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JMM v NLRC (1993)

JMM Promotions & Management, Inc., petiti oner, vs.Nati onal Labor Rel ations Commission and Ul pi ano L.
De Los Santos, respondents.

Ponente: Cruz, J.
Facts:
1. Followi ng Secs. 4 and 17, Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules, the petiti oner, a recruiti ng agency, made
the following:
a. Paid the license fee (Sec. 4)
b. Posted a cash bond of 100k and surety bond of 50k(Sec. 4)
c. Placed money in escrow worth 200k (Sec. 17)
2. The peti tioner wanted to appeal a decision of the Philippi ne Overseas Empl oyment Administration
(POEA) to the res pondent NLRC, but the l atter dis missed the appeal because of failure of the petitioner to
post an appeal bond required by Sec. 6, Rule V, B ook VII of the POEA Rules. The decision being appealed
involved a monetary award.
3. The petiti oner contended that i ts payment of a license fee, posting of cash bond and surety bond, and
pl acement of money i n escrow are enough; posting an appeal bond is unnecessary. Accordi ng to Sec. 4, the
bonds are posted to ans wer for all vali d and legal clai ms arising from vi olations of the conditions for the
grant and use of the license, and/ or accreditati on and contracts of employment. On the other hand,
accordi ng to Sec. 17, the escrow shall ans wer for vali d and legal clai ms of recruited workers as a result of
recruitment violations or money claims.
4. Sec. 6 reads:
“In case the decision of the Administrati on invol ves a monetary award, an appeal by the empl oyer shall be
perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond…”
The bonds required here are different from the bonds required in Sec. 4.

Issue: Was the petiti oner still required to post an appeal bond des pite the fact that i t has posted bonds of 150k
and placed 200k in escrow before?
Held:
Yes. It is possible for the monetary reward i n favor of the empl oyee to exceed the amount of 350,000 because
of the stringent requirements posed upon recruiters. The reason for such is that overseas employees are
subjected to greater risks and hence, the money will be used to insure more care on the part of the local
recruiter in its choice of foreign principal to whom the worker will be sent.
Doctrine: Construction:
It is a princi ple of legal hermeneutics that in interpreting a statute (or a set of rules as in this case), care
shoul d be taken that every part thereof be gi ven effect, on the theory that it was enacted as an integrated
measure and not as a hodge-podge of conflicting provisions. Ut res magis valeat quam pereat. “That the
thing may rather have effect than be destroyed.”
The rule is that a construction that woul d render a provision inoperati ve shoul d be avoi ded; instead,
apparently inconsistent provisions shoul d be reconciled whenever possible as parts of a coordinated and
harmoni ous whole. With regard to the present case, the doctrine can be applied when the Court found that
Sec. 6 complements Sec. 4 and Sec. 17.

In the POEA Rules, the bonds required in Sec. 4 Rule 2, B ook 2 and the escrow required in Sec. 17 Rule 2,
Book 2 have different purposes from the appeal bond required in Sec. 6, Rule 5 Book 7.
The bonds in Sec. 4 are made to ans wer for all clai ms against the employer, which is not limited to monetary
awards to employees whose contracts of employment have been violated.
The escrow agreement in Sec. 17 is used only as a last resort in claiming against the employer.
On the other hand, Sec. 6 requires an appeal bond in an amount equi valent to the monetary award. Indeed,
this appeal bond is intended to further insure the payment of the monetary award. Also, it is possible that the
monetary award may exceed the bonds posted previ ously and the money pl aced in escrow. If such a case
happens, where will the excess be sourced? To sol ve such a dilemma, an appeal bond equi valent to the
amount of the monetary award is required by Sec. 6.

Mateo Casela v. Court of Appeals, and Exequiel Magsaysay

Case No. 50
G.R. No. L – 26754 (October 16, 1970) Chapter IV, Page 134, Footnote No.38

FACTS:

Petitioner was ordered, on Oct. 26, 1956, to vacate the premises and remove his house. Petitioner refused to
comply. Thus, the Court issued two more writs on May 6, 1958 and April 14, 1959. Instead of obeying the
writs, the Petitioner filed a case before the Court of First Instance of Zambales, asking Pri vate Respondent to
pay hi m the value of his house in addi tion to damages. He also filed a moti on for suspension of the
implementation of the writ of executi on. The Court granted the motion for suspension but the ci vil case was
dismissed when it reached Res pondent Court. For this reason, Magsaysay filed a motion for execution of the
writ dated Dec. 6, 1963 and another on Feb. 11, 1964. CAR denied the motion hol ding that its decision dated
Oct. 26, 1956 coul d no longer be executed on mere moti on for the reason that a peri od of fi ve years has
already elapsed from the said date.

ISSUE:

W/N the motion for execution which was filed beyond the reglementary period was time-barred.

HELD:

No. From Dec. 17, 1956 when the decision in question became final and executory, to Dec. 11, 1963, the date
when Pri vate Respondent’s moti on for executi on was filed, a peri od of 6 years, 11 months and 24 days
elapsed. From this period, the ti me during which the writs of execution coul d not be served, or a period of 3
years, 9 months and 25 days must be subtracted. Consequently, onl y 3 years, 1 month and 29 days can be
charged against the reglementary period. Hence Pri vate Respondent’s motion for executi on was not ti me-
barred.

Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines

I. THE FACTS

Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) were enacted by Congress.
Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 is the organic act that established the ARMM and scheduled the first regular
elections for the ARMM regional officials. RA No. 9054 amended the ARMM Charter and reset the regular
elections for the ARMM regional officials to the second Monday of September 2001. RA No. 9140 further
reset the first regular elections to November 26, 2001. RA No. 9333 reset for the third time the ARMM
nd
regional elections to the 2 Monday of August 2005 and on the same date every 3 years thereafter.

Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held on August 8, 2011.
COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the
various regional offices to be elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the next
ARMM regular elections to May 2013 to coincide with the regular national and local elections of the country.

In these consolidated petitions filed directly with the Supreme Court, the petitioners assailed the
constitutionality of RA No. 10153.

II. THE ISSUES:

1. Does the 1987 Constitution mandate the synchronization of elections [including the ARMM elections]?
2. Does the passage of RA No. 10153 violate the three-readings-on-separate -days rule under Section 26(2),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution?

3. Is the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs constitutional?

III. THE RULING

[The Supreme Court] DISMISSED the petitions and UPHELD the constitutionality of RA No. 10153 in toto.]

1. YES, the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections.

While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize national and local elections,
the clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the
Constitution, which show the extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making
adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought

to attain synchronization of elections. The Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the provisions of
the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, all serve as patent indicators of the constitutional mandate to
hold synchronized national and local elections, starting the second Monday of May 1992 and for all the
following elections.

In this case, the ARMM elections, although called “regional” elections, should be included among the
elections to be synchronized as it is a “local” election based on the wording and structure of the Constitution.

Thus, it is clear from the foregoing that the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections,
including the ARMM elections.

2. NO, the passage of RA No. 10153 DOES NOT violate the three-readings-on-separate- days requirement in
Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

The general rule that before bills passed by either the House or the Senate can become laws they must pass
through three readings on separate days, is subject to the EXCEPTION when the President certifies to the
necessity of the bill’s immediate enactment. The Court, in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, explained the
effect of the President’s certification of necessity in the following manner:

The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the
bill on separate days. The phrase "except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate
enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Section 26[2] qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can become a law: [i]
the bill has passed three readings on separate days and [ii] it has been printed in its final form and distributed
three days before it is finally approved.

In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the Speaker of the House of Representatives
to certify the necessity of the immediate enactment of a law synchronizing the ARMM elections with the
national and local elections. Following our Tolentino ruling, the President’s certification exempted both the
House and the Senate from having to comply with the three separate readings requirement.

3. YES, the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs in the ARMM is constitutional

[During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three options open to Congress in order to resolve the
problem on who should sit as ARMM officials in the interim [in order to achieve synchronization in the 2013
elections]: (1) allow the [incumbent] elective officials in the ARMM

to remain in office in a hold over capacity until those elected in the synchronized elections assume office; (2)
hold special elections in the ARMM, with the terms of those elected to expire when those elected in the [2013]
synchronized elections assume office; or (3) authorize the President to appoint OICs, [their respective terms
to last also until those elected in the 2013 synchronized elections assume office.]

st
3.1. 1 option: Holdover is unconstitutional since it would extend the terms of office of the incumbent
ARMM officials

We rule out the [hold over] option since it violates Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. This provision
states:

Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by
law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. [emphases
ours]

Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are covered and bound by the three-year term limit
prescribed by the Constitution; they cannot extend their term through a holdover. xxx.

If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another term mandated by Congress, the net result
is for Congress to create a new term and to appoint the occupant for the new term. This view – like the
extension of the elective term – is constitutionally infirm because Congress cannot do indirectly what it
cannot do directly, i.e., to act in a way that would effectively extend the term of the incumbents. Indeed, if
acts that cannot be legally done directly can be done indirectly, then all laws would be illusory. Congress
cannot also create a new term and effectively appoint the occupant of the position for the new term. This is
effectively an act of appointment by Congress and an unconstitutional intrusion into the constitutional
appointment power of the President. Hence, holdover – whichever way it is viewed – is a constitutionally
infirm option that Congress could not have undertaken.

Even assuming that holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there had been statutory basis for it (namely
Section 7, Article VII of RA No. 9054) in the past, we have to remember that the rule of holdover can only
apply as an available option where no express or implied legislative intent to the contrary exists; it cannot
apply where such contrary intent is evident.

Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it explicitly clear that it had the intention of suppressing the
holdover rule that prevailed under RA No. 9054 by completely removing this provision. The deletion is a
policy decision that is wholly within the discretion of Congress to make in the exercise of its plenary
legislative powers; this Court cannot pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation,
except where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results.

nd
3.2. 2 option: Calling special elections is unconstitutional since COMELEC, on its own, has no authority to
order special elections.

The power to fix the date of elections is essentially legislative in nature. [N]o elections may be held on any
other date for the positions of President, Vice President, Members of Congress and local officials, except
when so provided by another Act of Congress, or upon orders of a body or officer to whom Congress may
have delegated either the power or the authority to ascertain or fill in the details in the execution of that
power.

Notably, Congress has acted on the ARMM elections by postponing the scheduled August 2011 elections and
setting another date – May 13, 2011 – for regional elections synchronized with the presidential, congressional
and other local elections. By so doing, Congress itself has made a policy decision in the exercise of its
legislative wisdom that it shall not call special elections as an adjustment measure in synchronizing the
ARMM elections with the other elections.

After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive nor the Judiciary can act to the contrary by ordering
special elections instead at the call of the COMELEC. This Court, particularly, cannot make this call without
thereby supplanting the legislative decision and effectively legislating. To be sure, the Court is not without the
power to declare an act of Congress null and void for being unconstitutional or for having been exercised in
grave abuse of discretion. But our power rests on very narrow ground and is merely to annul a contravening
act of Congress; it is not to supplant the decision of Congress nor to mandate what Congress itself should
have done in the exercise of its legislative powers.

Thus, in the same way that the term of elective ARMM officials cannot be extended through a holdover, the
term cannot be shortened by putting an expiration date earlier than the three (3) years that the Constitution
itself commands. This is what will happen – a term of less than two years – if a call for special elections shall
prevail. In sum, while synchronization is achieved, the result is at the cost of a violation of an express
provision of the Constitution.

rd
3.3. 3 option: Grant to the President of the power to appoint ARMM OICs in the interim is valid.

The above considerations leave only Congress’ chosen interim measure – RA No. 10153 and the appointment
by the President of OICs to govern the ARMM during the pre-synchronization period pursuant to Sections 3,
4 and 5 of this law – as the only measure that Congress can make. This choice itself, however, should be
examined for any attendant constitutional infirmity.

At the outset, the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the limitations on or qualifications
to the exercise of this power should be strictly construed; these limitations or

qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be recognized. The appointing power is embodied in Section
16, Article VII of the Constitution, which states:

Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint
the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls or officers of the
armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in
him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are
not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress
may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in
the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. [emphasis ours]

This provision classifies into four groups the officers that the President can appoint. These are:

First, the heads of the executive departments; ambassadors; other public ministers and consuls; officers of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, from the rank of colonel or naval captain; and other officers whose
appointments are vested in the President in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;

Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.

Since the President’s authority to appoint OICs emanates from RA No. 10153, it falls under the third group
of officials that the President can appoint pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Thus, the
assailed law facially rests on clear constitutional basis.

If at all, the gravest challenge posed by the petitions to the authority to appoint OICs under Section 3 of RA
No. 10153 is the assertion that the Constitution requires that the ARMM executive and legislative officials to
be “elective and representative of the constituent political units.” This requirement indeed is an express
limitation whose non-observance in the assailed law leaves the appointment of OICs constitutionally
defective.

After fully examining the issue, we hold that this alleged constitutional problem is more apparent than real
and becomes very real only if RA No. 10153 were to be mistakenly read as a law that changes the elective and
representative character of ARMM positions. RA No. 10153, however, does not in any way amend what the
organic law of the ARMM (RA No. 9054) sets outs in terms of structure of governance. What RA No. 10153 in
fact only does is to “appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice
Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to
the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and

assumed office.” This power is far different from appointing elective ARMM officials for the abbreviated
term ending on the assumption to office of the officials elected in the May 2013 elections.

[T]he legal reality is that RA No. 10153 did not amend RA No. 9054. RA No. 10153, in fact, provides only for
synchronization of elections and for the interim measures that must in the meanwhile prevail. And this is how
RA No. 10153 should be read – in the manner it was written and based on its unambiguous facial terms.
Aside from its order for synchronization, it is purely and simply an interim measure responding to the
adjustments that the synchronization

requires.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-59154 April 3, 1990

MERIDIAN ASSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ABELARDO M. DAYRIT, Judge, CFI, Manila, Br. II, and FIRST WESTERN BANK & TRUST
COMPANY, respondents.

Bito, Lozada, Ortega & Castillo for private respondent.

NARVASA, J.:

The sole issue in this speci al ci vil acti on of certi orari concerns the rate of interest properly i mposable in
relation to a judg ment for the payment of money: 6% , as provi ded by Article 2209 of the Ci vil Code, or 12% ,
conformabl y wi th Central B ank Circular been passed upon and resol ved No. 416. The issue has already by
this Court in two (2) earlier cases, 1 and it is in accordance with those precedents that the case at bar will also
be determined.

The petiti oner, Meri dian Assurance Corporation, was a defendant in Ci vil Case No. 62317 of the then Court
of First Instance of Manil a, enti tled "First Western Bank and Trust Company vs. Atl as Ti mber Company, et
al." The case resulted in a verdict adverse to the defendants, 2 disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, judg ment is rendered in favor of the pl aintiff and against the defendants, jointly and
severally, for the Sum of $21,933.38 or its equi valent in pesos at the rate of P3.9390 to a dollar, wi th interest
at the legal rate from the filing of the complaint, and the costs of the suit, provi ded, however, that this
judg ment shoul d not be enforced against the indi vi dual partners before the properties of the partnership
have been exhausted.

The Trial Court's judg ment was affirmed i n toto by the Court of Appeals on October 9, 1980; 3 and the
latter's judg ment havi ng in due course become final and executory, the case was reminded to the Court a quo
for execution. Execution was eventually ordered by the Trial Court by Order dated September 8, 1981.

On September 16, 1981, Meri dian Assurance Corporation (hereafter, simpl y Meri di an) wrote to the
judg ment creditor, First Western Bank & Trust Co. (hereafter, simpl y First Western), offering to pay the
amount of the judg ment with 6% interest per annum and the approved costs of P237.00. The offer was
rejected by First Western, in its letter of September 21, 1981, its view bei ng that the rate of interest shoul d be
12% per annum, i n accordance wi th Central B ank Circular No. 416 dated Jul y 29, 1974. Another exchange of
letters ensued in which the parties stood firm on the views set out in their first communications.

Meri dian then filed wi th the Tri al Court a motion dated September 30, 1981, manifesting its deposit with the
Court of the amount of P170,061.03 — representing the total of.(1) P86,395.58 (the peso equi valent at the tune
of the princi pal indebtedness of $21,933.38), (2) P83,428.45 (the interest on the princi pal debt at 6% p.a from
August 27, 1965 to September 30, 1981) and (3) costs in the sum of P237.00 — and praying that the deposit be
allowed, that it be consi dered full satisfaction of the judg ment, and that enforcement of the writ of execution
be restrained. The motion was denied by Order dated October 15, 1981, 4 the Trial. Court opi ning that
Central B ank Circular No. 416 had changed "the legal rate of interest from 6% to 12% per annum." This
ruling the trial Court refused to reconsider, overruling Meri dians motion of October 26, 1981 asking it to do
so. Meri dian thereupon proceeded to this Court praying for a writ of certiorari to annul the orders denying
its aforementi oned moti on to deposit, etc. dated September 1981, and to authorize it "to satisfy the amount of
the judgment with 6% interest per annum and the approved costs of P237.00 totalling P170,061.03 . ."

The writ will issue as prayed for. As pointed out in this opini on's opening paragraph, the matter in question
has already been settled in Reformina v. Tomol, Jr. and Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Cruz, supra. 5
The question posed in Reformina was whether or not Circular No. 416 of the Central B ank of the Phili ppines
6 — amendi ng Section 1 of the Us ury Law (Act No. 2655) by prescribing twel ve percent (12% ) per annum as

the "rate of interest for the loan, or forbearance of any money, goods, or credits and the rate allowed in
judg ments, in the absence of express contract as to such rate of interest" . .— applied to "all kinds of
monetary judg ment." Reformina hel d that the "judg ments spoken of and referred to are (onl y) judg ments in
litigations involving loans or forbearance of any money, goods or credits." It declared 7 that—

. . Any other kind of monetary judg ment which has nothing to do with, nor i nvol ving loans or forbearance of
any money, goods of credits does not fall within the coverage of the sai d l aw (P.D. No. 116) for it is not wi thin
the ambit of the authority granted to the Central B ank. The Monetary Board may not tread on forbi dden
grounds. It cannot rewri te other l aws. That functi on is vested solely with the legislative authority. It is
axi omatic in legal hermeneutics that statutes shoul d be construed as a whole and not as series of disconnected
articles and phrases. In the absence of a clear contrary i ntention, words and phrases in statutes shoul d not be
interpreted in isolation from one another. A word or phrase in a statute is al ways used in association wi th
other words or phrases and its meaning may thus be modified of restricted by the latter.

And, as in Philippi ne Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Cruz, supra, there is "no reason to depart or devi ate from that
ruling here. It seems qui te clear that Section 1 -a of Act No. 2655, as amended 8 — which, as distinguished
from sec. 1 of the same will appears to be the actual and operati ve grant of authority to the Monetary Board
of the Central Bank to prescribe maxi mum rates of interest where the parties have not sti pul ated thereon —
in excludi ng mention of rates allowed in judg ments, shoul d, at the least, be construed as limi ting the authority
thus granted onl y to l oans or forbearances of money, etc., and to judg ments invol ving such loans or
forbearances.

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The Orders promulgated on October 15, 1981 and December 2, 1981
are ANNULLED AND S ET AS IDE. The petitioner's deposit with the Trial Court of the amount of
P170,061.03 is declared to constitute full satisfacti on of the judg ment against it, and the Trial Court is
DIRECT ED to cause entry of sai d full satisfacti on of judg ment, and declare the case closed and termi nated as
far as the petitioner is concerned. No Costs.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, Gancayco, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

 Socorro Ramirez vs Court of Appeals

Case Digests: Statutory Construction

Socorro Ramirez vs Court of Appeals
248 SCRA 590
G. R. No. 93833
September 25 1995

Facts:

A ci vil case for damages was filed by petiti oner Socorro Ramirez in the RTC of Quezon Ci ty alleging that the
pri vate res pondent, Ester Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter’s office, allegedly vexed, insulted and
humiliated her i n a “hostile and furious mood” and in a manner offensive to petitioner’s dignity and
personality, “contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.”
In support of her clai m, petiti oner produced a verbati m transcript of the event. The transcript on which the
civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner.
As a result of peti tioner ’s recordi ng of the event and alleging that the sai d act of secretly taping the
confrontation was illegal, pri vate respondent filed a cri minal case before the RTC of Pasay City for vi olation
of RA 4200, entitled “ An Act to Prohi bit and Penalize Wiretappi ng and Other Related Viol ati ons of Pri vate
Communication, and Other Purposes.”
Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, petiti oner filed a Motion to Quash the Informati on on the ground that
the facts charged do not constitute an offense particul arly a vi olation of RA 4200. The tri al court granted the
Motion to Quash, agreeing with petitioner.
From the trial court’s Order, the pri vate res pondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari wi th this Court,
which forthwith referred the case to the CA.
Respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed Decision decl aring the tri al court’s order null and
void.

Issue:
W/N RA 4200 applies to taping of a private conversation by one of the parties to a conversation.

Hel d:
Legislati ve intent is determined princi pally from the l anguage of a statute. Where the language of a statute is
clear and unambiguous, the law is applied accordi ng to i ts express terms, and interpretati on woul d be
resorted to only where a literal interpretati on woul d be either i mpossible or absurd or woul d lead to an
injustice.
Section 1 of RA 4200 clearly and unequi vocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all parties
to any pri vate communicati on, to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The l aw
makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other
than or different from those invol ved i n the pri vate communication. The statute’s intent to penalize all
persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of qualifier “any.” Consequently, as
respondent CA correctl y concluded, “even a (person) pri vy to a communicati on who records his pri vate
conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a vi olator under this provision
of RA 4200.
The unambiguity of the express words of the provision therefore pl ainly supports the view hel d by the
respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize even those pri vy to the pri vate communications. Where
the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.
Stat Con Principle: Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of the statute.
Legal Maxi ms: Verba Legis (the statute must be interpreted literally if the language of the statute is plain and
free from ambiguity)
 G.R. No. 170195
March 28, 2011
SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION and SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, Petitioner,
vs.
TERESA G. FAVILA, Respondent.

Topic: Joint obligation to support

DOCTRINE: A spouse who claims entitlement to death benefits as a primary beneficiary under the Social Security
Law must establish two qualifying factors, to wit: (1) that he/she is the legitimate spouse; and (2) that he/she is
dependent upon the member for support. A person separated de facto from her husband is not a dependent,
unless the contrary is shown.

FACTS:
• January 17, 1970 - Teresa married Florante Favila
• June 30, 1970 - Florante designated Teresita to be his sole beneficiary in SSS
o He likewise named their common children as beneficiaries when they later had children
• Feb 1, 1997 - Florante died; his pension benefits under the SSS were given to their only minor child at
that time, Florante II, but only until his emancipation at age 21
• Teresa then filed claim to the benefits as the surviving legal spouse but was denied by the SSS; SSS
claimed that Teresa was not entitled
o SSS answered that Teresa as guardian was paid a total period of 57 months and that sister of
Florante wrote that Teresa has been separated from Florante because former had an affair with
a married man, have sex 4 times a week and the couple lived together for 10 years only
o Interview of SSS - Teresa did not live with anybody but rumored to have an affair

Ruling of SSS Commission: death benefits dependent on 2 factors(1) legality of the marital relationship; and (2)
dependency for support, which, in SSC’s opinioin, is affected by factors such as separation de facto of the spouses,
marital infidelity and such other grounds sufficient to disinherit a spouse under the law. SSC ruled that she is
disqualified from claiming benefits because she is not dependent for support from Florante due to her marital
infidelity. Also, she has been separated from Florante for 17 years before his death. She only contested her non-
entitlement of benefits when the pension was stopped

CA Ruling: found Teresa's petition impressed with merit. It gave weight to the fact that she is a primary beneficiary
because she is the lawful surviving spouse of Florante and in addition, she was designated by Florante as such
beneficiary. There was no legal separation or annulment of marriage that could have disqualified her from claiming
the death benefits as her designation as beneficiary had not been invalidated by any court of law.

ISSUE: Is Teresa a primary beneficiary in contemplation of the Social Security Law as to be entitled to death
benefits accruing from the death of Florante?

HELD: NO. CA order set aside. Teresa is not dependent spouse within the contemplation of the SSL
• Under the SSS Law (RA 1161), the term “dependent” is defined as “xxx; the legitimate spouse dependent
for support upon the employee; xxx”
• In Re: Application for Survivor’s Benefits of Manlavi, a dependent is "one who derives his or her main
support from another [or] relying on, or subject to, someone else for support; not able to exist or sustain
oneself, or to perform anything without the will, power or aid of someone else."
• Likewise under the same law, “beneficiaries”, is defined as : the dependent spouse until he remarries and
dependent children, who shall be the primary beneficiaries. xxx
• For a spouse to qualify as a primary beneficiary the SSS Law he/she must not only be a legitimate spouse
but also a dependent as defined, that is, one who is dependent upon the member for support.
• SC agreed with Teresa that her alleged affair with another man was not sufficiently established and
Florante was actually the one who has a common wife; however, Teresa is still not entitled as she has
been separated in fact from Florante for 17 years prior to his death
• From prevailing jurisprudence: a wife who is already separated de facto from her husband cannot be
said to be ‘dependent for support’ upon the husband, absent any showing to the contrary.
• "[w]hoever claims entitlement to the benefits provided by law should establish his or her right thereto by
substantial evidence” In this case, as held in Aguas, the wife-claimant had the burden to prove that all
the statutory requirements have been complied with, particularly her dependency on her husband at the
time of his death
• Aside from Teresa’s bare allegation that she was dependent upon her husband for support and her
misplaced reliance on the presumption of dependency by reason of her valid and then subsisting
marriage with Florante, Teresa has not presented sufficient evidence to discharge her burden of proving
that she was dependent upon her husband for support at the time of his death. She could have done this
by submitting affidavits of reputable and disinterested persons who have knowledge that during her
separation with Florante, she does not have a known trade, business, profession or lawful occupation
from which she derives income sufficient for her support and such other evidence tending to prove her
claim of dependency.
• Hence, for Teresa’s failure to show that despite their separation she was dependent upon Florante for
support at the time of his death, Teresa cannot qualify as a primary beneficiary. Hence, she is not
entitled to the death benefits accruing on account of Florante’s death.
 Globe Mackay Cable vs NLRC

(GR 74156, June 29, 1988)

FACTS:

• Wage Order No. 6, which took effect on October 30, 1984, increased the cost-of-li vi ng allowance
(COLA) of nonagricultural workers in the private sector.

• Gl obe Mackay complied with the sai d wage order by paying its monthly-pai d employees the
mandated P3.00 per day COLA. But, in computing the COLA, Globe Mackay multi plied P3.00 per
day COLA by 22 days, which was the number of working days in the company.

• The Union disagreed with the computation, clai ming that the dail y COLA shoul d be multi plied by 30
days to arrive at the monthly COLA rate.

• The Uni on further alleged that before Wage Order No. 6 took effect, the empl oyer had been
computing and payi ng the monthl y COLA based on 30 days per month. This, the Uni on sai d, was an
employer practice, which should not be unilaterally withdrawn.

RULING:

• Payment in full by the empl oyer of the COLA before the execution of the Collecti ve Bargaini ng
Agreement in 1982 and in compliance wi th Wage Orders Nos. 1 (March 26, 1981) to 5 (June 11, 1984)
shoul d not be construed as constituti ve of voluntary empl oyer practice, which cannot l ater be
unilaterally withdrawn by the employer. To be considered as such, it shoul d have been practiced over
a long period of time and must be shown to have been consistent and deliberate.

• Absent clear administrati ve gui delines, the empl oyer cannot be faulted for erroneous application of
the l aw. Payment may be sai d to have been made by reason of a mistake in the constructi on or
application of a “ doubtful or difficul t question of law” (Article 2155, Ci vil Code, in rel ation to Article
2154, Civil Code).
 • If it is a past error that is being corrected, no vested right may be sai d to have arisen not any
di minuti on of benefit under Article 100 of the Labor Code may be sai d to have resulted by virtue of
the correction.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 109445 November 7, 1994

FELICITO BASBACIO, petitioner,

vs.
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FRANKLIN DRILON in his capacity as
Secretary of Justice, respondent.

Amparita S. Sta. Maria for petitioner.

MENDOZA, J.:

This case presents for determinati on the scope of the State's liability under Rep. Act No. 7309, which among
other things provi des compensation for persons who are unjustly accused, convicted and i mprisoned but on
appeal are acquitted and ordered released.

Petitioner Felicito B asbacio and his son-in-l aw, Wilfredo B al derrama, were convicted of frustrated murder
and of two counts of frustrated murder for the killing of Federico Boyon and the wounding of the l atter's wife
Fl ori da and his son Tirso, at Pal o, Calanuga, Rapu-Rapu, Al bay, on the night of June 26, 1988. The moti ve
for the killing was apparently a land dis pute between the Boyons and petitioner. Petitioner and his son-in-l aw
were sentenced to imprisonment and ordered immediately detained after their bonds had been cancelled.

Petitioner and his son-in-l aw appealed. Onl y peti tioner's appeal proceeded to judg ment, however, as the
appeal of the other accused was dismissed for failure to file his brief.

On June 22, 1992 the Court of Appeals rendered a decision acquitting petitioner on the ground that the
prosecution failed to prove cons pirac y between hi m and his son-in-law. He had been poi nted to by a daughter
of Federico B oyon as the companion of B al derrama when the latter barged into their hut and without
warning started shooti ng, but the appellate court ruled that because petitioner di d nothing more, petitioner's
presence at the scene of the crime was insufficient to show conspiracy.

Based on his acquittal, petitioner filed a clai m under Rep. Act No. 7309, sec. 3(a), which provi des for the
payment of compensation to "any person who was unjustly accused, convicted, i mprisoned but subsequently
released by virtue of a judg ment of acquittal." 1 The clai m was filed with the B oard of Cl aims of the
Department of Justice, but the clai m was denied on the ground that while petiti oner's presence at the scene of
the killing was not sufficient to find hi m guilty beyond reasonable doubt, yet, considering that there was bad
bl ood between hi m and the deceased as a result of a l and dispute and the fact that the convicted murderer is
his son-in-law, there was basis for finding that he was "probably guilty."

On appeal, respondent Secretary of Justice affirmed the Board's ruling. Sai d the Secretary of Justice in his
resolution dated March 11, 1993:

It is believed therefore that the phrase "any person . . . unjustly accused, convicted and i mprisoned" in
Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7309 refers to an indi vi dual who was wrongly accused and i mprisoned for a crime he
di d not commi t, thereby making hi m "a victi m of unjust i mprisonment." In the instant case, however,
Clai mant/ Appell ant cannot be deemed such a victi m since a reading of the decision of his acquittal shows that
his exculpation is not based on his innocence, but upon, in effect, a finding of reasonable doubt.

Petitioner brought this petition for review on certiorari . Nei ther Rule 45 nor Rep. Act No. 7309, however,
provi des for review by certiorari of the decisions of the Secretary of Justice. Nonetheless, in view of the
importance of the question tendered, the Court resol ved to treat the petition as a s pecial ci vil action for
certiorari under Rule 65.

Petitioner questions the basis of the res pondent's ruling that to be able to recover under sec. 3(a) of the l aw
the clai mant must on appeal be found to be innocent of the cri mes of which he was convicted in the tri al
court. Through counsel he contends that the l anguage of sec. 3(a) is clear and does not call for interpretati on.
The "mere fact that the clai mant was i mprisoned for a cri me which he was subsequently acquitted of is
already unjust in itself," he contends. To deny his clai m because he was not declared innocent woul d be to say
that his imprisonment for two years while his appeal was pendi ng was justified. Petitioner arg ues that there is
only one requirement for conviction in cri minal cases and that is proof beyond reasonable doubt. If the
prosecution fails to present such proof, the presumpti on that the accused is innocent stands and, therefore,
there is no reason for requiring that he be declared innocent of the cri me before he can recover compensation
for his imprisonment.

Petitioner's contention has no merit. It woul d require that every ti me an accused is acquitted on appeal he
must be gi ven compensati on on the theory that he was "unjustly convicted" by the trial court. Such a readi ng
of sec. 3(a) is contrary to petitioner's professed canon of construction that when the language of the statute is
clear it shoul d be gi ven its natural meani ng. It leaves out of the provision in question the qualifying word
"unjustly" so that the provision woul d simpl y read: "The followi ng may file clai ms for compensati on before
the B oard: (a) any person who was accused, convicted, i mprisoned but subsequentl y released by virtue of a
judgment of acquittal."

But sec. 3(a) requires that the clai mant be "unjustly accused, convicted [and] i mprisoned." The fact that his
conviction is reversed and the accused is acquitted is not itself proof that the previous convicti on was
"unjust." An accused may be acquitted for a number of reasons and his conviction by the trial court may, for
any of these reasons, be set aside. For example, he may be acquitted not because he is innocent of the crime
charged but because of reasonable doubt, i n which case he may be found ci villy liable to the complainant,
because while the evi dence against hi m does not satisfy the quantum of proof required for conviction, it may
nonetheless be sufficient to sustain a ci vil acti on for damages. 2 In one case the accused, an alien, was acquitted
of statutory rape wi th homicide because of doubt as to the ages of the offended parties who consented to have
sex with hi m. Nonetheless the accused was ordered to pay moral and exemplary damages and ordered
deported. 3 In such a case to pay the accused compensation for havi ng been "unjustly convicted" by the tri al
court woul d be utterly inconsistent with his liability to the complainant. Yet to follow peti tioner's theory such
an accused would be entitled to compensation under sec. 3(a).

The truth is that the presumpti on of innocence has never been intended as evi dence of innocence of the
accused but onl y to shift the burden of proof that he is guilty to the prosecution. If "accusation is not
synonymous wi th guilt," 4 so is the presumpti on of innocence not a proof thereof. It is one thing to say that the
accused is presumed to be innocent in order to place on the prosecution the burden of proving beyond
reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty. It is quite another thing to say that he is innocent and if he is
convicted that he has been "unjustly convicted." As this Court held in a case:

Though we are acquitting the appellant for the crime of rape wi th homicide, we emphasize that we are not
ruling that he is innocent or bl ameless. It is only the constitutional presumption of innocence and the failure
of the prosecution to buil d an airtight case for convicti on which saved hi m, not that the facts of unlawful
conduct do not exist. 5

To say then that an accused has been "unjustly convicted" has to do with the manner of his conviction rather
than with his innocence. An accused may on appeal be acquitted because he di d not commi t the crime, but
that does
not necessarily mean that he is entitled to compensation for having been the victi m of an "unjust conviction."
If his convicti on was due to an error in the appreciati on of the evi dence the convicti on while erroneous is not
unjust. That is why it is not, on the other hand, correct to say as does respondent, that under the law li ability
for compensation depends entirely on the innocence of the accused.

The phrase "unjustly convicted" has the same meaning as "knowingly rendering an unjust judg ment" in art.
204 of the Revised Penal Code. What this Court held in In re Rafael C. Climaco 6 applies:

In order that a judge may be hel d liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judg ment, it must be shown
beyond doubt that the judg ment is unjust as it is contrary to law or is not supported by the evi dence , and the
same was made with conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice . . . .

To hol d a judge liable for the renditi on of manifestly unjust judg ment by reason of inexcusable negligence or
ignorance, it must be shown, accordi ng to Groizard, that althoug h he has acted without malice, he failed to
observe i n the performance of his duty, that diligence, prudence and care which the l aw is entitled to exact in
the rendering of any public service. Negligence and ignorance are inexcusable if they i mpl y a manifest
injustice which cannot be explai ned by a reasonable interpretati on. Inexcusable mistake onl y exists in the
legal concept when i t i mplies a manifest injustice, that is to say, such i njustice which cannot be expl ained by a
reasonable interpretation, even though there is a misunderstanding or error of the l aw applied, yet in the
contrary i t results, logicall y and reasonabl y, and in a very clear and indis putable manner, in the notori ous
violation of the legal precept.

Indeed, sec. 3(a) does not refer solely to an unjust convicti on as a result of which the accused is unjustly
imprisoned, but, in additi on, to an unjust accusati on. The accused must have been "unjustly accused, in
consequence of which he is unjustly convicted and then i mprisoned. It is important to note this because if
from its inception the prosecuti on of the accused has been wrongful, his conviction by the court is, in all
probability, also wrongful. Conversely, if the prosecution is not malicious any conviction even though based
on less than the required quantum of proof in criminal cases may be erroneous but not necessarily unjust.

The reason is that under Rule 112, sec. 4, the question for the prosecutor in filing a case in court is not
whether the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt but onl y whether "there is reasonable ground to
believe that a cri me has been committed and the accused is probabl y guilty thereof." Hence, an accusation
which is based on "probable g uilt" is not an unjust accusation and a convicti on based on such degree of proof
is not necessarily an unjust judgment but only an erroneous one. The remedy for such error is appeal.

In the case at bar there is absolutely no evi dence to show that petitioner's conviction by the tri al court was
wrongful or that it was the product of malice or gross ignorance or gross negligence. To the contrary, the
court had reason to believe that petitioner and his co-accused were in league, because petitioner is the father-
in-law of Wilfredo B al derrama and i t was peti tioner who bore the victi m a grudge because of a l and dispute.
Not onl y that. Petiti oner and his coaccused arri ved together in the hut of the victi ms and forced their way into
it.
The Court of Appeals ruled there was no cons piracy onl y because there was no proof that he di d or say
anything on the occasion. Said the appellate court.

Both eyewitness testimonies fail to show the appellant Felicito Bas bacio to have commi tted any act at all. Both
fail to show Felicito Bas bacio as havi ng said anything at all. Both fail to show Felicito Bas bacio as havi ng
committed anything in furtherance of a conspiracy to commit the crimes charged against the defendants. It
seems to be a frail and fli msy basis on which to conclude that conspiracy existed between actual killer
Wilfredo B al derrama and Felicito B asbacio to commit murder and two frustrated murders on that night of
June 26, 1988. It may be asked: where was the coming together of the two defendants to an agreement to
commit the crimes of murder and frustrated murder on two counts? Where was B asbacio's contri bution to
the commission of the sai d cri mes? Basbacio was — as the record shows — nothing but part of the dark
shadows of that night. . . .

One may take issue with this ruling because precisely cons piracy may be shown by concert of action and
other circumstances. Why was petiti oner wi th his son-in-law? Why di d they apparently flee together? And
what about the fact that there was bad blood between petitioner and the victi m Federico B oyon? These
questions may no longer be passed upon in view of the acquittal of petiti oner but they are relevant in
evaluati ng his claim that he had been unjustly accused, convicted and i mprisoned before he was released
because of his acquittal on appeal. We hol d that in view of these circumstances res pondent Secretary of
Justice and the Board of Cl ai ms di d not commit a grave abuse of its discretion in disallowing petitioner's
claim for compensation under Rep. Act No. 7309.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Comendador v De Villa 200 SCRA 80 (1991)

Facts: This is a consolidated case of members of the AFP who were charged with viol ation of Articles of War
(AW) 67 (Muti ny), AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman) and AW 94 (Various Cri mes)
in relation to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (Murder). The petiti oners were questioning the conduct
of the pre-trial investigation conducted where a motion to bail was filed but was denied. Peti tioner applied for
provisional li berty and preli minary injuncti on before the court which was granted. However De Villa refused
to release petitioner for provisional li berty pending the resoluti on of the appeal they have taken before the
court invoking that military officers are an exempti on from the right to bail guaranteed by the Constituti on.
Decision was rendered reiterati ng the release for provisional li berty of petitioners with the court stating that
there is a mistake in the presumption of res pondents that bail does not appl y among military men facing
court martial proceeding. Respondents now appeal before the higher court.

Issue: Whether or not military men are exempted from the Constitutional guarantee on the right to bail.

Cases on constitutional law (Philippine casebook series)

A historical and juridical study of the Philippine Bill of rights

Hel d: The SC ruled that the bail invoked by petiti oners is not available in the military as an exception to the
general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. Thus the right to a s peedy trial is given more emphasis in the
military where the right to bail does not exist. J ustification to this rule invol ves the uni que structure of the
military and nati onal security considerati ons which may result to damaging precedents that mutinous
soldiers will be released on provisional li berty gi ving them the chance to continue their plot in overthrowi ng
the government. Therefore the decision of the lower court granting bail to the petitioners was reversed.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

G.R. No. 78687 January 31, 1989

ELENA SALENILLAS AND BERNARDINO SALENILLAS, petitioners,

vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and HONORABLE RAYMUNDO SEVA, JUDGE OF BRANCH 38
OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CAMARINES NORTE and WILLIAM GUERRA, respondents.

Jose L. Lapak for petitioners.

Jose T. Atienza for private respondent.

SARMIENTO, J.:

This petition for review on certi orari which seeks the reversal and setting aside of the decision 1 of the Court
of Appeals 2 dismissing the petiti on for certiorari ag ainst Judge Raymundo Seva of the Regional Trial Court
of Camarines Norte and the pri vate res pondent, William Guerra, invol ves a pure question of l aw i.e., the
coverage and application of Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, known otherwise as the
Public Land Act.

The facts are undisputed.

The property subject matter of the case was formerl y covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-1248,
issued by virtue of Free Patent Application No. 192765, in favor of the s pouses, Fl orencia H. de Enciso and
Miguel Enciso. The sai d original certificate of title was i nscribed in the Registration B ook for the Provi nce of
Camarines Norte on December 10, 1961. On February 28, 1970, the patentees, the Enciso spouses, by an
Absolute Deed of S ale, sold the property in favor of the petitioners, the s pouses Elena Salenillas and
Bernardino Salenillas for a consi deration of P900.00. Petitioner Elena Salenillas is a daughter of the Encisos.
As a result of the aforementi oned sale, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-8104 of the Register of Deeds of
Camarines Norte was issued in the name of the Salenillas, cancelling Original Certificate of Title No. P-1248.
On June 30, 1971, the petitioners mortgaged the property now covered by T.C.T. No. T-8104 with the Rural
Bank of Daet, Inc. The mortgage was subsequentl y released on November 22, 1973 after the petiti oners pai d
the amount of P1,000.00. Later, or on December 4, 1975, the peti tioners ag ain mortg aged the property, this
time in favor of the Philippi ne National Bank Branch, Daet, Camarines Norte as security for a loan of
P2,500.00.

For failure of the petitioners to pay their l oan, extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding, pursuant to Act No. 3135,
was instituted by the Philippi ne National Bank ag ainst the mortgage and the property was sol d at a public
aucti on hel d on February 27, 1981. The pri vate respondent, William Guerra, emerged as the highest bi dder
in the sai d public auction and as a result thereof a "Certificate of Sale" was issued to hi m by the Ex Officio
Provi ncial Sheriff of Camarines Norte. Ulti mately, on July 12, 1983, a "Sheriff's Final Deed" was executed in
favor of the private respondent.

On August 17,1983, the Philippi ne National Bank filed with the Regional Trial Court of Camarines Norte at
Daet, a motion for a writ of possession. The public respondent, Judge Raymundo Seva of the tri al court,
acting on the motion, issued on September 22, 1983 an order for the issuance of a writ of possession in favor
of the pri vate res pondent. When the deputy sheriff of Camarines Norte however, attempted on November 17,
1983, to place the property in the possession of the pri vate res pondent, the peti tioners refused to vacate and
surrender the possession of the same and instead offered to repurchase it under Section 119 of the Public
Land Act. On August 15, 1984, another moti on, this time for the issuance of an alias writ of possession was
filed by the pri vate respondent with the trial court. The petiti oners, on August 31, 1984, opposed the pri vate
respondents' motion and instead made a formal offer to repurchase the property. Notwi thstanding the
petitioners' opposition and formal offer, the trial court judge on October 12, 1984 issued the alias writ of
possession prayed for the pri vate res pondent. The petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the order but
their motion was denied.

Undeterred by their initi al setback, the petitioners elevated the case to the res pondent Court of Appeals by
way of a petition for certi orari cl ai ming that the res pondent trial court judge acted with grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the order dated October 12, 1984 granting the writ of possession, and the order dated
October 22, 1984, denying their motion for reconsider consideration.

In a resolution dated January 23, 1985, the respondent appellate court gave due course to the petition;
required the parties to submi t simul taneous memoranda in support to their res pecti ve positions; and
restrained the trial court and the pri vate res pondent from executing, implementing or otherwise gi ving effect
to the assailed wri t of possession until further orders from the court. 3 However, in a decision promulgated on
September 17, 1986, the res pondent Court of Appeals dismissed the case for l ack of merit. According to the
appellate court:

It must be noted that when the original owner, Fl orencia H. Enciso whose title, OCT No. P-1248, was issued
on August 9, 1961, executed a deed of abs olute sale on February 28, 1970 of the property covered by said title
to spouses Elena Salenillas and Bernardino Salenillas, the fi ve year period to repurchase the property
provi ded for i n Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended coul d have already started. Prom this
fact alone, the petition shoul d have been dismissed. However, granting that the transfer from parent to chil d
for a nominal sum may not be the "conveyance" contemplated by the law. We will rule on the issue raised by
the petitioners. 4

xxx xxx xxx

Appl ying the case of Monge, et al . vs. Angeles, et al.,5 the appellate court went on to hol d that the fi ve-year
peri od of the peti tioners to repurchase under Section 119 of the Public Land Act had already prescribed. The
point of reckoning, ruled the respondent court i n consonance wi th Monge is from the date the petiti oners
mortgaged the property on December 4, 1973. Thus, when the peti tioners made their formal offer to
repurchase on August 31, 1984, the period had clearly expired.

In an effort to still overturn the decision, the peti tioners moved for reconsi deration. Their moti on apparently
went for naught because on May 7, 1987, the res pondent appellate court resol ved to deny the same. Hence,
this petition.

Before us, the petiti oners maintain that contrary to the rulings of the courts below, their right to repurchase
wi thin fi ve years under Section 119 of the Public Land Act has not yet prescribed. To support their
contenti on, the petitioners cite the cases of Paras vs. Court of Appeals 6 and Manuel vs. Phili ppine Nati onal
Bank, et al.7

On the other side, the pri vate respondent, in support of the appellate court's decision, states that the sale of
the contested property by the patentees to the petitioners disqualified the latter from being legal heirs vis-a-
vis the sai d property. As such, they (the petitioners) no longer enjoy the right granted to heirs under the
provisions of Section 119 of the Public Land Act. 8

In fi ne, what need be determined and resol ved here are: whether or not the petiti oners have the right to
repurchase the contested property under Section 119 of the Public Land Act; and assuming the answer to the
question is in the affirmative, whether or not their right to repurchase had already prescribed.

We rule for the petiti oners. They are granted by the l aw the right to repurchase their property and their right
to do so subsists.

Section 119 of the Public Land Act, as amended, provides in full:

Sec. 119. Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions, when proper,
shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his wi dow, or legal heirs within a peri od of fi ve years from the
date of the conveyance.

From the foregoing legal provision, it is explicit that only three classes of persons are bestowed the right to
repurchase — the applicant-patentee, his wi dow, or other legal heirs. Consequently, the contention of the
pri vate res pondent sustained by the respondent appellate court that the petiti oners do not belong to any of
those classes of repurchasers because they acquired the property not through inheritance but by sale, has no
legal basis. The peti tioners-spouses are the daughter and son-in-l aw of the Encisos, patentees of the contested
property. At the very least, petiti oner Elena Salenillas, being a chil d of the Encisos, is a "legal heir" of the
latter. As such, and even on this score alone, she may therefore vali dl y repurchase. This must be so because
Section 119 of the Public Land Act, in s peaking of "legal heirs," makes no distinction. Ubi lex non distinguit
nec nos distinguere debemos.

Moreover, to i ndorse the distincti on made by the pri vate res pondent and the appellate court woul d be to
contravene the very purpose of Section 119 of the Public Land Act which is to gi ve the homesteader or
patentee every chance to preserve for hi mself and his family the land that the State had gratui tously gi ven
him as a reward for his labor in clearing and cul ti vating it. 9 Considering that petiti oner Salenillas is a
daughter of the s pouses Florencia H. Enciso and Miguel Enciso, there is no gainsaying that allowi ng her
(Elena) and her hus band to repurchase the property woul d be more in keeping wi th the s pirit of the law. We
have ti me and ag ain sai d that between two statutory i nterpretations, that which better serves the purpose of
the law should prevail.

Gui ded by the same purpose of the l aw, and proceeding to the other issue here raised, we rule that the fi ve-
year period for the petitioners to repurchase their property had not yet prescribed.
The case of Monge et al. vs. Angeles, et al.,10 cited as authority by the respondent Court of Appeals is
inapplicable to the present controversy. The facts obtaining there are substanti ally different from those in
this case. In Monge the conveyance invol ved was a pacto de retro sale and not a foreclosure sale. More
importantly, the question raised there was whether the fi ve-year peri od provi ded for in Section 119 "shoul d
be counted from the date of the sale even if the same is with an option to repurchase or from the date the
ownership of the land has become consoli dated in favor of the purchaser because of the homesteader's failure
to redeem i t. 11 It is therefore understandable why the Court ruled there as it di d. A sale on pacto de retro
immedi ately vests title, ownership, and, generally possession over the property on the vendee a retro , subject
only to the right of the vendor a retro to repurchase within the sti pul ated peri od. It is an absolute sale with a
resolutory condition.

The cases 12 pointed to by the petitioner in support of their position, on the other hand, present facts that are
quite i dentical to those in the case at bar. Both cases invol ved properties the titles over which were obtained
either through homestead or free patent. These properties were mortgaged to a bank as collateral for l oans,
and, upon failure of the owners to pay their indebtedness, the mortgages were foreclosed. In both instances,
the Court ruled that the fi ve-year peri od to. repurchase a homestead sol d at public aucti on or foreclosure sale
under Act 3135 begins on the day after the expiration of the period of redemption when the deed of absolute
sale is executed thereby formally transferring the property to the purchaser, and not otherwise. Taking into
account that the mortgage was forecl osed and the mortg aged property sol d at a public aucti on to the pri vate
respondent on February 27, 1981, with the "Sheriff's Final Deed" issued on July 12, 1983, the two offers of
the petiti oners to repurchase the first on November 17, 1983, and the second, formally, on August 31, 1984
were both made within the prescribed five-year period.

Now, as regards the redempti on price, appl ying Sec. 30 of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, the
petitioners shoul d reimburse the pri vate respondent the amount of the purchase price at the public auction
pl us interest at the rate of one per centum per month up to November 17, 1983, together wi th the amounts of
assessments and taxes on the property that the pri vate res pondent might have pai d after purchase and
interest on the last named amount at the same rate as that on the purchase price. 13

WHEREFORE, the petiti on is GRANTED. The Decision dated September 17, 1986, and the Resolution dated
May 7, 1987 of the Court of Appeals, and the Orders dated September 22, 1983, October 12, 1984, and
October 22, 1984 of the Regional Trial Court of Daet, Camarines Norte, are hereby REV ERS ED and S ET
ASIDE, and another one ENTER ED directi ng the pri vate res pondent to reconvey the subject property and to
execute the corres ponding deed of reconveyance therefor in favor of the petitioners upon the return to hi m by
the latter of the purchase price and the amounts, if any, of assessments or taxes he pai d plus interest of one
(1% ) per centum per month on both amounts up to November 17, 1983.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.