CASE STUDY

The BRT and the danfo:

A case study of Lagos’ transport
reforms from 1999-2019

Biodun Otunola Sebastian Kriticos

Planet Projects Limited International Growth Centre
Managing Director of Planet Economist, Cities that Work
Projects Ltd. Initiative

Oliver Harman
International Growth Centre
Economist, Cities that Work
Initiative

DIRECTED BY FUNDED BY
BIODUN OTUNOLA

‘Biodun Otunola is the founding Managing

Director of Planet Projects Limited (PPL),
a leading and fast growing Engineering,
Procurement, Construction and Management
(EPCM) firm, where he heads a team that
provides a wide range of solutions to transport
problems in Nigerian cities, across Bus, BRT,
Rail, Water Transport and Traffic Engineering,
over the entire value chain of Studies, Planning,
Engineering Designs, Construction and
Operations & Maintenance (O&M).

‘Biodun is an experienced engineer, transport

planner and projects manager who has been
involved in large scale infrastructure and
public transport projects including the largest
bus terminal in Africa – the Oshodi Transport
Interchange Project (OTIP), Lekki Port Projects,
Ogun Light Rail Projects, Lagos Strategic
Transport Master Plan, Lagos Blue Line Light
Rail Project, Lekki Junction Improvement Works,
Lagos Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) Project, among
others.

He holds a Master’s degree from Chalmers

University of Technology, Goteborg, Sweden
and a Bachelor’s in Civil Engineering from
Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria.
‘Biodun is a member of the International
Association of Public Transport (UITP), and an
Associate member of the American Society of
Civil Engineers (ASCE).

E: [email protected]
In many developing cities, transportation is characterised by disorganised and
largely unregulated systems where demand clearly outstrips supply. As a result,
citizens are often left isolated from productive jobs and other valuable amenities
of urban life. Improving the functionality of these cities is hence often rooted in
making improvements to transport networks and providing reliable, affordable,
clean, convenient, and safe access to urban opportunities. With improved
urban mobility, firms and workers can come together to generate scale and
specialisation, which in turn, fuels productivity growth.

The city of Lagos has grappled with transport challenges for many decades. As
the second largest city in Africa, and the fastest growing megacity in the world,
government authorities have had to meet consistent pressure to improve the
quality of existing transport systems while also providing new services that can
support a larger urban population.1 In response to these demands, the Lagos
State Government has made a range of large-scale investments in infrastructure
and public transport over the last 20 years. Most notably, Lagos opened the first
ever Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) system on the African continent in 2008. Today,
the system boasts two different lines which cover over 35.5 km of track and
transport over 350,000 commuters on a daily basis.2

The Lagos BRT and wider transport reforms have helped to transform the The Lagos BRT and
sprawling and unplanned city, characterised by fragmentation and heavy traffic, wider transport
to a much better example of transport development for liveable and productive reforms have helped
cities. Through these reforms, Lagos has been able to achieve reductions in to transform the
travel times of up to one-third since 2008, relieving an estimated USD$240M in sprawling and
economic loss each year.3 The reforms and their successes were centred around unplanned city,
five key factors which we will discuss in this case study: characterised by
fragmentation and
——Designing organisations for differences: Lagos undertook a radical heavy traffic, to a much
redesign of the organisations governing transport to foster greater better example of
coordination, accountability and public participation. transport development
for liveable and
——Establishing financial viability: long-term success was backed by proactive productive cities
plans to improve creditworthiness and financial viability of the transport
sector.

——Generating buy-in: contextual awareness and public communication

proved instrumental in gaining public support for reform.

1  Rosenthal, E. (2012) “Nigeria Tested by Rapid Rise in Population,” The New York
Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/15/world/africa/in-nigeria-a-preview-of-an-
overcrowded-planet.html. Earley, K. (2016) “A Tale of Two Megacities - How Shenzhen
and Lagos Are Coping with Urbanisation,” The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/
julius-baer-partner-zone/2016/mar/18/a-tale-of-two-megacities-how-shenzhen-and-lagos-
are-coping-with-urbanisation.
2  Mobereola, D. (2009) “Lagos Bus Rapid Transit: Africa’s First BRT Scheme.” A SSATP
Discussion Paper No 9 on Urban Transport Series.
3  Ongoing transport reforms in the city of Lagos (2018) Available at <https://www.theigc.
org/multimedia/ongoing-transport-reforms-city-lagos/>

3 — THE BRT AND THE DANFO: A CASE STUDY OF LAGOS’ TRANSPORT REFORMS FROM 1999-2019
 ——Demonstrating quick-wins through a project driven approach:
demonstrating positive transformations in the short-term helped secure
investor and public support. With the success of each project came further
stakeholder buy-in, a greater willingness to instigate wider reform, and
over time, the empowerment of formal institutions.

——Monitoring performance to meet expected standards: Lagos has shown a

clear commitment to assessing and achieving results through the BRT and
subsequent reforms to improve the transport system.

The challenge of urban mobility in Lagos

Up until the year 2008, Lagos was one of the only major world cities without Informal minibuses
any formalised mass public transit system. Shared transportation was accounted for around
predominantly provided by a fleet of 75,000 privately operated minibus services 69 percent of all
(danfos) together with a smaller number of midi-buses (molue), tricycles motorised trips back
popularly known as keke napep, motorcycle (Okada) and shared-taxis 4. These in 2008 and were,
informal minibuses accounted for around 69 percent of all motorised trips back as they still remain,
in 20085 and were, as they still remain, characterised by their lack of safety characterised by
standards, limited regulation, poor maintenance, poor security and frequent their lack of safety
violation of traffic laws6. Planted on congested streets with slow speeds and standards, limited
highly uncertain commute times, they were not enough to truly transform the regulation, poor
mobility and efficiency of the city maintenance, poor
security and frequent
ûû High cost, low-quality service: Almost all of the issues of the danfo and violation of traffic laws
molue services are exemplified through their poor-quality infrastructure:
badly maintained buses, uncomfortable seating arrangements,
breakdowns, accidents, and few considerations for customers anywhere
across the system. Couple this with the system’s unreliability and lack
of regulation, and passengers are left with a low-quality, high-cost
service. Fares regularly vary depending on the time of day or even on
weather conditions. For instance, passengers can pay up to nine times
more between the peak hours of 6:30am-8am compared to at 9am.7
Furthermore, many of the less profitable routes are underserviced, thus
leaving many citizens behind. Without any alternative to danfos before
2008, traffic and transport was highly unpredictable – only serving to
reinforce poverty.

ûû Lack of safety and security: Accidents and passenger safety have It is estimated that
been a major concern of informal transport in Lagos, often because around 2008, there
drivers engage in reckless activities such as speeding, overlapping, and would be 2-3 accidents
per week on the danfo
4  World Bank. (2016) “Lagos Urban Transport Project” Project Performance Assessment system
Report No.: 103068 Document Date: JUN 30, 2016.
5  LAMATA. (2009) Final Report—Strategic Transport Master Plan for Lagos
Metropolitan Area (Lagos: Lagos Metropolitan Area Transport Authority, 2009).
6  UN-Habitat. (2012). Enhancing urban safety and security: Global report on human
settlements 2007. Routledge.
7  This figure is based on an interview with Biodun Otunola who is a transport specialist in
Lagos.

4 — CITIES THAT WORK

 Danfo minibuses congest
the main road in Lagos.
Image credit: Planet
Projects Ltd.

indiscriminate turnings. With no training and little respect for the law,
drivers regularly risk the safety of their passengers. It is estimated that
around 2008, there would be 2-3 accidents per week on the danfo system.
Security is also a major concern across the informal system as they have
very limited infrastructure in terms of laybys, shelters and designated
stops. At the same time, there are no trained personel to monitor and
police activities on the buses, which means they often become havens
for criminality – putting passengers at the risk of robbery or harassment
when they travel.

ûû Congestion: The carrying capacity of the typical danfo and okada

minibuses is around 14-18 people, while molue buses can seat 50.8 This
comparatively low carrying capacity of the danfo, particularly with
reference to their high-occupany vehicle replacements, which can carry
30-50 passengers, means their contribution to congestion is much larger.
While it is not uncommon to see informal providers cramming passengers
onto buses far beyond their advised carrying capacity, this only further
propogates the aforementioned issues of safety and poor-quality service.

In 2008, commuters from the residential areas in the north and west could
spend over 2 hours in traffic on a one-way journey to work in the city centre
each day (distances of approximately 20km).9 At the same time, the average
Lagosian was spending around 40% of their income on transport.10 With
lower income families often living far from the city centre, this higher but
unavoidable cost fell disproportionately on them. It was widely recognised
that improvements to public transportation and traffic management could
yield significant benefits not just to transport users, but also to the city at
large. However, as with most reforms, the Lagos State Government faced a
number of constraints which made the challenge of revamping the transport

8  Agha, E (2016) Nigeria: Molue – Is Lagos’s King of the Road Going Intro Exctinction
Avilable at <https://allafrica.com/stories/201605080226.html>
9  Mobereola, D. (2009) “Lagos Bus Rapid Transit: Africa’s First BRT Scheme.” A SSATP
Discussion Paper No 9 on Urban Transport Series.
10  Ibid. N.B. The full fare of travelling 10 kilometres to work on similar systems in many
cities represents almost a third of incomes for the poorest 20% of low income households.
Carruthers, R., Malise, D., and Saurkar, A. (2005) “Affordability of Public Transport in
Developing Countries”. World Bank

5 — THE BRT AND THE DANFO: A CASE STUDY OF LAGOS’ TRANSPORT REFORMS FROM 1999-2019
network particularly dauntingLagos needed major capital investments for the
construction, maintenance and management of a new ‘BRT Lite’11 system and
all of its requisite infrastructure such as rolling stock, bus terminals, and vehicle
tracks. We explain the main differences between regular BRT and ‘BRT Lite’
in Table 1. These investments in BRT Lite would also require complementary
changes to regulation, setting in place standards and frameworks such as vehicle
use, safety and emissions. Initiating such major changes takes a substantial
amount of time and requires strong political will to keep reform moving
forwards, coordinating not just the legal and regulatory framework but also
encouraging behavioural changes across society at large.

Table 1: Differences between regular BRT and ‘BRT Lite’12

Full Systems Lite Systems

——Specific lanes exclusively ——Partially segregated lanes for
designated for BRT buses BRT buses
——Raised platforms and shelters ——Have simpler bus shelters and
with pre-boarding fare some collection on buses
collection
——Less technological intensivity
——Advanced technologies to
——Easier and quicker to
manage traffic signalling &
implement but at the expense
provide information
of efficieny
——More efficient and effective but
at a financial and time cost

Despite a strong will for reform in government, there were a number of political
impediments embedded in the institutional, structural, and socioeconomic
foundations of the city. Notably, the Lagos State government had to take
into account the interests of large and powerful groups of informal transport
providers who stood to potentially lose out with reforms to the system.
Weaknesses in the incumbent formal institutions for transport meant the
reforms had to focus on establishing new teams and taskforces to carry out
the ambitions. This meant taking on a project-driven approach that made
incremental and manageable changes which could offer demonstrable results in
the short-term, while looking to build up institutional capacity over the longer
term on the foundation of successful projects. In the following section, we detail
the process of Lagos’ transport reforms and some of their key successes.

11  BRT Lite systems are not designed to meet the highest technical specifications of Bus
Rapid Transit schemes which would generally entail high-speed, high occupancy vehicles.
Generally, these systems aim to improve the efficiency of the system through improving
reliability and frequency of the service and enhancing customer support and commercial
awareness. This might include changes to the operating environment such as dedicated bus
lanes, priority signals, parking controls and traffic management. Other typical changes
include new fare collection and ticketing systems to enhance customer convenience and
enhanced travel information, better marketing and overall customer care.
12  For more information on BRT systems see Collier, P., Glaeser, E., Venables, T.,
Manwaring, P., & Blake, M. (2018) Accessing opportunities: Policy decisions for
enhancing urban mobility, Final Report, IGC online: https://www.theigc.org/wp-content/
uploads/2018/05/Accessibility-04.05.18.pdf

6 — CITIES THAT WORK

Overcoming Lagos’ transport challenge
The turn of the 21st century saw a series of landmark shifts in the Lagos State The government
transportation strategy. Governor Tinubu (12th Governor of Lagos State made clear efforts
1999 – 2007) had recently been elected based on a platform of tax reform and to communicate the
infrastructure delivery. Over the course of his term in power, he emphasised link between quality
capital spending on highly visible transport projects, such as roads.13 These infrastructure and
early reforms focused on making the most of the existing network, emphasising taxation to the public
spending on maintenance and infrastructure upgrades. At the same time,
the government made clear efforts to communicate the link between quality
infrastructure and taxation to the public. The idea was to enhance the social
contract between state and society, which played an important facilitating role
for ensuing reforms in the transport sector, such as efforts to improve traffic
management and compliance.

Figure 1: Four quadrants of transport reform

• Legal • Bus lanes

• Institutional • Laybys
• Regulatory • Bus stops
• Depots
• Signalling

Frameworks Infrastructure

Finance Operations &

Maintenance

• Purchase • Buses
• Hire • Fares
• Lease • Training
• Maintenance • Intelligent transport
• Subsidies systems

Source: ‘Biodun Otunola’

Over time, however, it became clear that the existing infrastructure was not Over time, however, it
sufficient to truly transform mobility within the city. The longer-term strategy became clear that the
had to include the provision of a comprehensive public transport system, existing infrastructure
moving away from the reliance on private motorisation and shared molue and was not sufficient
danfo buses. Achieving this meant going beyond just delivering the required to truly transform
infrastructure and towards recognising the transportation challenge as part mobility within the
of an integrated system, in which complementary reforms across sectors and city. The longer-term
policy areas were needed to truly modernise the coordination and delivery of strategy had to include
transportation. These principles are summarised in Figure 1 which has been the the provision of a
comprehensive public
transport system

13  de Gramont, D. (2015). Governing Lagos: unlocking the politics of reform (Vol. 12).
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

7 — THE BRT AND THE DANFO: A CASE STUDY OF LAGOS’ TRANSPORT REFORMS FROM 1999-2019
underpinning approach for much of Lagos’ transformation – simultaneously
focusing on the regulatory frameworks, infrastructure, operations and
maintenance, and financing of bus reforms.14

The process of public transport reform

Major reforms often require a shift in political strategy to enable effective
change. For Lagos’ transport sector, this process was largely kickstarted in
2000 with the inauguration of the Lagos State Traffic Management Authority
(LASTMA). LASTMA was mandated by the Lagos State Government to
improve enforcement of traffic laws, set new standards and rulings, and
encourage compliance among road users. Although it initially did not include
any provisions for public transport, its establishment marked a behavioural
shift within politics and society that collectively strived for better performance
in urban mobility.

Before LASTMA was established, there had been a wide array of local, state
and federal government agencies involved in transport provision in Lagos. Most
operated in siloes, with little regard for the effect their policies had on other
areas of the system, or even how the decisions of other agencies affected them.15
Furthermore, they had a tendency to over-rely on infrastructure building,
neglecting the importance of traffic planning and management. A number
of studies undertaken in the 1990s – such as the Lagos Mass Transit Study
(LMTS) – had brought these issues to light, highlighting the fragmentation of
institutional responsibilities, weaknesses in traffic management, and the lack of
a cohesive strategy for the city. These studies were used as the basis to justify
the establishment and responsibilities of agencies like LASTMA.

While LASTMA helped generate attention towards traffic management, there

With LAMATA in
was a clear recognition that Lagos still needed a metropolitan-wide agency
operation, it offered the
to encompass all matters of transport policy including and beyond traffic
foresight and practical
management. Subsequently in 2002, the Lagos Metropolitan Area Transport
strategy to move Lagos
Authority (LAMATA) was established, taking on principal authority for
out of chaos on the
coordinating inter-agency responsibilities, policies and programmes. The
roads and towards a
concept of LAMATA had previously been proposed in the LMTS and 1996
21st century transport
Detailed Framework for Establishment of LAMATA (DFEL). Influenced by
system
Transport for London (TfL), the framework detailed the role, objectives, and
resource requirements it would need in relation to other transport agencies.16
The World Bank had also ardently pushed for a dedicated transport authority
to be set-up. In fact, this was made a requirement for future funding of
proposed transport reforms during the Lagos Urban Transport projects which
began in 2000.

14  This diagram is based on an interview with Biodun Otunola who is a transport
specialist in Lagos.
15  http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/758551468288333387/
pdf/418330WP0UNI0A1s0case0dp0501PUBLIC1.pdf
16  http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/758551468288333387/
pdf/418330WP0UNI0A1s0case0dp0501PUBLIC1.pdf

8 — CITIES THAT WORK

With LAMATA in operation, it offered the foresight and practical strategy to LAMATA was able to
move Lagos out of chaos on the roads and towards a 21st century transport finance the city’s first
system. Through the assistance of the World Bank, LAMATA was able to Strategic Transport
finance the city’s first Strategic Transport Master Plan (STMP) in 2005, which Master Plan (STMP) in
has since served as the guiding framework for all transport policies up to 2025. 2005, which has since
The plan set ambitions for the city to harness multi-modal transport, predicting served as the guiding
that by 2025, 60% of travel should be by road, 20% by rail, and 20% by water. framework for all
At the same time, LAMATA would oversee major investments in transport transport policies up to
infrastructure including the plan’s ambitions to establish 6 BRT lines, 7 rail 2025
lines, and 6 water transport routes by 2025.

Table 2: Key stages of reform

Year Lite Systems

2000 Lagos Transport Management Invest in the road network and enforce traffic laws
Authority (LASTMA) inaugurated. and compliance.
Lagos Urban Transport Projects begin.

2002 Lagos Metropolitan Transport Establish a metropolitan agency with principal

Authority (LAMATA) inaugurated. responsibility to oversee and coordinate city
transport policy. LAMATA would be the organisation
Policy learning from World Bank.
to improve overall functionality, comfort, reliability
and accessibility of the transport system.
2005 Strategic Transport Master Plan Guide the development of transportation policies in
(STMP) developed through help of the state until 2025 and set plans to diversify public
World Bank transport modes including BRT, rail, and water
transport routes.
2006- Consultations with best-practice in Policy learning was used to sensitise the powerful
2007 other developing cities transport union, showing how things could be
done in Lagos. This happened in parallel with the
First BRT Lite lines operational
launch of the BRT and LAGBUS, which offered
State-owned company LAGBUS is a safer alternative to the informal sector and new
launched employment opportunities for workers.
2008 BRT Lite system becomes fully To ameliorate the negative consequences of the
operational disorganised, fragmented, costly, unsafe, and
unreliable transport system.
2008- Complimentary regulatory reforms Regulations have been implemented to provide for
2017 and infrastructure investments. several safety standards. New technologies have
been rolled-out on the bus fleet to improve customer
experience, and new infrastructure such as junctions,
bus terminals, shelters, and rail systems have helped
improve the overall transport system.
2017- Bus Reform Initiative (2017-2019) Aims to improve the capacity and customer
2019 experience of the system through: replacement of
all danfos with HOVs, increased digitatisation of
the network, improved transport infrastructure, and
driver training.

9 — THE BRT AND THE DANFO: A CASE STUDY OF LAGOS’ TRANSPORT REFORMS FROM 1999-2019
In 2007, the first BRT Lite lines became operational and within one year
the system was delivered in full and experiencing extremely high demand. A
number of reforms have taken place since then, including the second wave of
bus reforms ongoing since 2017. Further detail on these policies are provided in
the Table 2 and the sections that follow.

The principles that underlay the effective development of the BRT and other
public transport reforms focused on five key areas:

Designing organisations for differences

Delivering reform required a complete redesign of the organisations governing
transport in Lagos. Significant political and financial backing from top officials
played a critical role in establishing and maintaining the integrity of the
ongoing governance changes.17 The creation of LAMATA was undoubtedly
an instrumental shift towards better coordination of planning, regulation and
management of transport in the city. As a state government agency, it also
meant that authorities were held more accountable for their performance.
Finally, LAMATA’s active public relations strategy and community meetings
meant citizen engagement became a much stronger norm.

LAMATA took responsibility for coordinating all of the major stakeholders

in the transport sector. This helped to integrate the activities of different
agencies, ensuring they could cooperate effectively based on common objectives.
Supporting legislation and planning strategies enshrined the particular roles and
responsibilities of different agencies. It also made clear how each agency could
leverage one another’s distinct powers to deliver the city’s plan. The following
are three important examples where inter-agency coordination played a key role
in the success of the BRT system:

——Ministry of Physical Planning and Urban Development: As representatives

of the state master plan, the Ministry of Physical Planning and Urban
Development were invited to sit on the BRT Steering Committee. This
helped the transport authorities access the land on which they needed to
make infrastructure investments. Furthermore, with proactive planning
they could also utilise zoning and land-use regulations to more effectively
ensure high density around the transport nodes. In turn, increased
ridership on the system would likely improve the financial viability
of reform.18 Contrasting this with the policy experience in Bogota
(Colombia), where the BRT was planned and built without amendments
in the zoning laws around the corridor. As a result, Bogota has not been
able to capture the full welfare gains from increased land values that may
have been possible with the construction of their BRT system.19

17  World Bank. (2016) “Lagos Urban Transport Project” Project Performance Assessment
Report No.: 103068 Document Date: JUN 30, 2016.
18  Collier, P., Glaeser, E., Venables, T., Manwaring, P., & Blake, M. (2018) Accessing
opportunities: Policy decisions for enhancing urban mobility, Final Report, IGC online:
https://www.theigc.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Accessibility-04.05.18.pdf
19  Tsivanidis, N. (2018). The Aggregate and Distributional Effects of Urban Transit
Infrastructure: Evidence from Bogotá’s TransMilenio. Working Paper, University of Chicago
Booth School of Business.

10 — CITIES THAT WORK

 ——Lagos State Traffic Management Authority: It was critical that LAMATA
had a comprehensive role, both to support the operational systems
necessary to complement spatial planning and traffic regulation, as well
as, to take the responsibility for the hard infrastructure. As such, a close
working relationship with the LASTMA was instrumental to ensure they
committed resources to protect and improve the BRT.20 This partnership
enabled effective enforcement of rules. It also meant that there were the
necessary accompanying investments such as traffic lights, signalling
systems, or renewal of pinch-point areas on the road network.

——Ministry of Public Works and Housing: With the inauguration of LAMATA

there had to be a transfer of power and control over infrastructure in
Lagos. This happened in coordination with the Federal Ministry of
Works and Housing who transferred control of the federal highways – in
which the BRT system would operate – over to LAMATA, as well as the
responsibility for financing and constructing the required infrastructure.21

To operate effectively, these institutions also had to improve internal capacity,

ensuring they had an adequately trained and motivated staff. The recruitment of
experienced international staff allowed for policy learning and the creation of
a strong authority which could move the project from conception to practical
delivery. Providing an adequate cadre of qualified staff as well as reorganising
its functions and providing on-going skills training, has been key in ensuring the
reforms were sustainable over time.

Governor Fashola (13th Governor of Lagos State 2007 – 2015), who succeeded Fashola recognised
Governor Tinubu, also placed a strong emphasis on improving the image that to operate
of the transport authority to make it reflective of a modern-day institution, effectively, the bus
worthy of more positive expectations from international investors and wider system had to be
society. Fashola recognised that to operate effectively, the bus system had to staged with a strong
be staged with a strong network of trained, committed, and qualified staff network of trained,
including drivers, attendants, and back-office operators. Specific funds were committed, and
earmarked for staff training, social support, and uniforms for the drivers, which qualified staff including
improved career incentives and the dignity of the profession. Tax funds were drivers, attendants,
also put aside for the for maintenance and operations of the BRT system which and back-office
generated confidence among private investors to engage more directly in the operators
system through public-private partnerships.22

Establishing financial viability

A sustainable BRT system requires a realistic financial strategy from the outset.
For the early stages of reform, the World Bank had been the principal funder,
offering financial support for the technical advisory and feasibility work which
took place during the Lagos Urban Transport Projects and the STMP. However,
attracting the kind of capital needed to finance the hard infrastructure for the

20  Mobereola, D. (2009) “Lagos Bus Rapid Transit: Africa’s First BRT Scheme.” A SSATP
Discussion Paper No 9 on Urban Transport Series.
21  Ibid

22  Ibid

11 — THE BRT AND THE DANFO: A CASE STUDY OF LAGOS’ TRANSPORT REFORMS FROM 1999-2019
whole system over the long-term meant the Lagos State government had to
borrow more. This required demonstrating a capability to handle and repay
large sums of money to potential investors.

Therefore, one of the initial intentions of the BRT Lite system was to focus
on delivering results within an agreed upon budget. This was particularly
relevant as the Lagos State Government was to finance the first line exclusively
themselves. It was built at an average cost of just $1.7 million per kilometre.
This is much lower than a similar system that has been proposed in Kampala
at an estimated cost of USD$17million per kilometre. 23 Even in other cities like
Bogota and Brisbane, although they have more intricate infrastructure, the BRT
systems cost around $6 million per kilometre.24

With the BRT operational, Lagos State Government also acted as a financial With that success, the
guarantor for the National Union of Transport Workers (NURTW), which NURTW was able to
allowed the NURTW to attract commercial funds for the purchase and pay back their loans in
operation of 100 high capacity buses and lease of a further 120. Members of just two years
the transport union would then operate these buses on the BRT lanes, where
they experienced higher rates of ridership, better service delivery, and ultimately
increased revenue. With that success, the NURTW was able to pay back their
loans in just two years. At the same time, the Lagos State Government began to
see large increases in operational revenue through ticket sales and advertising,
making the scheme widely considered as a financial success.25

Given the positive outcomes of first stages of BRT Lite implementation, Given the positive
development finance institutions were much more willing to provide finance for outcomes of first
the expansion of the BRT as part of the second phase. The principle investors stages of BRT Lite
were the World Bank and AfDB, who together provided the state loans of implementation,
$190million and $100million respectively.26 Over time, the full 22km BRT development finance
system in Lagos cost just USD$37.4 million to build, including the cost of institutions were
stations, road partitions and 220 buses. Today, it remains financially sustainable much more willing to
to fund operations without subsidies from the national government.27 provide finance for the
expansion of the BRT
as part of the second
Encouraging buy in phase
During the construction of the BRT system there was intense criticism of the
Lagos State Government by certain interest groups who thought they would
lose out from the reforms. Private vehicle users felt threatened by the likelihood
of disrupted traffic. Incumbent minibus operators felt they would be squeezed
by increased competition. There was even resistance from ordinary residents
of Lagos who were worried about the possibility of sunk state capital. These

23  Collier, P., Glaeser, E., Venables, T., Manwaring, P., & Blake, M. (2018) Accessing
opportunities: Policy decisions for enhancing urban mobility, Final Report, IGC online:
https://www.theigc.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Accessibility-04.05.18.pdf
24  Ibid

25  World Bank (2016) “Nigeria. Lagos Urban Transport Project.Project Performance
Assessment Report.”
26  World Bank Independent Evaluation Group. “NG - LUTP-II (FY10) (P112956)
27  World Bank (2016) “Nigeria. Lagos Urban Transport Project.Project Performance
Assessment Report.”

12 — CITIES THAT WORK

concerns were taken seriously by the state and the success of the BRT can be
partly attributed to systems being put in place for citizens to express their views
and have them addressed.

One of the biggest challenges LAMATA faced in this regard, was Seeing how such
communicating with the existing bus operators and convincing them to engage systems had been
with the new system. The Lagos State Government therefore embarked on successfully integrated
extensive negotiations with the politically powerful NURTW. They used these with exisiting bus
negotiations to convince union officials of the widespread benefits of a BRT services elsewhere,
system – in particular, the prospect that BRT could offer direct employment helped to persuade
via hiring, training and renumerating existing drivers as well as indirect the NURTW to adopt
employment through enhancing Lagos’ competitiveness. One of the key and franchise the BRT
negotiating tools for the state, was that they sponsored visits for the union concepts locally
officials to see BRT and other bus services in other international cities, including
Curitiba (Brazil) and Bogota (Colombia). Seeing how such systems had been
successfully integrated with exisiting bus services elsewhere, helped to persuade
the NURTW to adopt and franchise the BRT concepts locally, smoothing the
later transition of existing operators into the formal system.

After the first lines became operational, the following administration under
Governor Fashola made further provisions to incorporate informal operators.
Existing operators were encouraged to retrain their staff and it became known
that the best minibus drivers would be offered a career path in the more
formalised BRT system. This had the additional benefit that operators of the
moule and danfo systems were incentivised to improve the overall quality of
their service delivery so they could compete with the BRT Lite.

The choice of integrating the incumbent bus services rather than attempting to The choice of
eradicate them proved instrumental in gaining political support for the system integrating the
from local communities. Commuters maintained their flexibility of choice for incumbent bus services
shared transport systems, while some of the more isolated, non-commercial rather than attempting
routes could still be maintained. In this way, the previous network provided a to eradicate them
feeder, ‘last mile’ service to routes which the BRT did not cover. proved instrumental
in gaining political
support for the system
Demonstrating quick wins through a project-driven from local communities
approach
The focus on positive incremental change was at the heart of Lagos’s approach
to transport reform. In particular, one of the main intentions of implementing a
BRT Lite system, as opposed to a standard BRT, was to concentrate on essential
gaps in infrastructure that could be targeted and addressed very quickly. These
choices for where to focus resources were based on where considerable positive
change could be made through relatively modest and cost-effective investments.
Therefore, the investments that were undertaken, prioritised the creation
of dedicated lanes, bus stops, depots and signalling infrastructure and the
introduction of reliable services to customers.

To put some of these infrastructure gaps into perspective, Lagos did not have
even one single formal bus stop prior to the BRT implementation in 2008. It
now has approximately 260. Compared to London, where the bus system serves
roughly half the number of citizens, the city has around 19,000 stops, roughly
70 times as many than Lagos. By targeting resources towards a clear need in

13 — THE BRT AND THE DANFO: A CASE STUDY OF LAGOS’ TRANSPORT REFORMS FROM 1999-2019
the city, Lagos could build bus stops and curb the irregular stopping patterns
of danfos, demonstrating a quick improvement to congestion thanks to their
reform efforts.

The BRT itself took just 15 months to go from the conception phase to
having the first line fully operational. Within the first 100 days of operation,
the system had carried over 9.7 million passengers and within six months of
operations, it was over 29 million.28 An evaluation by the World Bank in 2009
suggested that within a year of the operation of the BRT system, over 200,000
commuters were using it daily, with passengers enjoying a reduction of fares,
journey time, and an overall increase in quality of service. Short term and
regular demonstrable improvements were critical in maintaining interest in and
building support for long-term reform.

Commuters queue to board

the Bus Rapid Transit (BRT)
in 2009. Photo credit: Pius
Utomi Ekpei/AFP/Getty
Images.

28  Ibid

14 — CITIES THAT WORK

Monitoring performance to meet expected
standards
Apart from the visible successes felt by passengers on a daily basis, it was also
important to measure the performance of the BRT against the desired objectives
of the government, as well as the changing needs of the city. Several studies
have assessed the impacts of the BRT, including both its successes and areas for
improvement.

Successful outcomes of the BRT reform

üü Reduced congestion: even though BRT buses only accounted for around
4% of vehicles on Lagos’ roads in 2009, it has been estimated that across
the whole transport system, average in vehicle journey times were reduced
by 40% and average waiting times by 35%.29

üü Affordability: The Lagos BRT system has been able to maintain affordable
fees for customers. Following the BRT’s introduction, one off fares in
Lagos actually decreased by 30 percent, from 140 Naira to 100 Naira,30
helping to bring-in low-income passenger groups. In the Mile 12 to Ikorodu
BRT corridor the average monthly spend by individuals on bus travel
halved.31

üü Financial Sustainability: Operators can deliver their service without

relying on financial government assistance. It is self-sustaining even with
the 30% reduction in fees received by the user.32

üü Safety benefits: the operation of the BRT and reduction of bad habits
among danfo operators has contributed to a reduction in accidents from
139 to 96 accidents per 100,000.33

üü Employment: The Lagos BRT reforms generated 2000 direct new

employment opportunities for drivers, bus conductors, ticket sellers and
mechanics. Moreover, transferring over to the formal system offered
operators on the pre-existing danfo services a more stable, formalised
career path. It is estimated that a further 10,000 jobs were indirectly

29  Mobereola, D (2009) “Africa’s First Bus Rapid Transit Scheme”. Sub-Saharan Africa
Transport Policy Program
30  Mobereola, D (2009) “Africa’s First Bus Rapid Transit Scheme”. Sub-Saharan Africa
Transport Policy Program
31  World Bank Independent Evaluation Group. “NG - LUTP-II (FY10) (P112956)”
32  Omole, D and Ndambuki, J (2014). Sustainable Living in Africa:Case of Water,
Sanitation, Air Pollution and Energy. Sustainability 6(8), 5187 - 5202
33  World Bank Independent Evaluation Group. “NG - LUTP-II (FY10) (P112956)”

15 — THE BRT AND THE DANFO: A CASE STUDY OF LAGOS’ TRANSPORT REFORMS FROM 1999-2019
 created through the operation of park and ride facilities as well as food
services.34 Some estimates indicate that there were socio-economic benefits
indirectly impacting as many as 500,000 individuals.35

üü Environmental benefits: the introduction of the BRT has been associated

with a reduction in CO2 emissions of 13% and GHG emissions by 20%36,
benefits that are not only felt by users of the new system, but the wider
population as well.

Areas for improvement

ûû Demand estimations: the BRT system introduced in 2008, though
laudable, became over saturated within few months of operation and
faced a big issue of demand and supply mismatch. Only 100 high floor
buses were initially available to the NURTW, yet it became apparent
within the first year of operation that another 200 buses would be
needed.37 Responsive policymaking allowed some of this demand gap
to be satisfied through leasing of buses through LAGBUS. However,
at times many commuters would be stranded because the buses could
not sufficiently meet the growing demand of the city, particularly at
peak periods. The experience shows that the need for flexibility and
contingency in plans to either upscale or downscale in reaction to demand
is important.

ûû Enforcement: enforcing traffic rules and respect for the BRT system
among private vehicle users has been challenging, particularly because
the system is only 65% physically segregated from the regular lanes. As
a result, private vehicles are still able to drive in BRT lanes, although
they are not supposed to. Poor policing over vehicles using the lanes has
therefore impaired the overall speed of the system.

ûû Private car to public transport shift. In 2009, 85% of the clientele using
the BRT had transferred from previously using danfos, however, due to
the difficulty in encouraging a private to public shift, only 6% of riders
had transferred from private cars. Ensuring a high quality customer
experience has since been an important focus for improvement in order to
capture higher income transport users.

34  Peltier-Thiberge, N. (2015) “Lagos’ Bus Rapid Transit System: Decongesting and
Depolluting Mega-Cities” World Bank Group, Transport for Development Blog
35  UNHabitat (2013) “Planning and Design for Sustainable Urban Mobility: Global
Report on Human Settlements 2013”
36  Peltier-Thiberge, N. (2015) “Lagos’ Bus Rapid Transit System: Decongesting and
Depolluting Mega-Cities” World Bank Group, Transport for Development Blog
37  Mobereola, D (2009) “Africa’s First Bus Rapid Transit Scheme”. Sub-Saharan Africa
Transport Policy Program

16 — CITIES THAT WORK

Latest efforts to improve the transport system: the Bus
Reform Initiative (BRI)
In response to these areas for improvement, the Lagos State Government
recently embarked on an ambitious 3-year Bus Reform Initiative (2017-2019).
The program is spearheaded by Governor Ambode – building on the work of
his predecessors Bola Tinubu and Babatunde Fashola – and broadly aiming to
enhance the customer experience and capacity of the public transport network.

Key elements of the reform include:

1 Buses: The replacement of all danfos, taking them off the street and in
their place providing a fleet of 5000 new European standard HOVs and
Midi-Buses which offer increased safety, reliability and comfort. 820
buses have so far been procured, 520 of which are HOVs and 300 are
Midi-buses.

2 Infrastructures: The provision of world-class infrastructure to support

the transport system. This includes: the completion of remaining BRT
corridors, road and junction improvement works, as well as 954 new bus
shelters and lay-bys, 13 new terminals, and 7 depots.

3 Operations: 60 routes will be allocated to qualified bus operating

companies whose performance will be monitored against set indicators
for service delivery. By allowing private operators to manage parts of the
public transport network, the government hopes to improve the capacity
and overall conditions of the system.

4 Digitisation: The increased digitisation of the network – including the

collection and dissemination of real-time service information, smart
ticketing and ITS-based route allocation.

5 Staff training: Better support and training for drivers and bus attendees,
including mandatory practical courses to ensure staff are adequately
certified to operate the bus services.

We provide some illustrative examples below of how the BRI is has been carried
forwards in practice. For further details, we refer the reader to the appendix,
where we provide project and infrastructure specifications that have been part
of the reform to date, as well as pictures to showcase some of these.

Infrastructure and operational improvements as part of the

BRI
The first phase of the BRI commenced in Ikeja in 2018 as critical infrastructures
such as depots, terminals and dedicated stops were constructed. Such
infrastructures are to be developed along all of the proposed routes of the
reform initiative, covering major transport zones including Ikeja, Lagos Island,
Oshodi and Abule Egba. See Figure 1 in the appendix for a map showing the
full coverage of the BRI.

Opearations of the buses then commenced in May 2019 starting with a pilot
on two major routes between Oshodi-Talafa Balewa Square and Oshodi-Berger.
Within the first six weeks of operation, from May 2nd to June 23rd, these two

17 — THE BRT AND THE DANFO: A CASE STUDY OF LAGOS’ TRANSPORT REFORMS FROM 1999-2019
routes alone recorded a ridership volume of 84,903 and 75,554 passengers
respectively, meaning there were roughly 3,700 overall passengers travelling
from Oshodi per day. Managing this traffic was only made possible because of
the recent construction of the Oshodi Transport Interchange, one of several new
infrastructure projects that the reform iniative is putting in place.

Before Oshodi was constructed, passengers had excessive troubles trying to

board buses: waiting points were undefined and unstandardized, boarding areas
were typically congested, and passengers were susceptible to injuries and theft.
In addition, the state of boarding areas was very poor, passengers had no shelter
against harsh weather and the waiting environment was typically unclean and
poorly maintained. However, the construction of the Oshodi terminal, has made
the environment efficient and more comfortable for all passengers: new state-
of-the-art terminals have shelters where passengers sit comfortably while they
wait for their buses and designated spaces so passengers can queue in an orderly
manner as they move into the bus. Moreover, the infrastructure has made a
transformative difference to the management of vehicular traffic within and
around the Oshodi terminal.

In parallel, the government has also made efforts to improve the flow of
traffic across the city through the extensive removal of bottlenecks in the
road network. Junction improvements, merge and exit lanes, roundabout
modifications, and pedestrian bridges have all been key areas of focus to
complement the BRI. One example is the axis connecting Lekki and Victoria
Island: previously with nine roundabouts between Abraham-Adesanya and the
Lekki tollgate, citizens could spend as much as three hours travelling between
the centre and east of the city – a distance of only 18km.38 Since the government
removed six roundabouts, there has been a 75 percent reduction in traffic time
and an estimated NRN87billion (~USD$240million)39 saving through reduction
in fuel costs, environmental costs and lost travel time.

Aerial picture of the Oshodi

Transport Interchange
before and after new
construction work. Photo
credit: Planet Projects Ltd.

Finally, the government is also opening up new routes for the BRT network
such as the Oshodi-Abule-Egba corridor. The Oshodi-Abule-Egba corridor is
currently one of the busiest corridors in West Africa, often experiencing huge
congestion, particularly during peak periods, where journey time can increase

38  Ongoing transport reforms in the city of Lagos (2018) [Multimedia Item]. London,
International Growth Centre
39  Ongoing transport reforms in the city of Lagos (2018) [Multimedia Item]. London,
International Growth Centre

18 — CITIES THAT WORK

by as much as 400%. Construction of the BRT corridor remains ongoing, with
operations planned for early 2020, at which point it is expected that the BRT
corridor will carry over 300,000 passengers daily across a 13km stretch.

These efforts intend to enhance the overall quality, efficiency and reliability of
the bus network, changing the public perspective and strengthening trust in the
system.

In summary
The Lagos transport reforms highlight that with the right motivation,
dedication and leadership it is possible to achieve striking results. Since the
implementation of the BRT, the city has seen remarkable improvements across
a number of indicators that impact upon the everyday lives of citizens. We
summarise a few of the key highlights in the Table 3.

Table 3: Lagos’s pre and post reform transport performance

Pre-reform Post-reform
Transport cost Average 140 Naira Decreased 30% - 50%
Congestion Very high Reduction in travel times of 40%
Greenhouse gas emissions High Decreased 13% - 20%

Safety 139 accidents per 100,000 Decreased 30%

Comfort levels Low Wide felt improvements
Other benefits Direct & indirect employment, security of travel.

Several features of the reforms are important to consider for replication in

other cities. Firstly, policy learning from abroad was combined with a strong
knowledge of the city context. Solutions were tailored towards integrating
society and the danfo-dominated network rather than excluding it from
the decision-making process. Secondly, establishing a strong institutional
foundation for project coordination and setting the strategic plan was critical
to the long-term success of reform. Lastly, utilising the incremental approach
allowed the state to make quick, cost-effective and visible wins that were
witnessed by everyday citizens. These characteristics proved instrumental to the
successes of the Lagos transport reforms.

19 — THE BRT AND THE DANFO: A CASE STUDY OF LAGOS’ TRANSPORT REFORMS FROM 1999-2019
Appendix
In the sections below, we provide details of the coverage and infrastructures in
the Lagos Bus Reform Initiative. This information is from Planet Projects Ltd, a
Nigerian company that has been closely involved in the strategic planning and
implementation of various transport improvements in Lagos including the BRI.

Coverage of the Bus Reform Initiative

Figure 2: Map of Lagos Bus Reforms – Phase 1A

20 — CITIES THAT WORK

As part of the planning and implementation of the BRI, Lagos was divided into
five strategic transport zones in which targeted solutions could be made based
on the specific transport challenges of each area. These zones include:

——Zone 1A: Ikeja;

——Zone 1B: Lagos Island;

——Zone 2A: Oshodi;

——Zone 2B: Oshodi-Abule-Egba;

——Zone 3: Strategic Linkages.

Figure 2 provides a map of Phase 1 of the bus reforms initiative, showcasing the
routes and locations of proposed infrastructures.

Bus specifications:
5,000 new buses (HOVs and Midi Buses) will be deployed to the public
transport route to replace the danfos. These buses provide more comfort, with
amenities like charging points and free Wi-Fi, for enhanced user experience and
increased ridership. The bus specifications are shown in Table 4.

Table 4: Summary of Bus Specifications (HOV and Midi-buses)

S/No. Bus Specifications (HOV & Midi-buses)
1. Configuration and Size 2-Axle Single Deck,
- HOV: Length 12m – 13m, Width 2.4m – 2.55m
Midi-bus: Length 7m – 11m, Width 2.2m – 2.4m
2. Ground Clearance 150mm – 450mm
3. Seating Capacity HOV 40 - 50 Passengers,
Midi-bus: 27 – 33 Passengers
2x2 Distribution, Vinyl Seat Covers
4. Standing Capacity HOV 30 - 45 Passengers,
Midi-bus: 10 – 20 Passengers
5. Passenger Door 2 Double Leaf Pneumatically Operated Doors
Numbers Door Release Valve For Emergency Exit
Manual Ramp For Wheelchair Access
6. Passenger Door Ahead Of Front Axle
Positions Ahead Of Rear Axle
7. Ventilation And Climate Fully Air Conditioned
Control Sliding Windows, Tinted Glasses With UV Filtering and Heat
Insulation
Roof Hatches with 4 opening positions and emergency exit
8. Suspension Air Suspension
Configuration Kneeling Suspension

21 — THE BRT AND THE DANFO: A CASE STUDY OF LAGOS’ TRANSPORT REFORMS FROM 1999-2019
 S/No. Bus Specifications (HOV & Midi-buses)
9. Steering Configuration Left Hand Drive with integrated power steering
Steering Column with pneumatic height and titlt adjustment
10. Braking System Self-Adjusting Braking System (Slack Adjuster, Automatic)
Drum Brake
Exhaust Brake Control, Automatic
Retarder
11. Power-Plant Location Centrally And Longitudinally Rear
12. Engine HOV: 5-Cylinder, In-Line, Direct Injection, Turbo-Charge, 250hp
Midi-bus: 4-Cylinder, In-Line, Direct Injection, Turbo-Charged,
150hp
13. Power-Plant Fueling Automotive Gas Oil (Diesel)
14. Exhaust Emission Euro Ill, with Diesel Particulate Filter
Standards And Exhaust Catalysts
Treatments
Fuel Cooler
Centrifugal Oil Cleaner
15. Transmission Type Automatic 6-Speed Transmission
16. Windscreen Front – 2piece Green Laminated Glass [ECE-R 43]
Rear – 1 Piece Green Laminated Glass
17. Destination Signs Electronic – LED
Exterior And Interior
18. Electrical System Alternator – 2x 100A
Batteries – 2x225AH (HOV), 2x150AH (Midi-bus), Maintenance
Free
19. Fuel Tank Internally Coated
Minimum 300 Liters Capacity with preferably 2 Filling Points
Anti- Siphon Device Fitted
20. Front Axle HOV: 7 Tonnes; Midi-bus: 3 tonnes
Rear Axle HOV: Minimum 12 Tonnes; Midi-bus: 6 tonnes
21. Body And Flooring Full Body Frame Insulation With Injected Polyurethane
Overall Anticorrosion Treatment On Body Frame
Fiberglass And Aluminum Body
Flooring – Marine Plywood, 14mm Thickness
Flooring Covered With Heavy Duty Synthetic Material

22 — CITIES THAT WORK

 S/No. Bus Specifications (HOV & Midi-buses)
22. Interior Accessories 1 nos. 6kg Fire Extinguisher – Driver’s Compartment
1 Set Of Triangular Early Warning Device
1 Box Of First Aid Kit
4 Pieces Of Hammers For Breaking Windows In Case Of An
Emergency
Windscreen Roller Blind
Passenger Bells With Buzzer And Warning On The Driver’s
Dashboard
PA System
Tool Box
Entertainment System (Dvd and Radio) With Speakers On Parcel
Rack
23. Additional Driver’s enclosure
Requirements Tropicalisation of engines minimize engine overheating issues
Speed limiting device
Warranty 5-years rust free on body frame
Electronic Ticketing Machine ready
Turnstiles at entry and exit points
GPS enabled
CCTV with minimum of 4 cameras for exterior and interiors views
Hub odometers
Customized operator logo
Workshop and operation manuals
3-years warranty or 150,000km whichever comes first
Provision of factory and local technical training
Setup and initial managing of central workshops
Provision of recommended fast moving spare part list with part
numbers for 3 years with fixed prices
Existing or ability to setup Bus Manufacturing Assembly Plant in
Lagos, Nigeria within specified timeframe.
USB charging point at all passengers’ seats and In-bus Wi-Fi
coverage

23 — THE BRT AND THE DANFO: A CASE STUDY OF LAGOS’ TRANSPORT REFORMS FROM 1999-2019
 Lagos Bus Reforms Buses –
HOV bus

Lagos Bus Reforms Buses –

HOV bus

Infrastructure Projects Status

Table 2 provides a description of the various infrastructures that are included in
Phase 1 of he BRI and their delivery status.

Table 5: Status of Phase 1 Infrastructure Delivery

S/No. Infrastructure Completed On-going Remaining balance

1. Buses 820 (HOV – 520, - 4,180
Midi-bus – 300)
2. Depots 2; Yaba & Oshodi 1; Anthony 4

3. Bus Shelters 100 - 854

4. Bus Terminals 3; TBS, Ikeja, Oshodi 6; Yaba, Ojota, Agege, 18
Oyingbo, NAHCO,
Ajah
5. Junction Improvement - Ongoing -
Works (JIW)
6. Intelligent Transport - Ongoing -
System

24 — CITIES THAT WORK

The images below provide visuals of some of the infrastructures and their
associated impacts.

3D architectural plan of
the Oshodi Transport
Interchange

Aerial picture of the

completed Oshodi
Transport Interchange

Aerial picture of the Oshodi

Bus Depot

25 — THE BRT AND THE DANFO: A CASE STUDY OF LAGOS’ TRANSPORT REFORMS FROM 1999-2019
 Yaba Bus Terminal (currently
under construction)

Yaba Bus Depot

Tafawa Balewa Square Bus

Shelters

Typical Bus Station & Lay-by

26 — CITIES THAT WORK

 Ikeja Bus Terminal – Before
& After

Ikeja Bus Terminal

Waiting points (before and

after)

Boarding process (before

and after)

Passenger comfort during

transit (before and after)

Environmental conditions
(before and after)

27 — THE BRT AND THE DANFO: A CASE STUDY OF LAGOS’ TRANSPORT REFORMS FROM 1999-2019
The International Growth Centre (IGC) aims to promote sustainable growth in
developing countries by providing demand-led policy advice based on frontier
research. Cities that Work is an initiative from the IGC to facilitate evidence-
based policy decisions on urbanization in developing countries, by synthesizing
economic research with the knowledge of urban planning practitioners and
policymakers. It is led by Paul Collier (Oxford University), Yvonne Aki Sawyer
(Mayor of Freetown), Edward Glaeser (Harvard University), Astrid Haas (IGC),
Naison Mutizwa-Mangiza (Director Regional Office for Africa, UN-Habitat),
Jonathan Leape (IGC), Jennifer Musisi (Executive Director of Kampala Capital
City Authority) and Tony Venables (Oxford University).
Please contact us at [email protected].

Please cite the contents of this document as follows:

Otunola, B., Kriticos, S., and Harman, O. (2019) The BRT and the danfo:
A case study of Lagos’ transport reforms from 1999-2019. IGC Cities that
Work Case Study.