Case Title: Mapa Jr.

v Sandiganbayan GR Number / Year:

G.R. No. 100295. April 26, 1994.
Topic: Ombudsman Act of 1989, November 17, 1989 (Sec. 17, RA No. 6770)
Petitioner: Placido Mapa Jr. & J. Lorenzo Respondent: Sandiganbayan
Vergara
Emergency Recit: Mapa and Vergara were charged for violating the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Later,
they were granted immunity by the PCGG if they were to testify against the Marcoses in their RICO case.
However, they were not called to the witness stand. Thus, both the PCGG and the Sandiganbayan claimed that
they are not immune from suit. The SC ruled otherwise and stated that petitioners have satisfied the
requirements both of the law and the parties’ implementing agreements.

Doctrine: We observe that in contrast to our other laws on immunity, section 5 of E.O. No. 14, as amended, confers on the
PCGG the power to grant immunity alone and on its own authority. The exercise of the power is not shared with any other authority.
Nor is its exercise subject to the approval or disapproval of another agency of government. The basic reason for vesting the power
exclusively on the PCGG lies in the principles of separation of power. The decision to grant immunity from prosecution forms a
constituent part of the prosecution process. It is essentially a tactical decision to forego prosecution of a person for government to
achieve a higher objective. It is a deliberate renunciation of the right of the State to prosecute all who appear to be guilty of having
committed a crime. Its justification lies in the particular need of the State to obtain the conviction of the more guilty criminals who,
otherwise, will probably elude the long arm of the law. Whether or not the delicate power should be exercised, who should be
extended the privilege, the timing of its grant, are questions addressed solely to the sound judgment of the prosecution. The power
to prosecute includes the right to determine who shall be prosecuted and the corollary right to decide whom not to prosecute. In
reviewing the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in these areas, the jurisdiction of the respondent court is limited. For the business
of a court of justice is to be an impartial tribunal, and not to get involved with the success or failure of the prosecution to prosecute.

Facts:
1. Petitioner together with other officers of PNB, National Investment and Development Corp.
and/or Pantranco North Express Inc (all GOCCs) where charged (Case No. 11960) with of
violating the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. 3019) for conspiring with accused
Gregorio Araneta III, son-in-law of former Pres. Marcos with:
 The sale of a major portion of the utility assets of PNEI to the North Express Transport, Inc. which Araneta
knew to be a newly organized paper corp;
 Through misleading, inducing and/or unduly influencing the Board of Directors of PNB, NIDC and PNEI
into approving a Memorandum of Agreement and later a Purchase Agreement with manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous terms and conditions;
 That made possible the premature delivery of said PNEI assets to NETI and thereby giving accused Gregorio
Ma. Araneta III unwarranted benefits, advantages and/or preferences and causing undue injury to the
damage and prejudice of the Government in the amount of 400M.
2. In the interim, Marcos was charged in New York with violations of the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organization (RICO) Act by transporting to the US the investment of money
through offshore orgs; the case was entitled United States of America vs Marcos. To insure
conviction, the prosecution solicited the testimonies of petitioners and were requested to testify
in the said RICO cases against the former First Couple.
 They were promised immunity from further criminal prosecution and thus there was an
agreement that was formed with the PCGG which included the fact that they would not interpose
any objection to the Motion to Dismiss to be filed by the petitioners. However, despite their
availability, the US prosecutors decided not to call them to the witness stand.
3. Thus, the legal struggle shifted back to Case No. 11960. After filing a Joint MTD, and without
any objection from the PCGG, the Sandiganbayan still denied the said motion by a vote of 4-1.
Thus, the petitioners argue that respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion in
denying their MTD.
4. Moreover, upon the appointment of Atty. Castro as the new Chairman of the PCGG, it made a
new stand that since they failed to provide their testimonies during the trial, their immunity
 becomes nullified.

Issue/s: Whether Mapa Jr. and Vergara are indeed immune from prosecution.

Held:
The powers granted to PCGG by Executive Order No. 14, as amended, to grant immunity from criminal prosecution. The
pertinent sections provide:

SEC. 2. Section 4 of Executive Order No. 14 dated May 7, 1986 is hereby amended to read as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library

‘SEC. 4. A witness may refuse on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or provide other information in a
proceeding before the Sandiganbayan if the witness believes that such testimony or provision of information would tend to
incriminate him or subject him to prosecution. Upon such refusal, the Sandiganbayan may order the witness to testify or provide
information.

The witness may not refuse to comply with the order on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination; but no testimony or
other information compelled under the order (or any information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony, or other
information) may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or
otherwise failing to comply with the order.’

SEC. 3. Section 5 of Executive Order No. 14 dated May 7, 1986 is hereby amended to read as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library

‘Sec. 5. The Presidential Commission on Good Government is authorized to grant immunity from criminal prosecution to any
person who provides information or testifies in any investigation conducted by such Commission to establish the unlawful
manner in which any respondent, defendant or accused has acquired or accumulated the property or properties in question in
any case where such information or testimony is necessary to ascertain or prove the latter’s guilt or his civil liability. The
immunity thereby granted shall be continued to protect the witness who repeats such testimony before the Sandiganbayan when
required to do so by the latter or by the Commission.’"

 The case at bench involves an exercise of power by PCGG under section 5, supra. Petitioners are
not hostile but friendly witnesses.

Respondent court, thru the Solicitor General, pushes the proposition that said power of review is plenary in
reach. It is urged that its plenitude and panoply empower the respondent court to reverse the grant of
immunity made by the PCGG by supplanting the latter’s judgment. The submission will warrant the
respondent court in examining the intrinsic quality of the given information or testimony, i.e., whether it
truly establishes the "unlawful manner" in which the respondent, defendant or accused has acquired or
accumulated the property or properties in question. Likewise, it will give a warrant to the respondent court
to change the judgment made by the PCGG that the witness’ information or testimony is "necessary" to
ascertain or prove the guilt or civil liability of the respondent, defendant or accused.
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 We are not prepared to concede the correctness of this proposition. Neither the text nor the texture
of E.O. No. 14, as amended, lends color to the suggested interpretation. Section 5 of E.O. No. 14,
as amended, vests no such role in respondent court. The rule is crafted as to leave no iota of doubt
on the power of the court to interfere with the discretion of the prosecution on the matter. In the
case at bench, E.O. 14, as amended, is eloquently silent with regard to the range and depth of the
power of the respondent court (Sandiganbayan) to review the exercise of discretion by the PCGG
granting a section 5 immunity.

Prescinding from these baseline propositions, we hold that in reviewing the grant of a section 5 immunity
made by the PCGG to the petitioners, the power of the respondents court can go no further than to pass
upon its procedural regularity. The respondent court should only ascertain: (a) whether the person claiming
immunity has provided information or testimony in any investigation conducted by the PCGG in the
discharge of its functions; (b) whether in the bona fide judgment of the PCGG, the information or testimony
given would establish the unlawful manner in which the respondent, defendant or accused has acquired or
accumulated the property or properties in question; and (c) whether in the bona fide judgment of the PCGG,
such information or testimony is necessary to ascertain or prove the guilt or civil liability of the respondent,
defendant or accused. Respondent court cannot substitute its judgment to the discretion of the PCGG
without involving itself in prosecution and without ceasing to be a court catering untilted justice.
o Applying this standard, we hold that the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion
when it denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss based on a claim of immunity granted by the PCGG
under section 5 of E.O. 14, as amended.

The records show that petitioners provided information to the PCGG relating to the prosecution of
the RICO cases against the Marcoses in New York. They gave the information in the course of
interviews conducted by PCGG lawyers Kendall and Severina Rivera and US prosecutor Charles La
Bella. They collaborated with the prosecution.chanrob les.co m : virt ual law li bra ry

Sec. 5 requires that the information should relate to "any case" which PCGG can prosecute as
mandated by the Constitution and E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. It does not limit said information
to be given only in a case where the informant is himself an accused or a Respondent. Such a
reading adopted by the respondent court is unduly restrictive of the intendment of section 5 of
E.O. No. 14, as amended, even as it is clearly in contravention of its plain language.

It is also fairly established that the pieces of information given by the petitioners would in the
judgment of the PCGG, establish the "unlawful manner" with which the Marcoses acquired or
accumulated their properties and were "necessary" to prove their guilt. The totality of the
circumstances of the case established this element. Thus, after their interview, the PCGG was
obviously convinced of the evidentiary value of the information given by the petitioners. It
forthwith signed and sealed an agreement with petitioners extending them immunity from
prosecution. In the case of petitioner Mapa, "the Republic shall cause the dismissal or exclusion
of MAPA as party defendant or respondent in all PCGG initiated civil cases and criminal
proceeding or investigation." In the case of petitioner Vergara, "the Republic shall cause the
dismissal of Vergara from Criminal Case No. 11960." This commitment was reiterated by former
Chairman Mateo Caparas of PCGG in his May 16, 1990 letters to the petitioners, as related above.
The parties’ agreements were then implemented. Petitioners travelled to New York to testify in
the RICO cases against the Marcoses. It was even the PCGG that shouldered their expenses. All
these circumstances prove the judgment of the PCGG that the pieces of information given by
petitioners would establish the "unlawful manner" with which the Marcoses acquired their wealth.

Contrary to the ruling of the respondent court, the failure of petitioners to testify in the RICO
cases against the Marcoses in New York cannot nullify their immunity. They have satisfied the
requirements both of the law and the parties’ implementing agreements. Under section 5 of E.O.
No. 14, as amended, their duty was to give information to the prosecution, and they did. Under
their Memorandum of Agreement, they promised to make themselves available as witnesses in
the said RICO cases, and they did. Petitioners were ready to testify but they were not called to
testify by the US prosecutors of the RICO cases. Their failure to testify was not of their own
making. It was brought about by the decision of the US prosecutors who may have thought that
their evidence was enough to convict the Marcoses. Since petitioners’ failure to testify was not of
their own choosing nor was it due to any fault of their own, justice and equity forbid that they be
penalized by the withdrawal of their immunity.