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CIVPRO: P.D. 1486; 1606; Republic Act No. 7975 – Sandiganbayan

MAJOR GENERAL CARLOS F. GARCIA, Petitioner, v. SANDIGANBAYAN and the OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN,
Respondents.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

Petitioner Major General Carlos F. Garcia was the Deputy Chief of Staff for Comptrollership, J6, of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines. Petitioner filed this Petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 to annul and set aside public respondent
Sandiganbayan's Resolution1 dated 29 October 2004 and Writ of Preliminary Attachment2 dated 2 November 2004, and to
enjoin public respondents Sandiganbayan and Office of the Ombudsman from further proceeding with any action relating to the
enforcement of the assailed issuances.

On 27 September 2004, Atty. Maria Olivia Elena A. Roxas, Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer II of the Field
Investigation Office of the Office of the Ombudsman, after due investigation, filed a complaint against petitioner with public
respondent Office of the Ombudsman, for violation of Sec. 8, in relation to Sec. 11 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713,3 violation of
Art. 183 of the Revised Penal Code, and violation of Section 52 (A)(1), (3) and (20) of the Civil Service Law. Based on this
complaint, a case for Violations of R.A. No. 1379,4 Art. 183 of the Revised Penal Code, and Sec. 8 in relation to Sec. 11 of R.A.
No. 6713, docketed as Case

No. OMB-P-C-04-1132-I, was filed against petitioner.5 Petitioner's wife Clarita Depakakibo Garcia, and their three sons, Ian
Carl, Juan Paolo and Timothy Mark, all surnamed Garcia, were impleaded in the complaint for violation of R.A. No. 1379 insofar
as they acted as conspirators, conduits, dummies and fronts of petitioner in receiving, accumulating, using and disposing of his
ill-gotten wealth.

On the same day, 27 October 2004, the Republic of the Philippines, acting through public respondent Office of the Ombudsman,
filed before the Sandiganbayan, a Petition with Verified Urgent Ex Parte Application for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Attachment6 against petitioner, his wife, and three sons, seeking the forfeiture of unlawfully acquired properties under Sec. 2 of
R.A. No. 1379, as amended. The petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 0193, entitled "Republic of the Philippines v. Maj. Gen.
Carlos F. Garcia, et al." It was alleged that the Office of the Ombudsman, after conducting an inquiry similar to a preliminary
investigation in criminal cases, has determined that a prima facie case exists against Maj. Gen. Garcia and the other
respondents therein who hold such properties for, with, or on behalf of, Maj. Gen. Garcia, since during his incumbency as a
soldier and public officer he acquired huge amounts of money and properties manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such
public officer and his other lawful income, if any.7

Acting on the Republic's prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment, the Sandiganbayan issued the questioned
Resolution granting the relief prayed for. The corresponding writ of preliminary attachment was subsequently issued on 2
November 2004 upon the filing of a bond by the Republic. On 17 November 2004, petitioner (as respondent a quo) filed a Motion
to Dismiss8 in Civil Case No. 0193 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over forfeiture proceedings under
R.A. No. 1379. On even date, petitioner filed the present Petition , raising the same issue of lack jurisdiction on the part of the
Sandiganbayan.

Petitioner argues in this Petition that the Sandiganbayan is without jurisdiction over the "civil action" for forfeiture of unlawfully
acquired properties under R.A. No. 1379, maintaining that such jurisdiction actually resides in the Regional Trial Courts as
provided under Sec. 29 of the law, and that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in civil actions pertains only to separate actions
for recovery of unlawfully acquired property against President Marcos, his family, and cronies as can be gleaned from Sec. 4 of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606,10 as amended, and Executive Orders (E.O.) Nos. 1411 and 14-A.12

Theorizing that the Sandiganbayan, under P.D. No. 1606 or the law creating it, was intended principally as a criminal court, with
no jurisdiction over separate civil actions, petitioner points to President Corazon C. Aquino's issuances after the EDSA
Revolution, namely: (1) E.O. No. 1 creating the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) for the recovery of ill-
gotten wealth amassed by President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his family and cronies, (2) E.O. No. 14 which amended P.D. No.
1606 and R.A. No. 1379 by transferring to the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction over civil actions filed against President Marcos, his
family and cronies based on R.A. No. 1379, the Civil Code and other existing laws, and (3) E.O. No. 14-A whch further amended
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CIVPRO: P.D. 1486; 1606; Republic Act No. 7975 – Sandiganbayan
Gen. Garcia v. Sandiganbayan
E.O. No. 14, P.D. No. 1606 and R.A. No. 1379 by providing that the civil action under R.A. No. 1379 which may be filed against
President Marcos, his family and cronies, may proceed independently of the criminal action.

Petitioner gathers from the presidential issuances that the Sandiganbayan has been granted jurisdiction only over the separate
civil actions filed against President Marcos, his family and cronies, regardless of whether these civil actions were for recovery of
unlawfully acquired property under R.A. No. 1379 or for restitution, reparation of damages or indemnification for consequential
damages or other civil actions under the Civil Code or other existing laws. According to petitioner, nowhere in the amendments
to P.D. No. 1606 and R.A. No. 1379 does it provide that the Sandiganbayan has been vested jurisdiction over separate civil
actions other than those filed against President Marcos, his family and cronies.13 Hence, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction
over any separate civil action against him, even if such separate civil action is for recovery of unlawfully acquired property under
R.A. No. 1379.

Petitioner further contends that in any event, the petition for forfeiture filed against him is fatally defective for failing to comply
with the jurisdictional requirements under Sec. 2, R.A. No. 1379, 14 namely: (a) an inquiry similar to a preliminary investigation
conducted by the prosecution arm of the government; (b) a certification to the Solicitor General that there is reasonable ground
to believe that there has been violation of the said law and that respondent is guilty thereof; and (c) an action filed by the
Solicitor General on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines.15 He argues that only informations for perjury were filed and there
has been no information filed against him for violation of R.A. No. 1379. Consequently, he maintains, it is impossible for the
Office of the Ombudsman to certify that there is reasonable ground to believe that a violation of the said law had been committed
and that he is guilty thereof. The petition is also supposedly bereft of the required certification which should be made by the
investigating City or Provincial Fiscal (now Prosecutor) to the Solicitor General. Furthermore, he opines that it should have been
the Office of the Solicitor General which filed the petition and not the Office of the Ombudsman as in this case. The petition
being fatally defective, the same should have been dismissed, petitioner concludes.

In their Comment,16 respondents submit the contrary, noting that the issues raised by petitioner are not novel as these have
been settled in Republic v. Sandiganbayan17 which categorically ruled that "there is no issue that jurisdiction over violations of
[R.A.] Nos. 3019 and 1379 now rests with the Sandiganbayan."18 Respondents argue that under the Constitution19 and
prevailing statutes, the Sandiganbayan is vested with authority and jurisdiction over the petition for forfeiture under R.A. No.
1379 filed against petitioner. Respondents point to Sec. 4.a (1) (d) of P.D. 1606, as amended, as the prevailing law on the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, thus:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. 'The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act
No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials
occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the
commission of the offense:

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade '27'
and higher of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:

(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher ranks;

As petitioner falls squarely under the category of public positions covered by the aforestated law, the petition for forfeiture should
be within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

Respondents also brush off as inconsequential petitioner's argument that the petition for forfeiture is "civil" in nature and the
Sandiganbayan, having allegedly no jurisdiction over civil actions, therefore has no jurisdiction over the petition, since the same
P.D. No. 1606 encompasses all cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019, irrespective of whether these cases are civil or
criminal in nature. The petition for forfeiture should not be confused with the cases initiated and prosecuted by the PCGG
pursuant to E.O. Nos. 14 and 14-A, as these are dealt with under a separate subparagraph of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, in
particular Sec. 4.c thereof.20 Further, respondents stress that E.O. Nos. 14 and 14-A exclusively apply to actions for recovery of
unlawfully acquired property against President Marcos, his family, and cronies. It would also not be accurate to refer to a petition
for forfeiture as a "civil case," since it has been held that petitions for forfeiture are deemed criminal or penal and that it is only
the proceeding for its prosecution which is civil in nature.21
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CIVPRO: P.D. 1486; 1606; Republic Act No. 7975 – Sandiganbayan
Gen. Garcia v. Sandiganbayan
The Office of the Ombudsman filed a separate Comment,22 likewise relying on Republic v. Sandiganbayan to argue that the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the petition for forfeiture filed against petitioner. The Ombudsman explains that the grant to
the Sandiganbayan of jurisdiction over violations of R.A. No. 1379 did not change even under the amendments of R.A. No.
797523 and R.A. No. 829424, although it came to be limited to cases involving high-ranking public officials as enumerated
therein, including Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all other officers of higher rank, to which petitioner
belongs.25

In arguing that it has authority to investigate and initiate forfeiture proceedings against petitioner, the Office of the Ombudsman
refers to both the Constitution26 and R.A. No. 6770.27 The constitutional power of investigation of the Office of the Ombudsman
is plenary and unqualified; its power to investigate any act of a public official or employee which appears to be "illegal, unjust,
improper or inefficient" covers the unlawful acquisition of wealth by public officials as defined under R.A. No. 1379. Furthermore,
Sec. 15 (11)28 of R.A. No. 6770 expressly empowers the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute such cases of unlawful
acquisition of wealth. This authority of the Ombudsman has been affirmed also in Republic v. Sandiganbayan.29

The Office of the Ombudsman then refutes petitioner's allegation that the petition for forfeiture filed against him failed to comply
with the procedural and formal requirements under the law. It asserts that all the requirements of R.A. No. 1379 have been
strictly complied with. An inquiry similar to a preliminary investigation was conducted by a Prosecution Officer of the Office of the
Ombudsman. The participation of the Office of the Solicitor General, claimed by petitioner to be necessary, is actually no longer
required since the Office of the Ombudsman is endowed with the authority to investigate and prosecute the case as discussed
above.30

In addition, the Office of the Ombudsman alleges that the present Petition should be dismissed for blatant forum-shopping. Even
as petitioner had filed a Motion to Dismiss as regards the petition for forfeiture (docketed as Civil Case No. 0193) before the
Sandiganbayan on the ground of the Sandiganbayan's alleged lack of jurisdiction, he filed the instant Petition raising exactly the
same issue, even though the Motion to Dismiss in Civil Case No. 0193 is still pending resolution.chanrobles virtual law library
Worse, it appears that the Motion to Dismiss and the instant Petition were filed on the same day, 17 November 2004.

Petitioner refutes these arguments in his Reply31 and enunciates that the Sandiganbayan's criminal jurisdiction is separate and
distinct from its civil jurisdiction, and that the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction over forfeiture cases had been removed without
subsequent amendments expressly restoring such civil jurisdiction. His thesis is that R.A. No. 1379 is a special law which is
primarily civil and remedial in nature, the clear intent of which is to separate the prima faciedetermination in forfeiture
proceedings from the litigation of the civil action. This intent is further demonstrated by Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 1379 which grants the
authority to make an inquiry similar to a preliminary investigation being done by the City or Provincial Fiscal, and the authority to
file a petition for forfeiture to the Solicitor General.

Petitioner also points out in his Reply32 to the Comment of the Office of the Ombudsman, that the use of the phrase "violations
of [R.A.] Nos. 3019 and 1379" in P.D. No. 1606, as amended, implies jurisdiction over cases which are principally criminal or
penal in nature because the concept of "violation" of certain laws necessarily carries with it the concept of imposition of penalties
for such violation. Hence, when reference was made to "violations of [R.A.] Nos. 3019 and 1379," the only jurisdiction that can
supposedly be implied is criminal jurisdiction, not civil jurisdiction, thereby highlighting respondent Sandiganbayan's lack of
jurisdiction over the "civil case" for forfeiture of ill-gotten wealth. Of course, petitioner does not rule out cases where the crime
carries with it the corresponding civil liability such that when the criminal action is instituted, the civil action for enforcement of the
civil liability is impliedly instituted with it, and the court having jurisdiction over the criminal action also acquires jurisdiction over
the ancillary civil action. However, petitioner argues that the action for forfeiture subject of this case is not the ancillary civil
action impliedly instituted with the criminal action. Rather, the petition for forfeiture is an independent civil action over which the
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction. Petitioner points to P.D. No. 1606, as amended, which treats of independent civil actions
only in the last paragraph of Sec. 4 thereof:

Any provisions of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding civil action for
the recovery of civil liability shall at all times be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in, the same proceeding by
the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts, the filing of the criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing
of the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing of such civil action separately from the criminal action shall be recognized:
Provided, however, That where the civil action had heretofore been filed separately but judgment therein has not yet been
rendered, and the criminal case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, said civil action shall be
transferred to the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, as the case may be, for consolidation and joint determination with the
criminal action, otherwise the separate civil action shall be deemed abandoned.

Petitioner however did not raise any argument to refute the charge of forum-shopping.
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CIVPRO: P.D. 1486; 1606; Republic Act No. 7975 – Sandiganbayan
Gen. Garcia v. Sandiganbayan
The issues for resolution are: (a) whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over petitions for forfeiture under R.A. No. 1379;
(b) whether the Office of the Ombudsman has the authority to investigate, initiate and prosecute such petitions for forfeiture; and
(c) whether petitioner is guilty of forum-shopping.

The petition is patently without merit. It should be dismissed.

The seminal decision of Republic v. Sandiganbayan33 squarely rules on the issues raised by petitioner concerning the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and the authority of the Office of the Ombudsman. After reviewing the legislative history of the
Sandiganbayan and the Office of the Ombudsman, the Court therein resolved the question of jurisdiction by the Sandiganbayan
over violations of R.A. No. 3019 and R.A. No. 1379. Originally, it was the Solicitor General who was authorized to initiate
forfeiture proceedings before the then Court of First Instance of the city or province where the public officer or employee resides
or holds office, pursuant to Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 1379. Upon the creation of the Sandiganbayan pursuant to P.D. No. 1486,34
original and exclusive jurisdiction over such violations was vested in the said court.35 P.D. No. 160636 was later issued
expressly repealing P.D. No. 1486, as well as modifying the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by removing its jurisdiction over
civil actions brought in connection with crimes within the exclusive jurisdiction of said court.37 Such civil actions removed from
the jurisdiction of the Sandigabayan include those for restitution or reparation of damages, recovery of instruments and effects of
the crime, civil actions under Articles 32 and 34 of the Civil Code, and forfeiture proceedings provided for under R.A. No.
1379.38

Subsequently, Batas Pambansa Blg. 12939 abolished the concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and the regular courts
and expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over the offenses enumerated in Sec. 4 of P.D. No. 1606
to embrace all such offenses irrespective of the imposable penalty. Since this change resulted in the proliferation of the filing of
cases before the Sandiganbayan where the offense charged is punishable by a penalty not higher than prision correccional or its
equivalent, and such cases not being of a serious nature, P.D. No. 1606 was again amended by P.D. No. 186040 and eventually
by P.D. No. 1861.41

On the foregoing premises alone, the Court in Republic v. Sandiganbayan, deduced that jurisdiction over violations of R.A. No.
3019 and 1379 is lodged with the Sandiganbayan.42 It could not have taken into consideration R.A. No. 797543 and R.A. No.
824944 since both statutes which also amended the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan were not yet enacted at the time. The
subsequent enactments only serve to buttress the conclusion that the Sandiganbayan indeed has jurisdiction over violations of
R.A. No. 1379.

Under R.A. No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan is vested with exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving violations of R.A. No.
3019, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Sec. 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are
officials occupying the following positions whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of
the offense: (1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as
Grade '27' and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 989 (R.A. No. 6758), specifically including: (a)
Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors,
engineers, and other city department heads; (b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads; (c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position
of consul and higher; (d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank; (e) Officers of the
Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior superintended
or higher; (f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman
and special prosecutor; (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state
universities or educational institutions or foundations; (2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade '27' and
up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989; (3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution; (4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commission, without prejudice to the provisions of
the Constitution; and (5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade '27' and higher under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989.45

In the face of the prevailing jurisprudence and the present state of statutory law on the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,
petitioner's argument that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the petition for forfeiture it being "civil" in nature and the
Sandiganbayan allegedly having no jurisdiction over civil actions'collapses completely.

The civil nature of an action for forfeiture was first recognized in Republic v. Sandiganbayan, thus: "[T]he rule is settled that
forfeiture proceedings are actions in rem and, therefore, civil in nature."46 Then, Almeda, Sr. v. Perez,47 followed, holding that
the proceedings under R.A. No. 1379 do not terminate in the imposition of a penalty but merely in the forfeiture of the properties
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CIVPRO: P.D. 1486; 1606; Republic Act No. 7975 – Sandiganbayan
Gen. Garcia v. Sandiganbayan
illegally acquired in favor of the State. It noted that the procedure outlined in the law leading to forfeiture is that provided for in a
civil action.48

However, the Court has had occasion to rule that forfeiture of illegally acquired property partakes the nature of a penalty. In
Cabal v. Kapunan, Jr.,49 the Court cited voluminous authorities in support of its declaration of the criminal or penal nature of
forfeiture proceedings, viz:

In a strict signification, a forfeiture is a divestiture of property without compensation, in consequence of a default or an offense,
and the term is used in such a sense in this article. A forfeiture, as thus defined, is imposed by way of punishment not by the
mere convention of the parties, but by the lawmaking power, to insure a prescribed course of conduct. It is a method deemed
necessary by the legislature to restrain the commission of an offense and to aid in the prevention of such an offense. The effect
of such a forfeiture is to transfer the title to the specific thing from the owner to the sovereign power. (23 Am. Jur. 599)

"In Black's Law Dictionary a 'forfeiture' is defined to be 'the incurring of a liability to pay a definite sum of money as the
consequence of violating the provisions of some statute or refusal to comply with some requirement of law. 'It may be said to be
a penalty imposed for misconduct or breach of duty. '" (Com. v. French, 114 S.W. 255.)

"Generally speaking, informations for the forfeiture of goods that seek no judgment of fine or imprisonment against any person
are deemed to be civil proceedings in rem. Such proceedings are criminal in nature to the extent that where the person using the
res illegally is the owner of rightful possessor of it the forfeiture proceeding is in the nature of a punishment. They have been
held to be so far in the nature of criminal proceedings that a general verdict on several counts in an information is upheld if one
count is good. According to the authorities such proceedings, where the owner of the property appears, are so far considered as
quasicriminal proceedings as to relieve the owner from being a witness against himself and to prevent the compulsory
production of his books and papers. . . ." (23 Am. Jur. 612)

"Proceedings for forfeitures are generally considered to be civil and in the nature of proceedings in rem. The statute providing
that no judgment or other proceedings in civil causes shall be arrested or reversed for any defect or want of form is applicable to
them. In some aspects, however, suits for penalties and forfeitures are of quasi-criminal nature and within the reason of criminal
proceedings for all the purposes of . . . that portion of the Fifth Amendment which declares that no person shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself. The proceeding is one against the owner, as well as against the goods; for it is
his breach of the laws which has to be proved to establish the forfeiture and his property is sought to be forfeited." (15 Am. Jur.,
Sec. 104, p. 368)50

Cabal v. Kapunan modified the earlier ruling in Almeda, Sr. v. Perez.51 The Court in Cabal held that the doctrine laid down in
Almeda refers to the purely procedural aspect of the forfeiture proceedings and has no bearing on the substantial rights of
respondents, particularly their constitutional right against self-incrimination.52 This was reaffirmed and reiterated in Republic v.
Agoncillo53 and Katigbak v. Solicitor General.54

The Sandiganbayan is vested with jurisdiction over violations of R.A. No. 1379, entitled "An Act Declaring Forfeiture In Favor of
the State Any Property Found to Have Been Unlawfully Acquired By Any Public Officer or Employee and Providing For the
Proceedings Therefor." What acts would constitute a violation of such a law? A reading of R.A. No. 1379 establishes that it does
not enumerate any prohibited acts the commission of which would necessitate the imposition of a penalty. Instead, it provides
the procedure for forfeiture to be followed in case a public officer or employee has acquired during his incumbency an amount of
property manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his lawful income and income from
legitimately acquired property.55 Section 1256 of the law provides a penalty but it is only imposed upon the public officer or
employee who transfers or conveys the unlawfully acquired property; it does not penalize the officer or employee for making the
unlawful acquisition. In effect, as observed in Almeda, Sr. v. Perez, it imposes the penalty of forfeiture of the properties
unlawfully acquired upon the respondent public officer or employee.57

It is logically congruent, therefore, that violations of R.A. No. 1379 are placed under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, even
though the proceeding is civil in nature, since the forfeiture of the illegally acquired property amounts to a penalty. The
soundness of this reasoning becomes even more obvious when we consider that the respondent in such forfeiture proceedings
is a public officer or employee and the violation of R.A. No. 1379 was committed during the respondent officer or employee's
incumbency and in relation to his office. This is in line with the purpose behind the creation of the Sandiganbayan as an anti-
graft court to address the urgent problem of dishonesty in public service.58

Following the same analysis, petitioner should therefore abandon his erroneous belief that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction
only over petitions for forfeiture filed against President Marcos, his family and cronies.
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CIVPRO: P.D. 1486; 1606; Republic Act No. 7975 – Sandiganbayan
Gen. Garcia v. Sandiganbayan
We come then to the question of authority of the Office of the Ombudsman to investigate, file and prosecute petitions for
forfeiture under R.A. No. 1379. This was the main issue resolved in Republic v. Sandiganbayan.59

Under Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 1379, it was the Solicitor General who was authorized to initiate forfeiture proceedings before the then
Courts of First Instance. P.D. No. Decree No. 1486 was later issued on 11 June 1978 vesting the Sandiganbayan with
jurisdiction over R.A. No. 1379 forfeiture proceedings. Sec. 12 of P.D. No. 1486 gave the Chief Special Prosecutor the authority
to file and prosecute forfeiture cases. This may be taken as an implied repeal by P.D. No. 1486 of the jurisdiction of the former
Courts of First Instance and the authority of the Solicitor General to file a petition for forfeiture under Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 1379 by
transferring said jurisdiction and authority to the Sandiganbayan and the Chief Special Prosecutor, respectively.60 An implied
repeal is one which takes place when a new law contains some provisions which are contrary to, but do not expressly repeal
those of a former law.61 As a rule, repeals by implication are not favored and will not be so declared unless it be manifest that
the legislature so intended. Before such repeal is deemed to exist, it must be shown that the statutes or statutory provisions deal
with the same subject matter and that the latter be inconsistent with the former. The language used in the latter statute must be
such as to render it irreconcilable with what had been formerly enacted. An inconsistency that falls short of that standard does
not suffice. What is needed is a manifest indication of the legislative purpose to repeal.62

P.D. No. 1486 contains a repealing clause which provides that "[A]ny provision of law, order, rule or regulation inconsistent with
the provisions of this Decree is hereby repealed or modified accordingly."63 This is not an express repealing clause because it
fails to identify or designate the statutes that are intended to be repealed. Rather, it is a clause which predicates the intended
repeal upon the condition that a substantial conflict must be found in existing and prior laws.64

The conflict between P.D. No. 1486 and R.A. No. 1379 refers to the jurisdiction over the forfeiture proceeding and the authority
to file the petition for forfeiture. As P.D. No. 1486 grants exclusive jurisdiction and authority to the Sandiganbayan and the Chief
Special Prosecutor, the then Courts of First Instance and Solicitor General cannot exercise concurrent jurisdiction or authority
over such cases. Hence, P.D. No. 1486 and Sec. 2, R.A. No. 1379 are inconsistent with each other and the former should be
deemed to have repealed the latter.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

On 11 June 1978, the same day that P.D. No. 1486 was enacted, P.D. No. 148765 creating the Office of the Ombudsman (then
known as the Tanodbayan) was passed. The Tanodbayan initially had no authority to prosecute cases falling within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as provided in Sec. 4 of P.D. No. 1486, such jurisdiction being vested in the Chief Special
Prosecutor as earlier mentioned.

On 10 December 1978, P.D. No. 1606 was enacted expressly repealing P.D. No. 1486. Issued on the same date was P.D. No.
160766 which amended the powers of the Tanodbayan to investigate administrative complaints67 and created the Office of the
Chief Special Prosecutor.68 P.D. No. 1607 provided said Office of the Chief Special Prosecutor with exclusive authority to
conduct preliminary investigation of all cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, file informations therefor, and direct and control
the prosecution of said cases.69 P.D. No. 1607 also removed from the Chief Special Prosecutor the authority to file actions for
forfeiture under R.A. No. 1379.70

The rule is that when a law which expressly repeals a prior law is itself repealed, the law first repealed shall not be thereby
revived unless expressly so provided. From this it may fairly be inferred that the old rule continues in force where a law which
repeals a prior law, not expressly but by implication, is itself repealed; and that in such cases the repeal of the repealing law
revives the prior law, unless the language of the repealing statute provides otherwise.71 Hence, the repeal of P.D. No. 1486 by
P.D. No. 1606 necessarily revived the authority of the Solicitor General to file a petition for forfeiture under R.A. No. 1379, but
not the jurisdiction of the Courts of First Instance over the case nor the authority of the Provincial or City Fiscals (now
Prosecutors) to conduct the preliminary investigation therefore, since said powers at that time remained in the Sandiganbayan
and the Chief Special Prosecutor.72

The Tanodbayan's authority was further expanded by P.D. No. 163073 issued on 18 July 1990. Among other things, the
Tanodbayan was given the exclusive authority to conduct preliminary investigation of all cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan, to file informations therefore and to direct and control the prosecution of said cases.74 The power to conduct
the necessary investigation and to file and prosecute the corresponding criminal and administrative cases before the
Sandiganbayan or the proper court or administrative agency against any public personnel who has acted in a manner warranting
criminal and disciplinary action or proceedings was also transferred from the Chief Special Prosecutor to the Tanodbayan.75

Thereafter, P.D. No. 1606 was amended by P.D. Nos. 1860 and 186176 which granted the Tanodbayan the same authority. The
present Constitution was subsequently ratified and then the Tanodbayan became known as the Office of the Special Prosecutor
which continued to exercise its powers except those conferred on the Office of the Ombudsman created under the
Constitution.77 The Office of the Ombudsman was officially created under R.A. No. 6770.78
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At present, the powers of the Ombudsman, as defined by R.A. No. 6770, corollary to Sec. 13, Art. XI of the Constitution, include
the authority, among others, to:

(I) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee,
office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, may take over, at any stage, from any
investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases;79

(II) Investigate and initiate the proper action for the recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth amassed after 25 February
1986 and the prosecution of the parties involved therein.80

Ostensibly, it is the Ombudsman who should file the petition for forfeiture under R.A. No. 1379. However, the Ombudsman's
exercise of the correlative powers to investigate and initiate the proper action for recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth
is restricted only to cases for the recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth amassed after 25 February 1986.81 As regards
such wealth accumulated on or before said date, the Ombudsman is without authority to commence before the Sandiganbayan
such forfeiture action'since the authority to file forfeiture proceedings on or before 25 February 1986 belongs to the Solicitor
General although he has the authority to investigate such cases for forfeiture even before 25 February 1986, pursuant to the
Ombudsman's general investigatory power under Sec. 15 (1) of R.A. No. 6770.82

It is obvious then that respondent Office of the Ombudsman acted well within its authority in conducting the investigation of
petitioner's illegally acquired assets and in filing the petition for forfeiture against him. The contention that the procedural
requirements under Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 1379 were not complied with no longer deserve consideration in view of the foregoing
discussion.

Now to the charge that petitioner is guilty of forum-shopping. Forum-shopping is manifest whenever a party "repetitively avail[s]
of several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same
transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either pending in, or
already resolved adversely by, some other court."83 It has also been defined as "an act of a party against whom an adverse
judgment has been rendered in one forum of seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in another forum, other than by
appeal or the special civil action of certiorari , or the institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same
cause on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition."84 Considered a pernicious evil, it
adversely affects the efficient administration of justice since it clogs the court dockets, unduly burdens the financial and human
resources of the judiciary, and trifles with and mocks judicial processes.85 Willful and deliberate forum-shopping is a ground for
summary dismissal of the complaint or initiatory pleading with prejudice and constitutes direct contempt of court, as well as a
cause for administrative sanctions, which may both be resolved and imposed in the same case where the forum-shopping is
found.86

There is ample reason to hold that petitioner is guilty of forum-shopping. The present petition was filed accompanied by the
requisite Verification and Certification Against Forum Shopping87 in which petitioner made the following representation:

3.] As Petitioner, I have not heretofore commenced any other action or proceeding in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals,
or any other tribunal or agency, involving the same issues as that in the above-captioned case.

4.] To the best of my knowledge, no such action or proceeding is pending in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any
other tribunal or agency.

5.] If I should hereafter learn that such proceeding has been commenced or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency, I undertake to report that fact to this Honorable Court within five (5) days from
knowledge thereof.

However, petitioner failed to inform the Court that he had filed a Motion to Dismiss88 in relation to the petition for forfeiture
before the Sandiganbayan. The existence of this motion was only brought to the attention of this Court by respondent Office of
the Ombudsman in its Comment. A scrutiny of the Motion to Dismiss reveals that petitioner raised substantially the same issues
and prayed for the same reliefs therein as it has in the instant petition. In fact, the Arguments and Discussion89 in the Petition of
petitioner's thesis that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over separate civil actions for forfeiture of unlawfully acquired
properties appears to be wholly lifted from the Motion to Dismiss. The only difference between the two is that in the Petition,
petitioner raises the ground of failure of the petition for forfeiture to comply with the procedural requirements of R.A. No. 1379,
and petitioner prays for the annulment of the Sandiganbayan's Resolution dated 29 October 2004 and Writ of Preliminary
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Attachment dated 2 November 2004. Nevertheless, these differences are only superficial. Both Petition and Motion to Dismiss
have the same intent of dismissing the case for forfeiture filed against petitioner, his wife and their sons. It is undeniable that
petitioner had failed to fulfill his undertaking. This is incontestably forum-shopping which is reason enough to dismiss the petition
outright, without prejudice to the taking of appropriate action against the counsel and party concerned.90 The brazenness of this
attempt at forum-shopping is even demonstrated by the fact that both the Petition and Motion to Dismiss were filed on the same
day, 17 November 2004. Petitioner should have waited for the resolution of his Motion to Dismiss before resorting to the petition
at hand.

Petitioner's counsel of record, Atty. Constantino B. De Jesus, needs to be reminded that his primary duty is to assist the courts
in the administration of justice. As an officer of the court, his duties to the court are more significant and important than his
obligations to his clients. Any conduct which tends to delay, impede or obstruct the administration thereof contravenes his oath
of office.91 Atty. De Jesus failed to accord due regard, as he must, the tenets of the legal profession and the mission of our
courts of justice. For this, he should be penalized. Penalties imposed upon lawyers who engaged in forum-shopping range from
severe censure to suspension from the practice of law.92 In the instant case, we deem the imposition of a fine in the amount of
P20,000.00 to be sufficient to make Atty. De Jesus realize the seriousness of his naked abuse of the judicial process.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is DISMISSED. Atty. Constantino B. De Jesus is DECLARED in
CONTEMPT of this Court and meted a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) to be paid within ten (10) days from the
finality of this DECISION. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.