14. Gerardo Angat v. Republic. G.R. No.

132244

ANGAT vs. REPUBLIC

FACTS:

Petitioner Gerardo Angat was a natural born citizen of the Philippines until he lost
his citizenship by naturalization in the United States of America. On 11 March 1996, he
filed before the RTC of Marikina City, Branch 272, a petition to regain his Status as
a citizen of the Philippines under Commonwealth Act No. 63, Republic Act No. 965 and
Republic Act No. 2630. The case was thereafter set for initial hearing.

On 13 June 1996, petitioner sought to be allowed to take his oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines pursuant to R.A. 8171. The motion was initially denied by the
trial judge but after a motion for reconsideration, it was granted. The petitioner was
ordered to take his oath of allegiance pursuant to R.A. 8171. After taking his oath
of allegiance, the trial court issued an order repatriating petitioner and declaring him
as citizen of the Philippines pursuant to Republic Act No. 8171. The Bureau of
Immigration was ordered to cancel his alien certificate ofregistration and issue the
certificate of identification as Filipino citizen.

On 19 March 1997, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion
(virtually a motion for reconsideration) asserting that the petition itself should have been
dismissed by the court a quo for lack of jurisdiction because the proper forum for it was
the Special Committee on Naturalization consistently with Administrative Order No. 285
("AO 285"), dated 22 August 1996, issued by President Fidel V. Ramos. AO 285 had
tasked the Special Committee on Naturalization to be the implementing agency of R.A
8171. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the petition.

Petitioner appealed contending that the RTC seriously erred in dismissing the petition
by giving retroactive effect to Administrative Order No. 285, absent a provision on
Retroactive Application.

ISSUES:

WON Court erred in dismissing the petition by giving retroactive effect to AO 285,
absent a provision on Retroactive Application

HELD:

No. Under Section 1 of Presidential Decree ("P.D.") No. 725, 8 dated 05 June 1975,
amending Commonwealth Act No. 63, an application for repatriation could be filed by
Filipino women who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens, as well as by
natural born Filipinos who lost their Philippine citizenship, with
the Special Committee on Naturalization. The committee, chaired by the Solicitor
General with the Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the National
Intelligence Coordinating Agency as the other members, was created pursuant to Letter
of Instruction ("LOI") No. 270, dated 11 April 1975, as amended by LOI No. 283 and LOI
No. 491 issued, respectively, on 04 June 1975 and on 29 December 1976. Although the
agency was deactivated by virtue of President Corazon C. Aquino's Memorandum of 27
March 1987, it was not however, abrogated. In Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, 9
the Court observed that the aforedated memorandum of President Aquino had merely
directed the Special Committee on Naturalization "to cease and desist from undertaking
any and all proceedings . . . under Letter of Instruction ("LOI") 270." 10 The Court
elaborated:

This memorandum dated March 27, 1987 cannot by any stretch of legal hermeneutics
be construed as a law sanctioning or authorizing a repeal of P.D. No. 725. Laws are
repealed only by subsequent ones and a repeal may be express or implied. It is obvious
that no express repeal was made because then President Aquino in her memorandum-
based on the copy furnished us by Lee-did not categorically and/or impliedly state that
P.D. 725 was being repealed or was being rendered without any legal effect. In fact, she
did not even mention it specifically by its number or text. On the other hand, it is a basic
rule of statutory construction that repeals by implication are not favored. An implied
repeal will not be allowed "unless it is convincingly and unambiguously demonstrated
that the two laws are clear repugnant and patently inconsistent that they cannot co-
exist."

Indeed, the Committee was reactivated on 08 June 1995; hence, when petitioner filed
his petition on 11 March 1996, the Special Committee on Naturalizationconstituted
pursuant to LOI No. 270 under P.D. No. 725 was in place. Administrative Order 285,
promulgated on 22 August 1996 relative to R.A. No. 8171, in effect, was merely then a
confirmatory issuance.

The Office of the Solicitor General was right in maintaining that Angat's petition should
have been filed with the Committee, aforesaid, and not with the RTC which had no
jurisdiction thereover. The court's order of 04 October 1996 was thereby null and void,
and it did not acquire finality nor could be a source of right on the part of petitioner.

It should also be noteworthy that the was one for repatriation, and it was thusincorrect
for petitioner to initially invoke Republic Act No. 965 and R.A. No. 2630 since these laws
could only apply to persons who had lost their citizenship by rendering service to, or
accepting commission in, the armed forces of an alliedforeign country or the armed
forces of the United States of America, a factual matter not alleged in the petition,
Parenthetically, under these statutes, the person desiring to re-acquire
Philippine citizenship would not even be required to file a petition in court, and all that
he had to do was to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
and to register that fact with the civil registry in the place of his residence or where he
had last resided in the Philippines.
15. Mercado v. Manzano G.R. No. 135083 May 26, 1999

Facts:
Petitioners filed for respondent’s disqualification for election alleging that respondent is
a dual citizen, and under the Local Government Code, dual citizens cannot run for
public office.

Respondent is a son of both Filipinos but was born in the U.S which follows the principle
of jus soli, hence, considered an American citizen as well.
COMELEC allowed Manzano to run because he was considered natural-born because
of the vrtue that he is a son of both Filipino citizens but petitioners assail this.

Issue: Is respondent Manzano a dual citizen and cannot run for public office?
Ruling: The Court first defined dual citizenship and compared it to dual allegiance.

Dual citizenship arises when a person whose parents are citizens of a state that follows
jus saguinis and was born in a state that follows jus soli, hence, resulting to a
concurrent application of different two laws or more.
On the other hand, dual allegiance is a situation whre a person simultaneously owes
loyalty to two or more states.

In this case, Respondent, though dual citizen, his act of filing a certificate of candidacy
tantamount to his election of Phil. citizenship – meaning he forswears allegiance to the
other country and thereby terminating their status as dual.
The Court stressed that participating in the election is an express renunciation of
American citizenship.

Mercado v. Manzano Case Digest [G.R. No. 135083. May 26, 1999]

FACTS:

Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Eduardo Manzano were both candidates for Vice-Mayor of
Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections.

Based on the results of the election, Manzano garnered the highest number of votes. However,
his proclamation was suspended due to the pending petition for disqualification filed by Ernesto
Mercado on the ground that he was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.

From the facts presented, it appears that Manzano is both a Filipino and a US citizen.

The Commission on Elections declared Manzano disqualified as candidate for said elective
position.

However, in a subsequent resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the disqualification of the

Manzano was eventually proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City on August 31, 1998.

Thus the present petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a dual citizen is disqualified to hold public elective office in the philippines.
RULING:

The court ruled that the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. 7160 Sec. 40 (d) and R.A. 7854 Sec.
20 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance. Dual citizenship is different from dual
allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the application of the different laws of two or
more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Dual
allegiance on the other hand, refers to a situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by
some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual
allegiance is a result of an individual's volition. Article IV Sec. 5 of the Constitution provides
"Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."

Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike
those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the
termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing
of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as
persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of
conflicting laws of different states.

By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the
other country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens.
It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has
not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment.

When a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he renounces his
loyalty to any other country or government and solemnly declares that he owes his allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines, the condition imposed by law is satisfied and complied with.
The determination whether such renunciation is valid or fully complies with the provisions of our
Naturalization Law lies within the province and is an exclusive prerogative of our courts. The
latter should apply the law duly enacted by the legislative department of the Republic. No
foreign law may or should interfere with its operation and application.

The court ruled that the filing of certificate of candidacy of respondent sufficed to renounce his
American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen.
By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent
resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the
Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental
reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively
repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual
citizen.

On the other hand, private respondent’s oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered
with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his
profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his
election of Philippine citizenship.

His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath.
Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine
citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, the
court sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking
his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and
declared in commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A
similar sanction can be taken against any one who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces
his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his
Philippine citizenship.

The petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Facts: Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the
Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate
with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the
PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. The President declared
that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in
nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall have
improved. The IBP filed a petition seeking to declare the deployment of the Philippine
Marines null and void and unconstitutional.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not the President’s factual determination of the necessity of calling the
armed forces is subject to judicial review
(2) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility
patrols violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and
the civilian character of the PNP

Held:
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. Under
Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, Congress may revoke such proclamation of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the Court may review the
sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing
with the revocation or review of the President’s action to call out the armed forces. The
distinction places the calling out power in a different category from the power to declare martial
law and power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of
the Constitution would have simply lumped together the 3 powers and provided for their
revocation and review without any qualification.

The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powers highlights the intent to grant
the President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it
is considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the power to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which involve
the curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus
necessitating safeguards by Congress and review by the Court.

In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to determine the
necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the
President’s decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge such
heavy burden, as there is no evidence to support the assertion that there exists no justification
for calling out the armed forces.

The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the Marines, the civilian task of
law enforcement is “militarized” in violation of Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution. The deployment
of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the
Marines constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The local
police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority
belonging to the PNP

Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian
character of the police force. The real authority in the operations is lodged with the head of a
civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the military. Since none of the Marines was
incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no appointment to civilian
position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of the Marines in the joint visibility patrols does not
destroy the civilian character of the PNP.
17. Oposa vs Factoran
Natural and Environmental Laws; Constitutional Law: Intergenerational Responsibility
GR No. 101083; July 30 1993

FACTS:
A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al., representing
their generation and generations yet unborn, and represented by their parents against
Fulgencio Factoran Jr., Secretary of DENR. They prayed that judgment be rendered
ordering the defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his
behalf to:

1. Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country;

and granting the plaintiffs “such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.”
They alleged that they have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful
ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae.
Furthermore, they claim that the act of the defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut and
deforest the remaining forests constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the
natural resources property he holds in trust for the benefit of the plaintiff minors and
succeeding generations.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:

1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;

ISSUE:
Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to “prevent the
misappropriation or impairment of Philippine rainforests?”

HELD:
Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations
to come. The Supreme Court ruled that they can, for themselves, for others of their
generation, and for the succeeding generation, file a class suit. Their personality to sue
in behalf of succeeding generations is based on the concept of intergenerational
responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.
Such a right considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature” which indispensably include,
inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation
of the country’s forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other
natural resources to the end that their exploration, development, and utilization be
equitably accessible to the present as well as the future generations.
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that
rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a
little differently, the minor’s assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes at
the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right
for the generations to come.
18. Tano vs Socrates
Natural and Environmental Laws; Constitutional Law; Regalian Doctrine
GR No. 110249; August 21, 1997

FACTS:
On Dec 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Puerto Princesa enacted an
ordinance banning the shipment of all live fish and lobster outside Puerto Princesa City
from January 1, 1993 to January 1, 1998. Subsequently the Sangguniang Panlalawigan,
Provincial Government of Palawan enacted a resolution prohibiting the catching ,
gathering, possessing, buying, selling, and shipment of a several species of live marine
coral dwelling aquatic organisms for 5 years, in and coming from Palawan waters.
Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, praying that the court
declare the said ordinances and resolutions as unconstitutional on the ground that the
said ordinances deprived them of the due process of law, their livelihood, and unduly
restricted them from the practice of their trade, in violation of Section 2, Article XII and
Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE:
Are the challenged ordinances unconstitutional?

HELD:
No. The Supreme Court found the petitioners contentions baseless and held that the
challenged ordinances did not suffer from any infirmity, both under the Constitution and
applicable laws. There is absolutely no showing that any of the petitioners qualifies as a
subsistence or marginal fisherman. Besides, Section 2 of Article XII aims primarily not to
bestow any right to subsistence fishermen, but to lay stress on the duty of the State to
protect the nation’s marine wealth. The so-called “preferential right” of subsistence or
marginal fishermen to the use of marine resources is not at all absolute.
In accordance with the Regalian Doctrine, marine resources belong to the state and
pursuant to the first paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, their
“exploration, development and utilization...shall be under the full control and supervision
of the State.

In addition, one of the devolved powers of the LCG on devolution is the enforcement of
fishery laws in municipal waters including the conservation of mangroves. This
necessarily includes the enactment of ordinances to effectively carry out such fishery
laws within the municipal waters. In light of the principles of decentralization and
devolution enshrined in the LGC and the powers granted therein to LGUs which
unquestionably involve the exercise of police power, the validity of the questioned
ordinances cannot be doubted.
19. Miriam College Foundation, Inc. v CA 348 SCRA 265 December 15, 2000
Facts: The members of the editorial board of the Miriam College Foundation’s school
paper were subjected to disciplinary sanction by the College Discipline Committee after
letters of complaint were filed before the Board following the publication of the school
paper that contains obscene, vulgar, and sexually explicit contents. Prior to the
disciplinary sanction to the defendants they were required to submit a written statement
to answer the complaints against them to the Discipline Committee but the defendants,
instead of doing so wrote to the Committee to transfer the case to the DECS which they
alleged to have the jurisdiction over the issue. Pushing through with the investigation
ex parte the Committee found the defendants guilty and imposed upon them disciplinary
sanctions. Defendants filed before the court for prohibition with preliminary injunction on
said decision of the Committee questioning the jurisdiction of said Discipline Board over
the defendants.

Issue: WON the Discipline Board of Miriam College has jurisdiction over the defendants.

Held: The court resolved the issue before it by looking through the power of DECS and
the Disciplinary Committee in imposing sanctions upon the defendants. Section 5 (2),
Article XIV of the Constitution guarantees all institutions of higher learning academic
freedom. This institutional academic freedom includes the right of the school or college
to decide for itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to attain them free from
outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls
for some restraint. Such duty gives the institution the right to discipline its students and
inculcate upon them good values, ideals and attitude. The right of students to free
speech in school is not always absolute. The court upheld the right of students for the
freedom of expression but it does not rule out disciplinary actions of the school on the
conduct of their students. Further, Sec. 7 of the of the Campus Journalism Act provides
that the school cannot suspend or expel a student solely on the basis of the articles
they write EXCEPT when such article materially disrupts class work of involve
substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others. Therefore the court ruled that the
power of the school to investigate is an adjunct of its power to suspend or expel. It is a
necessary corollary to the enforcement of rules and regulations and the maintenance of
a safe and orderly educational environment conducive to learning. That power, like the
power to suspend or expel, is an inherent part of the academic freedom of institutions of
higher learning guaranteed by the Constitution. The court held that Miriam Collegehas
the authority to hear and decide the cases filed against respondent students.
21. UP BOARD OF REGENTS v. CA
G.R. No. 134625
August 31, 1999
313 SCRA 404
FACTS: Respondent Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine enrolled in the doctoral program in
Anthropology of the UP CSSP Diliman. She already completed the units of course work required
and finished her dissertation and was ready for oral defense.

After going over her dissertation, Dr. Medina informed CSSP Dean Paz that she committed
plagiarism. However, respondent was allowed to defend her dissertation. Four out of the five
panelists gave a passing mark except Dr. Medina.

UP held meeting against her case and some of the panels indicated disapproval. Hence, she
expressed her disappointments over the CSSP administration and warned Dean Paz. However,
Dean Paz request the exclusion of Celine’s name from the list of candidates for graduation but it
did not reach the Board of Regents on time, hence Celine graduated.

Dr. Medina formally charged private respondent with plagiarism and recommended that the
doctorate granted to her be withdrawn. Dean Paz informed private respondent of the charges
against her.

CSSP College Assembly unanimously approved the recommendation to withdraw private

The Board sent her a letter indicating that they resolved to withdraw her Doctorate Degree
recommended by the University Council.

She sought an audience with the Board of Regents and/or the U.P. President, which request was
denied by President

Hence, Celine then filed a petition for mandamus with a prayer for a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction and damages, alleging that petitioners had unlawfully withdrawn her
degree without justification and without affording her procedural due process.

ISSUE: Whether or not Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine was deprived of her right to
substantive due process.

RULING: No. Respondent Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine was indeed heard several
times.

Several committees and meetings had been formed to investigate the charge that private
respondent had committed plagiarism and she was heard in her defense.

In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain
one's side of a controversy or a chance seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
of. A party who has availed of the opportunity to present his position cannot tenably claim to
have been denied due process.

In the case at bar, Celine was informed in writing of the charges against her and given
opportunities to answer them. She was asked to submit her written explanation which she
submiited. She, as well, met with the U.P. chancellor and the members of the Zafaralla
committee to discuss her case. In addition, she sent several letters to the U.P. authorities
explaining her position.

It is not tenable for private respondent to argue that she was entitled to have an audience before
the Board of Regents. Due process in an administrative context does not require trial-type
proceedings similar to those in the courts of justice. It is noteworthy that the U.P. Rules do not
require the attendance of persons whose cases are included as items on the agenda of the Board
of Regents.
22.