" which she filed in Spl. Proceeding No. 2540:
4. That ... prior to the filing of the petition they (petitioner Celedonia Solivio and movant Concordia Javellana) have agreed to make the estate of the
decedent a foundation, besides they have closely known each other due to their filiation to the decedent and they have been visiting each other's
house which are not far away for (sic) each other. (p. 234, Record; Emphasis supplied)
she is bound by that agreement. It is true that by that agreement, she did not waive her inheritance in favor of Celedonia, but she did agree to place
all of Esteban's estate in the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation" which Esteban, Jr., during his lifetime, planned to set up to honor his
mother and to finance the education of indigent but deserving students as well.
Her admission may not be taken lightly as the lower court did. Being a judicial admission, it is conclusive and no evidence need be presented to prove
the agreement (Cunanan v. Amparo, 80 Phil. 227; Granada v. Philippine National Bank, L-20745, Sept. 2, 1966, 18 SCRA 1; Sta. Ana v. Maliwat, L-
23023, Aug. 31, 1968, 24 SCRA 1018; People v. Encipido, G.R.70091, Dec. 29, 1986, 146 SCRA 478; and Rodillas v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. 58652,
May 20, 1988, 161 SCRA 347).
The admission was never withdrawn or impugned by Concordia who, significantly, did not even testify in the case, although she could have done so
by deposition if she were supposedly indisposed to attend the trial. Only her husband, Narciso, and son-in-law, Juanito Domin, actively participated
in the trial. Her husband confirmed the agreement between his wife and Celedonia, but he endeavored to dilute it by alleging that his wife did not
intend to give all, but only one-half, of her share to the foundation (p. 323, Record).
The records show that the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation" was established and duly registered in the Securities and Exchange
Commission under Reg. No. 0100027 for the following principal purposes:
1. To provide for the establishment and/or setting up of scholarships for such deserving students as the Board of Trustees of the Foundation may
decide of at least one scholar each to study at West Visayas State College, and the University of the Philippines in the Visayas both located in Iloilo
City.
2. To provide a scholarship for at least one scholar for St. Clements Redemptorist Community for a deserving student who has the religious vocation
to become a priest.
3. To foster, develop, and encourage activities that will promote the advancement and enrichment of the various fields of educational endeavors,
especially in literary arts. Scholarships provided for by this foundation may be named after its benevolent benefactors as a token of gratitude for their
contributions.
4. To direct or undertake surveys and studies in the community to determine community needs and be able to alleviate partially or totally said needs.
5. To maintain and provide the necessary activities for the proper care of the Solivio-Javellana mausoleum at Christ the King Memorial Park, Jaro,
Iloilo City, and the Javellana Memorial at the West Visayas State College, as a token of appreciation for the contribution of the estate of the late
Esteban S. Javellana which has made this foundation possible. Also, in perpetuation of his Roman Catholic beliefs and those of his mother, Gregorian
masses or their equivalents will be offered every February and October, and Requiem masses every February 25th and October llth, their death
anniversaries, as part of this provision.
6. To receive gifts, legacies, donations, contributions, endowments and financial aids or loans from whatever source, to invest and reinvest the funds,
collect the income thereof and pay or apply only the income or such part thereof as shall be determined by the Trustees for such endeavors as may
be necessary to carry out the objectives of the Foundation.
7. To acquire, purchase, own, hold, operate, develop, lease, mortgage, pledge, exchange, sell, transfer, or otherwise, invest, trade, or deal, in any
manner permitted by law, in real and personal property of every kind and description or any interest herein.
8. To do and perform all acts and things necessary, suitable or proper for the accomplishments of any of the purposes herein enumerated or which
shall at any time appear conducive to the protection or benefit of the corporation, including the exercise of the powers, authorities and attributes
concerned upon the corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines in general, and upon domestic corporation of like nature in particular.
(pp. 9-10, Rollo)
As alleged without contradiction in the petition' for review:
The Foundation began to function in June, 1982, and three (3) of its eight Esteban Javellana scholars graduated in 1986, one (1) from UPV graduated
Cum Laude and two (2) from WVSU graduated with honors; one was a Cum Laude and the other was a recipient of Lagos Lopez award for teaching
for being the most outstanding student teacher.
The Foundation has four (4) high school scholars in Guiso Barangay High School, the site of which was donated by the Foundation. The School has
been selected as the Pilot Barangay High School for Region VI.
The Foundation has a special scholar, Fr. Elbert Vasquez, who would be ordained this year. He studied at St. Francis Xavier Major Regional Seminary
at Davao City. The Foundation likewise is a member of the Redemptorist Association that gives yearly donations to help poor students who want to
become Redemptorist priests or brothers. It gives yearly awards for Creative writing known as the Esteban Javellana Award.
Further, the Foundation had constructed the Esteban S. Javellana Multi-purpose Center at the West Visayas State University for teachers' and
students' use, and has likewise contributed to religious civic and cultural fund-raising drives, amongst other's. (p. 10, Rollo)
Having agreed to contribute her share of the decedent's estate to the Foundation, Concordia is obligated to honor her commitment as Celedonia has
honored hers.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted. The decision of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are hereby SET ASIDE. Concordia J.
Villanueva is declared an heir of the late Esteban Javellana, Jr. entitled to one-half of his estate. However, comformably with the agreement between
her and her co-heir, Celedonia Solivio, the entire estate of the deceased should be conveyed to the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javallana Foundation,"
of which both the petitioner and the private respondent shall be trustees, and each shall be entitled to nominate an equal number of trustees to
constitute the Board of Trustees of the Foundation which shall administer the same for the purposes set forth in its charter. The petitioner, as
administratrix of the estate, shall submit to the probate court an inventory and accounting of the estate of the deceased preparatory to terminating the
proceedings therein.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-14856 November 15, 1919

ENCARNACION FLORENTINO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
MERCEDES FLORENTINO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
Ramon Querubin, Simeon Ramos and Orense and Vera for appellants.
Vicente Foz, Jose Singsong Tongson and Angel Encarnacion for appellees.

TORRES, J.:
On January 17, 1918, counsel for Encarnacion (together with her husband Simeon Serrano), Gabriel, Magdalena, Ramon, Miguel, Victorino, and
Antonino of the surname Florentino; for Miguel Florentino, guardian ad litem of the minor Rosario Florentino; for Eugenio Singson, the father and
guardian ad litem of Emilia, Jesus, Lourdes, Caridad, and Dolores of the surname Singson y Florentino; and for Eugenio Singson, guardian of the
minors Jose and Asuncion Florentino, filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, against Mercedes Florentino and her husband,
alleging as follows:
That Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II married the first time Antonia Faz de Leon; that during the marriage he begot nine children called, Jose, Juan,
Maria, Encarnacion, Isabel, Espirita, Gabriel, Pedro, and Magdalena of the surname Florentino y de Leon; that on becoming a widower he married
the second time Severina Faz de Leon with whom he had two children, Mercedes and Apolonio III of the surname Florentino y de Leon; that Apolonio
Isabelo Florentino II died on February 13, 1890; that he was survived by his second wife Severina Faz de Leon and the ten children first above
mentioned; that his eleventh son, Apolonio III, was born on the following 4th of March 1890.
That of the deceased Apolonio Isabelo's aforementioned eleven children, Juan, Maria and Isabel died single, without leaving any ascendants or
descendants; that Ramon, Miguel, Victorino, Antonio, and Rosario are the legitimate children of the deceased Jose Florentino who was one of the
children of the deceased Apolonio Isabelo; that Emilia, Jesus, Lourdes, Caridad, and Dolores are the legitimate children of Espirita Florentino, now
deceased, and her husband Eugenio Singson; that Jose and Asuncion are the children of Pedro Florentino, another son of the deceased Apolonio
Isabelo Florentino.
That on January 17 and February 13, 1890, Apolonio Isabelo Florentino executed a will before the notary public of Ilocos Sur, instituting as his
universal heirs his aforementioned ten children, the posthumos Apolonio III and his widow Severina Faz de Leon; that he declared, in one of the
paragraphs of said will, all his property should be divided among all of his children of both marriages.
That, in the partition of the said testator's estate, there was given to Apolonio Florentino III, his posthumos son, the property marked with the letters
A, B, C, D, E, and F in the complaint, a gold rosary, pieces of gold, of silver and of table service, livestock, palay, some personal property and other
objects mentioned in the complaint.
That Apolonio Florentino III, the posthumos son of the second marriage, died in 1891; that his mother, Severina Faz de Leon, succeeded to all his
property described in the complaint; that the widow, Severina Faz de Leon died on November 18, 1908, leaving a will instituting as her universal
heiress her only living daughter, Mercedes Florentino; that, as such heir, said daughter took possession of all the property left at the death of her
mother, Severina Faz de Leon; that among same is included the property, described in the complaint, which the said Severina Faz de Leon inherited
from her deceased son, the posthumos Apolonio, as reservable property; that, as a reservist, the heir of the said Mercedes Florentino deceased had
been gathering for herself alone the fruits of lands described in the complaint; that each and every one of the parties mentioned in said complaint is
entitled to one-seventh of the fruits of the reservable property described therein, either by direct participation or by representation, in the manner
mentioned in paragraph 9 of the complaint.
That several times the plaintiffs have, in an amicable manner, asked the defendants to deliver their corresponding part of the reservable property; that
without any justifiable motive the defendants have refused and do refuse to deliver said property or to pay for its value; that for nine years Mercedes
Florentino has been receiving, as rent for the lands mentioned, 360 bundles of palay at fifty pesos per bundle and 90 bundles of corn at four pesos
per bundle; that thereby the plaintiffs have suffered damages in the sum of fifteen thousand four hundred and twenty-eight pesos and fifty-eight
centavos, in addition to three hundred and eight pesos and fifty-eight centavos for the value of the fruits not gathered, of one thousand pesos (P1,000)
for the unjustifiable retention of the aforementioned reservable property and for the expenses of this suit. Wherefore they pray it be declared that all
the foregoing property is reservable property; that the plaintiffs had and do have a right to the same, in the quantity and proportion mentioned in the
aforementioned paragraph 9 of the complaint; that the defendants Mercedes Florentino and her husband be ordered to deliver to the plaintiffs their
share of the property in question, of the palay and of the corn above mentioned, or their value; and that they be condemned to pay the plaintiffs the
sum of one thousand pesos (P1,000) together with the costs of this instance.
To the preceding complaint counsel for the defendants demurred, alleging that the cause of action is based on the obligation of the widow Severina
Faz de Leon to reserve the property she inherited from her deceased son Apolonio Florentino y de Leon who, in turn, inherited same from his father
Apolonio Isabelo Florentino; that, there being no allegation to the contrary, it is to be presumed that the widow Severina Faz de Leon did not remarry
after the death of this husband nor have any natural child; that the right claimed by the plaintiffs is not that mentioned in article 968 and the following
articles, but that established in article 811 of the Civil Code; that the object of the provisions of the aforementioned articles is to avoid the transfer of
said reservable property to those extraneous to the family of the owner thereof; that if the property inherited by the widow Severina Faz de Leon from
her deceased son Apolonio Florentino y Faz de Leon (property which originated from his father and her husband) has all passed into the hands of
the defendant, Mercedes Florentino y Encarnacion, a daughter of the common ancestor's second marriage (said Apolonio Isabelo Florentino with the
deceased Severina Faz de Leon) it is evident that the property left at the death of the posthumos son Apolonio Florentino y Faz de Leon did not pass
after the death of his mother Severina, his legitimate heirs as an ascendant, into the hands of strangers; that said property having been inherited by
Mercedes Florentino y Encarnacion from her mother (Severina), article 811 of the Civil Code is absolutely inapplicable to the present case because,
when the defendant Mercedes, by operation law, entered into and succeeded to, the possession, of the property lawfully inherited from her mother
Severina Faz de Leon, said property had, while in the possession of her mother, lost the character of reservable property — there being a legitimate
daughter of Severina Faz de Leon with the right to succeed her in all her rights, property and actions; that the restraints of the law whereby said
property may not passed into the possession of strangers are void, inasmuch as the said widow had no obligation to reserve same, as Mercedes
Florentino is a forced heiress of her mother Severina Faz de Leon; that, in the present case, there is no property reserved for the plaintiffs since there
is a forced heiress, entitled to the property left by the death of the widow Severina Faz de Leon who never remarried; that the obligation to reserve is
secondary to the duty of respecting the legitime; that in the instant case, the widow Severina Faz de Leon was in duty bound to respect the legitime
of her daughter Mercedes the defendant; that her obligation to reserve the property could not be fulfilled to the prejudice of the legitime which belongs
to her forced heiress, citing in support of these statements the decision of the supreme court of Spain of January 4, 1911; that, finally, the application
of article 811 of the Civil Code in favor of the plaintiffs would presuppose the exclusion of the defendant from here right to succeed exclusively to all
the property, rights and actions left by her legitimate mother, although the said defendant has a better right than the plaintiffs; and that there would be
injustice if the property claimed be adjudicated to the plaintiffs, as well as violation of section 5 of the Jones Law which invalidates any law depriving
any person of an equal protection. Wherefore they prayed that the demurrer be sustained, with costs against the plaintiffs.
After the hearing of the demurrer, on August 22, 1918, the judge absolved the defendants from the complaint and condemned the plaintiffs to pay the
costs.
Counsel for the plaintiffs excepted to this order, moved to vacate it and to grant them a new trial; said motion was overruled; the plaintiffs expected
thereto and filed the corresponding bill of exceptions which was allowed, certified and forwarded to the clerk of this court.
On appeal the trial judge sustained the demurrer of the defendants to the complaint of the plaintiffs, but, instead of ordering the latter to amend their
complaint within the period prescribed by the rules — undoubtedly believing that the plaintiffs could not alter nor change the facts constituting the
cause of action, and that, as both parties were agreed as to the facts alleged in the complaint as well as in the demurrer, every question reduced itself
to one of the law, already submitted to the decision of the court — the said judge, disregarding the ordinary procedure established by law, decided
the case by absolving the defendants from the complaint and by condemning the plaintiffs to pay the costs of the instance.
There certainly was no real trial, inasmuch as the defendants, instead of answering the complaint of the plaintiffs, confined themselves to filing a
demurrer based on the ground that the facts alleged in the complaint do not constitute a cause of action. However, the judge preferred to absolve the
defendants, thereby making an end to the cause, instead of dismissing the same, because undoubtedly he believed, in view of the controversy
between the parties, that the arguments adduced to support the demurrer would be the same which the defendants would allege in their answer —
those dealing with a mere question of law which the courts would have to decide — and that, the demurrer having been sustained, if the plaintiffs
should insist — they could do no less — upon alleging the same facts as those set out in their complaint and if another demurrer were afterwards set
up, he would be obliged to dismiss said complaint with costs against the plaintiffs — in spite of being undoubtedly convinced in the instant case that
the plaintiffs absolutely lack the right to bring the action stated in their complaint.
Being of the opinion that the emendation of the indicated defects is not necessary — as in this case what has been done does not prejudice the
parties — the appellate court will now proceed to decide the suit according to its merits, as found in the record and to the legal provisions applicable
to the question of law in controversy so that unnecessary delay and greater expense may be avoided, inasmuch as, even if all the ordinary proceedings
be followed, the suit would be subsequently decided in the manner and terms that it is now decided in the opinion thoughtfully and conscientiously
formed for its determination.
In order to decide whether the plaintiffs are or are not entitled to invoke, in their favor, the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code, and whether the
same article is applicable to the question of law presented in this suit, it is necessary to determine whether the property enumerated in paragraph 5
of the complaint is of the nature of reservable property; and if so, whether in accordance with the provision of the Civil Code in article 811, Severina
Faz de Leon (the widow of the deceased Apolonio Isabelo Florentino) who inherited said property from her son Apolonio Florentino III (born after the
death of his father Apolonio Isabelo) had the obligation to preserve and reserve same for the relatives, within the third degree, of her aforementioned
deceased son Apolonio III.
The above mentioned article reads:
Any ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property acquired by the latter gratuitously from some other ascendant, or from a brother or
sister, is obliged to reserve such of the property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives within the third degree
belonging to the line from which such property came.
During the marriage of Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II and Severina Faz de Leon two children were born, namely the defendant Mercedes Florentino
and Apolonio Florentino III (born after the death of his father). At the death of Apolonio Isabelo Florentino under a will, his eleven children succeeded
to the inheritance he left, one of whom, the posthumos son Apolonio III, was given, as his share, the aforementioned property enumerated in the
complaint. In 1891 the said posthumos son Apolonio Florentino III died and was succeeded by his legitimate mother Severina Faz de Leon, who
inherited the property he left and who on dying, November 18, 1908, instituted by will as her sole heiress her surviving daughter, Mercedes Florentino,
the defendant herein, who took possession of all property left by her father, same constituting the inheritance. Included in said inheritance is the
property, specified in by the posthumos son Apolonio Florentino III from his father Apolonio Isabelo Florentino, and which, at the death of the said
posthumos son, had in turn been inherited by his mother, Severina Faz de Leon. Even if Severina left in her will said property, together with her own,
to her only daughter and forced heiress, Mercedes Florentino, nevertheless this property had not lost its reservable nature inasmuch as it originated
from the common ancestor of the litigants, Apolonio Isabelo; was inherited by his son Apolonio III; was transmitted by same (by operation of law) to
his legitimate mother and ascendant, Severina Faz de Leon.
The posthumos son, Apolonio Florentino III, acquired the property, now claimed by his brothers, by a lucrative title or by inheritance from his
aforementioned legitimate father, Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II. Although said property was inherited by his mother, Severina Faz de Leon,
nevertheless, she was in duty bound, according to article 811 of the Civil Code, to reserve the property thus acquired for the benefit of the relatives,
within the third degree, of the line from which such property came.
According to the provisions of law, ascendants do not inherit the reservable property, but its enjoyment, use or trust, merely for the reason that said
law imposes the obligation to reserve and preserve same for certain designated persons who, on the death of the said ascendants reservists, (taking
into consideration the nature of the line from which such property came) acquire the ownership of said property in fact and by operation of law in the
same manner as forced heirs (because they are also such) — said property reverts to said line as long as the aforementioned persons who, from the
death of the ascendant-reservists, acquire in fact the right of reservatarios (person for whom property is reserved), and are relatives, within the third
degree, of the descendant from whom the reservable property came.
Any ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property, while there are living, within the third degree, relatives of the latter, is nothing but a life
usufructuary or a fiduciary of the reservable property received. He is, however, the legitimate owner of his own property which is not reservable
property and which constitutes his legitime, according to article 809 of the Civil Code. But if, afterwards, all of the relatives, within the third degree, of
the descendant (from whom came the reservable property) die or disappear, the said property becomes free property, by operation of law, and is
thereby converted into the legitime of the ascendant heir who can transmit it at his death to his legitimate successors or testamentary heirs. This
property has now lost its nature of reservable property, pertaining thereto at the death of the relatives, called reservatarios, who belonged within the
third degree to the line from which such property came.lawphil.net
Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession, when there are relatives of the descendant within the third degree, the right of the
nearest relative, called reservatario, over the property which the reservista (person holding it subject to reservation) should return to him, excludes
that of the one more remote. The right of representation cannot be alleged when the one claiming same as a reservatario of the reservable property
is not among the relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which such property came, inasmuch as the right granted by the Civil
Code in article 811 is in the highest degree personal and for the exclusive benefit of designated persons who are the relatives, within the third degree,
of the person from whom the reservable property came. Therefore, relatives of the fourth and the succeeding degrees can never be considered
as reservatarios, since the law does not recognize them as such.
In spite of what has been said relative to the right of representation on the part of one alleging his right as reservatario who is not within the third
degree of relationship, nevertheless there is right of representation on the part of reservatarios who are within the third degree mentioned by law, as
in the case of nephews of the deceased person from whom the reservable property came. These reservatarios have the right to represent their
ascendants (fathers and mothers) who are the brothers of the said deceased person and relatives within the third degree in accordance with article
811 of the Civil Code.
In this case it is conceded without denial by defendants, that the plaintiffs Encarnacion, Gabriel and Magdalena are the legitimate children of the first
marriage of the deceased Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II; that Ramon, Miguel, Ceferino, Antonio, and Rosario are both grandchildren of Apolonio
Isabelo Florentino II, and children of his deceased son, Jose Florentino; that the same have the right to represent their aforementioned father, Jose
Florentino; that Emilia, Jesus, Lourdes, Caridad, and Dolores are the legitimate children of the deceased Espirita Florentino, one of the daughters of
the deceased Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II, and represent the right of their aforementioned mother; and that the other plaintiffs, Jose and Asuncion,
have also the right to represent their legitimate father Pedro Florentino one of the sons of the aforementioned Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II. It is a
fact, admitted by both parties, that the other children of the first marriage of the deceased Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II died without issue so that this
decision does not deal with them.
There are then seven "reservatarios" who are entitled to the reservable property left at the death of Apolonio III; the posthumos son of the
aforementioned Apolonio Isabelo II, to wit, his three children of his first marriage — Encarnacion, Gabriel, Magdalena; his three children, Jose, Espirita
and Pedro who are represented by their own twelve children respectively; and Mercedes Florentino, his daughter by a second marriage. All of the
plaintiffs are the relatives of the deceased posthumos son, Apolonio Florentino III, within the third degree (four of whom being his half-brothers and
the remaining twelve being his nephews as they are the children of his three half-brothers). As the first four are his relatives within the third degree in
their own right and the other twelve are such by representation, all of them are indisputably entitled as reservatarios to the property which came from
the common ancestor, Apolonio Isabelo, to Apolonio Florentino III by inheritance during his life-time, and in turn by inheritance to his legitimate mother,
Severina Faz de Leon, widow of the aforementioned Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II.
In spite of the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code already cited, the trial judge refused to accept the theory of the plaintiffs and, accepting that
of the defendants, absolved the latter from the complaint on the ground that said article is absolutely inapplicable to the instant case, inasmuch as the
defendant Mercedes Florentino survived her brother, Apolonio III, from whom the reservable property came and her mother, Severina Faz de Leon,
the widow of her father, Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II; that the defendant Mercedes, being the only daughter of Severina Faz de Leon, is likewise her
forced heiress; that when she inherited the property left at the death of her mother, together with that which came from her deceased brother Apolonio
III, the fundamental object of article 811 of the Code was thereby complied with, inasmuch as the danger that the property coming from the same line
might fall into the hands of strangers had been avoided; and that the hope or expectation on the part of the plaintiffs of the right to acquire the property
of the deceased Apolonio III never did come into existence because there is a forced heiress who is entitled to such property.
The judgment appealed from is also founded on the theory that article 811 of the Civil Code does not destroy the system of legitimate succession and
that the pretension of the plaintiffs to apply said article in the instant case would be permitting the reservable right to reduce and impair the forced
legitimate which exclusively belongs to the defendant Mercedes Florentino, in violation of the precept of article 813 of the same Code which provides
that the testator cannot deprive his heirs of their legitime, except in the cases expressly determined by law. Neither can he impose upon it any burden,
condition, or substitution of any kind whatsoever, saving the provisions concerning the usufruct of the surviving spouse, citing the decision of the
Supreme Court of Spain of January 4, 1911.
The principal question submitted to the court for decision consists mainly in determining whether they property left at the death of Apolonio III, the
posthumos son of Apolonio Isabelo II, was or was not invested with the character of reservable property when it was received by his mother, Severina
Faz de Leon.
The property enumerated by the plaintiffs in paragraph 5 of their complaint came, without any doubt whatsoever, from the common ancestor Apolonio
Isabelo II, and when, on the death of Apolonio III without issue the same passed by operation of law into the hands of his legitimate mother, Severina
Faz de Leon, it became reservable property, in accordance with the provision of article 811 of the Code, with the object that the same should not fall
into the possession of persons other than those comprehended within the order of person other than those comprehended within the order of
succession traced by the law from Apolonio Isabelo II, the source of said property. If this property was in fact clothed with the character and condition
of reservable property when Severina Faz de Leon inherited same from her son Apolonio III, she did not thereby acquire the dominion or right of
ownership but only the right of usufruct or of fiduciary with the necessary obligation to preserve and to deliver or return it as such reservable property
to her deceased son's relatives within the third degree, among whom is her daughter, Mercedes Florentino.
Reservable property neither comes, nor falls under, the absolute dominion of the ascendant who inherits and receives same from his descendant,
therefore it does not form part of his own property nor become the legitimate of his forced heirs. It becomes his own property only in case that all the
relatives of his descendant shall have died (reservista) in which case said reservable property losses such character.
With full right Severina Faz de Leon could have disposed in her will of all her own property in favor of her only living daughter, Mercedes Florentino,
as forced heiress. But whatever provision there is in her will concerning the reservable property received from her son Apolonio III, or rather, whatever
provision will reduce the rights of the other reservatarios, the half brothers and nephews of her daughter Mercedes, is unlawful, null and void, inasmuch
as said property is not her own and she has only the right of usufruct or of fiduciary, with the obligation to preserve and to deliver same to
the reservatarios, one of whom is her own daughter, Mercedes Florentino.
It cannot reasonably be affirmed, founded upon an express provision of law, that by operation of law all of the reservable property, received during
lifetime by Severina Faz de Leon from her son, Apolonio III, constitutes or forms parts of the legitime pertaining to Mercedes Florentino. If said property
did not come to be the legitimate and exclusive property of Severina Faz de Leon, her only legitimate and forced heiress, the defendant Mercedes,
could not inherit all by operation of law and in accordance with the order of legitimate succession, because the other relatives of the deceased Apolonio
III, within the third degree, as well as herself are entitled to such reservable property.
For this reason, in no manner can it be claimed that the legitime of Mercedes Florentino, coming from the inheritance of her mother Severina Faz de
Leon, has been reduced and impaired; and the application of article 811 of the Code to the instant case in no way prejudices the rights of the defendant
Mercedes Florentino, inasmuch as she is entitled to a part only of the reservable property, there being no lawful or just reason which serves as real
foundation to disregard the right to Apolonio III's other relatives, within the third degree, to participate in the reservable property in question. As these
relatives are at present living, claiming for it with an indisputable right, we cannot find any reasonable and lawful motive why their rights should not be
upheld and why they should not be granted equal participation with the defendant in the litigated property.
The claim that because of Severina Faz de Leon's forced heiress, her daughter Mercedes, the property received from the deceased son Apolonio III
lost the character, previously held, of reservable property; and that the mother, the said Severina, therefore, had no further obligation to reserve same
for the relatives within the third degree of the deceased Apolonio III, is evidently erroneous for the reason that, as has been already stated, the
reservable property, left in a will by the aforementioned Severina to her only daughter Mercedes, does not form part of the inheritance left by her
death nor of the legitimate of the heiress Mercedes. Just because she has a forced heiress, with a right to her inheritance, does not relieve Severina
of her obligation to reserve the property which she received from her deceased son, nor did same lose the character of reservable property, held
before the reservatariosreceived same.
It is true that when Mercedes Florentino, the heiress of the reservista Severina, took possession of the property in question, same did not pass into
the hands of strangers. But it is likewise true that the said Mercedes is not the only reservataria. And there is no reason founded upon law and upon
the principle of justice why the other reservatarios, the other brothers and nephews, relatives within the third degree in accordance with the precept
of article 811 of the Civil Code, should be deprived of portions of the property which, as reservable property, pertain to them.
From the foregoing it has been shown that the doctrine announced by the Supreme Court of Spain on January 4, 1911, for the violation of articles
811, 968 and consequently of the Civil Code is not applicable in the instant case.
Following the provisions of article 813, the Supreme Court of Spain held that the legitime of the forced heirs cannot be reduced or impaired and said
article is expressly respected in this decision.
However, in spite of the efforts of the appellee to defend their supposed rights, it has not been shown, upon any legal foundation, that the reservable
property belonged to, and was under the absolute dominion of, the reservista, there being relatives within the third degree of the person from whom
same came; that said property, upon passing into the hands of the forced heiress of the deceased reservista, formed part of the legitime of the former;
and that the said forced heiress, in addition to being a reservataria, had an exclusive right to receive all of said property and to deprive the
other reservatarios, her relatives within the third degree of certain portions thereof.
Concerning the prayer in the complaint relative to the indemnity for damages and the delivery of the fruits collected, it is not proper to grant the first
for there is no evidence of any damage which can give rise to the obligation of refunding same. As to the second, the delivery of the fruits produced
by the land forming the principal part of the reservable property, the defendants are undoubtedly in duty bound to deliver to the plaintiffs six-sevenths
of the fruits or rents of the portions of land claimed in the complaint, in the quantity expressed in paragraph 11 of the same, from January 17, 1918,
the date the complaint was filed; and the remaining seventh part should go to the defendant Mercedes.
For the foregoing reasons it follows that with the reversal of the order of decision appealed from we should declare, as we hereby do, that the
aforementioned property, inherited by the deceased Severina Faz de Leon from her son Apolonio Florentino III, is reservable property; that the
plaintiffs, being relatives of the deceased Apolonio III within the third degree, are entitled to six-sevenths of said reservable property; that the defendant
Mercedes is entitled to the remaining seventh part thereof; that the latter, together with her husband Angel Encarnacion, shall deliver to the plaintiffs,
jointly, six-sevenths of the fruits or rents, claimed from said portion of the land and of the quantity claimed, from January 17, 1918, until fully delivered;
and that the indemnity for one thousand pesos (P1,000) prayed for in the complaint is denied, without special findings as to the costs of both instances.
So ordered.

G.R. No. 6878 September 13, 1913

MARCELINA EDROSO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
PABLO and BASILIO SABLAN, opponents-appellees.
Francisco Dominguez for appellant.
Crispin Oben for appellees.
ARELLANO, C.J.:
The subject matter of this appeal is the registration of certain property classified as required by law to be reserved. Marcelina Edroso applied for
registration and issuance of title to two parcels of land situated in the municipality of Pagsanjan, Province of Laguna, one of 1 hectare 77 ares and 63
centares, and the other 1 hectare 6 ares and 26 centares. Two applications were filed, one for each parcel, but both were heard and decided in a
single judgment.
Marcelina Edroso was married to Victoriano Sablan until his death on September 22, 1882. In this marriage they had a son named Pedro, who was
born on August 1, 1881, and who at his father's death inherited the two said parcels. Pedro also died on July 15, 1902, unmarried and without issue
and by this decease the two parcels of land passed through inheritance to his mother, Marcelina Edroso. Hence the hereditary title whereupon is
based the application for registration of her ownership.
Two legitimate brothers of Victoriano Sablan — that is, two uncles german of Pedro Sablan — appeared in the case to oppose the registration,
claiming one of two things: Either that the registration be denied, "or that if granted to her the right reserved by law to the opponents be recorded in
the registration of each parcel." (B. of E., 11, 12.)
The Court of Land Registration denied the registration and the application appealed through a bill of exceptions.
Registration was denied because the trial court held that the parcels of land in question partake of the nature of property required by law to be reserved
and that in such a case application could only be presented jointly in the names of the mother and the said two uncles of Pedro Sablan.
The appellant impugns as erroneous the first idea advanced (second assignment of error), and denies that the land which are the subject matter of
the application are required by law to be reserved — a contention we regard as indefensible.
Facts: (1) The applicant acquired said lands from her descendant Pedro Sablan by inheritance; (2) Pedro Sablan had acquired them from his
ascendant Victoriano Sablan, likewise by inheritance; (3) Victoriano Sablan had likewise acquired them by inheritance from his ascendants, Mariano
Sablan and Maria Rita Fernandez, they having been adjudicated to him in the partition of hereditary property had between him and his brothers.
These are admitted facts.
A very definite conclusions of law is that the hereditary title is one without a valuable consideration [gratuitous title], and it is so characterized in article
968 of the Civil Code, for he who acquires by inheritance gives nothing in return for what he receives; and a very definite conclusion of law also is that
the uncles german are within the third degree of blood relationship.
The ascendant who inherits from his descendant property which the latter acquired without a valuable consideration from another ascendant, or from
a brother or sister, is under obligation to reserve what he has acquired by operation of law for the relatives who are within the third degree and belong
to the line whence the property proceeded. (Civil Code, art. 811.)
Marcelina Edroso, ascendant of Pedro Sablan, inherited from him these two parcels of land which he had acquired without a valuable consideration
— that is, by inheritance from another ascendant, his father Victoriano. Having acquired them by operation of law, she is obligated to relatives within
the third degree and belong to the line of Mariano Sablan and Maria Rita Fernandez, whence the lands proceeded. The trial court's ruling that they
partake of the nature property required by law to be reserved is therefore in accordance with the law.
But the appellant contends that it is not proven that the two parcels of land in question have been acquired by operation of law, and that only property
acquired without a valuable consideration, which is by operation of law, is required by law to reserved.
The appellees justly argue that this defense was not alleged or discussed in first instance, but only herein. Certainly, the allegation in first instance
was merely that "Pedro Sablan acquired the property in question in 1882, before the enforcement of the Civil Code, which establishes the alleged
right required by law to be reserved, of which the opponents speak; hence, prescription of the right of action; and finally, opponents' renunciation of
their right, admitting that it existed and that they had it" (p. 49).
However that be, it is not superflous to say, although it may be unnecessary, that the applicant inherited the two parcels of land from her son Pedro,
who died "unmarried and without issue." The trial court so held as a conclusion of fact, without any objection on the appellant's part. (B. of E., 17, 20.)
When Pedro Sablan died without issue, his mother became his heir by virtue of her right to her son's legal portion under article 935 of the Civil Code:
In the absence of legitimate children and descendants of the deceased, his ascendants shall from him, to the exclusion of collaterals.
The contrary could only have occurred if the heiress had demonstrated that any of these lands had passed into her possession by free disposal in her
son's will; but the case presents no testamentary provision that demonstrate any transfer of property from the son to the mother, not by operation of
law, but by her son's wish. The legal presumption is that the transfer of the two parcels of land was abintestate or by operation of law, and not by will
or the wish of the predecessor in interest. (Act No. 190, sec. 334, No. 26.) All the provision of article 811 of the Civil Code have therefore been fully
complied with.
If Pedro Sablan had instituted his mother in a will as the universal heiress of his property, all he left at death would not be required by law to be
reserved, but only what he would have perforce left her as the legal portion of a legitimate ascendant.
The legal portion of the parents or ascendants is constituted by one-half of the hereditary estate of the children and descendants. The latter may
unrestrictedly dispose of the other half, with the exception of what is established in article 836. (Civil Code, art. 809.)
In such case only the half constituting the legal portion would be required by law to be reserved, because it is what by operation of law could full to
the mother from her son's inheritance; the other half at free disposal would not have to be reserved. This is all that article 811 of the Civil Code says.
No error has been incurred in holding that the two parcels of land which are the subject matter of the application are required by law to be reserved,
because the interested party has not proved that either of them became her inheritance through the free disposal of her son.
Proof testate succession devolves upon the heir or heiress who alleges it. It must be admitted that a half of Pedro Sablan's inheritance was acquired
by his mother by operation of law. The law provides that the other half is also presumed to be acquired by operation of law — that is, by intestate
succession. Otherwise, proof to offset this presumption must be presented by the interested party, that is, that the other half was acquired by the
man's wish and not by operation of law.
Nor is the third assignments of error admissible — that the trial court failed to sustain the renunciation of the right required by law to be reserved,
which the applicant attributes to the opponents. Such renunciation does not appear in the case. The appellant deduces it from the fact that the
appellees did not contradict the following statement of hers at the trial:
The day after my brother-in-law Pablo Sablan dies and was buried, his brother came to my house and said that those rice lands were mine, because
we had already talked about making delivery of them. (p. 91).
The other brother alluded to is Basilio Sablan, as stated on page 92. From the fact that Basilio Sablan said that the lands belong to the appellant and
must be delivered to her it cannot be deduced that he renounced the right required by law to be reserved in such lands by virtue of the provisions of
article 811 of the Civil Code, for they really belong to her and must be delivered to her.
The fourth assignments of error set up the defense of prescription of the right of action. The appellant alleges prescription of the opponent's right of
action for requiring fulfillment of the obligation they attribute to her recording in the property registry the right required by law to be reserved, in
accordance with the provisions of the Mortgage Law; and as such obligation is created by law, it prescribed in the time fixed in No. 2 of section 43 of
Act No. 190. She adds: "Prescription of the right alleged to the reserved by force of law has not been invoked." (Eight allegation.)
The appellant does not state in her brief what those provisions of the Mortgage Law are. Nor did she do so in first instance, where she says only the
following, which is quoted from the record: "I do not refer to the prescription of the right required by law to be reserved in the property; I refer to the
prescription of the right of action of those who are entitled to the guaranty of that right for seeking that guaranty, for those who are entitled to that right
the Mortgage Law grants a period of time for recording it in the property registry, if I remember correctly, ninety days, for seeking entry in the registry;
but as they have not exercised that right of action, such right of action for seeking here that it be recorded has prescribed. The right of action for
requiring that the property be reserved has not prescribed, but the right of action for guaranteeing in the property registry that this property is required
by law to be reserved" (p. 69 of the record).
The appellees reply: It is true that their right of action has prescribed for requiring the applicant to constitute the mortgage imposed by the Mortgage
Law for guaranteeing the effectiveness of the required by law to be reserved; but because that right of action has prescribed, that property has not
been divested of its character of property required by law to be reserved; that it has such character by virtue of article 8112 of the Civil Code, which
went into effect in the Philippine in December, 1889, and not by virtue of the Mortgage Law, which only went into effect in the country by law of July
14, 1893; that from December, 1889, to July, 1893, property which under article 811 of the Civil Code acquired the character of property reserved by
operation of law was such independently of the Mortgage Law, which did not yet form part of the positive legislation of the country; that although the
Mortgage Law has been in effect in the country since July, 1893, still it has in no way altered the force of article 811 of the Civil Code, but has operated
to reinforce the same merely by granting the right of action to the persons in whose favor the right is reserved by operation of law to require of the
person holding the property a guaranty in the form of a mortgage to answer for the enforcement, in due time, of the right; that to lose the right of action
to the guaranty is not to lose the right itself; that the right reserved is the principal obligation and the mortgage the accessory obligation, and loss of
the accessory does not mean loss of the principal. (Fifth and sixth allegations.)
The existence of the right required by law to be reserved in the two parcels of land in question being indisputable, even though it be admitted that the
right of action which the Mortgage Law grants as a guaranty of final enforcement of such right has prescribed, the only thing to be determined by this
appeal is the question raised in the first assignment of error, that is, how said two parcels of land can and ought to be registered, not in the property
registry newly established by the Mortgage Law, but in the registry newly organized by Act No. 496. But as the have slipped into the allegations quoted
some rather inexact ideas that further obscure such an intricate subject as this of the rights required to be reserved in Spanish-Philippine law, a brief
disgression on the most essential points may not be out of place here.
The Mortgage Law of July 14, 1893, to which the appellees allude, is the amended one of the colonies, not the first enforced in the colonies and
consequently in the Philippines. The preamble of said amended Mortgage Law states:
The Mortgage Law in force in Spain for thirty years went into effect, with the modifications necessary for its adaptation, in the Antilles on May 1, 1880,
and in the Philippines on December 1, 1889, thus commencing in those regions the renovation of the law on real property, and consequently of
agrarian credit.
The Civil Code went into effect in the Philippines in the same year, 1889, but on the eight day.
Two kinds of property required by law to be reserved are distinguished in the Civil Code, as set forth in article 968 thereof, where it says:
Besides the reservation imposed by article 811, the widow or widower contracting a seconds marriage shall be obliged to set apart for the children
and descendants of the first marriage the ownership of all the property he or she may have required from the deceased spouse by will, by intestate
succession, by gift, or other transfer without a valuable consideration."
The Mortgage Law of Spain and the first law that went into effect in the Philippines on December 1, 189, do not contain any provision that can be
applied to the right reserved by article 811 of the Civil Code, for such right is a creation of the Civil Code. In those laws appear merely the provisions
intended to guarantee the effectiveness of the right in favor of the children of the first marriage when their father or mother contracts a second marriage.
Nevertheless, the holding of the supreme court of Spain, for the first time set forth in the decision on appeal of November 8, 1894, has been reiterated:
That while the provisions of articles 977 and 978 of the Civil Code that tend to secure the right required to be reserved in the property refer especially
to the spouses who contract second or later marriages, they do not thereby cease to be applicable to the right establishes in article 811, because,
aside from the legal reason, which is the same in both cases, such must be the construction from the important and conclusive circumstance that said
provisions are set forth in the chapter that deals with inheritances in common, either testate or intestate, and because article 968, which heads the
section that deals in general with property required by law to be reserved, makes reference to the provisions in article 811; and it would consequently
be contradictory to the principle of the law and of the common nature of said provisions not to hold them applicable to that right.
Thus it was again stated in a decision on appeal, December 30, 1897, that: "As the supreme court has already declared, the guaranties that the Code
fixes in article 977 and 978 for the rights required by law to the reserved to which said articles refer, are applicable to the special right dealt with in
article 811, because the same principle exists and because of the general nature of the provisions of the chapter in which they are found."
From this principle of jurisprudence it is inferred that if from December, 1889, to July, 1893, a case had occurred of a right required to be reserved by
article 811, the persons entitled to such right would have been able to institute, against the ascendant who must make the reservation, proceedings
for the assurance and guaranty that article 977 and 978 grant to the children of a first marriage against their father or mother who has married again.
The proceedings for assurance, under article 977; are: Inventory of the property subject to the right reserved, annotation in the property registry of
such right reserved in the real property and appraisal of the personal property; and the guaranty, under article 978, is the assurance by mortgage, in
the case of realty, of the value of what is validly alienated.
But since the amended Mortgage Law went into effect by law of July 14, 1893, in the Philippines this is not only a principle of jurisprudence which
may be invoked for the applicability to the right reserved in article 811 of the remedies of assurance and guaranty provided for the right reserved in
article 968, but there is a positive provision of said law, which is an advantage over the law of Spain, to wit, article 199, which read thus:
The special mortgage for guaranteeing the right reserved by article 811 of the Civil Code can only be required by the relatives in whose favor the
property is to be reserved, if they are of age; if minors, it will be require by the person who should legally represent them. In either case the right of
the persons in whose favor the property must be reserved will be secured by the same requisites as set forth in the preceding article (relative to the
right reserved by article 968 of the Civil Code), applying to the person obligated to reserve the right the provisions with respect to the father.
In article 168 of the same law the new subsection 2 is added in connection with article 199 quoted, so that said article 168 reads as thus:
Legal mortgage is established:
1. . . .
2. In favor of the relatives to whom article 811 of the Civil Code refers, for the property required to be reserved, upon the property of the person obliged
to reserve it.
This being admitted, and admitted also that both the litigating parties agree that the period of ninety days fixed for the right of action to the guaranty,
that is, to require the mortgage that guarantees the effectiveness of the right required by law to be reserved, has prescribed, it is necessary to lay
down a principle in this matter. Now it should by noted that such action has not prescribed, because the period of ninety days fixed by the Mortgage
Law is not for the exercise of the right of action of the persons entitled to the right reserved, but for the fulfillment of the obligation of the person who
must make the reservation.
Article 191 of the reads thus: "If ninety days pass without the father's instituting in court the proceeding to which the foregoing article refers, the
relatives themselves may demand fulfillment, etc., . . . applying, according to said article 199, to the person obligated to reserve the right the provisions
with respect to the father."
Article 203 of the regulation for the application of the Mortgage Law says: "In the case of article 199 of the law the proceedings to which article 190
thereof refers will be instituted within the ninety days succeeding the date of the date of the acceptation of the inheritance by the person obligated to
reserve the property; after this period has elapsed, the interested parties may require the institution of such proceedings, if they are of age; and in any
other case, their legal representatives."
Thus it clearly appears that the lapse of the ninety days is not the expiration by prescription of the period for the right must be reserved, but really the
commencement thereof, enables them to exercise it at any time, since no limits is set in the law. So, if the annotation of the right required by law to
be reserved in the two parcels of land in question must be made in the property registry of the Mortgage Law, the persons entitled to it may now
institute proceedings to that end, and an allegation of prescription against the exercise of such right of action cannot be sustained.
Since the applicant confesses that she does not allege prescription of the right of action for requiring that the property be reserved, for she explicitly
so stated at the trial, and as the case presents no necessity for the proceedings that should be instituted in accordance with the provisions of the
Mortgage Law, this prescription of the right of action cannot take place, because such right of action does not exist with reference to instituting
proceedings for annotation in the registry of Act No. 496 of the right to the property required by law to be reserved. It is sufficient, as was done in the
present case, to intervene in the registration proceedings with the claim set up by the two opponents for recording therein the right reserved in either
parcel of land.
Now comes the main point in the appeal. The trial court denied the registration because of this finding set forth in its decision:
Absolute title to the two parcels of land undoubtedly belongs to the applicant and the two uncles of the deceased Pedro Sablan, and the application
cannot be made except in the name of all of them in common. (B. of E., p. 20.)
It must be remembered that absolute title consists of the rights to use, enjoy, dispose of, and recover. The person who has in himself all these rights
has the absolute or complete ownership of the thing; otherwise, the person who has the right to use and enjoy will have the usufruct, and the person
who has the rights of disposal and recovery the direct title. The person who by law, act, or contract is granted the right of usufruct has the first two
rights or using an enjoying, and then he is said not to have the fee simple — that is, the rights of disposal and recovery, which pertain to another who,
after the usufruct expires, will come into full ownership.
The question set up in the first assignment of error of the appellant's brief is this:
What are the rights in the property of the person who holds it subject to the reservation of article 811 of the Civil Code?
There are not lacking writers who say, only those of a usufructuary, the ultimate title belonging to the person in whose favor the reservation is made.
If that were so, the person holding the property could not apply for registration of title, but the person in whose favor it must be reserved, with the
former's consent. This opinion does not seem to be admissible, although it appears to be supported by decisions of the supreme court of Spain of
May 21, 1861, and June 18, 1880, prior to the Civil Code, and of June 22, 1895, somewhat subsequent to the enforcement thereof.
Another writer says: "This opinion only looks at two salient points — the usufruct and the fee simple; the remaining features of the arrangement are
not perceived, but become obscure in the presence of that deceptive emphasis which only brings out two things: that the person holding the property
will enjoy it and that he must keep what he enjoys for other persons." (Manresa, VII, 189.)
In another place he says: "We do not believe that the third opinion can now be maintained — that is, that the surviving spouse (the person obliged by
article 968 to make the reservation) can be regarded as a mere usufructuary and the descendants immediately as the owner; such theory has no
serious foundation in the Code." (Ibid., 238.)
The ascendants who inherits from a descendants, whether by the latter's wish or by operation of law, requires the inheritance by virtue of a title
perfectly transferring absolute ownership. All the attributes of the right of ownership belong to him exclusively — use, enjoyment, disposal and
recovery. This absolute ownership, which is inherent in the hereditary title, is not altered in the least, if there be no relatives within the third degree in
the line whence the property proceeds or they die before the ascendant heir who is the possessor and absolute owner of the property. If there should
be relatives within the third degree who belong to the line whence the property proceeded, then a limitation to that absolute ownership would arise.
The nature and scope of this limitation must be determined with exactness in order not to vitiate rights that the law wishes to be effective. The opinion
which makes this limitation consist in reducing the ascendant heir to the condition in of a mere usufructuary, depriving him of the right of disposal and
recovery, does not seem to have any support in the law, as it does not have, according to the opinion that he has been expressed in speaking of the
rights of the father or mother who has married again. There is a marked difference between the case where a man's wish institutes two persons as
his heirs, one as usufructuary and the other as owner of his property, and the case of the ascendant in article 811 or of the father or mother in article
968. In the first case, there is not the slightest doubt that the title to the hereditary property resides in the hereditary owner and he can dispose of and
recover it, while the usufructuary can in no way perform any act of disposal of the hereditary property (except that he may dispose of the right of
usufruct in accordance with the provisions of article 480 of the Civil Code), or any act of recovery thereof except the limited one in the form prescribed
in article 486 of the Code itself, because he totally lacks the fee simple. But the ascendants who holds the property required by article 811 to be
reserved, and the father of mother required by article 986 to reserve the right, can dispose of the property they might itself, the former from his
descendant and the latter from his of her child in first marriage, and recover it from anyone who may unjustly detain it, while the persons in whose
favor the right is required to be reserved in either case cannot perform any act whatsoever of disposal or of recovery.
Article 975 states explicitly that the father or mother required by article 9687 to reserve the right may dispose of the property itself:
Alienation of the property required by law to be reserved which may be made by the surviving spouse after contracting a second marriage shall be
valid only if at his or her death no legitimate children or descendants of the first marriage survive, without prejudice to the provisions of the Mortgage
of Law.
It thus appears that the alienation is valid, although not altogether effective, but under a condition subsequent, to wit: "If at his or her death no legitimate
children or descendants of the first marriage survive."
If the title did not reside in the person holding the property to be reserved, his alienation thereof would necessarily be null and void, as executed
without a right to do so and without a right which he could transmit to the acquirer. The law says that the alienation subsists (to subject is to continue
to exist) "without prejudice to the provisions of the Mortgage Law." Article 109 of this Law says:
The possessor of property subject to conditions subsequent that are still pending may mortgage or alienate it, provided always that he preserve the
right of the parties interested in said conditions by expressly reserving that right in the registration.
In such case, the child or legitimate descendants of the first marriage in whose favor the right is reserved cannot impugn the validity of the alienation
so long as the condition subsequent is pending, that is, so long as the remarried spouse who must reserve the right is alive, because it might easily
happen that the person who must reserve the right should outlive all the person in whose favor the right is reserved and then there would be no reason
for the condition subsequent that they survive him, and, the object of the law having disappeared, the right required to be reserved would disappear,
and the alienation would not only be valid but also in very way absolutely effective. Consequently, the alienation is valid when the right required by
law to be reserved to the children is respected; while the effects of the alienation depend upon a condition, because it will or will not become definite,
it will continue to exist or cease to exist, according to circumstances. This is what the law establishes with reference to the reservation of article 968,
wherein the legislator expressly directs that the surviving spouse who contracts a second marriage shall reserve to the children or descendants of the
first marriage ownership. Article 811 says nothing more than that the ascendants must make the reservation.
Manresa, with his recognized ability, summarizes the subject under the heading, "Rights and obligations during the existence of the right required by
law to be reserved," in these words:
During the whole period between the constitution in legal form of the right required by law to be reserved and the extinction thereof, the relatives within
the third degree, after the right that in their turn may pertain to them has been assured, have only an expectation, and therefore they do not even have
the capacity to transmit that expectation to their heirs.
The ascendant is in the first place a usufructuary who should use and enjoy the things according to their nature, in the manner and form already set
forth in commenting upon the article of the Code referring to use and usufruct.
But since in addition to being the usufructuary he is, even though conditionally, the owner in fee simple of the property, he can dispose of it in the
manner provided in article 974 and 976 of the same Code. Doubt arose also on this point, but the Direccion General of the registries, in an opinion of
June 25, 1892, declared that articles 974 and 975, which are applicable by analogy, for they refer to property reserved by law, reveal in the clearest
manner the attitude of the legislator on this subject, and the relatives with the third degree ought not to be more privileged in the right reserved in
article 811 than the children in the right reserved by article 975, chiefly for the reason that the right required to be reserved carries with it a condition
subsequent, and the property subject to those conditions can validly be alienated in accordance with article 109 of the Mortgage Law, such alienation
to continue, pending fulfillment of the condition." (Civil Code, VI, 270.)
Another commentator corroborates the foregoing in every way. He says:
The ascendants acquires that property with a condition subsequent, to wit, whether or not there exists at the time of his death relatives within the third
degree of the descendants from whom they inherit in the line whence the property proceeds. If such relatives exist, they acquire ownership of the
property at the death of the ascendants. If they do not exist, the ascendants can freely dispose thereof. If this is true, since the possessor of property
subject to conditions subsequent can alienate and encumber it, the ascendants may alienate the property required by law to be reserved, but he will
alienate what he has and nothing more because no one can give what does not belong to him, and the acquirer will therefore receive a limited and
revocable title. The relatives within the third degree will in their turn have an expectation to the property while the ascendant lives, an expectation that
cannot be transmitted to their heirs, unless these are also within the third degree. After the person who is required by law to reserve the right has
died, the relatives may rescind the alienation of the realty required by law to be reserved and they will complete ownership, in fee simple, because
the condition and the usufruct have been terminated by the death of the usufructuary. (Morell, Estudios sobre bienes reservable, 304, 305.)
The conclusion is that the person required by article 811 to reserve the right has, beyond any doubt at all, the rights of use and usufruct. He has,
moreover, for the reasons set forth, the legal title and dominion, although under a condition subsequent. Clearly he has, under an express provision
of the law, the right to dispose of the property reserved, and to dispose of is to alienate, although under a condition. He has the right to recover it,
because he is the one who possesses or should possess it and have title to it, although a limited and revocable one. In a word, the legal title and
dominion, even though under a condition, reside in him while he lives. After the right required by law to be reserved has been assured, he can do
anything that a genuine owner can do.
On the other hand, the relatives within the third degree in whose favor of the right is reserved cannot dispose of the property, first because it is no
way, either actually, constructively or formally, in their possession; and, moreover, because they have no title of ownership or of the fee simple which
they can transmit to another, on the hypothesis that only when the person who must reserve the right should die before them will they acquire it, thus
creating a fee simple, and only then will they take their place in the succession of the descendants of whom they are relatives within the third degree,
that it to say, a second contingent place in said legitimate succession in the fashion of aspirants to a possible future legacy. If any of the persons in
whose favor the right is reserved should, after their rights has been assured in the registry, dare to dispose of even nothing more than the fee simple
of the property to be reserved his act would be null and void, for, as was definitely decided in the decision on appeal of December 30, 1897, it is
impossible to determine the part "that might pertain therein to the relative at the time he exercised the right, because in view of the nature and scope
of the right required by law to be reserved the extent of his right cannot be foreseen, for it may disappear by his dying before the person required to
reserve it, just as may even become absolute should that person die."
Careful consideration of the matter forces the conclusion that no act of disposal inter vivos of the person required by law to reserve the right can be
impugned by him in whose favor it is reserved, because such person has all, absolutely all, the rights inherent in ownership, except that the legal title
is burdened with a condition that the third party acquirer may ascertain from the registry in order to know that he is acquiring a title subject to a
condition subsequent. In conclusion, it seems to us that only an act of disposal mortis causa in favor of persons other than relatives within the third
degree of the descendants from whom he got the property to be reserved must be prohibited to him, because this alone has been the object of the
law: "To prevent persons outside a family from securing, by some special accident of life, property that would otherwise have remained therein."
(Decision of December 30, 1897.)
Practically, even in the opinion of those who reduce the person reserving the right to the condition of a mere usufructuary, the person in whose favor
it must be reserved cannot attack the alienation that may be absolutely made of the property the law requires to be reserved, in the present case, that
which the appellant has made of the two parcels of land in question to a third party, because the conditional alienation that is permitted her is equivalent
to an alienation of the usufruct, which is authorized by article 480 of the Civil Code, and, practically, use and enjoyment of the property required by
law to be reserved are all that the person who must reserve it has during his lifetime, and in alienating the usufruct all the usefulness of the thing
would be transmitted in an incontrovertible manner. The question as to whether or not she transmits the fee simple is purely academic, sine re, for it
is not real, actual positive, as is the case of the institution of two heirs, one a usufructuary and the other the owner, by the express wish of the
predecessor in interest.
If the person whom article 811 requires to reserve the right has all the rights inherent in ownership, he can use, enjoy, dispose of and recover it; and
if, in addition to usufructuary, he is in fact and in law the real owner and can alienate it, although under a condition, the whole question is reduced to
the following terms:
Cannot the heir of the property required by law to reserved, merely because a condition subsequent is annexed to his right of disposal, himself alone
register the ownership of the property he has inherited, when the persons in whose favor the reservation must be made degree thereto, provided that
the right reserved to them in the two parcels of land be recorded, as the law provides?
It is well known that the vendee under pacto de retracto acquires all the rights of the vendor:
The vendee substitutes the vendor in all his rights and actions. (Civil Code, art. 1511.)
If the vendor can register his title, the vendee can also register this same title after he has once acquired it. This title, however, in its attribute of being
disposable, has a condition subsequent annexed — that the alienation the purchaser may make will be terminated, if the vendor should exercise the
right granted him by article 1507, which says:
Conventional redemption shall take place when the vendor reserves to himself the right to recover the thing sold, with the obligation to comply with
article 1518, and whatever more may have been agreed upon," that is, if he recovers the thing sold by repaying the vendee the price of the sale and
other expenses. Notwithstanding this condition subsequent, it is a point not at all doubtful now that the vendee may register his title in the same way
as the owner of a thing mortgaged — that is to say, the latter with the consent of his creditor and the former with the consent of the vendor. He may
alienate the thing bought when the acquirer knows by well from the title entered in the registry that he acquires a title revocable after a fixed period, a
thing much more certain and to be expected than the purely contingent expectation of the person in whose favor is reserved a right to inherit some
day what another has inherited. The purpose of the law would be defeated in not applying to the person who must make the reservation the provision
therein relative to the vendee under pacto de retracto, since the argument in his favor is the more power and conclusive; ubi eadem ratio, eadem legis
dispositivo.
Therefore, we reverse the judgment appealed from, and in lieu thereof decide and declare that the applicant is entitled to register in her own name
the two parcels of land which are the subject matter of the applicants, recording in the registration the right required by article 811 to be reserved to
either or both of the opponents, Pablo Sablan and Basilio Sablan, should they survive her; without special findings as to costs.

G.R. No. L-12957 March 24, 1961

CONSTANCIO SIENES, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
FIDEL ESPARCIA, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
Proceso R. Remollo for plaintiffs-appellants.
Leonardo D. Mancao for defendants-appellees.
DIZON, J.:
Appellants commenced this action below to secure judgment (1) declaring null and void the sale executed by Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso in favor of
appellees, the spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes; (2) ordering the Esparcia spouses to reconvey to appellants Lot 3368 of the Cadastral
Survey of Ayuquitan (now Amlan), Oriental Negros; and (3) ordering all the appellees to pay, jointly and severally, to appellants the sum of P500.00
as damages, plus the costs of suit. In their answer appellees disclaimed any knowledge or information regarding the sale allegedly made on April 20,
1951 by Andrea Gutang in favor of appellants and alleged that, if such sale was made, the same was void on the ground that Andrea Gutang had no
right to dispose of the property subject matter thereof. They further alleged that said property had never been in possession of appellants, the truth
being that appellees, as owners, had been in continuous possession thereof since the death of Francisco Yaeso. By way of affirmative defense and
counterclaim, they further alleged that on July 30, 1951, Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso, as the only surviving heirs of Francisco Yaeso, executed a
public instrument of sale in favor of the spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes, the said sale having been registered together with an affidavit of
adjudication executed by Paulina and Cipriana on July 18, 1951, as sole surviving heirs of the aforesaid deceased; that since then the Esparcias had
been in possession of the property as owners.
After trial upon the issues thus joined, the lower court rendered judgment as follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered declaring (1) that the sale of Lot No. 3368 made by Andrea Gutang to the plaintiff
spouses Constancio Sienes and Genoveva Silay is void, and the reconveyance prayed for by them is denied; (2) that the sale made by Paulina and
Cipriana Yaeso in favor of defendants Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes involving the same lot is also void, and they have no valid title thereto; and
(3) that the reservable property in question is part of and must be reverted to the estate of Cipriana Yaeso, the lone surviving relative and heir of
Francisco Yaeso at the death of Andrea Gutang as of December 13, 1951. No pronouncement as to the costs.
From the above decision the Sienes spouse interposed the present appeal, their principal contentions being, firstly, that the lower court erred in
holding that Lot 3368 of the Cadastral Survey of Ayuquitan was a reservable property; secondly, in annulling the sale of said lot executed by Andrea
Gutang in their favor; and lastly, in holding that Cipriana Yaeso, as reservee, was entitled to inherit said land.
There is no dispute as to the following facts:
Lot 3368 originally belonged to Saturnino Yaeso. With his first wife, Teresa Ruales, he had four children named Agaton, Fernando, Paulina and
Cipriana, while with his second wife, Andrea Gutang, he had an only son named Francisco. According to the cadastral records of Ayuquitan, the
properties left by Saturnino upon his death — the date of which does not clearly appear of record — were left to his children as follows: Lot 3366 to
Cipriana, Lot 3367 to Fernando, Lot 3375 to Agaton, Lot 3377 (southern portion) to Paulina, and Lot 3368 (western portion) to Francisco. As a result
of the cadastral proceedings, Original Certificate of Title No. 10275 covering Lot 3368 was issued in the name of Francisco. Because Francisco was
a minor at the time, his mother administered the property for him, declared it in her name for taxation purposes (Exhs A & A-1), and paid the taxes
due thereon (Exhs. B, C, C-1 & C-2). When Francisco died on May 29, 1932 at the age of 20, single and without any descendant, his mother, as his
sole heir, executed the public instrument Exhibit F entitled EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT AND SALE whereby, among other things, for and in
consideration of the sum of P800.00 she sold the property in question to appellants. When thereafter said vendees demanded from Paulina Yaeso
and her husband Jose Esparcia, the surrender of Original Certificate of Title No. 10275 — which was in their possession — the latter refused, thus
giving rise to the filing of the corresponding motion in the cadastral record No. 507. The same, however, was denied (Exhs. 8 & 9).
Thereafter, or more specifically, on July 30, 1951, Cipriana and Paulina Yaeso, the surviving half-sisters of Francisco, and who as such had declared
the property in their name, on January 1, 1951 executed a deed of sale in favor of the spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes (Exh. 2) who, in
turn, declared it in their name for tax purposes and thereafter secured the issuance in their name of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-2141 (Exhs. 5
& 5-A).
As held by the trial court, it is clear upon the facts already stated, that the land in question was reservable property. Francisco Yaeso inherited it by
operation of law from his father Saturnino, and upon Francisco's death, unmarried and without descendants, it was inherited, in turn, by his mother,
Andrea Gutang. The latter was, therefore, under obligation to reserve it for the benefit of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from
which said property came, if any survived her. The record discloses in this connection that Andrea Gutang died on December 13, 1951, the lone
reservee surviving her being Cipriana Yaeso who died only on January 13, 1952 (Exh. 10).
In connection with reservable property, the weight of opinion is that the reserve creates two resolutory conditions, namely, (1) the death of the
ascendant obliged to reserve and (2) the survival, at the time of his death, of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which the
property came (6 Manresa 268-269; 6 Sanchez Roman 1934). This Court has held in connection with this matter that the reservista has the legal title
and dominion to the reservable property but subject to a resolutory condition; that he is like a life usufructuary of the reservable property; that he may
alienate the same but subject to reservation, said alienation transmitting only the revocable and conditional ownership of the reservists, the rights
acquired by the transferee being revoked or resolved by the survival of reservatarios at the time of the death of the reservista (Edroso vs. Sablan, 25
Phil. 295; Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480; and Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 65 Phil. 279).
The sale made by Andrea Gutang in favor of appellees was, therefore, subject to the condition that the vendees would definitely acquire ownership,
by virtue of the alienation, only if the vendor died without being survived by any person entitled to the reservable property. Inasmuch much as when
Andrea Gutang died, Cipriana Yaeso was still alive, the conclusion becomes inescapable that the previous sale made by the former in favor of
appellants became of no legal effect and the reservable property subject matter thereof passed in exclusive ownership to Cipriana.
On the other hand, it is also clear that the sale executed by the sisters Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso in favor of the spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina
Sienes was subject to a similar resolutory condition. The reserve instituted by law in favor of the heirs within the third degree belonging to the line
from which the reservable property came, constitutes a real right which the reservee may alienate and dispose of, albeit conditionally, the condition
being that the alienation shall transfer ownership to the vendee only if and when the reservee survives the person obliged to reserve. In the present
case, Cipriana Yaeso, one of the reservees, was still alive when Andrea Gutang, the person obliged to reserve, died. Thus the former became the
absolute owner of the reservable property upon Andrea's death. While it may be true that the sale made by her and her sister prior to this event,
became effective because of the occurrence of the resolutory condition, we are not now in a position to reverse the appealed decision, in so far as it
orders the reversion of the property in question to the Estate of Cipriana Yaeso, because the vendees — the Esparcia spouses did — not appeal
therefrom.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision — as above modified — is affirmed, with costs, and without prejudice to whatever action in equity the Esparcia
spouses may have against the Estate of Cipriana Yaeso for the reconveyance of the property in question.

G.R. No. L-34395 May 19, 1981

BEATRIZ L. GONZALES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA (BRANCH V), BENITO F. LEGARDA, ROSARIO L. VALDEZ, ALEJANDRO LEGARDA, TERESA
LEGARDA, JOSE LEGARDA, BENITO LEGARDA Y FERNANDEZ, CARMEN LEGARDA Y FERNANDEZ, FILOMENA LEGARDA Y
HERNANDEZ, CARMEN LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, ALEJANDRO LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, RAMON LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, FILOMENA
LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, JAIME LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, CELSO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, ALEJANDRO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, MA.
TERESA LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, MA. ANTONIA LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, JOSE LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, ROSARIO LEGARDA Y
LOBREGAT, BENITO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, EDUARDO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, TRINIDAD F. LEGARDA, and the ESTATE OF DONA
FILOMENA ROCES DE LEGARDA, respondents.

AQUINO, J.:1äwphï1.ñët
Beatriz Legarda Gonzales appealed from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, dismissing her complaint for partition, accounting,
reconveyance and damages and holding, as not subject to reserve troncal, the properties which her mother Filomena Races inherited in 1943 from
Filomena Legarda (Civil Case No. 73335). The facts are as follows:
Benito Legarda y De la Paz, the son of Benito Legarda y Tuason, died [Manila] on June 17, 1933. He was survived by his widow, Filomena Races,
and their seven children: four daughters named Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa and Filomena and three sons named Benito, Alejandro and Jose.
On July 12, 1939, the real properties left by Benito Legarda y Tuason were partitioned in three equal portions by his daughters, Consuelo and Rita,
and the heirs of his deceased son Benito Legarda y De la Paz who were represented by Benito F. Legarda.
Filomena Legarda y Races died intestate and without issue on March 19, 1943. Her sole heiress was her mother, Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda.
Mrs. Legarda executed on May 12, 1947 an affidavit adjudicating extrajudicially to herself the properties which she inherited from her deceased
daughter, Filomena Legarda. The said properties consist of the following: 1äwphï1.ñët
(a) Savings deposit in the National City Bank of New York with a credit balance of P3,699.63.
(b) 1,429 shares of the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company and a 1/7 interest in certain shares of the San Miguel Brewery, Tuason & Legarda,
Ltd., Philippine Guaranty Company, Insular Life Assurance Company and the Manila Times.
(c) 1/7 of the properties described in TCT Nos. 80226, 80237 to 80243 (7 titles), 80260, 80261 and 57512 of the Manila registry of deeds.
1/21st of the properties covered by TCT Nos. 48164, 84714, 48201, 48202, 48205, 48203, 48206, 48160 and 48192 of the Manila registry of deeds;
1/21st of the property described in TCT No. 4475 of the registry of deeds of Rizal, now Quezon City; 1/14th of the property described in TCT No. 966
of the registry of deeds of Baguio;
1/7th of the lot and improvements at 127 Aviles described in TCT No. 41862 of the Manila registry of deeds; 1/7th of the lots and improvements at
181 San Rafael describe in TCT Nos. 50495 and 48161 of the Manila registry of deeds;
1/7th of the property described in TCT No. 48163 of the Manila registry of deeds (Streets);
l/21st of the properties described in TCT Nos. 48199 and 57551 of the Manila registry of deeds (Streets and Estero):
2/21st of the property described in TCT No. 13458 of tile registry of deeds of T0ayabas.
These are the properties in litigation in this case. As a result of the affidavit of adjudication, Filomena Races succeeded her deceased daughter
Filomena Legarda as co-owner of the properties held proindiviso by her other six children.
Mrs. Legarda on March 6, 1953 executed two handwritten Identical documents wherein she disposed of the properties, which she inherited from her
daughter, in favor of the children of her sons, Benito, Alejandro and Jose (sixteen grandchildren in all). The document reads: 1äwphï1.ñët
A mis hijos :
Dispongo que se reparta a todos mis nietos hijos de Ben, Mandu y Pepito, los bienes que he heredado de mi difunta hija Filomena y tambien los
acciones de la Destileria La Rosario' recientemente comprada a los hermanos Values Legarda.
De los bienes de mi hija Filomena se deducira un tote de terreno que yo he 0donada a las Hijas de Jesus, en Guipit
La case No. 181 San Rafael, la cede a mi hijo Mandu solo la casa; proque ella esta construida sobre terreno de los hermanos Legarda
Races. 1äwphï1.ñët
(Sgd.) FILOMENA ROCES LEGARDA
6 Marzo 1953
During the period from July, 1958 to February, 1959 Mrs. Legarda and her six surviving children partitioned the properties consisting of the one-third
share in the estate of Benito Legarda y Tuason which the children inherited in representation of their father, Benito Legarda y De la Paz.
Mrs. Legarda died on September 22, 1967. Her will was admitted to probate as a holographic will in the order dated July 16, 1968 of the Court of First
Instance of Manila in Special Proceeding No. 70878, Testate Estate of Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda. The decree of probate was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals in Legarda vs. Gonzales, CA-G.R. No. 43480-R, July 30,1976.
In the testate proceeding, Beatriz Legarda Gonzales, a daughter of the testatrix, filed on May 20, 1968 a motion to exclude from the inventory of her
mother's estate the properties which she inherited from her deceased daughter, Filomena, on the ground that said properties are reservable properties
which should be inherited by Filomena Legarda's three sisters and three brothers and not by the children of Benito, Alejandro and Jose, all surnamed
Legarda. That motion was opposed by the administrator, Benito F. Legarda.
Without awaiting the resolution on that motion, Mrs. Gonzales filed on June 20, 1968 an ordinary civil action against her brothers, sisters, nephews
and nieces and her mother's estate for the purpose of securing a declaration that the said properties are reservable properties which Mrs. Legarda
could not bequeath in her holographic will to her grandchildren to the exclusion of her three daughters and her three sons (See Paz vs. Madrigal, 100
Phil. 1085).
As already stated, the lower court dismissed the action of Mrs. Gonzales. ln this appeal under Republic Act No. 5440 she contends in her six
assignments of error that the lower court erred in not regarding the properties in question as reservable properties under article 891 of the Civil Code.
On the other hand, defendants-appellees in their six counter-assignments of error contend that the lower court erred in not holding that Mrs. Legarda
acquired the estate of her daughter Filomena] Legarda in exchange for her conjugal and hereditary shares in the estate of her husband Benito Legarda
y De la Paz and in not holding that Mrs. Gonzales waived her right to the reservable properties and that her claim is barred by estoppel, laches and
prescription.
The preliminary issue raised by the private respondents as to the timeliness of Mrs. Gonzales' petition for review is a closed matter. This Court in its
resolution of December 16, 1971 denied respondents' motion to dismiss and gave due course to the petition for review.
In an appeal under Republic Act No. 5440 only legal issues can be raised under undisputed facts. Since on the basis of the stipulated facts the lower
court resolved only the issue of whether the properties in question are subject to reserva troncal that is the only legal issue to be resolved in this
appeal.
The other issues raised by the defendants-appellees, particularly those involving factual matters, cannot be resolved in this appeal. As the trial court
did not pass upon those issues, there is no ruling which can be reviewed by this Court.
The question is whether the disputed properties are reservable properties under article 891 of the Civil Code, formerly article 811, and whether
Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda could dispose of them in his will in favor of her grandchildren to the exclusion of her six children.
Did Mrs. Legarda have the right to convey mortis causa what she inherited from her daughter Filomena to the reservees within the third degree and
to bypass the reservees in the second degree or should that inheritance automatically go to the reservees in the second degree, the six children of
Mrs. Legarda?
As will hereinafter be shown that is not a novel issue or a question of first impression. lt was resolved in Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480. Before
discussing the applicability to this case of the doctrine in the Florentino case and other pertinent rulings, it may be useful to make a brief discourse on
the nature of reserve troncal, also called lineal, familiar, extraordinaria o semi-troncal.
Much time, effort and energy were spent by the parties in their five briefs in descanting on the nature of reserve troncal which together with the reserva
viudal and reversion legal, was abolished by the Code Commission to prevent the decedent's estate from being entailed, to eliminate the uncertainty
in ownership caused by the reservation (which uncertainty impedes the improvement of the reservable property) and to discourage the confinement
of property within a certain family for generations which situation allegedly leads to economic oligarchy, and is incompatible with the socialization of
ownership.
The Code Commission regarded the reservas as remnants of feudalism which fomented agrarian unrest. Moreover, the reserves, insofar as they
penalize legitimate relationship, is considered unjust and inequitable.
However, the lawmaking body, not agreeing entirely with the Code Commission, restored the reserve troncal, a legal institution which, according to
Manresa and Castan Tobenas has provoked questions and doubts that are difficult to resolve.
Reserva troncal is provided for in article 811 of the Spanish Civil Code, now article 891, which reads: 1äwphï1.ñët
ART. 811. El ascendiente que heredare de su descendiente bienes que este hubiese adquirido por titulo lucrative de otro ascendiente, o de un
hermano, se halla obligado a reservas los que hubiere adquirido por ministerio de la ley en favor de los parientes que eaten dentro del tercer grade
y pertenezcan a la linea de donde los bienes proceden
ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant,
or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the
third degree and who belong to the line from which said property came.
In reserve troncal (1) a descendant inherited or acquired by gratuitous title property from an ascendant or from a brother or sister; (2) the same
property is inherited by another ascendant or is acquired by him by operation of law from the said descendant, and (3) the said ascendant should
reserve the said property for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree from the deceased descendant (prepositus) and who belong to
the line from which the said property came.
So, three transmissions are involved: (I) a first transmission by lucrative title (inheritance or donation) from an ascendant or brother or sister to the
deceased descendant; (2) a posterior transmission, by operation of law (intestate succession or legitime) from the deceased descendant (causante
de la reserve) in favor of another ascendant, the reservor or reservista, which two transmissions precede the reservation, and (3) a third transmissions
of the same property (in consequence of the reservation) from the reservor to the reservees (reservatarios) or the relatives within the third degree
from the deceased descendant belonging to the line of the first ascendant, brother or sister of the deceased descendant (6 Castan Tobenas Derecho
Civil, Part l, 1960, 6th Ed., pp. 198-9).
If there are only two transmissions there is no reserve. Thus, where one Bonifacia Lacerna died and her properties were inherited by her son, Juan
Marbebe, upon the death of Juan, those lands should be inherited by his half-sister, to the exclusion of his maternal first cousins. The said lands are
not reservable property within the meaning of article 811 (Lacerna vs. Vda. de Corcino, l l l Phil. 872).
The persons involved in reserve troncal are (1) the ascendant or brother or sister from whom the property was received by the descendant by lucrative
or gratuitous title, (2) the descendant or prepositus (prepositus) who received the property, (3) the reservor (reservista) the other ascendant who
obtained the property from the (prepositus) by operation of law and (4) the reserves (reservatario) who is within the third degree from the prepositus and
who belongs to the (line o tronco) from which the property came and for whom the property should be reserved by the reservor.
The reservees may be half-brothers and sisters (Rodriguez vs. Rodriguez, 101 Phil. 1098; Chua vs. Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, L-
29901, August 31, 1977, 78 SCRA 412). Fourth degree relatives are not included (Jardin vs. Villamayor, 72 Phil. 392).
The rationale of reserve troncal is to avoid "el peligro de que bienes poseidos secularmente por una familia pasen bruscamente a titulo gratuito a
manos extrañas por el azar de los enlaces y muertes prematuras or impeder que, por un azar de la vide personas extranas a una familia puedan
adquirir bienes que sin aquel hubieran quedado en ella (6 Castan Tobenas Derecho Civil, Part l, 6th Ed., 1980, p. 203; Padura vs. Baldovino, 104
Phil. 1065).
An illustration of reserve troncal is found in Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295. ln that case, Pedro Sablan inherited two parcels of land from his father
Victorians. Pedro died in 1902, single and without issue. His mother, Marcelina Edroso, inherited from him the two parcels of land.
It was held that the land was reservable property in the hands of Marcelina. The reservees were Pablo Sablan and Basilio Sablan, the paternal uncles
of Pedro Sablan, the prepositus. Marcelina could register the land under the Torrens system in her name but the fact that the land was reservable
property in favor of her two brothers-in-law, should they survive her, should be noted in the title.
In another case, it appears that Maria Aglibot died intestate in 1906. Her one-half share of a parcel of conjugal land was inherited by her daughter,
Juliana Mañalac. When Juliana died intestate in 1920, said one-half share was inherited by her father, Anacleto Mañalac who owned the other one-
half portion.
Anacleto died intestate in 1942, survived by his second wife and their six children. lt was held that the said one-half portion was reservable property
in the hands of Anacleto Mañalac and, upon his death, should be inherited by Leona Aglibot and Evarista Aglibot, sisters of Maria and materna aunts
of Juliana Mañalac, who belonged to the line from which said one-half portion came (Aglibot vs. Mañalac 114 Phil. 964).
Other illustrations of reserva troncal are found in Florentino vs Florentino, 40 Phil. 480; Nieva and Alcala vs. Alcala and Deocampo, 41 Phil. 915;
Maghirang and Gutierrez vs. Balcita 46 Phil. 551; Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Dizon vs. Galang, 48 Phil. 601; Riosa vs. Rocha, 48 Phil.
737; Centeno vs. Centeno 52 Phil. 322; Velayo Bernardo vs. Siojo, 58 Phil. 89; Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 63 Phil. 279; Fallorfina vs. Abille, CA 39
O.G. 1784.
The person from whom the degree should be reckoned is the descendant, or the one at the end of the line from which the property came and upon
whom the property last revolved by descent. He is called the prepositus(Cabardo vs. Villanueva. 44 Phil. 186, 190).
In the Cabardo case, one Cornelia Abordo inherited property from her mother, Basilia Cabardo. When Cornelia died, her estate passed to her father,
Lorenzo Abordo. ln his hands, the property was reservable property. Upon the death of Lorenzo, the person entitled to the property was Rosa Cabardo,
a maternal aunt of Cornelia, who was her nearest relative within the third degree.
First cousins of the prepositus are in the fourth degree and are not reservees. They cannot even represent their parents because representation is
confined to relatives within the third degree (Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480).
Within the third degree, the nearest relatives exclude the more remote subject to the rule of representation. But the representative should be within
the third degree from the prepositus (Padura vs. Baldovino, 104 Phil. 1065).
Reserva troncal contemplates legitimate relationship. illegitimate relationship and relationship by affinity are excluded.
Gratuitous title or titulo lucrativo refers to a transmission wherein the recipient gives nothing in return such as donacion and succession (Cabardo vs.
Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, 189-190, citing 6 Manresa, Codigo Civil, 7th Ed., 195 l, p. 360).
The reserva creates two resolutory conditions, namely, (1) the death of the ascendant obliged to reserve and (2) the survival, at the time of his death,
of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which the property came
(Sienes vs. E Esparcia l l l Phil. 349, 353).
The reservor has the legal title and dominion to the reservable property but subject to the resolutory condition that such title is extinguished if the
reservor predeceased the reservee. The reservor is a usufructuary of the reservable property. He may alienate it subject to the reservation. The
transferee gets the revocable and conditional ownership of the reservor. The transferee's rights are revoked upon the survival of the reservees at the
time of the death of the reservor but become indefeasible when the reservees predecease the reservor. (Sienes vs. Esparcia, 111 Phil. 349, 353;
Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295; Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480: Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 63 Phil. 279.)
The reservor's title has been compared with that of the vendee a retro in a pacta de retro sale or to a fideicomiso conditional.
The reservor's alienation of the reservable property is subject to a resolutory condition, meaning that if at the time of the reservor's death, there are
reservees, the transferee of the property should deliver it to the reservees. lf there are no reservees at the time of the reservor's death, the transferee's
title would become absolute. (Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Gueco vs. Lacson, 118 Phil. 944; Mono vs. Nequia 93 Phil. 120).
On the other hand, the reserves has only an inchoate, expectant or contingent right. His expectant right would disappear if he predeceased the
reservor. lt would become absolute should the reservor predecease the reserves.
The reserves cannot impugn any conveyance made by the reservor but he can require that the reservable character of the property be recognized by
the purchaser (Riosa vs. Rocha 48 Phil. 737; Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295, 312-3; Gueco vs. Lacson, 118 Phil. 944).
There is a holding that the renunciation of the reservee's right to the reservable property is illegal for being a contract regarding future inheritance
(Velayo Bernardo vs. Siojo, 58 Phil. 89, 96).
And there is a dictum that the reservee's right is a real right which he may alienate and dispose of conditionally. The condition is that the alienation
shall transfer ownership to the vendee only if and when the reserves survives the reservor (Sienes vs. Esparcia, 111 Phil. 349, 353). 1äwphï1.ñët
The reservatario receives the property as a conditional heir of the descendant (prepositus) said property merely reverting to the line of origin from
which it had temporarily and accidentally stayed during the reservista's lifetime. The authorities are all agreed that there being reservatarios that
survive the reservists, the latter must be deemed to have enjoyed no more than a than interest in the reservable property. (J. J. B. L. Reyes in Cane
vs. Director of Lands, 105 Phil. l5.)
Even during the reservista's lifetime, the reservatarios, who are the ultimate acquirers of the property, can already assert the right to prevent
the reservista from doing anything that might frustrate their reversionary right, and, for this purpose, they can compel the annotation of their right in
the registry of property even while the (reservista) is alive (Ley Hipotecaria de Ultramar, Arts. 168, 199; Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295).
This right is incompatible with the mere expectancy that corresponds to the natural heirs of the reservista lt is likewise clear that the reservable
property is no part of the estate of the reservista who may not dispose of them (it) by will, so long as there are reservatarios existing (Arroyo vs.
Gerona, 58 Phil. 226, 237).
The latter, therefore, do not inherit from the reservista but from the descendant (prepositus) of whom the reservatarios are the heirs mortis causa,
subject to the condition that they must survive the reservista. (Sanchez Roman, Vol. VI Tomo 2, p. 286; Manresa, Commentaries, Vol. 6, 6th Ed., pp.
274, 310, cited by J. J.B.L. Reyes in Padura vs. Baldovino, L-11960, December 27, 1958, 104 Phil. 1065).
Hence, upon the reservista's death, the reservatario nearest to the prepositus becomes, "automatically and by operation of law, the owner of the
reservable property." (Cane vs. Director of Lands, 105 Phil. l5.)
In the instant case, the properties in question were indubitably reservable properties in the hands of Mrs. Legarda. Undoubtedly, she was a reservor.
The reservation became a certainty when at the time of her death the reservees or relatives within the third degree of the prepositus Filomena Legarda
were living or they survived Mrs. Legarda.
So, the ultimate issue in this case is whether Mrs. Legarda, as reservor, could convey the reservable properties by will or mortis causa to the reservees
within the third degree (her sixteen grandchildren) to the exclusion of the reservees in the second degree, her three daughters and three sons. As
indicated at the outset, that issue is already res judicata or cosa juzgada.
We hold that Mrs. Legarda could not convey in her holographic will to her sixteen grandchildren the reservable properties which she had inherited
from her daughter Filomena because the reservable properties did not form part of her estate (Cabardo vs. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, 191). The reservor
cannot make a disposition mortis causa of the reservable properties as long as the reservees survived the reservor.
As repeatedly held in the Cano and Padura cases, the reservees inherit the reservable properties from the prepositus, not from the reservor.
Article 891 clearly indicates that the reservable properties should be inherited by all the nearest relatives within the third degree from
the prepositus who in this case are the six children of Mrs. Legarda. She could not select the reservees to whom the reservable property should be
given and deprive the other reservees of their share therein.
To allow the reservor in this case to make a testamentary disposition of the reservable properties in favor of the reservees in the third degree and,
consequently, to ignore the reservees in the second degree would be a glaring violation of article 891. That testamentary disposition cannot be
allowed.
We have stated earlier that this case is governed by the doctrine of Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480, a similar case, where it was
ruled: 1äwphï1.ñët
Reservable property left, through a will or otherwise, by the death of ascendant (reservista) together with his own property in favor of another of his
descendants as forced heir, forms no part of the latter's lawful inheritance nor of the legitime, for the reason that, as said property continued to be
reservable, the heir receiving the same as an inheritance from his ascendant has the strict obligation of its delivery to the relatives, within the third
degree, of the predecessor in interest (prepositus), without prejudicing the right of the heir to an aliquot part of the property, if he has at the same time
the right of a reservatario (reserves).
ln the Florentino case, it appears that Apolonio Florentino II and his second wife Severina Faz de Leon begot two children, Mercedes and Apolonio
III. These two inherited properties from their father. Upon Apolonio III death in 1891, his properties were inherited by his mother, Severina, who died
in 1908. ln her will, she instituted her daughter Mercedes as heiress to all her properties, including those coming from her deceased husband through
their son, Apolonio III.
The surviving children, begotten by Apolonio II with his first wife Antonia Faz de Leon and the descendants of the deceased children of his first
marriage, sued Mercedes Florentino for the recovery of their share in the reservable properties, which Severina de Leon had inherited from Apolonio
III which the latter had inherited from his father Apolonio II and which Severina willed to her daughter Mercedes.
Plaintiff's theory was that the said properties, as reservable properties, could not be disposed of in Severina's will in favor of Mercedes only. That
theory was sustained by this Court.
It was held that the said properties, being reservable properties, did not form part of Severina's estate and could not be inherited from her by her
daughter Mercedes alone.
As there were seven reservees, Mercedes was entitled, as a reserves, to one-seventh of the properties. The other six sevenths portions were
adjudicated to the other six reservees.
Under the rule of stare decisis et non quieta movere, we are bound to follow in this case the doctrine of the Florentino case. That doctrine means that
as long as during the reservor's lifetime and upon his death there are relatives within the third degree of the prepositus regardless of whether those
reservees are common descendants of the reservor and the ascendant from whom the property came, the property retains its reservable character.
The property should go to the nearest reservees. The reservor cannot, by means of his will, choose the reserves to whom the reservable property
should be awarded.
The alleged opinion of Sanchez Roman that there is no reserva troncal when the only relatives within the third degree are the common descendants
of the predeceased ascendant and the ascendant who would be obliged to reserve is irrelevant and sans binding force in the light of the ruling in
the Florentino case.
It is contended by the appellees herein that the properties in question are not reservable properties because only relatives within the third degree from
the paternal line have survived and that when Mrs. Legarda willed the said properties to her sixteen grandchildren, who are third-degree relatives of
Filomena Legarda and who belong to the paternal line, the reason for the reserva troncal has been satisfied: "to prevent persons outside a family from
securing, by some special accident of life, property that would otherwise have remained therein".
That same contention was advanced in the Florentino case where the reservor willed the reservable properties to her daughter, a full-blood sister of
the prepositus and ignored the other six reservors, the relatives of the half-blood of the prepositus.
In rejecting that contention, this Court held that the reservable property bequeathed by the reservor to her daughter does not form part of the reservor's
estate nor of the daughter's estate but should be given to all the seven reservees or nearest relatives of the prepositus within the third degree.
This Court noted that, while it is true that by giving the reservable property to only one reserves it did not pass into the hands of strangers, nevertheless,
it is likewise true that the heiress of the reservor was only one of the reservees and there is no reason founded upon law and justice why the other
reservees should be deprived of their shares in the reservable property (pp. 894-5).
Applying that doctrine to this case, it results that Mrs. Legarda could not dispose of in her will the properties in question even if the disposition is in
favor of the relatives within the third degree from Filomena Legarda. The said properties, by operation of Article 891, should go to Mrs. Legarda's six
children as reservees within the second degree from Filomena Legarda.
It should be repeated that the reservees do not inherit from the reservor but from the reservor but from the prepositus, of whom the reservees are the
heirs mortis causa subject to the condition that they must survive the reservor (Padura vs. Baldovino, L-11960, December 27, 1958, 104 Phil. 1065).
The trial court said that the disputed properties lost their reservable character due to the non-existence of third-degree relatives of Filomena Legarda
at the time of the death of the reservor, Mrs. Legarda, belonging to the Legarda family, "except third-degree relatives who pertain to both" the Legarda
and Races lines.
That holding is erroneous. The reservation could have been extinguished only by the absence of reservees at the time of Mrs. Legarda's death. Since
at the time of her death, there were (and still are) reservees belonging to the second and third degrees, the disputed properties did not lose their
reservable character. The disposition of the said properties should be made in accordance with article 891 or the rule on reserva troncal and not in
accordance with the reservor's holographic will. The said properties did not form part of Mrs. Legarda's estate. (Cane vs. Director of Lands, 105 Phil.
l, 4).
WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is reversed and set aside. lt is hereby adjudged that the properties inherited by Filomena Roces Vda. de
Legarda from her daughter Filomena Legarda, with all the fruits and accessions thereof, are reservable properties which belong to Beatriz, Rosario,
Teresa, Benito, Alejandro and Jose, all surnamed Legarda y Roces, as reservees. The shares of Rosario L. Valdes and Benito F. Legarda, who died
in 1969 and 1973, respectively, should pertain to their respective heirs. Costs against the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. L-10701. January 16, 1959.]

MARIA CANO, applicant-appellee, v. DIRECTOR OF LANDS, EUSTAQUIA GUERRERO, ET AL., Oppositors-Appellants. JOSE FERNANDEZ,
ET AL., Oppositors-Appellants.

Ramon C. Fernandez for Appellants.

Jose B. Dealca for Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. SUCCESSION; RESERVA TRONCAL; RECORD RESERVA; DEATH OF RESERVISTA; ISSUANCE OF CERTIFICATE OF TITLE OF
RESERVEE. — Once an original certificate of title by virtue of the final decree of the land court was duly issued in the name of the reservista, subject
to reserva troncal, and subsequently the latter died, the registration court, in view of the said recorded reserva has authority under Sec. 112 of Act
496 to order the reservatario; for the reason that the death of the reservista vested the ownership of the property in the sole reservatario troncal.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EXCEPTION. — Where, however, the registration decree merely specifies the reservable character of the property, without
determining the identity of the reservatario (as in the case of Director of Lands v. Aguas, 63 Phil., 279) or where several reservatories dispute the
property among themselves, further proceedings would be unavoidable.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUISITES TO VEST TITLE IN RESERVE. — The only requisites for the passing of the title from the reservista to the reservee are
(1) the death of the reservista; and (2) the fact the reservitario has survived the reservista.

4. ID.; ID.; RESERVATION NOT RESERVISTA’S SUCCESSOR MORTIS CAUSA. — The reservatario is not the reservista’s successor mortis causa
nor is the reservable property part of the reservista’s estate; the reservatario receives the property as a conditional heir of the descendant (prepositus),
the property merely reverting to the line of origin from which it had temporarily and accidentally strayed during the reservista’s lifetime. The authorities
are all agreed that there being reservatarios that survive the reservista, the latter must be deemed to have enjoyed no more a life interest in the
reservable property.

5. ID.; ID.; DEATH OF RESERVISTA; RESERVATARIO AUTOMATICALLY BECOMES OWNER OF RESERVABLE PROPERTY. — Upon the death
of the reservatario nearest to the prepositus becomes, automatically and by operation of law, the owner of the reservable property.

6. ID.; ID.; RESERVABLE PROPERTY CANNOT BE TRANSMITTED MORTIS CAUSA BY RESERVISTA. — The reservable property cannot be
transmitted by a reservista to her or his own successors mortis causa so long as a reservatario, within the third degree from the prepositus and
belonging to the line whence the property came, is in existence when the reservista dies.
DECISION

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

In an amended decision dated October 9, 1951, issued in Land Registration Case No. 12, G. L. O. Rec. No. 2835, the Court of First Instance of
Sorsogon decreed the registration of Lots. Nos. 1798 and 1799 of the Juban (Sorsogon) Cadastre, under the following terms and
conditions:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"In view of the foregoing, and it appearing that the notices have been duly published and posted as required by law, and that the title of the applicant
to the above-mentioned two parcels of land is registrable in law, it is hereby adjudged and decreed, and with reaffirmation of the order of general
default, that the two parcels of land described in plan SWO-24152, known as Lots Nos. 1798 and 1799 of the Cadastral Survey of Juban, with their
improvements, be registered in the name of Maria Cano, Filipina 71 years of age, widow and resident of Juban, province of Sorsogon, with the
understanding that Lot No. 1799 shall be subject to the right of reservation in favor of Eustaquia Guerrero pursuant to Article 891 of Civil Code. After
this decision shall have become final for lack of appeal therefrom within the 30-day period from its promulgation, let the corresponding decree issue.

So ordered." (Rec. App. pp. 18-19)

The decision having become final, the decree and the Certificate of Title (No. 0-20) were issued in the name of Maria Cano, subject to reserva troncal
in favor of Eustaquia Guerrero. In October 1955, counsel for the reservee (reservatario) Guerrero filed a motion with the Cadastral Court, alleging the
death of the original registered owner and reservista, Maria Cano, on September 8, 1955, and praying that the original Certificate of Title be ordered
cancelled and a new one issued in favor of movant Eustaquia Guerrero; and that the Sheriff be ordered to place her in possession of the property.
The motion was opposed by Jose and Teotimo Fernandez, sons of the reservista Maria Cano, who contended that the application and operation of
the reserva troncal should be ventilated in an ordinary contentious proceeding, and that the Registration Court did not have jurisdiction to grant the
motion.

In view of the recorded reserva in favor of the appellee, as expressly noted in the final decree of registration, the lower court granted the petition for
the issuance of a new certificate, for the reason that the death of reservista vested the ownership of the property in the petitioner as the sole
reservatario troncal.

The oppositors, heirs of the reservista Maria Cano, duly appealed from the order, insisting that the ownership of the reservatario can not be decreed
in a mere proceeding under sec. 112 of Act 496, but requires a judicial administration proceedings, wherein the rights of appellee, as the reservatario
entitled to the reservable property, are to be declared. In this connection, appellants argue that the reversion in favor of the reservatario requires the
declaration of the existence of the following facts:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"(1) The property was received by a ascendant by gratuitous titled from an ascendant or from a brother or sister;

(2) Said descendant dies without issue;

(3) The property ascendant by operation of law; and

(4) The existence of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which said property came." (Appellants’ Brief, p. 8)

We find the appeal untenable. The requisites enumerated by appellants have already been declared to exist by the decree of registration wherein the
rights of the appellee as reservatario troncal were expressly recognized:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"From the above-quoted agreed stipulation of facts, it is evident that Lot No. 1799 was acquired by the applicant Maria Cano by inheritance from her
deceased daughter, Lourdes Guerrero who, in turn, inherited the same from her father Evaristo Guerrero and, hence falls squarely under the provisions
of Article 891 of the Civil Code; and that each and everyone of the private oppositors are within the third degree of consanguinity of the decedent
Evaristo Guerrero, and who belonging to the same line from which the property came.

It appears, however, from the agreed stipulation of facts that with exception of Eustaquia Guerrero, who is the only living daughter of the decedent
Evaristo Guerrero, by his former marriage, all the other oppositors are grandchildren of the said Evaristo Guerrero by his former marriages. Eustaquia
Guerrero, being the nearest of kin, excludes all the other private oppositors, whose degree of relationship to the decedent is remoter (Article 962, Civil
Code; Director of Lands v. Aguas, 62 Phil., 279)." (Rec. App. pp. 16-17)

This decree having become final, all persons (appellees included) are barred thereby from contesting the existence of the constituent elements of the
reserva. The only requisites for the passing of the titled from the reservista to the appellee are: (1) the death of the reservista; and (2) the fact that the
reservatario has survived the reservista. Both facts are admitted, and their existence in nowhere questioned.

The contention that an intestacy proceeding is still necessary rests upon the assumption that the reservatario will succeed in, or inherit, the reservable
property from the reservista. This is not true. The reservatario is not the reservista’s successor mortis causa nor is the reservable property part of the
reservista’s estate; the reservatario receives the property as a conditional heir of the descendant (prepositus), said property merely reverting to the
line of origin from which it had temporarily and accidentally strayed during the reservatarios that survive the reservista, the latter must be deemed to
have enjoyed no more than a life interest in the reservable property.

It is a consequence of these principles that upon the death of the reservista, the reservatario nearest to the prepositus (the appellee in this case)
becomes, automatically and by operation of law, the owner of the reservable property. As already stated, that property is no part of the estate of the
reservista, and does not even answer for the debts of the latter. Hence, its acquisition by the reservatario may be entered in the property records
without necessity of estate proceedings, since the basic requisites therefor appear of record. It is equally well settled that the reservable property can
not be transmitted by a reservista to her or his own successors mortis causa, (like appellants herein) so long as a reservatario within the third degree
from the prepositus and belonging to the line whence the property came, is in existence when the reservista dies.

Of course, where the registration decree merely specifies the reservable character of the property, without determining the identity of the reservatario
(as in the case of Director of Lands v. Aguas, 63 Phil., 279) or where several reservatarios dispute the property among themselves, further proceedings
would be unavoidable. But this is not the case. The rights of the reservataria Eustaquia Guerrero have been expressly recognized, and it is nowhere
claimed that there are other reservatarios of equal or nearer degree. It is thus apparent that the heirs of the reservista are merely endeavoring to
prolong their enjoyment of the reservable property to the detriment of the party lawfully entitled thereto.

We find no error in the order appealed from therefore, the same is affirmed with costs against appellants in both instances. So ordered.
[G.R. No. 118449. February 11, 1998]
LAURO G. VIZCONDE, petitioner, vs., COURT OF APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Branch 120, Caloocan City, and RAMON G.
NICOLAS, respondents.
DECISION
FRANCISCO, J.:
Petitioner Lauro G. Vizconde and his wife Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde had two children, viz., Carmela and Jennifer. Petitioners wife, Estrellita, is one
of the five siblings of spouses Rafael Nicolas and Salud Gonzales-Nicolas. The other children of Rafael and Salud are Antonio Nicolas; Ramon
Nicolas; Teresita Nicolas de Leon, and Ricardo Nicolas, an incompetent.Antonio predeceased his parents and is now survived by his widow, Zenaida,
and their four children.
On May 22, 1979, Estrellita purchased from Rafael a parcel of land with an area of 10,110 sq. m. located at Valenzuela, Bulacan (hereafter Valenzuela
property) covered by TCT No. (T-36734) 13206 for One Hundred Thirty Five Thousand Pesos (P135,000.00), evidenced by a Lubusang Bilihan ng
Bahagi ng Lupa na Nasasakupan ng Titulo TCT NO. T-36734.[1] In view thereof, TCT No. V-554 covering the Valenzuela property was issued to
Estrellita.[2] On March 30, 1990, Estrellita sold the Valenzuela property to Amelia Lim and Maria Natividad Balictar Chiu for Three Million, Four Hundred
Five Thousand, Six Hundred Twelve Pesos (P3,405,612.00).[3] In June of the same year, Estrellita bought from Premiere Homes, Inc., a parcel of
land with improvements situated at Vinzon St., BF Homes, Paraaque (hereafter Paraaque property) using a portion of the proceeds was used in
buying a car while the balance was deposited in a bank.
The following year an unfortunate event in petitioners life occurred. Estrellita and her two daughters, Carmela and Jennifer, were killed on June 30,
1991, an incident popularly known as the Vizconde Massacre. The findings of the investigation conducted by the NBI reveal that Estrellita died ahead
of her daughters.[4] Accordingly, Carmela, Jennifer and herein petitioner succeeded Estrellita and, with the subsequent death of Carmela and Jennifer,
petitioner was left as the sole heir of his daughters. Nevertheless, petitioner entered into an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of Deceased
Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde With Waiver of Shares,[5] with Rafael and Salud, Estrellitas parents. The extra-judicial settlement provided for the division
of the properties of Estrellita and her two daughters between petitioner and spouses Rafael and Salud. The properties include bank deposits, a car
and the Paraaque property. The total value of the deposits deducting the funeral and other related expenses in the burial of Estrellita, Carmela and
Jennifer, amounts to Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00).[6] The settlement gave fifty percent (50%) of the total amount of the bank deposits of
Estrellita and her daughters to Rafael, except Saving Account No. 104-111211-0 under the name of Jennifer which involves a token amount. The
other fifty percent (50%) was allotted to petitioner. The Paraaque property and the car were also given to petitioner with Rafael and Salud waiving all
their claims, rights, ownership and participation as heirs[7] in the said properties.
On November 18, 1992, Rafael died. To settle Rafaels estate, Teresita instituted an intestate estate proceeding[8] docketed as Sp. Proc. No. C-1679,
with Branch 120 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City listing as heirs Salud, Ramon, Ricardo and the wife (Zenaida) and children of
Antonio. Teresita prayed to be appointed Special Administratrix of Rafaels estate. Additionally, she sought to be appointed as guardian ad litem of
Salud, now senile, and Ricardo, her incompetent brother. Herein private respondent Ramon filed an opposition[9]dated March 24, 1993, praying to be
appointed instead as Salud and Ricardos guardian. Barely three weeks passed, Ramon filed another opposition[10] alleging, among others, that
Estrellita was given the Valenzuela property by Rafael which she sold for not les than Six Million Pesos (P6,000,000.00) before her gruesome
murder. Ramon pleaded for courts intervention to determine the legality and validity of the intervivos distribution made by deceased Rafael to his
children,[11] Estrellita included. On May 12, 1993, Ramon filed his own petition, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. C-1699, entitled InMatter Of The
Guardianship Of Salud G. Nicolas and Ricardo G. Nicolas and averred that their legitime should come from the collation of all the properties distributed
to his children by Rafael during his lifetime.[12] Ramon stated that herein petitioner is one of Rafaels children by right of representation as the widower
of deceased legitimate daughter of Estrellita.[13]
In a consolidated Order, dated November 9, 1993, the RTC appointed Ramon as the Guardian of Salud and Ricardo while Teresita, in turn, was
appointed as the Special Administratrix of Rafaels estate. The courts Order did not include petitioner in the slate of Rafaels heirs.[14] Neither was the
Paraaque property listed in its list of properties to be included in the estate. [15]Subsequently, the RTC in an Order dated January 5, 1994, removed
Ramon as Salud and Ricardos guardian for selling his wards property without the courts knowledge and permission.[16]
Sometime on January 13, 1994, the RTC released an Order giving petitioner ten (10) days x x x within which to file any appropriate petition or motion
related to the pending petition insofar as the case is concerned and to file any opposition to any pending motion that has been filed by both the
counsels for Ramon Nicolas and Teresita de Leon. In response, petitioner filed a Manifestation, dated January 19, 1994, stressing tha the was neither
a compulsory heir nor an intestate heir of Rafael and he has no interest to participate in the proceedings. The RTC noted said Manifestation in its
Order dated February 2, 1994.[17] Despite the Manifestation, Ramon, through a motion dated February 14, 1994, moved to include petitioner in the
intestate estate proceeding and asked that the Paraaque property, as well as the car and the balance of the proceeds of the sale of the Valenzuela
property, be collated.[18] Acting on Ramons motion, the trial court on March 10, 1994 granted the same in an Order which pertinently reads as follows:
xxxxxxxxx
On the Motion To Include Lauro G. Vizconde In Intestate proceedings in instant case and considering the comment on hi Manifestation, the same is
hereby granted.[19]
xxxxxxxxx
Petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid Order which Ramon opposed. [20] On August 12, 1994, the RTC rendered an Order
denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. It provides:
xxxxxxxxx
The centerpoint of oppositor-applicants argument is that spouses Vizconde were then financially incapable of having purchased or acquired for a
valuable consideration the property at Valenzuela from the deceased Rafael Nicolas. Admittedly, the spouses Vizconde were then living with the
deceased Rafael Nicolas in the latters ancestral home. In fact, as the argument further goes, said spouses were dependent for support on the
deceased Rafael Nicolas. And Lauro Vizconde left for the United States in, de-facto separation, from the family for sometime and returned to the
Philippines only after the occurrence of violent deaths of Estrellita and her two daughters.
To dispute the contention that the spouses Vizconde were financially incapable to buy the property from the late Rafael Nicolas, Lauro Vizconde
claims that they have been engaged in business venture such as taxi business, canteen concessions and garment manufacturing. However, no
competent evidence has been submitted to indubitably support the business undertakings adverted to.
In fine, there is no sufficient evidence to show that the acquisition of the property from Rafael Nicolas was for a valuable consideration.
Accordingly, the transfer of the property at Valenzuela in favor of Estrellita by her father was gratuitous and the subject property in Paraaque which
was purchased out of the proceeds of the said transfer of property by the deceased Rafael Nicolas in favor of Estrellita, is subject to collation.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED.[21] (Underscoring added)
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with respondent Court of Appeals. In its decision of December 14, 1994, respondent Court of
Appeals[22] denied the petition stressing that the RTC correctly adjudicated the question on the title of the Valenzuela property as the jurisdiction of
the probate court extends to matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers in handling the settlement of the estate of the
deceased (Cf.: Sec. 1, Rule 90, Revised Rules of Court).[23] Dissatisfied, petitioner filed the instant petition for review on certiorari. Finding prima
facie merit, the Court on December 4, 1995, gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda.
The core issue hinges on the validity of the probate courts Order, which respondent Court of Appeals sustained, nullifying the transfer of the Valenzuela
property from Rafael to Estrellita and declaring the Paraaque property as subject to collation.
The appeal is well taken.
Basic principles of collation need to be emphasized at the outset. Article 1061 of the Civil Code speaks of collation. It states:
Art. 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he
may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed
in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition.
Collation is the act by virtue of which descendants or other forced heirs who intervene in the division of the inheritance of an ascendant bring into the
common mass, the property which they received from him, so that the division may be made according to law and the will of the testator. [24] Collation
is only required of compulsory heirs succeeding with other compulsory heirs and involves property or rights received by donation or gratuitous title
during the lifetime of the decedent.[25] The purpose for it is presumed that the intention of the testator or predecessor in interest in making a donation
or gratuitous transfer to a forced heir is to give him something in advance on account of his share in the estate, and that the predecessors will is to
treat all his heirs equally, in the absence of any expression to the contrary.[26] Collation does not impose any lien on the property or the subject matter
of collationable donation. What is brought to collation is not the property donated itself, but rather the value of such property at the time it was
donated,[27] the rationale being that the donation is a real alienation which conveys ownership upon its acceptance, hence any increase in value or
any deterioration or loss thereof is for the account of the heir or donee.[28]
The attendant facts herein do no make a case of collation. We find that the probate court, as well as respondent Court of Appeals, committed reversible
errors.
First: The probate court erred in ordering the inclusion of petitioner in the intestate estate proceeding. Petitioner, a son-in-law of Rafael, is one of
Rafaels compulsory heirs. Article 887 of the Civil Code is clear on this point:
Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs:
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants;
(2) In default of the following, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their legitimate children and ascendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287.
Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4, and 5 are not excluded by those in Nos 1 and 2; neither do they exclude one another.
In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved.
The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three classes mentioned, shall inherit from them in the manner and to the extent established by this
Code.
With respect to Rafaels estate, therefore, petitioner who was not even shown to be a creditor of Rafael is considered a third person or a stranger. [29] As
such, petitioner may not be dragged into the intestate estate proceeding. Neither may he be permitted or allowed to intervene as he has no personality
or interest in the said proceeding,[30] which petitioner correctly argued in his manifestation.[31]
Second: As a rule, the probate court may pass upon and determine the title or ownership of a property which may or may not be included in the estate
proceedings.[32] Such determination is provisional in character and is subject to final decision in a separate action to resolve title.[33] In the case at
bench, however, we note that the probate court went beyond the scope of its jurisdiction when it proceeded to determine the validity of the sale of the
Valenzuela property between Rafael and Estrellita and ruled that the transfer of the subject property between the concerned parties was
gratuitous. The interpretation of the deed and the true intent of the contracting parties, as well as the presence or absence of consideration, are matter
outside the probate courts jurisdiction. These issues should be ventilated in an appropriate action. We reiterate:
x x x we are of the opinion and so hold, that a court which takes cognizance of testate or intestate proceedings has power and jurisdiction to determine
whether or not the properties included therein or excluded therefrom belong prima facie to the deceased, although such a determination is not final
or ultimate in nature, and without prejudice to the right of the interested parties, in a proper action, to raise the question bearing on the ownership or
existence of the right or credit.[34]
Third: The order of the probate court subjecting the Paraaque property to collation is premature. Records indicate that the intestate estate proceedings
is still in its initiatory stage. We find nothing herein to indicate that the legitimate of any of Rafaels heirs has been impaired to warrant collation. We
thus advert to our ruling in Udarbe v. Jurado, 59 Phil. 11, 13-14, to wit:
We are of the opinion that this contention is untenable. In accordance with the provisions of article 1035[35] of the Civil Code, it was the duty of the
plaintiffs to allege and prove that the donations received by the defendants were inofficious in whole or in part and prejudiced the legitimate or
hereditary portion to which they are entitled. In the absence of evidence to that effect, the collation sought is untenable for lack of ground or basis
therefor.
Fourth: Even on the assumption that collation is appropriate in this case the probate court, nonetheless, made a reversible error in ordering collation
of the Paraaque property. We note that what was transferred to Estrellita, by way of a deed of sale, is the Valenzuela property. The Paraaque property
which Estrellita acquired by using the proceeds of the sale of the Valenzuela property does not become collationable simply by reason thereof. Indeed
collation of the Paraaque property has no statutory basis.[36] The order of the probate court presupposes that the Paraaque property was gratuitously
conveyed by Rafael to Estrellita. Records indicate, however, that the Paraaque property was conveyed for and in consideration of P900,000.00,[37] by
Premier Homes, Inc., to Estrellita. Rafael, the decedent, has no participation therein, and petitioner who inherited and is now the present owner of the
Paraaque property is not one of Rafaels heirs. Thus, the probate courts order of collation against petitioner is unwarranted for the obligation to collate
is lodged with Estrellita, the heir, and not to herein petitioner who does not have any interest in Rafaels estate. As it stands, collation of the Paraaque
property is improper for, to repeat, collation covers only properties gratuitously given by the decedent during his lifetime to his compulsory heirs which
fact does not obtain anent the transfer of the Paraaque property. Moreover, Rafael, in a public instrument, voluntarily and willfully waived any claims,
rights, ownership and participation as heir[38] in the Paraaque property.
Fifth: Finally, it is futile for the probate court to ascertain whether or not the Valenzuela property may be brought to collation. Estrellita, it should be
stressed, died ahead of Rafael. In fact, it was Rafael who inherited from Estrellita an amount more than the value of the Valenzuela property.[39] Hence,
even assuming that the Valenzuela property may be collated collation may not be allowed as the value of the Valenzuela property has long been
returned to the estate of Rafael. Therefore, any determination by the probate court on the matter serves no valid and binding purpose.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals appealed from is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005]

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA
HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her natural mother as her middle name? This is the issue raised
in the instant case.
The facts are undisputed.
On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition[1] to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia.
He alleged therein, among others, that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994;[2] that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie has been
using her mothers middle name and surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanies
middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia, her mothers surname, and that her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig, his surname.
On March 23, 2001,[3] the trial court rendered the assailed Decision granting the adoption, thus:
After a careful consideration of the evidence presented by the petitioner, and in the absence of any opposition to the petition, this Court finds that the
petitioner possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualification provided for by law as an adoptive parent, and that as such he is qualified
to maintain, care for and educate the child to be adopted; that the grant of this petition would redound to the best interest and welfare of the minor
Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. The Court further holds that the petitioners care and custody of the child since her birth up to the present constitute
more than enough compliance with the requirement of Article 35 of Presidential Decree No. 603.
WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be meritorious, the same is GRANTED. Henceforth, Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia is hereby freed from all
obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to her natural mother, and for civil purposes, shall henceforth be the petitioners legitimate
child and legal heir. Pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code of the Philippines, the minor shall be known as STEPHANIE NATHY CATINDIG.
Upon finality of this Decision, let the same be entered in the Local Civil Registrar concerned pursuant to Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.
Let copy of this Decision be furnished the National Statistics Office for record purposes.
SO ORDERED.[4]
On April 20, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration [5] praying that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of
her natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle name.
On May 28, 2001,[6] the trial court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child
to use the surname of his biological mother as his middle name.
Hence, the present petition raising the issue of whether an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle name when she is
subsequently adopted by her natural father.
Petitioner submits that the trial court erred in depriving Stephanie of a middle name as a consequence of adoption because: (1) there is no law
prohibiting an adopted child from having a middle name in case there is only one adopting parent; (2) it is customary for every Filipino to have as
middle name the surname of the mother; (3) the middle name or initial is a part of the name of a person; (4) adoption is for the benefit and best interest
of the adopted child, hence, her right to bear a proper name should not be violated; (5) permitting Stephanie to use the middle name Garcia (her
mothers surname) avoids the stigma of her illegitimacy; and; (6) her continued use of Garcia as her middle name is not opposed by either the Catindig
or Garcia families.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), agrees with petitioner that Stephanie should be permitted to use, as her middle name,
the surname of her natural mother for the following reasons:
First, it is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanies filiation with her natural mother because under Article 189 of the Family Code, she remains
to be an intestate heir of the latter. Thus, to prevent any confusion and needless hardship in the future, her relationship or proof of that relationship
with her natural mother should be maintained.
Second, there is no law expressly prohibiting Stephanie to use the surname of her natural mother as her middle name. What the law does not prohibit,
it allows.
Last, it is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name, which is ordinarily the surname of the mother. This custom has been recognized by the
Civil Code and Family Code. In fact, the Family Law Committees agreed that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the
surname of the father so that the second name, if any, will be before the surname of the mother. [7]
We find merit in the petition.
Use Of Surname Is Fixed By Law
For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the designation by which he is known and called in the community in which he lives and is best
known. It is defined as the word or combination of words by which a person is distinguished from other individuals and, also, as the label or appellation
which he bears for the convenience of the world at large addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him.[8] It is both of personal as well as public
interest that every person must have a name.
The name of an individual has two parts: (1) the given or proper name and (2) the surname or family name. The given or proper name is that which
is given to the individual at birth or at baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The surname or family name is that which identifies the family
to which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The given name may be freely selected by the parents for the child, but the surname to
which the child is entitled is fixed by law.[9]
Thus, Articles 364 to 380 of the Civil Code provides the substantive rules which regulate the use of surname [10] of an individual whatever may be his
status in life, i.e., whether he may be legitimate or illegitimate, an adopted child, a married woman or a previously married woman, or a widow, thus:
Art. 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.
Art. 365. An adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter.
xxx
Art. 369. Children conceived before the decree annulling a voidable marriage shall principally use the surname of the father.
Art. 370. A married woman may use:
(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or
(2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname or
(3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as Mrs.
Art. 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty party, she shall resume her maiden name and surname. If she is the innocent
spouse, she may resume her maiden name and surname. However, she may choose to continue employing her former husband's surname, unless:
(1) The court decrees otherwise, or
(2) She or the former husband is married again to another person.
Art. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue using her name and surname employed before the legal separation.
Art. 373. A widow may use the deceased husband's surname as though he were still living, in accordance with Article 370.
Art. 374. In case of identity of names and surnames, the younger person shall be obliged to use such additional name or surname as will avoid
confusion.
Art. 375. In case of identity of names and surnames between ascendants and descendants, the word Junior can be used only by a son. Grandsons
and other direct male descendants shall either:
(1) Add a middle name or the mother's surname,
(2) Add the Roman numerals II, III, and so on.
xxx
Law Is Silent As To The Use Of
Middle Name
As correctly submitted by both parties, there is no law regulating the use of a middle name. Even Article 176 [11] of the Family Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 9255, otherwise known as An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father, is silent as to what middle
name a child may use.
The middle name or the mothers surname is only considered in Article 375(1), quoted above, in case there is identity of names and surnames between
ascendants and descendants, in which case, the middle name or the mothers surname shall be added.
Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use. Article 365 of the Civil Code merely provides that an adopted
child shall bear the surname of the adopter. Also, Article 189 of the Family Code, enumerating the legal effects of adoption, is likewise silent on the
matter, thus:
"(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and
obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including the right of the adopted to use the surname of the adopters;
xxx
However, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, the members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees that drafted the Family Code recognized
the Filipino custom of adding the surname of the childs mother as his middle name. In the Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and
Family Law Committees, the members approved the suggestion that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the
surname of the father, thus
Justice Caguioa commented that there is a difference between the use by the wife of the surname and that of the child because the fathers surname
indicates the family to which he belongs, for which reason he would insist on the use of the fathers surname by the child but that, if he
wants to, the child may also use the surname of the mother.
Justice Puno posed the question: If the child chooses to use the surname of the mother, how will his name be written? Justice Caguioa replied that it
is up to him but that his point is that it should be mandatory that the child uses the surname of the father and permissive in the case of the
surname of the mother.
Prof. Baviera remarked that Justice Caguioas point is covered by the present Article 364, which reads:
Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.
Justice Puno pointed out that many names change through no choice of the person himself precisely because of this misunderstanding. He then cited
the following example: Alfonso Ponce Enriles correct surname is Ponce since the mothers surname is Enrile but everybody calls him Atty. Enrile.
Justice Jose Gutierrez Davids family name is Gutierrez and his mothers surname is David but they all call him Justice David.
Justice Caguioa suggested that the proposed Article (12) be modified to the effect that it shall be mandatory on the child to use the surname
of the father but he may use the surname of the mother by way of an initial or a middle name. Prof. Balane stated that they take note of this for
inclusion in the Chapter on Use of Surnames since in the proposed Article (10) they are just enumerating the rights of legitimate children so that the
details can be covered in the appropriate chapter.
xxx
Justice Puno remarked that there is logic in the simplification suggested by Justice Caguioa that the surname of the father should always be last
because there are so many traditions like the American tradition where they like to use their second given name and the Latin tradition, which is also
followed by the Chinese wherein they even include the Clan name.
xxx
Justice Puno suggested that they agree in principle that in the Chapter on the Use of Surnames, they should say that initial or surname of
the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father so that the second name, if any, will be before the surname of the mother.
Prof. Balane added that this is really the Filipino way. The Committee approved the suggestion. [12] (Emphasis supplied)
In the case of an adopted child, the law provides that the adopted shall bear the surname of the adopters.[13] Again, it is silent whether he can use a
middle name. What it only expressly allows, as a matter of right and obligation, is for the adoptee to bear the surname of the adopter, upon issuance
of the decree of adoption.[14]
The Underlying Intent of
Adoption Is In Favor of the
Adopted Child
Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether related or not to the adopter, possess in general, the rights accorded to a legitimate
child.[15] It is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem which creates between two persons a relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity
and filiation.[16] The modern trend is to consider adoption not merely as an act to establish a relationship of paternity and filiation, but also as an act
which endows the child with a legitimate status.[17] This was, indeed, confirmed in 1989, when the Philippines, as a State Party to the Convention
of the Rights of the Child initiated by the United Nations, accepted the principle that adoption is impressed with social and moral
responsibility, and that its underlying intent is geared to favor the adopted child.[18] Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as the Domestic
Adoption Act of 1998,[19]secures these rights and privileges for the adopted.[20]
One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopter for all intents and purposes pursuant to Article
189[21] of the Family Code and Section 17[22] Article V of RA 8552.[23]
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child
without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother, as discussed above. This is
consistent with the intention of the members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees as earlier discussed. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the
initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father.
Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties, Stephanies continued use of her mothers surname (Garcia) as her middle name will maintain her maternal
lineage. It is to be noted that Article 189(3) of the Family Code and Section 18[24], Article V of RA 8552 (law on adoption) provide that the adoptee
remains an intestate heir of his/her biological parent. Hence, Stephanie can well assert or claim her hereditary rights from her natural mother in the
future.
Moreover, records show that Stephanie and her mother are living together in the house built by petitioner for them at 390 Tumana, San Jose, Baliuag,
Bulacan. Petitioner provides for all their needs. Stephanie is closely attached to both her mother and father. She calls them Mama and Papa. Indeed,
they are one normal happy family. Hence, to allow Stephanie to use her mothers surname as her middle name will not only sustain her continued
loving relationship with her mother but will also eliminate the stigma of her illegitimacy.
Liberal Construction of
Adoption Statutes In Favor Of
Adoption
It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of
adoption.[25] The interests and welfare of the adopted child are of primary and paramount consideration,[26] hence, every reasonable intendment should
be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.[27]
Lastly, Art. 10 of the New Civil Code provides that:
In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.
This provision, according to the Code Commission, is necessary so that it may tip the scales in favor of right and justice when the law is doubtful or
obscure. It will strengthen the determination of the courts to avoid an injustice which may apparently be authorized by some way of interpreting the
law.[28]
Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mothers
surname, we find no reason why she should not be allowed to do so.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is partly MODIFIED in the sense that Stephanie should be allowed to use her mothers
surname GARCIA as her middle name.
Let the corresponding entry of her correct and complete name be entered in the decree of adoption.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 138774 March 8, 2001

REGINA FRANCISCO AND ZENAIDA PASCUAL, petitioners,
vs.
AIDA FRANCISCO-ALFONSO, respondent.
PARDO, J.:
May a legitimate daughter be deprived of her share in the estate of her deceased father by a simulated contract transferring the property of her father
to his illegitimate children?
The case before the Court is an appeal via certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals1 declaring void the deed of sale of two parcels of land
conveyed to petitioners who are illegitimate children of the deceased to the exclusion of respondent, his sole legitimate daughter.
The facts2 are:
Respondent Aida Francisco-Alfonso (hereafter Aida) is the only daughter of spouses Gregorio Francisco and Cirila de la Cruz, who are now both
deceased.
Petitioners, on the other hand, are daughters of the late Gregorio Francisco with his common law wife Julia Mendoza, with whom he begot seven (7)
children.
Gregorio Francisco (hereafter Gregorio) owned two parcels of residential land, situated in Barangay Lolomboy, Bocaue, Bulacan, covered by TCT
Nos. T-32740 and T-117160. When Gregorio was confined in a hospital in 1990, he confided to his daughter Aida that the certificates of title of his
property were in the possession of Regina Francisco and Zenaida Pascual.
After Gregorio died on July 20, 1990,3 Aida inquired about the certificates of title from her half sisters. They informed her that Gregorio had sold the
land to them on August 15, 1983. After verification, Aida learned that there was indeed a deed of absolute sale in favor of Regina Francisco and
Zenaida Pascual. Thus, on August 15, 1983, Gregorio executed a "Kasulatan sa Ganap na Bilihan, whereby for P25,000.00, he sold the two parcels
of land to Regina Francisco and Zenaida Pascual. By virtue of the sale, the Register of Deeds of Bulacan issued TCT No. T-59.585 to Regina
Francisco and TCT T-59.586 to Zenaida Pascual.4
On April 1, 1991, Aida filed with the Regional Trial Court, Bulacan a complaint against petitioners for annulment of sale with damages.5 She alleged
that the signature of her late father, Gregorio Francisco, on the Kasulatan sa Ganap na Bilihan dated August 15, 1983, was a forgery.
In their joint answer to the complaint, petitioners denied the alleged forgery or simulation of the deed of sale. After due proceedings, on July 21, 1994,
the trial court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint. The dispositive portion reads:
"WHEREFORE, on the basis of the evidence adduced and the law applicable thereon, the Court hereby renders judgment:
"a) sustaining the validity of the "Kasulatan Sa Ganap Na Bilihan" (Exh."G") executed on 15 August 1993 by the late Gregorio Francisco in favor of
the defendants;
"b) affirming the validity of the Transfer Certificates of Title No. T-59.585 (Exh. "I") issued to defendant Regina Francisco and No. T-59.386 (Exh. "H")
issued to defendant Zenaida Pascual; and
"c) dismissing the complaint as well as the defendants' counterclaim for damages and attorney's fees for lack of merit." 6
In time7, respondent Alfonso appealed to the Court of Appeals.8
After due proceedings, on April 30, 1999, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision reversing that of the trial court, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
"WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 21, 1994 of the court a quo is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another rendered as follows:
"1. The Kasulatan Sa Ganap na Bilihan dated August 15, 1983 (Exhibit "G") is declared null and void from the beginning and TCT Nos. T-59.585 (M)
and T-59-586 (M), both of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan (Meycauayan Branch) in the names of Regina Francisco and Zenaida Pascual,
respectively, are annulled and cancelled;
"2. The Register of Deeds of Bulacan (Meycauayan Branch) is ordered to cancel the aforementioned TCT Nos. T-59.585 (M) and T-59.586 (M) and
to reinstate Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-132740 and T-117160 both in the name of Gregorio Francisco.
"3. Defendants-appellees Regina Francisco and Zenaida Pascual jointly and solidarily are ordered to pay plaintiff-appellant Alfonso the amount of
P5,000.00 as moral damages, P5,000.00 as exemplary damages and P5,000.00 as attorney's fees.
"4. The counterclaim of defendants-appellees is dismissed for lack of merit.
"Costs of suit against said defendants-appellees." 9
Hence, this petition.10
The main issue raised is whether the Supreme Court may review the factual findings of the appellate court. The jurisdiction of this Court in cases
brought before it from the Court of Appeals under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court is limited to review of pure errors of law. It is not the function
of this Court to analyze or weigh evidence all over again, unless there is a showing that the findings of the lower court are totally devoid of support or
are glaringly erroneous as to constitute grave abuse of discretion.11
The findings of fact of the Court of Appeals supported by substantial evidence are conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewable by
this Court,12 unless the case falls under any of the recognized exceptions to the rule.13
Petitioner has failed to prove that the case falls within the exceptions.14
We affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals because:
First: The kasulatan was simulated. There was no consideration for the contract of sale. Felicitas de la Cruz, a family friend of the Franciscos, testified
that Zenaida Pascual and Regina Francisco did not have any source of income in 1983, when they bought the property, until the time when Felicitas
testified in 1991.15
As proof of income, however, Zenaida Pascual testified that she was engaged in operating a canteen, working as cashier in Mayon Night Club as well
as buying and selling RTW (Ready to Wear) items in August of 1983 and prior thereto.
Zenaida alleged that she paid her father the amount of P10,000.00. She did not withdraw money from her bank account at the Rural Bank of
Meycauayan, Bulacan, to pay for the property. She had personal savings other than those deposited in the bank. Her gross earnings from the RTW
for three years was P9,000.00, and she earned P50.00 a night at the club.16
Regina Francisco, on the other hand, was a market vendor, selling nilugaw, earning a net income of P300.00 a day in 1983. She bought the property
from the deceased for P15,000.00.17 She had no other source of income.
We find it incredible that engaging in buy and sell could raise the amount of P10,000.00, or that earnings in selling goto could save enough to pay
P15,000.00, in cash for the land.
The testimonies of petitioners were incredible considering their inconsistent statements as to whether there was consideration for the sale and also
as to whether the property was bought below or above its supposed market value. They could not even present a single witness to the kasulatan that
would prove receipt of the purchase price.
Since there was no cause or consideration for the sale, the same was a simulation and hence, null and void.18
Second: Even if the kasulatan was not simulated, it still violated the Civil Code19 provisions insofar as the transaction affected respondent's legitime.
The sale was executed in 1983, when the applicable law was the Civil Code, not the Family Code.
Obviously, the sale was Gregorio's way to transfer the property to his illegitimate daughters20 at the expense of his legitimate daughter. The sale was
executed to prevent respondent Alfonso from claiming her legitime and rightful share in said property. Before his death, Gregorio had a change of
heart and informed his daughter about the titles to the property.
According to Article 888, Civil Code:
"The legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half of the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother.
"The latter may freely dispose of the remaining half subject to the rights of illegitimate children and of the surviving spouse as hereinafter provided."
Gregorio Francisco did not own any other property. If indeed the parcels of land involved were the only property left by their father, the sale in fact
would deprive respondent of her share in her father's estate. By law, she is entitled to half of the estate of her father as his only legitimate child. 21
The legal heirs of the late Gregorio Francisco must be determined in proper testate or intestate proceedings for settlement of the estate. His
compulsory heir can not be deprived of her share in the estate save by disinheritance as prescribed by law.22
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. CV No. 48545 is AFFIRMED, in toto.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS, G.R. No. 179922

Petitioner,
Present:

- versus - YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,

Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
FELICIDAD SANDOVAL, also CHICO-NAZARIO,
known as FELICIDAD S. VDA. NACHURA, and
DE CARLOS or FELICIDAD REYES, JJ.
SANDOVAL CARLOS or
FELICIDAD SANDOVAL VDA.
DE CARLOS, and TEOFILO Promulgated:
CARLOS II,
Respondents. December 16, 2008

x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

REYES, R.T., J.:

ONLY a spouse can initiate an action to sever the marital bond for marriages solemnized during the effectivity of the Family Code, except cases
commenced prior to March 15, 2003. The nullity and annulment of a marriage cannot be declared in a judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment,
or confession of judgment.

We pronounce these principles as We review on certiorari the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) which reversed and set aside the summary
judgment[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in an action for declaration of nullity of marriage, status of a child, recovery of property, reconveyance,
sum of money, and damages.

The Facts

The events that led to the institution of the instant suit are unveiled as follows:

Spouses Felix B. Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate. They left six parcels of land to their compulsory heirs, Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan
De Dios Carlos. The lots are particularly described as follows:

Parcel No. 1

Lot No. 162 of the MUNTINLUPA ESTATE SUBDIVISION, Case No. 6137 of the Court of Land Registration.

Exemption from the provisions of Article 567 of the Civil Code is specifically reserved.

Area: 1 hectare, 06 ares, 07 centares.

Parcel No. 2

A parcel of land (Lot No. 159-B), being a portion of Lot 159, situated in the Bo. of Alabang, Municipality of Muntinlupa, Province of Rizal, x x x
containing an area of Thirteen Thousand Four Hundred Forty One (13,441) square meters.

Parcel No. 3

A parcel of land (Lot 159-B-2 of the subd. plan [LRC] Psd-325903, approved as a non-subd. project), being a portion of Lot 159-B [LRC] Psd- Alabang,
Mun. of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the NE, points 2 to 4 by Lot 155, Muntinlupa Estate; on the SE, point 4 to 5 by Lot
159-B-5; on the S, points 5 to 1 by Lot 159-B-3; on the W, points 1 to 2 by Lot 159-B-1 (Road widening) all of the subd. plan, containing an area
of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY (130) SQ. METERS, more or less.

PARCEL No. 4

A parcel of land (Lot 28-C of the subd. plan Psd-13-007090, being a portion of Lot 28, Muntinlupa Estate, L.R.C. Rec. No. 6137), situated in the Bo.
of Alabang, Mun. of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. Bounded on the NE, along lines 1-2 by Lot 27, Muntinlupa Estate; on the East & SE, along lines 2 to
6 by Mangangata River; and on the West., along line 6-1, by Lot 28-B of the subd. plan x x x containing an area of ONE THUSAND AND SEVENTY-
SIX (1,076) SQUARE METERS.

PARCEL No. 5

PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 50, Manzana No. 18, de la subd. de Solocan. Linda por el NW, con la parcela 49; por el NE, con la parcela 36; por el
SE, con la parcela 51; y por el SW, con la calle Dos Castillas. Partiendo de un punto marcado 1 en el plano, el cual se halla a S. gds. 01'W, 72.50
mts. Desde el punto 1 de esta manzana, que es un mojon de concreto de la Ciudad de Manila, situado on el esquina E. que forman las Calles Laong
Laan y Dos. Castillas, continiendo un extension superficial de CIENTO CINCUENTA (150) METROS CUADRADOS.

PARCEL No. 6
PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 51, Manzana No. 18, de la subd. De Solocon. Linda por el NW, con la parcela 50; por el NE, con la parcela 37; por el
SE, con la parcela 52; por el SW, con la Calle Dos Castillas. Partiendo de un punto Marcado 1 en el plano, el cual se halla at S. 43 gds. 01'E, 82.50
mts. Desde el punto 1 de esta manzana, que es un mojon de concreto de la Ciudad de Manila, situado on el esquina E. que forman las Calles Laong
Laan y Dos. Castillas, continiendo una extension superficial de CIENTO CINCUENTA (150) METROS CUADRADOS. [3]

During the lifetime of Felix Carlos, he agreed to transfer his estate to Teofilo. The agreement was made in order to avoid the payment of inheritance
taxes. Teofilo, in turn, undertook to deliver and turn over the share of the other legal heir, petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos.

Eventually, the first three (3) parcels of land were transferred and registered in the name of Teofilo. These three (3) lots are now covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 234824 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City; TCT No. 139061 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City;
and TCT No. 139058 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City.

Parcel No. 4 was registered in the name of petitioner. The lot is now covered by TCT No. 160401 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City.

On May 13, 1992, Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by respondents Felicidad and their son, Teofilo Carlos II (Teofilo II). Upon Teofilos death,
Parcel Nos. 5 & 6 were registered in the name of respondent Felicidad and co-respondent, Teofilo II. The said two (2) parcels of land are covered
by TCT Nos. 219877 and 210878, respectively, issued by the Registry of Deeds of Manila.

In 1994, petitioner instituted a suit against respondents before the RTC in Muntinlupa City, docketed as Civil Case No. 94-1964. In the said case, the
parties submitted and caused the approval of a partial compromise agreement. Under the compromise, the parties acknowledged their respective
shares in the proceeds from the sale of a portion of the first parcel of land. This includes the remaining 6,691-square-meter portion of said land.

On September 17, 1994, the parties executed a deed of extrajudicial partition, dividing the remaining land of the first parcel between them.

Meanwhile, in a separate case entitled Rillo v. Carlos,[4] 2,331 square meters of the second parcel of land were adjudicated in favor of
plaintiffs Rillo. The remaining 10,000-square meter portion was later divided between petitioner and respondents.

The division was incorporated in a supplemental compromise agreement executed on August 17, 1994, with respect to Civil Case No. 94-1964. The
parties submitted the supplemental compromise agreement, which was approved accordingly.
Petitioner and respondents entered into two more contracts in August 1994. Under the contracts, the parties equally divided between them the third
and fourth parcels of land.
In August 1995, petitioner commenced an action, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-135, against respondents before the court a quo with the following
causes of action: (a) declaration of nullity of marriage; (b) status of a child; (c) recovery of property; (d) reconveyance; and (e) sum of money and
damages. The complaint was raffled to Branch 256 of the RTC in Muntinlupa.

In his complaint, petitioner asserted that the marriage between his late brother Teofilo and respondent Felicidad was a nullity in view of the absence
of the required marriage license. He likewise maintained that his deceased brother was neither the natural nor the adoptive father of respondent
Teofilo Carlos II.

Petitioner likewise sought the avoidance of the contracts he entered into with respondent Felicidad with respect to the subject real properties. He also
prayed for the cancellation of the certificates of title issued in the name of respondents. He argued that the properties covered by such certificates of
title, including the sums received by respondents as proceeds, should be reconveyed to him.

Finally, petitioner claimed indemnification as and by way of moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and costs of suit.

On October 16, 1995, respondents submitted their answer. They denied the material averments of petitioners complaint. Respondents contended
that the dearth of details regarding the requisite marriage license did not invalidate Felicidads marriage to Teofilo. Respondents declared that Teofilo II
was the illegitimate child of the deceased TeofiloCarlos with another woman.

On the grounds of lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, respondents prayed for the dismissal of the case before the
trial court. They also asked that their counterclaims for moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees, be granted.

But before the parties could even proceed to pre-trial, respondents moved for summary judgment. Attached to the motion was the affidavit of the
justice of the peace who solemnized the marriage. Respondents also submitted the Certificate of Live Birth of respondent Teofilo II. In the certificate,
the late Teofilo Carlos and respondent Felicidad were designated as parents.

On January 5, 1996, petitioner opposed the motion for summary judgment on the ground of irregularity of the contract evidencing the marriage. In the
same breath, petitioner lodged his own motion for summary judgment. Petitioner presented a certification from the Local Civil Registrar of Calumpit,
Bulacan, certifying that there is no record of birth of respondent Teofilo II.

Petitioner also incorporated in the counter-motion for summary judgment the testimony of respondent Felicidad in another case. Said testimony was
made in Civil Case No. 89-2384, entitled Carlos v. Gorospe, before the RTC Branch 255, Las Pias. In her testimony, respondent Felicidad narrated
that co-respondent Teofilo II is her child with Teofilo.[5]
Subsequently, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa submitted to the trial court its report and manifestation, discounting the possibility of
collusion between the parties.
RTC and CA Dispositions

On April 8, 1996, the RTC rendered judgment, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendants (respondents) Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby denied. Plaintiffs (petitioners) Counter-
Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted and summary judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff as follows:

1. Declaring the marriage between defendant Felicidad Sandoval and Teofilo Carlos solemnized at Silang, Cavite on May 14, 1962, evidenced by the
Marriage Certificate submitted inthis case, null and void ab initio for lack of the requisite marriage license;

2. Declaring that the defendant minor, Teofilo S. Carlos II, is not the natural, illegitimate, or legally adopted child of the late Teofilo E. Carlos;
3. Ordering defendant Sandoval to pay and restitute to plaintiff the sum of P18,924,800.00 together with the interest thereon at the legal rate from
date of filing of the instant complaint until fully paid;

4. Declaring plaintiff as the sole and exclusive owner of the parcel of land, less the portion adjudicated to plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 11975, covered
by TCT No. 139061 of the Register of Deeds of Makati City, and ordering said Register of Deeds to cancel said title and to issue another title in the
sole name of plaintiff herein;

5. Declaring the Contract, Annex K of complaint, between plaintiff and defendant Sandoval null and void, and ordering the Register of Deeds of Makati
City to cancel TCT No. 139058 in the name of Teofilo Carlos, and to issue another title in the sole name of plaintiff herein;

6. Declaring the Contract, Annex M of the complaint, between plaintiff and defendant Sandoval null and void;

7. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210877 in the names of defendant Sandoval and defendant minor Teofilo S. Carlos II and ordering the Register
of Deeds of Manila to issue another title in the exclusive name of plaintiff herein;

8. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210878 in the name of defendant Sandoval and defendant Minor Teofilo S. Carlos II and ordering the Register
of Deeds of Manila to issue another title in the sole name of plaintiff herein.
Let this case be set for hearing for the reception of plaintiffs evidence on his claim for moral damages, exemplary damages, attorneys fees, appearance
fees, and litigation expenses on June 7, 1996 at 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon.

SO ORDERED.[6]

Dissatisfied, respondents appealed to the CA. In the appeal, respondents argued, inter alia, that the trial court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction
in rendering summary judgment annulling the marriage of Teofilo, Sr. and Felicidad and in declaring Teofilo II as not an illegitimate child of Teofilo,
Sr.

On October 15, 2002, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC ruling, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, the summary judgment appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and in lieu thereof, a new one is entered REMANDING the
case to the court of origin for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.[7]

The CA opined:

We find the rendition of the herein appealed summary judgment by the court a quo contrary to law and public policy as ensconced in the aforesaid
safeguards. The fact that it was appellants who first sought summary judgment from the trial court, did not justify the grant thereof in favor of
appellee. Not being an action to recover upon a claim or to obtain a declaratory relief, the rule on summary judgment apply (sic) to an action to annul
a marriage. The mere fact that no genuine issue was presented and the desire to expedite the disposition of the case cannot justify a misinterpretation
of the rule. The first paragraph of Article 88 and 101 of the Civil Code expressly prohibit the rendition of decree of annulment of a marriage upon a
stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment. Yet, the affidavits annexed to the petition for summary judgment practically amount to these methods
explicitly proscribed by the law.

We are not unmindful of appellees argument that the foregoing safeguards have traditionally been applied to prevent collusion of spouses in the
matter of dissolution of marriages and that the death of Teofilo Carlos on May 13, 1992 had effectively dissolved the marriage herein impugned. The
fact, however, that appellees own brother and appellant Felicidad Sandoval lived together as husband and wife for thirty years and that the annulment
of their marriage is the very means by which the latter is sought to be deprived of her participation in the estate left by the former call for a closer and
more thorough inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the case. Rather that the summary nature by which the court a quo resolved the issues in
the case, the rule is to the effect that the material facts alleged in the complaint for annulment of marriage should always be proved. Section 1, Rule
19 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's
pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation,
the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved. (Underscoring supplied)

Moreover, even if We were to sustain the applicability of the rules on summary judgment to the case at bench, Our perusal of the record shows that
the finding of the court a quo for appellee would still not be warranted. While it may be readily conceded that a valid marriage license is among the
formal requisites of marriage, the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in relation to Article 58 of the Civil
Code the failure to reflect the serial number of the marriage license on the marriage contract evidencing the marriage between Teofilo Carlos and
appellant Felicidad Sandoval, although irregular, is not as fatal as appellee represents it to be. Aside from the dearth of evidence to the contrary,
appellant Felicidad Sandovals affirmation of the existence of said marriage license is corroborated by the following statement in the affidavit executed
by Godofredo Fojas, then Justice of the Peace who officiated the impugned marriage, to wit:

That as far as I could remember, there was a marriage license issued at Silang, Cavite on May 14, 1962 as basis of the said marriage contract
executed by Teofilo Carlos and Felicidad Sandoval, but the number of said marriage license was inadvertently not placed in the marriage contract for
the reason that it was the Office Clerk who filled up the blanks in the Marriage Contract who in turn, may have overlooked the same.

Rather than the inferences merely drawn by the trial court, We are of the considered view that the veracity and credibility of the foregoing statement
as well as the motivations underlying the same should be properly threshed out in a trial of the case on the merits.

If the non-presentation of the marriage contract the primary evidence of marriage is not proof that a marriage did not take place, neither should
appellants non-presentation of the subject marriage license be taken as proof that the same was not procured. The burden of proof to
show the nullity of the marriage, it must be emphasized, rests upon the plaintiff and any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.

Considering that the burden of proof also rests on the party who disputes the legitimacy of a particular party, the same may be said of the trial courts
rejection of the relationship between appellant Teofilo Carlos II and his putative father on the basis of the inconsistencies in appellant Felicidad
Sandovals statements. Although it had effectively disavowed appellants prior claims regarding the legitimacy of appellant Teofilo Carlos II, the
averment in the answer that he is the illegitimate son of appellees brother, to Our mind, did not altogether foreclose the possibility of the said appellants
illegitimate filiation, his right to prove the same or, for that matter, his entitlement to inheritance rights as such.

Without trial on the merits having been conducted in the case, We find appellees bare allegation that appellant Teofilo Carlos II was merely purchased
from an indigent couple by appellant Felicidad Sandoval, on the whole, insufficient to support what could well be a minors total forfeiture of the rights
arising from his putative filiation. Inconsistent though it may be to her previous statements, appellant Felicidad Sandovals declaration regarding the
illegitimate filiation of Teofilo Carlos II is more credible when considered in the light of the fact that, during the last eight years of his life, Teofilo Carlos
allowed said appellant the use of his name and the shelter of his household. The least that the trial court could have done in the premises was to
conduct a trial on the merits in order to be able to thoroughly resolve the issues pertaining to the filiation of appellant Teofilo Carlos II.[8]
On November 22, 2006, petitioner moved for reconsideration and for the inhibition of the ponente, Justice Rebecca De Guia-Salvador. The CA denied
the twin motions.

Issues

In this petition under Rule 45, petitioner hoists the following issues:

1. That, in reversing and setting aside the Summary Judgment under the Decision, Annex A hereof, and in denying petitioners Motion for
reconsideration under the Resolution, Annex F hereof, with respect to the nullity of the impugned marriage, petitioner respectfully submits that the
Court of Appeals committed a grave reversible error in applying Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code, despite the fact that the circumstances of this
case are different from that contemplated and intended by law, or has otherwise decided a question of substance not theretofore decided by the
Supreme Court, or has decided it in a manner probably not in accord with law or with the applicable decisions of this Honorable Court;

2. That in setting aside and reversing the Summary Judgment and, in lieu thereof, entering another remanding the case to the court of origin for further
proceedings, petitioner most respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals committed a serious reversible error in applying Section 1, Rule 19 (now
Section 1, Rule 34) of the Rules of Court providing for judgment on the pleadings, instead of Rule 35 governing Summary Judgments;

3. That in reversing and setting aside the Summary Judgment and, in lieu thereof, entering another remanding the case to the court of origin for further
proceedings, petitioner most respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion, disregarded judicial admissions,
made findings on ground of speculations, surmises, and conjectures, or otherwise committed misapplications of the laws and misapprehension of the
facts.[9] (Underscoring supplied)

Essentially, the Court is tasked to resolve whether a marriage may be declared void ab initio through a judgment on the pleadings or a summary
judgment and without the benefit of a trial. But there are other procedural issues, including the capacity of one who is not a spouse in bringing the
action for nullity of marriage.

Our Ruling

I. The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage must be proved. Neither judgment on the pleadings nor summary judgment
is allowed. So is confession of judgment disallowed.

Petitioner faults the CA in applying Section 1, Rule 19[10] of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides:
SECTION 1. Judgment on the pleadings. Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse partys
pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation,
the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.

He argues that the CA should have applied Rule 35 of the Rules of Court governing summary judgment, instead of the rule on judgment on the
pleadings.

Petitioner is misguided. The CA did not limit its finding solely within the provisions of the Rule on judgment on the pleadings. In disagreeing with the
trial court, the CA likewise considered the provisions on summary judgments, to wit:

Moreover, even if We are to sustain the applicability of the rules on summary judgment to the case at bench, Our perusal of the record shows that the
finding of the court a quo for appellee would still not be warranted. x x x[11]

But whether it is based on judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment, the CA was correct in reversing the summary judgment rendered by the
trial court. Both the rules on judgment on the pleadings and summary judgments have no place in cases of declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
and even in annulment of marriage.

With the advent of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, known as Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,
the question on the application of summary judgments or even judgment on the pleadings in cases of nullity or annulment of marriage has been
stamped with clarity. The significant principle laid down by the said Rule, which took effect on March 15, 2003[12] is found in Section 17, viz.:

SEC. 17. Trial. (1) The presiding judge shall personally conduct the trial of the case. No delegation of evidence to a commissioner shall be allowed
except as to matters involving property relations of the spouses.

(2) The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of marriage must be proved. No judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment, or
confession of judgment shall be allowed. (Underscoring supplied)

Likewise instructive is the Courts pronouncement in Republic v. Sandiganbayan.[13] In that case, We excluded actions for nullity or annulment of
marriage from the application of summary judgments.

Prescinding from the foregoing discussion, save for annulment of marriage or declaration of its nullity or for legal separation, summary judgment is
applicable to all kinds of actions.[14](Underscoring supplied)
By issuing said summary judgment, the trial court has divested the State of its lawful right and duty to intervene in the case. The participation of the
State is not terminated by the declaration of the public prosecutor that no collusion exists between the parties. The State should have been given the
opportunity to present controverting evidence before the judgment was rendered.[15]

Both the Civil Code and the Family Code ordain that the court should order the prosecuting attorney to appear and intervene for the State. It is at this
stage when the public prosecutor sees to it that there is no suppression of evidence. Concomitantly, even if there is no suppression of evidence, the
public prosecutor has to make sure that the evidence to be presented or laid down before the court is not fabricated.

To further bolster its role towards the preservation of marriage, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages reiterates the duty of the
public prosecutor, viz.:

SEC. 13. Effect of failure to appear at the pre-trial. (a) x x x

(b) x x x If there is no collusion, the court shall require the public prosecutor to intervene for the State during the trial on the merits to prevent
suppression or fabrication of evidence.(Underscoring supplied)
Truly, only the active participation of the public prosecutor or the Solicitor General will ensure that the interest of the State is represented and protected
in proceedings for declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing the fabrication or suppression of evidence.[16]

II. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage
cases commenced before the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and (2) Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code.

Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage may not be filed by any party outside of the marriage. The Rule made it exclusively a right of the spouses by stating:

SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.

(a) Who may file. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. (Underscoring supplied)

Section 2(a) of the Rule makes it the sole right of the husband or the wife to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage. The rationale of the Rule is enlightening, viz.:
Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such
petition cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal
right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and, hence, can only question
the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed
in the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution.[17] (Underscoring supplied)

The new Rule recognizes that the husband and the wife are the sole architects of a healthy, loving, peaceful marriage. They are the only ones who
can decide when and how to build the foundations of marriage. The spouses alone are the engineers of their marital life. They are simultaneously the
directors and actors of their matrimonial true-to-life play. Hence, they alone can and should decide when to take a cut, but only in accordance with
the grounds allowed by law.

The innovation incorporated in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC sets forth a demarcation line between marriages covered by the Family Code and those
solemnized under the Civil Code. The Rule extends only to marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August
3, 1988.[18]

The advent of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages marks the beginning of the end of the right of the heirs of the deceased
spouse to bring a nullity of marriage case against the surviving spouse. But the Rule never intended to deprive the compulsory or intestate heirs of
their successional rights.

While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, it
does not mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs are without any recourse under the law. They can still protect their successional right, for, as
stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, compulsory or intestate
heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity but upon the death of a spouse in a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.[19]

It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply to cases already commenced before March 15, 2003 although the marriage involved is within
the coverage of the Family Code. This is so, as the new Rule which became effective on March 15, 2003[20] is prospective in its application. Thus, the
Court held in Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli,[21] viz.:

As has been emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC covers marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines, and is prospective in its
application.[22] (Underscoring supplied)

Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage case against respondent Felicidad in 1995. The marriage in controversy was celebrated on May 14,
1962. Which law would govern depends upon when the marriage took place.[23]
The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at
the time of its celebration.[24] But the Civil Code is silent as to who may bring an action to declare the marriage void. Does this mean that any person
can bring an action for the declaration of nullity of marriage?

We respond in the negative. The absence of a provision in the Civil Code cannot be construed as a license for any person to institute a nullity of
marriage case. Such person must appear to be the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit.[25] Elsewise stated, plaintiff must be the real party-in-interest. For it is basic in procedural law that every action must be prosecuted
and defended in the name of the real party-in-interest.[26]

Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as
distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved or a mere incidental interest. One having no material interest to protect cannot invoke
the jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an action. When plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest, the case is dismissible on the ground of lack of cause
of action.[27]

Illuminating on this point is Amor-Catalan v. Court of Appeals,[28] where the Court held:

True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the respondents were married, or even in the Family Code, there is no
specific provision as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage; however, only a party who can demonstrate proper interest can file
the same. A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-
interest and must be based on a cause of action. Thus, in Nial v. Badayog, the Court held that the children have the personality to file the petition to
declare the nullity of marriage of their deceased father to their stepmother as it affects their successional rights.

xxxx

In fine, petitioners personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage cannot be ascertained because of the absence of the divorce decree
and the foreign law allowing it.Hence, a remand of the case to the trial court for reception of additional evidence is necessary to determine whether
respondent Orlando was granted a divorce decree and whether the foreign law which granted the same allows or restricts remarriage. If it is proved
that a valid divorce decree was obtained and the same did not allow respondent Orlandos remarriage, then the trial court should declare respondents
marriage as bigamous and void ab initio but reduced the amount of moral damages from P300,000.00 to P50,000.00 and exemplary damages
from P200,000.00 to P25,000.00. On the contrary, if it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained which allowed Orlando to remarry, then the
trial court must dismiss the instant petition to declare nullity of marriage on the ground that petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan lacks legal personality to
file the same.[29] (Underscoring supplied)

III. The case must be remanded to determine whether or not petitioner is a real-party-in-interest to seek the declaration of nullity of the
marriage in controversy.
In the case at bench, the records reveal that when Teofilo died intestate in 1992, his only surviving compulsory heirs are respondent Felicidad and
their son, Teofilo II. Under the law on succession, successional rights are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent and the compulsory
heirs are called to succeed by operation of law.[30]

Upon Teofilos death in 1992, all his property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance are transmitted to his compulsory
heirs. These heirs were respondents Felicidad and Teofilo II, as the surviving spouse and child, respectively.

Article 887 of the Civil Code outlined who are compulsory heirs, to wit:

(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants;

(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their legitimate children and descendants;

(3) The widow or widower;

(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;

(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 of the Civil Code.[31]

Clearly, a brother is not among those considered as compulsory heirs. But although a collateral relative, such as a brother, does not fall within the
ambit of a compulsory heir, he still has a right to succeed to the estate. Articles 1001 and 1003 of the New Civil Code provide:

ART. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and
the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.

ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire
estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles. (Underscoring supplied)

Indeed, only the presence of descendants, ascendants or illegitimate children excludes collateral relatives from succeeding to the estate of the
decedent. The presence of legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted child or children of the deceased precludes succession by collateral
relatives.[32] Conversely, if there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to
the entire estate of the decedent.[33]

If respondent Teofilo II is declared and finally proven not to be the legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner would then
have a personality to seek the nullity of marriage of his deceased brother with respondent Felicidad. This is so, considering that collateral relatives,
like a brother and sister, acquire successional right over the estate if the decedent dies without issue and without ascendants in the direct line.

The records reveal that Teofilo was predeceased by his parents. He had no other siblings but petitioner. Thus, if Teofilo II is finally found and proven
to be not a legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner succeeds to the other half of the estate of his brother, the first half being allotted
to the widow pursuant to Article 1001 of the New Civil Code. This makes petitioner a real-party-interest to seek the declaration of absolute nullity
of marriage of his deceased brother with respondent Felicidad. If the subject marriage is found to be void ab initio, petitioner succeeds to the entire
estate.

It bears stressing, however, that the legal personality of petitioner to bring the nullity of marriage case is contingent upon the final declaration that
Teofilo II is not a legitimate, adopted, or illegitimate son of Teofilo.

If Teofilo II is proven to be a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally adopted son of Teofilo, then petitioner has no legal personality to ask for the nullity of
marriage of his deceased brother and respondent Felicidad. This is based on the ground that he has no successional right to be protected, hence,
does not have proper interest. For although the marriage in controversy may be found to be void from the beginning, still, petitioner would not
inherit. This is because the presence of descendant, illegitimate,[34] or even an adopted child[35] excludes the collateral relatives from inheriting from
the decedent.

Thus, the Court finds that a remand of the case for trial on the merits to determine the validity or nullity of the subject marriage is called for. But
the RTC is strictly instructed to dismiss the nullity of marriage case for lack of cause of action if it is proven by evidence that Teofilo II is a
legitimate, illegitimate, or legally adopted son of Teofilo Carlos, the deceased brother of petitioner.

IV. Remand of the case regarding the question of filiation of respondent Teofilo II is proper and in order. There is a need to vacate the
disposition of the trial court as to the other causes of action before it.

Petitioner did not assign as error or interpose as issue the ruling of the CA on the remand of the case concerning the filiation of respondent Teofilo
II. This notwithstanding, We should not leave the matter hanging in limbo.

This Court has the authority to review matters not specifically raised or assigned as error by the parties, if their consideration is necessary in arriving
at a just resolution of the case.[36]
We agree with the CA that without trial on the merits having been conducted in the case, petitioners bare allegation that respondent Teofilo II was
adopted from an indigent couple is insufficient to support a total forfeiture of rights arising from his putative filiation. However, We are not inclined to
support its pronouncement that the declaration of respondent Felicidad as to the illegitimate filiation of respondent Teofilo II is more credible. For the
guidance of the appellate court, such declaration of respondent Felicidad should not be afforded credence. We remind the CA of the guaranty provided
by Article 167 of the Family Code to protect the status of legitimacy of a child, to wit:

ARTICLE 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced
as an adulteress. (Underscoring supplied)

It is stressed that Felicidads declaration against the legitimate status of Teofilo II is the very act that is proscribed by Article 167 of the Family Code. The
language of the law is unmistakable. An assertion by the mother against the legitimacy of her child cannot affect the legitimacy of a child born or
conceived within a valid marriage.[37]

Finally, the disposition of the trial court in favor of petitioner for causes of action concerning reconveyance, recovery of property, and sum of money
must be vacated. This has to be so, as said disposition was made on the basis of its finding that the marriage in controversy was null and void ab
initio.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is MODIFIED as follows:

1. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court in regard to the action on the status and filiation of respondent Teofilo Carlos II and the validity
or nullity of marriage between respondent Felicidad Sandoval and the late Teofilo Carlos;

2. If Teofilo Carlos II is proven to be the legitimate, or illegitimate, or legally adopted son of the late Teofilo Carlos, the RTC is
strictly INSTRUCTED to DISMISS the action for nullity of marriage for lack of cause of action;

3. The disposition of the RTC in Nos. 1 to 8 of the fallo of its decision is VACATED AND SET ASIDE.

The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to conduct trial on the merits with dispatch and to give this case priority in its calendar.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 RAMON S. CHING AND PO WING PROPERTIES, G.R. No. 192828
INC.,
Petitioners,
Present:

CARPIO, J.,
- versus -
Chairperson,
BRION,
PEREZ,
HON. JANSEN R. RODRIGUEZ, in his capacity as
ARANAL-SERENO, and
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 6, JOSEPH CHENG, JAIME REYES, JJ.
CHENG, MERCEDES IGNE AND LUCINA
SANTOS, substituted by her son, EDUARDO S.
BALAJADIA,
Respondents.
Promulgated:

November 28, 2011

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION

REYES, J.:

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the December 14, 2009 Decision[2] and July 8, 2010
Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 99856. The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us DENYING the petition filed in this case and AFFIRMING the
assailed Orders dated March 15, 2007 and May 16, 2007 issued by the respondent Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 6, in Manila in
Civil Case No. 02-105251.[4]

The assailed Resolution denied the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.

The Factual Antecedents

Sometime between November 25, 2002 and December 3, 2002,[5] the respondents filed a Complaint[6] against the petitioners and Stronghold Insurance
Company, Global Business Bank, Inc. (formerly PhilBank), Elena Tiu Del Pilar, Asia Atlantic Resources Ventures, Inc., Registers of Deeds of Manila
and Malabon, and all persons claiming rights or titles from Ramon Ching (Ramon) and his successors-in-interest.

The Complaint, captioned as one for "Disinheritance, Declaration of Nullity of Agreement and Waiver, Affidavit of Extra-Judicial Settlement, Deed of
Absolute Sale, Transfer Certificates of Title with Prayer for [the] Issuance of [a] Temporary Restraining Order and [a] Writ of Preliminary Injunction,"
was docketed as Civil Case No. 02-105251 and raffled to Branch 8 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (RTC).

In the Complaint, the respondents alleged the following as causes of action:

First Cause of Action. They are the heirs of Lim San, also known as Antonio Ching / Tiong Cheng / Ching Cheng Suy (Antonio). Respondents
Joseph Cheng (Joseph) and Jaime Cheng (Jaime) are allegedly the children of Antonio with his common-law wife, respondent Mercedes Igne
(Mercedes). Respondent Lucina Santos (Lucina) claimed that she was also a common-law wife of Antonio. The respondents averred that Ramon
misrepresented himself as Antonio's and Lucina's son when in truth and in fact, he was adopted and his birth certificate was merely simulated. On
July 18, 1996, Antonio died of a stab wound. Police investigators identified Ramon as the prime suspect and he now stands as the lone accused in a
criminal case for murder filed against him. Warrants of arrest issued against him have remained unserved as he is at large. From the foregoing
circumstances and upon the authority of Article 919[7] of the New Civil Code (NCC), the respondents concluded that Ramon can be legally disinherited,
hence, prohibited from receiving any share from the estate of Antonio.

Second Cause of Action. On August 26, 1996, prior to the conclusion of the police investigations tagging Ramon as the prime suspect in the murder
of Antonio, the former made an inventory of the latter's estate. Ramon misrepresented that there were only six real estate properties left by Antonio.
The respondents alleged that Ramon had illegally transferred to his name the titles to the said properties. Further, there are two other parcels of land,
cash and jewelries, plus properties in Hongkong, which were in Ramon's possession.
Third Cause of Action. Mercedes, being of low educational attainment, was sweet-talked by Ramon into surrendering to him a Global Business
Bank, Inc. (Global Bank) Certificate of Time Deposit of P4,000,000.00 in the name of Antonio, and the certificates of title covering two condominium
units in Binondo which were purchased by Antonio using his own money but which were registered in Ramon's name. Ramon also fraudulently
misrepresented to Joseph, Jaime and Mercedes that they will promptly receive their complete shares, exclusive of the stocks in Po Wing Properties,
Inc. (Po Wing), from the estate of Antonio. Exerting undue influence, Ramon had convinced them to execute an Agreement [8] and a Waiver[9] on
August 20, 1996. The terms and conditions stipulated in the Agreement and Waiver, specifically, on the payment by Ramon to Joseph, Jaime and
Mercedes of the amount of P22,000,000.00, were not complied with. Further, Lucina was not informed of the execution of the said instruments and
had not received any amount from Ramon. Hence, the instruments are null and void.

Fourth Cause of Action. Antonio's 40,000 shares in Po Wing, which constitute 60% of the latter's total capital stock, were illegally transferred by
Ramon to his own name through a forged document of sale executed after Antonio died. Po Wing owns a ten-storey building in Binondo. Ramon's
claim that he bought the stocks from Antonio before the latter died is baseless. Further, Lucina's shares in Po Wing had also banished into thin air
through Ramon's machinations.

Fifth Cause of Action. On October 29, 1996, Ramon executed an Affidavit of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate[10] adjudicating solely to himself
Antonio's entire estate to the prejudice of the respondents. By virtue of the said instrument, new Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) covering eight
real properties owned by Antonio were issued in Ramon's name. Relative to the Po Wing shares, the Register of Deeds of Manila had required Ramon
to post a Surety Bond conditioned to answer for whatever claims which may eventually surface in connection with the said stocks. Co-defendant
Stronghold Insurance Company issued the bond in Ramon's behalf.

Sixth Cause of Action. Ramon sold Antonio's two parcels of land in Navotas to co-defendant Asia Atlantic Business Ventures, Inc. Another parcel
of land, which was part of Antonio's estate, was sold by Ramon to co-defendant Elena Tiu Del Pilar at an unreasonably low price. By reason of
Ramon's lack of authority to dispose of any part of Antonio's estate, the conveyances are null and void ab initio.

Since Ramon is at large, his wife, Belen Dy Tan Ching, now manages Antonio's estate. She has no intent to convey to the respondents their shares
in the estate of Antonio.

The respondents thus prayed for the following in their Complaint:

1. x x x a temporary restraining order be issued restraining the defendant RAMON CHING and/or his attorney-in-fact Belen Dy Tan Ching from
disposing, selling or alienating any property that belongs to the estate of the deceased ANTONIO CHING;

xxx

4. x x x
a.) Declaring that the defendant RAMON CHING who murdered his father ANTONIO CHING disqualified as heir and from inheriting to (sic) the estate
of his father;

b.) Declaring the nullity of the defendant RAMON CHING transfer (sic) of the six [6] parcels of land from the name of his father ANTONIO CHING to
his name covered by TCT No. x x x;

c.) Declaring the nullity of the AGREEMENT and WAIVER executed by plaintiffs x x x in favor of x x x RAMON CHING for being patently immoral,
invalid, illegal, simulated and (sic) sham;

d.) Declaring the nullity of the transfer of the shares of stocks at (sic) PO WING from the names of ANTONIO CHING and LUCINA SANTOS to the
defendant ANTONIOCHING's name for having been illegally procured through the falsification of their signatures in the document purporting the
transfer thereof;

e.) Declaring the nullity and to have no force and effect the AFFIDAVIT OF SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE executed by x x x RAMON CHING for being
contrary to law and existing jurisprudence;

f.) Declaring the nullity of the DEED OF SALES (sic) executed by x x x RAMON CHING (i) over two (2) parcels of land x x x to defendant ASIA
ATLANTIC BUSINESS VENTURES, Inc.; and (ii) one (1) parcel of land x x x sold to x x x ELENA TIU DEL PILAR for having illegally procured the
ownership and titles of the above properties;

x x x.[11]

The petitioners filed with the RTC a Motion to Dismiss[12] alleging forum shopping, litis pendentia, res judicata and the respondents as not being the
real parties in interest.

On July 30, 2004, the RTC issued an Omnibus Order[13] denying the petitioners' Motion to Dismiss.

The respondents filed an Amended Complaint[14] dated April 7, 2005 impleading Metrobank as the successor-in-interest of co-defendant Global Bank.
The Amended Complaint also added a seventh cause of action relative to the existence of a Certificate of Premium Plus Acquisition (CPPA) in the
amount of P4,000,000.00 originally issued by PhilBank to Antonio. The respondents prayed that they be declared as the rightful owners of the CPPA
and that it be immediately released to them. Alternatively, the respondents prayed for the issuance of a hold order relative to the CPPA to preserve it
during the pendency of the case.

On April 22, 2005, the petitioners filed their Consolidated Answer with Counterclaim.[15]

On October 28, 2005, the RTC issued an Order[16] admitting the respondents' Amended Complaint. The RTC stressed that Metrobank had already
filed Manifestations admitting that as successor-in-interest of Global Bank, it now possesses custody of Antonio's deposits. Metrobank expressed
willingness to abide by any court order as regards the disposition of Antonio's deposits. The petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration filed to assail the
aforecited Order was denied by the RTC on May 3, 2006.

On May 29, 2006, the petitioners filed their Consolidated Answer with Counterclaim to the respondents' Amended Complaint.

On August 11, 2006, the RTC issued a pre-trial order.[17]

On January 18, 2007, the petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss[18] the respondents' Amended Complaint on the alleged ground of the RTC's lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the Complaint. The petitioners argued that since the Amended Complaint sought the release of the CPPA to the
respondents, the latter's declaration as heirs of Antonio, and the propriety of Ramon's disinheritance, the suit partakes of the nature of a special
proceeding and not an ordinary action for declaration of nullity. Hence, jurisdiction pertains to a probate or intestate court and not to the RTC acting
as an ordinary court.

On March 15, 2007, the RTC issued an Order[19] denying the petitioners' Motion to Dismiss on grounds:

In the case at bar, an examination of the Complaint would disclose that the action delves mainly on the question of ownership of the
properties described in the Complaint which can be properly settled in an ordinary civil action. And as pointed out by the defendants, the
action seeks to declare the nullity of the Agreement, Waiver, Affidavit of Extra-Judicial Settlement, Deed of Absolute Sale, Transfer Certificates of
Title, which were all allegedly executed by defendant Ramon Ching to defraud the plaintiffs. The relief of establishing the status of the plaintiffs
which could have translated this action into a special proceeding was nowhere stated in the Amended Complaint. With regard [to] the
prayer to declare the plaintiffs as the rightful owner[s] of the CPPA and that the same be immediately released to them, in itself poses an
issue of ownership which must be proved by plaintiffs by substantial evidence. And as emphasized by the plaintiffs, the Amended Complaint
was intended to implead Metrobank as a co-defendant.

As regards the issue of disinheritance, the court notes that during the Pre-trial of this case, one of the issues raised by the defendants Ramon Ching
and Po Wing Properties is: Whether or not there can be disinheritance in intestate succession? Whether or not defendant Ramon Ching can be legally
disinherited from the estate of his father? To the mind of the Court, the issue of disinheritance, which is one of the causes of action in the
Complaint, can be fully settled after a trial on the merits. And at this stage, it has not been sufficiently established whether or not there is
a will.[20] (Emphasis supplied.)

The above Order, and a subsequent Order dated May 16, 2007 denying the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration, became the subjects of a petition
for certiorari filed with the CA. The petition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 99856, raised the issue of whether or not the RTC gravely abused its
discretion when it denied the petitioners' Motion to Dismiss despite the fact that the Amended Complaint sought to establish the status or rights of the
respondents which subjects are within the ambit of a special proceeding.

On December 14, 2009, the CA rendered the now assailed Decision[21] denying the petition for certiorari on grounds:

Our in-depth assessment of the condensed allegations supporting the causes of action of the amended complaint induced us to infer that nothing in
the said complaint shows that the action of the private respondents should be threshed out in a special proceeding, it appearing that their
allegations were substantially for the enforcement of their rights against the alleged fraudulent acts committed by the petitioner Ramon
Ching. The private respondents also instituted the said amended complaint in order to protect them from the consequence of the fraudulent
acts of Ramon Ching by seeking to disqualify Ramon Ching from inheriting from Antonio Ching as well as to enjoin him from disposing or
alienating the subject properties, including the P4 Million deposit with Metrobank. The intestate or probate court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate
such issues, which must be submitted to the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction as a regional trial court. Furthermore, we agree with the
trial court that the probate court could not take cognizance of the prayer to disinherit Ramon Ching, given the undisputed fact that there
was no will to be contested in a probate court.

The petition at bench apparently cavils the subject amended complaint and complicates the issue of jurisdiction by reiterating the grounds or defenses
set up in the petitioners' earlier pleadings. Notwithstanding, the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter is determined by the allegations
of the complaint without regard to whether or not the private respondents (plaintiffs) are entitled to recover upon all or some of the causes
of action asserted therein. In this regard, the jurisdiction of the court does not depend upon the defenses pleaded in the answer or in the
motion to dismiss, lest the question of jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon the petitioners (defendants). [22] Hence, we focus our
resolution on the issue of jurisdiction on the allegations in the amended complaint and not on the defenses pleaded in the motion to dismiss or in the
subsequent pleadings of the petitioners.

In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling reason to still subject the action of the petitioners in a special
proceeding since the nullification of the subject documents could be achieved in the civil case, the lower court should proceed to evaluate the
evidence of the parties and render a decision thereon upon the issues that it defined during the pre-trial in Civil Case No. 02-105251.[23] (emphasis
supplied)

The petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the CA through a Resolution[24] issued on July 8, 2010.
The Issue

The instant Petition for Review on Certiorari[25] is anchored on the issue of:

WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC SHOULD HAVE GRANTED THE MOTION TO DISMISS FILED BY THE PETITIONERS ON THE ALLEGED GROUND
OF THE RTC'S LACK OF JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE AMENDED COMPLAINT, TO WIT, (A) FILIATIONS WITH
ANTONIO OF RAMON, JAIME AND JOSEPH; (B) RIGHTS OF COMMON-LAW WIVES, LUCINA AND MERCEDES, TO BE CONSIDERED AS
HEIRS OF ANTONIO; (C) DETERMINATION OF THE EXTENT OF ANTONIO'S ESTATE; AND (D) OTHER MATTERS WHICH CAN ONLY BE
RESOLVED IN A SPECIAL PROCEEDING AND NOT IN AN ORDINARY CIVIL ACTION.

The petitioners argue that only a probate court has the authority to determine (a) who are the heirs of a decedent; (b) the validity of a waiver
of hereditary rights; (c) the status of each heir; and (d) whether the property in the inventory is conjugal or the exclusive property of the deceased
spouse.[26] Further, the extent of Antonio's estate, the status of the contending parties and the respondents' alleged entitlement as heirs to receive the
proceeds of Antonio's CPPA now in Metrobank's custody are matters which are more appropriately the subjects of a special proceeding and not of
an ordinary civil action.

The respondents opposed[27] the instant petition claiming that the petitioners are engaged in forum shopping. Specifically, G.R. Nos. 175507[28] and
183840,[29] both involving the contending parties in the instant petition were filed by the petitioners and are currently pending before this Court. Further,
in Mendoza v. Hon. Teh,[30] the SC declared that whether a particular matter should be resolved by the RTC in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or
its limited probate jurisdiction, is not a jurisdictional issue but a mere question of procedure. Besides, the petitioners, having validly submitted
themselves to the jurisdiction of the RTC and having actively participated in the trial of the case, are already estopped from challenging the RTC's
jurisdiction over the respondents' Complaint and Amended Complaint.[31]

The Court's Ruling

We resolve to deny the instant petition.

The petitioners failed to comply with a lawful order of this Court directing them to file their reply to the respondents' Comment/Opposition to the instant
Petition. While the prescribed period to comply expired on March 15, 2011, the petitioners filed their Manifestation that they will no longer file a reply
only on October 10, 2011 or after the lapse of almost seven months.

Further, no reversible errors were committed by the RTC and the CA when they both ruled that the denial of the petitioners' second motion to dismiss
Civil Case No. 02-105251 was proper.
Even without delving into the procedural allegations of the respondents that the petitioners engaged in forum shopping and are already estopped from
questioning the RTC's jurisdiction after having validly submitted to it when the latter participated in the proceedings, the denial of the instant Petition
is still in order. Although the respondents' Complaint and Amended Complaint sought, among others, the disinheritance of Ramon and the release in
favor of the respondents of the CPPA now under Metrobank's custody, Civil Case No. 02-105251 remains to be an ordinary civil action, and not a
special proceeding pertaining to a settlement court.

An action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased
person such as advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly requires the
application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court.[32] A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a
right, or a particular fact.[33] It is distinguished from an ordinary civil action where a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or
the prevention or redress of a wrong.[34] To initiate a special proceeding, a petition and not a complaint should be filed.

Under Article 916 of the NCC, disinheritance can be effected only through a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified. This Court agrees
with the RTC and the CA that while the respondents in their Complaint and Amended Complaint sought the disinheritance of Ramon, no will or any
instrument supposedly effecting the disposition of Antonio's estate was ever mentioned. Hence, despite the prayer for Ramon's disinheritance, Civil
Case No. 02-105251 does not partake of the nature of a special proceeding and does not call for the probate court's exercise of its limited jurisdiction.

The petitioners also argue that the prayers in the Amended Complaint, seeking the release in favor of the respondents of the CPPA under Metrobank's
custody and the nullification of the instruments subject of the complaint, necessarily require the determination of the respondents' status as Antonio's
heirs.

It bears stressing that what the respondents prayed for was that they be declared as the rightful owners of the CPPA which was in Mercedes'
possession prior to the execution of the Agreement and Waiver. The respondents also prayed for the alternative relief of securing the issuance by the
RTC of a hold order relative to the CPPA to preserve Antonio's deposits with Metrobank during the pendency of the case. It can thus be said that the
respondents' prayer relative to the CPPA was premised on Mercedes' prior possession of and their alleged collective ownership of the same, and not
on the declaration of their status as Antonio's heirs. Further, it also has to be emphasized that the respondents were parties to the execution of the
Agreement[35] and Waiver[36] prayed to be nullified. Hence, even without the necessity of being declared as heirs of Antonio, the respondents have the
standing to seek for the nullification of the instruments in the light of their claims that there was no consideration for their execution, and that Ramon
exercised undue influence and committed fraud against them. Consequently, the respondents then claimed that the Affidavit of Extra-Judicial
Settlement of Antonios estate executed by Ramon, and the TCTs issued upon the authority of the said affidavit, are null and void as well. Ramon's
averment that a resolution of the issues raised shall first require a declaration of the respondents' status as heirs is a mere defense which is not
determinative of which court shall properly exercise jurisdiction.

In Marjorie Cadimas v. Marites Carrion and Gemma Hugo,[37] the Court declared:
It is an elementary rule of procedural law that jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint
irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. As a necessary consequence, the
jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or upon the motion to dismiss, for otherwise, the question
of jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon the defendant. What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as
appearing from the allegations in the complaint. The averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought are the matters to be consulted.

In sum, this Court agrees with the CA that the nullification of the documents subject of Civil Case No. 02-105251 could be achieved in an ordinary
civil action, which in this specific case was instituted to protect the respondents from the supposedly fraudulent acts of Ramon. In the event that the
RTC will find grounds to grant the reliefs prayed for by the respondents, the only consequence will be the reversion of the properties subject of the
dispute to the estate of Antonio. Civil Case No. 02-105251 was not instituted to conclusively resolve the issues relating to the administration, liquidation
and distribution of Antonio's estate, hence, not the proper subject of a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person under
Rules 73-91 of the Rules of Court.

The respondents' resort to an ordinary civil action before the RTC may not be strategically sound, because a settlement proceeding should thereafter
still follow, if their intent is to recover from Ramon the properties alleged to have been illegally transferred in his name. Be that as it may, the RTC, in
the exercise of its general jurisdiction, cannot be restrained from taking cognizance of respondents' Complaint and Amended Complaint as the issues
raised and the prayers indicated therein are matters which need not be threshed out in a special proceeding.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The petitioners' (a) Opposition to the respondents' Motion to Admit Substitution of Party; [38] and (b)
Manifestation[39]through counsel that they will no longer file a reply to the respondents' Comment/Opposition to the instant petition are NOTED.

SO ORDERED.