SECOND DIVISION I.

WHETHER OR NOT, UNDER THE PECULIAR CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE, WHERE

[G.R. No. 122954. February 15, 2000] THE RECORDS OF CONVICTION WERE LOST, THE PETITIONERS CONTINUED
NORBERTO FERIA Y PACQUING, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE DIRECTOR OF THE INCARCERATION IS JUSTIFIED UNDER THE LAW.
BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, MUNTINLUPA, METRO MANILA (IN PLACE OF THE JAIL WARDEN OF THE COROLLARY TO THIS, WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS RESOLUTION,
MANILA CITY JAIL), THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH II, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, and THE AFFIRMING THE DENIAL OF HEREIN APPELLANTS PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS IS,
CITY PROSECUTOR, CITY OF MANILA, respondents. IN CONTEMPLATION OF LAW, A JUDGMENT OR A SUBSTITUTE JUDGMENT, WHICH CAN
DECISION BE UTILIZED AS A SUFFICIENT BASIS FOR HIS INCARCERATION.
QUISUMBING, J.: II. WHETHER OR NOT THE RECONSTITUTION OF OFFICIAL RECORDS
The mere loss or destruction of the records of a criminal case subsequent to conviction of the accused will not render LOST/DESTROYED SHOULD BE INITIATED BY THE GOVERNMENT AND ITS ORGANS,
the judgment of conviction void, nor will it warrant the release of the convict by virtue of a writ of habeas corpus. The WHO ARE IN CUSTODY OF SUCH, OR BY THE PRISONER, WHOSE LIBERTY IS
proper remedy is the reconstitution of judicial records which is as much a duty of the prosecution as of the defense. RESTRAINED.
Subject of this petition for review on certiorari are (1) the Decision dated April 28, 1995, of the Eighth Division of the Petitioner argues that his detention is illegal because there exists no copy of a valid judgment as required by
Court of Appeals, which affirmed the dismissal of the petition for habeas corpusfiled by petitioner, and (2) the Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court,[11] and that the evidence considered by the trial court and Court of
Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated December 1, 1995, which denied the Motion for Reconsideration. As Appeals in the habeas corpus proceedings did not establish the contents of such judgment. Petitioner further
hereafter elucidated, we sustain the judgment of respondent appellate court. contends that our ruling in Gunabe v. Director of Prisons, 77 Phil. 993, 995 (1947), that "reconstitution is as much the
Based on the available records and the admissions of the parties, the antecedents of the present petition are as duty of the prosecution as of the defense" has been modified or abandoned in the subsequent case of Ordonez v.
follows: Director of Prisons, 235 SCRA 152, 155 (1994), wherein we held that "[i]t is not the fault of the prisoners that the
Petitioner Norberto Feria y Pacquing has been under detention since May 21, 1981, up to present [1] by reason of his records cannot now be found. If anyone is to be blamed, it surely cannot be the prisoners, who were not the
conviction of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, in Criminal Case No. 60677, by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, custodians of those records."
Branch 2, for the jeepney hold-up and killing of United States Peace Corps Volunteer Margaret Viviene Carmona. In its Comment,[12] the Office of the Solicitor General contends that the sole inquiry in this habeas corpus proceeding
Some twelve (12) years later, or on June 9, 1993, petitioner sought to be transferred from the Manila City Jail to the is whether or not there is legal basis to detain petitioner. The OSG maintains that public respondents have more than
Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City,[2] but the Jail Warden of the Manila City Jail informed the Presiding Judge sufficiently shown the existence of a legal ground for petitioners continued incarceration, viz., his conviction by final
of the RTC-Manila, Branch 2, that the transfer cannot be effected without the submission of the requirements, judgment, and under Section 4 of Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the discharge of a person suffering imprisonment
namely, the Commitment Order or Mittimus, Decision, and Information. [3] It was then discovered that the entire under lawful judgment is not authorized. Petitioners remedy, therefore, is not a petition for habeas corpus but a
records of the case, including the copy of the judgment, were missing. In response to the inquiries made by counsel proceeding for the reconstitution of judicial records.
of petitioner, both the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila and the Clerk of Court of Regional Trial Court of Manila, The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus, whose origin is traced to antiquity, was devised and exists as a speedy
Branch 2 attested to the fact that the records of Criminal Case No. 60677 could not be found in their respective and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of
offices. Upon further inquiries, the entire records appear to have been lost or destroyed in the fire which occurred at personal freedom.[13] It secures to a prisoner the right to have the cause of his detention examined and determined
the second and third floor of the Manila City Hall on November 3, 1986. [4] by a court of justice, and to have the issue ascertained as to whether he is held under lawful authority.
On October 3, 1994, petitioner filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus[5] with the Supreme Court [14]
 Consequently, the writ may also be availed of where, as a consequence of a judicial proceeding, (a) there has
against the Jail Warden of the Manila City Jail, the Presiding Judge of Branch 2, Regional Trial Court of Manila, and been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person, (b) the court had no jurisdiction to
the City Prosecutor of Manila, praying for his discharge from confinement on the ground that his continued detention impose the sentence, or (c) an excessive penalty has been imposed, as such sentence is void as to such excess.
[15]
without any valid judgment is illegal and violative of his constitutional right to due process.  Petitioners claim is anchored on the first ground considering, as he claims, that his continued detention,
In its Resolution dated October 10, 1994, [6] the Second Division of this Court resolved - notwithstanding the lack of a copy of a valid judgment of conviction, is violative of his constitutional right to due
" x x x (a) to ISSUE the Writ of Habeas Corpus; (b) to ORDER the Executive Judge of the process.
Regional Trial Court of Manila to conduct an immediate RAFFLE of this case among the Based on the records and the hearing conducted by the trial court, there is sufficient evidence on record to establish
incumbent judges thereof; and (c) to REQUIRE [1] the Judge to whom this case is raffled to SET the fact of conviction of petitioner which serves as the legal basis for his detention. Petitioner made judicial
the case for HEARING on Thursday, October 13, 1994 at 8:30 A.M., try and decide the same on admissions, both verbal and written, that he was charged with and convicted of the crime of Robbery with Homicide,
the merits and thereafter FURNISH this Court with a copy of his decision thereon; [2] the and sentenced to suffer imprisonment "habang buhay".
respondents to make a RETURN of the Writ on or before the close of office hours on In its Order dated October 17, 1994, the RTC-Manila, Branch 9, made the finding that -[16]
Wednesday, October 12, 1994 and APPEAR PERSONALLY and PRODUCE the person of "During the trial and on manifestation and arguments made by the accused, his learned counsel
Norberto Feria y Pa[c]quing on the aforesaid date and time of hearing to the Judge to whom this and Solicitor Alexander G. Gesmundo who appeared for the respondents, it appears clear and
case is raffled, and [3] the Director General, Philippine National Police, through his duly indubitable that:
authorized representative(s) to SERVE the Writ and Petition, and make a RETURN thereof as (A) Petitioner had been charged with Robbery with Homicide in Criminal
provided by law and, specifically, his duly authorized representative(s) to APPEAR Case No. 60677, Illegal Possession of Firearm in Criminal Case No. 60678
PERSONALLY and ESCORT the person of Norberto Feria y Pa[c]quing at the aforesaid date and Robbery in Band in Criminal Case No. 60867. ... In Criminal Case No.
and time of hearing." 60677 (Robbery with Homicide) the accused admitted in open Court that
The case was then raffled to Branch 9 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, which on November 15, 1994, after a decision was read to him in open Court by a personnel of the
hearing, issued an Order[7] dismissing the case on the ground that the mere loss of the records of the case does not respondent Court (RTC Branch II) sentencing him to Life Imprisonment
invalidate the judgment or commitment nor authorize the release of the petitioner, and that the proper remedy would (Habang buhay)..." (emphasis supplied)
be reconstitution of the records of the case which should be filed with the court which rendered the decision. Further, in the Urgent Motion for the Issuance of Commitment Order of the Above Entitled Criminal Case dated June
Petitioner duly appealed said Order to the Court of Appeals, which on April 28, 1995, rendered the assailed 8, 1993,[17] petitioner himself stated that -
Decision[8] affirming the decision of the trial court with the modification that "in the interest of orderly administration of "COMES NOW, the undersigned accused in the above entitled criminal case and unto this
justice" and "under the peculiar facts of the case" petitioner may be transferred to the Bureau of Corrections in Honorable Court most respectfully move:
Muntinlupa City without submission of the requirements (Mittimus, Decision and Information) but without prejudice to 1. That in 1981 the accused was charge of (sic) Robbery with Homicide;
the reconstitution of the original records. 2. That after four years of trial, the court found the accused guilty and given a Life
The Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Order having been denied for lack of merit, [9] petitioner is now before Sentence in a promulgation handed down in 1985; (emphasis supplied)
us on certiorari, assigning the following errors of law:[10]
 3. That after the sentence was promulgated, the Presiding Judge told the councel (sic) that order, or decree is not subject to collateral attack by habeas corpus.[24] Put another way, in order that a judgment
accused has the right to appeal the decision; may be subject to collateral attack by habeas corpus, it must be void for lack of jurisdiction. [25] Thus, petitioners
4. That whether the de oficio counsel appealed the decision is beyond the accused invocation of our ruling in Reyes v. Director of Prisons, supra, is misplaced. In the Reyes case, we granted the writ
comprehension (sic) because the last time he saw the counsel was when the decision was and ordered the release of the prisoner on the ground that "[i]t does not appear that the prisoner has been sentenced
promulgated. by any tribunal duly established by a competent authority during the enemy occupation" and not because there were
5. That everytime there is change of Warden at the Manila City Jail attempts were made to get no copies of the decision and information. Here, a copy of the mittimusis available. And, indeed, petitioner does not
the Commitment Order so that transfer of the accused to the Bureau of Corrections can be raise any jurisdictional issue.
affected, but all in vain;" The proper remedy in this case is for either petitioner or public respondents to initiate the reconstitution of the
Petitioners declarations as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him under Section 23 of Rule 130 of judgment of the case under either Act No. 3110, [26] the general law governing reconstitution of judicial records, or
the Rules of Court. This rule is based upon the presumption that no man would declare anything against himself, under the inherent power of courts to reconstitute at any time the records of their finished cases in accordance with
unless such declaration were true, [18] particularly with respect to such grave matter as his conviction for the crime of Section 5 (h) of Rule 135 of the Rules of Court.[27] Judicial records are subject to reconstitution without exception,
Robbery with Homicide. Further, under Section 4 of Rule 129, "[a]n admission, verbal or written, made by a party in whether they refer to pending cases or finished cases.[28] There is no sense in limiting reconstitution to pending
the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by cases; finished cases are just as important as pending ones, as evidence of rights and obligations finally adjudicated.
[29]
a showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made." Petitioner does not
claim any mistake nor does he deny making such admissions. Petitioner belabors the fact that no initiative was taken by the Government to reconstitute the missing records of the
The records also contain a certified true copy of the Monthly Report dated January 1985[19] of then Judge Rosalio A. trial court. We reiterate, however, that "reconstitution is as much the duty of the prosecution as of the
De Leon, attesting to the fact that petitioner was convicted of the crime of Robbery with Homicide on January 11, defense."[30] Petitioners invocation of Ordoez v. Director of Prisons, 235 SCRA 152 (1994), is misplaced since the
1985. Such Monthly Report constitutes an entry in official records under Section 44 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules grant of the petition for habeas corpus therein was premised on the loss of records prior to the filing of Informations
on Evidence, which is prima facie evidence of facts therein stated. against the prisoners, and therefore "[t]he government has failed to show that their continued detention is supported
Public respondents likewise presented a certified true copy of Peoples Journal dated January 18, 1985, page 2, by a valid conviction or by the pendency of charges against them or by any legitimate cause whatsoever." In this
[20]
 issued by the National Library, containing a short news article that petitioner was convicted of the crime of case, the records were lost after petitioner, by his own admission, was already convicted by the trial court of the
Robbery with Homicide and was sentenced to "life imprisonment." However, newspaper articles amount to "hearsay offense charged. Further, the same incident which gave rise to the filing of the Information for Robbery with Homicide
evidence, twice removed"[21] and are therefore not only inadmissible but without any probative value at all whether also gave rise to another case for Illegal Possession of Firearm,[31] the records of which could be of assistance in the
objected to or not,[22] unless offered for a purpose other than proving the truth of the matter asserted. In this case, the reconstitution of the present case.
news article is admissible only as evidence that such publication does exist with the tenor of the news therein stated. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit, and the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
As a general rule, the burden of proving illegal restraint by the respondent rests on the petitioner who attacks such
restraint. In other words, where the return is not subject to exception, that is, where it sets forth process which on its SECOND DIVISION
face shows good ground for the detention of the prisoner, it is incumbent on petitioner to allege and prove new G.R. No. 125901            March 8, 2001
matter that tends to invalidate the apparent effect of such process. [23] If the detention of the prisoner is by reason of EDGARDO A. TIJING and BIENVENIDA R TIJING, petitioners, 
lawful public authority, the return is considered prima facie evidence of the validity of the restraint and the petitioner vs.
has the burden of proof to show that the restraint is illegal. Thus, Section 13 of Rule 102 of the Rules of Court COURT OF APPEALS (Seventh Division) and ANGELITA DIAMANTE, respondents.
provides: QUISUMBING, J.:
"SEC. 13. When the return evidence, and when only a plea.If it appears that the prisoner is in For review is the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 6, 1996, in CA-G.R. SP No. 39056, reversing the
custody under a warrant of commitment in pursuance of law, the return shall be considered decision of the Regional Trial Court in a petition for habeas corpus of Edgardo Tijing, Jr., allegedly the child of
prima facie evidence of the cause of restraint, but if he is restrained of his liberty by any alleged petitioners.
private authority, the return shall be considered only as a plea of the facts therein set forth, and Petitioners are husband and wife. They have six children. The youngest is Edgardo Tijing, Jr., who was born on April
the party claiming the custody must prove such facts." 27, 1989, at the clinic of midwife and registered nurse Lourdes Vasquez in Sta. Ana, Manila. Petitioner Bienvenida
Public respondents having sufficiently shown good ground for the detention, petitioners release from confinement is served as the laundrywoman of private respondent Angelita Diamante, then a resident of Tondo, Manila.
not warranted under Section 4 of Rule 102 of the Rules of Court which provides that - According to Bienvenida in August 1989, Angelita went to her house to fetch her for an urgent laundry job. Since
"Sec. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. - If it appears that the person alleged to Bienvenida was on her way to do some marketing, she asked Angelita to wait until she returned. She also left her
be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or four-month old son, Edgardo, Jr., under the care of Angelita as she usually let Angelita take care of the child while
judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had Bienvenida was doing laundry.
jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be When Bienvenida returned from the market, Angelita and Edgardo, Jr., were gone. Bienvenida forthwith proceeded
allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged to Angelita's house in Tondo, Manila, but did not find them there. Angelita's maid told Bienvenida that her employer
by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in went out for a stroll and told Bienvenida to come back later. She returned to Angelita's house after three days, only to
this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense discover that Angelita had moved to another place. Bienvenida then complained to her barangay chairman and also
in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment." to the police who seemed unmoved by her pleas for assistance.
In the case of Gomez v. Director of Prisons, 77 Phil. 458 (1946), accused was convicted by the trial court of the Although estranged from her husband, Bienvenida could not imagine how her spouse would react to the
crime of rape, and was committed to the New Bilibid Prison. Pending appeal with the Court of Appeals, the records disappearance of their youngest child and this made her problem even more serious. As fate would have it,
of the case were, for reasons undisclosed, completely destroyed or lost. Accused then filed a petition for the Bienvenida and her husband reconciled and together, this time, they looked for their missing son in other places.
issuance of the writ of habeas corpus with the Supreme Court. The Court denied the petition, ruling thus: Notwithstanding their serious efforts, they saw no traces of his whereabouts.
"The petition does not make out a case. The Director of Prisons is holding the prisoner under Four years later or in October 1993, Bienvenida read in a tabloid about the death of Tomas Lopez, allegedly the
process issued by a competent court in pursuance of a lawful, subsisting judgment. The prisoner common-law husband of Angelita, and whose remains were lying in state in Hagonoy, Bulacan.
himself admits the legality of his detention. The mere loss or destruction of the record of the Bienvenida lost no time in going to Hagonoy, Bulacan, where she allegedly saw her son Edgardo, Jr., for the first
case does not invalidate the judgment or the commitment, or authorize the prisoners release." time after four years. She claims that the boy, who was pointed out to her by Benjamin Lopez, a brother of the late
Note further that, in the present case, there is also no showing that petitioner duly appealed his conviction of the Tomas Lopez, was already named John Thomas Lopez. 1 She avers that Angelita refused to return to her the boy
crime of Robbery with Homicide, hence for all intents and purposes, such judgment has already become final and despite her demand to do so.
executory. When a court has jurisdiction of the offense charged and of the party who is so charged, its judgment,
Bienvenida and Edgardo filed their petition for habeas corpus with the trial court in order to recover their son. To is prosecuted for the purpose of determining the right of custody over a child.13 It must be stressed too that in habeas
substantiate their petition, petitioners presented two witnesses, namely, Lourdes Vasquez and Benjamin Lopez. The corpus proceedings, the question of identity is relevant and material, subject to the usual presumptions including
first witness, Vasquez, testified that she assisted in the delivery of one Edgardo Tijing, Jr. on April 27, 1989 at her those as to identity of the person.
clinic in Sta. Ana, Manila. She supported her testimony with her clinical records. 2 The second witness, Benjamin In this case, the minor's identity is crucial in determining the propriety of the writ sought. Thus, it must be resolved
Lopez, declared that his brother, the late Tomas Lopez, could not have possibly fathered John Thomas Lopez as the first whether the Edgardo Tijing, Jr., claimed by Bienvenida to be her son, is the same minor named John Thomas
latter was sterile. He recalled that Tomas met an accident and bumped his private part against the edge of a banca Lopez, whom Angelita insists to be her offspring. We must first determine who between Bienvenida and Angelita is
causing him excruciating pain and eventual loss of his child-bearing capacity. Benjamin further declared that Tomas the minor's biological mother. Evidence must necessarily be adduced to prove that two persons, initially thought of to
admitted to him that John Thomas Lopez was only an adopted son and that he and Angelita were not blessed with be distinct and separate from each other, are indeed one and the same.14 Petitioners must convincingly establish that
children.3 the minor in whose behalf the application for the writ is made is the person upon whom they have rightful custody. If
For her part, Angelita claimed that she is the natural mother of the child. She asserts that at age 42, she gave birth to there is doubt on the identity of the minor in whose behalf the application for the writ is made, petitioners cannot
John Thomas Lopez on April 27, 1989, at the clinic of midwife Zosima Panganiban in Singalong, Manila. She added, invoke with certainty their right of custody over the said minor.
though, that she has two other children with her real husband, Angel Sanchez. 4 She said the birth of John Thomas True, it is not the function of this Court to examine and evaluate the probative value of all evidence presented to the
was registered by her common-law husband, Tomas Lopez, with the local civil registrar of Manila on August 4, 1989. concerned tribunal which formed the basis of its impugned decision, resolution or order. 15 But since the conclusions
On March 10, 1995, the trial court concluded that since Angelita and her common-law husband could not have of the Court of Appeals contradict those of the trial court, this Court may scrutinize the evidence on the record to
children, the alleged birth of John Thomas Lopez is an impossibility. 5 The trial court also held that the minor and determine which findings should be preferred as more conformable to the evidentiary facts.
Bienvenida showed strong facial similarity. Accordingly, it ruled that Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are A close scrutiny of the records of this case reveals that the evidence presented by Bienvenida is sufficient to
one and the same person who is the natural child of petitioners. The trial court decreed: establish that John Thomas Lopez is actually her missing son, Edgardo Tijing, Jr.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition for First, there is evidence that Angelita could no longer bear children. From her very lips, she admitted that after the
Habeas Corpus, as such, respondent Angelita Diamante is ordered to immediately release from her birth of her second child, she underwent ligation at the Martinez Hospital in 1970, before she lived with Tomas Lopez
personal custody minor John Thomas D. Lopez, and turn him over and/or surrender his person to without the benefit of marriage in 1974. Assuming she had that ligation removed in 1978, as she claimed, she offered
petitioners, Spouses Edgardo A. Tijing and Bienvenida R. Tijing, immediately upon receipt hereof. no evidence she gave birth to a child between 1978 to 1988 or for a period of ten years. The midwife who allegedly
Branch Sheriff of this Court, Carlos Bajar, is hereby commanded to implement the decision of this Court by delivered the child was not presented in court. No clinical records, log book or discharge order from the clinic were
assisting herein petitioners in the recovery of the person of their minor son, Edgardo Tijing Jr., the same ever submitted.
person as John Thomas D. Lopez. Second, there is strong evidence which directly proves that Tomas Lopez is no longer capable of siring a son.
SO ORDERED.6 Benjamin Lopez declared in court that his brother, Tomas, was sterile because of the accident and that Tomas
Angelita seasonably filed her notice of appeal. 7 Nonetheless, on August 3, 1994, the sheriff implemented the order of admitted to him that John Thomas Lopez was only an adopted son. Moreover, Tomas Lopez and his legal wife,
the trial court by taking custody of the minor. In his report, the sheriff stated that Angelita peacefully surrendered the Maria Rapatan Lopez, had no children after almost fifteen years together. Though Tomas Lopez had lived with
minor and he turned over the custody of said child to petitioner Edgardo Tijing. 8 private respondent for fourteen years, they also bore no offspring.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision rendered by the trial court. The appellate court Third, we find unusual the fact that the birth certificate of John Thomas Lopez was filed by Tomas Lopez instead of
expressed its doubts on the propriety of the habeas corpus. In its view, the evidence adduced by Bienvenida was not the midwife and on August 4, 1989, four months after the alleged birth of the child. Under the law, the attending
sufficient to establish that she was the mother of the minor. It ruled that the lower court erred in declaring that physician or midwife in attendance at birth should cause the registration of such birth. Only in default of the physician
Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are one and the same person, 9 and disposed of the case, thus: or midwife, can the parent register the birth of his child. The certificate must be filed with the local civil registrar within
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the lower court dated March 10, 1995 is hereby thirty days after the birth.16 Significantly, the birth certificate of the child stated Tomas Lopez and private respondent
REVERSED, and a new one entered dismissing the petition in Spec. Proc. No. 94-71606, and directing the were legally married on October 31, 1974, in Hagonoy, Bulacan, which is false because even private respondent had
custody of the minor John Thomas Lopez to be returned to respondent Angelita Diamante, said minor admitted she is a "common-law wife". 17 This false entry puts to doubt the other data in said birth certificate.
having been under the care of said respondent at the time of the filing of the petition herein. Fourth, the trial court observed several times that when the child and Bienvenida were both in court, the two had
SO ORDERED.10 strong similarities in their faces, eyes, eyebrows and head shapes. Resemblance between a minor and his alleged
Petitioners sought reconsideration of the abovequoted decision which was denied. Hence, the instant petition parent is competent and material evidence to establish parentage.18 Needless to stress, the trial court's conclusion
alleging: should be given high respect, it having had the opportunity to observe the physical appearances of the minor and
I petitioner concerned.
THAT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR WHEN IT Fifth, Lourdes Vasquez testified that she assisted in Bienvenida's giving birth to Edgardo Tijing, Jr., at her clinic.
DECLARED THAT THE PETITIONERS' ACTION FOR HABEAS CORPUS IS MERELY SECONDARY TO Unlike private respondent, she presented clinical records consisting of a log book, discharge order and the
THE QUESTION OF FILIATION THAT THE PETITIONERS HAD LIKEWISE PROVEN. signatures of petitioners.
II All these considered, we are constrained to rule that subject minor is indeed the son of petitioners. The writ
THAT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE of habeas corpus is proper to regain custody of said child.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR "HABEAS CORPUS" AND DIRECTING A final note. Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the modern and scientific
THAT THE CUSTODY OF THE MINOR JOHN THOMAS LOPEZ WHO WAS PROVEN TO THE SAME ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in using DNA test 19 for identification and
MINOR AS EDGARDO R. TIJING, JR., BE RETURNED TO THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT. 11 parentage testing. The University of the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis
In our view, the crucial issues for resolution are the following: Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is
(1) Whether or not habeas corpus is the proper remedy? based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other from
(2) Whether or not Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are one and the same person and is the the father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and child are analyzed to establish parentage. 20 Of course,
son of petitioners? being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still open to challenge. 21 Eventually, as the
We shall discuss the two issues together since they are closely related. appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that
The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of courts should apply the results of science when competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject
his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto. 12 Thus, it is the said result is to deny progress. 22 Though it is not necessary in this case to resort to DNA testing, in future it would be
proper legal remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of a minor child even if the latter be in the custody of a useful to all concerned in the prompt resolution of parentage and identity issues.
third person of his own free will. It may even be said that in custody cases involving minors, the question of illegal WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed DECISION of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED
and involuntary restraint of liberty is not the underlying rationale for the availability of the writ as a remedy. Rather, it and decision of the Regional Trial Court is REINSTATED. Costs against the private respondent.
 3. his constitutional right to due process had been violated by the long delay in the termination of
the preliminary investigation.
Republic of the Philippines After the parties had filed their written arguments, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution on August 1, 1991 granting
SUPREME COURT the motion to quash on the ground of prescription of the offense charged. The Sandiganbayan's ratiocination of its
Manila  resolution is quoted below:
The crime charged is alleged to have been committed "on or about January 21, 1976" when the
accused allegedly misrepresented to a Lands Inspector of the Bureau of Lands that the land
G.R. No 101724 July 3, 1992 subject of the herein movant's Application for a Free Patent was disposable land. This
misrepresentation allegedly resulted in the issuance of a Torrens Title under a Free Patent to
the herein accused-movant. This, the Information avers, was prejudicial to the public interest
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,  because the land in question had been reserved for a school site and was, therefore, not
vs. disposable.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN and CEFERINO S. PAREDES, JR., respondents. Thus, the charge is for the violation of Sec. 3(a) of R.A. No. 3019 because the accused had
  allegedly persuaded, induced and influenced the Public Lands Inspector to violate existing law,
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.: rules and regulations by recommending approval of the free patent application.
Assailed in this petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the resolution promulgated on August 1, The accused asserts that since at the time of the alleged commission of the crime (January 21,
1991 by the Sandiganbayan which granted the private respondent's motion to quash the information for violation of 1976) the period of prescription was ten (10) years under Sec. 11 of R.A. No. 3019, the crime
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) on the ground of prescription of the crime charged. should have prescribed in 1986. The prosecution seems to agree with the movant's statement
Two letter-complaints were filed on October 28, 1986 and December 9, 1986, with the Tanodbayan by Teofilo as to the term of the prescriptive period with the qualification that the period of prescription
Gelacio, a political leader of Governor Valentina Plaza, wife of Congressman Democrito O. Plaza of Agusan del Sur, should have commenced to run from March 28, 1985, when the complaint was allegedly filed by
shortly after the private respondent had replaced Mrs. Plaza as OIC/provincial governor of Agusan del Sur in March the Republic for the cancellation of the title.
1986 (p. 235, Rollo). Gelacio's complaint questioned the issuance to Governor Paredes, when he was still the xxx xxx xxx
provincial attorney in 1976, of a free patent title for Lot No. 3097-8, Pls. 67, with an area of 1,391 sq. m., more or The question then is this: when should the period of prescription have commenced to run as to
less, in the Rosario public land subdivision in San Francisco, Agusan del Sur. the alleged misrepresentation which persuaded, influenced and induced the Lands Inspector of
On February 23, 1989, the tanodbayan referred the complaint to the City Fiscal of Butuan City the Bureau of Lands resulting in the approval of the application of the accused for a free patent?
who subpoenaed Governor Paredes. However, the subpoena was served on, and received by, xxx xxx xxx
the Station Commander of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur, who did not serve it on Paredes. The Supreme Court has clearly stated that even in the case of falsification of public documents,
Despite the absence of notice to Paredes, Deputized Tanodbayan/City Fiscal Ernesto M. Brocoy prescription commences from its recording with the Registry of Deeds when the existence of the
conducted a preliminary investigation ex-parte. He recommended that an information be filed in document and the averments therein theoretically become a matter of public knowledge.
court. His recommendation was approved by the Tanodbayan who, on August 10, 1989, filed the xxx xxx xxx
following information in the Sandiganbayan where it was docketed as TBP Case No. 86-03368: The matter of improper inducement, persuasion or influence upon the Lands Inspector allegedly
That on or about January 21, 1976, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in San Francisco, applied by the accused through his misrepresentation may have been unknown to others
Agusan del Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above- besides the two of them because their interaction would presumably have been private. The fact
named accused, a public officer, being then the Provincial Attorney of Agusan del Sur, having of the improper segregation of the piece of land in question and the grant thereof to the accused,
been duly appointed and qualified as such, taking advantage of his public position, did, then and however, became, presumptively at least, a matter of public knowledge upon the issuance of a
there, wilfully and unlawfully persuade, influence and induce the Land Inspector of the Bureau of Torrens Title over that parcel of non-disposable public land.
Lands, by the name of Armando L. Luison to violate an existing rule or regulation duly xxx xxx xxx
promulgated by competent authority by misrepresenting to the latter that the land subject of an 4. Notice to the whole world must be presumed at the very latest on May 28, 1976 when the
application filed by the accused with the Bureau of Lands is disposable by a free patent when Register of Deeds of Agusan del Sur issued Original Certificate of Title No. 8379 in the name of
the accused well knew that the said land had already been reserved for a school site, thus by the accused as a result of the grant of the patent on the school site reservation;
the accused's personal misrepresentation in his capacity as Provincial Attorney of Agusan del 5. The act of filing the approved free patent with the Registry of Deeds is notice duly given to the
Sur and applicant for a free patent, a report favorably recommending the issuance of a free various offices and officials of the government, e.g., the Department (Ministry) of Agriculture and
patent was given by the said Armando L. Luison, land inspector, thereby paving the way to the the Bureau of Lands, who are affected thereby specially because it is the Bureau of Lands which
release of a decree of title, by the Register of Deeds of Agusan del Sur, an act committed by the files the approved patent application with the Registry of Deeds. If the land in question was
accused, in outright prejudice of the public interest. (pp. 3-4, Rollo.) indeed reserved for as school site, then the Department (Ministry) of Education would also know
Paredes was arrested upon a warrant issued by the Sandiganbayan. Claiming that the information and the warrant of or would be presumed to know. (pp. 28-33, Rollo.)
arrest were null and void because he had been denied his right to a preliminary investigation. Paredes refused to The Sandiganbayan could not abide the fact that the Lands Inspector (Luison) who was supposedly induced by
post bail. His wife filed a petition for habeas corpus praying this Court to order his release (Paredes vs. Paredes to violate the law, and who did violate it by recommending approval of Paredes' free patent application was
Sandiganbayan, 193 SCRA 464), but we denied her petition because the proper remedy was for Paredes to file a not charged with a crime. The Sandiganbayan concluded:
bail bond of P20,000 fixed by the Sandiganbayan for his provisional liberty, and move to quash the information It would seriously strain credulity to say that while the violation of law, rules or regulation by the
before being arraigned. Lands Inspector was obvious and public (since the school site had been titled in the name of the
On April 5, 1991, Paredes filed in the Sandiganbayan "An Urgent Motion to Quash Information and to Recall Warrant alleged inducer Pimentel **), the beneficiary thereof could not have been suspected of having
of Arrest" alleging that: induced the violation itself. It would be grossly unfair and unjust to say that prescription would
1. he is charged for an offense which has prescribed: run in favor of the Lands Inspector who had actually violated the law but not to the public official
2. the preliminary investigation, as well as the Information prepared by the Tanodbayan and the who had benefitted therefrom and who may have, therefore, instigated the favorable
Warrant of Arrest issued by the Sandiganbayan were invalid for lack of notice to him of the recommendation for the disposition of non-disposable land.
preliminary investigation conducted by Deputized Tanodbayan Ernesto M. Brocoy and In view of all the foregoing, the Motion to Quash the Information is granted. (p. 36, Rollo.)
Tanodbayan Prosecutor Josephine Z. Fernandez; and
The Sandiganbayan further observed that since R.A. No. 3019 is a special law, the computation of the period for the Fact that the statute of limitations is jurisdictional necessarily determined that a prosecution
prescription of the crime of violating it is governed by Section 29 of Act No. 3326 which provides as follows: within the period specified is an essential element of the offense. (People vs. Allen, 118 P 2d,
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, 927, Emphasis supplied.)
and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial Unless statutes of limitation are clearly retrospective in their terms, they do not apply to crimes
proceedings for its investigation and punishment. previously committed (22 CJS 576; People vs. Lurd, 12 Hun 282; Martine vs. State, 24 Tex 61;
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, Emphasis ours.)
and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting To apply B.P. Blg. 195 to Paredes would make it an ex post facto law for it would after his situation to his
jeopardy. disadvantage by making him criminally liable for a crime that had already been extinguished under the law existing
The Sandiganbayan correctly observed that "the date of the violation of the law becomes the operative date for the when it was committed. An ex post facto law is defined as:
commencement of the period of prescription" (p. 34, Rollo). A law passed after the occurrence of a fact or commission of an act, which retrospectively
Assuming that Paredes did induce Lands Inspector Luison to recommend approval of his application for free patent changes the legal consequences or relations of such fact or deed. By Art. I, Sec. 10 of U.S.
(which both of them denied doing), the date of the violation, for the purpose of computing the period of prescription, Const., the states are forbidden to pass "any ex post facto law". Most all state constitutions
would be the date of filing his application on January 21, 1976. contain similar prohibitions against ex post facto laws.
The theory of the prosecution that the prescriptive period should not commence upon the filing of Paredes' An "ex post facto law" is defined as a law which provides for the infliction of punishment upon a
application because no one could have known about it except Paredes and Lands Inspector Luison, is not correct person for an act done which, when it was committed, was innocent; a law which aggravates a
for, as the Sandiganbayan pointedly observed: "it is not only the Lands Inspector who passes upon the disposability crime or makes it greater than when it was committed; a law that changes the punishment or
of public land . . . other public officials pass upon the application for a free patent including the location of the land inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed; a law
and, therefore, the disposable character thereof" (p. 30, Rollo). Indeed, practically all the department personnel, who that changes the rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than was required at
had a hand in processing and approving the application, namely: (1) the lands inspector who inspected the land to the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the offender; a law which, assuming
ascertain its location and occupancy: (2) the surveyor who prepared its technical description: (3) the regional director to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes a penalty or the deprivation of a right
who assessed the application and determined the land classification: (4) the Director of Lands who prepared the free which, when done, was lawful; a law which deprives persons accused of crime of some lawful
patent: and (5) the Department Secretary who signed it, could not have helped "discovering" that the subject of the protection to which they have become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or
application was nondisposable public agricultural land. acquittal, or of the proclamation of amnesty; every law which, in relation to the offense or its
The Sandiganbayan correctly observed that the "crime" whether it was the filing of Paredes application for a free consequences, alters the situation of a person to his disadvantage. Wilensky v. Fields, Fla., 267
patent in January 1976 or his supposedly having induced Luison to recommend its approval, prescribed ten (10) So. 2d 1, 5. (Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, p. 520.)
years later, on January 21, 1986. Gelacio's complaint, dated October 28, 1986, was filed late. Since an ex post facto law is proscribed by our Constitution (Sec. 22, Article 111, 1987 Constitution), the
The reason for the extinction of the State's right to prosecute a crime after the lapse of the statutory limitation period Sandiganbayan committed no reversible error in ruling that Paredes may no longer be prosecuted for his supposed
for filing the criminal action, is that: violation of R.A. 3019 in 1976, six (6) years before B.P. Blg. 195 was approved on March 16, 1982. The new
Statutes of Limitation are construed as being acts of grace, and as a surrendering by the prescriptive period under that law should apply only to those offense which were committed after the approval of B.P.
sovereign of its right to prosecute or of its right to prosecute at its discretion, and they are 195.
considered as equivalent to acts of amnesty. Such statutes are founded on the liberal theory that WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit. The resolution dated August 1, 1991 of the
prosecutions should not be allowed to ferment endlessly in the files of the government to Sandiganbayan in Crim. Case No. 13800 is AFFIRMED. No costs.
explode only after witnesses and proofs necessary to the protection of accused have by sheer SO ORDERED.
lapse of time passed beyond availability. They serve, not only to bar prosecutions on aged and
untrustworthy evidence, but also to cut off prosecution for crimes a reasonable time after
completion, when no further danger to society is contemplated from the criminal activity. (22 CJS
573-574.)
In the absence of a special provision otherwise, the statute of limitations begins to run on the
commission of an offense and not from the time when the offense is discovered or when the
offender becomes known, or it normally begins to run when the crime is complete. (22 CJS 585;
Emphasis supplied.)
Even if the ten-year prescriptive period commenced to run from the registration and issuance of the free patent title
by the Register of Deeds on May 28, 1976, registration being constructive notice to the whole world, the prescriptive
period would have fully run its course on May 28, 1986, or five (5) months before Gelacio filed his complaint, and
more than thirteen (13) years before judicial proceedings were initiated in the Sandiganbayan on August 10, 1989 by
the filing of the information therein.
Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 which was approved on March 16, 1982, amending Section 11 R.A. No. 3019 by
increasing from ten (10) to fifteen (15) years the period for the prescription or extinguishment of a violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, may not be given retroactive application to the "crime" which was committed by
Paredes in January 1976 yet, for it should be prejudicial to the accused. It would deprive him of the substantive
benefit of the shorter (10 years) prescriptive period under Section 11, R.A. 3019, which was an essential element of
the "crime" at the time he committed it.
Protection from prosecution under a statute of limitation is a substantive right. Where the statute
fixes a period of limitation as to a prosecution for a particular offense, the limitation so fixed is
jurisdictional, and the time within which the offense is committed is a jurisdictional fact, it being
necessary that the indictment or information be actually filed within the time prescribed. (22 CJS
574.)
 FIRST DIVISION "WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Florentino Bracamonte y Abellar guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Double Homicide and he is hereby sentenced to RECLUSION
PERPETUA, to indemnify the heirs of Jay Vee Parnala and Teresita Rosalinas the amount of P30,000 each and to
pay unto Violeta Parnala P1,100.00 corresponding to the value of the articles lost without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency and to pay the cost."[2]
[G.R. No. 95939. June 17, 1996]
Hence, appellant interposed the present appeal, assigning the following errors:

I
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FLORENTINO BRACAMONTE y ABELLAR,
MANUEL REGINALDO y SAPON, and ERNIE LAPAN y CABRAL alias ERNING BULAG, defendants- "x x x IN GIVING CREDENCE TO PROSECUTION WITNESS' DECLARATION CONCERNING THE POSITIVE
appellants. IDENTIFICATION OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT AS ONE OF THE THREE (3) MEN WHO ALLEGEDLY
EMERGED FROM THE GARAGE DOOR OF THE VICTIM'S HOUSE AND SPRINTED AWAY THEREFROM
ALMOST IMMEDIATELY.
DECISION

HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.: II

Alibi, the plea of having been elsewhere than at the scene of the crime at the time of the commission of the x x x IN APPRECIATING THE THEN EXTANT CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCES AS INDICATIVE OF ACCUSED-
felony, is a plausible excuse for the accused. Let there be no mistake about it. Contrary to the common notion, alibi APPELLANT'S GUILT.
is in fact a good defense. But, to be valid for purposes of exoneration from a criminal charge, the defense of alibi
must be such that it would have been physically impossible for the person charged with the crime to be at the  locus
criminis at the time of its commission, the reason being that no person can be in two places at the same time.  The III
excuse must be so airtight that it would admit of no exception. Where there is the least possibility of accused's
presence at the crime scene, the alibi will not hold water. x x x IN ITS PRONOUNCEMENT THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT EVADED ARREST BY HIDING AFTER HIS
Appellant Florentino Bracamonte y Abellar, Manuel Reginaldo y Sapon, and Ernie Lapan y Cabral alias Erning ALLEGED COMMISSION OF THE HEINOUS CRIME IMPUTED AGAINST HIM.
Bulag, stand charged with the crime of Robbery with Double Homicide under the following Information, dated
October 6, 1987:
IV

"The undersigned 2nd Asst. City Fiscal for the City of Cavite accuses Florentino Bracamonte y Abellar, Manuel
Reginaldo y Sapon and Ernie Lapan y Cabral alias Erning Bulag of the crime of Robbery with Double Homicide, x x x IN DISREGARDING COMPLETELY THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI PUT UP BY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT." [3]
committed as follows:
At the trial in the court a quo, the following facts appear to have been proven:
That on or about September 23, 1987, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of On September 23, 1987, at about 8:30 in the evening, Violeta Parnala and her common-law husband, Clark
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping each Din, arrived home from the Kingdom Hall of Jehovah's Witnesses. She rang their doorbell and when she got no
other, with intent to gain did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter the house of one Violeta response, she pounded on the garage door while her husband went to the back of their house and stoned the
Sayaman Parnala, and once inside, by means of violence and intimidation, rob, take and carry away a necklace window of their son's room. Then, she heard somebody trying to remove the padlock of the garage door and saw a
worth P600.00 and ring worth P440.00 belonging to one Jay Vee Parnala Custodio, son of Violeta Sayaman Parnala, man, prompting her to shout, "magnanakaw, magnanakaw." After the door was opened, three (3) men rushed out,
without the consent of the said owner and to his damage and prejudice in the total amount of P1,100.00, Philippine one after the other, whom she recognized as appellant Bracamonte, Ernie Lapan and Manuel Reginaldo.
Currency and that on the occasion of the said robbery, and in pursuance of their conspiracy, the above-named Upon hearing his wife shouting, Clark Din rushed to her and saw a man about to turn at the other street.  He
accused, with intent to kill, did, then and there, wilfully unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack, scald and stab Jay ran after him but could not catch up. He thus proceeded back to their house. By this time, some of their neighbors,
Vee Parnala inflicting upon Jay Vee Parnala Custodio 3 incised and 15 stab wounds and upon Teresita Minorca roused by the shouting of Violeta, came out of their houses, among whom were Pat. Sahagun and Pat. Punzal. The
Rosalinas 1 incised and 6 stab wounds on the different parts of their body, which ultimately caused their deaths. two (2) policemen went with Clark Din inside the house and saw the television set on. Din turned on the lights and
Contrary to law.''[1] started to look for his son. He tried the bathroom but it was locked. He then went to their room, got the keys and
opened the bathroom where he saw their maid, Teresita M. Rosalinas, hands tied with her mouth gagged, and
bathed in her own blood. Thereafter, he saw their son, Jay Vee Parnala, in the dirty kitchen, his head and body
Ernie Lapan y Cabral was tried and convicted of the crime in a Decision of the court  a quo, dated February 13, immersed in a pail of water, dead.
1989, and his case is on appeal with this Court. Manuel Reginaldo y Sapon is at large. Dr. Regalado Sosa, City Health Officer of Cavite City, conducted an autopsy on the cadavers of Jay Vee and
Appellant Bracamonte had been at large until his arrest on October 27, 1989. He had been in hiding for more Rosalina. His findings disclosed that Rosalina sustained six (6) stab wounds and one (1) incised wound, while Jay
than two years. Vee sustained thirteen (13) stab wounds and three (3) incised wounds on different parts of the body. [4] In the case of
The present appeal deals solely with the conviction by the court a quo of herein appellant Bracamonte. Rosalina, the most fatal wounds were wounds Nos. 6 and 7 while in the case of Jay Vee, almost all of the wounds
Arraigned on November 13, 1989, appellant pleaded "not guilty" to the crime charged. were fatal due to his age.[5] Jay Vee was only six years old at the time of his death.
After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Cavite City, Branch XVII, rendered judgment on September 21, 1990 Appellant Florentino Bracamonte denied the charge and interposed the defense of alibi. According to him, he
finding appellant guilty as charged. The dispositive portion of the judgment reads: was not in Cavite City at the time the crime was committed, but was then in the premises of the RM Motor Works
located in Paraaque, Metro Manila. This shop is owned by Rafael Diaz. Appellant worked as an all around employee,
alternating as a mechanic and shopkeeper of Rafael Diaz.
 We affirm the conviction of the herein appellant. xxx xxx xxx
The defense of alibi is a handy but shabby excuse which indictees never seem to tire of. [6] At the risk of
sounding like a broken record, we reiterate once more the oft-repeated rule that the defense of alibi is worthless in Q: What is in the driver taking your son to school (sic) or the distinguishing feature that made you say
the face of positive identification. [7] In the case at bench, Violeta Parnala, witness for the prosecution and mother of that you came to know the accused because he used to ride in the jeepney of his?
one of the victims, positively testified that she saw appellant Bracamonte, together with Manuel Reginaldo and Ernie A: Of course the feature of his face and the built of his body.
Lapan, come out of their garage door, obviously immediately after the incident in question.  The situation was that the Q: Was there any distinguishing feature in his face or in his body, what is it?
accused were still inside the Parnala residence when the spouses Parnala arrived thereat. This circumstance and A: His face a little bit round.
the fact that the three accused left Violeta in a hurried manner and without paying their respects to the house owner Q: If that accused is in the courtroom today, will you be able to identify him?
as would have been the case if their presence in the Parnala house were legitimate, constitute circumstantial A: Yes, Ma'am (He is there, witness pointing to the accused.)
evidence of their culpability. Violeta clearly saw the three (3) men because they were only about an arm's length from Q: How many times more or less did your son Jay Vee and Teresita Rosalinas ride in this jeepney being
where she was when they scampered out of the garage door. As they came out, they were practically facing driven by this Bracamonte?
her. Moreover, although the light coming from the electric post, admittedly, was dim, there was additional illumination A: I cannot remember already how many times but I could see them very often riding in the jeepney.
coming from the houses nearby sufficient to enable her to identify the malefactors: Thus: Q: And this accused Bracamonte is not living in your neighborhood?
A: He is also living in that place but a little bit far from our place."[9]
"Q: Following your testimony, you were outside the small door knocking, then these three persons came
out from the garage? Appellant countered, however, that witness Violeta could not have known him personally since her son and
A: They were still in the garage when suddenly they opened the door of the garage.  I thought he is our maid rode coincidentally on appellant's jeepney only on occasions whenever he passed by the witness' house in the
maid and I told him that I was knocking here for a long time already why did you wake up just now. course of regular work. Their relationship was impersonal, not conducive to close and regular relationship thereby
Q: And the distance between you and the place where they came out was very short distance? ruling out intimate knowledge of each other.[10] The implication is that Violeta could not have positively identified him
A: Yes, Ma'am. as one of those who emerged from the garage door of the victims' house, they being complete strangers to each
Q: What is the distance? other.
A: About an arm (sic) length. This averment is of no consequence, because nowhere in the testimony of Violeta did she claim that she
Q: And you said they walked very fast? knows the appellant personally. What she testified to was that she used to see her son and maid ride in appellant's
A: Not so fast. When they were already outside they ran so fast. jeepney very often,[11] which is the reason why she became familiar with appellant's physical appearance. There is
Q: Mrs. Witness, is there a lighting facilities (sic) in your door? nothing in law and jurisprudence which requires, as a condition sine qua non, that in order for there to be a positive
A: There is an electric post that has a light. identification by a prosecution witness of a felon, he must first know the latter personally. If this were the case, the
Q: And would it be 8 to 10 meters from the door of your garage? prosecution would rarely get any conviction since, in most instances, the perpetrator of the crime is unrelated to the
A: It could be not so far (sic) because our house is at the corner. victim. No further requirement is imposed by law on the prosecution than that the identification made by its witness
Q: Page 35 of your transcript of stenographic notes shows it is about 8 to 10 meters.  What is the kind of be direct, firm, unequivocal, and, most importantly, credible. The witness' degree of closeness or familiarity with the
light? accused, although may be helpful, is by no means an indispensable requirement for purposes of positive
A: Electric bulb. identification.
Q: Not the fluorescent? To corroborate his defense of alibi, appellant presented Rafael Diaz, owner of RM Motor Works in Paraaque,
A: Bulb. where appellant used to work as an all around employee and where he allegedly spent the night on September 23,
Q: And it was about how high? 1987, the time when the crime was committed. Diaz' testimony contributed very little, if at all, to his defense. The
A: The height of an electric post. direct examination of Diaz reveals the following:
Q: It could be about 20 feet?
"Q: Please recall the specific date of September 23, 1987, have you gone to your shop?
A: I am not sure.
A: As far as I know, I cannot remember. At that date because of too long to recall (sic) but what can say
Q: And you will agree with me that that light was not sufficient enough to be able to clearly see the faces
is that I know that he stayed in the shop. He sleep (sic) in the shop.
of the persons going out of the garage?
A: The house nearby have also light. The place was also lighted by the houses of the neighbor which xxx xxx xxx
has a light."[8]
Q: Now, you said that you used to visit, inspect your shop usually in the morning.  Now, tell us Mr.
Violeta Parnala was unswerving in her identification in open court of appellant Bracamonte as one of the felons Witness have you done that in September 1987?
who emerged from their house, considering that the latter used to drive her son to school.  As further recounted by A: Yes, sir.
Violeta, viz: Q: In your doing such inspection, where was Florentino Bracamonte?
A: He was in the shop.
Q: In your direct testimony when you were asked this question. Q: Why do you know the accused? A:
Q: For the whole month of September 1987?
Because my son used to ride in his jeepney on his way to school. How young was your son Jay
A: Yes, sir.[12]
Vee Parnala Custodio when the incident happened?
A: He was six years old? However, on cross-examination, Diaz became more ambivalent:
xxx xxx xxx "Q: And you are definite that on September 23, 1987 as you mentioned earlier you did not know if the
accused left your shop or not?
Q: And during those times when this Teresita Rosalinas and your son Jay Vee Parnala Custodio were
A: In the afternoon.
going to school, you do not mind who the driver was of the jeepney they were taking?
Q: On September 23, 1987?
A: I also looked at him.
A: I am not sure.
Q: But your concern was merely to reach their destination, not to identify the driver of the jeepney?
COURT:
A: Of course when my child leaves the house, I used to see who was the driver because I have much
Q: You are not sure he did not leave?
concern about my son in case something might happen.
A: Yes, Your Honor, I am not sure.[13]
 The above testimony, whose purpose is to corroborate appellant's defense of alibi, failed to serve its purpose (4) He and Sapon went into hiding for more than two (2) years. Bracamonte was arrested on October 27,
for it was hardly clear and convincing. Thus, the trial court did not commit any error in refusing to give probative 1989.
value to this piece of evidence. Settled is the doctrine that the trial court's evaluation of the credit-worthiness of the
testimony given before it by witnesses must be accorded great respect. [14] It has been said that the defense of alibi is The above circumstances, highlighted by the testimony of Violeta Parnala which was straightforward and clear
inherently weak since it is very easy to concoct. In order that this defense may prosper, it must be established clearly as to the identity of the appellant as one of the malefactors, clearly point to appellant Bracamonte's guilt.  Thus was
and convincingly not only that the accused is elsewhere at the time of the commission of the crime, but that likewise overcome, by proof beyond reasonable doubt, the presumption of innocence in appellant's favor.
it would have been physically impossible for him to be at the vicinity thereof. [15] In the instant case, appellant In contrast, appellant merely relies on denial and alibi, weak defenses, to support his claim of innocence, which
Bracamonte tragically failed to show, by clear and convincing proof, that it was physically impossible for him to be at defenses were overthrown by the prosecution.
the victims' house at the time the crime was committed, apart from his self-serving declaration that he was at RM The Court notes that appellant, together with his two (2) other co-accused, were charged and convicted of
Motors Works in Paraaque on the fateful night of September 23, 1987, seconded by the discredited testimony of his robbery with double homicide. The charge and the corresponding conviction should have been for robbery with
alleged employer, Rafael Diaz. homicide only although two persons were killed. [24] In this complex crime, the penalty prescribed in Article 294(1) of
With marked relevance is the fact that there appears to be no motive on the part of Violeta Parnala to falsely the Revised Penal Code is not affected by the number of killings accompanying the robbery. [25] The multiplicity of the
accuse appellant, other than her sincere desire to seek justice for the deaths of her son and maid.  Appellant himself victims slain, though, is appreciated as an aggravating circumstance. [26]
admitted that he was not aware of any reason or motive why Violeta should testify falsely against him. [16] Positive Although Republic Act No. 7659 reimposed the death penalty for certain heinous crimes, including robbery with
identification by an independent witness who has not been shown to have any reason or motive to testify falsely homicide,[27] the capital punishment could not be imposed in the case at bench.The crime here was committed way
must prevail over simple denials and the unacceptable alibi of the accused. [17] back in September 23, 1987, while R.A. No. 7659 took effect only on December 31, 1993. [28] To impose upon
Appellant insists that, as proof of his innocence, he did not escape nor evade arrest after the commission of appellant the death penalty would violate the basic rule in criminal law that, if the new law imposes a heavier penalty,
the crime imputed against him. He contends that he stayed in his place of employment in Paraaque, Metro Manila, the law in force at the time of the commission of the offense shall be applied, [29] which in this case is Article 294 (1) of
from 1986 to 1989, regularly performing his job, when he was apprehended on the strength of a warrant of arrest. the Revised Penal Code sans the death penalty clause by virtue of Section 19 (1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution
This is contrary to the finding of the court a quo which held that: which provides, viz:

"Accused Florentino Bracamonte y Abellar also stayed at large until his arrest on October 27, 1989 after more than "x x x Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress
two years of hiding to evade the scales of justice. hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua."

xxx xxx xxx WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that the conviction is
for robbery with homicide, and the indemnity for the heirs of the two victims is hereby increased from P30,000 to
P50,000[30] each.
x x x [A]ccused chose to flee from the scene of the crime and to stay beyond the clutches of the law x x x, thus
spotlighting the legal maxim 'the guilty fleeth while the innocent stands fast, bold as a lion."' [18] The evidence on
record does not warrant reversal of this finding by the trial court. It is this Court's bounden duty to refrain from Republic of the Philippines
reviewing findings of fact by the lower court, considering that it has all the opportunity to directly observe the SUPREME COURT
witnesses and to determine by their demeanor on the stand the probative value of their testimonies. [19] Manila
SECOND DIVISION
 
In any case, assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that appellant's claim of non-flight is true, there is no law or G.R. No. L-30061 February 27, 1974
principle which guarantees that non-flight per se is proof, let alone conclusive proof, of one's innocence and, as in THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellees, 
the case of alibi, such a defense is unavailing when placed astride the undisputed fact that there is positive vs.
identification of the felon. [20] JOSE JABINAL Y CARMEN, defendant-appellant.
Finally, appellant claims that the evidence against him is purely circumstantial which is insufficient to sustain Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar and Solicitor Antonio M. Martinez for plaintiff-appellee.
his conviction. He submits that there is no solitary piece of evidence directly linking him to the commission of the Pedro Panganiban y Tolentino for defendant-appellant.
crime imputed against him, hence he should be acquitted.
This argument is specious. Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which indirectly proves a fact in issue. ANTONIO, J.:p
[21]
 In this jurisdiction, direct evidence is not only the basis upon which the guilt of an accused may be proved; it may Appeal from the judgment of the Municipal Court of Batangas (provincial capital), Batangas, in Criminal Case No.
also be established through circumstantial evidence. [22] Under the Revised Rules on Evidence, circumstantial 889, finding the accused guilty of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition and sentencing him to
evidence will support and justify a conviction if the following requisites concur: suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from one (1) year and one (1) day to two (2) years imprisonment, with the
accessories provided by law, which raises in issue the validity of his conviction based on a retroactive application of
(1) There is more than one circumstance;
Our ruling in People v. Mapa.1
(2) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
The complaint filed against the accused reads:
(3) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
That on or about 9:00 o'clock, p.m., the 5th day of September, 1964, in the poblacion,
doubt.[23]
Municipality of Batangas, Province of Batangas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
In the case at bench, the circumstances pointing to accused-appellant's guilt are as follows: Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a person not authorized by law, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously keep in his possession, custody and direct control a revolver
(1) He was not an inmate of private complainant's house and so, his presence therein at a late hour in Cal. .22, RG8 German Made with one (1) live ammunition and four (4) empty shells without first
the evening indicate his and his companions' evil designs. securing the necessary permit or license to possess the same.
(2) He and his cohorts were seen coming out of the victims' house immediately after the crime of robbery At the arraignment on September 11, 1964, the accused entered a plea of not guilty, after which trial was accordingly
with homicide was perpetrated. held.
(3) After coming out, the culprits immediately fled. The accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, he was in possession of the revolver and the ammunition
described in the complaint, without the requisite license or permit. He, however, claimed to be entitled to exoneration
because, although he had no license or permit, he had an appointment as Secret Agent from the Provincial Governor necessary means to carry out the lawful purpose of the batallion commander to effect the capture of a Huk leader.
of Batangas and an appointment as Confidential Agent from the PC Provincial Commander, and the said In Mapa, expressly abandoning the doctrine in Macarandang, and by implication, that in Lucero, We sustained the
appointments expressly carried with them the authority to possess and carry the firearm in question. judgment of conviction on the following ground:
Indeed, the accused had appointments from the above-mentioned officials as claimed by him. His appointment from The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any
Governor Feliciano Leviste, dated December 10, 1962, reads: person to ... possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any
Reposing special trust and confidence in your civic spirit, and trusting that you will be an instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of
effective agent in the detection of crimes and in the preservation of peace and order in the firearms, or ammunition." (Sec. 878, as amended by Republic Act No. 4, Revised Administrative
province of Batangas, especially with respect to the suppression of trafficking in explosives, Code.) The next section provides that "firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to
jueteng, illegal cockfighting, cattle rustling, robbery and the detection of unlicensed firearms, you officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], the Philippine
are hereby appointed a SECRET AGENT of the undersigned, the appointment to take effect Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial
immediately, or as soon as you have qualified for the position. As such Secret Agent, your duties governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors,
shall be those generally of a peace officer and particularly to help in the preservation of peace and guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are not covered "when such firearms are in
and order in this province and to make reports thereon to me once or twice a month. It should be possession of such officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official
clearly understood that any abuse of authority on your part shall be considered sufficient ground duties." (Sec. 879, Revised Administrative Code.)
for the automatic cancellation of your appointment and immediate separation from the service. In The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As such he is not
accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-12088 dated December 23, exempt. ... .
1959, you will have the right to bear a firearm, particularly described below, for use in connection It will be noted that when appellant was appointed Secret Agent by the Provincial Government in 1962, and
with the performance of your duties. Confidential Agent by the Provincial Commander in 1964, the prevailing doctrine on the matter was that laid down by
By virtue hereof, you may qualify and enter upon the performance of your duties by taking your Us in People v. Macarandang (1959) and People v. Lucero (1958). Our decision in People v. Mapa reversing the
oath of office and filing the original thereof with us. aforesaid doctrine came only in 1967. The sole question in this appeal is: Should appellant be acquitted on the basis
of Our rulings in Macarandang and Lucero, or should his conviction stand in view of the complete reversal of
the Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa? The Solicitor General is of the first view, and he accordingly
Very truly yours,
recommends reversal of the appealed judgment.
(Sgd.) FELICIANO LEVISTE
Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean, and this
Provincial Governor
is the reason why under Article 8 of the New Civil Code "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution shall form a part of the legal system ... ." The interpretation upon a law by this Court constitutes, in a
FIREARM AUTHORIZED TO CARRY: way, a part of the law as of the date that law originally passed, since this Court's construction merely establishes the
Kind: — ROHM-Revolver contemporaneous legislative intent that law thus construed intends to effectuate. The settled rule supported by
Make: — German numerous authorities is a restatement of legal maxim "legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet" — the interpretation
SN: — 64 placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. The doctrine laid down
Cal:— .22 in Lucero and Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence of the law, of the land, at the time appellant was
On March 15, 1964, the accused was also appointed by the PC Provincial Commander of Batangas as Confidential found in possession of the firearm in question and when he arraigned by the trial court. It is true that the doctrine was
Agent with duties to furnish information regarding smuggling activities, wanted persons, loose firearms, subversives overruled in the Mapa case in 1967, but when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted,
and other similar subjects that might affect the peace and order condition in Batangas province, and in connection the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine
with these duties he was temporarily authorized to possess a ROHM revolver, Cal. .22 RG-8 SN-64, for his personal and acted on the faith thereof. This is especially true in the construction and application of criminal laws, where it is
protection while in the performance of his duties. necessary that the punishability of an act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society.
The accused contended before the court a quo that in view of his above-mentioned appointments as Secret Agent It follows, therefore, that considering that appellant conferred his appointments as Secret Agent and Confidential
and Confidential Agent, with authority to possess the firearm subject matter of the prosecution, he was entitled to Agent and authorized to possess a firearm pursuant to the prevailing doctrine enunciated
acquittal on the basis of the Supreme Court's decision in People vs. Macarandang2 and People vs. Lucero.3 The trial in Macarandang and Lucero, under which no criminal liability would attach to his possession of said firearm in spite
court, while conceding on the basis of the evidence of record the accused had really been appointed Secret Agent of the absence of a license and permit therefor, appellant must be absolved. Certainly, appellant may not be
and Confidential Agent by the Provincial Governor and the PC Provincial Commander of Batangas, respectively, with punished for an act which at the time it was done was held not to be punishable.
authority to possess and carry the firearm described in the complaint, nevertheless held the accused in its decision WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed, and appellant is acquitted, with costs de oficio.
dated December 27, 1968, criminally liable for illegal possession of a firearm and ammunition on the ground that the Zaldivar (Chairman), Barredo, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.
rulings of the Supreme Court in the cases of Macarandang and Lucero were reversed and abandoned in People vs. Fernando, J., took no part.
Mapa, supra. The court considered as mitigating circumstances the appointments of the accused as Secret Agent
and Confidential Agent.
Let us advert to Our decisions in People v. Macarandang, supra, People v. Lucero, supra, and People v. Mapa,
supra. In Macarandang, We reversed the trial court's judgment of conviction against the accused because it was
shown that at the time he was found to possess a certain firearm and ammunition without license or permit, he had
an appointment from the Provincial Governor as Secret Agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order and in
the detection of crimes, with authority to hold and carry the said firearm and ammunition. We therefore held that
while it is true that the Governor has no authority to issue any firearm license or permit, nevertheless, section 879 of
the Revised Administrative Code provides that "peace officers" are exempted from the requirements relating to the
issuance of license to possess firearms; and Macarandang's appointment as Secret Agent to assist in the
maintenance of peace and order and detection of crimes, sufficiently placed him in the category of a "peace officer"
equivalent even to a member of the municipal police who under section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code are
exempted from the requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms. In Lucero, We held that
under the circumstances of the case, the granting of the temporary use of the firearm to the accused was a
 Republic of the Philippines subversive organizations, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then
SUPREME COURT and there knowingly, willfully and feloniously commit subversive and/or seditious acts, by
Manila inciting, instigating and stirring the people to unite and rise publicly and tumultuously and take up
EN BANC arms against the government, and/or engage in rebellious conspiracies and riots to overthrow
  the government of the Republic of the Philippines by force, violence, deceit, subversion and/or
G.R. Nos. L-32613-14 December 27, 1972 other illegal means among which are the following:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,  1. On several occasions within the province of Tarlac, the accused conducted meetings and/or
vs. seminars wherein the said accused delivered speeches instigating and inciting the people to
HON. SIMEON. FERRER (in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac, Branch I), unite, rise in arms and overthrow the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, by force,
FELICIANO CO alias LEONCIO CO alias "Bob," and NILO S. TAYAG alias Romy Reyes alias violence, deceit, subversion and/or other illegal means; and toward this end, the said accused
"Taba," respondents. organized, among others a chapter of the KABATAANG MAKABAYAN in barrio Motrico, La Paz,
Solicitor R. Mutuc for respondent Feliciano Co. Tarlac for the avowed purpose of undertaking or promoting an armed revolution, subversive
Jose W. Diokno for respondent Nilo Tayag. and/or seditious propaganda, conspiracies, and/or riots and/or other illegal means to discredit
and overthrow the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and to established in the
CASTRO, J.:p Philippines a Communist regime.
I. Statement of the Case 2. The accused NILO TAYAG alias ROMY REYES alias TABA, together with FRANCISCO
Posed in issue in these two cases is the constitutionality of the Anti-Subversion  PORTEM alias KIKO Gonzales and others, pursued the above subversive and/or seditious
Act,1 which outlaws the Communist Party of the Philippines and other "subversive associations," and punishes any activities in San Pablo City by recruiting members for the New People's Army, and/or by
person who "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts affiliates himself with, becomes or remains a member" of the Party instigating and inciting the people to organize and unite for the purpose of overthrowing the
or of any other similar "subversive" organization. Government of the Republic of the Philippines through armed revolution, deceit, subversion
On March 5, 1970 a criminal complaint for violation of section 4 of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed against the and/or other illegal means, and establishing in the Philippines a Communist Government.
respondent Feliciano Co in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac. On March 10 Judge Jose C. de Guzman conducted That the following aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the offense: (a) aid of
a preliminary investigation and, finding a prima facie case against Co, directed the Government prosecutors to file armed men or persons to insure or afford impunity; and (b) craft, fraud, or disguise was
the corresponding information. The twice-amended information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 27, recites: employed.
That on or about May 1969 to December 5, 1969, in the Municipality of Capas, Province of On July 21, 1970 Tayag moved to quash, impugning the validity of the statute on the grounds that (1) it is a bill of
Tarlac, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed attainder; (2) it is vague; (3) it embraces more than one subject not expressed in the title thereof; and (4) it denied
accused, feloniously became an officer and/or ranking leader of the Communist Party of the him the equal protection of the laws.
Philippines, an outlawed and illegal organization aimed to overthrow the Government of the Resolving the constitutional issues raised, the trial court, in its resolution of September 15, 1970, declared the statute
Philippines by means of force, violence, deceit, subversion, or any other illegal means for the void on the grounds that it is a bill of attainder and that it is vague and overboard, and dismissed the informations
purpose of establishing in the Philippines a totalitarian regime and placing the government under against the two accused. The Government appealed. We resolved to treat its appeal as a special civil action
the control and domination of an alien power, by being an instructor in the Mao Tse Tung for certiorari.
University, the training school of recruits of the New People's Army, the military arm of the said II. Is the Act a Bill of Attainder?
Communist Party of the Philippines. Article III, section 1 (11) of the Constitution states that "No bill of attainder or ex port facto law shall be enacted."2 A
That in the commission of the above offense, the following aggravating circumstances are bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial.3 Its essence is the substitution of a
present, to wit: legislative for a judicial determination of guilt.4 The constitutional ban against bills of attainder serves to implement
(a) That the crime has been committed in contempt of or with insult to public authorities; the principle of separation of powers 5 by confining legislatures to 
(b) That the crime was committed by a band; and afford impunity. rule-making 6 and thereby forestalling legislative usurpation of the judicial function. 7 History in perspective, bills of
(c) With the aid of armed men or persons who insure or afford impunity. attainder were employed to suppress unpopular causes and political minorities, 8 and it is against this evil that the
Co moved to quash on the ground that the Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of attainder. constitutional prohibition is directed. The singling out of a definite class, the imposition of a burden on it, and a
Meanwhile, on May 25, 1970, another criminal complaint was filed with the same court, sharing the respondent Nilo legislative intent, suffice to stigmatizea statute as a bill of attainder. 9
Tayag and five others with subversion. After preliminary investigation was had, an information was filed, which, as In the case at bar, the Anti-Subversion Act was condemned by the court a quo as a bill of attainder because it "tars
amended, reads: and feathers" the Communist Party of the Philippines as a "continuing menace to the freedom and security of the
The undersigned provincial Fiscal of Tarlac and State Prosecutors duly designated by the country; its existence, a 'clear, present and grave danger to the security of the Philippines.'" By means of the Act, the
Secretary of Justice to collaborate with the Provincial Fiscal of Tarlac, pursuant to the Order trial court said, Congress usurped "the powers of the judge," and assumed "judicial magistracy by pronouncing the
dated June 5, above entitled case, hereby accuse Nilo S. Tayag, alias Romy Reyes alias TABA, guilt of the CCP without any of the forms or safeguards of judicial trial." Finally, according to the trial court, "if the only
ARTHUR GARCIA, RENATO (REY) CASIPE, ABELARDO GARCIA, MANUEL ALAVADO, issue [to be determined] is whether or not the accused is a knowing and voluntary member, the law is still a bill of
BENJAMIN BIE alias COMMANDER MELODY and several JOHN DOES, whose identities are attainder because it has expressly created a presumption of organizational guilt which the accused can never hope
still unknown, for violation of REPUBLIC ACT No. 1700, otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion to overthrow."
Law, committed as follows: 1. When the Act is viewed in its actual operation, it will be seen that it does not specify the Communist Party of the
That in or about March 1969 and for sometime prior thereto and thereafter, in the Province of Philippines or the members thereof for the purpose of punishment. What it does is simply to declare the Party to be
Tarlac, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, and elsewhere in the Philippines, the an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for the purposes of the prohibition, stated in section 4,
above-named accused knowingly, willfully and by overt acts organized, joined and/or remained against membership in the outlawed organization. The term "Communist Party of the Philippines" issued solely for
as offices and/or ranking leaders, of the KABATAANG MAKABAYAN, a subversive organization definitional purposes. In fact the Act applies not only to the Communist Party of the Philippines but also to "any other
as defined in Republic Act No. 1700; that BENJAMIN BIE and COMMANDER MELODY, in organization having the same purpose and their successors." Its focus is not on individuals but on conduct. 10
addition thereto, knowingly, willfully and by over acts joined and/or remained as a member and This feature of the Act distinguishes it from section 504 of the U.S. Federal Labor-Management Reporting and
became an officer and/or ranking leader not only of the Communist Party of the Philippines but Disclosure Act of 1959 11 which, in U.S. vs. Brown, 12 was held to be a bill of attainder and therefore unconstitutional.
also of the New People's Army, the military arm of the Communist Party of the Philippines; and Section 504 provided in its pertinent parts as follows:
that all the above-named accused, as such officers and/or ranking leaders of the aforestated
 (a) No person who is or has been a member of the Communist  direct participation in the organization's unlawful activities, while the latter requires proof of mere adherence to the
Party ... shall serve — organization's illegal objectives.
(1) as an officer, director, trustee, member of any executive board or similar governing body, 2. Even assuming, however, that the Act specifies individuals and not activities, this feature is not enough to render it
business agent, manager, organizer, or other employee (other than as an employee performing a bill of attainder. A statute prohibiting partners or employees of securities underwriting firms from serving as officers
exclusively clerical or custodial duties) of any labor organization. or employees of national banks on the basis of a legislative finding that the persons mentioned would be subject to
during or for five years after the termination of his membership in the Communist Party.... the temptation to commit acts deemed inimical to the national economy, has been declared not to be a bill of
(b) Any person who willfully violates this section shall be fined not more than $10,000 or attainder. 16 Similarly, a statute requiring every secret, oath-bound society having a membership of at least twenty to
imprisoned for not more than one year, or both. register, and punishing any person who becomes a member of such society which fails to register or remains a
This statute specified the Communist Party, and imposes disability and penalties on its members. Membership in the member thereof, was declared valid even if in its operation it was shown to apply only to the members of the Ku Klux
Party, without more, ipso facto disqualifies a person from becoming an officer or a member of the governing body of Klan. 17
any labor organization. As the Supreme Court of the United States pointed out: In the Philippines the validity of section 23 (b) of the Industrial Peace Act, 18 requiring labor unions to file with the
Under the line of cases just outlined, sec. 504 of the Labor Management Reporting and Department of Labor affidavits of union officers "to the effect that they are not members of the Communist Party and
Disclosure Act plainly constitutes a bill of attainder. Congress undoubtedly possesses power that they are not members of any organization which teaches the overthrow of the Government by force or by any
under the Commerce Clause to enact legislation designed to keep from positions affecting illegal or unconstitutional method," was upheld by this Court. 19
interstate commerce persons who may use of such positions to bring about political strikes. In Indeed, it is only when a statute applies either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in
section 504, however, Congress has exceeded the authority granted it by the Constitution. The such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial does it become a bill of attainder. 20 It is upon this
statute does not set forth a generally applicable rule decreeing that any person who commits ground that statutes which disqualified those who had taken part in the rebellion against the Government of the
certain acts or possesses certain characteristics (acts and characteristics which, in Congress' United States during the Civil War from holding office, 21 or from exercising their profession, 22 or which prohibited the
view, make them likely to initiate political strikes) shall not hold union office, and leaves to courts payment of further compensation to individuals named in the Act on the basis of a finding that they had engages in
and juries the job of deciding what persons have committed the specified acts or possessed the subversive activities, 23 or which made it a crime for a member of the Communist Party to serve as an officer or
specified characteristics. Instead, it designates in no uncertain terms the persons who possess employee of a labor union, 24 have been invalidated as bills of attainder.
the feared characteristics and therefore cannot hold union office without incurring criminal But when the judgment expressed in legislation is so universally acknowledged to be certain as to be "judicially
liability — members of the Communist Party. noticeable," the legislature may apply its own rules, and judicial hearing is not needed fairly to make such
Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 US 1, 6 L ed 2d 625, 81 S CT determination. 25
1357, lend a support to our conclusion. That case involved an appeal from an order by the In New York ex rel. Bryant vs. Zimmerman, 26 the New York legislature passed a law requiring every secret, oath-
Control Board ordering the Communist Party to register as a "Communist-action organization," bound society with a membership of at least twenty to register, and punishing any person who joined or remained a
under the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, 64 Stat 987, 50 USC sec. 781 et seq. (1958 member of such a society failing to register. While the statute did not specify the Ku Klux Klan, in its operation the
ed). The definition of "Communist-action organization" which the Board is to apply is set forth in law applied to the KKK exclusively. In sustaining the statute against the claim that it discriminated against the Ku
sec. 3 of the Act: Klux Klan while exempting other secret, oath-bound organizations like masonic societies and the Knights of
[A]ny organization in the United States ... which (i)is substantially directed, dominated, or Columbus, the United States Supreme Court relied on common knowledge of the nature and activities of the Ku Klux
controlled by the foreign government or foreign organization controlling the world Communist Klan. The Court said:
movement referred to in section 2 of this title, and(ii) operates primarily to advance the The courts below recognized the principle shown in the cases just cited and reached the
objectives of such world Communist movement... 64 Stat 989, 50 USC sec. 782 (1958 ed.) conclusion that the classification was justified by a difference between the two classes of
A majority of the Court rejected the argument that the Act was a bill of attainder, reasoning that associations shown by experience, and that the difference consisted (a) in a manifest tendency
sec. 3 does not specify the persons or groups upon which the deprivations setforth in the Act are on the part of one class to make the secrecy surrounding its purpose and membership a cloak
to be imposed, but instead sets forth a general definition. Although the Board has determined in for acts and conduct inimical to personal rights and public welfare, and (b) in the absence of
1953 that the Communist Party was a "Communist-action organization," the Court found the such a tendency on the part of the other class. In pointing out this difference one of the courts
statutory definition not to be so narrow as to insure that the Party would always come within it: said of the Ku Klux Klan, the principal association in the included class: "It is a matter of
In this proceeding the Board had found, and the Court of Appeals has sustained its conclusion, common knowledge that this organization functions largely at night, its members disguised by
that the Communist Party, by virtud of the activities in which it now engages, comes within the hoods and gowns and doing things calculated to strike terror into the minds of the people;" and
terms of the Act. If the Party should at anytime choose to abandon these activities, after it is later said of the other class: "These organizations and their purposes are well known, many of
once registered pursuant to sec. 7, the Act provides adequate means of relief. (367 US, at 87, 6 them having been in existence for many years. Many of them are oath-bound and secret. But we
L ed 2d at 683) hear no complaint against them regarding violation of the peace or interfering with the rights of
Indeed, were the Anti-Subversion Act a bill of attainder, it would be totally unnecessary to charge Communists in others." Another of the courts said: "It is a matter of common knowledge that the association or
court, as the law alone, without more, would suffice to secure their punishment. But the undeniable fact is that their organization of which the relator is concededly a member exercises activities tending to the
guilt still has to be judicially established. The Government has yet to prove at the trial that the accused joined the prejudice and intimidation of sundry classes of our citizens. But the legislation is not confined to
Party knowingly, willfully and by overt acts, and that they joined the Party, knowing its subversive character and with this society;" and later said of the other class: "Labor unions have a recognized lawful purpose.
specific intent to further its basic objective, i.e., to overthrow the existing Government by force deceit, and other The benevolent orders mentioned in the Benevolent Orders Law have already received
illegal means and place the country under the control and domination of a foreign power. legislative scrutiny and have been granted special privileges so that the legislature may well
As to the claim that under the statute organizationl guilt is nonetheless imputed despite the requirement of proof of consider them beneficial rather than harmful agencies." The third court, after recognizing "the
knowing membership in the Party, suffice it to say that is precisely the nature of conspiracy, which has been referred potentialities of evil in secret societies," and observing that "the danger of certain organizations
to as a "dragneet device" whereby all who participate in the criminal covenant are liable. The contention would be has been judicially demonstrated," — meaning in that state, — said: "Benevolent orders, labor
correct if the statute were construed as punishing mere membership devoid of any specific intent to further the unions and college fraternities have existed for many years, and, while not immune from hostile
unlawful goals of the Party. 13 But the statute specifically required that membership must be knowing or active, with criticism, have on the whole justified their existence."
specific intent to further the illegal objectives of the Party. That is what section 4 means when it requires that We assume that the legislature had before it such information as was readily available including
membership, to be unlawful, must be shown to have been acquired "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts." 14 The the published report of a hearing, before a committee of the House of Representatives of the
ingredient of specific intent to pursue the unlawful goals of the Party must be shown by "overt acts." 15 This 57th Congress relating to the formation, purposes and activities of the Klu Klux Klan. If so it was
constitutes an element of "membership" distinct from the ingredient of guilty knowledge. The former requires proof of advised — putting aside controverted evidence — that the order was a revival of the Ku Klux
 Klan of an earlier time with additional features borrowed from the Know Nothing and the A. P. A. the statutory terms. Legislatures may act tocurb behaviour which they regard as harmful to the
orders of other periods; that its memberships was limited to native-born, gentile, protestant public welfare,whether that conduct is found to be engaged in by manypersons or by one. So
whites; that in part of its constitution and printed creed it proclaimed the widest freedom for all long as the incidence of legislation issuch that the persons who engage in the regulated
and full adherence to the Constitution of the United States; in another exacted of its member an conduct, bethey many or few, can escape regulation merely by altering thecourse of their own
oath to shield and preserve "white supremacy;" and in still another declared any person actively present activities, there can be no complaintof an attainder. 33
opposing its principles to be "a dangerous ingredient in the body politic of our country and an This statement, mutatis mutandis, may be said of theAnti-Subversion Act. Section 4 thereof expressly statesthat the
enemy to the weal of our national commonwealth;" that it was conducting a crusade against prohibition therein applies only to acts committed"After the approval of this Act." Only those who "knowingly,willfully
Catholics, Jews, and Negroes, and stimulating hurtful religious and race prejudices; that it was and by overt acts affiliate themselves with,become or remain members of the Communist Party of thePhilippines
striving for political power and assuming a sort of guardianship over the administration of local, and/or its successors or of any subversive association"after June 20, 1957, are punished. Those whowere members
state and national affairs; and that at times it was taking into its own hands the punishment of of the Party or of any other subversive associationat the time of the enactment of the law, weregiven the opportunity
what some of its members conceived to be crimes. 27 of purging themselves of liability byrenouncing in writing and under oath their membershipin the Party. The law
In the Philippines the character of the Communist Party has been the object of continuing scrutiny by this Court. In expressly provides that such renunciationshall operate to exempt such persons from penalliability. 34 The penalties
1932 we found the Communist Party of the Philippines to be an illegal association. 28 In 1969 we again found that the prescribed by the Act are thereforenot inescapable.
objective of the Party was the "overthrow of the Philippine Government by armed struggle and to establish in the III. The Act and the Requirements of Due Process
Philippines a communist form of government similar to that of Soviet Russia and Red China." 29 More recently, 1. As already stated, the legislative declaration in section 2 of the Act that the Communist Party of the Philippinesis
in Lansang vs. Garcia, 30 we noted the growth of the Communist Party of the Philippines and the organization of an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of theGovernment is inteded not to provide the basis for a
Communist fronts among youth organizations such as the Kabataang Makabayan (KM) and the emergence of the legislativefinding of guilt of the members of the Party butrather to justify the proscription spelled out in section 4.
New People's Army. After meticulously reviewing the evidence, we said: "We entertain, therefore, no doubts about Freedom of expression and freedom of association are sofundamental that they are thought by some to occupy
the existence of a sizeable group of men who have publicly risen in arms to overthrow the government and have thus a"preferred position" in the hierarchy of constitutional values. 35 Accordingly, any limitation on their exercise mustbe
been and still are engaged in rebellion against the Government of the Philippines. justified by the existence of a substantive evil. This isthe reason why before enacting the statute in question
3. Nor is it enough that the statute specify persons or groups in order that it may fall within the ambit of the Congressconducted careful investigations and then stated itsfindings in the preamble, thus:
prohibition against bills of attainder. It is also necessary that it must apply retroactively and reach past conduct. This ... [T]he Communist Party of the Philippines althoughpurportedly a political party, is in fact an
requirement follows from the nature of a bill of attainder as a legislative adjudication of guilt. As Justice Frankfurter organized conspiracyto overthrow the Government of the Republic of the Philippinesnot only by
observed, "frequently a bill of attainder was ... doubly objectionable because of its ex post facto features. This is the force and violence but also by deceit, subversionand other illegal means, for the purpose of
historic explanation for uniting the two mischiefs in one  establishing in thePhilippines a totalitarian regime subject to alien dominationand control;
clause — 'No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed.' ... Therefore, if [a statute] is a bill of attainder it is ... [T]he continued existence and activities of the CommunistParty of the Philippines constitutes
also an ex post facto law. But if it is not an ex post facto law, the reasons that establish that it is not are persuasive a clear, present andgrave danger to the security of the Philippines;
that it cannot be a bill of attainder." 31 ... [I]n the face of the organized, systematice and persistentsubversion, national in scope but
Thus in Gardner vs. Board of Public Works, 32 the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the validity of the Charter of the City of international in direction,posed by the Communist Party of the Philippines and its activities,there
Los Angeles which provided: is urgent need for special legislation to cope withthis continuing menace to the freedom and
... [N]o person shall hold or retain or be eligible for any public office or employment in the service security of the country.
of the City of Los Angeles, in any office or department thereof, either elective or appointive, who In truth, the constitutionality of the Act would be opento question if, instead of making these findings in enactingthe
has within five (5) years prior to the effective date of this section advised, advocated, or taught, statute, Congress omitted to do so.
or who may, after this section becomes effective, become a member of or affiliated with any In saying that by means of the Act Congress has assumed judicial magistracy, the trial courd failed to takeproper
group, society, association, organization or party which advises, advocates or teaches or has account of the distinction between legislative fact and adjudicative fact. Professor Paul Freund elucidatesthe crucial
within said period of five (5) years advised, advocated, or taught the overthrow by force or distinction, thus:
violence of the Government of the United States of America or of the State of California. ... A law forbidding the sale of beverages containingmore than 3.2 per cent of alcohol would
In upholding the statute, the Court stressed the prospective application of the Act to the petitioner therein, thus: raise a question of legislativefact, i.e., whether this standard has a reasonable relationto public
... Immaterial here is any opinion we might have as to the charter provision insofar as it health, morals, and the enforcement problem. Alaw forbidding the sale of intoxicating beverages
purported to apply restrospectively for a five-year period to its effective date. We assume that (assuming itis not so vague as to require supplementation by rule-making)would raise a question
under the Federal Constitution the Charter Amendment is valid to the extent that it bars from the of adjudicative fact, i.e., whether thisor that beverage is intoxicating within the meaning of the
city's public service persons who, subsequently to its adoption in 1941, advise, advocate, or statuteand the limits on governmental action imposed by the Constitution. Of course what we
reach the violent overthrow of the Government or who are or become affiliated with any group mean by fact in each case is itselfan ultimate conclusion founded on underlying facts and
doing so. The provisions operating thus prospectively were a reasonable regulation to protect oncriteria of judgment for weighing them.
the municipal service by establishing an employment qualification of loyalty to the State and the A conventional formulation is that legislative facts — those facts which are relevant to the
United States. legislative judgment — will not be canvassed save to determine whether there is a rationalbasis
... Unlike the provisions of the charter and ordinance under which petitioners were removed, the for believing that they exist, while adjudicativefacts — those which tie the legislative enactment
statute in the Lovett case did not declare general and prospectively operative standards of to the litigant — are to be demonstrated and found according to the ordinarystandards prevailing
qualification and eligibility for public employment. Rather, by its terms it prohibited any further for judicial trials. 36
payment of compensationto named individuals or employees. Under these circumstances, The test formulated in Nebbia vs. new York, 37 andadopted by this Court in Lansang vs. Garcia, 38 is that 'if laws are
viewed against the legislative background, the statutewas held to have imposed penalties seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the
without judicial trial. requirements of due process are satisfied, and judicial determination to that effect renders a court functus officio."
Indeed, if one objection to the bill of attainder is thatCongress thereby assumed judicial magistracy, them it mustbe The recital of legislative findings implements this test.
demonstrated that the statute claimed to be a bill of attainderreaches past conduct and that the penalties it With respect to a similar statement of legislative findingsin the U.S. Federal Subversive Activities Control Actof 1950
imposesare inescapable. As the U.S. Supreme Court observedwith respect to the U.S. Federal Subversive Activities (that "Communist-action organizations" are controlledby the foreign government controlling the worldCommunist
ControlAct of 1950: movement and that they operate primarily to"advance the objectives of such world Communist movement"),the U.S.
Nor is the statute made an act of "outlawry" or of attainderby the fact that the conduct which it Supreme Court said:
regulates is describedwith such particularity that, in probability, few organizationswill come within
 It is not for the courts to reexamine the validity of theselegislative findings and reject Whoever organizes or helps or attempts to organize anysociety, group, or assembly of persons
them....They are the productof extensive investigation by Committes of Congress over morethan who teach, advocate, orencourage the overthrow or destruction of any such governmentby force
a decade and a half. Cf. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S.502, 516, 530. We certainly cannot or violence; or becomes or is a member of, or affiliatedwith, any such society, group or assembly
dismiss them as unfoundedirrational imaginings. ... And if we accept them, as we mustas a not of persons, knowingthe purpose thereof —
unentertainable appraisal by Congress of the threatwhich Communist organizations pose not Shall be fined not more than $20,000 or imprisoned notmore than twenty years, or both, and
only to existing governmentin the United States, but to the United States as asovereign, shall be ineligible for emplymentby the United States or any department or agencythereof, for
independent Nation. ...we must recognize that thepower of Congress to regulate Communist the five years next following his conviction.... 46
organizations of thisnature is  In sustaining the validity of this provision, the "Court said in Scales vs. United States: 47
extensive. 39 It was settled in Dennis that advocacy with which we arehere concerned is not constitutionally
This statement, mutatis mutandis, may be said of thelegislative findings articulated in the Anti-Subversion Act. protected speech, and itwas further established that a combination to promote suchadvocacy,
That the Government has a right to protect itself againstsubversion is a proposition too plain to require albeit under the aegis of what purports to be a politicalparty, is not such association as is
elaboration.Self-preservation is the "ultimate value" of society. It surpasses and transcendes every other value, "forif protected by the firstAmendment. We can discern no reason why membership, whenit
a society cannot protect its very structure from armedinternal attack, ...no subordinate value can be protected" 40 As constitutes a purposeful form of complicity in a group engagingin this same forbidden advocacy,
Chief Justice Vinson so aptly said in Dennis vs. United States: 41 should receive anygreater degree of protection from the guarantees of that Amendment.
Whatever theoretical merit there may be to the argumentthat there is a 'right' to rebellion against Moreover, as was held in another case, where the problemsof accommodating the exigencies of self-
dictatorial governmentsis without force where the existing structure of government provides for preservationand the values of liberty are as complex and intricate as inthe situation described in the legislative
peaceful and orderly change. We rejectany principle of governmental helplessness in the face of findings stated inthe U.S. Federal Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950,the legislative judgment as to how that
preparationfor revolution, which principle, carried to its logical conclusion,must lead to anarchy. threat may best bemet consistently with the safeguards of personal freedomsis not to be set aside merely because
No one could conceive that it isnot within the power of Congress to prohibit acts intended the judgment of judgeswould, in the first instance, have chosen other methods. 48 For in truth, legislation, "whether it
tooverthrow the government by force and violence. restrains freedom tohire or freedom to speak, is itself an effort at compromisebetween the claims of the social order
2. By carefully delimiting the reach of the Act to conduct (as explicitly described in sectin 4 thereof), and individual freedom,and when the legislative compromise in either case isbrought to the judicial test the court
Congressreaffirmed its respect for the rule that "even throughthe governmental purpose be legitimate and stands one step removedfrom the conflict and its resolution through law." 49
substantial,that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stiflefundamental personal liberties when the end V. The Act and its Title
can be more narrowly achieved." 42 The requirement of knowing membership,as distinguished The respondent Tayag invokes the constitutional commandthat "no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace
from nominal membership, hasbeen held as a sufficient basis for penalizing membershipin a subversive more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill." 50
organization. 43 For, as has been stated: What is assailed as not germane to or embraced in thetitle of the Act is the last proviso of section 4 which reads:
Membership in an organization renders aid and encouragement to the organization; and when And provided, finally, That one who conspires with anyother person to overthrow the
membership is acceptedor retained with knowledge that the organization is engaged inan Government of the Republic ofthe Philippines, or the government of any of its political
unlawful purpose, the one accepting or retaining membershipwith such knowledge makes subdivisionsby force, violence, deceit, subversion or illegal means,for the purpose of placing
himself a party to the unlawfulenterprise in which it is engaged. 44 such Government or political subdivisionunder the control and domination of any lien power,
3. The argument that the Act is unconstitutionallyoverbroad because section 2 merely speaks of "overthrow"of the shallbe punished by prision correccional to prision mayor with allthe accessory penalties
Government and overthrow may be achieved by peaceful means, misconceives the function of the provided therefor in the same code.
phrase"knowingly, willfully and by overt acts" in section 4. Section 2 is merely a legislative declaration; the It is argued that the said proviso, in reality, punishes notonly membership in the Communist Party of the
definitionsof and the penalties prescribed for the different acts prescribedare stated in section 4 which requires that Philippinesor similar associations, but as well "any conspiracyby two persons to overthrow the national or any local
membershipin the Communist Party of the Philippines, to be unlawful, must be acquired "knowingly, willfully and by governmentby illegal means, even if their intent is not to establisha totalitarian regime, burt a democratic regime,
overt acts." Indeed, the first "whereas" clause makes clear thatthe overthrow contemplated is "overthrow not only by evenif their purpose is not to place the nation under an aliencommunist power, but under an alien democratic power
forceand violence but also be deceit, subversion and other illegalmeans." The absence of this qualificatio in section 2 likethe United States or England or Malaysia or even an anti-communistpower like Spain, Japan, Thailand or
appearsto be due more to an oversight rather than to deliberateomission. Taiwanor Indonesia."
Moreover, the word "overthrow' sufficiently connotesthe use of violent and other illegal means. Only in a The Act, in addition to its main title ("An Act to Outlawthe Communist Party of the Philippines and
metaphoricalsense may one speak of peaceful overthrow ofgovernments, and certainly the law does not speak in SimilarAssociations, Penalizing Membership Therein, and forOther Purposes"), has a short title. Section 1
metaphors.In the case of the Anti-Subversion Act, the use ofthe word "overthrow" in a metaphorical sense is providesthat "This Act shall be known as the 
hardlyconsistent with the clearly delineated objective of the "overthrow,"namely, "establishing in the Philippines a Anti-Subversion Act."Together with the main title, the short title of the statuteunequivocally indicates that the subject
totalitarianregime and place [sic] the Government under thecontrol and domination of an alien power." What matter is subversionin general which has for its fundamental purpose the substitutionof a foreign totalitarian regime
thisCourt once said in a prosecution for sedition is appropos: "The language used by the appellant clearly imported in place of theexisting Government and not merely subversion by Communistconspiracies..
anoverthrow of the Government by violence, and it should beinterpreted in the plain and obvious sense in which it The title of a bill need not be a catalogue or an indexof its contents, and need not recite the details of the Act. 51 It is a
wasevidently intended to be understood. The word 'overthrow'could not have been intended as referring to an valid title if it indicates in broad but clear termsthe nature, scope, and consequences of the proposed lawand its
ordinarychange by the exercise of the elective franchise. The useof the whip [which the accused exhorted his operation. 52 A narrow or technical construction isto be avoided, and the statute will be read fairly and reasonablyin
audience to useagainst the Constabulary], an instrument designed toleave marks on the sides of adversaries, is order not to thwart the legislative intent. We holdthat the Anti-Subversion Act fully satisfies these requirements.
inconsistentwith the mild interpretation which the appellant wouldhave us impute to the language." 45 VI. Conclusion and Guidelines
IV. The Act and the Guaranty of Free Expression In conclusion, even as we uphold the validity of theAnti-Subversion Act, we cannot overemphasize the needfor
As already pointed out, the Act is aimed against conspiracies to overthrow the Government by force, violence orother prudence and circumspection in its enforcement, operatingas it does in the sensitive area of freedom of
illegal means. Whatever interest in freedom of speechand freedom of association is infringed by the expressionand belief. Accordingly, we set the following basic guidelines to be observed in any prosecution under the
prohibitionagainst knowing membership in the Communist Party ofthe Philippines, is so indirect and so insubstantial Act.The Government, in addition to proving such circumstancesas may affect liability, must establish the following
as to beclearly and heavily outweighed by the overriding considerationsof national security and the preservartion of elementsof the crime of joining the Communist Party of the Philippinesor any other subversive association:
democraticinstitutions in his country. (1) In the case of subversive organizations other thanthe Communist Party of the Philippines, (a) that thepurpose of
The membership clause of the U.S. Federal Smith Actis similar in many respects to the membership provision ofthe the organization is to overthrow the presentGovernment of the Philippines and to establish in thiscountry a
Anti-Subversion Act. The former provides: totalitarian regime under the domination of aforeign power; (b) that the accused joined such organization;and (c) that
he did so knowingly, willfully and byovert acts; and
(2) In the case of the Communist Party of the Philippines,(a) that the CPP continues to pursue the objectiveswhich
led Congress in 1957 to declare it to be an organizedconspiracy for the overthrow of the Government by
illegalmeans for the purpose of placing the country under thecontrol of a foreign power; (b) that the accused joined
theCPP; and (c) that he did so willfully, knowingly and byovert acts.
We refrain from making any pronouncement as to thecrime or remaining a member of the Communist Party ofthe
Philippines or of any other subversive association: weleave this matter to future determination.
ACCORDINGLY, the questioned resolution of September15, 1970 is set aside, and these two cases are
herebyremanded to the court a quo for trial on the merits. Costs de oficio.
Makalintal, Zaldivar, Teehankee, Barredo and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J., concurs in the result.
Makasiar and Antonio, JJ., took no part.

 
 Republic of the Philippines The case presents several questions of importance, which will be discussed in what appears to be the sequence of
SUPREME COURT most convenient development. In the first part of this opinion we shall, for the purpose of argument, assume that the
Manila clerk of the Court of First Instance did not obey the order of the court in the matter of mailing the papers which he
EN BANC was directed to send to the defendant in Amoy; and in this connection we shall consider, first, whether the court
G.R. No. L-11390            March 26, 1918 acquired the necessary jurisdiction to enable it to proceed with the foreclosure of the mortgage and, secondly,
EL BANCO ESPAÑOL-FILIPINO, plaintiff-appellant,  whether those proceedings were conducted in such manner as to constitute due process of law.
vs. The word "jurisdiction," as applied to the faculty of exercising judicial power, is used in several different, though
VICENTE PALANCA, administrator of the estate of Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng, defendant-appellant. related, senses since it may have reference (1) to the authority of the court to entertain a particular kind of action or
Aitken and DeSelms for appellant.  to administer a particular kind of relief, or it may refer to the power of the court over the parties, or (2) over the
Hartigan and Welch for appellee. property which is the subject to the litigation.
STREET, J.: The sovereign authority which organizes a court determines the nature and extent of its powers in general and thus
This action was instituted upon March 31, 1908, by "El Banco Espanol-Filipino" to foreclose a mortgage upon various fixes its competency or jurisdiction with reference to the actions which it may entertain and the relief it may grant.
parcels of real property situated in the city of Manila. The mortgage in question is dated June 16, 1906, and was Jurisdiction over the person is acquired by the voluntary appearance of a party in court and his submission to its
executed by the original defendant herein, Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco, as security for a debt owing authority, or it is acquired by the coercive power of legal process exerted over the person.
by him to the bank. Upon March 31, 1906, the debt amounted to P218,294.10 and was drawing interest at the rate of Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation may result either from a seizure of the property
8 per centum per annum, payable at the end of each quarter. It appears that the parties to this mortgage at that time under legal process, whereby it is brought into the actual custody of the law, or it may result from the institution of
estimated the value of the property in question at P292,558, which was about P75,000 in excess of the legal proceedings wherein, under special provisions of law, the power of the court over the property is recognized
indebtedness. After the execution of this instrument by the mortgagor, he returned to China which appears to have and made effective. In the latter case the property, though at all times within the potential power of the court, may
been his native country; and he there died, upon January 29, 1810, without again returning to the Philippine Islands. never be taken into actual custody at all. An illustration of the jurisdiction acquired by actual seizure is found in
As the defendant was a nonresident at the time of the institution of the present action, it was necessary for the attachment proceedings, where the property is seized at the beginning of the action, or some subsequent stage of its
plaintiff in the foreclosure proceeding to give notice to the defendant by publication pursuant to section 399 of the progress, and held to abide the final event of the litigation. An illustration of what we term potential jurisdiction over
Code of Civil Procedure. An order for publication was accordingly obtained from the court, and publication was made the res, is found in the proceeding to register the title of land under our system for the registration of land. Here the
in due form in a newspaper of the city of Manila. At the same time that the order of the court should deposit in the court, without taking actual physical control over the property assumes, at the instance of some person claiming to
post office in a stamped envelope a copy of the summons and complaint directed to the defendant at his last place of be owner, to exercise a jurisdiction in rem over the property and to adjudicate the title in favor of the petitioner
residence, to wit, the city of Amoy, in the Empire of China. This order was made pursuant to the following provision against all the world.
contained in section 399 of the Code of Civil Procedure: In the terminology of American law the action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a proceeding quasi in rem, by
In case of publication, where the residence of a nonresident or absent defendant is known, the judge must which is expressed the idea that while it is not strictly speaking an action in rem yet it partakes of that nature and is
direct a copy of the summons and complaint to be forthwith deposited by the clerk in the post-office, substantially such. The expression "action in rem" is, in its narrow application, used only with reference to certain
postage prepaid, directed to the person to be served, at his place of residence proceedings in courts of admiralty wherein the property alone is treated as responsible for the claim or obligation
Whether the clerk complied with this order does not affirmatively appear. There is, however, among the papers upon which the proceedings are based. The action quasi rem differs from the true action in rem in the circumstance
pertaining to this case, an affidavit, dated April 4, 1908, signed by Bernardo Chan y Garcia, an employee of the that in the former an individual is named as defendant, and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interest
attorneys of the bank, showing that upon that date he had deposited in the Manila post-office a registered letter, therein to the obligation or lien burdening the property. All proceedings having for their sole object the sale or other
addressed to Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng, at Manila, containing copies of the complaint, the plaintiff's affidavit, disposition of the property of the defendant, whether by attachment, foreclosure, or other form of remedy, are in a
the summons, and the order of the court directing publication as aforesaid. It appears from the postmaster's receipt general way thus designated. The judgment entered in these proceedings is conclusive only between the parties.
that Bernardo probably used an envelope obtained from the clerk's office, as the receipt purports to show that the In speaking of the proceeding to foreclose a mortgage the author of a well known treaties, has said:
letter emanated from the office. Though nominally against person, such suits are to vindicate liens; they proceed upon seizure; they treat
The cause proceeded in usual course in the Court of First Instance; and the defendant not having appeared, property as primarily indebted; and, with the qualification above-mentioned, they are substantially property
judgment was, upon July 2, 1908, taken against him by default. Upon July 3, 1908, a decision was rendered in favor actions. In the civil law, they are styled hypothecary actions, and their sole object is the enforcement of the
of the plaintiff. In this decision it was recited that publication had been properly made in a periodical, but nothing was lien against the res; in the common law, they would be different in chancery did not treat the conditional
said about this notice having been given mail. The court, upon this occasion, found that the indebtedness of the conveyance as a mere hypothecation, and the creditor's right ass an equitable lien; so, in both, the suit is
defendant amounted to P249,355. 32, with interest from March 31, 1908. Accordingly it was ordered that the real action so far as it is against property, and seeks the judicial recognition of a property debt, and an
defendant should, on or before July 6, 1908, deliver said amount to the clerk of the court to be applied to the order for the sale of the res. (Waples, Proceedings In Rem. sec. 607.)
satisfaction of the judgment, and it was declared that in case of the failure of the defendant to satisfy the judgment It is true that in proceedings of this character, if the defendant for whom publication is made appears, the action
within such period, the mortgage property located in the city of Manila should be exposed to public sale. The becomes as to him a personal action and is conducted as such. This, however, does not affect the proposition that
payment contemplated in said order was never made; and upon July 8, 1908, the court ordered the sale of the where the defendant fails to appear the action is quasi in rem; and it should therefore be considered with reference
property. The sale took place upon July 30, 1908, and the property was bought in by the bank for the sum of to the principles governing actions in rem.
P110,200. Upon August 7, 1908, this sale was confirmed by the court. There is an instructive analogy between the foreclosure proceeding and an action of attachment, concerning which
About seven years after the confirmation of this sale, or to the precise, upon June 25, 1915, a motion was made in the Supreme Court of the United States has used the following language:
this cause by Vicente Palanca, as administrator of the estate of the original defendant, Engracio Palanca If the defendant appears, the cause becomes mainly a suit in personam, with the added incident, that the
Tanquinyeng y Limquingco, wherein the applicant requested the court to set aside the order of default of July 2, property attached remains liable, under the control of the court, to answer to any demand which may be
1908, and the judgment rendered upon July 3, 1908, and to vacate all the proceedings subsequent thereto. The established against the defendant by the final judgment of the court. But, if there is no appearance of the
basis of this application, as set forth in the motion itself, was that the order of default and the judgment rendered defendant, and no service of process on him, the case becomes, in its essential nature, a proceeding in
thereon were void because the court had never acquired jurisdiction over the defendant or over the subject of the rem, the only effect of which is to subject the property attached to the payment of the defendant which the
action. court may find to be due to the plaintiff. (Cooper vs. Reynolds, 10 Wall., 308.)
At the hearing in the court below the application to vacate the judgment was denied, and from this action of the court In an ordinary attachment proceeding, if the defendant is not personally served, the preliminary seizure is to, be
Vicente Planca, as administrator of the estate of the original defendant, has appealed. No other feature of the case is considered necessary in order to confer jurisdiction upon the court. In this case the lien on the property is acquired
here under consideration than such as related to the action of the court upon said motion. by the seizure; and the purpose of the proceedings is to subject the property to that lien. If a lien already exists,
whether created by mortgage, contract, or statute, the preliminary seizure is not necessary; and the court proceeds requiring the defendant to pay the money into court. This step is a necessary precursor of the order of sale. In the
to enforce such lien in the manner provided by law precisely as though the property had been seized upon present case the judgment which was entered contains the following words:
attachment. (Roller vs. Holly, 176 U. S., 398, 405; 44 L. ed., 520.) It results that the mere circumstance that in an Because it is declared that the said defendant Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco, is indebted in
attachment the property may be seized at the inception of the proceedings, while in the foreclosure suit it is not taken the amount of P249,355.32, plus the interest, to the 'Banco Espanol-Filipino' . . . therefore said appellant is
into legal custody until the time comes for the sale, does not materially affect the fundamental principle involved in ordered to deliver the above amount etc., etc.
both cases, which is that the court is here exercising a jurisdiction over the property in a proceeding directed This is not the language of a personal judgment. Instead it is clearly intended merely as a compliance with the
essentially in rem. requirement that the amount due shall be ascertained and that the evidence of this it may be observed that
Passing now to a consideration of the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance in a mortgage foreclosure, it is evident according to the Code of Civil Procedure a personal judgment against the debtor for the deficiency is not to be
that the court derives its authority to entertain the action primarily from the statutes organizing the court. The rendered until after the property has been sold and the proceeds applied to the mortgage debt. (sec. 260).
jurisdiction of the court, in this most general sense, over the cause of action is obvious and requires no comment. The conclusion upon this phase of the case is that whatever may be the effect in other respects of the failure of the
Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, if acquired at all in such an action, is obtained by the voluntary clerk of the Court of First Instance to mail the proper papers to the defendant in Amoy, China, such irregularity could
submission of the defendant or by the personal service of process upon him within the territory where the process is in no wise impair or defeat the jurisdiction of the court, for in our opinion that jurisdiction rest upon a basis much
valid. If, however, the defendant is a nonresident and, remaining beyond the range of the personal process of the more secure than would be supplied by any form of notice that could be given to a resident of a foreign country.
court, refuses to come in voluntarily, the court never acquires jurisdiction over the person at all. Here the property Before leaving this branch of the case, we wish to observe that we are fully aware that many reported cases can be
itself is in fact the sole thing which is impleaded and is the responsible object which is the subject of the exercise of cited in which it is assumed that the question of the sufficiency of publication or notice in a case of this kind is a
judicial power. It follows that the jurisdiction of the court in such case is based exclusively on the power which, under question affecting the jurisdiction of the court, and the court is sometimes said to acquire jurisdiction by virtue of the
the law, it possesses over the property; and any discussion relative to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of publication. This phraseology was undoubtedly originally adopted by the court because of the analogy between
the defendant is entirely apart from the case. The jurisdiction of the court over the property, considered as the service by the publication and personal service of process upon the defendant; and, as has already been suggested,
exclusive object of such action, is evidently based upon the following conditions and considerations, namely: (1) that prior to the decision of Pennoyer vs. Neff (supra) the difference between the legal effects of the two forms of service
the property is located within the district; (2) that the purpose of the litigation is to subject the property by sale to an was obscure. It is accordingly not surprising that the modes of expression which had already been molded into legal
obligation fixed upon it by the mortgage; and (3) that the court at a proper stage of the proceedings takes the tradition before that case was decided have been brought down to the present day. But it is clear that the legal
property into custody, if necessary, and expose it to sale for the purpose of satisfying the mortgage debt. An obvious principle here involved is not effected by the peculiar language in which the courts have expounded their ideas.
corollary is that no other relief can be granted in this proceeding than such as can be enforced against the property. We now proceed to a discussion of the question whether the supposed irregularity in the proceedings was of such
We may then, from what has been stated, formulated the following proposition relative to the foreclosure proceeding gravity as to amount to a denial of that "due process of law" which was secured by the Act of Congress in force in
against the property of a nonresident mortgagor who fails to come in and submit himself personally to the jurisdiction these Islands at the time this mortgage was foreclosed. (Act of July 1, 1902, sec. 5.) In dealing with questions
of the court: (I) That the jurisdiction of the court is derived from the power which it possesses over the property; (II) involving the application of the constitutional provisions relating to due process of law the Supreme Court of the
that jurisdiction over the person is not acquired and is nonessential; (III) that the relief granted by the court must be United States has refrained from attempting to define with precision the meaning of that expression, the reason
limited to such as can be enforced against the property itself. being that the idea expressed therein is applicable under so many diverse conditions as to make any attempt ay
It is important that the bearing of these propositions be clearly apprehended, for there are many expressions in the precise definition hazardous and unprofitable. As applied to a judicial proceeding, however, it may be laid down with
American reports from which it might be inferred that the court acquires personal jurisdiction over the person of the certainty that the requirement of due process is satisfied if the following conditions are present, namely; (1) There
defendant by publication and notice; but such is not the case. In truth the proposition that jurisdiction over the person must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; (2) jurisdiction must
of a nonresident cannot be acquired by publication and notice was never clearly understood even in the American be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property which is the subject of the proceeding; (3)
courts until after the decision had been rendered by the Supreme Court of the United States in the leading case of the defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard; and (4) judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.
Pennoyer vs. Neff (95 U. S. 714; 24 L. ed., 565). In the light of that decision, and of other decisions which have Passing at once to the requisite that the defendant shall have an opportunity to be heard, we observe that in a
subsequently been rendered in that and other courts, the proposition that jurisdiction over the person cannot be thus foreclosure case some notification of the proceedings to the nonresident owner, prescribing the time within which
acquired by publication and notice is no longer open to question; and it is now fully established that a personal appearance must be made, is everywhere recognized as essential. To answer this necessity the statutes generally
judgment upon constructive or substituted service against a nonresident who does not appear is wholly invalid. This provide for publication, and usually in addition thereto, for the mailing of notice to the defendant, if his residence is
doctrine applies to all kinds of constructive or substituted process, including service by publication and personal known. Though commonly called constructive, or substituted service of process in any true sense. It is merely a
service outside of the jurisdiction in which the judgment is rendered; and the only exception seems to be found in the means provided by law whereby the owner may be admonished that his property is the subject of judicial
case where the nonresident defendant has expressly or impliedly consented to the mode of service. (Note to Raher proceedings and that it is incumbent upon him to take such steps as he sees fit to protect it. In speaking of notice of
vs. Raher, 35 L. R. A. [N. S. ], 292; see also 50 L .R. A., 585; 35 L. R. A. [N. S.], 312 this character a distinguish master of constitutional law has used the following language:
The idea upon which the decision in Pennoyer vs. Neff (supra) proceeds is that the process from the tribunals of one . . . if the owners are named in the proceedings, and personal notice is provided for, it is rather from
State cannot run into other States or countries and that due process of law requires that the defendant shall be tenderness to their interests, and in order to make sure that the opportunity for a hearing shall not be lost
brought under the power of the court by service of process within the State, or by his voluntary appearance, in order to them, than from any necessity that the case shall assume that form. (Cooley on Taxation [2d. ed.], 527,
to authorize the court to pass upon the question of his personal liability. The doctrine established by the Supreme quoted in Leigh vs. Green, 193 U. S., 79, 80.)
Court of the United States on this point, being based upon the constitutional conception of due process of law, is It will be observed that this mode of notification does not involve any absolute assurance that the absent owner shall
binding upon the courts of the Philippine Islands. Involved in this decision is the principle that in proceedings in rem thereby receive actual notice. The periodical containing the publication may never in fact come to his hands, and the
or quasi in rem against a nonresident who is not served personally within the state, and who does not appear, the chances that he should discover the notice may often be very slight. Even where notice is sent by mail the probability
relief must be confined to the res, and the court cannot lawfully render a personal judgment against him. (Dewey vs. of his receiving it, though much increased, is dependent upon the correctness of the address to which it is forwarded
Des Moines, 173 U. S., 193; 43 L. ed., 665; Heidritter vs. Elizabeth Oil Cloth Co., 112 U. S., 294; 28 L. ed., 729.) as well as upon the regularity and security of the mail service. It will be noted, furthermore, that the provision of our
Therefore in an action to foreclose a mortgage against a nonresident, upon whom service has been effected law relative to the mailing of notice does not absolutely require the mailing of notice unconditionally and in every
exclusively by publication, no personal judgment for the deficiency can be entered. (Latta vs. Tutton, 122 Cal., 279; event, but only in the case where the defendant's residence is known. In the light of all these facts, it is evident that
Blumberg vs. Birch, 99 Cal., 416.) actual notice to the defendant in cases of this kind is not, under the law, to be considered absolutely necessary.
It is suggested in the brief of the appellant that the judgment entered in the court below offends against the principle The idea upon which the law proceeds in recognizing the efficacy of a means of notification which may fall short of
just stated and that this judgment is void because the court in fact entered a personal judgment against the absent actual notice is apparently this: Property is always assumed to be in the possession of its owner, in person or by
debtor for the full amount of the indebtedness secured by the mortgage. We do not so interpret the judgment. agent; and he may be safely held, under certain conditions, to be affected with knowledge that proceedings have
In a foreclosure proceeding against a nonresident owner it is necessary for the court, as in all cases of foreclosure, been instituted for its condemnation and sale.
to ascertain the amount due, as prescribed in section 256 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and to make an order
 It is the duty of the owner of real estate, who is a nonresident, to take measures that in some way he shall showing also a meritorious defense to the action. It is held that a general statement that a party has a good defense
be represented when his property is called into requisition, and if he fails to do this, and fails to get notice to the action is insufficient. The necessary facts must be averred. Of course if a judgment is void upon its face a
by the ordinary publications which have usually been required in such cases, it is his misfortune, and he showing of the existence of a meritorious defense is not necessary. (10 R. C. L., 718.)
must abide the consequences. (6 R. C. L., sec. 445 [p. 450]). The lapse of time is also a circumstance deeply affecting this aspect of the case. In this connection we quote the
It has been well said by an American court: following passage from the encyclopedic treatise now in course of publication:
If property of a nonresident cannot be reached by legal process upon the constructive notice, then our Where, however, the judgment is not void on its face, and may therefore be enforced if permitted to stand
statutes were passed in vain, and are mere empty legislative declarations, without either force, or on the record, courts in many instances refuse to exercise their quasi equitable powers to vacate a
meaning; for if the person is not within the jurisdiction of the court, no personal judgment can be rendered, judgement after the lapse of the term ay which it was entered, except in clear cases, to promote the ends
and if the judgment cannot operate upon the property, then no effective judgment at all can be rendered, of justice, and where it appears that the party making the application is himself without fault and has acted
so that the result would be that the courts would be powerless to assist a citizen against a nonresident. in good faith and with ordinary diligence. Laches on the part of the applicant, if unexplained, is deemed
Such a result would be a deplorable one. (Quarl vs. Abbett, 102 Ind., 233; 52 Am. Rep., 662, 667.) sufficient ground for refusing the relief to which he might otherwise be entitled. Something is due to the
It is, of course universally recognized that the statutory provisions relative to publication or other form of notice finality of judgments, and acquiescence or unnecessary delay is fatal to motions of this character, since
against a nonresident owner should be complied with; and in respect to the publication of notice in the newspaper it courts are always reluctant to interfere with judgments, and especially where they have been executed or
may be stated that strict compliance with the requirements of the law has been held to be essential. In Guaranty satisfied. The moving party has the burden of showing diligence, and unless it is shown affirmatively the
Trust etc. Co. vs. Green Cove etc., Railroad Co. (139 U. S., 137, 138), it was held that where newspaper publication court will not ordinarily exercise its discretion in his favor. (15 R. C. L., 694, 695.)
was made for 19 weeks, when the statute required 20, the publication was insufficient. It is stated in the affidavit that the defendant, Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco, died January 29, 1910.
With respect to the provisions of our own statute, relative to the sending of notice by mail, the requirement is that the The mortgage under which the property was sold was executed far back in 1906; and the proceedings in the
judge shall direct that the notice be deposited in the mail by the clerk of the court, and it is not in terms declared that foreclosure were closed by the order of court confirming the sale dated August 7, 1908. It passes the rational bounds
the notice must be deposited in the mail. We consider this to be of some significance; and it seems to us that, having of human credulity to suppose that a man who had placed a mortgage upon property worth nearly P300,000 and had
due regard to the principles upon which the giving of such notice is required, the absent owner of the mortgaged then gone away from the scene of his life activities to end his days in the city of Amoy, China, should have long
property must, so far as the due process of law is concerned, take the risk incident to the possible failure of the clerk remained in ignorance of the fact that the mortgage had been foreclosed and the property sold, even supposing that
to perform his duty, somewhat as he takes the risk that the mail clerk or the mail carrier might possibly lose or he had no knowledge of those proceedings while they were being conducted. It is more in keeping with the ordinary
destroy the parcel or envelope containing the notice before it should reach its destination and be delivered to him. course of things that he should have acquired information as to what was transpiring in his affairs at Manila; and
This idea seems to be strengthened by the consideration that placing upon the clerk the duty of sending notice by upon the basis of this rational assumption we are authorized, in the absence of proof to the contrary, to presume that
mail, the performance of that act is put effectually beyond the control of the plaintiff in the litigation. At any rate it is he did have, or soon acquired, information as to the sale of his property.
obvious that so much of section 399 of the Code of Civil Procedure as relates to the sending of notice by mail was The Code of Civil Procedure, indeed, expressly declares that there is a presumption that things have happened
complied with when the court made the order. The question as to what may be the consequences of the failure of the according to the ordinary habits of life (sec. 334 [26]); and we cannot conceive of a situation more appropriate than
record to show the proof of compliance with that requirement will be discussed by us further on. this for applying the presumption thus defined by the lawgiver. In support of this presumption, as applied to the
The observations which have just been made lead to the conclusion that the failure of the clerk to mail the notice, if present case, it is permissible to consider the probability that the defendant may have received actual notice of these
in fact he did so fail in his duty, is not such an irregularity, as amounts to a denial of due process of law; and hence in proceedings from the unofficial notice addressed to him in Manila which was mailed by an employee of the bank's
our opinion that irregularity, if proved, would not avoid the judgment in this case. Notice was given by publication in a attorneys. Adopting almost the exact words used by the Supreme Court of the United States in Grannis vs. Ordeans
newspaper and this is the only form of notice which the law unconditionally requires. This in our opinion is all that (234 U. S., 385; 58 L. ed., 1363), we may say that in view of the well-known skill of postal officials and employees in
was absolutely necessary to sustain the proceedings. making proper delivery of letters defectively addressed, we think the presumption is clear and strong that this notice
It will be observed that in considering the effect of this irregularity, it makes a difference whether it be viewed as a reached the defendant, there being no proof that it was ever returned by the postal officials as undelivered. And if it
question involving jurisdiction or as a question involving due process of law. In the matter of jurisdiction there can be was delivered in Manila, instead of being forwarded to Amoy, China, there is a probability that the recipient was a
no distinction between the much and the little. The court either has jurisdiction or it has not; and if the requirement as person sufficiently interested in his affairs to send it or communicate its contents to him.
to the mailing of notice should be considered as a step antecedent to the acquiring of jurisdiction, there could be no Of course if the jurisdiction of the court or the sufficiency of the process of law depended upon the mailing of the
escape from the conclusion that the failure to take that step was fatal to the validity of the judgment. In the notice by the clerk, the reflections in which we are now indulging would be idle and frivolous; but the considerations
application of the idea of due process of law, on the other hand, it is clearly unnecessary to be so rigorous. The mentioned are introduced in order to show the propriety of applying to this situation the legal presumption to which
jurisdiction being once established, all that due process of law thereafter requires is an opportunity for the defendant allusion has been made. Upon that presumption, supported by the circumstances of this case, ,we do not hesitate to
to be heard; and as publication was duly made in the newspaper, it would seem highly unreasonable to hold that found the conclusion that the defendant voluntarily abandoned all thought of saving his property from the obligation
failure to mail the notice was fatal. We think that in applying the requirement of due process of law, it is permissible which he had placed upon it; that knowledge of the proceedings should be imputed to him; and that he acquiesced in
to reflect upon the purposes of the provision which is supposed to have been violated and the principle underlying the consequences of those proceedings after they had been accomplished. Under these circumstances it is clear
the exercise of judicial power in these proceedings. Judge in the light of these conceptions, we think that the that the merit of this motion is, as we have already stated, adversely affected in a high degree by the delay in asking
provision of Act of Congress declaring that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law for relief. Nor is it an adequate reply to say that the proponent of this motion is an administrator who only qualified a
has not been infringed. few months before this motion was made. No disability on the part of the defendant himself existed from the time
In the progress of this discussion we have stated the two conclusions; (1) that the failure of the clerk to send the when the foreclosure was effected until his death; and we believe that the delay in the appointment of the
notice to the defendant by mail did not destroy the jurisdiction of the court and (2) that such irregularity did not administrator and institution of this action is a circumstance which is imputable to the parties in interest whoever they
infringe the requirement of due process of law. As a consequence of these conclusions the irregularity in question is may have been. Of course if the minor heirs had instituted an action in their own right to recover the property, it
in some measure shorn of its potency. It is still necessary, however, to consider its effect considered as a simple would have been different.
irregularity of procedure; and it would be idle to pretend that even in this aspect the irregularity is not grave enough. It is, however, argued that the defendant has suffered prejudice by reason of the fact that the bank became the
From this point of view, however, it is obvious that any motion to vacate the judgment on the ground of the purchaser of the property at the foreclosure sale for a price greatly below that which had been agreed upon in the
irregularity in question must fail unless it shows that the defendant was prejudiced by that irregularity. The least, mortgage as the upset price of the property. In this connection, it appears that in article nine of the mortgage which
therefore, that can be required of the proponent of such a motion is to show that he had a good defense against the was the subject of this foreclosure, as amended by the notarial document of July 19, 1906, the parties to this
action to foreclose the mortgage. Nothing of the kind is, however, shown either in the motion or in the affidavit which mortgage made a stipulation to the effect that the value therein placed upon the mortgaged properties should serve
accompanies the motion. as a basis of sale in case the debt should remain unpaid and the bank should proceed to a foreclosure. The upset
An application to open or vacate a judgment because of an irregularity or defect in the proceedings is usually price stated in that stipulation for all the parcels involved in this foreclosure was P286,000. It is said in behalf of the
required to be supported by an affidavit showing the grounds on which the relief is sought, and in addition to this appellant that when the bank bought in the property for the sum of P110,200 it violated that stipulation.
It has been held by this court that a clause in a mortgage providing for a tipo, or upset price, does not prevent a Kentucky against a nonresident debtor it was necessary that publication should be made in a newspaper for a
foreclosure, nor affect the validity of a sale made in the foreclosure proceedings. (Yangco vs. Cruz Herrera and Wy specified period of time, also be posted at the front door of the court house and be published on some Sunday,
Piaco, 11 Phil. Rep., 402; Banco-Español Filipino vs. Donaldson, Sim and Co., 5 Phil. Rep., 418.) In both the cases immediately after divine service, in such church as the court should direct. In a certain action judgment had been
here cited the property was purchased at the foreclosure sale, not by the creditor or mortgagee, but by a third party. entered against a nonresident, after publication in pursuance of these provisions. Many years later the validity of the
Whether the same rule should be applied in a case where the mortgagee himself becomes the purchaser has proceedings was called in question in another action. It was proved from the files of an ancient periodical that
apparently not been decided by this court in any reported decision, and this question need not here be considered, publication had been made in its columns as required by law; but no proof was offered to show the publication of the
since it is evident that if any liability was incurred by the bank by purchasing for a price below that fixed in the order at the church, or the posting of it at the front door of the court-house. It was insisted by one of the parties that
stipulation, its liability was a personal liability derived from the contract of mortgage; and as we have already the judgment of the court was void for lack of jurisdiction. But the Supreme Court of the United States said:
demonstrated such a liability could not be the subject of adjudication in an action where the court had no jurisdiction The court which made the decree . . . was a court of general jurisdiction. Therefore every presumption not
over the person of the defendant. If the plaintiff bank became liable to account for the difference between the upset inconsistent with the record is to be indulged in favor of its jurisdiction. . . . It is to be presumed that the
price and the price at which in bought in the property, that liability remains unaffected by the disposition which the court before making its decree took care of to see that its order for constructive service, on which its right
court made of this case; and the fact that the bank may have violated such an obligation can in no wise affect the to make the decree depended, had been obeyed.
validity of the judgment entered in the Court of First Instance. It is true that in this case the former judgment was the subject of collateral , or indirect attack, while in the case at bar
In connection with the entire failure of the motion to show either a meritorious defense to the action or that the the motion to vacate the judgment is direct proceeding for relief against it. The same general presumption, however,
defendant had suffered any prejudice of which the law can take notice, we may be permitted to add that in our is indulged in favor of the judgment of a court of general jurisdiction, whether it is the subject of direct or indirect
opinion a motion of this kind, which proposes to unsettle judicial proceedings long ago closed, can not be considered attack the only difference being that in case of indirect attack the judgment is conclusively presumed to be valid
with favor, unless based upon grounds which appeal to the conscience of the court. Public policy requires that unless the record affirmatively shows it to be void, while in case of direct attack the presumption in favor of its validity
judicial proceedings be upheld. The maximum here applicable is non quieta movere. As was once said by Judge may in certain cases be overcome by proof extrinsic to the record.
Brewer, afterwards a member of the Supreme Court of the United States: The presumption that the clerk performed his duty and that the court made its decree with the knowledge that the
Public policy requires that judicial proceedings be upheld, and that titles obtained in those proceedings be requirements of law had been complied with appear to be amply sufficient to support the conclusion that the notice
safe from the ruthless hand of collateral attack. If technical defects are adjudged potent to destroy such was sent by the clerk as required by the order. It is true that there ought to be found among the papers on file in this
titles, a judicial sale will never realize that value of the property, for no prudent man will risk his money in cause an affidavit, as required by section 400 of the Code of Civil Procedure, showing that the order was in fact so
bidding for and buying that title which he has reason to fear may years thereafter be swept away through sent by the clerk; and no such affidavit appears. The record is therefore silent where it ought to speak. But the very
some occult and not readily discoverable defect. (Martin vs. Pond, 30 Fed., 15.) purpose of the law in recognizing these presumptions is to enable the court to sustain a prior judgment in the face of
In the case where that language was used an attempt was made to annul certain foreclosure proceedings on the such an omission. If we were to hold that the judgment in this case is void because the proper affidavit is not present
ground that the affidavit upon which the order of publication was based erroneously stated that the State of Kansas, in the file of papers which we call the record, the result would be that in the future every title in the Islands resting
when he was in fact residing in another State. It was held that this mistake did not affect the validity of the upon a judgment like that now before us would depend, for its continued security, upon the presence of such affidavit
proceedings. among the papers and would be liable at any moment to be destroyed by the disappearance of that piece of paper.
In the preceding discussion we have assumed that the clerk failed to send the notice by post as required by the order We think that no court, with a proper regard for the security of judicial proceedings and for the interests which have
of the court. We now proceed to consider whether this is a proper assumption; and the proposition which we propose by law been confided to the courts, would incline to favor such a conclusion. In our opinion the proper course in a
to establish is that there is a legal presumption that the clerk performed his duty as the ministerial officer of the court, case of this kind is to hold that the legal presumption that the clerk performed his duty still maintains notwithstanding
which presumption is not overcome by any other facts appearing in the cause. the absence from the record of the proper proof of that fact.
In subsection 14 of section 334 of the Code of Civil Procedure it is declared that there is a presumption "that official In this connection it is important to bear in mind that under the practice prevailing in the Philippine Islands the word
duty has been regularly performed;" and in subsection 18 it is declared that there is a presumption "that the ordinary "record" is used in a loose and broad sense, as indicating the collective mass of papers which contain the history of
course of business has been followed." These presumptions are of course in no sense novelties, as they express all the successive steps taken in a case and which are finally deposited in the archives of the clerk's office as a
ideas which have always been recognized. Omnia presumuntur rite et solemniter esse acta donec probetur in memorial of the litigation. It is a matter of general information that no judgment roll, or book of final record, is
contrarium. There is therefore clearly a legal presumption that the clerk performed his duty about mailing this notice; commonly kept in our courts for the purpose of recording the pleadings and principal proceedings in actions which
and we think that strong considerations of policy require that this presumption should be allowed to operate with full have been terminated; and in particular, no such record is kept in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila.
force under the circumstances of this case. A party to an action has no control over the clerk of the court; and has no There is, indeed, a section of the Code of Civil Procedure which directs that such a book of final record shall be kept;
right to meddle unduly with the business of the clerk in the performance of his duties. Having no control over this but this provision has, as a matter of common knowledge, been generally ignored. The result is that in the present
officer, the litigant must depend upon the court to see that the duties imposed on the clerk are performed. case we do not have the assistance of the recitals of such a record to enable us to pass upon the validity of this
Other considerations no less potent contribute to strengthen the conclusion just stated. There is no principle of law judgment and as already stated the question must be determined by examining the papers contained in the entire
better settled than that after jurisdiction has once been required, every act of a court of general jurisdiction shall be file.
presumed to have been rightly done. This rule is applied to every judgment or decree rendered in the various stages But it is insisted by counsel for this motion that the affidavit of Bernardo Chan y Garcia showing that upon April 4,
of the proceedings from their initiation to their completion (Voorhees vs. United States Bank, 10 Pet., 314; 35 U. S., 1908, he sent a notification through the mail addressed to the defendant at Manila, Philippine Islands, should be
449); and if the record is silent with respect to any fact which must have been established before the court could accepted as affirmative proof that the clerk of the court failed in his duty and that, instead of himself sending the
have rightly acted, it will be presumed that such fact was properly brought to its knowledge. (The Lessee of Grignon requisite notice through the mail, he relied upon Bernardo to send it for him. We do not think that this is by any
vs. Astor, 2 How., 319; 11 L. ed., 283.) means a necessary inference. Of course if it had affirmatively appeared that the clerk himself had attempted to
In making the order of sale [of the real state of a decedent] the court are presumed to have adjudged every comply with this order and had directed the notification to Manila when he should have directed it to Amoy, this
question necessary to justify such order or decree, viz: The death of the owners; that the petitioners were would be conclusive that he had failed to comply with the exact terms of the order; but such is not this case. That the
his administrators; that the personal estate was insufficient to pay the debts of the deceased; that the clerk of the attorneys for the plaintiff erroneously sent a notification to the defendant at a mistaken address affords in
private acts of Assembly, as to the manner of sale, were within the constitutional power of the Legislature, our opinion very slight basis for supposing that the clerk may not have sent notice to the right address.
and that all the provisions of the law as to notices which are directory to the administrators have been There is undoubtedly good authority to support the position that when the record states the evidence or makes an
complied with. . . . The court is not bound to enter upon the record the evidence on which any fact was averment with reference to a jurisdictional fact, it will not be presumed that there was other or different evidence
decided. (Florentine vs. Barton, 2 Wall., 210; 17 L. ed., 785.) Especially does all this apply after long lapse respecting the fact, or that the fact was otherwise than stated. If, to give an illustration, it appears from the return of
of time. the officer that the summons was served at a particular place or in a particular manner, it will not be presumed that
Applegate vs. Lexington and Carter County Mining Co. (117 U. S., 255) contains an instructive discussion in a case service was also made at another place or in a different manner; or if it appears that service was made upon a
analogous to that which is now before us. It there appeared that in order to foreclose a mortgage in the State of person other than the defendant, it will not be presumed, in the silence of the record, that it was made upon the
defendant also (Galpin vs. Page, 18 Wall., 350, 366; Settlemier vs. Sullivan, 97 U. S., 444, 449). While we believe vacate a judgment after the lapse of the time limited by statute if the judgment is not void on its face; and in all cases,
that these propositions are entirely correct as applied to the case where the person making the return is the officer after the lapse of the time limited by statute if the judgment is not void on its face; and all cases, after the lapse of
who is by law required to make the return, we do not think that it is properly applicable where, as in the present case, such time, when an attempt is made to vacate the judgment by a proceeding in court for that purpose an action
the affidavit was made by a person who, so far as the provisions of law are concerned, was a mere intermeddler. regularly brought is preferable, and should be required. It will be noted taken verbatim from the California Code (sec.
The last question of importance which we propose to consider is whether a motion in the cause is admissible as a 473).
proceeding to obtain relief in such a case as this. If the motion prevails the judgment of July 2, 1908, and all The conclusions stated in this opinion indicate that the judgment appealed from is without error, and the same is
subsequent proceedings will be set aside, and the litigation will be renewed, proceeding again from the date accordingly affirmed, with costs. So ordered.
mentioned as if the progress of the action had not been interrupted. The proponent of the motion does not ask the Arellano, C.J., Torres, Carson, and Avanceña, JJ., concur.
favor of being permitted to interpose a defense. His purpose is merely to annul the effective judgment of the court, to
the end that the litigation may again resume its regular course.
There is only one section of the Code of Civil Procedure which expressly recognizes the authority of a Court of First
Instance to set aside a final judgment and permit a renewal of the litigation in the same cause. This is as follows:
SEC. 113. Upon such terms as may be just the court may relieve a party or legal representative from the
judgment, order, or other proceeding taken against him through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect; Provided, That application thereof be made within a reasonable time, but in no case
exceeding six months after such judgment, order, or proceeding was taken.
An additional remedy by petition to the Supreme Court is supplied by section 513 of the same Code. The first
paragraph of this section, in so far as pertinent to this discussion, provides as follows:
When a judgment is rendered by a Court of First Instance upon default, and a party thereto is unjustly
deprived of a hearing by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, and the Court of First Instance
which rendered the judgment has finally adjourned so that no adequate remedy exists in that court, the
party so deprived of a hearing may present his petition to the Supreme Court within sixty days after he first
learns of the rendition of such judgment, and not thereafter, setting forth the facts and praying to have
judgment set aside. . . .
It is evident that the proceeding contemplated in this section is intended to supplement the remedy provided by
section 113; and we believe the conclusion irresistible that there is no other means recognized by law whereby a
defeated party can, by a proceeding in the same cause, procure a judgment to be set aside, with a view to the
renewal of the litigation.
The Code of Civil Procedure purports to be a complete system of practice in civil causes, and it contains provisions
describing with much fullness the various steps to be taken in the conduct of such proceedings. To this end it defines
with precision the method of beginning, conducting, and concluding the civil action of whatever species; and by
section 795 of the same Code it is declared that the procedure in all civil action shall be in accordance with the
provisions of this Code. We are therefore of the opinion that the remedies prescribed in sections 113 and 513 are
exclusive of all others, so far as relates to the opening and continuation of a litigation which has been once
concluded.
The motion in the present case does not conform to the requirements of either of these provisions; and the
consequence is that in our opinion the action of the Court of First Instance in dismissing the motion was proper.
If the question were admittedly one relating merely to an irregularity of procedure, we cannot suppose that this
proceeding would have taken the form of a motion in the cause, since it is clear that, if based on such an error, the
came to late for relief in the Court of First Instance. But as we have already seen, the motion attacks the judgment of
the court as void for want of jurisdiction over the defendant. The idea underlying the motion therefore is that
inasmuch as the judgment is a nullity it can be attacked in any way and at any time. If the judgment were in fact void
upon its face, that is, if it were shown to be a nullity by virtue of its own recitals, there might possibly be something in
this. Where a judgment or judicial order is void in this sense it may be said to be a lawless thing, which can be
treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head.
But the judgment in question is not void in any such sense. It is entirely regular in form, and the alleged defect is one
which is not apparent upon its face. It follows that even if the judgment could be shown to be void for want of
jurisdiction, or for lack of due process of law, the party aggrieved thereby is bound to resort to some appropriate
proceeding to obtain relief. Under accepted principles of law and practice, long recognized in American courts, a
proper remedy in such case, after the time for appeal or review has passed, is for the aggrieved party to bring an
action to enjoin the judgment, if not already carried into effect; or if the property has already been disposed of he
may institute suit to recover it. In every situation of this character an appropriate remedy is at hand; and if property
has been taken without due process, the law concedes due process to recover it. We accordingly old that, assuming
the judgment to have been void as alleged by the proponent of this motion, the proper remedy was by an original
proceeding and not by motion in the cause. As we have already seen our Code of Civil Procedure defines the
conditions under which relief against a judgment may be productive of conclusion for this court to recognize such a
proceeding as proper under conditions different from those defined by law. Upon the point of procedure here
involved, we refer to the case of People vs. Harrison (84 Cal., 607) wherein it was held that a motion will not lie to
 FIRST DIVISION After learning of the adverse decision against him, petitioners counsel filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Cavite City, Branch 16, a motion to set aside judgment. The motion was treated as an appeal and docketed as Civil
Case No. N-6281. On July 18, 1996, the RTC affirmed the decision of the MTC.[5]
The aforesaid decision became final. Accordingly, the court of origin issued on September 17, 1996 a writ of
execution.[6] Petitioner was given a grace period of one month within which to vacate the premises. His real property
[G.R. No. 131482. July 3, 2002] situated in Noveleta, Cavite, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-283572, was levied and sold at public
auction to respondents in full satisfaction of the monetary award.[7]
On November 25, 1996, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cavite City, a petition for relief from
judgment, docketed as Civil Case No. N-6393. [8] In support thereof, petitioner submitted an affidavit of merit,
[9]
 alleging in fine that the parcel of land from which he was being evicted had been sold to him by Filomena
REGALADO P. SAMARTINO, petitioner, vs. LEONOR B. RAON, AGUSTIN G. CRISOSTOMO, THE MUNICIPAL Bernardo-Crisostomo, as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 13, 1988. [10]
TRIAL COURT OF NOVELETA, CAVITE, HON. MANUEL A. MAYO, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, The following day, November 26, 1996, the RTC issued an Order dismissing the petition for relief from
BRANCH 16, CAVITE CITY, HON. ROLANDO D. DIAZ, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 17, judgment.[11] Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied on December 12, 1996. A second Motion for
CAVITE CITY, SHERIFF DANILO G. LAPUZ, CAVITE CITY and THE HON. COURT OF Reconsideration was likewise denied on January 14, 1997. [12] On the same day, a writ of demolition was issued
APPEALS, respondents. commanding the sheriff to remove the building and improvements made by petitioner on the subject premises and to
deliver the possession thereof to respondents.[13]
DECISION Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 432O2.
[14]
 On August 29, 1997, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. [15] Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: denied on November 14, 1997.[16] Hence this petition for review.
The petition is impressed with merit.
In actions in personam, summons on the defendant must be served by handing a copy thereof to the
Respondents Leonor Bernardo-Raon and Agustin G. Crisostomo are the surviving sister and spouse, defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him. If efforts to serve the summons personally
respectively, of the late Filomena Bernardo-Crisostomo, who passed away on May 17, 1994. Among the properties to defendant is impossible, service may be effected by leaving copies of the summons at the defendants dwelling
left by the deceased was her one-half share in a parcel of land in Noveleta, Cavite, registered under Transfer house or residence with some person of suitable age and discretion residing therein, or by leaving the copies at the
Certificate of Title No. T- 131898 in the name of co-owners Lido Beach Corporation and Filomena Bernardo. defendants office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof. Otherwise stated,
On January 25, 1996, respondents instituted against petitioner Regalado P. Samartino a complaint for service of summons upon the defendant shall be by personal service first and only when the defendant cannot be
ejectment, docketed as Civil Case No. 744 of the Municipal Trial Court of Noveleta, Cavite. [1]They alleged that during promptly served in person will substituted service be availed of.[17]
the lifetime of Filomena Bernardo, she leased her share in the property to petitioner for a period of five years counted Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure clearly provides:
from 1986; that the said lease expired and was not extended thereafter; and that petitioner refused to vacate the
property despite demands therefor.
Summons was served on Roberto Samartino, brother of petitioner. [2] At the time of service of summons at Sec. 6. Service in person on defendant. - Whenever practicable, the summons shall be served by handing a copy
petitioners house, he was not at home as he was then confined at the National Bureau of Investigation Treatment thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him.
and Rehabilitation Center (NBI-TRC), Tagaytay City since January 19, 1996, where he was undergoing treatment Sec. 7. Substituted service. - If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as
and rehabilitation for drug dependency. Thus, on February 2, 1996, a liaison officer of the NBI-TRC appeared before provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendants
the trial court with a certification that petitioner will be unable to comply with the directive to answer the complaint residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at
within the reglementary period, inasmuch as it will take six months for him to complete the rehabilitation program and defendants office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.
before he can be recommended for discharge by the Rehabilitation Committee. [3]
The trial court, despite the written certification from NBI-TRC, granted respondents motion to declare petitioner We have long held that the impossibility of personal service justifying availment of substituted service should
in default and ordered them to present evidence ex-parte. On March 21, 1996, the trial court rendered judgment in be explained in the proof of service; why efforts exerted towards personal service failed. The pertinent facts and
favor of respondents as follows: circumstances attendant to the service of summons must be stated in the proof of service or Officers Return;
otherwise, the substituted service cannot be upheld. It is only under exceptional terms that the circumstances
FROM THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the warranting substituted service of summons may be proved by evidence aliunde. It bears stressing that since service
defendant ordering the latter and other person/s claiming rights under him: of summons, especially for actions in personam, is essential for the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant, the resort to a substituted service must be duly justified. Failure to do so would invalidate all subsequent
proceedings on jurisdictional grounds. [18]
1. To vacate immediately the land in question after the finality of the decision. In this connection, Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 59 was issued on November 19, 1989 to stress
2. For the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P5,000.00 monthly from January, 1992 up to the importance of strict compliance with the requisites for a valid substituted service, to wit:
the time he surrenders the premises considered as damages for the use of the subject
land.
3. For the defendant to pay the plaintiffs P 10,000.00 as and for attorneys fees with an additional Delays in court proceedings have been caused by faulty and erroneous implementation of Section 8, Rule 14, Rules
P800.00 as appearance fees. of Court on Substituted Service of Summons.
4. To pay the plaintiffs P 100.00 as filing fee. The Trial Judges of all lower courts, as well as the Clerks of Court in their capacity as Ex-Officio Sheriffs together
with the Deputy Sheriffs are reminded of the provision of Section 8, Rule 14, Rules of Court on substituted service as
follows:
SO ORDERED.[4]

xxx xxx xxx
The manner of effecting substituted service as prescribed in Venturanza vs. Court of Appeals, 156 SCRA 305, must possibility of such serious consequences necessitates a careful examination of the grounds upon which the
be strictly complied with, thus: defendant asks that it be set aside. Since rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of
justice, it is well recognized that this Court is empowered to suspend its operation, or except a particular case from
its operation, when the rigid application thereof tends to frustrate rather than promote the ends of justice. We are not
The substituted service should be availed only when the defendant cannot be served promptly in person.
unmindful of the fact that during the pendency of the instant petition, the trial court has rendered judgment against
Impossibility of prompt service should be shown by stating the efforts made to find the defendant personally and the
petitioners. However, being the court of last resort, we deem it in the best interest that liberality and relaxation of the
failure of such efforts. The statement should be made in the proof of service. This is necessary because substituted
Rules be extended to petitioners by setting aside the order of default issued by the trial court and the consequent
service is in derogation of the usual method of service.
default judgment; otherwise, great injustice would result if petitioners are not afforded an opportunity to prove their
Substituted service is a method extraordinary in character, and hence may be used only as prescribed in the
claims.[23]
circumstances authorized by statute. Thus, the statutory requirements of substituted service must be followed
strictly, faithfully and any substituted service other than authorized by the statute is considered ineffective.
For immediate compliance. In addition, the Regional Trial Court committed reversible error in dismissing the petition for relief from
judgment for having been filed out of time. According to the Regional Trial Court, the petition for relief, filed on
November 25, 1996, was late because petitioner had actual knowledge of the judgment in the ejectment case since
In the case at bar, the sheriffs Return of Summons simply states:
March 1996. The period within which to file a petition for relief should have been reckoned from the date petitioner
learned of the judgment of the Regional Trial Court. It should not have been counted from the date of the Municipal
This is to certify that on this date: 26th day of January I have caused the service of summons, together with the Trial Courts decision because, precisely, petitioner appealed the same. It was the Regional Trial Courts decision that
attached complaint and its annexes issued in the above entitled case upon defendant REGALADO SAMARTINO became final and, hence, was the proper subject of the petition for relief from judgment. It is axiomatic that a petition
thru ROBERTO SAMARTINO, Brother of the defendant acknowledge receipt of said court processes by affixing his for relief is only available against a final and executory judgment. [24]
signature at the lower left portion of the original summons hereto attached. Section 3, Rule 38, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a verified petition for relief must be filed
WHEREFORE, the attached original summons is hereby respectfully returned to the court of origin duly served for within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or other proceeding to be set aside and
information and record purposes. not more than six (6) months after such judgment or final order has been entered or such proceeding has been
Noveleta, Cavite, February 9, 1996.[19] taken. It must be accompanied with affidavits showing the fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence relied
upon, and the facts constituting petitioners good and substantial cause of action or defense. [25]
It is not clear from the records of the case at bar when petitioner learned of the decision of the Regional Trial
Clearly, the above return failed to show the reason why personal service could not be made. It failed to state Court affirming the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court. What appears is that the said decision became final only
that prompt and personal service on the defendant was rendered impossible. It was not shown that efforts were on August 15, 1996, and must have been entered sometime thereafter. Hence, the petition for relief filed on
made to find the defendant personally and that said efforts failed; hence the resort to substituted service. As stated November 25, 1996 was well within the six-month period prescribed by the Rules.
above, these requirements are indispensable because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of Finally, the records show that petitioner raised a meritorious defense in his affidavit of merit. He alleged therein
service. It is an extraordinary method since it seeks to bind the defendant to the consequences of a suit even though that the property from which he was being ejected had been sold to him by its registered owner. Ownership is a valid
notice of such action is served not upon him but upon another whom law could only presume would notify him of the defense in unlawful detainer cases. While possession is the main issue in ejectment, it is also one of the essential
pending proceedings. For this reason, failure to faithfully, strictly, and fully comply with the requirements of attributes of ownership. It follows that an owner of real property is entitled to possession of the same. Petitioner can,
substituted service renders said service ineffective. [20] therefore, properly plead his right of possession to defeat that of respondents. Indeed, an owner who cannot
Furthermore, nowhere in the return of summons or in the records of this case is it shown that petitioners exercise the seven "juses or attributes of ownership - the right to possess, to use and enjoy, to abuse or consume, to
brother, on whom substituted service of summons was effected, was a person of suitable age and discretion residing accessories, to dispose or alienate, to recover or vindicate and to the fruits - is a crippled owner. [26]
at petitioners residence. All told, the Municipal Trial Court of Noveleta and the Regional Trial Court of Cavite City did not have
There being no valid substituted service of summons, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person jurisdiction over the person of petitioner. Hence, all proceedings had as regards petitioner were null and void.
of petitioner. It should be emphasized that the service of summons is not only required to give the court jurisdiction Necessarily, the enforcement of the writ of execution as well as the sale at public auction of petitioners real property
over the person of the defendant, but also to afford the latter an opportunity to be heard on the claim made against to satisfy the void judgment must also be declared of no legal effect.
him. Thus, compliance with the rules regarding the service of summons is as much an issue of due process as of There is a real need to resolve the issue of ownership over the premises in order to determine who, as
jurisdiction. The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any between petitioner and respondents, has a better right to possess the property in dispute. This can only be done in
evidence one may have in support of his defense. It is elementary that before a person can be deprived of his the proper proceeding before the trial court wherein petitioner will be afforded every right to present evidence in his
property, he should first be informed of the claim against him and the theory on which such claim is premised. [21] behalf.
By reason of the ineffective service of summons, petitioner was not duly apprised of the action against him. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
Consequently, he was prevented from answering the claims against him. He was not given a chance to be heard on G.R. SP No. 43202 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. This case is REMANDED to the Municipal Trial Court of
his defenses. What made matters worse was that the trial court had actual knowledge that petitioner was then Noveleta, Cavite, which is directed to continue proceedings in Civil Case No. 744 by affording petitioner Regalado P.
indisposed and unable to file his answer to the complaint, as he was then confined at the NBI-TRC. The trial courts Samartino a chance to file his answer and present evidence in his defense, and thereafter to hear and decide the
failure to give petitioner a reasonable opportunity to file his answer violated his right to due process. Perforce, the case. The Writ of Execution dated September 17, 1996, the Writ of Demolition dated January 14, 1997, and the
judgment rendered against petitioner is nugatory and without effect. certificate of sale over Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-283572, as well as all acts and deeds incidental to the
The trial court should not have been too rash in declaring petitioner in default, considering it had actual notice judgment in Civil Case No. 744, are declared NULL AND VOID.
of valid reasons that prevented him from answering. Well-settled is the rule that courts should be liberal in setting
aside orders of default for default judgments are frowned upon, unless in cases where it clearly appears that the SO ORDERED.
reopening of the case is intended for delay. The issuance of orders of default should be the exception rather than the
rule, to be allowed only in clear cases of obstinate refusal by the defendant to comply with the orders of the trial Davide, Jr., C.J., Vitug, Kapunan, and Austria-Martinez, JJ., concur.
court.[22]

Suits should as much as possible be decided on the merits and not on technicalities. In this regard, we have often
admonished courts to be liberal in setting aside orders of default as default judgments are frowned upon and not
looked upon with favor for they may amount to a positive and considerable injustice to the defendant and the
 (1) The denial of respondent’s motion to dissolve the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction or the
THIRD DIVISION dismissal of the instant case;
G.R. No. 111397            August 12, 2002 (2) Petitioner-corporation is authorized to remove the wooden cross-bars or any other impediments which
HON. ALFREDO LIM and RAFAELITO GARAYBLAS, petitioners,  were placed at its establishments, namely, New Bangkok Club and Exotic Garden Restaurant on February
vs. 12, 1993 and February 15, 1993, respectively, and thereafter said establishments are allowed to resume
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. WILFREDO REYES and BISTRO PIGALLE, INC., respondents. their operations;
CARPIO, J.: (3) All the other petitioners are allowed to continue working in the aforenamed establishments of petitioner-
The Case corporation if they have not yet reported; and
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari1 of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 25, 1993, 2 and its (4) The hearing on the contempt proceedings is deferred to give sufficient time to respondent to elevate
Resolution dated July 13, 19933 which denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. The assailed Decision the matters assailed herein to the Supreme Court."11
sustained the orders dated December 29, 1992, January 20, 1993 and March 2, 1993, 4 issued by Branch 36 of the On March 10, 1993, Lim filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against
Regional Trial Court of Manila. The trial court’s orders enjoined petitioner Alfredo Lim ("Lim" for brevity), then Mayor Bistro and Judge Wilfredo Reyes. Lim claimed that the trial judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
of Manila, from investigating, impeding or closing down the business operations of the New Bangkok Club and the lack of jurisdiction in issuing the writ of prohibitory preliminary injunction.
Exotic Garden Restaurant owned by respondent Bistro Pigalle Inc. ("Bistro" for brevity). On March 25, 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision.12 In a resolution dated July 13, 1993, the
The Antecedent Facts Court of Appeals denied Lim’s motion for reconsideration.13
On December 7, 1992 Bistro filed before the trial court a petition5 for mandamus and prohibition, with prayer for On July 1, 1993, Manila City Ordinance No. 778314 took effect. On the same day, Lim ordered the Western Police
temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction, against Lim in his capacity as Mayor of the City of District Command to permanently close down the operations of Bistro, which order the police implemented at once. 15
Manila. Bistro filed the case because policemen under Lim’s instructions inspected and investigated Bistro’s license The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
as well as the work permits and health certificates of its staff. This caused the stoppage of work in Bistro’s night club In denying Lim’s petition, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion since
and restaurant operations.6 Lim also refused to accept Bistro’s application for a business license, as well as the work it issued the writ after hearing on the basis of the evidence adduced.
permit applications of Bistro’s staff, for the year 1993.7 The Court of Appeals reasoned thus:
In its petition, Bistro argued that Lim’s refusal to issue the business license and work permits violated the doctrine "x x x. A writ of preliminary injunction may issue if the act sought to be enjoined will cause irreparable
laid down this Court in De la Cruz vs. Paras,8 to wit: injury to the movant or destroy the status quo before a full hearing can be had on the merits of the case.
"Municipal corporations cannot prohibit the operation of nightclubs. They may be regulated, but not A writ of preliminary injunction, as an ancillary or preventive remedy, may only be resorted to by a litigant
prevented from carrying on their business." to protect or preserve his rights or interests and for no other purpose during the pendency of the principal
Acting on Bistro’s application for injunctive relief, the trial court issued the first assailed temporary restraining order action. It is primarily intended to maintain the status quo between the parties existing prior to the filing of
on December 29, 1992, the dispositive portion of which reads: the case.
"WHEREFORE, respondent and/or his agents and representatives are ordered to refrain from inspecting In the case at bar, We find that the respondent Judge did not act improvidently in issuing the assailed
or otherwise interfering in the operation of the establishments of petitioner (Bistro Pigalle, Inc.)." 9 orders granting the writ of preliminary injunction in order to maintain the status quo, while the petition is
At the hearing, the parties submitted their evidence in support of their respective positions. On January 20, 1993, the pending resolution on the merits. The private respondent correctly points out that the questioned writ was
trial court granted Bistro’s application for a writ of prohibitory preliminary injunction. The dispositive portion of the trial regularly issued after several hearings, in which the parties were allowed to adduce evidence, and argue
court’s order declared: their respective positions.
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, Petitioners’ application for a writ of prohibitory preliminary The issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is within the limits of the sound exercise of discretion of the
injunction is granted, and Respondent, and any/all persons acting under his authority, are and (sic) court and the appellate court will not interfere, except, in a clear case of abuse thereof. x x x.
ordered to cease and desist from inspecting, investigating and otherwise closing or impeding the business WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED DUE COURSE and is accordingly DISMISSED." 16
operations of Petitioner Corporation’s establishments while the petition here is pending resolution on the Hence, this petition.
merits. The Issues
Considering that the Respondent is a government official and this injunction relates to his official duties, In their Memorandum, petitioners raise the following issues:
the posting of an injunction bond by the Petitioners is not required. 1. "DID RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
On the other hand, Petitioners’ application for a writ of mandatory injunction is hereby denied, for to grant EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING HIS SAID ASSAILED ORDERS OF DECEMBER 29, 1992,
the same would amount to granting the writ of mandamus prayed for. The Court reserves resolution JANUARY 20, 1993 AND MARCH 2, 1993?"
thereof until the parties shall have been heard on the merits."10 2. "DID RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERRORS IN RENDERING ITS
However, despite the trial court’s order, Lim still issued a closure order on Bistro’s operations effective January 23, ASSAILED DECISION OF MARCH 25, 1993 AND ITS ASSAILED RESOLUTION OF JULY 13, 1993?"
1993, even sending policemen to carry out his closure order. 3. "DID SAID CIVIL CASE NO. 92-63712 AND SAID CA-G.R. SP NO. 30381 BECOME MOOT AND
On January 25, 1993, Bistro filed an "Urgent Motion for Contempt" against Lim and the policemen who stopped ACADEMIC WHEN THE NEW BANGKOK CLUB AND THE EXOTIC GARDEN RESTAURANT OF
Bistro’s operations on January 23, 1993. At the hearing of the motion for contempt on January 29, 1993, Bistro PRIVATE RESPONDENT WERE CLOSED ON JULY 1, 1993 PURSUANT TO ORDINANCE NO. 7783?"
withdrew its motion on condition that Lim would respect the court’s injunction. The Ruling of the Court
However, on February 12, 13, 15, 26 and 27, and on March 1 and 2, 1993, Lim, acting through his agents and The petition is without merit.
policemen, again disrupted Bistro’s business operations. Considering that the constitutionality of Ordinance No. 7783 was not raised before the trial court or the Court of
Meanwhile, on February 17, 1993, Lim filed a motion to dissolve the injunctive order of January 20, 1993 and to Appeals, and this issue is still under litigation in another case, 17 the Court will deal only with the first two issues raised
dismiss the case. Lim insisted that the power of a mayor to inspect and investigate commercial establishments and by petitioner.
their staff is implicit in the statutory power of the city mayor to issue, suspend or revoke business permits and Validity of the Preliminary Injunction
licenses. This statutory power is expressly provided for in Section 11 (l), Article II of the Revised Charter of the City Bistro’s cause of action in the mandamus and prohibition proceedings before the trial court is the violation of its
of Manila and in Section 455, paragraph 3 (iv) of the Local Government Code of 1991. property right under its license to operate. The violation consists of the work disruption in Bistro’s operations caused
The trial court denied Lim’s motion to dissolve the injunction and to dismiss the case in an order dated March 2, by Lim and his subordinates as well as Lim’s refusal to issue a business license to Bistro and work permits to its staff
1993, the dispositive portion of which stated: for the year 1993. The primary relief prayed for by Bistro is the issuance of writs of mandatory and prohibitory
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby orders: injunction. The mandatory injunction seeks to compel Lim to accept Bistro’s 1993 business license application and to
issue Bistro’s business license. Also, the mandatory injunction seeks to compel Lim to accept the applications of is no provision in these laws expressly or impliedly granting the mayor authority to close down private commercial
Bistro’s staff for work permits. The writ of prohibitory injunction seeks to enjoin Lim from interfering, impeding or establishments without notice and hearing, and even if there is, such provision would be void. The due process
otherwise closing down Bistro’s operations. clause of the Constitution requires that Lim should have given Bistro an opportunity to rebut the allegations that it
The trial court granted only the prohibitory injunction. This enjoined Lim from interfering, impeding or otherwise violated the conditions of its licenses and permits.
closing down Bistro’s operations pending resolution of whether Lim can validly refuse to issue Bistro’s business The regulatory powers granted to municipal corporations must always be exercised in accordance with law, with
license and its staff’s work permits for the year 1993. utmost observance of the rights of the people to due process and equal protection of the law.21 Such power cannot
Lim contends that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the prohibitory injunction. Lim relies primarily on his be exercised whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically. In the instant case, we find that Lim’s exercise of this power
power, as Mayor of the City of Manila, to grant and refuse municipal licenses and business permits as expressly violated Bistro’s property rights that are protected under the due process clause of the Constitution.
provided for in the Local Government Code and the Revised Charter of the City of Manila. Lim argues that the Lim did not charge Bistro with any specific violation of the conditions of its business license or permits. Still, Lim
powers granted by these laws implicitly include the power to inspect, investigate and close down Bistro’s operations closed down Bistro’s operations even before the expiration of its business license on December 31, 1992. Lim also
for violation of the conditions of its licenses and permits. refused to accept Bistro’s license application for 1993, in effect denying the application without examining whether it
On the other hand, Bistro asserts that the legal provisions relied upon by Lim do not apply to the instant case. Bistro complies with legal prerequisites.
maintains that the Local Government Code and the Revised Charter of the City of Manila do not expressly or Lim’s zeal in his campaign against prostitution is commendable. The presumption is that he acted in good faith and
impliedly grant Lim any power to prohibit the operation of night clubs. Lim failed to specify any violation by Bistro of was motivated by his concern for his constituents when he implemented his campaign against prostitution in the
the conditions of its licenses and permits. In refusing to accept Bistro’s business license application for the year Ermita-Malate area. However, there is no excusing Lim for arbitrarily closing down, without due process of law, the
1993, Bistro claims that Lim denied Bistro due process of law. business operations of Bistro. For this reason, the trial court properly restrained the acts of Lim.
The Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the prohibitory Consequently, the Court of Appeals did not err in upholding the trial court’s orders. The sole objective of a writ of
preliminary injunction. preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard fully. It is generally
We uphold the findings of the Court of Appeals. availed of to prevent actual or threatened acts, until the merits of the case can be disposed of. 22 In the instant case,
The authority of mayors to issue business licenses and permits is beyond question. The law expressly provides for the issuance of the writ of prohibitory preliminary injunction did not dispose of the main case for mandamus. The trial
such authority. Section 11 (l), Article II of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila, reads: court issued the injunction in view of the disruptions and stoppage in Bistro’s operations as a consequence of Lim’s
"Sec. 11. General duties and powers of the mayor. The general duties and powers of the mayor shall closure orders. The injunction was intended to maintain the status quo while the petition has not been resolved on
be: the merits.
x x x. WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of merit. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
(l) To grant and refuse municipal licenses or permits of all classes and to revoke the same for NO. 30381 is AFFIRMED in toto.
violation of the conditions upon which they were granted, or if acts prohibited by law or municipal SO ORDERED.
ordinances are being committed under the protection of such licenses or in the premises in which the Puno, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
business for which the same have been granted is carried on, or for any other reason of general interest." Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., on leave.
(Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, Section 455 (3) (iv) of the Local Government Code provides:
"Sec. 455. Chief Executive, Powers, Duties and Compensation: xxx.
(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which is the general welfare of the
City and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the City Mayor shall:
(3) x x x.
(iv) Issue licenses and permits and suspend or revoke the same for any violation of the
condition upon which said licenses or permits had been issued, pursuant to law or
ordinance." (Emphasis supplied)
From the language of the two laws, it is clear that the power of the mayor to issue business licenses and permits
necessarily includes the corollary power to suspend, revoke or even refuse to issue the same. However, the power
to suspend or revoke these licenses and permits is expressly premised on the violation of the conditions of these
permits and licenses. The laws specifically refer to the "violation of the condition(s)" on which the licenses and
permits were issued. Similarly, the power to refuse to issue such licenses and permits is premised on non-
compliance with the prerequisites for the issuance of such licenses and permits. The mayor must observe due
process in exercising these powers, which means that the mayor must give the applicant or licensee notice and
opportunity to be heard.
True, the mayor has the power to inspect and investigate private commercial establishments for any violation of the
conditions of their licenses and permits. However, the mayor has no power to order a police raid on these
establishments in the guise of inspecting or investigating these commercial establishments. Lim acted beyond his
authority when he directed policemen to raid the New Bangkok Club and the Exotic Garden Restaurant. Such act of
Lim violated Ordinance No. 771618 which expressly prohibits police raids and inspections, to wit:
"Section 1. No member of the Western Police District shall conduct inspection of food and other business
establishments for the purpose of enforcing sanitary rules and regulations, inspecting licenses and
permits, and/or enforcing internal revenue and customs laws and regulations. This responsibility should be
properly exercised by Local Government Authorities and other concerned agencies." (Emphasis supplied)
These local government officials include the City Health Officer or his representative, pursuant to the Revised City
Ordinances of the City of Manila,19 and the City Treasurer pursuant to Section 470 of the Local Government Code. 20
Lim has no authority to close down Bistro’s business or any business establishment in Manila without due process of
law. Lim cannot take refuge under the Revised Charter of the City of Manila and the Local Government Code. There
 Republic of the Philippines A copy of the above Order was received by Solar on 26 September 1988. A Writ of Execution issued by the Board
SUPREME COURT was received by Solar on 31 March 1989.
Manila Meantime, Solar filed a motion for reconsideration/appeal with prayer for stay of execution of the Order dated 22
THIRD DIVISION September 1988. Acting on this motion, the Board issued an Order dated 24 April 1989 allowing Solar to operate
G.R. No. 93891             March 11, 1991 temporarily, to enable the Board to conduct another inspection and evaluation of Solar's wastewater treatment
POLLUTION ADJUDICATION BOARD, petitioner  facilities. In the same Order, the Board directed the Regional Executive Director of the DENR/ NCR to conduct the
vs. inspection and evaluation within thirty (30) days.
COURT OF APPEALS and SOLAR TEXTILE FINISHING CORPORATION, respondents. On 21 April 1989, however, Solar went to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 77, on petition for
Oscar A. Pascua and Charemon Clio L. Borre for petitioner. certiorari with preliminary injunction against the Board, the petition being docketed as Civil Case No. Q-89-2287.
Leonardo A. Aurelio for respondent Solar Textile Finishing Corp. On 21 July 1989, the Regional Trial Court dismissed Solar's petition upon two (2) grounds, i.e., that appeal and not
  certiorari from the questioned Order of the Board as well as the Writ of Execution was the proper remedy, and that
RESOLUTION the Board's subsequent Order allowing Solar to operate temporarily had rendered Solar's petition moot and
academic.
Dissatisfied, Solar went on appeal to the Court of Appeals which, in the Decision here assailed, reversed the Order
of dismissal of the trial court and remanded the case to that court for further proceedings. In addition, the Court of
FELICIANO, J.:
Appeals declared the Writ of Execution null and void. At the same time, the Court of Appeals said in the dispositive
Petitioner Pollution Adjudication Board ("Board") asks us to review the Decision and Resolution promulgated on 7
portion of its Decision that:
February 1990 and 10 May 1990, respectively, by the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G R. No. SP 18821 entitled "Solar
. . .. Still and all, this decision is without prejudice to whatever action the appellee [Board] may take relative
Textile Finishing Corporation v. Pollution Adjudication Board." In that Decision and Resolution, the Court of Appeals
to the projected 'inspection and evaluation' of appellant's [Solar's] water treatment facilities. 3
reversed an order of the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 77, in Civil Case No. Q-89-2287 dismissing
The Court of Appeals, in so ruling, held that certiorari was a proper remedy since the Orders of petitioner Board may
private respondent Solar Textile Finishing Corporation's ("Solar") petition for certiorari and remanded the case to the
result in great and irreparable injury to Solar; and that while the case might be moot and academic, "larger issues"
trial court for further proceedings.
demanded that the question of due process be settled. Petitioner Board moved for reconsideration, without success.
On 22 September 1988, petitioner Board issued an ex parte Order directing Solar immediately to cease and desist
The Board is now before us on a Petition for Review basically arguing that:
from utilizing its wastewater pollution source installations which were discharging untreated wastewater directly into a
1. its ex parte Order dated 22 September 1988 and the Writ of Execution were issued in accordance with
canal leading to the adjacent Tullahan-Tinejeros River. The Order signed by Hon. Fulgencio Factoran, Jr., as Board
law and were not violative of the requirements of due process; and
Chairman, reads in full as follows:
2. the ex parte Order and the Writ of Execution are not the proper subjects of a petition for certiorari.
Respondent, Solar Textile Finishing Corporation with plant and place of business at 999 General Pascual
The only issue before us at this time is whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court on the
Avenue, Malabon, Metro Manila is involved in bleaching, rinsing and dyeing textiles with wastewater of
ground that Solar had been denied due process by the Board.
about 30 gpm. being directly discharged untreated into the sewer. Based on findings in the Inspections
Petitioner Board claims that under P.D. No. 984, Section 7(a), it has legal authority to issue ex parte orders to
conducted on 05 November 1986 and 15 November 1986, the volume of untreated wastewater discharged
suspend the operations of an establishment when there is prima facie evidence that such establishment is
in the final out fall outside of the plant's compound was even greater. The result of inspection conducted
discharging effluents or wastewater, the pollution level of which exceeds the maximum permissible standards set by
on 06 September 1988 showed that respondent's Wastewater Treatment Plant was noted unoperational
the NPCC (now, the Board). Petitioner Board contends that the reports before it concerning the effluent discharges
and the combined wastewater generated from its operation was about 30 gallons per minute and 80% of
of Solar into the Tullahan-Tinejeros River provided prima facie evidence of violation by Solar of Section 5 of the 1982
the wastewater was being directly discharged into a drainage canal leading to the Tullahan-Tinejeros River
Effluent Code.
by means of a by-pass and the remaining 20% was channelled into the plant's existing Wastewater
Solar, on the other hand, contends that under the Board's own rules and regulations, an ex parte order may issue
Treatment Plant (WTP). Result of the analyses of the sample taken from the by-pass showed that the
only if the effluents discharged pose an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal and
wastewater is highly pollutive in terms of Color units, BOD and Suspended Solids, among others. These
plant life." In the instant case, according to Solar, the inspection reports before the Board made no finding that
acts of respondent in spite of directives to comply with the requirements are clearly in violation of Section 8
Solar's wastewater discharged posed such a threat.
of Presidential Decree No. 984 and Section 103 of its Implementing Rules and Regulations and the 1982
The Court is not persuaded by Solar's contention. Section 7(a) of P.D. No. 984 authorized petitioner Board to
Effluent Regulations.
issue ex parte cease and desist orders under the following circumstances:
WHEREFORE, pursuant to Section 7 of P.D. 984 and Section 38 of its Implementing Rules and
P.D. 984, Section 7, paragraph (a), provides:
Regulations, respondent is hereby ordered to cease and desist from utilizing its wastewater pollution
(a) Public Hearing. . . . Provided, That whenever the Commission finds prima facie evidence that the
source installation and discharging its untreated wastewater directly into the canal leading to the Tullahan-
discharged sewage or wastes are of immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal
Tinejeros River effective immediately upon receipt hereof and until such time when it has fully complied
or plant life, or exceeds the allowable standards set by the Commission, the Commissioner may issue an
with all the requirements and until further orders from this Board.
ex-parte order directing the discontinuance of the same or the temporary suspension or cessation of
SO ORDERED.1
operation of the establishment or person generating such sewage or wastes without the necessity of a
We note that the above Order was based on findings of several inspections of Solar's plant:
prior public hearing. The said ex-parte order shall be immediately executory and shall remain in force until
a. inspections conducted on 5 November 1986 and 12 November 1986 by the National Pollution Control
said establishment or person prevents or abates the said pollution within the allowable standards or
Commission ("NPCC"), the predecessor of the Board ;2 and
modified or nullified by a competent court. (Emphasis supplied)
b. the inspection conducted on 6 September 1988 by the Department of Environment and Natural
We note that under the above-quoted portion of Section 7(a) of P.D. No. 984, an ex parte cease and desist order
Resources ("DENR").
may be issued by the Board (a) whenever the wastes discharged by an establishment pose an "immediate threat to
The findings of these two (2) inspections were that Solar's wastewater treatment plant was non-operational and that
life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life," or (b) whenever such discharges or wastes exceed
its plant generated about 30 gallons per minute of wastewater, 80% of which was being directly discharged into a
"the allowable standards set by the [NPCC]." On the one hand, it is not essential that the Board prove that an
drainage canal leading to the Tullahan-Tinejeros River. The remaining 20% of the wastewater was being channeled
"immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life" exists before an ex parte cease
through Solar's non-operational wastewater treatment plant. Chemical analysis of samples of Solar's effluents
and desist order may be issued. It is enough if the Board finds that the wastes discharged do exceed "the allowable
showed the presence of pollutants on a level in excess of what was permissible under P.D. No. 984 and its
standards set by the [NPCC]." In respect of discharges of wastes as to which allowable standards have been set by
Implementing Regulations.
the Commission, the Board may issue an ex parte cease and desist order when there is prima facie evidence of an
establishment exceeding such allowable standards. Where, however, the effluents or discharges have not yet been mg.1 mg./1.
the subject matter of allowable standards set by the Commission, then the Board may act on an ex parte basis when e) Suspended 75 e) Suspended 340 80
it finds at least prima facie proof that the wastewater or material involved presents an "immediate threat to life, public solids in solids in
health, safety or welfare or to animal or plant life." Since the applicable standards set by the Commission existing at mg./1. mg./1.
any given time may well not cover every possible or imaginable kind of effluent or waste discharge, the general
standard of an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal and plant life" remains f) BOD in 80 f) BOD (5-day) 1,100 152
necessary. mg./1. mg./1
Upon the other hand, the Court must assume that the extant allowable standards have been set by the Commission g) oil/Grease 10 g) Oil/Grease
or Board precisely in order to avoid or neutralize an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to in mg./1. mg./1.
animal or plant life.'' h) Detergents 5 h) Detergents 2.93
Section 5 of the Effluent Regulations of 19824 sets out the maximum permissible levels of physical and chemical mg./1." mg./1. MBAS
substances which effluents from domestic wastewater treatment plants and industrial plants" must not exceed "when i) Dissolved 0
discharged into bodies of water classified as Class A, B, C, D, SB and SC in accordance with the 1978 NPCC Rules oxygen, mg./1.
and Regulations." The waters of Tullahan-Tinejeros River are classified as inland waters Class D under Section 68 of
j) Settleable 0.4 1.5
the 1978 NPCC Rules and Regulations 5 which in part provides that:
Matter, mg./1.
Sec. 68. Water Usage and Classification. — The quality of Philippine waters shall be maintained in a safe
and satisfactory condition according to their best usages. For this purpose, all water shall be classified k) Total Dis 800 610
according to the following beneficial usages: solved Solids
mg./1.
l) Total Solids 1,400 690
(a) Fresh Surface Water m) Turbidity NTU / ppm, SiO3 70
Classification Best usage
The November 1986 inspections report concluded that:
x x x           x x x          x x x
Class D For agriculture, irrigation, livestock watering and industrial cooling and processing. Records of the Commission show that the plant under its previous owner, Fine Touch Finishing
x x x           x x x          x x x Corporation, was issued a Notice of Violation on 20 December 1985 directing same to cease and desist
from conducting dyeing operation until such time the waste treatment plant is already completed and
operational. The new owner Solar Textile Corporation informed the Commission of the plant acquisition
(Emphases supplied) thru its letter dated March 1986 (sic).

The reports on the inspections carried on Solar's wastewater treatment facilities on 5 and 12 November 1986 and 6 The new owner was summoned to a hearing held on 13 October 1986 based on the adverse findings
September 1988 set forth the following Identical finding: during the inspection/water sampling test conducted on 08 August 1986. As per instruction of the Legal
Division a re- inspection/sampling text should be conducted first before an appropriate legal action is
instituted; hence, this inspection.
a. For legal action in [view of] implementing rules and regulations of P.D. No. 984 and Section 5 of the
Effluent Regulations of 1982. 6
Based on the above findings, it is clear that the new owner continuously violates the directive of the
Commission by undertaking dyeing operation without completing first and operating its existing WTP. The
Placing the maximum allowable standards set in Section 5 of the Effluent Regulations of 1982 alongside the findings
analysis of results on water samples taken showed that the untreated wastewater from the firm pollutes
of the November 1986 and September 1988 inspection reports, we get the following results:
our water resources. In this connection, it is recommended that appropriate legal action be instituted
immediately against the firm. . . .10
 
The September 1988 inspection report's conclusions were:
"Inland November September
Waters 1986 1988 1. The plant was undertaking dyeing, bleaching and rinsing operations during the inspection. The
(Class C & D7 Report8 Report9 combined wastewater generated from the said operations was estimated at about 30 gallons per minute.
Station 1 Station 1 About 80% of the wastewater was traced directly discharged into a drainage canal leading to the Tullahan-
a) Color in 100 a) Color units 250 125 Tinejeros river by means of a bypass. The remaining 20% was channeled into the plant's existing
platinum (Apparent wastewater treatment plant (WTP).
cobalt Color)
units
2. The WTP was noted not yet fully operational- some accessories were not yet installed.1âwphi1 Only the
b) pH 6-8.5 b) pH 9.3 8.7 sump pit and the holding/collecting tank are functional but appeared seldom used. The wastewater
c) Tempera- 40 c) Temperature mentioned channeled was noted held indefinitely into the collection tank for primary treatment. There was
ture in °C (°C) no effluent discharge [from such collection tank].
d) Phenols in 0.1 d) Phenols in
 3. A sample from the bypass wastewater was collected for laboratory analyses. Result of the analyses 6. While petitioner was able to present a temporary permit to operate by the then National Pollution Control
show that the bypass wastewater is polluted in terms of color units, BOD and suspended solids, among Commission on December 15,1987, the permit was good only up to May 25,1988 (Annex A-12, petition).
others. (Please see attached laboratory resul .)11 Petitioner had not exerted any effort to extend or validate its permit much less to install any device to
control the pollution and prevent any hazard to the health of the residents of the community."
From the foregoing reports, it is clear to this Court that there was at least prima facie evidence before the Board that
the effluents emanating from Solar's plant exceeded the maximum allowable levels of physical and chemical In the instant case, the ex parte cease and desist Order was issued not by a local government official but by the
substances set by the NPCC and that accordingly there was adequate basis supporting the ex parte cease and Pollution Adjudication Board, the very agency of the Government charged with the task of determining whether the
desist order issued by the Board. It is also well to note that the previous owner of the plant facility Fine Touch effluents of a particular industrial establishment comply with or violate applicable anti-pollution statutory and
Finishing Corporation had been issued a Notice of Violation on 20 December 1985 directing it to cease and refrain regulatory provisions.
from carrying out dyeing operations until the water treatment plant was completed and operational. Solar, the new
owner, informed the NPCC of the acquisition of the plant on March 1986. Solar was summoned by the NPCC to a
Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in situations like that here presented precisely
hearing on 13 October 1986 based on the results of the sampling test conducted by the NPCC on 8 August 1986.
because stopping the continuous discharge of pollutive and untreated effluents into the rivers and other inland
Petitioner Board refrained from issuing an ex parte cease and desist order until after the November 1986 and
waters of the Philippines cannot be made to wait until protracted litigation over the ultimate correctness or propriety
September 1988 re-inspections were conducted and the violation of applicable standards was confirmed. In other
of such orders has run its full course, including multiple and sequential appeals such as those which Solar has taken,
words, petitioner Board appears to have been remarkably forbearing in its efforts to enforce the applicable standards
which of course may take several years. The relevant pollution control statute and implementing regulations were
vis-a-vis Solar. Solar, on the other hand, seemed very casual about its continued discharge of untreated, pollutive
enacted and promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive, sovereign power to protect the safety, health, and
effluents into the Tullahan- Tinerejos River, presumably loath to spend the money necessary to put its Wastewater
general welfare and comfort of the public, as well as the protection of plant and animal life, commonly designated as
Treatment Plant ("WTP") in an operating condition.
the police power. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process yield
to the necessities of protecting vital public interests like those here involved, through the exercise of police power.
In this connection, we note that in Technology Developers, Inc. v. Court of appeals, et al.,12 the Court very recently The Board's ex parte Order and Writ of Execution would, of course, have compelled Solar temporarily to stop its
upheld the summary closure ordered by the Acting Mayor of Sta. Maria, Bulacan, of a pollution-causing plant operations, a state of affairs Solar could in any case have avoided by simply absorbing the bother and burden
establishment, after finding that the records showed that: of putting its WTP on an operational basis. Industrial establishments are not constitutionally entitled to reduce their
capitals costs and operating expenses and to increase their profits by imposing upon the public threats and risks to
its safety, health, general welfare and comfort, by disregarding the requirements of anti- pollution statutes and their
1. No mayor's permit had been secured. While it is true that the matter of determining whether there is a
implementing regulations.
pollution of the environment that requires control if not prohibition of the operation of a business is
essentially addressed to the then National Pollution Control Commission of the Ministry of Human
Settlements, now the Environmental Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural It should perhaps be made clear the Court is not here saying that the correctness of the ex parte Order and Writ of
Resources, it must be recognized that the mayor of a town has as much responsibility to protect its Execution may not be contested by Solar in a hearing before the Board itself. Where the establishment affected by
inhabitants from pollution, and by virtue of his police power, he may deny the application for a permit to an ex parte cease and desist order contests the correctness of the prima facie findings of the Board, the Board must
operate a business or otherwise close the same unless appropriate measures are taken to control and/or hold a public hearing where such establishment would have an opportunity to controvert the basis of such ex
avoid injury to the health of the residents of the community from the emission in the operation of the parteorder. That such an opportunity is subsequently available is really all that is required by the due process clause
business. of the Constitution in situations like that we have here. The Board's decision rendered after the public hearing may
then be tested judicially by an appeal to the Court of Appeals in accordance with Section 7(c) of P.D. No. 984 and
Section 42 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations. A subsequent public hearing is precisely what Solar should
2. The Acting Mayor, in a letter of February l6, 1989, called the attention of petitioner to the pollution
have sought instead of going to court to seek nullification of the Board's Order and Writ of Execution and instead of
emitted by the fumes of its plant whose offensive odor "not only pollute the air in the locality but also affect
appealing to the Court of Appeals. It will be recalled the at the Board in fact gave Solar authority temporarily to
the health of the residents in the area," so that petitioner was ordered to stop its operation until further
continue operations until still another inspection of its wastewater treatment facilities and then another analysis of
orders and it was required to bring the following:
effluent samples could be taken and evaluated.

x x x           x x x          x x x
Solar claims finally that the petition for certiorari was the proper remedy as the questioned Order and Writ of
Execution issued by the Board were patent nullities. Since we have concluded that the Order and Writ of Execution
(3) Region III-Department of Environment and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution permit. (Annex were entirely within the lawful authority of petitioner Board, the trial court did not err when it dismissed Solar's petition
A-2, petition) for certiorari. It follows that the proper remedy was an appeal from the trial court to the Court of Appeals, as Solar did
in fact appeal.
3. This action of the Acting Mayor was in response to the complaint of the residents of Barangay Guyong,
Sta. Maria, Bulacan, directed to the Provincial Governor through channels (Annex A-B, petition).. . . ACCORDINGLY, the Petition for Review is given DUE COURSE and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 7
February 1990 and its Resolution dated 10 May 1990 in A.C.-G.R. No. SP 18821 are hereby SET ASIDE. The Order
of petitioner Board dated 22 September 1988 and the Writ of Execution, as well as the decision of the trial court
4. The closure order of the Acting Mayor was issued only after an investigation was made by Marivic dated 21 July 1989, are hereby REINSTATED, without prejudice to the right of Solar to contest the correctness of the
Guina who in her report of December 8, 1988 observed that the fumes emitted by the plant of petitioner basis of the Board's Order and Writ of Execution at a public hearing before the Board.
goes directly to the surrounding houses and that no proper air pollution device has been installed. (Annex
A-9, petition)
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
x x x           x x x          x x x
Republic of the Philippines 1,704,782.00 was past due and another sum of P1,130,000.00 was also past due in favor of the Central Bank (Rollo,
SUPREME COURT p. 86). The promissory notes evidencing these loans were rediscounted with the Central Bank for cash. As a result
Manila thereof, the bank became insolvent and prejudiced its depositors and creditors.

Respondent, Consolacion V. Odra, submitted a report recommending to the Monetary Board of the Central Bank the
SECOND DIVISION
placing of Buhi under receivership in accordance with Section 29 of Republic Act No. 265, as amended, the
designation of the Director, DRBSLA, as receiver thereof. On March 28, 1980, the Monetary Board, finding the report
G.R. No. L-61689 June 20, 1988 to be true, adopted Resolution No. 583 placing Buhi, petitioner herein, under receivership and designated
respondent, Consolacion V. Odra, as Receiver, pursuant to the provisions of Section 29 of Republic Act No. 265 as
amended (Rollo, p. 111).
RURAL BANK OF BUHI, INC., and HONORABLE JUDGE CARLOS R. BUENVIAJE, petitioners, 
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and CONSOLACION In a letter dated April 8, 1980, respondent Consolacion V. Odra, as receiver, implemented and carried out said
ODRA, respondents. Monetary Board Resolution No. 583 by authorizing deputies of the receiver to take control, possession and charge
of Buhi, its assets and liabilities (Rollo, p. 109).
Manuel B. Tomacruz and Rustico Pasilavan for petitioners.
Imelda del Rosario, Manager of herein petitioner Buhi, filed a petition for injunction with Restraining Order dated April
23, 1980, docketed as Special Proceedings IR-428 against respondent Consolacion V. Odra and DRBSLA deputies
I.B. Regalado, Jr. and Pacifica T. Torres for respondents.
in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, Branch VII, Iriga City, entitled Rural Bank of Buhi vs. Central Bank,
which assailed the action of herein respondent Odra in recommending the receivership over Buhi as a violation of
the provisions of Sections 28 and 29 of Republic Act No. 265 as amended, and Section 10 of Republic Act No. 720
(The Rural Banks Act) and as being ultra vires and done with grave abuse of discretion and in excess of jurisdiction
(Rollo, p. 120).
PARAS, J.:

Respondents filed their motion to dismiss dated May 27, 1980 alleging that the petition did not allege a cause of
This is a petition for review on certiorari with preliminary mandatory injunction seeking the reversal of the orders of
action and is not sufficient in form and substance and that it was filed in violation of Section 29, Republic Act No. 265
the Court of Appeals dated March 19, 1982 and March 24, 1982 and its decision * (HATOL) promulgated on June
as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1007 (Rollo, p. 36).
17,1982 in CA-G.R. No. 13944 entitled "Banko Central ng Pilipinas at Consolacion Odra Laban Kina Rural Bank of
Buhi (Camarines Sur), Inc." and praying for a restraining order or a preliminary mandatory injunction to restrain
respondents from enforcing aforesaid orders and decision of the respondent Court, and to give due course to the Petitioners, through their counsel, filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss dated June 17, 1980 averring that the
petitioners' complaint in IR-428, pending before Hon. Judge Carlos R. Buenviaje of Branch VII, CFI, Camarines Sur. petition alleged a valid cause of action and that respondents have violated the due process clause of the Constitution
(Rollo, p. 49).
The decretal portion of the appealed decision reads:
Later, respondents filed a reply to the opposition dated July 1, 1980, claiming that the petition is not proper; that
Imelda del Rosario is not the proper representative of the bank; that the petition failed to state a cause of action; and,
DAHIL DITO, ang utos ng pinasasagot sa Hukom noong ika-9 ng Marso, 1982, ay isinasang-
that the provisions of Section 29 of Republic Act No. 265 had been faithfully observed (Rollo, p. 57).
tabi. Kapalit nito, isang utos and ipinalabas na nag-uutos sa pinasasagot sa Hukom na itigil ang
anumang pagpapatuloy o pagdidinig kaugnay sa usaping IR-428 na pinawawalang saysay din
ng Hukumang ito. On August 22, 1980, the Central Bank Monetary Board issued a Resolution No. 1514 ordering the liquidation of the
Rural Bank of Buhi (Rollo, p. 108).
SIYANG IPINAG-UUTOS.
On September 1, 1981, the Office of the Solicitor General, in accordance with Republic Act No. 265, Section 29, filed
in the same Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, Branch VII, a petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of Buhi,
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
which petition was docketed as SP-IR-553, pursuant to the Monetary Board Resolution No. 1514 (Rollo, pp. 89;
264).
The petitioner Rural Bank of Buhi, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Buhi) is a juridical entity existing under the laws of
the Philippines. Buhi is a rural bank that started its operations only on December 26,1975 (Rollo, p. 86).
Meanwhile, respondent Central Bank filed on September 15, 1981, in Civil Case No. IR-428 a Supplemental Motion
To Dismiss on the ground that the receivership of Buhi, in view of the issuance of the Monetary Board Resolution
In 1980, an examination of the books and affairs of Buhi was ordered conducted by the Rural Banks and Savings No. 1514 had completely become moot and academic (Rollo, p. 68) and the fact that Case SP-IR-553 for the
and Loan Association (DRBSLA), Central Bank of the Philippines, which by law, has charge of the supervision and liquidation of Buhi was already pending with the same Court (Rollo, p. 69).
examination of rural banks and savings and loan associations in the Philippines. However, said petitioner refused to
be examined and as a result thereof, financial assistance was suspended.
On October 16, 1981, petitioners herein filed their amended complaint in Civil Case No. IR-428 alleging that the
issuance of Monetary Board Resolution No. 583 was plainly arbitrary and in bad faith under aforequoted Section 29
On January 10, 1980, a general examination of the bank's affairs and operations was conducted and there were of Republic Act No. 265 as amended, among others (Rollo, p. 28). On the same day, petitioner herein filed a
found by DRBSLA represented by herein respondent, Consolacion V. Odra, Director of DRBSLA, among others, rejoinder to its opposition to the motion to dismiss (Rollo, p. 145).
massive irregularities in its operations consisting of loans to unknown and fictitious borrowers, where the sum of P
On March 9,1982, herein petitioner Judge Buenviaje, issued an order denying the respondents' motion to dismiss, The Court of Appeals issued on May 24, 1982 an order requiring herein petitioner Rural Bank of Buhi, Inc., through
supplemental motion to dismiss and granting a temporary restraining order enjoining respondents from further its then Acting Manager, Imelda del Rosario and herein petitioner Judge Carlos Buenviaje, as well as Manuel
managing and administering the Rural Bank of Buhi and to deliver the possession and control thereof to the Genova and Rodolfo Sosa, to show cause within ten (10) days from notice why they should not be held in contempt
petitioner Bank under the same conditions and with the same financial status as when the same was taken over by of court and further directing the Ministry of National Defense or its representative to cause the return of possession
herein respondents (defendants) on April 16, 1980 and further enjoining petitioner to post a bond in the amount of and management of the Rural Bank to the respondents Central Bank and Consolacion Odra (Rollo, p. 180).
three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) (Rollo, p. 72).
On June 9, 1982, petitioners filed their objection to respondents' motion for contempt dated June 5, 1982 claiming
The dispositive portion of said decision reads: that the properties, subject of the order, had already been returned to the herein petitioners who are the lawful
owners thereof and that the returning could no longer be undone (Rollo, p. 181).
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion to dismiss and supplemental motion to dismiss,
in the light of petitioners' opposition, for want of sufficient merit is denied. Respondents are Later, petitioners filed another motion dated June 17, 1982 for the reconsideration of the resolution of June 1, 1982
hereby directed to file their answer within ten (10) days from receipt of a copy of this order. of the Court of Appeals alleging that the same contravened and departed from the rulings of the Supreme Court that
(Rollo, p. 4). consummated acts or acts already done could no longer be the subject of mandatory injunction and that the
respondent Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to issue the order unless it was in aid of its appellate jurisdiction,
claiming that the case (CA-G.R. No. 13944) did not come to it on appeal (Rollo, p. 302).
On March 11, 1982, petitioner Buhi through counsel, conformably with the above-mentioned order, filed a Motion to
Admit Bond in the amount of P300,220.00 (Rollo, pp. 78-80).
As aforestated, on June 17, 1982, respondent Court of Appeals rendered its decision (HATOL) setting aside the
lower court's restraining order dated March 9,1982 and ordering the dismissal of herein petitioners' amended
On March 15,1982, herein petitioner Judge issued the order admitting the bond of P300,220.00 filed by the
complaint in Civil Case No. IR-428 (Rollo, p. 186).
petitioner, and directing the respondents to surrender the possession of the Rural Bank of Buhi, together with all its
equipments, accessories, etc. to the petitioners (Rollo, p. 6).
On July 9, 1982, petitioners (respondents in CA-G.R. No. 13944) filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision
dated June 17, 1982 insofar as the complaint with the lower court (Civil Case No. IR-428 was ordered dismissed
Consequently, on March 16, 1982, herein petitioner Judge issued the writ of execution directing the Acting Provincial
(Rollo, p. 305).
Sheriff of Camarines Sur to implement the Court's order of March 9, 1982 (Rollo, p. 268). Complying with the said
order of the Court, the Deputy Provincial Sheriff went to the Buhi premises to implement the writ of execution but the
vault of the petitioner bank was locked and no inventory was made, as evidenced by the Sheriffs Report (Rollo, pp. On August 23, 1982, the respondent Court of Appeals issued its Resolution denying for lack of merit, herein
83-84). Thus, the petitioner herein filed with the Court an "Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Allow Sheriff Calope to Force petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the resolution issued by the respondent Court of Appeals on June 1, 1982
Open Bank Vault" on the same day (Rollo, p. 268). Accordingly, on March 17, 1982, herein petitioner Judge granted and set on August 31, 1982 the hearing of the motion to cite the respondents in CA-G.R. No. SP-13944 (herein
the aforesaid Ex-Parte Motion to Force Open the Bank Vault (Rollo, p. 269). petitioner) for contempt (Rollo, p. 193).

On March 18, 1982, counsel for petitioner filed another "Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Order Manager of City Trust to At said hearing, counsel for Rural Bank of Buhi agreed and promised in open court to restore and return to the
Allow Petitioner to Withdraw Rural Bank Deposits" while a separate "Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Order Manager of Central Bank the possession and control of the Bank within three (3) days from August 31, 1982.
Metrobank to Release Deposits of Petitioners" was filed on the same date. The motion was granted by the Court in
an order directing the Manager of Metro Bank-Naga City (Rollo, p. 269) to comply as prayed for.
However on September 3,1982, Rosalia Guevara, Manager thereof, vigorously and adamantly refused to surrender
the premises unless she received a written order from the Court.
In view thereof, herein respondents filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction docketed as CA-G.R. No. 13944 against herein petitioners, seeking to set aside the restraining
In a subsequent hearing of the contempt incident, the Court of Appeals issued its Order dated October 13,1982, but
order and reiterating therein that petitioner Buhi's complaint in the lower court be dismissed (Rollo, p. 270).
Rosalia Guevara still refused to obey, whereupon she was placed under arrest and the Court of Appeals ordered her
to be detained until she decided to obey the Court's Order (Rollo, pp. 273-274).
On March 19, 1982, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution (KAPASIYAHAN) in tagalog, restraining the Hon.
Judge Carlos R. Buenviaje, from enforcing his order of March 9,1982 and suspending further proceedings in Sp.
Earlier, on September 14, 1982 petitioners had filed this petition even while a motion for reconsideration of the
Proc. No. IR-428 pending before him while giving the Central Bank counsel, Atty. Ricardo Quintos, authority to carry
decision of June 17,1982 was still pending consideration in the Court of Appeals.
out personally said orders and directing the "Punong Kawani" of the Court of Appeals to send telegrams to the Office
of the President and the Supreme Court (Rollo, p. 168).
In the resolution of October 20, 1982, the Second Division of this Court without giving due course to the petition
required respondents to COMMENT (Rollo, p. 225).
Herein petitioners did not comply with the Court of Appeals' order of March 19, 1982, but filed instead on March 21,
1982 a motion for reconsideration of said order of the Court of Appeals, claiming that the lower court's order of March
9, 1982 referred only to the denial of therein respondents' motion to dismiss and supplemental motion to dismiss and Counsel for respondents manifested (Rollo, p. 226) that they could not file the required comment because they were
that the return of Buhi to the petitioners was already an accomplished fact. The motion was denied by the not given a copy of the petition. Meanwhile, they filed an urgent motion dated October 28, 1982 with the Court of
respondent court in a resolution dated June 1, 1982 (Rollo, p. 301). Appeals to place the bank through its representatives in possession of the Rural Bank of Buhi (Camarines Sur), Inc.
(Rollo, p. 237).
In view of petitioners' refusal to obey the Court of Appeals' Order of March 19, 1982, herein respondents filed with
the Court of Appeals a Motion to Cite Petitioners in Contempt, dated April 22, 1982 (Rollo, p. 174). On December 9, 1982, petitioners filed a Supplemental Petition with urgent motion for the issuance of a restraining
order dated December 2, 1982 praying that the restraining order be issued against respondent court (Rollo, p. 229).
In the resolution of December 15,1982, the Court resolved to require petitioners to furnish the respondents with a I. Petitioner Rural Bank's position is to the effect that due process was not observed by the Monetary Board before
copy of the petition and to require the respondents to comment on both the original and the supplemental petitions said bank was placed under receivership. Said Rural Bank claimed that it was not given the chance to deny and
(Rollo, p. 243). disprove such claim of insolvency and/or any other ground which the Monetary Board used in justification of its
action.
In a resolution of February 21, 1983, the Court NOTED Rosalia V. Guevara's letter dated February 4, 1983 (Rollo, p.
252) addressed to Hon. Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, requesting that she be allowed to file a petition for the Relative thereto, the provision of Republic Act No. 265 on the proceedings upon insolvency reads:
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus (Rollo, p. 256).
SEC. 29. Proceedings upon insolvency.— Whenever, upon examination by the head of the
At the hearing of the said petition on February 23, 1983 where the counsel of both parties appeared, this Court noted appropriate supervising and examining department or his examiners or agents into the condition
the Return of the Writ of Habeas Corpus as well as the release of petitioner Rosalia V. Guevara from detention by of any banking institution, it shall be disclosed that the condition of the same is one of
the National Bureau of Investigation. After hearing aforesaid counsel and petitioner herself, and it appearing that the insolvency, or that its continuance in business would involve probable loss to its depositors or
latter had resigned since January 18,1983 as Manager of the Rural Bank of Buhi, Inc. and that the Central Bank creditors, it shall be the duty of the department head concerned forthwith, in writing, to inform the
might avail of more than adequate legal measures to take over the management, possession and control of the said Monetary Board of the facts, and the Board may, upon finding the statements of the department
bank (and not through contempt proceedings and detention and confinement of petitioner), with Assistant Solicitor head to be true, forbid the institution to do business in the Philippines and shall designate an
General Andin manifesting that respondents were not insisting on the continued detention of petitioner, the Court official of the Central Bank, or a person of recognized competence in banking, as receiver to
Resolved to SET the petitioner at liberty and to consider the contempt incident closed (Rollo, p. 339). immediately take charge of its assets and liabilities, as expeditiously as possible collect and
gather all the assets and administer the same for the benefit of its creditors, exercising all the
powers necessary for these purposes including, but not limited to, bringing suits and foreclosing
On April 11, 1983, respondents filed their comment on the original and supplemental petitions.
mortgages in the name of the banking institution.

Meanwhile, the Court of Appeals, acting on respondents' urgent motion filed on October 28, 1982 ordered on April
The Monetary Board shall thereupon determine within sixty days whether the institution may be
13, 1983 the return to the petitioners (herein respondents) or their duly authorized representatives of the possession,
recognized or otherwise placed in such a condition so that it may be permitted to resume
management and control of subject Rural Bank (Rollo, p. 319), together with its properties.
business with safety to its depositors and creditors and the general public and shall prescribe
the conditions under which such redemption of business shall take place as the time for
On April 28, 1983, petitioner filed an urgent motion: (1) to give due course to the petition and (2) for immediate fulfillment of such conditions. In such case, the expenses and fees in the collection and
issuance of a Restraining Order against the respondent court to prevent it from enforcing its aforesaid resolution administration of the assets of the institution shall be determined by the Board and shall be paid
dated April 13, 1983 and from further proceeding in AC-G.R. No. 13944-SP (Rollo, p. 315). to the Central Bank out of the assets of such banking institution.

On May 16, 1983, this Court resolved to deny the petition for lack of merit (Rollo, p. 321). On July 25, 1983, If the Monetary Board shall determine and confirm within the said period that the banking
petitioners filed their verified Motion for Reconsideration (Rollo, p. 337) praying that the HATOL dated June 17, 1982 institution is insolvent or cannot resume business with safety to its depositors, creditors and the
of the Court of Appeals be set aside as null and void and that Special Proceedings No. IR-428 of CFI-Camarines general public, it shall, if the public interest requires, order its liquidation, indicate the manner of
Sur, Iriga City, Branch VII, be ordered remanded to the RTC of Camarines Sur, Iriga City, for further proceedings. its liquidation and approve a liquidation plan. The Central Bank shall, by the Solicitor General,
file a petition in the Court of First Instance reciting the proceedings which have been taken and
praying the assistance of the court in the liquidation of the banking institution. The Court shall
A Motion for Early Resolution was filed by herein petitioners on March 12,1984 (Rollo, p. 348). have jurisdiction in the same proceedings to adjudicate disputed claims against the bank and
enforce individual liabilities of the stockholders and do all that is necessary to preserve the
Petitioners raised the following legal issues in their motion for reconsideration: assets of the banking institution and to implement the liquidation plan approved by the Monetary
Board. The Monetary Board shall designate an official of the Central Bank or a person of
recognized competence in banking, as liquidator who shall take over the functions of the
I. UNDER SEC. 29, R.A. 265, AS AMENDED, MAY THE MONETARY BOARD (MB) OF THE CENTRAL BANK (CB) receiver previously appointed by the Monetary Board under this Section. The liquidator shall,
PLACE A RURAL BANK UNDER RECEIVERSHIP WITHOUT PRIOR NOTICE TO SAID RURAL BANK TO ENABLE with all convenient speed, convert the assets of the banking institution to money or sell, assign
IT TO BE HEARD ON THE GROUND RELIED UPON FOR SUCH RECEIVERSHIP? or otherwise dispose of the same to creditors and other parties for the purpose of paying the
debts of such bank and he may, in the name of the banking institution, institute such actions as
II. UNDER THE SAME SECTION OF SAID LAW, WHERE THE MONETARY BOARD (MB) OF THE CENTRAL may be necessary in the appropriate court to collect and recover accounts and assets of the
BANK (CB) HAS PLACED A RURAL BANK UNDER RECEIVERSHIP, IS SUCH ACTION OF THE MONETARY banking institution.
BOARD (MB) SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW? IF SO, WHICH COURT MAY EXERCISE SUCH POWER AND
WHEN MAY IT EXERCISE THE SAME? The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding the actions of the Monetary Board
under this Section and the second paragraph of Section 34 of this Act shall be final and
III. UNDER THE SAID SECTION OF THE LAW, SUPPOSE A CIVIL CASE IS INSTITUTED SEEKING ANNULMENT executory, and can be set aside by the court only if there is convincing proof that the action is
OF THE RECEIVERSHIP ON THE GROUND OF ARBITRARINESS AND BAD FAITH ON THE PART OF THE plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith. No restraining order or injunction shall be issued by the
MONETARY BOARD (MB), MAY SUCH CASE BE DISMISSED BY THE IAC (THEN CA) ON THE GROUND OF court enjoining the Central Bank from implementing its actions under this Section and the
INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE EVEN IF THE TRIAL COURT HAS NOT HAD A CHANCE YET TO RECEIVE second paragraph of Section 34 of this Act, unless there is convincing proof that the action of
EVIDENCE AND THE PARTIES HAVE NOT YET PRESENTED EVIDENCE EITHER IN THE TRIAL COURT OR IN the Monetary Board is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith and the petitioner or plaintiff files
SAID APPELLATE COURT? (Rollo, pp. 330-331). with the clerk or judge of the court in which the action is pending a bond executed in favor of the
Central Bank, in an amount to be fixed by the court. The restraining order or injunction shall be
refused or, if granted, shall be dissolved upon filing by the Central Bank of a bond, which shall
 be in the form of cash or Central Bank cashier's check, in an amount twice the amount of the such constitutional requirement when it conferred upon the Monetary Board the power to place Rural Banks under
bond of the petitioner, or plaintiff conditioned that it will pay the damages which the petitioner or receivership (Rollo, p. 333).
plaintiff may suffer by the refusal or the dissolution of the injunction. The provisions of Rule 58 of
the New Rules of Court insofar as they are applicable and not inconsistent with the provisions of
The contention is without merit. It has long been established and recognized in this jurisdiction that the closure and
this Section shall govern the issuance and dissolution of the restraining order or injunction
liquidation of a bank may be considered as an exercise of police power. Such exercise may, however, be subject to
contemplated in this Section.
judicial inquiry and could be set aside if found to be capricious, discriminatory, whimsical, arbitrary, unjust or a denial
of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution (Central Bank vs. Court of Appeals, 106 SCRA
Insolvency, under this Act, shall be understood to mean the inability of a banking institution to 155 [1981]).
pay its liabilities as they fall due in the usual and ordinary course of business: Provided,
however, that this shall not include the inability to pay of an otherwise non-insolvent bank
The evident implication of the law, therefore, is that the appointment of a receiver may be made by the Monetary
caused by extraordinary demands induced by financial panic commonly evidenced by a run on
Board without notice and hearing but its action is subject to judicial inquiry to insure the protection of the banking
the banks in the banking community.
institution. Stated otherwise, due process does not necessarily require a prior hearing; a hearing or an opportunity to
be heard may be subsequent to the closure. One can just imagine the dire consequences of a prior hearing: bank
The appointment of a conservator under Section 28-A of this Act or the appointment of receiver runs would be the order of the day, resulting in panic and hysteria. In the process, fortunes may be wiped out, and
under this Section shall be vested exclusively with the Monetary Board, the provision of any law, disillusionment will run the gamut of the entire banking community.
general or special, to the contrary not withstanding.
In Mendiola vs. Court of Appeals, (106 SCRA 130), the Supreme Court held:
It will be observed from the foregoing provision of law, that there is no requirement whether express or implied, that a
hearing be first conducted before a banking institution may be placed under receivership. On the contrary, the law is
The pivotal issue raised by petitioner is whether or not the appointment of a receiver by the
explicit as to the conditions prerequisite to the action of the Monetary Board to forbid the institution to do business in
Court of First Instance on January 14, 1969 was in order.
the Philippines and to appoint a receiver to immediately take charge of the bank's assets and liabilities. They are: (a)
an examination made by the examining department of the Central Bank; (b) report by said department to the
Monetary Board; and (c) prima facie showing that the bank is in a condition of insolvency or so situated that its Respondent Court correctly stated that the appointment of a receiver pendente lite is a matter
continuance in business would involve probable loss to its depositors or creditors. principally addressed to and resting largely on the sound discretion of the court to which the
application is made. This Tribunal has so held in a number of cases. However, receivership
being admittedly a harsh remedy, it should be granted with extreme caution. Sound reasons for
Supportive of this theory is the ruling of this Court, which established the authority of the Central Bank under the
receivership must appear of record, and there should be a clear showing of a necessity therefor.
foregoing circumstances, which reads:
Before granting the remedy, the court is advised to consider the consequence or effects thereof
in order to avoid irreparable injustice or injury to others who are entitled to as much
As will be noted, whenever it shall appear prima facie that a banking institution is in "a condition consideration as those seeking it.
of insolvency" or so situated "that its continuance in business would involved probable loss to its
depositors or creditors," the Monetary Board has authority:
xxx xxx xxx

First, to forbid the institution to do business and appoint a receiver therefor; and
This is not to say that a hearing is an indispensable requirement for the appointment of a
receiver. As petitioner correctly contends in his first assignment of error, courts may appoint
Second, to determine, within 60 days, whether or not: receivers without prior presentation of evidence and solely on the basis of the averments of the
pleadings. Rule 59 of the Revised Rules of Court allows the appointment of a receiver upon an
ex parte application.
1) the institution may be reorganized and rehabilitated to such an extent as
to be permitted to resume business with safety to depositors, creditors and
the general public; or There is no question that the action of the Monetary Board in this regard may be subject to judicial review. Thus, it
has been held that the courts may interfere with the Central Bank's exercise of discretion in determining whether or
not a distressed bank shall be supported or liquidated. Discretion has its limits and has never been held to include
2) it is indeed insolvent or cannot resume business with safety to depositors,
arbitrariness, discrimination or bad faith (Ramos vs. Central Bank of the Philippines, 41 SCRA 567 [1971]).
creditors and the general public, and public interest requires that it be
liquidated.
It has likewise been held that resolutions of the Monetary Board under Section 29 of the Central Bank Act, such as:
forbidding bank institutions to do business on account of a "condition of insolvency" or because its continuance in
In this latter case (i.e., the bank can no longer resume business with safety to depositors, creditors and the public,
business would involve probable loss to depositors or creditors; or appointing a receiver to take charge of the bank's
etc.) its liquidation will be ordered and a liquidator appointed by the Monetary Board. The Central Bank shall
assets and liabilities, or determining whether the bank may be rehabilitated or should be liquidated and appointing a
thereafter file a petition in the Regional Trial Court praying for the Court's assistance in the liquidation of the bank." ...
liquidator for that purpose, are under the law "final and executory" and may be set aside only on one ground, that is
(Salud vs. Central Bank, 143 SCRA 590 [1986]).
"if there is convincing proof that the action is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith" (Salud vs. Central Bank, supra).

Petitioner further argues, that there is also that constitutional guarantee that no property shall be taken without due
There is no dispute that under the above-quoted Section 29 of the Central Bank Act, the Regional Trial Court has
process of law, so that Section 29, R.A. 265, as amended, could not have intended to disregard and do away with
jurisdiction to adjudicate the question of whether or not the action of the Monetary Board directing the dissolution of
the subject Rural Bank is attended by arbitrariness and bad faith. Such position has been sustained by this Court in
Salud vs. Central Bank of the Philippines (supra).

In the same case, the Court ruled further that a banking institution's claim that a resolution of the Monetary Board
under Section 29 of the Central Bank Act should be set aside as plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith, may be
asserted as an affirmative defense (Sections 1 and 4[b], Rule 6, Rules of Court) or a counterclaim (Section 6, Rule 6;
Section 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court) in the proceedings for assistance in liquidation or as a cause of action in a
separate and distinct action where the latter was filed ahead of the petition for assistance in liquidation (ibid; Central
Bank vs. Court of Appeals, 106 SCRA 143 [1981]).

III. It will be noted that in the issuance of the Order of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, Branch VII, Iriga
City, dated March 9, 1982 (Rollo, pp. 72-77), there was no trial on the merits. Based on the pleadings filed, the Court
merely acted on the Central Bank's Motion to Dismiss and Supplemental Motion to Dismiss, denying both for lack of
sufficient merit. Evidently, the trial court merely acted on an incident and has not as yet inquired, as mandated by
Section 29 of the Central Bank Act, into the merits of the claim that the Monetary Board's action is plainly arbitrary
and made in bad faith. It has not appreciated certain facts which would render the remedy of liquidation proper and
rehabilitation improper, involving as it does an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the
parties properly belonging to the trial court and not properly cognizable on appeal (Central Bank vs. Court of
Appeals, supra, p. 156).

Still further, without a hearing held for both parties to substantiate their allegations in their respective pleadings, there
is lacking that "convincing proof" prerequisite to justify the temporary restraining order (mandatory injunction) issued
by the trial court in its Order of March 9, 1982.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the Court of Appeals is MODIFIED; We hereby order the remand of this
case to the Regional Trial Court for further proceedings, but We LIFT the temporary restraining order issued by the
trial court in its Order dated March 9, 1982.

SO ORDERED.

Yap, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines 3. That Toribio Teodoro's letter to the Philippine Army dated September 29, 1938, (re supposed delay of
SUPREME COURT leather soles from the States) was but a scheme to systematically prevent the forfeiture of this bond
Manila despite the breach of his CONTRACT with the Philippine Army.

EN BANC 4. That the National Worker's Brotherhood of ANG TIBAY is a company or employer union dominated by
Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are illegal. (281 U.S., 548, petitioner's printed
memorandum, p. 25.)
G.R. No. L-46496             February 27, 1940

5. That in the exercise by the laborers of their rights to collective bargaining, majority rule and elective
ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager and propietor, and 
representation are highly essential and indispensable. (Sections 2 and 5, Commonwealth Act No. 213.)
NATIONAL WORKERS BROTHERHOOD, petitioners, 
vs.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC., respondents. 6. That the century provisions of the Civil Code which had been (the) principal source of dissensions and
continuous civil war in Spain cannot and should not be made applicable in interpreting and applying the
salutary provisions of a modern labor legislation of American origin where the industrial peace has always
Office of the Solicitor-General Ozaeta and Assistant Attorney Barcelona for the Court of Industrial Relations.
been the rule.
Antonio D. Paguia for National Labor Unon.
Claro M. Recto for petitioner "Ang Tibay".
Jose M. Casal for National Workers' Brotherhood. 7. That the employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating against the
National Labor Union, Inc., and unjustly favoring the National Workers' Brotherhood.
LAUREL, J.:
8. That the exhibits hereto attached are so inaccessible to the respondents that even with the exercise of
due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of
The Solicitor-General in behalf of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations in the above-entitled case has filed a
Industrial Relations.
motion for reconsideration and moves that, for the reasons stated in his motion, we reconsider the following legal
conclusions of the majority opinion of this Court:
9. That the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and effect that their
admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered herein.
1. Que un contrato de trabajo, asi individual como colectivo, sin termino fijo de duracion o que no sea para
una determinada, termina o bien por voluntad de cualquiera de las partes o cada vez que ilega el plazo
fijado para el pago de los salarios segun costumbre en la localidad o cunado se termine la obra; The petitioner, Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition both to the motion for reconsideration of the respondent National
Labor Union, Inc.
2. Que los obreros de una empresa fabril, que han celebrado contrato, ya individual ya colectivamente,
con ell, sin tiempo fijo, y que se han visto obligados a cesar en sus tarbajos por haberse declarando paro In view of the conclusion reached by us and to be herein after stead with reference to the motion for a new trial of the
forzoso en la fabrica en la cual tarbajan, dejan de ser empleados u obreros de la misma; respondent National Labor Union, Inc., we are of the opinion that it is not necessary to pass upon the motion for
reconsideration of the Solicitor-General. We shall proceed to dispose of the motion for new trial of the respondent
labor union. Before doing this, however, we deem it necessary, in the interest of orderly procedure in cases of this
3. Que un patrono o sociedad que ha celebrado un contrato colectivo de trabajo con sus osbreros sin
nature, in interest of orderly procedure in cases of this nature, to make several observations regarding the nature of
tiempo fijo de duracion y sin ser para una obra determiminada y que se niega a readmitir a dichos obreros
the powers of the Court of Industrial Relations and emphasize certain guiding principles which should be observed in
que cesaron como consecuencia de un paro forzoso, no es culpable de practica injusta in incurre en la
the trial of cases brought before it. We have re-examined the entire record of the proceedings had before the Court
sancion penal del articulo 5 de la Ley No. 213 del Commonwealth, aunque su negativa a readmitir se deba
of Industrial Relations in this case, and we have found no substantial evidence that the exclusion of the 89 laborers
a que dichos obreros pertenecen a un determinado organismo obrero, puesto que tales ya han dejado
here was due to their union affiliation or activity. The whole transcript taken contains what transpired during the
deser empleados suyos por terminacion del contrato en virtud del paro.
hearing and is more of a record of contradictory and conflicting statements of opposing counsel, with sporadic
conclusion drawn to suit their own views. It is evident that these statements and expressions of views of counsel
The respondent National Labor Union, Inc., on the other hand, prays for the vacation of the judgement rendered by have no evidentiary value.
the majority of this Court and the remanding of the case to the Court of Industrial Relations for a new trial, and avers:
The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation
1. That Toribio Teodoro's claim that on September 26, 1938, there was shortage of leather soles in ANG (Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an administrative than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation.
TIBAY making it necessary for him to temporarily lay off the members of the National Labor Union Inc., is It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the Government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially
entirely false and unsupported by the records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties
native dealers in leather. litigant, the function of the Court of Industrial Relations, as will appear from perusal of its organic law, is more active,
affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the determination of disputes
between employers and employees but its functions in the determination of disputes between employers and
2. That the supposed lack of leather materials claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme to employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and expensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines,
systematically prevent the forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his CONTRACT with the Philippine to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or dispute arising between, and/or
Army. affecting employers and employees or laborers, and regulate the relations between them, subject to, and in
accordance with, the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 103 (section 1). It shall take cognizance or purposes of accept as adequate to support a conclusion." (Appalachian Electric Power v. National Labor Relations
prevention, arbitration, decision and settlement, of any industrial or agricultural dispute causing or likely to cause a Board, 4 Cir., 93 F. 2d 985, 989; National Labor Relations Board v. Thompson Products, 6 Cir., 97 F. 2d
strike or lockout, arising from differences as regards wages, shares or compensation, hours of labor or conditions of 13, 15; Ballston-Stillwater Knitting Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 2 Cir., 98 F. 2d 758, 760.) . . .
tenancy or employment, between landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, provided that the number of employees, The statute provides that "the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be
laborers or tenants of farm-laborers involved exceeds thirty, and such industrial or agricultural dispute is submitted to controlling.' The obvious purpose of this and similar provisions is to free administrative boards from the
the Court by the Secretary of Labor or by any or both of the parties to the controversy and certified by the Secretary compulsion of technical rules so that the mere admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent
of labor as existing and proper to be by the Secretary of Labor as existing and proper to be dealth with by the Court inn judicial proceedings would not invalidate the administrative order. (Interstate Commerce Commission
for the sake of public interest. (Section 4, ibid.) It shall, before hearing the dispute and in the course of such hearing, v. Baird, 194 U.S. 25, 44, 24 S. Ct. 563, 568, 48 Law. ed. 860; Interstate Commerce Commission v.
endeavor to reconcile the parties and induce them to settle the dispute by amicable agreement. (Paragraph 2, Louisville and Nashville R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 93 33 S. Ct. 185, 187, 57 Law. ed. 431; United States v.
section 4, ibid.) When directed by the President of the Philippines, it shall investigate and study all industries Abilene and Southern Ry. Co. S. Ct. 220, 225, 74 Law. ed. 624.) But this assurance of a desirable
established in a designated locality, with a view to determinating the necessity and fairness of fixing and adopting for flexibility in administrative procedure does not go far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence having
such industry or locality a minimum wage or share of laborers or tenants, or a maximum "canon" or rental to be paid rational probative force. Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence.
by the "inquilinos" or tenants or less to landowners. (Section 5, ibid.) In fine, it may appeal to voluntary arbitration in (Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 59 S. Ct. 206, 83 Law. ed. No. 4, Adv. Op., p.
the settlement of industrial disputes; may employ mediation or conciliation for that purpose, or recur to the more 131.)"
effective system of official investigation and compulsory arbitration in order to determine specific controversies
between labor and capital industry and in agriculture. There is in reality here a mingling of executive and judicial
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the
functions, which is a departure from the rigid doctrine of the separation of governmental powers.
record and disclosed to the parties affected. (Interstate Commence Commission vs. L. & N. R. Co., 227
U.S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185, 57 Law. ed. 431.) Only by confining the administrative tribunal to the evidence
In the case of Goseco vs. Court of Industrial Relations et al., G.R. No. 46673, promulgated September 13, 1939, we disclosed to the parties, can the latter be protected in their right to know and meet the case against them.
had occasion to joint out that the Court of Industrial Relations et al., G. R. No. 46673, promulgated September 13, It should not, however, detract from their duty actively to see that the law is enforced, and for that purpose,
1939, we had occasion to point out that the Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by technical to use the authorized legal methods of securing evidence and informing itself of facts material and relevant
rules of procedure, and the Act requires it to "act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, to the controversy. Boards of inquiry may be appointed for the purpose of investigating and determining
without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technicalities or legal forms and shall not the facts in any given case, but their report and decision are only advisory. (Section 9, Commonwealth Act
be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and No. 103.) The Court of Industrial Relations may refer any industrial or agricultural dispute or any matter
equitable." (Section 20, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) It shall not be restricted to the specific relief claimed or under its consideration or advisement to a local board of inquiry, a provincial fiscal. a justice of the peace
demands made by the parties to the industrial or agricultural dispute, but may include in the award, order or decision or any public official in any part of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation, and may
any matter or determination which may be deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute or delegate to such board or public official such powers and functions as the said Court of Industrial Relations
of preventing further industrial or agricultural disputes. (section 13, ibid.) And in the light of this legislative policy, may deem necessary, but such delegation shall not affect the exercise of the Court itself of any of its
appeals to this Court have been especially regulated by the rules recently promulgated by the rules recently powers. (Section 10, ibid.)
promulgated by this Court to carry into the effect the avowed legislative purpose. The fact, however, that the Court of
Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent
can, in justifiable cases before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in
process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. There are primary rights which must be respected
arriving at a decision. It may be that the volume of work is such that it is literally Relations personally to
even in proceedings of this character:
decide all controversies coming before them. In the United States the difficulty is solved with the
enactment of statutory authority authorizing examiners or other subordinates to render final decision, with
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or the right to appeal to board or commission, but in our case there is no such statutory authority.
affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. In the language of Chief Hughes,
in Morgan v. U.S., 304 U.S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 773, 999, 82 Law. ed. 1129, "the liberty and property of the citizen
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a
shall be protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair play.
manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the
decision rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to
establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. (Chief Justice
In the right of the foregoing fundamental principles, it is sufficient to observe here that, except as to the alleged
Hughes in Morgan v. U.S. 298 U.S. 468, 56 S. Ct. 906, 80 law. ed. 1288.) In the language of this court
agreement between the Ang Tibay and the National Worker's Brotherhood (appendix A), the record is barren and
in Edwards vs. McCoy, 22 Phil., 598, "the right to adduce evidence, without the corresponding duty on the
does not satisfy the thirst for a factual basis upon which to predicate, in a national way, a conclusion of law.
part of the board to consider it, is vain. Such right is conspicuously futile if the person or persons to whom
the evidence is presented can thrust it aside without notice or consideration."
This result, however, does not now preclude the concession of a new trial prayed for the by respondent National
Labor Union, Inc., it is alleged that "the supposed lack of material claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme
(3) "While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity
adopted to systematically discharged all the members of the National Labor Union Inc., from work" and this
which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support it is a nullity, a place when
avernment is desired to be proved by the petitioner with the "records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of
directly attached." (Edwards vs. McCoy, supra.) This principle emanates from the more fundamental is
Accounts of native dealers in leather"; that "the National Workers Brotherhood Union of Ang Tibay is a company or
contrary to the vesting of unlimited power anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation upon power.
employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are illegal." Petitioner further
alleges under oath that the exhibits attached to the petition to prove his substantial avernments" are so inaccessible
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion (City of Manila vs. Agustin, to the respondents that even within the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them
G.R. No. 45844, promulgated November 29, 1937, XXXVI O. G. 1335), but the evidence must be and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations", and that the documents attached to the petition "are of
"substantial." (Washington, Virginia and Maryland Coach Co. v. national labor Relations Board, 301 U.S. such far reaching importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of
142, 147, 57 S. Ct. 648, 650, 81 Law. ed. 965.) It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind the judgment rendered herein." We have considered the reply of Ang Tibay and its arguments against the petition.
By and large, after considerable discussions, we have come to the conclusion that the interest of justice would be
better served if the movant is given opportunity to present at the hearing the documents referred to in his motion and
such other evidence as may be relevant to the main issue involved. The legislation which created the Court of
Industrial Relations and under which it acts is new. The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely
attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be and the
same is hereby granted, and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations,
with instruction that it reopen the case, receive all such evidence as may be relevant and otherwise proceed in
accordance with the requirements set forth hereinabove. So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, Concepcion and Moran, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines charges against petitioner by making it appear that she (private respondent) gave the money because of petitioner's
SUPREME COURT promise to facilitate her travel to Japan. Petitioner denied having received the sum of ₱29,000.00 from private
respondent, contending that such claim is "pure falsehood because of the absence of document to prove the alleged
receipt." As regards the complaints of Lao and Cosino, petitioner denied having met or known said persons.
SECOND DIVISION

Finding petitioner’s explanation "unsatisfactory and [her] defense weak," Commissioner Rodriguez issued Personnel
G.R. No. 153166 December 16, 2005
Order No. RBR 98-60,7 preventively suspending her for sixty (60) days pending the investigation of the case. The
instant case was assigned to Special Prosecutor Norberto dela Cruz, who issued a subpoena 8 ordering private
TERESITA L. VERTUDES,1 Petitioner,  respondent and petitioner to appear before him on October 15, 1998 for the formal investigation of the case. It
vs. appears that in the meantime, Villas died and private respondent personally took on the instant complaint with the BI
JULIE BUENAFLOR and BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, Respondents. for Grave Misconduct against petitioner, docketed as Administrative Charge No. 0004. Lao and Cosino filed their
respective complaint-affidavits9 with the BI which became the subject of another administrative case against
petitioner.10
DECISION

On August 21, 1998, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration (Re: Personnel Order No. RBR-98-60) with Motion
PUNO, J.: to Dismiss.11 On September 2, 1998, petitioner filed a Manifestation with Urgent Prayer to Resolve Motion to
Dismiss,12 averring that the complaint instituted by Villas in behalf of private respondent was a harassment case
Before us is a petition for review by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to review and set aside against her. Petitioner sought the dismissal of the instant action on the ground that in addition to the instant
the decision2 and resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed the decision of the Civil Service administrative case, private respondent had personally filed her complaint-affidavit "of similar nature and character"
Commission (CSC) finding petitioner guilty of grave misconduct and dismissing her from government service. with the Manila City Prosecutor's Office, docketed as 98-H-44000-1, and with the Office of the Ombudsman,
docketed as OMB-98-1701.
Petitioner Teresita L. Vertudes was a fingerprint examiner at the Alien Registration Division of the Bureau of
Immigration (BI). In a facsimile letter4 dated July 27, 1998, a certain Peng Villas, a news editor of the Philippine Private respondent narrated the pertinent events in her complaint-affidavit 13 as follows:
Weekly Newspaper, referred to then BI Commissioner Rufus Rodriguez the complaints of private respondent Julie
Buenaflor, Amy Cosino and Manuelito Lao, against petitioner. 1. That I met Ms. Teresita Vertudes, an employee of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, Intramuros, Manila
sometime in the middle part of 1996;
According to Villas, private respondent Buenaflor complained of having been convinced by petitioner into paying the
total amount of ₱79,000.00 in exchange for the processing of her visa, passport and other travel documents for 2. That from that time on, we became friends because we come from the same region and that she used to tell us
Japan. Private respondent delivered to petitioner Security Bank (SB) Check Nos. 0014797 and 0014798 in the that she is capable of deploying job applicants to Japan;
amounts of ₱30,000.00 and ₱20,000.00, respectively, and cash worth ₱29,000.00. However, no visa was delivered.
Private respondent insisted that petitioner return her money, to no avail.
3. That during one of those times that I dropped by her office, she intimated to me that a group of Immigration
Officers are scheduled to leave for Japan for training and that she was the one who received a call from a Japanese
Villas also referred to Commissioner Rodriguez the complaint of Lao who allegedly told him that he paid ₱60,000.00 Consul;
to petitioner in exchange for a Chinese Visa and a passport for Taiwan. Likewise, Villas referred Cosino’s complaint
that the latter collected from Virfinia Dumbrique, Jaime Santos Flores and Mariano Evangelista, the amounts of
₱20,000.00 each, upon petitioner's word that they would be in exchange for tourist visas. Both Lao and Cosino 4. That Ms. Teresita Vertudes asked me if I am interested in going to Japan because she will find a way to
claimed that the promised passport and visas did not materialize and despite many requests for the return of the accommodate me and I told her that I am deeply interested but my problem was that my passport was left in Bacolod
amounts paid to petitioner, she refused to comply. Allegedly, "Vertudez threatened them that they cannot force her to City and she volunteered to work-out [and] facilitate the processing of my passport and visa and that [all] I need to do
pay back the said amount as she has the back up [of] higher BID officials." is give her my picture which I did;

Acting upon Villas' letter, Commissioner Rodriguez issued a memorandum, 5 directing the petitioner to submit a sworn 5. That she even added that she has a brother in Japan who could also help me find a job and I will be going there
written explanation. In her sworn written memorandum,6 petitioner assailed the credibility of Villas. She alleged that along with her son, Jimmy V[e]rtudes Santos. She showed to me her son's passport and application for a Visa,
Villas was not a member of the National Press Club as he claimed to be. She averred that the sum of ₱50,000.00, as copies of which are attached and marked as Annexes "A", "B" and "C";
evidenced by SB Check Nos. 0014797 and 0014798, was extended to her by private respondent Buenaflor as a
loan. She was constrained to borrow money from private respondent and other close friends when her brother
6. That according to Ms. Vertudes I will be receiving a salary of one lapad per day as a factory worker and that
became seriously ill. However, she claimed that she had fully settled her obligation to private respondent through
should I accept to her offer, all that will be required of me is to give her the amount of ₱80,000.00;
installment. She also claimed that private respondent was the one engaged in illegal recruitment through the use of
falsified or forged passports. Private respondent was allegedly using petitioner’s name in dealing with some
immigration officials and employees to expedite the processing of the documents of her (private respondent’s) 7. That on December 24, 1997 Ms. Vertudes received from me Security Bank Check No. 0014797 in the amount of
clients. Petitioner allegedly informed said officers and employees that she was not connected to private respondent ₱30,000.00 which she was able to encash and likewise Security Bank Check No. 0014798 in the amount of
in any way. Private respondent allegedly resented this "abrupt disassociation." Also, her repeated refusal to "escort" ₱20,000.00 x x x Annexes "D" and "E";
private respondent's clients who were leaving for abroad using falsified travel documents allegedly led private
respondent to threaten her that she could easily use SB Check Nos. 0014797 and 0014798 as evidence to file
8. That on February 8, 1998, because of her insistence and persistence that I should deliver the balance of 4.7. Since I was then in financial distress, I was constrained to borrow money with interests from Ms. Buenaflor and
₱30,000.00 to her so that I could leave in a week's time, I was forced to produce the said amount by requesting a other close friends of mine. As a kind gesture on the part of Ms. Buenaflor she extended to me a loan in the total
friend to pawn my jewelry in the amount of ₱29,000.00 and the aforesaid amount was handed to Ms. Vertudes in the amount of ₱50,000.00 as represented by Security Bank check nos. 0014797 and 0014798 in the respective amounts
presence of Ms. Joy Gutierrez at her office in (BID), Intramuros, Manila; of ₱30,000.00 and ₱20,000.00 (citation omitted);

9. That after that last payment, I have been asking her as to when I am suppose[d] to leave because I was already 4.8. It is however our agreement that I would pay the amount of ₱50,000.00 with the additional amount of
prepared to leave and have in fact told my relatives and friends that I will be leaving soon for Japan but she did not ₱10,000.00 representing the interests therefore for a total of ₱60,000.00;
stop making promises;
4.9. We further agreed that I would pay my financial obligation to Ms. Buenaflor on or before the last day of May
10. That upon the advi[c]e of a lawyer and to be able to know once and for all whether I could still leave, I requested 1998 from December 1997 on installment basis;
my lawyer to write a letter to Ms. Vertudes for her to refund the sums of money which I delivered to her in the total
amount of ₱79,000.00 for the processing of my Passport and Visa for job deployment abroad but she did not even
4.10. With the aforementioned amount of ₱50,000.00 loaned to me by Julie Buenaflor and the other amounts x x x
answer the letter and neither called up my lawyer to explain her side; letter is attached as Annex "E";
from other friends, I was able to contribute the total amount of ₱100,000.00 for the treatment and hospitalization of
my brother. It was, however, to no avail because my brother died on January 6, 1998;
11. That for Ms. Teresita Vertudes' failure to make good her promise to deploy me after receiving the amount of
₱79,000.00 in consideration of a job placement in Japan, I hereby charge her for the crime of Illegal Recruitment and
4.11. Pursuant to our agreement, I was able to pay Ms. Buenaflor on installment basis the total amount of
Estafa; x x x
₱60,000.00 at my earlier indicated address on the following dates:

Annexed to private respondent's complaint-affidavit were: a) the affidavit of a certain Jessilyn Gutierrez 14 who
DATE AMOUNT
attested that she accompanied private respondent in going to the office of petitioner and she was with private
respondent when the latter delivered to petitioner the checks amounting to ₱50,000.00 and cash worth ₱29,000.00
for private respondent's job placement to Japan; b) copies of the passport and application for a visa of petitioner's February 28, 1998 ₱15,000.00
son, to prove that petitioner showed these documents to her so she would believe that she would be going to Japan
with petitioner's son; c) copies of SB Check Nos. 0014797 and 0014798, to prove petitioner's receipt of the total
March 31, 1998 15,000.00
amount of ₱50,000.00 from private respondent; and d) letter of private respondent's counsel to petitioner demanding
the refund of ₱79,000.00 from petitioner.
April 30, 1998 15,000.00
On October 15, 1998, petitioner, accompanied by her counsel, and private respondent appeared before Special
Prosecutor dela Cruz for the formal investigation of the case. 15 The second hearing took place on October 27, 1998, May 30, 1998 15,000.00
during which, petitioner submitted her Counter-Affidavit16 and the affidavits of her witnesses. Her version was:
4.12. I tendered the said payments to Ms. Buenaflor at my residence on the dates earlier enumerated in the
4.1. I first met Ms. Buenaflor sometime in 1996 when I was still assigned at the General Services Division of the presence of my housemaids, Eliza Compo and Jocelyn Reyes; x x x
Bureau of Immigration;
Petitioner averred that private respondent misrepresented to her (petitioner's) son, Jimmy Santos, Jr., that she
4.2. At that time, Ms. Buenaflor represented to me that she was connected with a travel agency assigned to (private respondent) would facilitate his travel to and employment in Japan. She also assailed the credibility of
process/facilitate documents of their clients in the Buereau of Immigration; private respondent by accusing her of using several passports under different names. Attached to petitioner's
counter-affidavit were: a) a copy of a passport application in the name of Honna Sumadia Araneta showing the
photographs of private respondent; b) referral slip of the Pasay City Police Station and the sworn statement of a
4.3. Indeed, I saw Ms. Buenaflor processing and making follow-ups of documents in the different
certain Armando Gambala charging private respondent with Estafa and Illegal Recruitment; 17 c) affidavits of
Divisions/Departments of the Bureau of Immigration similar to what were being done by the representatives of other
petitioner's son, Jimmy Santos, Jr.,18 and a certain Enrico Tuazon, showing that they likewise filed a case for Estafa
travel agencies transacting business therewith;
and Illegal Recruitment against private respondent; and d) a copy of the Certificate of Business Name and
Certification19 issued by Prudential Bank, to prove that private respondent misstated the address of her business
4.4. During that period, Ms. Buenaflor and me became close friends because she frequently visited me in my office establishment. Petitioner also submitted to Special Prosecutor dela Cruz the Pinagsamang Sinumpaang
at General Services Division and would even stay thereat while processing documents and waiting for their release. Salaysay20of her two housemaids, Eliza Compo and Jocelyn Reyes, to prove that she had fully paid her obligation to
In fact, she often took her lunch and merienda with me and sometimes, with the other employees of our division; private respondent. Likewise, she submitted the handwritten joint sworn statement 21 of Ernesto V. Cloma and Jhun
M. Romero, media practitioners, to prove that Villas asked for petitioner’s forgiveness before he died, admitting that
he only sent his letter dated July 27, 1998 to Commissioner Rodriguez in consideration of the amount given by
4.5. Sometime in the third week of December 1997, I was informed by my relatives in our hometown that my brother,
private respondent.
Mariano "Dido" Vertudes was seriously ill and was thereafter confined on December 22, 1997 at Gingoog General
Hospital located at Gingoog City, Misamis Oriental;
On the same hearing, the parties agreed to submit the instant case for resolution. 22 Thus, in his Resolution dated
November 12, 1998,23 Special Prosecutor dela Cruz found petitioner guilty of grave misconduct and recommended
4.6. The type of illness of my brother required extensive treatment and medication; and for this reason, they
her dismissal from the service.
requested for financial assistance to defray the expenses therefor;
Meantime, the case instituted by private respondent with the Office of the Ombudsman was referred to the Office of As to respondent's assertion that she was able to pay the ₱50,000.00 to the complainant, there is nothing to support
the City Prosecutor, thus: such payment. The statements of her two (2) maids -- Eliza C[o]mpo and Jocelyn Reyes -- in their Sinumpaang
Salaysay that respondent paid to the complainant the total amount of ₱60,000.00 during the months of February
1998 to May 1998 cannot be believed. Being the housemaids of the respondent, it is but natural and to be expected
After evaluation, the undersigned finds that the charges imputed against the respondent are not office related and
of these persons to come to the aid of their employe[r].28
that the administrative aspect of the case had already been undertaken by the Bureau of Immigration.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial, 29 reiterating her argument in her Motion to Re-open.
In view thereof, it is respectfully recommended that the instant complaint be referred to the Office of the City
Again, the motion was denied.30 Subsequently, the assailed order of dismissal was affirmed by then Department of
Prosecutor of Manila for appropriate action.
Justice Secretary Serafin Cuevas.31

SO ORDERED.24 (emphases supplied)
Petitioner appealed to the CSC,32 raising the issues of lack of due process and lack of substantial evidence. On
November 19, 1999, the CSC dismissed petitioner's appeal. It held, in part, that:
Petitioner filed a Motion to Re-open 25 with the BI, contending that the finding of the Ombudsman that "the charges
imputed against [petitioner] are not office related" clearly shows that she is not administratively liable for grave
A careful study of the records in the light of the arguments of appellant reveals that the requirements of due process
misconduct. She moved for the re-opening of the case "to allow her to adduce further evidence mainly based on the
have been duly observed in the proceedings had in this case.
findings of the Ombudsman." The motion, however, was denied for lack of merit. 26

xxx
On January 12, 1999, Commissioner Rodriguez issued an order, adopting the resolution of Special Prosecutor dela
Cruz, viz:
As to the second issue, the Commission finds substantial evidence to prove that respondent receive[d] money in
exchange for her services in facilitating the issuance of passport and visa of Julie Bernardo (sic).
WHEREFORE, respondent Teresita L. Vertudez is hereby found liable for grave misconduct under PD No. 807 and
the Administrative Code of 1987. Accordingly, she is ordered dismissed from the service effective immediately with
forfeiture of all benefits under the law, with prejudice to her reinstatement in this Bureau and all its branches. The complaint-affidavit of Julie Buenaflor is reproduced in part as follows: x x x

SO ORDERED.27 In the absence of any improper motive or malice on the part of the witness to foist said charges on respondent, the
Commission is inclined to give credence to the statements of witness Bernardo (sic). In fact Vertudez has admitted
that she received money from Buenaflor but argued that the money was a mere loan. However, if this were true,
The order quoted the pertinent portion of Special Prosecutor dela Cruz's resolution, viz:
Buenaflor should have demanded for a collateral, considering the amount involved. Vertudez failed to present any
evidence that she gave any security in return for said loan which makes her version highly incredible. x x x33
After carefully weighing and evaluating the versions of the complainant and the respondent, this Office is more
incline[d] to give credence to complainant's declarations that she was indeed duped by the respondent into parting
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration34 of the CSC's Resolution, to no avail. The CSC held:
with the hard-earned money of ₱79,000.00 on the promise of the respondent that she would secure a passport and
visa for the complainant to Japan.
In so far as Vertudez'[s] illegal recruitment activities are concerned, the Commission finds the existence of clear
substantial evidence to establish the same. Evidence presented all point to the fact that Vertudez solicited money
Respondent's alibi that the said amount was a loan from the complainant, who is her friend, is highly unbelievable.
from BI clients in return for a visa to Japan. The witnesses against Vertudez include Peng Villas (Deceased), Julie
Complainant does not appear to be a rich person who would so easily part with such big amount of money without
Buenflor (sic), Amy Cosino, Virginia Lubriano, Manuelito Lao and Jaime Santos Flores. The affidavits of said
any security without any hope or assurance of being re-paid.
witnesses all speak of the modus operandi of Vertudez at the BI, where she approaches BI clients and offers them a
visa, passport and an employment contract in exchange for ₱120,000.00. In the case of witness Julie Buenaflor, she
The fact that complainant paid ₱79,000.00 to the respondent so she could get a passport and a visa to work in testified that respondent assured her of a visa, a passport and a job in Japan for a fee of ₱80,000.00 and that
Japan as a factory worker clearly showed that she was desperately in need of a job. For her to give such amount to Vertudez after getting paid failed to fulfill her promise.
the respondent as an unsecured loan is extremely incredulous.
It is observed that Vertudez seeks to destroy the credibility of witness Buenaflor by implying that the former has a
Respondent's claim that the present complaint is pure harassment by the complainant is completely bereft of pending case for illegal recruitment and estafa. Records, however, show that the charges against witness Buenaflor
credence. What benefit or advantage would the complainant achieve in fabricating charges against the respondent? all came up after Vertudez was formally charged by the BI and that such charges have no reasonable connection
with her administrative case pending before the Commission. In this regard, "There being nothing in record to show
that witnesses were actuated by any improper motive, their testimony shall be entitled to full faith and credit."(People
If the complainant filed this complaint, it was because she was wronged by the respondent. v. Flores, 252 SCRA 31)35

Likewise, respondent's allegation that the ₱50,000.00 she received from the complainant was a loan because she Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition for review before the CA, raising the issues of: a) whether or not the BI and CSC
(respondent) was then in a financial distress and she needed money to help her sick brother in the province was violated petitioner's right to due process; b) whether or not respondents erred in finding that the alleged illegal
belied by her own son, Jimmy V. Santos, Jr., who declared in his Affidavit that sometime in December 1997, he gave recruitment activity of the petitioner had a direct relation to and connected with the performance of her duties and
₱50,000.00 to the complainant so that the latter could obtain a tourist visa for him to Japan. Why should the responsibilities as an employee of the BI; and c) whether or not there is substantial evidence to support the finding
respondent bother to get a ₱50,000.00 loan from the complainant to assist her ailing brother when she could readily that petitioner is an illegal recruiter, thus, warranting her removal from public service. 36
obtain this amount from her own son?
On February 12, 2002, the CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The CA found that "petitioner was given more We shall first resolve the issue of due process. Petitioner contends that the essential requirements of due process as
than ample opportunity to ventilate her defense and disprove the charges leveled against her, hence, there can be laid down in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations43 and Doruelo v. COMELEC44 were violated in the case at
no denial of her right to due process."37 Moreover, it held that "there is more than substantial evidence proving the bar. First, she contends that she was denied of her right to a full hearing when she was not accorded the opportunity
charge of grave misconduct against petitioner." 38 The CA ratiocinated that: to cross-examine the witnesses against her, as provided under Section 48, par. 5, Title I, Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987. She allegedly raised this issue in her appeal before the CSC.45
In the proceedings a quo, it was established that petitioner, indeed, received and encashed the two (2) checks given
by private respondent in the total amount of Php50,000.00. This fact, therefore, gives credence to the claim of private The argument is unmeritorious.
respondent that she gave petitioner two (2) checks in consideration of the latter's promise to facilitate her
employment abroad. This being the case, the burden was shifted to petitioner to refute this established fact through
We have explained the meaning of the right to cross-examination as a vital element of due process as follows:
equally weighty and competent evidence.

The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses in a judicial litigation, be it criminal or civil in
Now, petitioner admitted having received, and encashed, the two checks from private respondent but offered the
nature, or in proceedings before administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial powers, is a fundamental right which is
excuse that the same was extended to her as a loan. Aside from her testimony and that of her household helpers to
part of due process. However, the right is a personal one which may be waived expressly or impliedly by
prove this assertion, no other independent and unbiased evidence was offered to prove the fact of loan. As it is, her
conduct amounting to a renunciation of the right of cross-examination. Thus, where a party has had the
theory of loan stands on flimsy ground and is not sufficient enough to overthrow the fact established by complainant.
opportunity to cross-examine a witness but failed to avail himself of it, he necessarily forfeits the right to
This considering that it is highly improbable and even contrary to human experience for a person to loan a huge
cross-examine and the testimony given on direct examination of the witness will be received or allowed to remain in
amount of money as Php50,000.00 without any document evidencing such loan nor a collateral to secure its
the record.46 (emphasis supplied)
payment. Note even that the two checks were made payable to "cash," a bearer instrument, and was not even
crossed on its face, hence, can be encashed by any person holding the negotiable instrument. If, indeed, private
respondent gave the two checks to petitioner as a clean loan (without any collateral) without any separate document In the case at bar, petitioner cannot argue that she was deprived of due process simply because no cross-
embodying their loan agreement, the latter should have at least been made the payee of the checks and a examination took place. Nothing on record shows that petitioner asked for cross-examination during the formal
memorandum written at the back of the check to the effect that it is being extended as a loan, in order to protect the investigation conducted by Special Prosecutor dela Cruz. Notably, two hearings were conducted, during which, both
interest of the lender. This is conventional business practice which is altogether absent in the case at bar, hence, private respondent and petitioner appeared. During the hearing dated October 27, 1998, both parties agreed to
petitioner's theory of loan must necessarily crumble.39 submit the case for resolution after petitioner submitted her counter-affidavit and the affidavits of her witnesses. In
fact, when petitioner filed her Motion to Re-open the case with the BI, she did not question the lack of cross-
examination during the investigation proceedings. She merely based her motion on the order of the Office of the
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 40 contending that the CA failed to resolve the issue of whether
Ombudsman finding the charge against her as "not office related." In the same pleading, she admitted that "[a]s early
petitioner's alleged illegal recruitment activities are directly connected with her duties and responsibilities as a
as October 27, 1998, the instant administrative action has been submitted for resolution after the contending
Fingerprint Examiner of the BI. This motion was denied.41
parties have submitted their respective evidence" and that her move for the re-opening of the administrative case
was merely "to allow her to adduce further evidence mainly based on the findings of the Office of the
Undaunted, petitioner filed this petition, summing up the issues as follows: Ombudsman." Again, in her Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial of Commissioner Rodriguez's order of
dismissal, she merely reiterated her arguments in her Motion to Re-open. She never complained that she was
deprived of her right to cross-examination during the investigation of Special Prosecutor dela Cruz. The right to
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT MAY REVIEW THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF
cross-examination being a personal right, petitioner must be deemed to have waived this right by agreeing to submit
APPEALS IN CA-G.R. SP NO. 58766;
the case for resolution and not questioning the lack of it in the proceedings before the BI.

2. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS RESOLVED THE SECOND ISSUE RAISED IN THE PETITION
More importantly, it is well-settled that the essence of due process in administrative proceedings is an opportunity to
FOR REVIEW FILED BEFORE IT;
explain one's side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. 47 This was clearly
satisfied in the case at bar. Records show that petitioner not only gave her sworn written explanation of the charges
3. WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE FINDINGS THAT PETITIONER against her during the initial stage of the investigation, she also submitted: a) a sworn counter-affidavit refuting the
IS GUILTY OF GRAVE MISCONDUCT; charges against her, with all the attached annexes as evidence; b) a Motion to Re-open the case with the BI; c) a
Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial with the BI; d) an Appeal to the CSC; e) a Motion for Reconsideration
with the CSC; f) an Appeal to the CA; g) a Motion for Reconsideration with the CA; and h) the instant petition for
4. WHETHER OR NOT A PROMISE TO FACILITATE EMPLOYMENT OF ANOTHER ABROAD CONSTITUTES review.
GRAVE MISCONDUCT[;]

Second, petitioner contends that Commissioner Rodriguez violated the principle that "the tribunal or body or any of
5. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER WAS ACCORDED DUE PROCESS; its judges must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy and not simply
accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision" when his denial of her Motion to Re-open and his order
6. WHETHER OR NOT THE ACT CONSTITUTING GRAVE MISCONDUCT MUST HAVE A DIRECT RELATION TO finding her guilty of grave misconduct were based exclusively on the resolution of Special Prosecutor dela Cruz. 48
THE FUNCTION OF THE PUBLIC OFFICE HELD BY RESPONDENTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASES; AND
This argument is likewise unavailing.
7. WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGED ACT COMMITTED BY THE PETITIONER IS DIRECTLY RELATED TO ANY
OF HER FUNCTIONS AS FINGERPRINT EXAMINER AT THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION. 42 There is nothing essentially wrong in the head of a bureau adopting the recommendation of a subordinate. Section
47, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 gives the chief of bureau or office or department the power to
The petition is denied. delegate the task of investigating a case to a subordinate.49 What due process demands is for the chief of the bureau
to personally weigh and assess the evidence which the subordinate has gathered and not merely to rely on the We shall now proceed to the other issue: whether petitioner is guilty of grave misconduct warranting her removal
recommendation of said investigating officer.50 from government service.

In the case at bar, the order of Commissioner Rodriguez enjoys the disputable presumption that official duties have Citing Sarigumba v. Pasok,59 petitioner contends that "[m]isconduct, warranting removal from office of a public
been regularly performed. That his decision quotes the resolution of Special Prosecutor dela Cruz does not officer, must have a direct relation to and connected with the performance of official duties, amounting either to
necessarily imply that he did not personally examine the affidavits and evidence presented by the parties. Petitioner's maladministration or willful, intentional neglect and failure to discharge the duties of the office." Since the BI is a
bare assertion that Commissioner Rodriguez did not personally examine the evidence, without more, is not sufficient government agency principally responsible for the administration and enforcement of immigration, citizenship and
to overcome this presumption. alien admission and registration laws, "by no stretch of imagination" can there be a direct relation between the
function of a fingerprint examiner and the alleged promise to facilitate private respondent's employment
abroad.60Petitioner also capitalizes on the allegation of private respondent in her complaint-affidavit that she and
Third, petitioner contends that the CSC did not have basis in finding: a) that the affidavits of "Peng Villas (Deceased),
petitioner "became friends" to contend that the acts being imputed against her are personal and not office-related. 61
Julie Buenaflor, Amy Cosino, Virginia Lubriano, Manuelito Lao and Jaime Santos Flores x x x all speak of the modus
operandi of Vertudez at the BI" as these affidavits were not submitted to the CSC; and b) that petitioner "solicited
money from BI clients" inasmuch as private respondent never alleged that she was a BI client. Moreover, the CSC's These arguments lack merit.
finding that private respondent "testified that respondent assured her of a visa, a passport and a job in Japan for a
fee of ₱80,000.00 and that Vertudez, after getting paid, failed to fulfill her promise" is not supported by the complaint-
The allegations in private respondent’s complaint-affidavit indicate that petitioner used her position as a BI employee
affidavit of private respondent which merely stated that petitioner "volunteered to work-out and facilitate the
to assure private respondent that she could facilitate petitioner's deployment to Japan. Private respondent alleged
processing of [private respondent's] passport and visa" and that petitioner "has a brother in Japan who could also
that "during one of those times that [she] dropped by [petitioner's] office, [petitioner] intimated to [her] that a group of
help [private respondent] find a job." 51 Petitioner also assails the failure of the BI and CSC to consider the
Immigration officers [were] scheduled to leave for Japan for training and that [petitioner] was the one who
handwritten joint sworn statement of media practitioners Cloma and Romero and the joint affidavit of the housemaids
received a call from a Japanese Consul." Petitioner "asked [private respondent] if [she was] interested in going to
of petitioner, Compo and Reyes.52
Japan because [petitioner] will find a way to accommodate [her]."

Again, these arguments fail to impress.

Even petitioner's own admissions show that her position as an employee of the BI may be utilized in connection with
illegal recruitment. In her memorandum to Commissioner Rodriguez, as reiterated in her counter-affidavit, petitioner
It is settled that only questions of law are entertained in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules alleged that private respondent was engaged in illegal recruitment and "was using [petitioner's] name in her
of Court.53 It is not the function of this Court, in a petition under Rule 45, to scrutinize, weigh and analyze evidence all dealings with some immigration officials and employees, presumably to expedite the processing of the
over again.54 Well-settled is the rule that the findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies, like the BI and the CSC, are documents belonging to her clients." Petitioner likewise claimed that she "declined [private respondent's]
accorded not only respect but even finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence. 55 Substantial proposal that [she] 'escort' some of [private respondent's] clients who would be leaving for foreign countries
evidence is such amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a but with falsified travel documents." Private respondent even told her that the "proposed scheme could easily be
conclusion, even if other equally reasonable minds might conceivably opine otherwise. 56 done because being an employee of this Bureau, [petitioner has] several connections not only at the Ninoy
Aquino International Airport (NAIA) but also in Mactan International Airport."
In the case at bar, we note that contrary to petitioner's stance, the affidavits of Lao and Cosino do appear in the
records of the CSC.57 In any case, the affidavits of Villas, Cosino, Lubriano, Lao and Flores are of little relevance to That her position is designated as "fingerprint examiner" is not determinative of the issue of whether the charge
the case at bar. If any, they are merely corroborating evidence. Note that it was only in the CSC's resolution on against her is work-related. The allegations in the complaint against petitioner and her own admissions show that her
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration that said affidavits were mentioned. These affidavits were not used as basis duties go beyond her job title and that the charge against her is connected with her position as an employee of the
for the decision rendered by the BI, the main decision of the CSC denying the appeal of petitioner and the decision of BI.
the CA. We find the unanimous finding of guilt of the BI, the CSC and the CA amply supported by the following
evidence on record: a) the complaint-affidavit of private respondent; b) the affidavit of Jessilyn Gutierrez; c) copies of
Finally, petitioner contends that "a promise to find a way to accommodate private respondent and a representation
the passport and application for a visa of petitioner's son; d) copies of SB Check Nos. 0014797 and 0014798; and e)
that petitioner has a brother who could help private respondent find a job are not misconduct warranting the
letter of private respondent's counsel to petitioner demanding from petitioner the refund of the ₱79,000.00 that
dismissal of petitioner from office" but, "[a]t most," only "entitle[s] private respondent to civil indemnity." Petitioner
private respondent paid to petitioner.
contends that the CA's finding that petitioner merely made a "promise to facilitate" private respondent's employment
abroad, as distinguished from the CSC's finding that petitioner committed "shameful illegal recruitment activities,"
As to the other contentions, we note that in addition to the self-serving quotations of petitioner from the complaint- practically absolved petitioner from the charge of grave misconduct.
affidavit of private respondent, said complaint-affidavit categorically alleged that petitioner told private respondent
that the latter would "be receiving a salary of one lapad per day as a factory worker and that should [she] accept
This argument deserves scant consideration.
[petitioner's] offer, all that [would] be required of [her was] to give [petitioner] the amount of ₱80,000.00." Private
respondent also categorically alleged that she was charging petitioner for her "failure to make good her promise to
deploy [her] after receiving the amount of ₱79,000.00 in consideration of a job placement in Japan." Thus, contrary Misconduct has been defined as an intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of
to petitioner's stance, the assailed findings of the CSC are supported by private respondent's complaint-affidavit. behavior, especially by a 
government official.62 As distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the
law or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest in a charge of grave misconduct. 63 Corruption, as an
Moreover, it is well-settled that it is not for the appellate court to substitute its own judgment for that of the
element of grave misconduct, consists in the act of an official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses
administrative agency on the sufficiency of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. Administrative decisions
his station or character to procure some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of
on matters within their jurisdiction are entitled to respect and can only be set aside on proof of grave abuse of
others.64 An act need not be tantamount to a crime for it to be considered as grave misconduct as in fact, crimes
discretion, fraud or error of law. None of these vices has been shown in this case. 58
involving moral turpitude are treated as a separate ground for dismissal under the Administrative Code. 65
In the case at bar, petitioner cannot downplay the charges against her. Whether the charges against petitioner
satisfy the elements of illegal recruitment to make her criminally liable for such crime is not the issue at bar. At the
very least, petitioner was found to have taken advantage of her position as an employee of the BI to falsely promise,
for pecuniary gain, the facilitation of private respondent's travel to Japan, including the processing of her passport,
visa and other travel documents. Worse, she was found to have refused to reimburse the amounts paid to her by
private respondent even when the promised passport, visa, and travel documents did not materialize. Undoubtedly,
these acts involve "corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rule." Under Section
23(c), Rule XIV the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations, these acts constitute a grave offense for which
petitioner must suffer the penalty of dismissal.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated February 12, 2002 and
Resolution dated April 16, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 58766 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

REYNATO S. PUNO
 Republic of the Philippines PANLUNGSOD NG BAGUIO, LEONARDO B. YANGOT, JR., ROCKY THOMAS A. BALISONG, EDILBERTO B.
SUPREME COURT TENEFRANCIA, FAUSTINO A. OLOWAN, GALO P. WEYGAN, FEDERICO J. MANDAP AT, PERLITA L. CHAN-
Baguio City RONDEZ, ANTONIO R. TABORA, JOSE M. MOLINTAS AND RUFINO M. PANAGAN AND CITY LEGAL
OFFICER MELCHOR CARLOS R. RABANES, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 181488
CITY MAYOR BRAULIO D. YARANON, Petitioner, 
G.R. No. 160025               April 23, 2014 vs.
SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD NG BAGUIO CITY, Petitioner,  JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS CORPORATION, HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA,
vs. ACTING BY AUTHORITY OF THE PRESIDENT, AND HON. RONALDO V. PUNO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS CORPORATION, Respondent. SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 163052
DECISION
JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS CORPORATION, Petitioner, 
vs.
MAYOR BERNARDO M. VERGARA, CITY MAYOR OF BAGUIO, VICE MAYOR BETTY LOURDES F. TABANDA, SERENO, CJ:
VICE MAYOR OF BAGUIO, COUNCILOR BRAULIO D. YARANON, COUNCILOR ELMER O. DATUIN,
COUNCILOR ANTONIO R. TABORA, JR., COUNCILOR GALO D. WEYGAN, COUNCILOR EDILBERTO B.
Before this Court are nine (9) Petitions involving essentially the same parties - officials of the City Government of
TENEFRANCIA, COUNCILOR FEDERICO J. MANDAPAT, JR., COUNCILOR RICHARD A. CARINO,
Baguio and Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation (Jadewell). The only party here that is neither an official of the
COUNCILOR FAUSTINO A. OLOWAN, COUNCILOR DELFIN V. BALAJADIA, COUNCILOR RUFINO M.
City Government of Baguio nor an officer of Jadewell is former Judge Fernando Vil Pamintuan.
PANAGAN, CITY SECRETARY RONALDO B. PEREZ, SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD NG
BAGUIO,Respondents.
x-----------------------x The two principal parties executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) on 26 June 2000, whereby the City of
G.R. No. 164107 Baguio authorized Jadewell to regulate and collect parking fees for on-street parking in the city, as well as to
JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS CORPORATION, Petitioner,  implement the installation of modern parking meters.
vs.
CITY MAYOR BRAULIO D. YARANON, Respondent.
The legal disputes embodied in the nine Petitions began when the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Baguio City
x-----------------------x
(Sanggunian) revoked the MOA through City Resolution No. 037, Series of 2002 (Resolution 37), alleging substantial
G.R. No. 165564
breach of the MOA on the part of Jadewell. Then Mayor Alfredo Vergara vetoed the Resolution. The Sanggunian
JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS CORPORATION, Petitioner, 
Panlungsod overrode the veto through an unnumbered Resolution dated 17 April 2002. These twin Resolutions
vs.
constitute what we call here as the first act of Rescission1 of the MOA by the city officials of Baguio. Jadewell denied
CITY MAYOR BRAULIO D. YARANON, Respondent.
the breach and commenced an action before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio, 2questioning the validity of the
x-----------------------x
MOA’s revocation and the Sanggunian’s capacity to pass a resolution revoking the MOA.
G.R. No. 172215
JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS CORPORATION, Petitioner, 
vs. There was a second act of rescission that the city officials of Baguio performed in 2006, the circumstances of which
JUDGE FERNANDO VIL PAMINTUAN, PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 3 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT will be narrated later on.
OF BAGUIO CITY, BENEDICTO BALAJADIA, PATERNO AQUINO, RICHARD LABERINTO, ROLANDO
ABELLERA, FERNANDO SANGALANG, ALLAN ATOS, ANGELINO SANGALANG, CITY OF BAGUIO, AND
CITY MAYOR BRAULIO D. YARANON, Respondents. While the main case was under litigation, and then under appeal, the parties filed contempt charges against each
x-----------------------x other. Six of these cases are part of the consolidated Petitions before us.
G.R. No. 172216
JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS CORPORATION, Petitioner,  These nine highly-voluminous cases, however, all boil down essentially to just these five sets of legal questions
vs. requiring resolution:
JUDGE FERNANDO VIL PAMINTUAN, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 03 REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
BAGUIO CITY, Respondent.
x-----------------------x (a) The validity or invalidity and legal efficacy of Saggunian’s two distinct acts of rescission of the MOA;
G.R. No. 173043
JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS CORPORATION, Petitioner,  (b) The duty of a trial judge to dismiss a case assailing the validity of the MOA and the city resolution
vs. approving it in view of the pendency of the various petitions before this Court;
CITY MAYOR BRAULIO D. YARANON, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 174879 (c) the liability of : (i) respondent city officials of Baguio, for various counts of indirect contempt of this
JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS CORPORATION, Petitioner,  court, (ii) some respondents, who are lawyers at the same time, for acts that require the disciplinary action
vs. of disbarment, (iii) respondent Judge Pamintuan, for taking cognizance of a civil case allegedly in defiance
ACTING CITY MAYOR AND FORMERLY VICE MAYOR AND PRESIDING OFFICER OF THE SANGGUNIANG of this Court’s authority;
PANLUNGSOD NG BAGUIO, REINALDO A. BAUTISTA, JR., MEMBERS OF THE SANGGUNIANG
 (d) the validity of the administrative suspension of one of the respondents herein, former Mayor Braulio On 20 December 2000, Jadewell wrote then Vice-Mayor Daniel T. Fariñas to inform him of the progress of the
Yaranon, by the Office of the President in relation to his acts of non-recognition of the MOA; and deputization by the Department of Transportation and Communications–Land Transportation Office (DOTC-LTO) of
parking attendants required for the implementation of the MOA. Jadewell explained that they were still working on
the required deputization of Jadewell’s parking attendants. Nevertheless, it claimed that its parking attendants were
(e) the nullification of certain acts of officials of Baguio City directed against Jadewell pursuant to their
authorized to collect parking fees pending the actual installation of the parking meters. It also claimed that the
belief that the latter had no authority to continue implementing the terms of the MOA.
parking meters had not yet been installed because the necessary civil works were yet to be completed. 17

THE ANTECEDENT FACTS

Shortly thereafter, a case was filed by Edgar M. Avila, et al. with the RTC-Baguio City (Branch 61), assailing
Ordinance No. 003-2000 as unconstitutional and seeking to restrain the City Government of Baguio from
On 1 March 1999, Jadewell proposed the privatization 3 of the administration of on-street parking in Baguio City using implementing the provisions of the MOA. It further alleged that the City Government could not delegate the
Schlumberger’s DG4S Pay and Display Parking Meter (hereinafter "DG4S P&D"), which it touted as "technologically designation of pay parking zones to Jadewell, that the parking attendants deployed by Jadewell were not deputized,
advanced, up to the level of more progressive countries and which would make the city as the first and only city in and that the questioned ordinance creates class legislation as the designated taxi and jeepney stands were
the Philippines, if not in Asia, to have metered parking as an important part of its traffic and parking system." 4 discriminatorily removed. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 4892-R.18 This was dismissed on motion by
Jadewell joined by the City Government of Baguio. The lower court declared that Ordinance No. 003-2000 is
constitutional and that all acts emanating from it are deemed "reasonable and non-discriminatory...having been
Respondent Sanggunian acted favorably on the proposal.5 On 31 May 2000, it passed Resolution No. 159, Series of enacted in accordance with the powers granted to Baguio City by law."19 Complainants’ Motion for Reconsideration
1999, authorizing the City Mayor of Baguio to negotiate and enter into a Memorandum of Agreement with Jadewell (MR) was denied.
for the installation of its proposed DG4S parking technology. 6

On 24 August 2001, Edgar Avila, et al., filed a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with the
On 16 July 1999, the City Mayor of Baguio wrote to Jadewell, transmitting to it the finalized draft of the MOA, with Supreme Court assailing the RTC’s dismissal of their Complaint. The case was docketed as G.R. No. 149642. On 10
amendments emanating from his office. The City Mayor informed Jadewell that the finalization of the MOA would be October 2001, this Court issued a Resolution dismissing the petition of Avila, et al. for failure to state in their petition
subject to the appropriate action of the Sanggunian and the passage of an enabling ordinance. 7 the material dates when they received the appealed resolution and order, and to append the original or certified true
copies of the questioned resolution and order subject of their petition. 20 There was no resolution on the merits. The
On 27 March 2000, respondent Sanggunian enacted City Ordinance No. 003, Series of 2000 (Ordinance No. 003- Resolution became final and executory on 2 April 2002. 21
2000) amending Ordinance No. 13, Series of 1983, outlining the rules and policy on the privatization of the
administration of on-street parking in the city streets of Baguio.8 For this purpose, the City of Baguio authorized the A case was also filed by Nelia G. Cid against then Mayor Bernardo Vergara, et al. when her vehicle was clamped,
intervention of a private operator for the regulation, charging and collection of parking fees and the installation of towed away, and impounded by Jadewell after the latter found her car to be illegally parked. She refused to pay the
modern parking meters, among others. corresponding fees to Jadewell and as a result, the latter refused to release her vehicle. 22 Cid filed a case for replevin
and questioned the validity of Ordinance No. 003-2000 and the MOA, as well as the authority of Jadewell to clamp
On 10 April 2000, the City Legal Officer of Baguio City advised the City Mayor that the project for the regulation of down/tow away vehicles whose owners refuse to pay parking fees. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 5165-
on-street parking and installation of parking meters was not an infrastructure. Hence, the project was not covered by R and was assigned to Branch 7 of RTC-Baguio. On 24 May 2002, an Omnibus Order was issued by this RTC that
the Build-Operate-Transfer Law9 and did not require publication of a notice for its validity.10 addressed several pending incidents related to the authority of Jadewell to clamp down/tow away vehicles. The
Omnibus Order upheld Jadewell’s authority to retain the vehicle of petitioner Nelia G. Cid pending her payment of the
parking and towage fees to Jadewell, and held that the authority of Jadewell was lawfully provided in Ordinance No.
Nevertheless, for the sake of transparency, the City Legal Officer recommended the publication of the appropriate 003-2000 and the MOA. Also, the RTC-Baguio took cognizance of the ruling by this Court in G.R. No. 149642 which,
notice on the project and an invitation to bid. An invitation to bid for the proposed regulation of on-street parking and in its mistaken view, upheld the validity of the questioned ordinance and the MOA.23
installation of parking meters on Baguio City’s streets was published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on 8, 9 and 10
May 2000. Four interested bidders submitted their proposals, but three were disqualified. The bid of Jadewell was
the only one not disqualified; hence, it was awarded the project.11 Ultimately, Jadewell was able to install no more than 14 parking meters in three (3) areas of Baguio City: six (6) on
Session Road, five (5) on Harrison Road and three (3) on Lake Drive.24 At the time that these meters were installed,
there were already verbal complaints being raised against Jadewell by the Sanggunian for the following alleged
On 26 June 2000, the MOA was finally executed between Jadewell and the City of Baguio – through its then City violations:
Mayor, Mauricio G. Domogan – for the installation, management and operation of the DG4S P&D parking meters. 12

a. Failure to install parking meters for each parking space as specified in Section 3-F of Ordinance No.
On 17 July 2000, the Sanggunian confirmed the MOA through its Resolution No. 205-2000. 13 003-2000;25

On 31 August 2000, the parties executed a supplemental MOA to include the Ganza/Burnham parking space, owned b. Failure to install a convenient and technologically advanced parking device that is solar-powered and
by the Philippine Tourism Authority and managed by the City of Baguio, in the project. 14 This supplemental can measure the time a vehicle stays in a parking slot;26
agreement was neither confirmed nor ratified by the Sanggunian.

c. Failure to give the City of Baguio the latter's share of the collected parking fee; 27
In September of 2000, Jadewell began to mobilize and take over the parking facilities at the Ganza/Burnham Park
area.15 Around this time, questions arose regarding the compliance by Jadewell with the provisions of the MOA,
notably on matters such as obtaining the recommendation from the Department of Public Works and Highways d. Failure to post a performance bond in the amount of ₱1 million after its previous bond expired. 28
(DPWH) for the installation of the parking meters and the legality of the collection of parking fees being done by its
parking attendants prior to the installation of the parking meters at Burnham Park. 16 The Sanggunian passed Resolution No. 395, Series of 2000, directing Jadewell to comply with its obligations under
the MOA for the installation of the necessary number of parking meters.29
On 15 March 2001, Jadewell wrote to the City Mayor in response to the mentioned Resolution, informing the said WHEREAS, there has been no substantial improvement of the traffic situation in the City even with the introduction
office that the former had started operation of the off-street parking on 2 December 2000 and of the on-street parking of the P & D Parking System and thus it increasingly appears that the system introduced by Jadewell is more for
on 15 December 2000.30 On 27 January 2001, Jadewell also wrote the City Treasurer that the former had completed revenue raising than for regulatory purposes. As a consequence the legal principle applies that the collection of
installation of the parking meters.31 taxes cannot be let to any person. In other words, government cannot allow private persons to collect public funds for
themselves with the agreement that part thereof or as it turned out in this case no part thereof is shared with the City;
In response to the letter of Jadewell, the City Treasurer demanded the remittance of Baguio’s share of the parking
fees collected by Jadewell since it started operations. Jadewell responded by saying that it had complied with this WHEREAS, in its financial reports to the City showing substantial loses [sic] and in its statement to other persons
obligation.32 that it is losing money on the project, the kindest thing that the City can do for Jadewell is to prevent Jadewell from
incurring anymore [sic] loses.
On 19 February 2002, the Sanggunian passed Resolution 37,33 expressing its intent to rescind the MOA with
Jadewell. The said Resolution enumerated in the "Whereas" clauses the alleged violations of Jadewell prompting it NOW THEREFORE, on motion of Hon. Bautista, and Hon. Cariño, seconded by Hon. Yaranon, Hon. Weygan and
to rescind the MOA. It reads: Hon. Tabora, be it RESOLVED, as it is hereby resolved, to rescind the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) executed
between the City of Baguio and Jadewell Parking System Corporation dated 26 June 2000 on the basis of the
foregoing premises and exercising its rights under Section 12 of the MOA on the subject of On-Street Parking
xxxx
executed between the City of Baguio and Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation dated 26 June 2000 and, more
importantly, performing its duty to protect and promote the general welfare of the people of Baguio City.
WHEREAS, it now appears from verified facts that:
RESOLVED FURTHER, to direct the City Legal Officer to cause the proper notice of rescission to Jadewell Parking
1. contrary to its commitment to install a technologically based P & D parking system, at no cost to the Systems Corporation forthwith and to take all appropriate steps to implement and enforce the intent of this
City, including "such equipment and paraphernalia to meter the length of usage of the affected parking Resolution.
spaces for purposes of payment of the parking fees", Jadewell has installed only fourteen (14) parking
meters (only 12 of which are working) in only three (3) streets, and Jadewell does not intend to install
RESOLVED FURTHERMORE, to inform all City officials and employees and all other persons concerned to be
anymore [sic]; instead it has resorted as a rule to an exceptional circumstance of manual collection of
guided accordingly.35
parking fees by parking attendants who, despite express provisions of the Ordinance, are not duly
deputized by the DOTC-LTO. Despite assurances to the Honorable City Mayor that Jadewell would stop
collection of parking fees until the parking meters have been duly installed, Jadewell continues to collect On 1 March 2002, the then City Mayor of Baguio, Bernardo M. Vergara, vetoed Resolution 37, through a letter dated
parking fees manually by using undeputized parking attendants to do the collection; 1 March 2002 addressed to the Vice-Mayor, as Presiding Officer of the Sanggunian, and its members. Mayor
Vergara reasoned that it was premature for the Sangguniang Panlungsod to rescind the MOA, because the latter
provides for a minimum period of five years before the right of rescission can be exercised; and, that the right of
2. contrary to its commitment to install a technologically based P & D parking system, at no cost to the
Jadewell to due process was violated due to the lack of opportunity to hear the latter’s side. The City Mayor
City, Jadewell has charged the cost of such and similar equipment as direct costs, thus substantially
proposed a re-negotiation of the MOA with Jadewell as a solution to the problem. 36
eroding the share of the City in the parking fees;

Meanwhile, on 13 March 2002, the DOTC–Cordillera Autonomous Region (DOTC-CAR) issued a cease and desist
3. contrary to its obligation to post a performance bond, Jadewell has not fully complied, and when
order to Jadewell prohibiting it from clamping down and/or towing away vehicles in Baguio City for violation of traffic
required to update its performance bond Jadewell refused to do so rationalizing its non-compliance by the
rules and regulations.37
assertion that they are already performing and therefore are no longer obligated to post a performance
bond;
On 17 April 2002, the Sanggunian resolved through a Resolution of the same date, to override the veto of the City
Mayor, worded thus:
4. contrary to its obligation to remit the share of the City within the first ten (10) days of the following
month, Jadewell had initially resisted making payments to the City on the pretext that the profits cannot be
determined until after the end of the fiscal year and initially failed to have their tickets pre-numbered and NOW THEREFORE, the Sangguniang Panlungsod (City Council) in Regular Session assembled, by twelve
registered with the Office of the City Treasurer; affirmative votes constituting more that [sic] a two-thirds vote of all its Members, has resolved to override, as it
hereby overrides, the veto of His Honor, Mayor Bernardo M. Vergara, of City Resolution Numbered 037, Series of
2002, entitled "Rescinding the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) Executed Between the City of Baguio and
5. contrary to its promise that the City would derive substantial revenue from the on-street pay parking
Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation Dated 26 June 2000."38
system, Jadewell has not paid a single centavo of the City share in on-street parking operation; whatever
Jadewell has remitted to the City are properly chargeable against the share of the City in the MOA on off-
street parking (the Burnham Parking Area near Ganza), and it appears less than what the City is entitled Also at this time, Braulio D. Yaranon, who was then a member of the Sanggunian, requested a special audit from the
thereto; and Commission on Audit–Cordillera Autonomous Region (COA-CAR) on the operations of Jadewell as regards the pay
parking project embodied in the MOA.
6. contrary to its representations that the P & D System which it proposed would eliminate fraud in the
collection of parking fees, Jadewell has perpetrated fraud on the City by, according to the affidavit of its On 27 May 2002, Jadewell filed with the RTC of Baguio City a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and
former bookkeeper, Mr. Adonis Cabungan, doctoring the financial statements before the same are Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, assailing the validity of Resolution No.
submitted to City authorities. 34 037-2002, which rescinded the MOA between the Sangguniang Panlungsod and Jadewell. 39 The case was docketed
as Civil Case No. 5285-R and was raffled off to RTC-Baguio (Branch 61).
On 8 October 2002, the RTC Br. 61 promulgated its Decision40 finding the Sanggunian’s rescission of the MOA 8) The coverage of the parking operations contained in Annex "A" of the MOA was not confirmed by the
unlawful. The Sanggunian then filed an appeal assailing the RTC’s decision with the Court of Appeals; the case was City Council in violation of R.A. No. 7160;55
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 74756.
9) The City Government failed to ensure proper compliance by Jadewell with the MOA provisions; 56
Meanwhile, pending resolution of CA-G.R. SP No. 74756 before the CA, the Sanggunian passed Resolution No.
089, Series of 2003. The resolution sought the assistance of the DOTC-CAR specifically, for it to take immediate
10) The pay parking project was awarded to a bidder who did not have all the qualifications as stated in
action against the officers and personnel of Jadewell for defying the 13 March 2002 cease-and-desist Order it issued
the "Invitation to Bid" in violation of R.A. No. 7160 and Audit Circular No. 92-386; 57
prohibiting the latter from clamping down and/or towing away vehicles. 41 On 27 May 2003, City Mayor Vergara
approved and signed Resolution No. 089-2003. In response, Jadewell filed a Petition for Indirect Contempt with the
CA against Mayor Vergara, the Sanggunian and other local government officers. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. 11) The provisions on deputization in Ordinance No. 003-2000 and the MOA are contrary to R.A. No. 4136
SP No. 77341. The original petition was followed by three (3) supplemental petitions filed by Jadewell in the same (the Land Transportation and Traffic Code), thus rendering it invalid;58
case.
12) The monthly minimum amount to be remitted to the City Government is doubtful due to the
On 7 July 2003, the CA rendered a Decision42 in CA G.R. SP No. 74756, affirming the assailed Decision of the trial discrepancy in the amounts collected and expenses for the year 1999 provided by the City Government to
court which declared as invalid the Sanggunian’s rescission of the MOA. The Sanggunian filed a Motion For Jadewell as against the amount certified by the Office of the City Architect and Parks Superintendent-
Reconsideration, but this was denied by the CA through a Resolution dated 4 September 2003. 43 Aggrieved by the Burnham Parks Office for the City Government overseeing the Ganza-Burnham parking spaces. 59
denial of their appeal, the Sanggunian filed a Rule 45 Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court, seeking to
reverse and set aside the 7 July 2003 Decision and its Resolution dated 04 September 2003 of the CA. The petition
On 11 February 2004, after G.R. No. 160025 was filed and pending resolution by this Court, the Sangguniang
was docketed as G.R. No. 160025, the first of the consolidated petitions herein. 44
Panlungsod adopted Resolution No. 056, Series of 2004. The said Resolution informs the general public that
Jadewell had neither the authority nor the police power to clamp, tow, or impound vehicles at any place in the City of
In CA-G.R. SP No. 77341, the CA dismissed in a Decision45 promulgated on 28 July 2004 the contempt petitions filed Baguio.60 Also, on the same date, the Sangguniang Panlungsod passed Resolution No. 059, Series of 2004, in which
by Jadewell for lack of merit. The latter’s Motion For Reconsideration was likewise denied by the CA.46Jadewell it made a formal demand upon Jadewell to restore to it possession of the Ganza Parking Area. 61
elevated the dismissal of its contempt petitions to this Court on 8 December 2004 by filing a Rule 45 Petition for
Review on Certiorari. The case was docketed as G.R. No. 166094. This is not among the consolidated petitions
With these developments, Jadewell filed directly with this Court its first indirect contempt case against Bernardo M.
herein.
Vergara (then City Mayor of Baguio), its Vice-Mayor, and the entire City Council for enacting Resolution Nos. 056 &
059, Series of 2004 pending resolution by this Court of G.R. 160025. The case was docketed as G.R. No. 163052.
On 13 July 2003, the COA-CAR promulgated the requested Report.47 The Report’s objective was to ascertain
compliance by the contracting parties – the City of Baguio and Jadewell – with Ordinance No. 003-2000 and the
On 23 June 2004, this Court through its First Division, ordered G.R. No. 163052 consolidated with G.R. No.
MOA. The COA-CAR Report has 12 findings, essentially as follows:
160025.62

1) The provisions of the MOA and its Supplement as regards the sharing of the fees are contradicting,
On 1 July 2004, then Baguio City Mayor Braulio D. Yaranon issued Executive Order No. 001-04, 63 the decretal
hence the share of the City Government cannot be determined; 48
portion of which reads:

2) There was no proper segregation by area of the parking fees collected, hence the proper share of
NOW, THEREFORE, the undersigned City Mayor, pursuant to his authority to enforce all laws and ordinances
Baguio City cannot be determined; 49
relative to the governance of the City, and to issue executive orders for the faithful and appropriate enforcement and
execution of such laws and ordinances (Sec. 455 (b) (2) and (iii), R.A. 7160) hereby affirms and gives protection to
3) The City Government did not strictly implement the collection of penalties arising from the late the right of the citizenry, particularly affected motor vehicle owners, operators, and drivers, to refuse to submit to the
remittances of Jadewell, hence additional revenues were not collected;50 enforcement of Ordinance 003-2000, by the Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation, and further to refuse to pay
public revenue in the form of fees, charges, impositions, fines, and penalties provided for in the said ordinance, to
the said entity, such acts being patently illegal and prohibited by law; this Executive Order shall be in force and effect
4) The City Treasurer did not conduct an audit of the books and accounts of Jadewell, thus the City
until the City Council, as the legislative arm of the City of Baguio, shall have adopted appropriate remedial or
Government’s share from parking fees cannot be ascertained;51
corrective measures on the matters and concerns specified hereinabove.

5) The use of the P&D parking meters were [sic] not maximized due to Jadewell’s non-compliance with
On 8 July 2004, Mayor Yaranon issued a Memorandum64 to the City Director of the Baguio City Police Department,
Ordinance No. 003-2000 and the MOA, resulting in the collection of meager income from its use; 52
directing the department to stop and prevent Jadewell from clamping, towing, and impounding vehicles; to arrest and
file criminal charges against Jadewell personnel who would execute the proscribed acts specified in the said
6) The MOA does not specify the guidelines for determining the economic viability of installing the parking Memorandum; and to confiscate the equipment used by Jadewell to clamp, tow, or impound vehicles under the
meters and the period within which to install it [sic];53 authority of the rescinded MOA.

7) The Supplemental MOA was not confirmed by the City Council of Baguio in violation of R.A. No. 7160 On 12 July 2004, Jadewell filed its second Petition for indirect contempt again with this Court, this time against
(the Local Government Code);54 Mayor Yaranon for having issued the above-cited Order also for the same reasons given in its first contempt petition
with this Court. The Petition was docketed as G.R. No. 164107.
Furthermore, on 15 July 2004, Jadewell filed an administrative case against Mayor Yaranon before the Office of the Acting on the urgent motion dated January 26, 2005 of respondent Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation for the
President (OP). Docketed as Case No. OP 04-G-294, it sought the mayor’s suspension and removal from office. The issuance of a temporary mandatory/preventive order and/or for writ of preliminary mandatory/prohibitory injunction
case against Mayor Yaranon was for his issuance of the following: (1) Executive Order No. 001-04 dated 1 July pending appeal in G.R. No. 160025, alleging that the effects of the acts of City Mayor Yaranon, unless stayed, would
2004; (2) the Memorandum dated 7 July 2004 limiting the pay parking business of Jadewell to certain parts of Baguio also make effective what the petitioner Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Baguio failed to obtain in the instant case, the
City;; and (3) Memorandum dated 8 July 2004 directing the Baguio City Police Department to prevent Jadewell from net effect of which would not only be grave damage and injury to the respondent but also to the City of Baguio, the
apprehending, towing and impounding vehicles. A supplemental petition filed by Jadewell on 19 January 2005, Court further Resolved:
complaining of Executive Order No. 005-2004, which was issued on 15 October 2004, was also included in
administrative case OP 04-G-294.
(a) to ISSUE, the WRIT OF PRELIMINARY MANDATORY INJUNCTION prayed for, effective immediately,
commanding City Mayor Yaranon to immediately reopen the streets and/or premises operated and/or
On the following day, 16 July 2004, Jadewell filed a Supplemental Petition with Motion for Leave of this Court 65 in the occupied by the respondent and to let them remain open, until further orders of this Court; and
second contempt petition before this Court, G.R. No. 164107, alleging as a supplemental fact, Mayor Yaranon’s
Memorandum of 08 July 2004.
(b) to require petitioner to POST a CASH BOND or a SURETY BOND from a reputable bonding company
of indubitable solvency in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (₱100,000.00), with terms
On 15 October 2004, Mayor Yaranon issued Executive Order No. 005-2004. 66 This was a cease and desist order and conditions to be approved by the Court, within five (5) days from notice, otherwise, the writ of
against Jadewell to prevent it from performing the following acts: (1) charging and collecting from motorists, parking preliminary mandatory injunction herein issued shall AUTOMATICALLY be lifted.
fees without their consent;67 (2) seizing and detaining vehicles of motorists who refuse to pay parking fees to
Jadewell;68 and (3) using yellow-colored heavy wreckers or tow trucks bearing the name "City of Baguio". 69
NOW THEREFORE, You, [City Mayor Braulio D. Yaranon], your agents, representatives and/or any person or
persons acting upon your orders or in your place or stead, are hereby DIRECTED to IMMEDIATELY REOPEN the
In addition to Executive Order No. 005-2004, Mayor Yaranon issued Executive Order No. 005-2004-A, which is streets and/or premises operated and/or occupied by the respondents and to let the said streets and premises
essentially a rehash of Executive Order No. 005-2004. 70 remain OPEN, until further orders from this Court.

On 25 October 2004, Jadewell filed a third Petition with this Court, praying that Mayor Yaranon be cited for contempt On 8 April 2005, Mayor Yaranon issued a Memorandum 80 directing Col. Isagani Nerez, Director of the Baguio City
and that Executive Order No. 005-2004 be nullified. 71 This case was docketed as G.R. No. 165564. On 16 November Police District, to create a special task force to stop Jadewell from clamping, towing, and impounding vehicles in
2004, Jadewell filed a Supplemental Petition to this Petition alleging as a supplemental ground the issuance of violation of parking rules in Baguio City; to impound the wrecker/tow trucks used by Jadewell.
Executive Order No. 005-2004-A.72
On 20 April 2005, this Court promulgated a Resolution in G.R. No. 160025, finding Mayor Yaranon guilty of direct
On 20 December 2004, Mayor Yaranon issued Administrative Order No. 622, Series of 2004, which declared that and indirect contempt. He was cited for direct contempt when it was proven that he had submitted pleadings before
Jadewell exceeded its area of operations for the administration of on-street parking and was thus required to show this Court containing falsehoods. Mayor Yaranon had stated in his Compliance that the streets were opened for
lawful cause why its business permit should not be revoked. In response to this Order, Jadewell filed a Second Jadewell to resume operations, but upon inspection these were found to be closed.81 He was also cited for indirect
Supplemental Petition for contempt against Mayor Yaranon in G.R. No. 165564 on 25 January 2005. contempt, for having continuously refused to carry out the writ issued by this Court to reopen the streets so Jadewell
could resume operations.82 This Court likewise fined Mayor Yaranon the amount of ₱10,000, which he paid. The
Court further ordered the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to immediately arrest and detain Mayor Yaranon
On 10 January 2005, this Court through a Resolution73 ordered the consolidation of G.R. No. 160025 with G.R. Nos.
pending his compliance with the 9 February 2005 writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued by this Court, which
163052, 164107, and 165564.
ordered the reopening of some streets so Jadewell could continue its operations. 83

On 17 January 2005, this Court denied Jadewell’s petition in G.R. No. 166094 for failure to show any reversible error
On 10 August 2005, Benedicto Balajadia, et al. filed Civil Case No. 6089-R against Jadewell before the RTC–Baguio
on the part of the CA in dismissing its petition for contempt in CA-G.R. SP No. 77341. 74 Its Motion For
City. The case was subsequently raffled to Branch 3 of the RTC presided by Judge Fernando Vil
Reconsideration was likewise denied with finality.75
Pamintuan.84 Balajadia, et al. sought to nullify the MOA between Jadewell and the City Government of Baguio and its
enabling ordinance, Ordinance No. 003-2000. The complainants also prayed for the issuance of a Temporary
In the beginning of the year 2005, Jadewell attempted to renew its business permit from the City of Baguio and Restraining Order (TRO) and for a writ of preliminary injunction against Jadewell.
tendered the fees required. However, the Office of the City Mayor refused to renew the business permit and returned
the amount tendered.76 Because of these actions of Mayor Yaranon, Jadewell filed on 15 April 2005 its Third
On 19 April 2006, Judge Pamintuan issued an Order in Civil Case No. 6089-R granting the prayer of complainants
Supplemental Petition in G.R. No. 164107, which had been consolidated with G.R. Nos. 160025, 163052, and
Balajadia et al. for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction. The injunction was meant to restrain
165564. Aside from its main prayer to cite the mayor for contempt, Jadewell also prayed that Mayor Yaranon, a
Jadewell from proceeding with the supervision and collection of parking, towing, and impounding fees on the streets
lawyer, be disbarred.77 On 25 April 2005, this Court, through its Third Division, admitted the Third Supplemental
of Baguio City. Further, Judge Pamintuan ordered the holding in abeyance of the implementation of City Ordinance
Petition of Jadewell.78 
No. 003-2000 and the MOA.85

On 9 February 2005, this Court, in G.R. No. 160025, issued a Writ of preliminary mandatory injunction ordering
On 27 April 2006, Jadewell filed with this Court a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus against
Mayor Yaranon to immediately reopen the streets and premises occupied and/or operated by Jadewell. The Court
Judge Pamintuan86 for refusing to dismiss Civil Case No. 6089-R. The case was docketed as G.R. No. 172215. On
also required Jadewell to post a cash or surety bond in the amount of ₱100,000 within five days from receipt of the
the same day, Jadewell filed a Petition asking this Court to cite Judge Pamintuan for contempt. This fourth contempt
order.79
case, albeit primarily against a member of the judiciary, was docketed as G.R. No. 172216.

The order, in part, reads:

On 19 June 2006, G.R. No. 172215 was ordered consolidated with G.R. Nos. 160025, 163052, 164107, and
165564.87
On 23 June 2006, Mayor Yaranon wrote Jadewell a letter demanding that it desist from operating the pay parking On 9 October 2007, the CA dismissed Mayor Yaranon’s Petition in CA G.R. CV SP No. 96116 on the ground that it
system in Baguio City. Simultaneously, he wrote the Sanggunian, requesting it to cancel Ordinance No. 003-2000, had become moot and academic due to Mayor Yaranon’s failure to be re-elected in the 17 May 2007 elections.
the enabling ordinance for the MOA. Mayor Yaranon filed a Motion for Reconsideration on 07 November 2007, but this was also denied by the CA on 24
January 2008. Thus, on 17 March 2008, Mayor Yaranon filed a Rule 45 Petition before this Court seeking to reverse
and set aside the CA Decision and Resolution. It was docketed as G.R. No. 181488.
On 26 June 2006, Jadewell filed a Supplemental Petition88 in G.R. No. 172215 complaining of Judge Pamintuan’s
issuance of the following Orders in Civil Case No. 6089-R: (a) Order dated 24 April 2006 89 directing the parties to file
a pre-trial brief and setting the pre-trial of the case; (b) Order dated 01 June 2006 90 informing Jadewell that public On 12 November 2008, G.R. No. 181488 was ordered consolidated with the cases already mentioned. 105
respondent was not suspending the proceedings, because he believed he was not covered by the writ issued by this
Court; (c) Order dated 14 June 200691 upholding the writ he issued in the civil case despite his receipt of a copy of
THE ISSUES
the writ of preliminary injunction issued by this Court; and (d) Order dated 16 June 2006 92 directing Jadewell to
comply with the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction under pain of direct contempt.
1. On G.R. No. 160025 and on the
claim in G.R. No. 174879 that the second
On the same day, 26 June 2006, the Office of the President (OP) rendered a Decision in OP 04-G-294, the
act of rescission was a valid act of
administrative case Jadewell had filed against Mayor Yaranon, finding him guilty of grave misconduct, abuse of
rescission.
authority, and oppression. Mayor Yaranon was meted out a penalty totalling 12 months suspension from office. 93This
suspension was implemented by the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG). Aggrieved by his
suspension, Mayor Yaranon filed his Motion For Reconsideration, which was denied on 22 August 2006 by the OP. Whilst the issues are spread out among the nine cases, we have grouped these according to what are common to
the specific cases.
On 29 June 2006, in response to Mayor Yaranon’s letters of 23 June 2006, Jadewell filed before this Court yet
another case for contempt – its fifth contempt case, and the third one specifically against Mayor Yaranon. In addition In our effort to simplify the issues and provide forms of relief to the parties that are not purely academic, it is
to its prayer to cite the mayor for contempt, Jadewell also prayed that Mayor Yaranon, a lawyer, be disbarred. 94 The necessary to examine the operative effects that may result from any resolution of this Court. Such examination may
case was docketed as G.R. No. 173043. also help guide the parties in their future actions, and perhaps the overly-litigated matters brought before us in the
consolidated petitions may finally be put to rest.
On 31 July 2006, G.R. No. 173043 was ordered consolidated with G.R. Nos. 160025, 163052, 164107, 165564, and
172215.95 On 27 September 2006, G.R. No. 172216 was consolidated with G.R. Nos. 160025, 163052, 164107, We note at the outset that on 22 November 2006, 60 days had lapsed from receipt of the letter dated 22 September
165564.96 2006, informing Jadewell of the decision of the City of Baguio to rescind the MOA under Section 12 thereof. It may
be recalled that Section 12 requires that notice of the intention to rescind be given 60 days prior to the effectivity of
the rescission. Jadewell has not questioned the legal efficacy of this notice. It has brought this matter of a second
On 23 August 2006, while the consolidated cases were pending resolution before this Court, the Sangguniang
rescission to the Court’s attention only as a matter of contumacious behavior on the part of the respondents in G.R.
Panlungsod enacted Resolution No. 204, Series of 2006. The Resolution directed the City Legal Officer to notify
No. 174879, in the same way that it brought various actions of the public respondents before the Court in its other
Jadewell of the Baguio City Government’s intention to rescind the MOA, and to inform Jadewell to stop its operations
contempt petitions. Since the legal efficacy of the rescission in 2006 has not been contested by Jadewell in any of
under the MOA 60 days after receipt of the Notice.97
the petitions before us, we thus consider this notice of rescission to have taken legal effect and therefore, at the
latest, the MOA between the City of Baguio and Jadewell has ceased to legally exist as of 22 November 2006.
On 28 August 2006, the legal counsel for Jadewell wrote to Baguio City Vice-Mayor Bautista, Jr., informing him that
the OP had denied the Motion for Reconsideration of Mayor Yaranon assailing the OP resolution ordering the latter’s
Parenthetically, we note that while the validity of the second act of rescission described in G.R. No. 174879 is not
suspension as City Mayor of Baguio City.98 The counsel for Jadewell likewise stated in his letter that they were aware
principally determinative of the respondents’ liability for indirect contempt therein, a conclusion that the second act of
that the Sanggunian was planning to issue a resolution to repeal Ordinance No. 003-2000 and rescind the MOA. The
rescission was undertaken competently and appropriately will to a certain degree impact our appreciation of such
letter requested the Vice-Mayor to veto the measure in light of the pending petitions with the Supreme Court. 99 The
possible liability. We will discuss this issue in our subsequent discussion on the charges of contempt.
said counsel likewise sent a similar letter to the Sanggunian, urging it to desist from implementing the repeal of
Ordinance No. 003-2000 and the rescission of the MOA pending the resolution of the cases with the Supreme
Court.100 Inasmuch as there is no longer any existing MOA, no order of this Court can have the effect of directing the City of
Baguio to enforce any of the terms of the MOA, which brings us to the matter of G.R. No. 160025. In whatever
direction we rule on the question of the validity of the first act of rescission, such ruling will only have the effect of
On 13 September 2006, Mayor Yaranon appealed to the CA, in a case docketed as CA G.R. CV SP No. 96116,
either providing Jadewell a basis to seek damages from the City of Baguio for the wrongful termination of the MOA,
praying for the lifting of the penalty of suspension meted him in OP 04-G-294, but this appeal was denied. Mayor
should we find wrongful termination to have taken place, or, deny Jadewell that right. The possible susceptibility of
Yaranon moved for reconsideration.101
the City of Baguio and its officials to an action for damages on a finding of wrongful termination is why we do not
consider G.R. No. 160025 as having been rendered moot by the lawful rescission of the MOA on 22 November
On 22 September 2006, City Legal Officer Rabanes wrote a letter to Jadewell, through its President, Mr. Rogelio 2006. Thus, we will proceed to rule on the issues in G.R. No. 160025.
Tan, informing Jadewell of Resolution No. 204, Series of 2006, which rescinded the MOA, and ordering it to stop
operations within 60 days from notice. 102 This letter was received on the same day it was issued;103 hence, the 60-
The fallo of the RTC Decision upheld by the CA, which affirmance is the lis mota in G.R. No. 160025, reads as
day period lapsed on 22 November 2006. This notice, together with the resolution, constitute the second act of
follows:
rescission of the MOA by the city officials of Baguio.

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered declaring both Sangguniang Panlungsod Resolution No. 037, Series of 2002
On 19 October 2006, Jadewell filed the sixth contempt case with this Court against the acting City Mayor of Baguio,
and the April 17, 2002 Resolution overriding the Mayor’s veto as NULL and VOID. The Writ of Preliminary Injunction
Reinaldo A. Bautista, Jr., and the members of the Sanggunian, including City Legal Officer Melchor Carlos R.
earlier issued by this Court is made PERMANENT, with costs against respondents. 106
Rabanes, for the second act of rescission of the MOA.104 The case was docketed as G.R. No. 174879.
The RTC did not order the respondents therein to comply with the MOA. An order to perform a contract is not 2. On the substantive issues:
necessarily subsumed in an order not to terminate the same.
a. On the lack of due process afforded Jadewell. – The RTC was correct in ruling that Jadewell
Contrast this legal point with the fact that the prayer of Jadewell in its original petition asked the RTC, in relevant was denied the right to be heard before the Sanggunian rescinded the MOA. There is no
part: evidence on record that the Sanggunian afforded Jadewell an opportunity to present its side or
refute the charges of the latter’s violation committed under the MOA.111
...that the writ of preliminary injunction be made permanent and the writs applied for be issued against the
respondents nullifying and voiding Resolution No. 037, series of 2002 and the resolution over-riding the veto … and b. On the authority of the RTC to consider the effect of Section 9 of the MOA112 when Jadewell
instead, directing them to perform what the memorandum of agreement requires them to do. (Emphasis supplied) 107 never raised the matter of Section 9 in any of its pleadings. – The RTC correctly considered
Jadewell’s letter dated 24 November 2001, addressed to the Sanggunian and offered during the
trial, which introduced the subject matter of the five (5) year guarantee against rescission
This latter part, which is effectively a prayer for a permanent mandatory injunction against respondents therein to
provided in Section 9 of the MOA. The CA regarded the RTC’s consideration of said letter as
perform the terms of the MOA, are not in the fallo of the RTC decision. We consider therefore that the RTC
judicious and added that even without it, the MOA, and its provisions, form part of the case
deliberately withheld granting the specific prayer to order Baguio City to perform the MOA. No motion to correct or
records.113
clarify the said fallo having been filed by Jadewell, the prayer to order the city officials of Baguio to perform the MOA
is hereby deemed abandoned.
c. On the failure to observe the 60-day notice requirement. – The RTC correctly found that the
Sanggunian cannot validly and unilaterally rescind the MOA without observing the provisions in
We further note three things:
Section 12 of the MOA requiring that a 60-day notice be given before rescission can take place.
To allow the Sanggunian to unilaterally rescind the MOA without giving Jadewell an opportunity
1. Jadewell has not questioned - in its Petition, Reply to Comment, and Memorandum before this Court - to present its side is to render the right to rescission provided in the MOA legally vulnerable. 114
the implication of the RTC and CA Decisions to the effect that the Sanggunian had the authority to perform
acts of contractual rescission on behalf of the City of Baguio when both these courts ignored the issue
d. On the lack of substantiveness of the alleged breach of performance of the MOA by Jadewell.
raised by Jadewell in its Petition before the RTC, and we therefore do not consider this to be a genuine
– The CA reviewed the records of the case and upheld the findings of the RTC that the
issue in this Petition before us;
violations of Jadewell were not substantial to merit the consequence of rescission under the
MOA.115
2. While the Sangguniang Panlungsod has insinuated that there was fraud and excess of authority on the
part of the mayor in the execution108 of the MOA - because the latter provided for a smaller sharing of "20
We elucidate on the arguments of the parties, the RTC, and the CA.
% from the gross profit of the operation or 50% of the net profit whichever is higher" instead of the
intended "20% of gross receipts,"109- petitioners in G.R. No. 160025 conceded even at the RTC level that
they are not assailing the MOA for being defective but for having been breached in the performance. We In its Petition before the RTC, Jadewell argues that the rescission of the MOA was not valid, on due process
thus disregard all arguments in G.R. No. 160025 regarding the validity of the execution of the MOA, for grounds, and also because there was no substantial breach on its part to justify a rescission of the MOA. 116 It also
being a non-issue in this case; 110 asserts that the Sanggunian had no authority to rescind the MOA, because the latter was not a party thereto. 117

3. We also immediately set aside claims of Jadewell in its Petition before the RTC that an alternative relief Jadewell sought a writ of preliminary injunction to prevent the implementation of the questioned Resolution, and
should be provided by the courts in the form of compensation for terminated Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) prayed that after hearing, the preliminary injunction be made permanent. It further prayed for the issuance of a writ of
contracts under the BOT Law (Republic Act No. 6957) as there is not the slightest basis on record that the certiorari to nullify the assailed Resolution; and for a mandatory injunction to compel the City Government to perform
administration of on-street parking can be classified as an infrastructure contract, a basic element that the latter’s obligations under the MOA.118 Jadewell alternatively invoked the provisions of Section 18 of the
must be present for any contract to come within the terms of the BOT Law. Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of the BOT Law,119 in the event the RTC would uphold the validity of the
questioned Resolution.
Having preliminarily screened out the non-issues in this case, we proceed to examine the rulings of the courts a quo
in G.R. 160025. The trial court ruled that the rescission violated the due process clause of the Constitution and failed to meet the
requirements for rescission under the Civil Code and the MOA itself. In the Sanggunian’s Memorandum, on appeal
before the CA, the Sanggunian assigned three errors to the Decision of the trial court: (1) the RTC ignored the
The CA affirmed the RTC Decision in toto, along the following points:
evidence on record and the requirements of Rule 65 when it declared the subject Resolution void; (2) Jadewell was
not denied due process when the MOA was rescinded; and (3) by ruling that the Sangguniang Panlungsod had no
1. On the sole procedural issue. - The RTC was correct in treating the Petition as one for permanent right of rescission for the first 5 years of the MOA – an issue not raised in the pleadings – the trial court improperly
injunction with a prayer for a preliminary injunction, instead of treating it by its formal title: "Petition for took up the cudgels for Jadewell in the case.120
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with a Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction." It was correct in
holding that if the Petition had been treated by its formal denomination, then it would have been dismissed
As earlier stated, the CA upheld the RTC’s Decision in toto.
for failing to satisfy the requirement that the act sought to be nullified was rendered in a judicial or quasi-
judicial capacity by the respondents, but then this formal denomination could be disregarded and the
nature of the Petition should be determined by its allegations and prayers. Since there was a prayer to The Sanggunian filed its Motion for Reconsideration arguing that the CA had erred as follows: (1) treating Jadewell’s
permanently enjoin respondents from enforcing the questioned resolutions, the RTC was correct in treating petition as an original action for injunction;121 (2) ruling that Jadewell was deprived of due process 122 when it
it as one for permanent injunction. rescinded the MOA; and (3) finding that the MOA stipulated for a five-year minimum guarantee against
rescission.123This was denied, and this denial and the CA Decision are the subjects of G. R. 160025.
2. G.R. No. 172215 – Certiorari, This was followed by a Memorandum on 8 April 2005 directing the Baguio City Police District to create a special task
Prohibition and Mandamus, filed by force to prevent Jadewell from clamping, towing, and impounding vehicles found to be in violation of the parking
Jadewell against Judge Pamintuan rules in Baguio City.
for not dismissing Civil Case No. 6089-R
The issue to be resolved in this petition is whether Mayor Yaranon could be cited for contempt for the above,
Jadewell directly filed the instant Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari before this Court to nullify the denial by the trial court pending resolution of the issue of the validity of the rescission of the MOA in G.R. Nos. 160025 and 163052.
of its Motion to Dismiss and its Motion for Reconsideration of the same order, 124 and for ordering Jadewell to cease
collecting parking fees, and from towing and impounding vehicles on the streets of Baguio City. It also seeks to
c. G.R. No. 165564 – Jadewell filed this third contempt petition against Mayor Yaranon for issuing Executive Order
nullify the proceedings in Civil Case No. 6089-R, invoking both res judicata and litis pendentia. 125 It contends that,
No. 005-2004 dated 15 October 2004. The order directs Jadewell to cease and desist from: (a) charging and
since the issue on the validity of the questioned city ordinance and the MOA was favorably ruled upon previously by
collecting parking fees on the streets of Baguio City without the consent of the City Government; 130 (b) seizing and
RTC Branches 7 and 61 of Baguio City in separate cases, Branch 3 of the same RTC presided by Judge Pamintuan
detaining vehicles of motorists who refuse to pay the parking fees to Jadewell 131 and (c) using yellow-colored tow
is bound by the rulings of the other branches. 126 Litis pendentia is being invoked in relation to the petitions already
trucks bearing the name "City of Baguio".132 Jadewell’s petition also seeks to nullify Executive Order No. 005-2004.
before this Court.

On 16 November 2004, Jadewell filed a Supplemental Petition. The act complained of this time was the issuance of
Mayor Yaranon is impleaded in this case on the basis of the order of Judge Pamintuan to the city mayor to perform
Executive Order No. 005-2004-A which is a mere rehash of Executive Order No. 005-2004. 133 On 25 January 2005,
his duty to supervise the roads, streets and park of Baguio City, in coordination with the police and the LTO during
Jadewell filed a Second Supplemental Petition in connection with Mayor Yaranon’s issuance of Administrative Order
the validity of the Writ of Injunction that Judge Pamintuan issued.127
No. 622, Series of 2004. The said administrative order declared that Jadewell exceeded its area of operations for the
administration of on-street parking and it required to show lawful cause why its business permit should not be
The main issue to be resolved in Jadewell’s Petition for certiorari is whether Judge Pamintuan’s rulings in Civil Case revoked.
No. 6089-R violated the res judicata/litis pendentia doctrines.
Like in the earlier contempt petitions, Jadewell alleges that these issuances by Mayor Yaranon are contumacious
3. G.R. No. 181488 – The because they were made while the main petition, G.R. No. 160025 questioning the rescission of the MOA by the
Certiorari petition filed by Yaranon Sanggunian, is still pending resolution with this Court.
seeking to reverse Resolutions dated
9 October 2008 and 24 January 2008
d. G.R. No. 172216 – On 27 April 2006, Jadewell filed a petition for contempt against Judge Fernando Vil
in CA-G.R. SP No. 96116 which
Pamintuan, Presiding Judge of RTC-Branch 3 of Baguio City, in relation to Civil Case No. 6089-R pending before his
upheld the validity of his suspension
sala.134 In the said civil case, Judge Pamintuan issued an Order directing Jadewell to desist from the collection of
as City Mayor of Baguio.
parking fees, from towing and impounding vehicles on the streets of Baguio City and to hold in abeyance the
implementation of City Ordinance 003-2000 and the MOA. The validity of the Order of Judge Pamintuan is the
Mayor Yaranon’s instant Petition before this Court raises the following issues: (1) that his failed re-election bid was subject of a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus instituted by Jadewell in G.R. No. 172215.
not a supervening event in the final determination by the CA of whether he was guilty of grave misconduct, abuse of
authority, and oppression; and (2) that the CA should rule on the substantive validity of his suspension.
The main issue to be resolved in this case is whether Judge Pamintuan should be cited for indirect contempt by this
Court for issuing the assailed Orders.
4. The Petitions for Contempt
e. G.R. No. 173043 – On 29 June 2006, Jadewell filed yet another contempt case against Mayor Yaranon. In
a. G.R. No. 163052 – This is the first contempt petition filed by Jadewell directly with this Court against City Mayor addition to its prayer to cite him for contempt, Jadewell also prays that Mayor Yaranon, as a lawyer, be
Vergara, the Vice Mayor, and the entire Sanggunian, for enacting Resolution Nos. 056 & 059, Series of 2004. To disbarred.135Jadewell instituted this fifth contempt case after it received a letter from Mayor Yaranon demanding that
recall, Resolution No. 056, Series of 2004 informs the general public that Jadewell had neither the authority nor the it stop its business operations in Baguio City, at the same time directing the Sangguniang Panlungsod to cancel
police power to clamp, tow or impound vehicles at any place in the City of Baguio. 128 In Resolution No. 059, Series of Ordinance 003-2000.
2004, the City of Baguio made a formal demand upon Jadewell to surrender the Ganza and Burnham Park Parking
Areas within thirty days. In the same Resolution, the City of Baguio also directed the City Legal Officer to file the
The issue to be resolved in this case is whether Mayor Yaranon was guilty of indirect contempt and professional
appropriate legal actions necessary to recover the said parking areas and to ask for damages against Jadewell. 129
misconduct for the above acts pending resolution of G.R. Nos. 160025, 163052,164107, 165564 and 172215. 136

The core issue to be resolved in this case is whether the Sanggunian Panlungsod is guilty of indirect contempt for
f. G.R. No. 174879 - On 19 October 2006, Jadewell filed a contempt case against the acting City Mayor of Baguio,
enacting the above resolutions, pending resolution of G.R. No. 160025.
Reinaldo A. Bautista, Jr., and the members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, including City Legal Officer Melchor
Carlos R. Rabanes, in connection with the second act of rescission. 137 Jadewell also asks that the respondents who
b. G.R. No. 164107 – This contempt petition was filed directly with this Court against then Baguio City Mayor Braulio are lawyers, namely: Rocky Thomas A. Balisong, Edilberto B. Tenefrancia, Faustino A. Olowan, Federico J.
D. Yaranon after he issued Executive Order No. 001-04 announcing that, as City Mayor, he would give protection to Mandapat, Perlita L. Chan-Rondez, and Jose M. Molintas, be disbarred.
motor vehicle owners, operators, and drivers who would refuse to submit to the enforcement of traffic rules by
Jadewell such as by refusing to pay the parking fees or fines the latter imposes.
These acts, in Jadewell’s view, are contumacious in light of the pending G.R. No. 160025 before this Court.

Yaranon also issued a Memorandum dated 8 July 2004, ordering the arrest and filing of criminal charges against
OUR RULINGS
Jadewell personnel who would clamp, tow, or impound motor vehicles in defiance of Executive Order No. 001-04.
1. On G.R. No. 160025 Our perusal of the petition filed before the Court of Appeals clearly shows that it is a petition for review under Rule
42, and not a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65. We note that in the Court of Appeals’ petition, under the
heading "Nature of the Petition," petitioner stated that it was a "petition for review on certiorari to set aside, invalidate
a. On the Treatment of
and reverse the Decision dated December 14, 2001 of public respondent Judge Victor T. Llamas, Jr." Also, the
Jadewell’s Petition as one for
reversal sought was premised on the ground that the decision was issued in gross error. The statement under the
Permanent Injunction.
heading "Nature of the Petition" that the trial courts’ decisions were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction, and even the caption impleading the lower courts, would not automatically bring the petition
The CA sustained the position of the Sanggunian that certiorari could not prosper because when the latter enacted within the coverage of Rule 65. It is hornbook doctrine that it is not the caption of the pleading but the allegations
Resolution 37, the Sanggunian was exercising its legislative function and not its judicial or quasi-judicial function. therein that determine the nature of the action. (Emphasis supplied)
The writ of certiorari under Rule 65 requires: (a) that it is directed against a tribunal, a board or an officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (b) that such tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction
In the original action filed by Jadewell before the RTC of Baguio City, although the action was clearly denominated
or with grave abuse of discretion; and (c) that there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
as a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus against the Sangguniang Panlungsod, the allegations actually
ordinary course of law.138
supported an action for injunction under Rule 58 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure. As can be gleaned from its
allegations and especially in its prayers, Jadewell filed the case with the trial court with the ultimate end of restraining
The CA nevertheless proceeded to treat the Petition as an original action for injunction, ruling in this wise: the implementation of Resolution No. 037, Series of 2002.

xxxx We agree with the CA when it ruled that Jadewell sought permanent injunction aside from the auxiliary remedy of
preliminary injunction, thus:
Although in the trial court, Jadewell filed said petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus under Rule 65, it is
essentially one for Injunction under Rule 58. Said petition’s form and substance satisfied all the requirements of a An action for injunction is a recognized remedy in this jurisdiction. It is a suit for the purpose of enjoining the
civil action for Injunction, which is the proper remedy under the attendant circumstances. defendant, perpetually or for a particular time, from committing or continuing to commit a specific act, or compelling
the defendant to continue performing a particular act. It has an independent existence. The action for injunction is
distinct from the ancillary remedy of preliminary injunction, which cannot exist except only as part or an incident of an
The rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid technical sense, rules of procedure are used only to independent action or proceeding.143 xxxx...
help secure, not override substantial justice. If a technical and rigid enforcement of the rules is made, their aim would
be defeated.
In Garcia v. Adeva,144 this Court had the opportunity to clarify that while injunction can be a provisional remedy, it can
also be a main case. The Court had to make this preliminary distinction in order to find out whether the SEC had the
Considering the clear and patent denial of due process committed by the Sanggunian in precipitately rescinding the jurisdiction to prevent, on a permanent basis, the commission of certain acts by the respondents. Thus, the necessity
MOA and in the interest of substantial justice, WE deem it more prudent to treat the petition filed below as an action to make the distinction between injunction as a provisional remedy and injunction as a main case. It found guidance
for Injunction under Rule 58, which is well within the jurisdiction of the trial court. Consequently, the present appeal from Garayblas v. Atienza, Jr.,145 and quoting from the latter:
shall be considered as an appeal from the permanent injunction ordered by the trial court, which is properly
appealable to this Court, as held in Casilan vs. Ybaňez. 139
Injunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby a party is ordered to do or refrain from doing a certain act.
It may be the main action or merely a provisional remedy for and as an incident in the main action. The Court has
xxxx distinguished the main action for injunction from the provisional or ancillary remedy of preliminary injunction, thus:

We sustain the ruling of the appellate court treating Jadewell’s original action for certiorari as one for injunction The main action for injunction is distinct from the provisional or ancillary remedy of preliminary injunction which
based on the allegations in the latter’s pleadings. cannot exist except only as part or an incident of an independent action or proceeding. As a matter of course, in an
action for injunction, the auxiliary remedy of preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or mandatory, may issue.
In Ramon Jimenez, Jr. v. Juan Jose Jordana, 140 the issue to be resolved was whether the nature of the action was Under the law, the main action for injunction seeks a judgment embodying a final injunction which is distinct from,
one for specific performance or for recovery of real property. In determining that the case was one for the recovery of and should not be confused with, the provisional remedy of preliminary injunction, the sole object of which is to
real property, the Court characterized the suit on the basis of the allegations in the Complaint. We restated the rule preserve the status quo until the merits can be heard. A preliminary injunction is granted at any stage of an action or
that the nature of an action is determined by the material averments in the complaint and the character of the relief proceeding prior to the judgment or final order. It persists until it is dissolved or until the termination of the action
sought. In the recent case of Reyes v. Alsons Development and Investment Corporation, 141 we likewise ruled that the without the court issuing a final injunction.
nature of an action is determined by the allegations in the pleadings.
We, therefore, rule that the CA did not commit any error in treating Jadewell’s Petition for Certiorari as an original
In Lee, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,142 the controversy to be resolved was whether the appeal filed by the petitioner was action for injunction.
one under Rule 65 or Rule 42. The determination of the issue was crucial, because the appellate court had
dismissed the appeal of the petitioner, saying that the wrong mode of appeal had been used. The CA had ruled that b. On the denial of due process.
petitioner should have filed a certiorari petition under Rule 65 – instead of a petition under Rule 42 – to appeal the
assailed decision rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
The second issue in this Petition is the correctness of the CA’s ruling that Jadewell was deprived of due process
when the Sangguniang Panlungsod rescinded the MOA. The findings of the CA are as follows:
We held:
In the instant case, evidence on record does not show that before the Sanggunian passed the disputed Resolution it SECTION 5. Prohibitions against parking outside the parking spaces. No spaces shall park any motor vehicle on the
gave Jadewell an opportunity to present its side. Neither did the Sanggunian convene an investigatory body to sidewalk or cause or permit any motor vehicle to wait to any road or length of road on which in any place in which or
inquire into Jadewell’s alleged violations nor at least invite Jadewell to a conference to discuss the alleged violations, adjacent to or in close proximity to which there is a parking place.
if only to give Jadewell the chance to refute any evidence gathered by it against the latter. As it is, the Sanggunian
arrogated upon itself the role of a prosecutor, judge and executioner in rescinding the MOA, all in clear violation of
xxxx
Jadewell’s constitutionally embedded right to due process.146

SECTION 7. Payment of Prescribed Charges. (1) No person shall park any motor vehicle in a parking place or
x x x.
parking space during the times specified in this Ordinance without paying the prescribed charge for the required
parking period; (2) The prescribed charge payable in respect to the parking of a motor vehicle in a parking space
Both courts held that Jadewell was denied due process. When the denial of due process argument is raised, it is shall be paid by the insertion into the parking meter provided for that parking space a coin/coins of Philippine
directed primarily against the exercise of governmental authority that "deprives life, liberty and property" without Currency or by using cards in order to obtain the payment ticket to evidence the payment of the prescribed charge;
observance what is, in the circumstances, the applicable standards of "due process." It is not an argument that is (3) The payment ticket shall be displayed at a conspicuous part of a motor vehicle in a parking place or parking
relevant in situations of contractual breach between two purely private entities, nor is it available against the space; (4) The payment ticket shall be valid to be used on any parking space within the authorized period indicated
government when the latter is not discharging a governmental function, but merely pursuing a purely commercial in the payment ticket.
activity in a proprietary capacity. In order to consider the due process argument, this Court must first determine
whether the MOA was entered into by the City of Baguio in a governmental capacity, or in a purely proprietary
xxxx
capacity.

SECTION 22. Rules. The Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) to be entered into by the City Mayor shall be governed
The regulation of on-street and off-street parking is a governmental function that can be exercised by local
by this Ordinance.
governments. It is important to understand the objective of the Baguio City Government in: (1) privatizing the
administration of on-street and off-street parking; and (2) its execution of a MOA with Jadewell. This can be gleaned
from the Explanatory Note and other provisions of the agreement, to wit: From the above, the following are clear: (1) that the City of Baguio decided on the privatization of the administration
of parking for environmental and peace and safety reasons, both of which are within its powers under Section 458(A)
(5)(v) and (vi) of the Local Government Code; and (2) that the terms of agreement between the City of Baguio and
The City of Baguio has earned the reputation of the CLEANEST AND GREENEST HIGHLY URBANIZED CITY for
Jadewell involve the delegation of governmental functions in terms of regulating the designation and use of parking
the previous years. This has become possible due to the collective effort of both the Citizens of Baguio and the City
spaces as well as the collection of fees for such use. These are indicators that any privatization contract pursuant to
Government. However, the increase in population, volume of vehicles and the absence of a regulatory measure to
the above Resolution takes the essential character of a franchise because what is being privatized is a government-
address this concern gradually tainted what used to be a reputation we were proud of.
monopolized function.

The ever increasing problems, specifically those relevant to the Traffic situation is at this point the biggest contributor
It would thus be relevant to ask if there is a provision in the applicable laws or the franchise (MOA) that grants the
to environmental degradation. Other Salient points we must consider relevant to this matter are the problems on
City of Baguio the right to revoke the latter either at will, or upon the satisfaction of certain conditions, such that
OBSTRUCTION AND DOUBLE PARKING which are very rampant. We further add to these the problems on
ordinary due process protection can be considered to have been waived by the franchisee. We must caution that
DISORGANIZED PARKING, LACK OF DEPUTIZED AGENTS to monitor, supervise and enforce traffic rules and
when we refer to revocation at will here, we are referring to the revocation of resolutory, not suspensive,
regulations.
obligations.147

At this point in time, we feel the immediate need of focusing on these problems. There is an urgent need to adopt
We have looked closely at Resolution No. 003-2000 and the MOA and have additionally reflected on the applicable
measures that would alleviate these matters. This we recommend that PARKING SPACES should be REGULATED
provision under the Civil Code. We have come to the conclusion that:
in such a manner that it would bring advantage both to the City Government and the Citizens of Baguio. We further
propose the collection of REGULATORY FEES that would be used in maintaining our roads and to hire people that
would de deputized to help ease the problems as stated above. (a) There is only one provision that allows for unilateral revocation of the MOA, which can be found in
Section 9 thereof:
Finally, we believe that our roads are beyond the Commerce of Man. To convert our roads into PAY PARKING
SPACES, would be violative of this principle. However to REGULATE its use and its eventual effect would redound 9. Minimum Guaranty – The FIRST PARTY guaranties (sic) a minimum period of five (5) years against
to the GENERAL WELFARE will be an appreciated gesture to help preserve our image as the CLEANEST AND rescission; provided that after such period, the parties may agree to increase to a reasonable rate the
GREENEST HIGHLY URBANIZED CITY. parking fees and the share of the city from the parking fees collected as provided for in the guidelines,
(Annex "B");
xxxx
(b) This Section 9 requires that five years must have lapsed – presumably from the date of execution of
the MOA – before the unilateral right to revoke the MOA can be exercised;
SECTION 4. Parking spaces. A parking place may be divided into parking spaces and for the purposes of this
Ordinance, each space or for a number of spaces as determined by the private parking operator in consultation with
the concerned Official of the City of Baguio. (c) Therefore, before the five year period has lapsed, the right to revoke the MOA arises only under Article
1191 of the Civil Code, which reads:
xxxx
Art. 1191. The power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in case one of the obligors should not It is our view that the first act of rescission by the City of Baguio may be valid even if there is a stipulation against it
comply with what is incumbent upon him. within the first five years of the MOA’s existence. Article 1191 of the New Civil Code provides a party the right to
rescind the agreement and clearly overrides any stipulation to the contrary. However, the grounds that would serve
as basis to the application of the said article must be clearly established.
The injured party may choose between the fulfillment and the rescission of the obligation, with the payment of
damages in either case. He may also seek rescission, even after he has chosen fulfillment, if the latter should
become impossible. In the exercise of this option under Article 1191, was it necessary for the City of Baguio to provide Jadewell an
opportunity to air its side on the matter before the former implemented the rescission of the MOA? In the instant
case, was Jadewell deprived of procedural due process?
The court shall decree the rescission claimed, unless there be just cause authorizing the fixing of a period.

We answer in the negative. We disagree with the rulings of the RTC and the CA that Jadewell was deprived of due
This is understood to be without prejudice to the rights of third persons who have acquired the thing, in accordance
process. In Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila v. The Board of Transportation, 157 we confronted the issue of whether
with Articles 1385 and 1388 and the Mortgage Law.
the petitioners were denied procedural due process when the respondent Board of Transportation issued a circular
ordering the phasing out of old vehicles to be used as taxicabs. In the said case, the phase-out was embodied in a
From the above, it appears that in order to effect a valid revocation of the MOA prior to the lapse of the 5-year period circular that was promulgated without holding a public hearing or at least requiring those affected to submit their
provided for in Section 9, the City of Baguio had to approach the problem from one or both of two perspectives: one, position papers on the policy to be implemented. We held for the respondent Board, and ruled in this wise:
negotiate the termination of the MOA with Jadewell, or two, exercise its option under Article 1191 of the Civil Code.
Dispensing with a public hearing prior to the issuance of the Circulars is neither violative of procedural due process.
The first option, a negotiated pretermination of the contract, is an inherent right of every party in a contract. This can As held in Central Bank vs. Hon. Cloribel and Banco Filipino, 44 SCRA 307 (1972):
be inferred from the freedom of the parties to contract and modify their previous covenants provided it would not be
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.148 Despite the provision on the minimum
Previous notice and hearing as elements of due process, are constitutionally required for the protection of life or
warranty against rescission stipulated in the MOA, the parties were not constrained to mutually modify such
vested property rights, as well as of liberty, when its limitation or loss takes place in consequence of a judicial or
restriction. The Sanggunian could have proposed to Jadewell the possibility of lifting the warranty against rescission
quasi-judicial proceeding, generally dependent upon a past act or event which has to be established or ascertained.
subject to the condition that the latter will comply with its obligations under the MOA.
It is not essential to the validity of general rules or regulations promulgated to govern future conduct of a class or
persons or enterprises, unless the law provides otherwise.
This scenario could have impressed upon Jadewell that its contractual relations with the city government of Baguio
were less than ideal. The suggested approach for the Sanggunian could have been legally sound and practical.
In the instant case, the assailed act by the Sanggunian Panlungsod in rescinding the MOA – be it first or second act
Obviously, this was not done in this case; thus, Jadewell’s Complaint before the RTC of Baguio City.
of rescission – was clearly in the exercise of its legislative or administrative functions and was not an exercise of a
judicial or quasi-judicial function. The Sanggunian Panlungsod does not possess any judicial or quasi-judicial
The second option is the exercise of the unilateral right to rescind a bilateral contract on the part of a party who functions. The preamble of the MOA lends support to this view. Evidently, the foremost reason why the agreement
believes that it has been injured by a breach substantial enough to warrant revocation. Where one party allegedly was entered into by the parties was to provide order, given Baguio City’s parking problems in identified areas, as well
failed to comply with his obligations under a contract, the injured party may rescind the obligation if the other does as to generate income.
not perform or is not ready and willing to perform.149 We will examine the acts of Baguio City in relation to what is
allowed under Article 1191.
The objectives of the Sanggunian Panlungsod, as well as its intention to rescind the MOA; because it deems to no
longer serve the interest of the City of Baguio, are clearly an exercise of its legislative or administrative function.
Rescission under Article 1191 takes place through either of two modes: (1) through an extrajudicial declaration of However, it is another matter as to whether the City of Baguio was able to clearly establish the grounds as basis for
rescission; or (2) upon the grant of a judicial decree of rescission. the exercise of its right to rescind.

Extrajudicial declaration of rescission is recognized as a power which does not require judicial intervention. 150 If the c. On the allegation of Jadewell’s
rescission is not opposed, extrajudicial declaration of rescission produces legal effect 151 such that the injured party is substantial breach of the MOA.
already relieved from performing the undertaking.152
The Baguio City government has repeatedly mentioned that Jadewell had so far installed only 14 parking meters,
However, the power of declaring extrajudicial rescission conferred upon the injured party is regulated by the Civil with only 12 functioning. The COA-CAR Report dated 13 July 2003 enumerated 12 findings, 158 a majority of which
Code. If the extrajudicial rescission is impugned by the other party, it shall be subject to a judicial indicates that Jadewell was remiss in the fulfilment of its obligations under the MOA. While Finding Nos. (1), (2), (3),
determination153where court action must be taken, and the function of the court is to declare the rescission as having (4), (5), (8) and (12) of the COA-CAR Report state that Jadewell collected parking fees, Jadewell failed to properly
been properly or improperly made, or to give a period within which the debtor must perform the obligation alleged to remit the same. Finding No. (11) of the COA-CAR Report states that Jadewell failed to have its parking attendants
be breached.154 A unilateral cancellation of a contract may be questioned in courts by the affected party to determine deputized,159 a condition under the MOA that is also important to the overall objective of the endeavor.
whether or not cancellation is warranted. 155 Thus, in an extrajudicial decree of rescission, revocation cannot be
completely exercised solely on a party’s own judgment that the other has committed a breach of the obligation 156 but
The MOA does not specifically provide for the exact number of parking meters to be installed by Jadewell pursuant
always subject to the right of the other party to judicially impugn such decision.
to the parties’ objective in regulating parking in the city. Nevertheless, 100 parking spaces were allotted as
mentioned in Annex A of the MOA.160 The agreement also obligates Jadewell to have its parking attendants
It is important to contextualize that the agreement entered into by the City of Baguio with Jadewell is the embodiment deputized by the DOTC-LTO so that they shall have the authority to enforce traffic rules and regulations in the
of a grant of franchise imbued with public interest and is not merely an agreement between two private parties. regulated areas.161 To the Court’s mind, these are two of the most important obligations that Jadewell had to comply
with, considering the nature and objective of the agreement it had entered into.
Despite the enumeration of the above-mentioned faults of Jadewell, we do not make a categorical finding that there (c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a court not constituting
was substantial breach committed by Jadewell to justify a unilateral rescission of the MOA. We find, however, that direct contempt under Section 1 of this Rule;
the RTC had not properly received evidence that would allow it to determine the extent of the claimed violations of
the MOA. Had these violations by Jadewell been proven in a proper hearing, the finding of a substantial breach of
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration
the MOA would have been a distinct probability.
of justice;

Unfortunately, neither the RTC nor the CA provided a clear basis for their rulings on the extent of the breach of the
(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without authority;
MOA by Jadewell. Save from reiterating the Sanggunian’s litany of violations said to be committed by Jadewell, there
was no testimony on record to prove such facts and no indication as to whether the RTC or CA dismissed them or
took them at face value. (f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;

Whatever the extent of breach of contract that Jadewell may have committed – and the enumeration of Jadewell’s (g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an officer by virtue of an
alleged faults in Resolution 37 is quite extensive – the City of Baguio was still duty-bound to establish the alleged order or process of a court held by him.
breach.
But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent the court from issuing process to bring the respondent
Matters became complicated when the RTC and the CA lumped the issues on the due process violation of Baguio into court, or from holding him in custody pending such proceedings.
City with Jadewell’s alleged substantial breaches under the MOA, instead of making a clear finding on the existence
and extent of such breach. The facts and legal issues were thus muddled.
The rule alerts us to three possible situations, wherein, in the context of the facts of these petitions, contumacious
behaviour could have been committed by public respondents. First, disobedience or resistance to a lawful order of
We find fault in the lower and appellate court’s lapse in examining the issue on Jadewell’s alleged substantial this Court under paragraph (b). Second, unlawful interference with the proceedings of this Court under paragraph (c).
breach. Evidence-taking had to be undertaken by these courts before they could arrive at a judicial conclusion on the Third, improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impeded, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice
presence of substantial breach. by this Court under paragraph (d).

We thus DENY the Petition of the Sanggunian Panlungsod in G.R. No. 160025 and AFFIRM the questioned CA Jadewell, in G.R. Nos. 163052, 164107, 165564, 172216, 173043, and 174879, bases its charges of indirect
Decision. However, we reject the ruling made by the appellate court that the violations of Jadewell under the MOA contempt against public respondents on a claim that any action that tends to stop the implementation of the MOA is
were not substantial. We hold that there is no sufficient evidence on record to make such determination. contumacious. Such actions include desistance orders to desist against Jadewell itself, the second act of unilateral
rescission of the MOA; orders to other public officers to prevent Jadewell from exercising its authority under the
MOA; and the official encouragement for motorists to resist attempts of Jadewell to collect parking fees or clamp/tow
While Jadewell prays for damages against the public respondent, and while ordinarily we could grant the same, the
vehicles that do not observe the parking regulations.
context of this case prevents us from giving any form of recompense to Jadewell even if the rescission of the MOA
did not follow the required legal procedure. This is because it would be appalling to grant Jadewell any award of
damages, considering (1) it installed only 14 out of the apparently 100 contemplated parking meters; (2) its We find scant jurisprudence to guide us on this matter. The closest situation is that presented in Southern
employees, private citizens who did not possess any authority from the LTO, were manually collecting parking fees Broadcasting Network v. Davao Light and Power,162 penned by Justice Felix Makasiar. In that case, petitioner’s
from the public, and (3) it did not, apparently properly remit any significant amount of money to the City of Baguio. representative, Carmen Pacquing, wrote a letter to President Marcos asking for his intervention so that her Motion
These three facts are uncontested, these omissions are offensive to the concept of public service that the residents for Reconsideration (MR) of the resolution of this Court denying her Petition could be favorably granted. Respondent
of Baguio were promised through Jadewell. From its ambiguous responses extant in the records, it is clear that Davao Light asked that petitioner Pacquing be cited for contempt, arguing that her act in writing to the President
Jadewell does not appear to be an investor who has lost in its investments in the Baguio City project. Thus, we do asking him to intervene in the case showed disrespect to and disregard for the authority of this Court as the final
not award any damages to Jadewell. arbiter of all cases. We found petitioner Pacquing guilty of contempt, thus:

2. On G.R. Nos. 163052, 164107, x x x. WE hold that such actuation of herein petitioner’s representative only bespeaks more of her contumacious
165564, 172216, 173043 and 174879 attempt to trifle with the orderly administration of justice because if she know that this Court will ultimately decide the
(The Contempt Petitions) case "regardless of the President’s intervention," then she should have desisted from writing to the President.

Section 3 of Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure enumerates the acts constituting indirect contempt, In the light of the foregoing, there is no doubt that Mrs. Pacquing committed an "improper conduct tending, directly or
thus: indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice" (Section 3, par. [d] Rule 71, Rules of Court)
and impair the respect due to the courts of justice in general, and the Supreme Court, in particular.
(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or in his official transactions;
In the above case, respondent Carmen Pacquing was clearly asking the President to commit an improper act – to
influence the Supreme Court – that obstructs the orderly administration of justice, as the Court is constitutionally
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court, including the act
required to act independently free from the promptings of the President. Pacquing clearly violated both Sections (c)
of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment or process of
and (d) of Section 3, Rule 71.
any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such real
property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the
possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto; No such similar situation occurred here. Public respondents never asked anyone to employ pressure or influence on
this Court for the former’s benefit.
Instead, the acts that have been allegedly committed by public respondents are acts done pursuant to their belief We do not consider the promulgation of the assailed writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction against Jadewell as a
that: (a) the MOA has been validly voided, and more importantly, (b) that Jadewell’s personnel do not have the legal defiance of our writ issued on 9 February 2005, considering, it was directed against Mayor Yaranon only. We have
authority to perform the governmental function of administering the regulation of on-street and off-street parking, of held in Leonidas v. Supnet that "a party cannot be held in indirect contempt for disobeying a court order which is not
towing or clamping vehicles that violate such regulation, and of collecting parking fees from motorists. addressed to him."167 We note that Judge Pamintuan observed deference to the Orders of this Court when he
immediately suspended the proceedings in Civil Case No. 6089-R upon receipt of the TRO.
It is important to note that the Court never gave a mandatory injunction that is couched in a way that requires public
respondents to fully comply with the terms of the MOA. The writ of preliminary mandatory injunction (WPMI) issued G.R. No. 172215
on 9 February 2005 is directed to Mayor Yaranon only, and it directs him to perform only one specific act: to reopen,
and maintain open, the street and premises then being occupied and operated by Jadewell.
In this Petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, Jadewell
assails the Orders of RTC-Branch 3 (Baguio City) denying its motion to dismiss and motion for reconsideration in
Mayor Yaranon did not immediately comply with this WPMI. Thus, this Court fined him ₱10,000 on 20 April 2005, Civil Case No. 6089-R.
and ordered the NBI to arrest him if he further failed to comply with the WPMI. Subsequently, Mayor Yaranon paid
the fine, and there is nothing on record to show that he has, since April of 2005, further defied this Court on that
We deny the petition of Jadewell in this case.
score.

In Manuel Camacho v. Atty. Jovito Coresis, Jr.,168 we described the nature of special civil action for certiorari under
The Court did not issue a WPMI specifically ordering the parties to observe the terms of the MOA. Thus, public
Rule 65, as follows:
respondents were not expressly prohibited to act on their beliefs regarding the validity or invalidity of the MOA, or,
the authority or lack of authority of Jadewell personnel to perform governmental functions in the streets of Baguio.
A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is an extraordinary remedy for the correction of
errors of jurisdiction. To invoke the Court’s power of judicial review under this Rule, it must first be shown that
This is an important result, because to hold otherwise is to effectively grant one of the parties a mandatory injunction
respondent tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi- judicial functions has indeed acted without or in
even without an express resolution to this effect from the Court. Without an express order, the pendency of a suit
excess of its or his jurisdiction, and that there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
before the Supreme Court is not a prima facie entitlement of provisional relief to either party.
ordinary course of law. Conversely, absent a showing of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the acts of the respondents may not be subjected to our review under
Public respondents therefore were, at liberty to question and inform the public of their belief regarding the lack of Rule 65.
authority of Jadewell and its personnel to regulate public parking in Baguio. They were certainly free to formally write
Jadewell on their beliefs and pass the corresponding resolutions to this effect. The mayor was also not under legal
In Indiana Aerospace University v. Commission on Higher Education, 169 this Court ruled thus:
compulsion to renew Jadewell’s business permit in view of his opinion that Jadewell was exceeding its allowable
area of operation, which Jadewell was not able to fully disprove. This is especially true for two important reasons: (1)
there is an uncontested cease and desist order that was issued by the DOTC-CAR on 13 March 2002 which An order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory, and so the proper remedy in such a case is to appeal after a
Jadewell defied well into 2005, and (2) public respondents are city officials of Baguio who have the legal duty to decision has been rendered. A writ of certiorari is not intended to correct every controversial interlocutory ruling; it is
ensure the laws are being followed, including laws that define who may enforce regulations on public parking. resorted to only to correct a grave abuse of discretion or a whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. Its function is limited to keeping an inferior court within its jurisdiction and to relieve persons from
arbitrary acts -- acts which courts or judges have no power or authority in law to perform. It is not designed to correct
That Jadewell personnel do not have the legal authority to enforce regulations on public parking is categorical from
erroneous findings and conclusions made by the court.
the Letter dated 1 February 2001 by the Regional Director of the DOTC-CAR denying the request of Jadewell for the
deputation of its personnel.163
In East Asia Traders, Inc. v. Republic of the Philippines, et al.,170 we decreed:
We therefore do not find any of the public respondents who were then officials of the City of Baguio, liable for indirect
contempt, and thereby dismiss G.R. Nos. 163052, 164107, 165564, 173043 and 174879. In G.R. 174879, we have The petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioner with the Court of Appeals is not the proper remedy to
already pronounced that the Sanggunian was within its full right to perform the second act of rescission, and thus, it assail the denial by the RTC of the motion to dismiss. The Order of the RTC denying the motion to dismiss is merely
is even with more reason, that its members and the City Legal Officer cannot be held in contempt therefor. We deny interlocutory. An interlocutory order does not terminate nor finally dispose of the case, but leaves something to be
the prayer in the petitions to disbar the respondents therein who are lawyers. done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits. It is always under the control of the court and may
be modified or rescinded upon sufficient grounds shown at any time before final judgment. This proceeds from the
court’s inherent power to control its process and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice. The only
We also do not find Judge Fernando Vil Pamintuan liable for contempt in G.R. No. 172216.
limitation is that the judge cannot act with grave abuse of discretion, or that no injustice results thereby.

Jadewell wants this Court to cite Judge Pamintuan for contempt for issuing a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction
East Asia Trader also reiterated our ruling in Indiana Aerospace. Further, in Bonifacio Construction Management
ordering Jadewell to stop collecting parking fees; to refrain from supervising the parking in Baguio City; as well as to
Corporation v. Hon. Perlas Bernabe,171 we reiterated our rulings in East Asia Traders and Indiana Aerospace. We
hold in abeyance the implementation of the MOA and its enabling ordinance. 164
had ruled in these earlier cases that an order of the trial court denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order,
and to use a writ of certiorari to assail it is improper.
It was only on 5 June 2006 that this Court, in G.R. No. 172215, issued a Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO)165directing the trial court to discontinue the proceedings in Civil Case No. 6089-R. Upon receipt by Judge
The procedural policy in the cited cases was again referred to in Bernas v. Sovereign Ventures, Inc., 172 highlighting
Pamintuan of the TRO, he immediately ordered the cancellation of the 29 June 2006 hearing. 166
the following:
Let it be stressed at this point the basic rule that when a motion to dismiss is denied by the trial court, the remedy is provided for it is a naked or honorary office, and is supposed to be accepted merely for the public good." (Emphasis
not to file a petition for certiorari, but to appeal after a decision has been rendered. (Emphasis supplied) supplied)

G.R. No. 181488 Given the circumstances of this case, we find that Mayor Yaranon’s claim for unpaid salaries, in case of exoneration,
does not constitute such substantial relief that would justify the revival of his appeal. Even if we did sustain his
Petition, we nevertheless find that it has been mooted by our resolution in the main petition.
The question of law raised by petitioner Yaranon in this Petition for Review on Certiorari is whether the CA correctly
dismissed his appeal questioning the validity of his suspension from office as City Mayor, on the ground that his suit
had become moot and academic due to his non-re-election to office. The CA cited Crespo v. Provincial Board of WHEREFORE, we hereby rule as follows:
Nueva Ecija173 as basis for the dismissal.
a.) In G.R. No. 160025, the Petition of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Baguio City is DENIED. The CA
For his part, Mayor Yaranon contends that the appellate court should have ruled on the validity of his suspension Decision dated 7 July 2003 in CA G.R. SP No. 74756 is hereby AFFIRMED with modification. There is not
from office despite his failure to get re-elected as City Mayor. He argues that he has the right to know whether his enough evidence on record to conclude that Jadewell’s violations were sufficient to justify the unilateral
suspension was valid or not and, in the event his suspension is declared invalid, Mayor Yaranon believes he is cancellation of the MOA by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Baguio City; at the same time, neither the
entitled to the salaries and benefits accruing during the period he was suspended. RTC nor the CA provided a clear finding whether the breach of the MOA by Jadewell was substantial. We
affirm the CA as to the rest of its dispositions in its assailed Decision. Nevertheless, no award of damages
is hereby made in favour of Jadewell and neither is there any pronouncement as to costs.
We deny the Petition of Mayor Yaranon.

b.) G.R. Nos. 163052, 164107, 165564, 172216, 173043 and 174879, the Petitions of Jadewell to cite
The appeal of Mayor Yaranon has been rendered moot and academic. We hold that the resolution of the issue
Mayor Braulio D. Yaranon, Mayor Bernardo M. Vergara, Acting City Mayor Reinaldo A. Bautista, Vice
raised herein would serve no practical purpose.
Mayor Betty Lourdes F. Tabanda, the members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Baguio City namely:
Elmer O. Datuin, Antonio R. Tabora, Edilberto B. Tenefrancia, Federico J. Mandapat, Jr., Richard A.
In Miriam College v. Court of Appeals, 174 we ruled that a case becomes moot and academic when there is no more Carino, Faustino A. Olowan, Rufino M. Panagan, Leonardo B. Yangot, Jr., Rocky Thomas A. Balisong,
actual controversy between the parties, or when no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits. Galo P. Weygan, Perlita L. Chan-Rondez, Jose M. Molintas, and Judge Fernando Vil Pamintuan for
Further, courts will not determine a moot question in which no practical relief can be granted. 175 indirect contempt and to disbar Sangguniang Panlungsod members Rocky Thomas A. Balisong, Edilberto
B. Tenefrancia, Faustino A. Olowan, Federico J. Mandapat, Perlita L. Chan-Rondez, Jose M. Molintas,
Melchor Carlos B. Rabanes and Mayor Braulio D. Yaranon are all hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. No
Mayor Yaranon has already served his suspension. We find no practical value in remanding his case to the appellate pronouncement as to costs.
court for the determination of the factual basis and legal issues of his appeal pertaining to the validity of his
suspension as then City Mayor of Baguio City.
c.) We DENY the Petition of Jadewell for lack of merit in G.R. No. 172215. We likewise DENY its prayer for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction for being moot and
We have held in Nicart, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan (Third Division), 176 that an issue becomes moot when a petitioner is not academic. No pronouncement as to costs.
entitled to substantial relief:

d.) We DENY the Petition of Mayor Braulio D. Yaranon in G.R. No. 181488, for lack of merit and AFFIRM
x x x [T]he propriety of the preventive suspension of petitioner effected through the assailed Resolution of February the CA Decision CA-G.R. SP No. 96116. No pronouncement as to costs.
15, 2001 has become a moot issue, it appearing that he has already served his suspension. An issue becomes moot
and academic when it ceases to present a justifiable controversy so that a determination thereof would be of no
practical use and value. In such cases, there is no actual substantial relief to which petitioner would be entitled to SO ORDERED.
and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
We cannot sustain Mayor Yaranon’s argument that his appeal should not have been dismissed because, in the event Chief Justice, Chairperson
that the finding of the Office of the President to suspend him is reversed, he is still entitled to the salaries accruing
during the period he was suspended. We take note of the cases cited by Mayor Yaranon such as Crespo v.
Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija,177 Baquerfo v. Sanchez178 and Reyes v. Cristi,179 among others. These cases involve
substantial issues – such as denial of due process and procedural irregularities – other than a mere claim for
entitlement to salaries. The factual background and the legal issues for resolution in the cases mentioned are not
similar to the case at bar.

In Triste v. Leyte State College Board of Trustees 180 the Court elucidated on the nature of the salary of a public
official:

Mechem states that "(l)ike the requirement of an oath, the fact of the payment of a salary and/or fees may aid in
determining the nature of a position, but it is not conclusive, for while a salary or fees are usually annexed to the
office, it is not necessarily so. As in the case of the oath, the salary or fees are mere incidents and form no part of the
office. Where a salary or fees are annexed, the office is often said to be ‘coupled with an interest’; where neither is
 Republic of the Philippines 3. In 1971, a second earth station standard "A" antenna(Pinugay III) was established. Pinugay II
SUPREME COURT provided links with the Indian Ocean Region (major cities in Europe, Middle East, Africa, and
Manila other Asia Pacific countries operating within the region) thru the Indian Ocean INTELSAT
satellite.
EN BANC
4. In 1983, a third earth station standard "B" antenna (Pinugay III) was established to temporarily
assume the functions of Pinugay I and then Pinugay II while they were being refurbished.
G.R. No. 84818 December 18, 1989
Pinugay III now serves as spare or reserved antenna for possible contingencies.

PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE CORPORATION, petitioner, 

5. In 1983, PHILCOMSAT constructed and installed a standard "B" antenna at Clark Air Field,
vs.
Pampanga as a television receive-only earth station which provides the U.S. Military bases with
JOSE LUIS A. ALCUAZ, as NTC Commissioner, and NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS
a 24-hour television service.
COMMISSION, respondents.

6. In 1989, petitioner completed the installation of a third standard "A" earth station (Pinugay IV)
Rilloraza, Africa, De Ocampo & Africa for petitioner.
to take over the links in Pinugay I due to obsolescence. 3

Victor de la Serna for respondent Alcuaz.

By designation of the Republic of the Philippines, the petitioner is also the sole signatory for the Philippines in the
Agreement and the Operating Agreement relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization
(INTELSAT) of 115 member nations, as well as in the Convention and the Operating Agreement of the International
Maritime Satellite Organization (INMARSAT) of 53 member nations, which two global commercial
telecommunications satellite corporations were collectively established by various states in line with the principles set
REGALADO, J.: forth in Resolution 1721 (XVI) of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

This case is posed as one of first impression in the sense that it involves the public utility services of the petitioner Since 1968, the petitioner has been leasing its satellite circuits to:
Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT, for short) which is the only one rendering such
services in the Philippines.
1. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company;
The petition before us seeks to annul and set aside an Order 1 issued by respondent Commissioner Jose Luis Alcuaz
of the National Telecommunications Commission (hereafter, NTC), dated September 2, 1988, which directs the 2. Philippine Global Communications, Inc.;
provisional reduction of the rates which may be charged by petitioner for certain specified lines of its services by
fifteen percent (15%) with the reservation to make further reductions later, for being violative of the constitutional
3. Eastern Telecommunications Phils., Inc.;
prohibition against undue delegation of legislative power and a denial of procedural, as well as substantive, due
process of law.
4. Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. ITT; and
The antecedental facts as summarized by petitioner 2 are not in dispute. By virtue of Republic Act No. 5514,
PHILCOMSAT was granted "a franchise to establish, construct, maintain and operate in the Philippines, at such 5. Capitol Wireless, Inc.
places as the grantee may select, station or stations and associated equipment and facilities for international satellite
communications." Under this franchise, it was likewise granted the authority to "construct and operate such ground
or their predecessors-in-interest. The satellite services thus provided by petitioner enable said international carriers
facilities as needed to deliver telecommunications services from the communications satellite system and ground
to serve the public with indispensable communication services, such as overseas telephone, telex, facsimile,
terminal or terminals."
telegrams, high speed data, live television in full color, and television standard conversion from European to
American or vice versa.
Pursuant to said franchise, petitioner puts on record that it undertook the following activities and established the
following installations:
Under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5514, petitioner was exempt from the jurisdiction of the then Public Service
Commission, now respondent NTC. However, pursuant to Executive Order No. 196 issued on June 17, 1987,
1. In 1967, PHILCOMSAT established its provisional earth station in Pinugay, Rizal. petitioner was placed under the jurisdiction, control and regulation of respondent NTC, including all its facilities and
services and the fixing of rates. Implementing said Executive Order No. 196, respondents required petitioner to apply
for the requisite certificate of public convenience and necessity covering its facilities and the services it renders, as
2. In 1968, earth station standard "A" antenna (Pinugay I) was established. Pinugay I provided
well as the corresponding authority to charge rates therefor.
direct satellite communication links with the Pacific Ocean Region (the United States, Australia,
Canada, Hawaii, Guam, Korea, Thailand, China [PROC], New Zealand and Brunei) thru the
Pacific Ocean INTELSAT satellite. Consequently, under date of September 9, 1987, petitioner filed with respondent NTC an application 4 for authority to
continue operating and maintaining the same facilities it has been continuously operating and maintaining since
1967, to continue providing the international satellite communications services it has likewise been providing since
1967, and to charge the current rates applied for in rendering such services. Pending hearing, it also applied for a It becomes important then to ascertain the nature of the power delegated to respondent NTC and the manner
provisional authority so that it can continue to operate and maintain the above mentioned facilities, provide the required by the statute for the lawful exercise thereof.
services and charge therefor the aforesaid rates therein applied for.
Pursuant to Executive Orders Nos. 546 and 196, respondent NTC is empowered, among others, to determine and
On September 16, 1987, petitioner was granted a provisional authority to continue operating its existing facilities, to prescribe rates pertinent to the operation of public service communications which necessarily include the power to
render the services it was then offering, and to charge the rates it was then charging. This authority was valid for six promulgate rules and regulations in connection therewith. And, under Section 15(g) of Executive Order No. 546,
(6) months from the date of said order. 5 When said provisional authority expired on March 17, 1988, it was extended respondent NTC should be guided by the requirements of public safety, public interest and reasonable feasibility of
for another six (6) months, or up to September 16, 1988. maintaining effective competition of private entities in communications and broadcasting facilities. Likewise, in
Section 6(d) thereof, which provides for the creation of the Ministry of Transportation and Communications with
control and supervision over respondent NTC, it is specifically provided that the national economic viability of the
The NTC order now in controversy had further extended the provisional authority of the petitioner for another six (6)
entire network or components of the communications systems contemplated therein should be maintained at
months, counted from September 16, 1988, but it directed the petitioner to charge modified reduced rates through a
reasonable rates. We need not go into an in-depth analysis of the pertinent provisions of the law in order to conclude
reduction of fifteen percent (15%) on the present authorized rates. Respondent Commissioner ordered said
that respondent NTC, in the exercise of its rate-fixing power, is limited by the requirements of public safety, public
reduction on the following ground:
interest, reasonable feasibility and reasonable rates, which conjointly more than satisfy the requirements of a valid
delegation of legislative power.
The Commission in its on-going review of present service rates takes note that after an initial
evaluation by the Rates Regulation Division of the Common Carriers Authorization Department
II. On another tack, petitioner submits that the questioned order violates procedural due process because it was
of the financial statements of applicant, there is merit in a REDUCTION in some of applicant's
issued motu proprio, without notice to petitioner and without the benefit of a hearing. Petitioner laments that said
rates, subject to further reductions, should the Commission finds (sic) in its further evaluation
order was based merely on an "initial evaluation," which is a unilateral evaluation, but had petitioner been given an
that more reduction should be effected either on the basis of a provisional authorization or in the
opportunity to present its side before the order in question was issued, the confiscatory nature of the rate reduction
final consideration of the case. 6
and the consequent deterioration of the public service could have been shown and demonstrated to respondents.
Petitioner argues that the function involved in the rate fixing-power of NTC is adjudicatory and hence quasi-judicial,
PHILCOMSAT assails the above-quoted order for the following reasons: not quasi- legislative; thus, notice and hearing are necessary and the absence thereof results in a violation of due
process.
1. The enabling act (Executive Order No. 546) of respondent NTC empowering it to fix rates for public service
communications does not provide the necessary standards constitutionally required, hence there is an undue Respondents admit that the application of a policy like the fixing of rates as exercised by administrative bodies is
delegation of legislative power, particularly the adjudicatory powers of NTC; quasi-judicial rather than quasi-legislative: that where the function of the administrative agency is legislative, notice
and hearing are not required, but where an order applies to a named person, as in the instant case, the function
involved is adjudicatory. 8 Nonetheless, they insist that under the facts obtaining the order in question need not be
2. Assuming arguendo that the rate-fixing power was properly and constitutionally conferred, the same was preceded by a hearing, not because it was issued pursuant to respondent NTC's legislative function but because the
exercised in an unconstitutional manner, hence it is ultra vires, in that (a) the questioned order violates procedural assailed order is merely interlocutory, it being an incident in the ongoing proceedings on petitioner's application for a
due process for having been issued without prior notice and hearing; and (b) the rate reduction it imposes is unjust, certificate of public convenience; and that petitioner is not the only primary source of data or information since
unreasonable and confiscatory, thus constitutive of a violation of substantive due process. respondent is currently engaged in a continuing review of the rates charged.

I. Petitioner asseverates that nowhere in the provisions of Executive Order No. 546, providing for the creation of We find merit in petitioner's contention.
respondent NTC and granting its rate-fixing powers, nor of Executive Order No. 196, placing petitioner under the
jurisdiction of respondent NTC, can it be inferred that respondent NTC is guided by any standard in the exercise of
its rate-fixing and adjudicatory powers. While petitioner in its petition-in-chief raised the issue of undue delegation of In Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Public Service Commission,9 we made a categorical classification as to when the
legislative power, it subsequently clarified its said submission to mean that the order mandating a reduction of certain rate-filing power of administrative bodies is quasi-judicial and when it is legislative, thus:
rates is undue delegation not of legislative but of quasi-judicial power to respondent NTC, the exercise of which
allegedly requires an express conferment by the legislative body.
Moreover, although the rule-making power and even the power to fix rates- when such rules
and/or rates are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the Philippines-may
Whichever way it is presented, petitioner is in effect questioning the constitutionality of Executive Orders Nos. 546 partake of a legislative character, such is not the nature of the order complained of. Indeed, the
and 196 on the ground that the same do not fix a standard for the exercise of the power therein conferred. same applies exclusively to petitioner herein. What is more, it is predicated upon the finding of
fact-based upon a report submitted by the General Auditing Office-that petitioner is making a
profit of more than 12% of its invested capital, which is denied by petitioner. Obviously, the latter
We hold otherwise. is entitled to cross-examine the maker of said report, and to introduce evidence to disprove the
contents thereof and/or explain or complement the same, as well as to refute the conclusion
Fundamental is the rule that delegation of legislative power may be sustained only upon the ground that some drawn therefrom by the respondent. In other words, in making said finding of fact, respondent
standard for its exercise is provided and that the legislature in making the delegation has prescribed the manner of performed a function partaking of a quasi-judicial character, the valid exercise of which demands
the exercise of the delegated power. Therefore, when the administrative agency concerned, respondent NTC in this previous notice and hearing.
case, establishes a rate, its act must both be non- confiscatory and must have been established in the manner
prescribed by the legislature; otherwise, in the absence of a fixed standard, the delegation of power becomes This rule was further explained in the subsequent case of The Central Bank of the Philippines vs. Cloribel, et al. 10 to
unconstitutional. In case of a delegation of rate-fixing power, the only standard which the legislature is required to wit:
prescribe for the guidance of the administrative authority is that the rate be reasonable and just. However, it has
been held that even in the absence of an express requirement as to reasonableness, this standard may be implied. 7
 It is also clear from the authorities that where the function of the administrative body is There is no reason to assume that the aforesaid provision does not apply to respondent NTC, there being no limiting,
legislative, notice of hearing is not required by due process of law (See Oppenheimer, excepting, or saving provisions to the contrary in Executive Orders Nos. 546 and 196.
Administrative Law, 2 Md. L.R. 185, 204, supra, where it is said: 'If the nature of the
administrative agency is essentially legislative, the requirements of notice and hearing are not
It is thus clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent has no authority to make such order without first giving
necessary. The validity of a rule of future action which affects a group, if vested rights of liberty
petitioner a hearing, whether the order be temporary or permanent, and it is immaterial whether the same is made
or property are not involved, is not determined according to the same rules which apply in the
upon a complaint, a summary investigation, or upon the commission's own motion as in the present case. That such
case of the direct application of a policy to a specific individual) ... It is said in 73 C.J.S. Public
a hearing is required is evident in respondents' order of September 16, 1987 in NTC Case No. 87-94 which granted
Administrative Bodies and Procedure, sec. 130, pages 452 and 453: 'Aside from statute, the
PHILCOMSAT a provisional authority "to continue operating its existing facilities, to render the services it presently
necessity of notice and hearing in an administrative proceeding depends on the character of the
offers, and to charge the rates as reduced by them "under the condition that "(s)ubject to hearing and the final
proceeding and the circumstances involved. In so far as generalization is possible in view of the
consideration of the merit of this application, the Commission may modify, revise or amend the rates ..." 12
great variety of administrative proceedings, it may be stated as a general rule that notice and
hearing are not essential to the validity of administrative action where the administrative body
acts in the exercise of executive, administrative, or legislative functions; but where a public While it may be true that for purposes of rate-fixing respondents may have other sources of information or data, still,
administrative body acts in a judicial or quasi-judicial matter, and its acts are particular and since a hearing is essential, respondent NTC should act solely on the basis of the evidence before it and not on
immediate rather than general and prospective, the person whose rights or property may be knowledge or information otherwise acquired by it but which is not offered in evidence or, even if so adduced,
affected by the action is entitled to notice and hearing. 11 petitioner was given no opportunity to controvert.

The order in question which was issued by respondent Alcuaz no doubt contains all the attributes of a quasi-judicial Again, the order requires the new reduced rates to be made effective on a specified date. It becomes a final
adjudication. Foremost is the fact that said order pertains exclusively to petitioner and to no other. Further, it is legislative act as to the period during which it has to remain in force pending the final determination of the case. 13An
premised on a finding of fact, although patently superficial, that there is merit in a reduction of some of the rates order of respondent NTC prescribing reduced rates, even for a temporary period, could be unjust, unreasonable or
charged- based on an initial evaluation of petitioner's financial statements-without affording petitioner the benefit of even confiscatory, especially if the rates are unreasonably low, since the utility permanently loses its just revenue
an explanation as to what particular aspect or aspects of the financial statements warranted a corresponding rate during the prescribed period. In fact, such order is in effect final insofar as the revenue during the period covered by
reduction. No rationalization was offered nor were the attending contingencies, if any, discussed, which prompted the order is concerned. Upon a showing, therefore, that the order requiring a reduced rate is confiscatory, and will
respondents to impose as much as a fifteen percent (15%) rate reduction. It is not far-fetched to assume that unduly deprive petitioner of a reasonable return upon its property, a declaration of its nullity becomes inductible,
petitioner could be in a better position to rationalize its rates vis-a-vis the viability of its business requirements. The which brings us to the issue on substantive due process.
rates it charges result from an exhaustive and detailed study it conducts of the multi-faceted intricacies attendant to a
public service undertaking of such nature and magnitude. We are, therefore, inclined to lend greater credence to
III. Petitioner contends that the rate reduction is confiscatory in that its implementation would virtually result in a
petitioner's ratiocination that an immediate reduction in its rates would adversely affect its operations and the quality
cessation of its operations and eventual closure of business. On the other hand, respondents assert that since
of its service to the public considering the maintenance requirements, the projects it still has to undertake and the
petitioner is operating its communications satellite facilities through a legislative franchise, as such grantee it has no
financial outlay involved. Notably, petitioner was not even afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the inspector
vested right therein. What it has is merely a privilege or license which may be revoked at will by the State at any time
who issued the report on which respondent NTC based its questioned order.
without necessarily violating any vested property right of herein petitioner. While petitioner concedes this thesis of
respondent, it counters that the withdrawal of such privilege should nevertheless be neither whimsical nor arbitrary,
At any rate, there remains the categorical admission made by respondent NTC that the questioned order was issued but it must be fair and reasonable.
pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions. It, however, insists that notice and hearing are not necessary since the
assailed order is merely incidental to the entire proceedings and, therefore, temporary in nature. This postulate is
There is no question that petitioner is a mere grantee of a legislative franchise which is subject to amendment,
bereft of merit.
alteration, or repeal by Congress when the common good so requires. 14 Apparently, therefore, such grant cannot be
unilaterally revoked absent a showing that the termination of the operation of said utility is required by the common
While respondents may fix a temporary rate pending final determination of the application of petitioner, such rate- good.
fixing order, temporary though it may be, is not exempt from the statutory procedural requirements of notice and
hearing, as well as the requirement of reasonableness. Assuming that such power is vested in NTC, it may not
The rule is that the power of the State to regulate the conduct and business of public utilities is limited by the
exercise the same in an arbitrary and confiscatory manner. Categorizing such an order as temporary in nature does
consideration that it is not the owner of the property of the utility, or clothed with the general power of management
not perforce entail the applicability of a different rule of statutory procedure than would otherwise be applied to any
incident to ownership, since the private right of ownership to such property remains and is not to be destroyed by the
other order on the same matter unless otherwise provided by the applicable law. In the case at bar, the applicable
regulatory power. The power to regulate is not the power to destroy useful and harmless enterprises, but is the
statutory provision is Section 16(c) of the Public Service Act which provides:
power to protect, foster, promote, preserve, and control with due regard for the interest, first and foremost, of the
public, then of the utility and of its patrons. Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective confiscation of
Section 16. Proceedings of the Commission, upon notice and hearing the Commission shall private property or constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable infringement of property rights is void, because it is
have power, upon proper notice and hearing in accordance with the rules and provisions of this repugnant to the constitutional guaranties of due process and equal protection of the laws. 15
Act, subject to the limitations and exceptions mentioned and saving provisions to the contrary:
Hence, the inherent power and authority of the State, or its authorized agent, to regulate the rates charged by public
xxx xxx xxx utilities should be subject always to the requirement that the rates so fixed shall be reasonable and just. A
commission has no power to fix rates which are unreasonable or to regulate them arbitrarily. This basic requirement
of reasonableness comprehends such rates which must not be so low as to be confiscatory, or too high as to be
(c) To fix and determine individual or joint rates, ... which shall be imposed, observed and
oppressive. 16
followed thereafter by any public service; ...
What is a just and reasonable rate is not a question of formula but of sound business judgment based upon the
evidence 17 it is a question of fact calling for the exercise of discretion, good sense, and a fair, enlightened and
independent judgment. 18 In determining whether a rate is confiscatory, it is essential also to consider the given
situation, requirements and opportunities of the utility. A method often employed in determining reasonableness is
the fair return upon the value of the property to the public utility. Competition is also a very important factor in
determining the reasonableness of rates since a carrier is allowed to make such rates as are necessary to meet
competition. 19

A cursory perusal of the assailed order reveals that the rate reduction is solely and primarily based on the initial
evaluation made on the financial statements of petitioner, contrary to respondent NTC's allegation that it has several
other sources of information without, however, divulging such sources. Furthermore, it did not as much as make an
attempt to elaborate on how it arrived at the prescribed rates. It just perfunctorily declared that based on the financial
statements, there is merit for a rate reduction without any elucidation on what implications and conclusions were
necessarily inferred by it from said statements. Nor did it deign to explain how the data reflected in the financial
statements influenced its decision to impose a rate reduction.

On the other hand, petitioner may likely suffer a severe drawback, with the consequent detriment to the public
service, should the order of respondent NTC turn out to be unreasonable and improvident. The business in which
petitioner is engaged is unique in that its machinery and equipment have always to be taken in relation to the
equipment on the other end of the transmission arrangement. Any lack, aging, acquisition, rehabilitation, or
refurbishment of machinery and equipment necessarily entails a major adjustment or innovation on the business of
petitioner. As pointed out by petitioner, any change in the sending end abroad has to be matched with the
corresponding change in the receiving end in the Philippines. Conversely, any in the receiving end abroad has to be
matched with the corresponding change in the sending end in the Philippines. An inability on the part of petitioner to
meet the variegations demanded be technology could result in a deterioration or total failure of the service of satellite
communications.

At present, petitioner is engaged in several projects aimed at refurbishing, rehabilitating, and renewing its machinery
and equipment in order to keep up with the continuing charges of the times and to maintain its facilities at a
competitive level with the technological advances abroad. There projected undertakings were formulated on the
premise that rates are maintained at their present or at reasonable levels. Hence, an undue reduction thereof may
practically lead to a cessation of its business. While we concede the primacy of the public interest in an adequate
and efficient service, the same is not necessarily to be equated with reduced rates. Reasonableness in the rates
assumes that the same is fair to both the public utility and the consumer.

Consequently, we hold that the challenged order, particularly on the issue of rates provided therein, being violative of
the due process clause is void and should be nullified. Respondents should now proceed, as they should heretofore
have done, with the hearing and determination of petitioner's pending application for a certificate of public
convenience and necessity and in which proceeding the subject of rates involved in the present controversy, as well
as other matter involved in said application, be duly adjudicated with reasonable dispatch and with due observance
of our pronouncements herein.

WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is GRANTED and the order of respondents, dated September 2, 1988, in NTC
Case No. 87-94 is hereby SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining order issued under our resolution of September
13, 1988, as specifically directed against the aforesaid order of respondents on the matter of existing rates on
petitioner's present authorized services, is hereby made permanent.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-
Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Padilla, J., took no part.

 Republic of the Philippines 3) that as regards petitioner Guzman, his "academic showing" was "poor", "due to his activities in leading boycotts of
SUPREME COURT classes"; that when his father was notified of this development sometime in August, 1982, the latter had demanded
Manila that his son "reform or else we will recall him to the province"; that Guzman was one of the petitioners in G.R. No.
65443 entitled "Rockie San Juan, et al. vs. National University, et al.," at the hearing of which on November 23, 1983
this Court had admonished "the students involved (to) take advantage and make the most of the opportunity given to
EN BANC
them to study;" that Guzman "however continued to lead or actively participate in activities within the university
premises, conducted without prior permit from school authorities, that disturbed or disrupted classes therein;" that
G.R. No. L-68288 July 11, 1986 moreover, Guzman "is facing criminal charges for malicious mischief before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila
(Crim. Case No. 066446) in connection with the destruction of properties of respondent University on September 12,
1983 ", and "is also one of the defendants in Civil Case No. 8320483 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila
DIOSDADO GUZMAN, ULYSSES URBIZTONDO, and ARIEL RAMACULA, petitioners,  entitled 'National University, Inc. vs. Rockie San Juan et al.' for damages arising from destruction of university
vs. properties
NATIONAL UNIVERSITY and DOMINGO L. JHOCSON in his capacity as President of National
University, respondents.
4) that as regards petitioner Ramacula, like Guzman "he continued to lead or actively participate, contrary to the
spirit of the Resolution dated November 23, 1983 of this ... Court (in G.R. No. 65443 in which he was also one of the
Efren H. Mercado and Haydee Yorac for petitioners. petitioners) and to university rules and regulations, within university premises but without permit from university
officials in activities that disturbed or disrupted classes;" and
Samson S. Alcantara for respondents.
5) that petitioners have "failures in their records, (and) are not of good scholastic standing. "

Respondents close their comment with the following assertions, to wit:

NARVASA, J.:
1) By their actuations, petitioners must be deemed to have forfeited their privilege, if any, to seek enrollment in
Petitioners Diosdado Guzman, Ulysses Urbiztondo and Ariel Ramacula, students of respondent National University, respondent university. The rights of respondent university, as an institution of higher learning, must also be
have come to this Court to seek relief from what they describe as their school's "continued and persistent refusal to respected. It is also beyond comprehension why petitioners, who continually despise and villify respondent university
allow them to enrol." In their petition "for extraordinary legal and equitable remedies with prayer for preliminary and its officials and faculty members, should persist in seeking enrollment in an institution that they hate.
mandatory injunction" dated August 7, 1984, they allege:
2) Under the circumstances, and without regard to legal technicalities, it is not to the best interest of all concerned
1) that respondent University's avowed reason for its refusal to re-enroll them in their respective that petitioners be allowed to enroll in respondent university.
courses is "the latter's participation in peaceful mass actions within the premises of the
University. 3) In any event, petitioners' enrollment being on the semestral basis, respondents cannot be compelled to enroll
them after the end of the semester.
2) that this "attitude of the (University) is simply a continuation of its cavalier if not hostile attitude
to the student's exercise of their basic constitutional and human rights already recorded On October 2, 1984 this Court issued a resolution reading as follows:
in Rockie C. San Juan vs. National University, S.C. G.R. No. 65443 (1983) and its utter
contempt for the principle of due process of law to the prejudice of petitioners;" and
... Acting on the Comment submitted by respondent, the Court Resolved to NOTE the same and
to require a REPLY to such Comment. The Court further Resolved to ISSUE a MANDATORY
3) that "in effect petitioners are subjected to the extreme penalty of expulsion without cause or if INJUNCTION, enjoining respondent to allow the enrolment of petitioners for the coming
there be any, without being informed of such cause and without being afforded the opportunity to semester without prejudice to any disciplinary proceeding to which any or all of them may be
defend themselves. Berina v. Philippine Maritime Institute (117 SCRA 581 [1983]). subjected with their right to lawful defense recognized and respected. As regards petitioner
Diosdado Guzman, even if it be a fact that there is a pending criminal charge against him for
In the comment filed on September 24, 1986 for respondent University and its President pursuant to this Court's malicious mischief, the Court nonetheless is of the opinion that, as above-noted, without
requirement therefor1 , respondents make the claim: prejudice to the continuation of any disciplinary proceeding against him, that he be allowed to
resume his studies in the meanwhile. As shown in Annex 2 of the petition itself, Mr. Juan P.
Guzman, father of said petitioner, is extending full cooperation with petitioners to assure that
1) that "petitioners' failure to enroll for the first semester of the school year 1984-1985 is due to their own fault and whatever protest or grievance petitioner Guzman may have would be ventilated in a lawful and
not because of their allegedexercise of their constitutional and human rights;" peaceful manner.

2) that petitioner Urbiztondo, sought to re-enroll only on July 5, 1986 "when the enrollment period was already Petitioners' REPLY inter alia—
closed;"
1) denied that Urbiztondo attempted to enroll only on July 5, 1984 (when enrollment was already closed), it being But, to repeat, the imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires observance of procedural due process. And it bears
alleged that "while he did try to enroll that day, he also attempted to do so several times before that date, all to no stressing that due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings similar
avail, because respondents ... persistently refused to allow him to do so" respondents' ostensible reason being that to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. The proceedings in student discipline cases may
Urbiztondo (had) participated in mass actions ... within the school premises," although there were no existing be summary; and cross-examination is not, 'contrary to petitioners' view, an essential part thereof. There are withal
disciplinary charge against petitioner Urbiztondo" at the time; minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the demands of procedural due process; and these are, that (1) the
students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2) they shag have the
right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of the
2) asserted that "neither the text nor the context of the resolution 2 justifies the conclusion that "petitioners' right to
evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence
exercise their constitutional freedoms" had thereby been restricted or limited; and
must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and
decide the case.
3) alleged that "the holding of activities (mass action) in the school premises without the permission of the school ...
can be explained by the fact that the respondents persistently refused to issue such permit repeatedly sought by the
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted and the respondents are directed to allow the petitioners to re-enroll or
students. "
otherwise continue with their respective courses, without prejudice to any disciplinary proceedings to which any or all
of them may be subjected in accordance with the standards herein set forth.
On November 23, 1984, this Court promulgated another resolution, this time reading as follows:

... The Court, after considering the pleadings filed and deliberating on the issues raised in the
petition for extraordinary legal and equitable remedies with prayer for preliminary mandatory
injunction as well as the respondents' comment on the petition and the reply of counsel for
petitioners to the respondents' comment, Resolved to (a) give DUE COURSE to the petition; (b)
consider the respondents' comment as ANSWER to the petition; and (c) require the parties to
file their respective MEMORANDA within twenty (20) days from notice. ... .

Immediately apparent from a reading of respondents' comment and memorandum is the fact that they had never
conducted proceedings of any sort to determine whether or not petitioners-students had indeed led or participated "in
activities within the university premises, conducted without prior permit from school authorities, that disturbed or
disrupted classes therein" 3 or perpetrated acts of "vandalism, coercion and intimidation, slander, noise barrage and
other acts showing disdain for and defiance of University authority." 4 Parenthetically, the pendency of a civil case for
damages and a criminal case for malicious mischief against petitioner Guzman, cannot, without more, furnish
sufficient warrant for his expulsion or debarment from re-enrollment. Also apparent is the omission of respondents to
cite this Court to any duly published rule of theirs by which students may be expelled or refused re-enrollment for
poor scholastic standing.

Under the Education Act of 1982, 5 the petitioners, as students, have the right among others "to freely choose their
field of study subject to existing curricula and to continue their course therein up to graduation, except in case of
academic deficiency, or violation of disciplinary regulations." 6 Petitioners were being denied this right, or being
disciplined, without due process, in violation of the admonition in the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools 7 that
"(n)o penalty shall be imposed upon any student except for cause as defined in ... (the) Manual and/or in the school
rules and regulations as duly promulgated and only after due investigation shall have been conducted." 8 This Court
is therefore constrained, as in Berina v. Philippine Maritime Institute, 9 to declare illegal this act of respondents of
imposing sanctions on students without due investigation.

Educational institutions of course have the power to "adopt and enforce such rules as may be deemed expedient
for ... (its) government, ... (this being)" incident to the very object of incorporation, and indispensable to the
successful management of the college." 10 The rules may include those governing student discipline. Indeed, the
maintenance of "good school discipline" is a duty specifically enjoined on "every private school" by the Manual of
Regulations for Private Schools; 11 and in this connection, the Manual further provides that-

... The school rules governing discipline and the corresponding sanctions therefor must be
clearly specified and defined in writing and made known to the students and/or their parents or
guardians. Schools shall have the authority and prerogative to promulgate such rules and
regulations as they may deem necessary from time to time effective as of the date of their
promulgation unless otherwise specified. 12
 Republic of the Philippines admission of respondent Bungubung in his testimony, one of the two was a member of the Tau Gamma
SUPREME COURT Phi Fraternity. There was no rumble or physical violence then.
Manila
After this incident, a meeting was conducted between the two heads of the fraternity through the
THIRD DIVISION intercession of the Student Council. The Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity was asking for an apology.
"Kailangan ng apology" in the words of respondent Aguilar. But no apology was made.
G.R. No. 127980             December 19, 2007
Then, 5 members of the Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity went to the tambayan of the Domino Lux Fraternity in
the campus. Among them were respondents Bungubung, Reverente and Papio. They were looking for a
DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY, INC., EMMANUEL SALES, RONALD HOLMES, JUDE DELA TORRE, AMPARO
person whose description matched James Yap. According to them, this person supposedly "nambastos ng
RIO, CARMELITA QUEBENGCO, AGNES YUHICO and JAMES YAP, petitioners, 
brod." As they could not find Mr. Yap, one of them remarked "Paano ba iyan. Pasensiya na lang."
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. WILFREDO D. REYES, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 36,
Regional Trial Court of Manila, THE COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION, THE DEPARTMENT OF Came March 29, 1995 and the following events.
EDUCATION CULTURE AND SPORTS, ALVIN AGUILAR, JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG, RICHARD REVERENTE
and ROBERTO VALDES, JR., respondents.
Ten minutes before his next class at 6:00 p.m., Mr. James Yap went out of the campus using the
Engineering Gate to buy candies across Taft Avenue. As he was about to re-cross Taft Avenue, he heard
DECISION heavy footsteps at his back. Eight to ten guys were running towards him. He panicked. He did not know
what to do. Then, respondent Bungubung punched him in the head with something heavy in his hands –
"parang knuckles." Respondents Reverente and Lee were behind Yap, punching him. Respondents
REYES, R.T., J.:
Bungubung and Valdes who were in front of him, were also punching him. As he was lying on the street,
respondent Aguilar kicked him. People shouted; guards arrived; and the group of attackers left.
NAGTATAGIS sa kasong ito ang karapatang mag-aral ng apat na estudyante na nasangkot sa away ng
dalawang fraternity at ang karapatang akademiko ng isang pamantasan.
Mr. Yap could not recognize the other members of the group who attacked him. With respect to
respondent Papio, Mr. Yap said "hindi ko nakita ang mukha niya, hindi ko nakita sumuntok siya." What Mr.
PRIVATE respondents Alvin Aguilar, James Paul Bungubung, Richard Reverente and Roberto Valdes, Jr. are Yap saw was a long haired guy also running with the group.
members of Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity who were expelled by the De La Salle University (DLSU) and College of
Saint Benilde (CSB)1 Joint Discipline Board because of their involvement in an offensive action causing injuries to
Two guards escorted Mr. Yap inside the campus. At this point, Mr. Dennis Pascual was at the Engineering
petitioner James Yap and three other student members of Domino Lux Fraternity. This is the backdrop of the
Gate. Mr. Pascual accompanied Yap to the university clinic; reported the incident to the Discipline Office;
controversy before Us pitting private respondents' right to education vis-a-vis the University's right to academic
and informed his fraternity brods at their tambayan. According to Mr. Pascual, their head of the Domino
freedom.
Lux Fraternity said: "Walang gagalaw. Uwian na lang."

ASSAILED in this Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court are the
Mr. Ericson Cano, who was supposed to hitch a ride with Dennis Pascual, saw him under the clock in
following: (1) Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated July 30, 1996 dismissing DLSU's petition
Miguel Building. However, they did not proceed directly for home. With a certain Michael Perez, they went
for certiorariagainst respondent Judge and private respondents Aguilar, Bungubung, Reverente, and Valdes, Jr.; 2 (2)
towards the direction of Dagonoy Street because Mr. Pascual was supposed to pick up a book for his
Resolution of the CA dated October 15, 1996 denying the motion for reconsideration; 3 (3) Order dated January 7,
friend from another friend who lives somewhere in the area.
1997 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 36 Manila granting private respondent Aguilar's motion to reiterate
writ of preliminary injunction; 4 and (4) Resolution No. 181-96 dated May 14, 1996 of the Commission on Higher
Education (CHED) exonerating private respondent Aguilar and lowering the penalties for the other private As they were along Dagonoy Street, and before they could pass the Kolehiyo ng Malate Restaurant, Mr.
respondents from expulsion to exclusion.5 Cano first saw several guys inside the restaurant. He said not to mind them and just keep on walking.
However, the group got out of the restaurant, among them respondents Reverente, Lee and Valdes. Mr.
Cano told Mr. Lee: "Ayaw namin ng gulo." But, respondent Lee hit Mr. Cano without provocation.
Factual Antecedents
Respondent Reverente kicked Mr. Pascual and respondent Lee also hit Mr. Pascual. Mr. Cano and Mr.
Perez managed to run from the mauling and they were chased by respondent Lee and two others.
Gleaned from the May 3, 1995 Decision of the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board, two violent incidents on March 29,
1995 involving private respondents occurred:
Mr. Pascual was left behind. After respondent Reverente first kicked him, Mr. Pascual was ganged-upon
by the rest. He was able to run, but the group was able to catch up with him. His shirt was torn and he was
x x x From the testimonies of the complaining witnesses, it appears that one week prior to March 29, 1995, hit at the back of his head with a lead pipe. Respondent Lee who was chasing Cano and Perez, then
Mr. James Yap was eating his dinner alone in Manang's Restaurant near La Salle, when he overheard two returned to Mr. Pascual.
men bad-mouthing and apparently angry at Domino Lux. He ignored the comments of the two. When he
arrived at his boarding house, he mentioned the remarks to his two other brods while watching television.
Mr. Pascual identified respondents Reverente and Lee, as among those who hit him. Although Mr. Pascual
These two brods had earlier finished eating their dinner at Manang's. Then, the three, together with four
did not see respondent Valdes hit him, he identified respondent Valdez (sic) as also one of the members of
other persons went back to Manang's and confronted the two who were still in the restaurant. By
the group.
 In fact, Mr. Cano saw respondent Valdes near Mr. Pascual. He was almost near the corner of Leon Guinto not a family driver, but works from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. for the Philippine Ports Authority where the elder
and Estrada; while respondent Pascual who managed to run was stopped at the end of Dagonoy along Bungubung is also employed.
Leon Guinto. Respondent Valdes shouted: "Mga putang-ina niyo." Respondent Reverente hit Mr. Pascual
for the last time. Apparently being satisfied with their handiwork, the group left. The victims, Cano, Perez
Thus, attempting to corroborate the alibi of respondent Bungubung, Mr. Carillo said that he arrived at La
and Pascual proceeded to a friend's house and waited for almost two hours, or at around 8:00 in the
Salle at 4:56 p.m.; picked-up respondent at 5:02 p.m.; took the Roxas Blvd. route towards respondent's
evening before they returned to the campus to have their wounds treated. Apparently, there were three
house in BF Parañaque (on a Wednesday in Baclaran); and arrived at the house at 6:15 p.m. Respondent
cars roaming the vicinity.6
Bungubung was dropped-off in his house, and taking the same route back, Mr. Carillo arrived at the South
Harbor at 6:55 p.m. the Philippine Ports Authority is located at the South Harbor. 14
The mauling incidents were a result of a fraternity war. The victims, namely: petitioner James Yap and Dennis
Pascual, Ericson Cano, and Michael Perez, are members of the "Domino Lux Fraternity," while the alleged
xxxx
assailants, private respondents Alvin Aguilar, James Paul Bungubung, Richard Reverente and Roberto Valdes, Jr.
are members of "Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity," a rival fraternity.
Secondly, respondent Valdes said that he was with his friends at McDonald's Taft just before 6:00 p.m. of
7 March 29, 1995. He said that he left McDonald at 5:50 p.m. together to get some medicine at the university
The next day, March 30, 1995, petitioner Yap lodged a complaint  with the Discipline Board of DLSU charging private
clinic for his throat irritation. He said that he was at the clinic at 5:52 p.m. and went back to McDonald, all
respondents with "direct assault." Similar complaints8 were also filed by Dennis Pascual and Ericson Cano against
within a span of 3 or even 4 minutes.
Alvin Lee and private respondents Valdes and Reverente. Thus, cases entitled "De La Salle University and College
of St. Benilde v. Alvin Aguilar (AB-BSM/9152105), James Paul Bungubung (AB-PSM/9234403), Robert R. Valdes,
Jr. (BS-BS-APM/9235086), Alvin Lee (EDD/9462325), Richard Reverente (AB-MGT/9153837) and Malvin A. Papio Two witnesses, a certain Sharon Sia and the girlfriend of respondent Valdes, a certain Jorgette Aquino,
(AB-MGT/9251227)" were docketed as Discipline Case No. 9495-3-25121. attempted to corroborate Valdez' alibi.15

The Director of the DLSU Discipline Office sent separate notices to private respondents Aguilar, Bungubung and xxxx
Valdes, Jr. and Reverente informing them of the complaints and requiring them to answer. Private respondents filed
their respective answers.9
Third, respondent Reverente told that (sic) the Board that he was at his home at 5:00 p.m. of March 29,
1995. He said that he was given the responsibility to be the paymaster of the construction workers who
As it appeared that students from DLSU and CSB10 were involved in the mauling incidents, a joint DLSU-CSB were doing some works in the apartment of his parents. Although he had classes in the evening, the
Discipline Board11 was formed to investigate the incidents. Thus, petitioner Board Chairman Emmanuel Sales sent workers according to him would wait for him sometimes up to 9:00 p.m. when he arrives from his classes.
notices of hearing12 to private respondents on April 12, 1995. Said notices uniformly stated as follows: The workers get paid everyday.

Please be informed that a joint and expanded Discipline Board had been constituted to hear and deliberate Respondent Reverente submitted an affidavit, unsigned by the workers listed there, supposedly attesting
the charge against you for violation of CHED Order No. 4 arising from the written complaints of James to the fact that he paid the workers at the date and time in question.16
Yap, Dennis C. Pascual, and Ericson Y. Cano.
xxxx
You are directed to appear at the hearing of the Board scheduled on April 19, 1995 at 9:00 a.m. at the Bro.
Connon Hall for you and your witnesses to give testimony and present evidence in your behalf. You may
Fourth, respondent Aguilar "solemnly sw[ore] that [he] left DLSU at 5:00 p.m. for Camp Crame for a
be assisted by a lawyer when you give your testimony or those of your witnesses.
meeting with some of the officers that we were preparing." 17

On or before April 18, 1995, you are further directed to provide the Board, through the Discipline Office,
On May 3, 1995, the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board issued a Resolution 18 finding private respondents guilty. They
with a list of your witnesses as well as the sworn statement of their proposed testimony.
were meted the supreme penalty of automatic expulsion,19 pursuant to CHED Order No. 4.20 The dispositive part of
the resolution reads:
Your failure to appear at the scheduled hearing or your failure to submit the list of witnesses and the sworn
statement of their proposed testimony will be considered a waiver on your part to present evidence and as
WHEREFORE, considering all the foregoing, the Board finds respondents ALVIN AGUILAR (AB-
an admission of the principal act complained of.
BSM/9152105), JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG (AB-PSM/9234403), ALVIN LEE (EDD/94623250) and
RICHARD V. REVERENTE (AB-MGT/9153837) guilty of having violated CHED Order No. 4 and thereby
For your strict compliance.13 orders their automatic expulsion.

During the proceedings before the Board on April 19 and 28, 1995, private respondents interposed the common In the case of respondent MALVIN A. PAPIO (AB-MGT/9251227), the Board acquits him of the charge.
defense of alibi, summarized by the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board as follows:
SO ORDERED.21
First, in the case of respondent Bungubung, March 29, 1995 was one of the few instances when he was
picked-up by a driver, a certain Romeo S. Carillo. Most of the time, respondent Bungubung goes home
Private respondents separately moved for reconsideration 22 before the Office of the Senior Vice-President for Internal
alone sans driver. But on this particular date, respondent Bungubung said that his dad asked his
Operations of DLSU. The motions were all denied in a Letter-Resolution23 dated June 1, 1995.
permission to use the car and thus, his dad instructed this driver Carillo to pick-up his son. Mr. Carillo is
On June 5, 1995, private respondent Aguilar filed with the RTC, Manila, against petitioners a petition for certiorariand intervention to enroll and complete their respective courses/degrees until their graduation
injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with prayer for temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of thereat.
preliminary injunction. It was docketed as Civil Case No. 95-74122 and assigned to respondent Judge of Branch 36.
The petition essentially sought to annul the May 3, 1995 Resolution of the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board and the
The Writ of Preliminary Injunction shall take effect upon petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention posting an
June 1, 1995 Letter-Resolution of the Office of the Senior Vice-President for Internal Affairs.
injunctive bond in the amount of P15,000.00 executed in favor of respondent to the effect that petitioner
and petitioners-in-intervention will pay to respondent all damages that the latter may suffer by reason of
The following day, June 6, 1995, respondent Judge issued a TRO24 directing DLSU, its subordinates, agents, the injunction if the Court will finally decide that petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention are not entitled
representatives and/or other persons acting for and in its behalf to refrain and desist from implementing Resolution thereto.
dated May 3, 1995 and Letter-Resolution dated June 1, 1995 and to immediately desist from barring the enrollment
of Aguilar for the second term of school year (SY) 1995.
The motion to dismiss and the supplement thereto is denied for lack of merit. Respondents are directed to
file their Answer to the Petition not later than fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof.
Subsequently, private respondent Aguilar filed an ex parte motion to amend his petition to correct an allegation in
paragraph 3.2125 of his original petition. Respondent Judge amended the TRO26 to conform to the correction made in
SO ORDERED.33
the amended petition.27

Despite the said order, private respondent Aguilar was refused enrollment by petitioner DLSU when he attempted to
On June 7, 1995, the CHED directed DLSU to furnish it with copies of the case records of Discipline Case No. 9495-
enroll on September 22, 1995 for the second term of SY 1995-1996. Thus, on September 25, 1995, Aguilar filed with
3-25121,28 in view of the authority granted to it under Section 77(c) of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools
respondent Judge an urgent motion to cite petitioners (respondents there) in contempt of court. 34 Aguilar also prayed
(MRPS).
that petitioners be compelled to enroll him at DLSU in accordance with respondent Judge's Order dated September
20, 1995. On September 25, 1995, respondent Judge issued35 a writ of preliminary injunction, the relevant portion of
On the other hand, private respondents Bungubung and Reverente, and later, Valdes, filed petitions-in- which reads:
intervention29 in Civil Case No. 95-74122. Respondent Judge also issued corresponding temporary restraining orders
to compel petitioner DLSU to admit said private respondents.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED by the undersigned of the REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA that until
further orders, you the said DE LA SALLE University as well as your subordinates, agents,
On June 19, 1995, petitioner Sales filed a motion to dismiss30 in behalf of all petitioners, except James Yap. On June representatives, employees and any other person assisting or acting for or on your behalf, to immediately
20, 1995, petitioners filed a supplemental motion to dismiss31 the petitions-in-intervention. desist from implementing the Resolution dated May 3, 1995 ordering the automatic expulsion of petitioner
and the intervenors in DLSU, and the letter-resolution dated June 1, 1995 affirming the said Resolution of
May 3, 1995 and to immediately desist from barring the enrolment of petitioner and intervenors in the
On September 20, 1995, respondent Judge issued an Order32 denying petitioners' (respondents there) motion to
courses offered at DLSU and to allow them to enroll and complete their degree courses until their
dismiss and its supplement, and granted private respondents' (petitioners there) prayer for a writ of preliminary
graduation from said school. 36
injunction. The pertinent part of the Order reads:

On October 16, 1995, petitioner DLSU filed with the CA a petition for certiorari37 (CA-G.R. SP No. 38719) with prayer
For this purpose, respondent, its agents, representatives or any and all other persons acting for and in its
for a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the enforcement of respondent Judge's September 20, 1995
behalf is/are restrained and enjoined from –
Order and writ of preliminary injunction dated September 25, 1995.

1. Implementing and enforcing the Resolution dated May 3, 1995 ordering the automatic
On April 12, 1996, the CA granted petitioners' prayer for preliminary injunction.
expulsion of petitioner and the petitioners-in-intervention from the De La Salle University and the
letter-resolution dated June 1, 1995, affirming the Resolution dated May 3, 1995; and
On May 14, 1996, the CHED issued its questioned Resolution No. 181-96, summarily disapproving the
penalty of expulsion for all private respondents. As for Aguilar, he was to be reinstated, while other private
2. Barring the enrolment of petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention in the courses offered at
respondents were to be excluded.38 The Resolution states:
respondent De La Salle University and to immediately allow them to enroll and complete their
respective courses/degrees until their graduation thereat in accordance with the standards set
by the latter. RESOLUTION 181-96

WHEREFORE, the ancillary remedy prayed for is granted. Respondent, its agents, representatives, or any RESOLVED THAT THE REQUEST OF THE DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY (DLSU), TAFT AVENUE,
and all persons acting for and its behalf are hereby restrained and enjoyed from: MANILA FOR THE APPROVAL OF THE PENALTY OF EXPULSION IMPOSED ON MR. ALVIN
AGUILAR, JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG, ROBERT R. VALDES, JR., ALVIN LEE AND RICHARD V.
REVERENTE BE, AS IT IS HEREBY IS, DISAPPROVED.
1. Implementing and enforcing the Resolution dated May 3, 1995 ordering the automatic
expulsion of petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention and the Letter-Resolution dated June 1,
1995; and RESOLVED FURTHER, THAT THE COMMISSION DIRECT THE DLSU TO IMMEDIATELY EFFECT THE
REINSTATEMENT OF MR. AGUILAR AND THE LOWERING OF THE PENALTY OF MR. JAMES PAUL
BUNGUBUNG, MR. ROBER R. VALDEZ, JR., (sic) MR. ALVIN LEE AND MR. RICHARD V. REVERENTE
2. Barring the enrollment of petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention in the courses offered at
FROM EXPULSION TO EXCLUSION. 39
respondent (De La Salle University) and to forthwith allow all said petitioner and petitioners-in-
Despite the directive of CHED, petitioner DLSU again prevented private respondent Aguilar from enrolling and/or In light of the foregoing, petitioner Aguilar's urgent motion to reiterate writ of preliminary injunction is
attending his classes, prompting his lawyer to write several demand letters 40 to petitioner DLSU. In view of the refusal hereby granted, and respondents' motion to dismiss is denied.
of petitioner DLSU to enroll private respondent Aguilar, CHED wrote a letter dated June 26, 1996 addressed to
petitioner Quebengco requesting that private respondent Aguilar be allowed to continue attending his classes
The writ of preliminary injunction dated September 25, 1995 is declared to be in force and effect.
pending the resolution of its motion for reconsideration of Resolution No. 181-96. However, petitioner Quebengco
refused to do so, prompting CHED to promulgate an Order dated September 23, 1996 which states:
Let a copy of this Order and the writ be served personally by the Court's sheriff upon the respondents at
petitioners' expense.
Acting on the above-mentioned request of Mr. Aguilar through counsel enjoining De La Salle University
(DLSU) to comply with CHED Resolution 181-96 (Re: Expulsion Case of Alvin Aguilar, et al. v. DLSU)
directing DLSU to reinstate Mr. Aguilar and finding the urgent request as meritorious, there being no other SO ORDERED.48
plain and speedy remedy available, considering the set deadline for enrollment this current TRIMESTER,
and in order to prevent further prejudice to his rights as a student of the institution, DLSU, through the
Accordingly, private respondent Aguilar was allowed to conditionally enroll in petitioner DLSU, subject to the
proper school authorities, is hereby directed to allow Mr. Alvin Aguilar to provisionally enroll, pending the
continued effectivity of the writ of preliminary injunction dated September 25, 1995 and to the outcome of Civil Case
Commission's Resolution of the instant Motion for Reconsideration filed by DLSU.
No. 95-74122.

SO ORDERED.41
On February 17, 1997, petitioners filed the instant petition.

Notwithstanding the said directive, petitioner DLSU, through petitioner Quebengco, still refused to allow private
On June 15, 1998, We issued a TRO49 as prayed for by the urgent motion for the issuance of a TRO50 dated June 4,
respondent Aguilar to enroll. Thus, private respondent Aguilar's counsel wrote another demand letter to petitioner
1998 of petitioners, and enjoined respondent Judge from implementing the writ of preliminary injunction dated
DLSU.42
September 25, 1995 issued in Civil Case No. 95-74122, effective immediately and until further orders from this
Court.
Meanwhile, on June 3, 1996, private respondent Aguilar, using CHED Resolution No. 181-96, filed a motion to
dismiss43 in the CA, arguing that CHED Resolution No. 181-96 rendered the CA case moot and academic.
On March 27, 2006, private respondent Aguilar filed his manifestation 51 stating that he has long completed his course
at petitioner DLSU. He finished and passed all his enrolled subjects for the second trimester of 1997-1998, as
On July 30, 1996, the CA issued its questioned resolution granting the motion to dismiss of private indicated in his transcript of records52 issued by DLSU. However, despite having completed all the academic
respondent Aguilar, disposing thus: requirements for his course, DLSU has not issued a certificate of completion/graduation in his favor.

THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, dismissal of herein petition is hereby directed. Issues

SO ORDERED.44 We are tasked to resolve the following issues:

On October 15, 1996, the CA issued its resolution denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration, as follows: 1. Whether it is the DECS or the CHED which has legal authority to review decisions of institutions of
higher learning that impose disciplinary action on their students found violating disciplinary rules.
It is obvious to Us that CHED Resolution No. 181-96 is immediately executory in character, the pendency
of a Motion for Reconsideration notwithstanding. 2. Whether or not petitioner DLSU is within its rights in expelling private respondents.

After considering the Opposition and for lack of merit, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby denied. 2.a Were private respondents accorded due process of law?

SO ORDERED.45 2.b Can petitioner DLSU invoke its right to academic freedom?

On October 28, 1996, petitioners requested transfer of case records to the Department of Education, Culture and 2.c Was the guilt of private respondents proven by substantial evidence?
Sports (DECS) from the CHED.46 Petitioners claimed that it is the DECS, not CHED, which has jurisdiction over
expulsion cases, thus, necessitating the transfer of the case records of Discipline Case No. 9495-3-25121 to the
3. Whether or not the penalty imposed by DLSU on private respondents is proportionate to their misdeed.
DECS.

Our Ruling
On November 4, 1996, in view of the dismissal of the petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 38719 and the
automatic lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction, private respondent Aguilar filed an urgent motion to reiterate writ
of preliminary injunction dated September 25, 1995 before respondent RTC Judge of Manila. 47 Prefatorily, there is merit in the observation of petitioners 53 that while CHED Resolution No. 181-96 disapproved the
expulsion of other private respondents, it nonetheless authorized their exclusion from petitioner DLSU. However,
because of the dismissal of the CA case, petitioner DLSU is now faced with the spectacle of having two different
On January 7, 1997, respondent Judge issued its questioned order granting private respondent Aguilar's
directives from the CHED and the respondent Judge – CHED ordering the exclusion of private respondents
urgent motion to reiterate preliminary injunction. The pertinent portion of the order reads:
Bungubung, Reverente, and Valdes, Jr., and the Judge ordering petitioner DLSU to allow them to enroll and Sec. 8. Powers and functions of the Commission. – The Commission shall have the following powers and
complete their degree courses until their graduation. functions:

This is the reason We opt to decide the whole case on the merits, brushing aside technicalities, in order to settle the xxxx
substantial issues involved. This Court has the power to take cognizance of the petition at bar due to compelling
reasons, and the nature and importance of the issues raised warrant the immediate exercise of Our jurisdiction. 54This
n) promulgate such rules and regulations and exercise such other powers and functions as may be
is in consonance with our case law now accorded near-religious reverence that rules of procedure are but tools
necessary to carry out effectively the purpose and objectives of this Act; and
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, such that when its rigid application tends to frustrate rather than
promote substantial justice, this Court has the duty to suspend their operation. 55
o) perform such other functions as may be necessary for its effective operations and for the continued
enhancement of growth or development of higher education.
I. It is the CHED, not DECS, which has the
power of supervision and review over
disciplinary cases decided by institutions Clearly, there is no merit in the contention of petitioners that R.A. No. 7722 did not transfer to the CHED the DECS'
of higher learning. power of supervision/review over expulsion cases involving institutions of higher learning.

Ang CHED, hindi ang DECS, ang may kapangyarihan ng pagsubaybay at pagrepaso sa mga desisyong First, the foregoing provisions are all-embracing. They make no reservations of powers to the DECS insofar as
pandisiplina ng mga institusyon ng mas mataas na pag-aaral. institutions of higher learning are concerned. They show that the authority and supervision over all public and private
institutions of higher education, as well as degree-granting programs in all post-secondary educational institutions,
public and private, belong to the CHED, not the DECS.
Petitioners posit that the jurisdiction and duty to review student expulsion cases, even those involving students in
secondary and tertiary levels, is vested in the DECS not in the CHED. In support of their stance, petitioners cite
Sections 4,56 15(2) & (3),57 54,58 57(3)59 and 7060 of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 232, otherwise known as the Second, to rule that it is the DECS which has authority to decide disciplinary cases involving students on the tertiary
"Education Act of 1982." level would render nugatory the coverage of the CHED, which is "both public and private institutions of higher
education as well as degree granting programs in all post secondary educational institutions, public and private."
That would be absurd.
According to them, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7722 did not transfer to the CHED the DECS' power of
supervision/review over expulsion cases involving institutions of higher learning. They say that unlike B.P. Blg. 232,
R.A. No. 7722 makes no reference to the right and duty of learning institutions to develop moral character and instill It is of public knowledge that petitioner DLSU is a private educational institution which offers tertiary degree
discipline among its students. The clear concern of R.A. No. 7722 in the creation of the CHED was academic, i.e., programs. Hence, it is under the CHED authority.
the formulation, recommendation, setting, and development of academic plans, programs and standards for
institutions of higher learning. The enumeration of CHED's powers and functions under Section 8 does not include
Third, the policy of R.A. No. 772261 is not only the protection, fostering and promotion of the right of all citizens to
supervisory/review powers in student disciplinary cases. The reference in Section 3 to CHED's "coverage" of
affordable quality education at all levels and the taking of appropriate steps to ensure that education shall be
institutions of higher education is limited to the powers and functions specified in Section 8. The Bureau of Higher
accessible to all. The law is likewise concerned with ensuring and protecting academic freedom and with promoting
Education, which the CHED has replaced and whose functions and responsibilities it has taken over, never had any
its exercise and observance for the continued intellectual growth of students, the advancement of learning and
authority over student disciplinary cases.
research, the development of responsible and effective leadership, the education of high-level and middle-level
professionals, and the enrichment of our historical and cultural heritage.
We cannot agree.
It is thus safe to assume that when Congress passed R.A. No. 7722, its members were aware that disciplinary cases
On May 18, 1994, Congress approved R.A. No. 7722, otherwise known as "An Act Creating the Commission on involving students on the tertiary level would continue to arise in the future, which would call for the invocation and
Higher Education, Appropriating Funds Thereof and for other purposes." exercise of institutions of higher learning of their right to academic freedom.

Section 3 of the said law, which paved the way for the creation of the CHED, provides: Fourth, petitioner DLSU cited no authority in its bare claim that the Bureau of Higher Education, which CHED
replaced, never had authority over student disciplinary cases. In fact, the responsibilities of other government entities
having functions similar to those of the CHED were transferred to the CHED.62
Section 3. Creation of the Commission on Higher Education. – In pursuance of the abovementioned
policies, the Commission on Higher Education is hereby created, hereinafter referred to as Commission.
Section 77 of the MRPS63 on the process of review in student discipline cases should therefore be read in
conjunction with the provisions of R.A. No. 7722.
The Commission shall be independent and separate from the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports (DECS) and attached to the office of the President for administrative purposes only. Its coverage
shall be both public and private institutions of higher education as well as degree-granting programs in all Fifth, Section 18 of R.A. No. 7722 is very clear in stating that "[j]urisdiction over DECS-supervised or chartered
post secondary educational institutions, public and private. state-supported post-secondary degree-granting vocational and tertiary institutions shall be transferred to
the Commission [On Higher Education]." This provision does not limit or distinguish that what is being
transferred to the CHED is merely the formulation, recommendation, setting and development of academic plans,
The powers and functions of the CHED are enumerated in Section 8 of R.A. No. 7722. They include the following:
programs and standards for institutions of higher learning, as what petitioners would have us believe as the only
concerns of R.A. No. 7722. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus: Where the law does not distinguish,
neither should we.
To Our mind, this provision, if not an explicit grant of jurisdiction to the CHED, necessarily includes the transfer Ang petitioner DLSU, bilang institusyon ng mas mataas na pag-aaral, ay nagtataglay ng kalayaang
to the CHED of any jurisdiction which the DECS might have possessed by virtue of B.P. Blg. 232 or any other law or akademiko na sakop ang karapatang pumili ng mga mag-aaral dito.
rule for that matter.
Section 5(2), Article XIV of the Constitution guaranties all institutions of higher learning academic freedom. This
IIa. Private respondents were accorded due process of law. institutional academic freedom includes the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives,
and how best to attain them free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public
interest calls for some restraint.74 According to present jurisprudence, academic freedom encompasses the
Ang mga private respondents ay nabigyan ng tamang proseso ng batas.
independence of an academic institution to determine for itself (1) who may teach, (2) what may be taught, (3) how it
shall teach, and (4) who may be admitted to study.75
The Due Process Clause in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution embodies a system of rights based on moral
principles so deeply imbedded in the traditions and feelings of our people as to be deemed fundamental to a civilized
It cannot be gainsaid that "the school has an interest in teaching the student discipline, a necessary, if not
society as conceived by our entire history.64 The constitutional behest that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty
indispensable, value in any field of learning. By instilling discipline, the school teaches discipline. Accordingly, the
or property without due process of law is solemn and inflexible.65
right to discipline the student likewise finds basis in the freedom "what to teach." 76 Indeed, while it is categorically
stated under the Education Act of 1982 that students have a right "to freely choose their field of study, subject to
In administrative cases, such as investigations of students found violating school discipline, "[t]here are withal existing curricula and to continue their course therein up to graduation,"77 such right is subject to the established
minimum standards which must be met before to satisfy the demands of procedural due process and these are: that academic and disciplinary standards laid down by the academic institution. Petitioner DLSU, therefore, can very well
(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2) they shall exercise its academic freedom, which includes its free choice of students for admission to its school.
have the right to answer the charges against them and with the assistance if counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be
informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5)
IIc. The guilt of private respondents Bungubung, Reverente and Valdes, Jr. was proven by substantial
the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities
evidence.
to hear and decide the case."66

Ang pagkakasala ng private respondents na sina Bungubung, Reverente at Valdes, Jr. ay napatunayan ng
Where a party was afforded an opportunity to participate in the proceedings but failed to do so, he cannot complain
ebidensiyang substansyal.
of deprivation of due process.67 Notice and hearing is the bulwark of administrative due process, the right to which is
among the primary rights that must be respected even in administrative proceedings. 68 The essence of due process
is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side As has been stated earlier, private respondents interposed the common defense of alibi. However, in order that alibi
or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. 69 So long as the party is given the may succeed as a defense, "the accused must establish by clear and convincing evidence (a) his presence at
opportunity to advocate her cause or defend her interest in due course, it cannot be said that there was denial of due another place at the time of the perpetration of the offense and (b) the physical impossibility of his presence at the
process.70 scene of the crime."78

A formal trial-type hearing is not, at all times and in all instances, essential to due process – it is enough that the On the other hand, the defense of alibi may not be successfully invoked where the identity of the assailant has been
parties are given a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of the controversy and to present established by witnesses.79 Positive identification of accused where categorical and consistent, without any showing
supporting evidence on which a fair decision can be based.71 "To be heard" does not only mean presentation of of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying, should prevail over the alibi and denial of appellants whose
testimonial evidence in court – one may also be heard through pleadings and where the opportunity to be heard testimonies are not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. 80 Well-settled is the rule that denial and alibi,
through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of due process.72 being weak defenses, cannot overcome the positive testimonies of the offended parties. 81

Private respondents were duly informed in writing of the charges against them by the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Courts reject alibi when there are credible eyewitnesses to the crime who can positively identify the accused. 82 Alibi
Board through petitioner Sales. They were given the opportunity to answer the charges against them as they, in fact, is an inherently weak defense and courts must receive it with caution because one can easily fabricate an
submitted their respective answers. They were also informed of the evidence presented against them as they alibi.83Jurisprudence holds that denial, like alibi, is inherently weak and crumbles in light of positive declarations of
attended all the hearings before the Board. Moreover, private respondents were given the right to adduce evidence truthful witnesses who testified on affirmative matters that accused were at the scene of the crime and were the
on their behalf and they did. Lastly, the Discipline Board considered all the pieces of evidence submitted to it by all victim's assailants. As between categorical testimonies that ring of truth on one hand and a bare denial on the other,
the parties before rendering its resolution in Discipline Case No. 9495-3-25121. the former must prevail.84 Alibi is the weakest of all defenses for it is easy to fabricate and difficult to disprove, and it
is for this reason that it cannot prevail over the positive identification of accused by the witnesses. 85
Private respondents cannot claim that they were denied due process when they were not allowed to cross-examine
the witnesses against them. This argument was already rejected in Guzman v. National University73 where this Court The required proof in administrative cases, such as in student discipline cases, is neither proof beyond reasonable
held that "x x x the imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires observance of procedural due process. And it bears doubt nor preponderance of evidence but only substantial evidence. According to Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial
stressing that due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings similar Relations,86 it means "such reasonable evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. The proceedings in student discipline cases may conclusion."
be summary; and cross examination is not, x x x an essential part thereof."
Viewed from the foregoing, We reject the alibi of private respondents Bungubung, Valdes Jr., and
IIb. Petitioner DLSU, as an institution of higher learning, possesses academic freedom which includes Reverente.1awphi1 They were unable to show convincingly that they were not at the scene of the crime on March
determination of who to admit for study. 29, 1995 and that it was impossible for them to have been there. Moreover, their alibi cannot prevail over their
positive identification by the victims.
We hark back to this Court's pronouncement affirming the expulsion of several students found guilty of hazing: It is true that schools have the power to instill discipline in their students as subsumed in their academic freedom and
that "the establishment of rules governing university-student relations, particularly those pertaining to student
discipline, may be regarded as vital, not merely to the smooth and efficient operation of the institution, but to its very
No one can be so myopic as to doubt that the immediate reinstatement of respondent students who have
survival."94 This power, however, does not give them the untrammeled discretion to impose a penalty which is not
been investigated and found guilty by the Disciplinary Board to have violated petitioner university's
commensurate with the gravity of the misdeed. If the concept of proportionality between the offense committed and
disciplinary rules and standards will certainly undermine the authority of the administration of the school.
the sanction imposed is not followed, an element of arbitrariness intrudes. That would give rise to a due process
This we would be most loathe to do.
question.95

More importantly, it will seriously impair petitioner university's academic freedom which has been
We agree with respondent CHED that under the circumstances, the penalty of expulsion is grossly disproportionate
enshrined in the 1935, 1973 and the present 1987 Constitution.87
to the gravity of the acts committed by private respondents Bungubung, Reverente, and Valdes, Jr. Each of the two
mauling incidents lasted only for few seconds and the victims did not suffer any serious injury. Disciplinary measures
Certainly, private respondents Bungubung, Reverente and Valdes, Jr. do not deserve to claim a venerable institution especially where they involve suspension, dismissal or expulsion, cut significantly into the future of a student. They
as their own, for they may foreseeably cast a malevolent influence on the students currently enrolled, as well as attach to him for life and become a mortgage of his future, hardly redeemable in certain cases. Officials of colleges
those who come after them.88 It must be borne in mind that universities are established, not merely to develop the and universities must be anxious to protect it, conscious of the fact that, appropriately construed, a disciplinary action
intellect and skills of the studentry, but to inculcate lofty values, ideals and attitudes; nay, the development, or should be treated as an educational tool rather than a punitive measure.96
flowering if you will, of the total man.89
Accordingly, We affirm the penalty of exclusion97 only, not expulsion,98 imposed on them by the CHED. As such,
As for private respondent Aguilar, however, We are inclined to give credence to his alibi that he was at Camp Crame pursuant to Section 77(b) of the MRPS, petitioner DLSU may exclude or drop the names of the said private
in Quezon City at the time of the incident in question on March 29, 1995. This claim was amply corroborated by the respondents from its rolls for being undesirable, and transfer credentials immediately issued.
certification that he submitted before the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Resolutions dated July 30, 1996 and
CERTIFICATION dated October 15, 1996, and Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 36, Order dated January 7, 1997
are ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE, while CHED Resolution 181-96 dated May 14, 1996 is AFFIRMED.
TO WHOM THIS MAY CONCERN:
Petitioner DLSU is ordered to issue a certificate of completion/graduation in favor of private respondent Aguilar. On
the other hand, it may exclude or drop the names of private respondents Bungubung, Reverente, and Valdes, Jr.
We, the undersigned, hereby declare and affirm by way of this Certification that sometime on from its rolls, and their transfer credentials immediately issued.
March 29, 1995, at about and between 4:30 P.M. and 5:30 P.M., we were together with Alvin A.
Aguilar, at Kiangan Hall, inside Camp Crame, Quezon City, meeting in connection with an affair
of our class known as Class 7, Batch 89 of the Philippine Constabulary discussing on the SO ORDERED.
proposed sponsorship of TAU GAMMA PHI from said Batch '89 affair.
Ynares-Santiago, Chairperson, Quisumbing *, Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr. ** , JJ., concur.
That the meeting was terminated at about 6:30 P.M. that evening and Alvin Aguilar had asked our
permission to leave and we saw him leave Camp Crame, in his car with the driver.

April 18, 1995, Camp Crame, Quezon City.90

The said certification was duly signed by PO3 Nicanor R. Faustino (Anti-Organized Crime CIC, NCR), PO3 Alejandro
D. Deluviar (ODITRM, Camp Crame, Quezon City), PO2 Severino C. Filler (TNTSC, Camp Crame, Quezon City),
and PO3 Ireneo M. Desesto (Supply Center, PNPLSS). The rule is that alibi assumes significance or strength when it
is amply corroborated by credible and disinterested witnesses.91 It is true that alibi is a weak defense which an
accused can easily fabricate to escape criminal liability. But where the prosecution evidence is weak, and betrays
lack of credibility as to the identification of defendant, alibi assumes commensurate strength. This is but consistent
with the presumption of innocence in favor of accused. 92

Alibi is not always undeserving of credit, for there are times when accused has no other possible defense for what
could really be the truth as to his whereabouts at the crucial time, and such defense may, in fact, tilt the scales of
justice in his favor.93

III. The penalty of expulsion imposed by DLSU on private respondents is disproportionate to their misdeed.

Ang parusang expulsion na ipinataw ng DLSU sa private respondents ay hindi angkop sa kanilang

pagkakasala.
 EN BANC Respondents reiterated their request for the suspension of the implementation of PPA-AO No. 04-92, but
Secretary Garcia insisted on his position that the matter was within the jurisdiction of the Board of Directors of the
PPA. Compas appealed this ruling to the Office of the President (OP), reiterating his arguments before the DOTC.

On December 23, 1992, the OP issued an order directing the PPA to hold in abeyance the implementation of
[G.R. No. 111953. December 12, 1997] PPA-AO No. 04-92. In its answer, the PPA countered that said administrative order was issued in the exercise of its
administrative control and supervision over harbor pilots under Section 6-a (viii), Article IV of P. D. No. 857, as
amended, and it, along with its implementing guidelines, was intended to restore order in the ports and to improve
the quality of port services.

HON. RENATO C. CORONA, in his capacity as Assistant Secretary for Legal Affairs, HON. JESUS B. On March 17, 1993, the OP, through then Assistant Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs Renato C. Corona,
GARCIA, in his capacity as Acting Secretary, Department of Transportation and Communications, dismissed the appeal/petition and lifted the restraining order issued earlier. [11] He concluded that PPA-AO No. 04-92
and ROGELIO A. DAYAN, in his capacity as General Manager of Philippine Ports applied to all harbor pilots and, for all intents and purposes, was not the act of Dayan, but of the PPA, which was
Authority, petitioners, vs. UNITED HARBOR PILOTS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES and merely implementing Section 6 of P.D. No. 857, mandating it to control, regulate and supervise pilotage and conduct
MANILA PILOTS ASSOCIATION, respondents. of pilots in any port district.

On the alleged unconstitutionality and illegality of PPA-AO No. 04-92 and its implementing memoranda and
DECISION circulars, Secretary Corona opined that:

ROMERO, J.:
The exercise of ones profession falls within the constitutional guarantee against wrongful deprivation of, or
interference with, property rights without due process. In the limited context of this case, PPA-AO 04-92 does not
In issuing Administrative Order No. 04-92 (PPA-AO No. 04-92), limiting the term of appointment of harbor constitute a wrongful interference with, let alone a wrongful deprivation of, the property rights of those affected
pilots to one year subject to yearly renewal or cancellation, did the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) violate thereby. As may be noted, the issuance aims no more than to improve pilotage services by limiting the appointment
respondents right to exercise their profession and their right to due process of law? to harbor pilot positions to one year, subject to renewal or cancellation after a rigid evaluation of the appointees
performance.
The PPA was created on July 11, 1974, by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 505.  On December 23, 1975,
Presidential Decree No. 857 was issued revising the PPAs charter. Pursuant to its power of control, regulation, and
supervision of pilots and the pilotage profession, [1] the PPA promulgated PPA-AO-03-85 [2] on March 21, 1985, which PPA-AO 04-92 does not forbid, but merely regulates, the exercise by harbor pilots of their profession in PPAs
embodied the Rules and Regulations Governing Pilotage Services, the Conduct of Pilots and Pilotage Fees in jurisdictional area. (Emphasis supplied)
Philippine Ports. These rules mandate, inter alia, that aspiring pilots must be holders of pilot licenses [3] and must
train as probationary pilots in outports for three months and in the Port of Manila for four months.  It is only after they Finally, as regards the alleged absence of ample prior consultation before the issuance of the administrative
have achieved satisfactory performance [4] that they are given permanent and regular appointments by the PPA order, Secretary Corona cited Section 26 of P.D. No. 857, which merely requires the PPA to consult with relevant
itself [5] to exercise harbor pilotage until they reach the age of 70, unless sooner removed by reason of mental or Government agencies. Since the PPA Board of Directors is composed of the Secretaries of the DOTC, the
physical unfitness by the PPA General Manager. [6] Harbor pilots in every harbor district are further required to Department of Public Works and Highways, the Department of Finance, and the Department of Environment and
organize themselves into pilot associations which would make available such equipment as may be required by the Natural Resources, as well as the Director-General of the National Economic Development Agency, the
PPA for effective pilotage services. In view of this mandate, pilot associations invested in floating, communications, Administrator of the Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA), and the private sector representative who, due to his
and office equipment. In fact, every new pilot appointed by the PPA automatically becomes a member of a pilot knowledge and expertise, was appointed by the President to the Board, he concluded that the law has been
association and is required to pay a proportionate equivalent equity or capital before being allowed to assume his sufficiently complied with by the PPA in issuing the assailed administrative order.
duties, as reimbursement to the association concerned of the amount it paid to his predecessor.
Consequently, respondents filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with prayer for the issuance
Subsequently, then PPA General Manager Rogelio A. Dayan issued PPA-AO No. 04-92 [7] on July 15, 1992, of a temporary restraining order and damages, before Branch 6 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, which was
whose avowed policy was to instill effective discipline and thereby afford better protection to the port users through docketed as Civil Case No. 93-65673. On September 6, 1993, the trial court rendered the following judgment: [12]
the improvement of pilotage services. This was implemented by providing therein that all existing regular
appointments which have been previously issued either by the Bureau of Customs or the PPA shall remain valid up
to 31 December 1992 only and that all appointments to harbor pilot positions in all pilotage districts shall, henceforth, WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, this Court hereby rules that:
be only for a term of one (1) year from date of effectivity subject to yearly renewal or cancellation by the Authority
after conduct of a rigid evaluation of performance. 1. Respondents (herein petitioners) have acted in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of
On August 12, 1992, respondents United Harbor Pilots Association and the Manila Pilots Association, through discretion and in a capricious, whimsical and arbitrary manner in promulgating PPA Administrative
Capt. Alberto C. Compas, questioned PPA-AO No. 04-92 before the Department of Transportation and Order 04-92 including all its implementing Memoranda, Circulars and Orders;
Communication, but they were informed by then DOTC Secretary Jesus B. Garcia that the matter of reviewing,
recalling or annulling PPAs administrative issuances lies exclusively with its Board of Directors as its governing body. 2. PPA Administrative Order 04-92 and its implementing Circulars and Orders are declared null and void;
Meanwhile, on August 31, 1992, the PPA issued Memorandum Order No. 08-92 [8] which laid down the criteria
or factors to be considered in the reappointment of harbor pilots, viz.: (1) Qualifying Factors: [9] safety record and 3. The respondents are permanently enjoined from implementing PPA Administrative Order 04-92 and its
physical/mental medical exam report and (2) Criteria for Evaluation: [10] promptness in servicing vessels, compliance implementing Memoranda, Circulars and Orders.
with PPA Pilotage Guidelines, number of years as a harbor pilot, average GRT of vessels serviced as pilot,
awards/commendations as harbor pilot, and age. No costs.
SO ORDERED. profession. As will be presently demonstrated, such supposition is gravely erroneous and tends to perpetuate an
administrative order which is not only unreasonable but also superfluous.
The court a quo pointed out that the Bureau of Customs, the precursor of the PPA, recognized pilotage as a Pilotage, just like other professions, may be practiced only by duly licensed individuals.  Licensure is the
profession and, therefore, a property right under Callanta v. Carnation Philippines, Inc.[13] Thus, abbreviating the term granting of license especially to practice a profession. It is also the system of granting licenses (as for professional
within which that privilege may be exercised would be an interference with the property rights of the harbor practice) in accordance with established standards. [21] A license is a right or permission granted by some competent
pilots. Consequently, any withdrawal or alteration of such property right must be strictly made in accordance with the authority to carry on a business or do an act which, without such license, would be illegal. [22]
constitutional mandate of due process of law. This was apparently not followed by the PPA when it did not conduct
public hearings prior to the issuance of PPA-AO No. 04-92; respondents allegedly learned about it only after its Before harbor pilots can earn a license to practice their profession, they literally have to pass through the
publication in the newspapers. From this decision, petitioners elevated their case to this Court on certiorari. proverbial eye of a needle by taking, not one but five examinations, each followed by actual training and
practice. Thus, the court a quo observed:
After carefully examining the records and deliberating on the arguments of the parties, the Court is convinced
that PPA-AO No. 04-92 was issued in stark disregard of respondents right against deprivation of property without
due process of law. Consequently, the instant petition must be denied. Petitioners (herein respondents) contend, and the respondents (herein petitioners) do not deny, that here (sic) in this
jurisdiction, before a person can be a harbor pilot, he must pass five (5) government professional examinations,
Section 1 of the Bill of Rights lays down what is known as the due process clause of the Constitution, viz.: namely, (1) For Third Mate and after which he must work, train and practice on board a vessel for at least a year;
(2) For Second Mate and after which he must work, train and practice for at least a year; (3) For Chief Mate and after
SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, x x x. which he must work, train and practice for at least a year; (4) For a Master Mariner and after which he must work as
Captain of vessels for at least two (2) years to qualify for an examination to be a pilot; and finally, of course, that
In order to fall within the aegis of this provision, two conditions must concur, namely, that there is a deprivation given for pilots.
and that such deprivation is done without proper observance of due process. When one speaks of due process of
law, however, a distinction must be made between matters of procedure and matters of substance.  In essence,
procedural due process refers to the method or manner by which the law is enforced, while substantive due process Their license is granted in the form of an appointment which allows them to engage in pilotage until they retire
requires that the law itself, not merely the procedures by which the law would be enforced, is fair, reasonable, and at the age 70 years. This is a vested right. Under the terms of PPA-AO No. 04-92, (a)ll existing regular appointments
just. [14] PPA-AO No. 04-92 must be examined in light of this distinction. which have been previously issued by the Bureau of Customs or the PPA shall remain valid up to 31 December 1992
only, and (a)ll appointments to harbor pilot positions in all pilotage districts shall, henceforth, be only for a term of one
Respondents argue that due process was not observed in the adoption of PPA-AO No. 04-92 allegedly (1) year from date of effectivity subject to renewal or cancellation by the Authority after conduct of a rigid evaluation
because no hearing was conducted whereby relevant government agencies and the pilots themselves could ventilate of performance.
their views. They are obviously referring to the procedural aspect of the enactment. Fortunately, the Court has
maintained a clear position in this regard, a stance it has stressed in the recent case of Lumiqued v. Hon. It is readily apparent that PPA-AO No. 04-92 unduly restricts the right of harbor pilots to enjoy their profession
Exevea, [15] where it declared that (a)s long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due before their compulsory retirement. In the past, they enjoyed a measure of security knowing that after passing five
course, he cannot be said to have been denied due process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the very examinations and undergoing years of on-the-job training, they would have a license which they could use until their
essence of due process. Moreover, this constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if a person is granted an retirement, unless sooner revoked by the PPA for mental or physical unfitness. Under the new issuance, they have
opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. to contend with an annual cancellation of their license which can be temporary or permanent depending on the
outcome of their performance evaluation. Veteran pilots and neophytes alike are suddenly confronted with one-year
In the case at bar, respondents questioned PPA-AO No. 04-92 no less than four times  [16] before the matter terms which ipso facto expire at the end of that period. Renewal of their license is now dependent on a rigid
was finally elevated to this Tribunal. Their arguments on this score, however, fail to persuade. While respondents evaluation of performance which is conducted only after the license has already been cancelled. Hence, the use of
emphasize that the Philippine Coast Guard, which issues the licenses of pilots after administering the pilots the term renewal. It is this pre-evaluation cancellation which primarily makes PPA-AO No. 04-92 unreasonable and
examinations, was not consulted, [17] the facts show that the MARINA, which took over the licensing function of the constitutionally infirm. In a real sense, it is a deprivation of property without due process of law.
Philippine Coast Guard, was duly represented in the Board of Directors of the PPA.  Thus, petitioners correctly
argued that, there being no matters of naval defense involved in the issuance of the administrative order, the The Court notes that PPA-AO No. 04-92 and PPA-MO No. 08-92 are already covered by PPA-AO No. 03-85,
Philippine Coast Guard need not be consulted.[18] which is still operational. Respondents are correct in pointing out that PPA-AO No. 04-92 is a surplusage  [23] and,
therefore, an unnecessary enactment. PPA-AO 03-85 is a comprehensive order setting forth the Rules and
Neither does the fact that the pilots themselves were not consulted in any way taint the validity of the Regulations Governing Pilotage Services, the Conduct of Pilots and Pilotage Fees in Philippine Ports. It
administrative order. As a general rule, notice and hearing, as the fundamental requirements of procedural due provides, inter alia, for the qualification, appointment, performance evaluation, disciplining and removal of harbor
process, are essential only when an administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial function. In the performance of pilots - matters which are duplicated in PPA-AO No. 04-92 and its implementing memorandum order. Since it adds
its executive or legislative functions, such as issuing rules and regulations, an administrative body need not comply nothing new or substantial, PPA-AO No. 04-92 must be struck down.
with the requirements of notice and hearing.[19]
Finally, respondents insinuation that then PPA General Manager Dayan was responsible for the issuance of
Upon the other hand, it is also contended that the sole and exclusive right to the exercise of harbor pilotage by the questioned administrative order may have some factual basis; after all, power and authority were vested in his
pilots is a settled issue. Respondents aver that said right has become vested and can only be withdrawn or office to propose rules and regulations. The trial courts finding of animosity between him and private respondents
shortened by observing the constitutional mandate of due process of law. Their argument has thus shifted from the might likewise have a grain of truth. Yet the number of cases filed in court between private respondents and Dayan,
procedural to one of substance. It is here where PPA-AO No. 04-92 fails to meet the condition set by the organic law. including cases which have reached this Court, cannot certainly be considered the primordial reason for the issuance
of PPA-AO No. 04-92. In the absence of proof to the contrary, Dayan should be presumed to have acted in
There is no dispute that pilotage as a profession has taken on the nature of a property right. Even petitioner accordance with law and the best of professional motives. In any event, his actions are certainly always subject to
Corona recognized this when he stated in his March 17, 1993, decision that (t)he exercise of ones profession falls scrutiny by higher administrative authorities.
within the constitutional guarantee against wrongful deprivation of, or interference with, property rights without due
process. [20] He merely expressed the opinion that (i)n the limited context of this case, PPA-AO 04-92 does not WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed decision of the court a quo dated
constitute a wrongful interference with, let alone a wrongful deprivation of, the property rights of those affected September 6, 1993, in Civil Case No. 93-65673 is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
thereby, and that PPA-AO 04-92 does not forbid, but merely regulates, the exercise by harbor pilots of their
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines currency, or by imprisonment for not less than one month nor more than six months, or by both such fine
SUPREME COURT and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.
Manila
It is contended that the proper construction of the language of these provisions limits the prohibition contained in
section 30 and the penalty imposed in section 33 to cases (1) of slaughter of large cattle for human consumption in a
EN BANC
municipal slaughter without a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer, and (2) cases of killing of large cattle
for food in a municipal slaughterhouse without a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer; and it is urged
G.R. No. L-5060             January 26, 1910 that the municipality of Carmen not being provided with a municipal slaughterhouse, neither the prohibition nor the
penalty is applicable to cases of slaughter of large cattle without a permit in that municipality.
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, 
vs. We are of opinion, however, that the prohibition contained in section 30 refers (1) to the slaughter of large cattle for
LUIS TORIBIO, defendant-appellant. human consumption, anywhere, without a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer, and (2) expressly and
specifically to the killing for food of large cattle at a municipal slaughterhouse without such permit; and that the
penalty provided in section 33 applies generally to the slaughter of large cattle for human consumption, anywhere,
Rodriguez & Del Rosario, for appellant. 
without a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer, and specifically to the killing for food of large cattle at a
Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.
municipal slaughterhouse without such permit.

CARSON, J.:
It may be admitted at once, that the pertinent language of those sections taken by itself and examined apart from the
context fairly admits of two constructions: one whereby the phrase "at the municipal slaughterhouse" may be taken
The evidence of record fully sustains the findings of the trial court that the appellant slaughtered or caused to be as limiting and restricting both the word "slaughtered" and the words "killed for food" in section 30, and the words
slaughtered for human consumption, the carabao described in the information, without a permit from the municipal "slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered for human consumption" and the words "killing for food" in section 33; and
treasure of the municipality wherein it was slaughtered, in violation of the provisions of sections 30 and 33 of Act No. the other whereby the phrase "at the municipal slaughterhouse" may be taken as limiting and restricting merely the
1147, an Act regulating the registration, branding, and slaughter of large cattle. words "killed for food" and "killing for food" as used in those sections. But upon a reading of the whole Act, and
keeping in mind the manifest and expressed purpose and object of its enactment, it is very clear that the latter
construction is that which should be adopted.
It appears that in the town of Carmen, in the Province of Bohol, wherein the animal was slaughtered there is no
municipal slaughterhouse, and counsel for appellant contends that under such circumstances the provisions of Act
No. 1147 do not prohibit nor penalize the slaughter of large cattle without a permit of the municipal treasure. Sections The Act primarily seeks to protect the "large cattle" of the Philippine Islands against theft and to make easy the
30, 31, 32, and 33 of the Act are as follows: recovery and return of such cattle to their proper owners when lost, strayed, or stolen. To this end it provides an
elaborate and compulsory system for the separate branding and registry of ownership of all such cattle throughout
the Islands, whereby owners are enabled readily and easily to establish their title; it prohibits and invalidates all
SEC. 30. No large cattle shall be slaughtered or killed for food at the municipal slaughterhouse except
transfers of large cattle unaccompanied by certificates of transfer issued by the proper officer in the municipality
upon permit secured from the municipal treasure. Before issuing the permit for the slaughter of large cattle
where the contract of sale is made; and it provides also for the disposition of thieves or persons unlawfully in
for human consumption, the municipal treasurer shall require for branded cattle the production of the
possession, so as to protect the rights of the true owners. All this, manifestly, in order to make it difficult for any one
original certificate of ownership and certificates of transfer showing title in the person applying for the
but the rightful owner of such cattle to retain them in his possession or to dispose of them to others. But the
permit, and for unbranded cattle such evidence as may satisfy said treasurer as to the ownership of the
usefulness of this elaborate and compulsory system of identification, resting as it does on the official registry of the
animals for which permit to slaughter has been requested.
brands and marks on each separate animal throughout the Islands, would be largely impaired, if not totally
destroyed, if such animals were requiring proof of ownership and the production of certificates of registry by the
SEC. 31. No permit to slaughter has been carabaos shall be granted by the municipal treasurer unless person slaughtering or causing them to be slaughtered, and this especially if the animals were slaughtered privately
such animals are unfit for agricultural work or for draft purposes, and in no event shall a permit be given to or in a clandestine manner outside of a municipal slaughterhouse. Hence, as it would appear, sections 30 and 33
slaughter for food any animal of any kind which is not fit for human consumption. prohibit and penalize the slaughter for human consumption or killing for food at a municipal slaughterhouse of such
animals without a permit issued by the municipal treasurer, and section 32 provides for the keeping of detailed
records of all such permits in the office of the municipal and also of the provincial treasurer.
SEC. 32. The municipal treasurer shall keep a record of all permits for slaughter issued by him, and such
record shall show the name and residence of the owner, and the class, sex, age, brands, knots of radiated
hair commonly know as remolinos or cowlicks, and other marks of identification of the animal for the If, however, the construction be placed on these sections which is contended for by the appellant, it will readily be
slaughter of which permit is issued and the date on which such permit is issued. Names of owners shall be seen that all these carefully worked out provisions for the registry and record of the brands and marks of
alphabetically arranged in the record, together with date of permit. identification of all large cattle in the Islands would prove in large part abortion, since thieves and persons unlawfully
in possession of such cattle, and naturally would, evade the provisions of the law by slaughtering them outside of
municipal slaughterhouses, and thus enjoy the fruits of their wrongdoing without exposing themselves to the danger
A copy of the record of permits granted for slaughter shall be forwarded monthly to the provincial treasurer, of detection incident to the bringing of the animals to the public slaughterhouse, where the brands and other
who shall file and properly index the same under the name of the owner, together with date of permit. identification marks might be scrutinized and proof of ownership required.

SEC. 33. Any person slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered for human consumption or killing for food Where the language of a statute is fairly susceptible of two or more constructions, that construction should be
at the municipal slaughterhouse any large cattle except upon permit duly secured from the municipal adopted which will most tend to give effect to the manifest intent of the lawmaker and promote the object for which
treasurer, shall be punished by a fine of not less than ten nor more than five hundred pesos, Philippine the statute was enacted, and a construction should be rejected which would tend to render abortive other provisions
of the statute and to defeat the object which the legislator sought to attain by its enactment. We are of opinion,
therefore, that sections 30 and 33 of the Act prohibit and penalize the slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered for In the case of Com. vs. Alger (7 Cush., 53, 84), wherein the doctrine laid down in Com. vs. Tewksbury (supra) was
human consumption of large cattle at any place without the permit provided for in section 30. reviewed and affirmed, the same eminent jurist who wrote the former opinion, in distinguishing the exercise of the
right of eminent domain from the exercise of the sovereign police powers of the State, said:
It is not essential that an explanation be found for the express prohibition in these sections of the "killing for food at a
municipal slaughterhouse" of such animals, despite the fact that this prohibition is clearly included in the general We think it is settled principle, growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil society, that every holder of
prohibition of the slaughter of such animals for human consumption anywhere; but it is not improbable that the property, however absolute and unqualified may be his title, holds it under the implied liability that his use
requirement for the issue of a permit in such cases was expressly and specifically mentioned out of superabundance of it may be so regulated that is shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having an equal
of precaution, and to avoid all possibility of misunderstanding in the event that some of the municipalities should be right to the enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to the rights of the community. . . . Rights of property,
disposed to modify or vary the general provisions of the law by the passage of local ordinances or regulations for the like all other social and conventional rights, are subject to such reasonable limitations in their enjoyment as
control of municipal slaughterhouse. shall prevent them from being injurious, and to such reasonable restrain and regulations establish by law,
as the legislature, under the governing and controlling power vested in them by the constitution, may think
necessary and expedient.
Similar reasoning applied to the specific provisions of section 31 of the Act leads to the same conclusion. One of the
secondary purposes of the law, as set out in that section, is to prevent the slaughter for food of carabaos fit for
agricultural and draft purposes, and of all animals unfit for human consumption. A construction which would limit the This is very different from the right of eminent domain, the right of a government to take and appropriate
prohibitions and penalties prescribed in the statute to the killing of such animals in municipal slaughterhouses, private property to public use, whenever the public exigency requires it; which can be done only on
leaving unprohibited and unpenalized their slaughter outside of such establishments, so manifestly tends to defeat condition of providing a reasonable compensation therefor. The power we allude to is rather the police
the purpose and object of the legislator, that unless imperatively demanded by the language of the statute it should power, the power vested in the legislature by the constitution, to make, ordain, and establish all manner of
be rejected; and, as we have already indicated, the language of the statute is clearly susceptible of the construction wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant
which we have placed upon it, which tends to make effective the provisions of this as well as all the other sections of to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the
the Act. subjects of the same.

It appears that the defendant did in fact apply for a permit to slaughter his carabao, and that it was denied him on the It is much easier to perceive and realize the existence and sources of this power than to mark its
ground that the animal was not unfit "for agricultural work or for draft purposes." Counsel for appellant contends that boundaries or prescribe limits to its exercise.
the statute, in so far as it undertakes to penalize the slaughter of carabaos for human consumption as food, without
first obtaining a permit which can not be procured in the event that the animal is not unfit "for agricultural work or
Applying these principles, we are opinion that the restrain placed by the law on the slaughter for human consumption
draft purposes," is unconstitutional and in violation of the terms of section 5 of the Philippine Bill (Act of Congress,
of carabaos fit for agricultural work and draft purpose is not an appropriation of property interests to a "public use,"
July 1, 1902), which provides that "no law shall be enacted which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property
and is not, therefore, within the principle of the exercise by the State of the right of eminent domain. It is fact a mere
without due process of law."
restriction or limitation upon a private use, which the legislature deemed to be determental to the public welfare. And
we think that an examination of the general provisions of the statute in relation to the public interest which it seeks to
It is not quite clear from the argument of counsel whether his contention is that this provision of the statute safeguard and the public necessities for which it provides, leaves no room for doubt that the limitations and restraints
constitutes a taking of property for public use in the exercise of the right of eminent domain without providing for the imposed upon the exercise of rights of ownership by the particular provisions of the statute under consideration were
compensation of the owners, or that it is an undue and unauthorized exercise of the police power of the State. But imposed not for private purposes but, strictly, in the promotion of the "general welfare" and "the public interest" in the
whatever may be the basis of his contention, we are of opinion, appropriating, with necessary modifications exercise of the sovereign police power which every State possesses for the general public welfare and which
understood, the language of that great jurist, Chief Justice Shaw (in the case of Com. vs. Tewksbury, 11 Met., 55, "reaches to every species of property within the commonwealth."
where the question involved was the constitutionality of a statute prohibiting and penalizing the taking or carrying
away by any person, including the owner, of any stones, gravel, or sand, from any of the beaches in the town of
For several years prior to the enactment of the statute a virulent contagious or infectious disease had threatened the
Chesea,) that the law in question "is not a taking of the property for public use, within the meaning of the constitution,
total extinction of carabaos in these Islands, in many sections sweeping away seventy, eighty, and in some cases as
but is a just and legitimate exercise of the power of the legislature to regulate and restrain such particular use of the
much as ninety and even one hundred per cent of these animals. Agriculture being the principal occupation of the
property as would be inconsistent with or injurious to the rights of the public. All property is acquired and held under
people, and the carabao being the work animal almost exclusively in use in the fields as well as for draft purposes,
the tacit condition that it shall not be so used as to injure the equal rights of others or greatly impair the public rights
the ravages of the disease with which they were infected struck an almost vital blow at the material welfare of the
and interest of the community."
country. large areas of productive land lay waste for years, and the production of rice, the staple food of the
inhabitants of the Islands, fell off to such an extent that the impoverished people were compelled to spend many
It may be conceded that the benificial use and exclusive enjoyment of the property of all carabao owners in these millions of pesos in its importation, notwithstanding the fact that with sufficient work animals to cultivate the fields the
Islands is to a greater or less degree interfered with by the provisions of the statute; and that, without inquiring what arable rice lands of the country could easily be made to produce a supply more that sufficient for its own needs. The
quantum of interest thus passes from the owners of such cattle, it is an interest the deprivation of which detracts from drain upon the resources of the Islands was such that famine soon began to make itself felt, hope sank in the breast
their right and authority, and in some degree interferes with their exclusive possession and control of their property, of the people, and in many provinces the energies of the breadwinners seemed to be paralyzed by the apparently
so that if the regulations in question were enacted for purely private purpose, the statute, in so far as these hopeless struggle for existence with which they were confronted.
regulations are concerned, would be a violation of the provisions of the Philippine Bill relied on be appellant; but we
are satisfied that it is not such a taking, such an interference with the right and title of the owners, as is involved in
To meet these conditions, large sums of money were expended by the Government in relieving the immediate needs
the exercise by the State of the right of eminent domain, so as to entitle these owners to compensation, and that it is
of the starving people, three millions of dollars were voted by the Congress of the United States as a relief or famine
no more than "a just restrain of an injurious private use of the property, which the legislature had authority to
fund, public works were undertaken to furnish employment in the provinces where the need was most pressing, and
impose."
every effort made to alleviate the suffering incident to the widespread failure of the crops throughout the Islands, due
in large measure to the lack of animals fit for agricultural work and draft purposes.
Such measures, however, could only temporarily relieve the situation, because in an agricultural community material restriction of objectionable trades to certain localities; the compulsary vaccination of children; the
progress and permanent prosperity could hardly be hoped for in the absence of the work animals upon which such a confinement of the insane or those afficted with contagious deceases; the restraint of vagrants, beggars,
community must necessarily rely for the cultivation of the fields and the transportation of the products of the fields to and habitual drunkards; the suppression of obscene publications and houses of ill fame; and the
market. Accordingly efforts were made by the Government to increase the supply of these animals by importation, prohibition of gambling houses and places where intoxicating liquors are sold. Beyond this, however, the
but, as appears from the official reports on this subject, hope for the future depended largely on the conservation of State may interfere wherever the public interests demand it, and in this particular a large discretion is
those animals which had been spared from the ravages of the diseased, and their redistribution throughout the necessarily vested in the legislature to determine, not only what the interests of the public require, but
Islands where the need for them was greatest. what measures are necessary for the protection of such interests. (Barbier vs. Connolly, 113 U. S., 27;
Kidd vs. Pearson, 128 U. S., 1.) To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it
must appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular
At large expense, the services of experts were employed, with a view to the discovery and applications of preventive
class, require such interference; and, second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the
and curative remedies, and it is hoped that these measures have proved in some degree successful in protecting the
accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The legislature may not,
present inadequate supply of large cattle, and that the gradual increase and redistribution of these animals
under the guise of protecting the public interests, arbitrarily interfere with private business, or impose
throughout the Archipelago, in response to the operation of the laws of supply and demand, will ultimately results in
unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations. In other words, its determination as to what
practically relieving those sections which suffered most by the loss of their work animals.
is a proper exercise of its police powers is not final or conclusive, but is subject to the supervision of the
court.
As was to be expected under such conditions, the price of carabaos rapidly increase from the three to five fold or
more, and it may fairly be presumed that even if the conservative measures now adopted prove entirely successful,
From what has been said, we think it is clear that the enactment of the provisions of the statute under consideration
the scant supply will keep the price of these animals at a high figure until the natural increase shall have more nearly
was required by "the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class;" and that the
equalized the supply to the demand.
prohibition of the slaughter of carabaos for human consumption, so long as these animals are fit for agricultural work
or draft purposes was a "reasonably necessary" limitation on private ownership, to protect the community from the
Coincident with and probably intimately connected with this sudden rise in the price of cattle, the crime of cattle loss of the services of such animals by their slaughter by improvident owners, tempted either by greed of momentary
stealing became extremely prevalent throughout the Islands, necessitating the enactment of a special law penalizing gain, or by a desire to enjoy the luxury of animal food, even when by so doing the productive power of the community
with the severest penalties the theft of carabaos and other personal property by roving bands; and it must be may be measurably and dangerously affected.
assumed from the legislative authority found that the general welfare of the Islands necessitated the enactment of
special and somewhat burdensome provisions for the branding and registration of large cattle, and supervision and
Chief Justice Redfield, in Thorpe vs. Rutland & Burlington R. R. Co. (27 Vt., 140), said (p. 149) that by this "general
restriction of their slaughter for food. It will hardly be questioned that the provisions of the statute touching the
police power of the State, persons and property are subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to
branding and registration of such cattle, and prohibiting and penalizing the slaughter of diseased cattle for food were
secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State; of the perfect right in the legislature to do which no
enacted in the due and proper exercise of the police power of the State; and we are of opinion that, under all the
question ever was, or, upon acknowledge and general principles, ever can be made, so far as natural persons are
circumstances, the provision of the statute prohibiting and penalizing the slaughter for human consumption of
concerned."
carabaos fit for work were in like manner enacted in the due and proper exercise of that power, justified by the
exigent necessities of existing conditions, and the right of the State to protect itself against the overwhelming disaster
incident to the further reduction of the supply of animals fit for agricultural work or draft purposes. And Cooley in his "Constitutional Limitations" (6th ed., p. 738) says:

It is, we think, a fact of common knowledge in these Islands, and disclosed by the official reports and records of the It would be quite impossible to enumerate all the instances in which the police power is or may be
administrative and legislative departments of the Government, that not merely the material welfare and future exercised, because the various cases in which the exercise by one individual of his rights may conflict with
prosperity of this agricultural community were threatened by the ravages of the disease which swept away the work a similar exercise by others, or may be detrimental to the public order or safety, are infinite in number and
animals during the years prior to the enactment of the law under consideration, but that the very life and existence of in variety. And there are other cases where it becomes necessary for the public authorities to interfere with
the inhabitants of these Islands as a civilized people would be more or less imperiled by the continued destruction of the control by individuals of their property, and even to destroy it, where the owners themselves have fully
large cattle by disease or otherwise. Confronted by such conditions, there can be no doubt of the right of the observed all their duties to their fellows and to the State, but where, nevertheless, some controlling public
Legislature to adopt reasonable measures for the preservation of work animals, even to the extent of prohibiting and necessity demands the interference or destruction. A strong instance of this description is where it
penalizing what would, under ordinary conditions, be a perfectly legitimate and proper exercise of rights of ownership becomes necessary to take, use, or destroy the private property of individuals to prevent the spreading of
and control of the private property of the citizen. The police power rests upon necessity and the right of self- a fire, the ravages of a pestilence, the advance of a hostile army, or any other great public calamity. Here
protection and if ever the invasion of private property by police regulation can be justified, we think that the the individual is in no degree in fault, but his interest must yield to that "necessity" which "knows no law."
reasonable restriction placed upon the use of carabaos by the provision of the law under discussion must be held to The establishment of limits within the denser portions of cities and villages within which buildings
be authorized as a reasonable and proper exercise of that power. constructed of inflammable materials shall not be erected or repaired may also, in some cases, be
equivalent to a destruction of private property; but regulations for this purpose have been sustained
notwithstanding this result. Wharf lines may also be established for the general good, even though they
As stated by Mr. Justice Brown in his opinion in the case of Lawton vs. Steele (152 U.S., 133, 136):
prevent the owners of water-fronts from building out on soil which constitutes private property. And,
whenever the legislature deem it necessary to the protection of a harbor to forbid the removal of stones,
The extent and limits of what is known as the police power have been a fruitful subject of discussion in the gravel, or sand from the beach, they may establish regulations to that effect under penalties, and make
appellate courts of nearly every State in the Union. It is universally conceded to include everything them applicable to the owners of the soil equally with other persons. Such regulations are only "a just
essential to the public safely, health, and morals, and to justify the destruction or abatement, by summary restraint of an injurious use of property, which the legislature have authority" to impose.
proceedings, of whatever may be regarded as a public nuisance. Under this power it has been held that
the State may order the destruction of a house falling to decay or otherwise endangering the lives of
So a particular use of property may sometimes be forbidden, where, by a change of circumstances, and
passers-by; the demolition of such as are in the path of a conflagration; the slaughter of diseased cattle;
without the fault of the power, that which was once lawful, proper, and unobjectionable has now become a
the destruction of decayed or unwholesome food; the prohibition of wooden buildings in cities; the
public nuisance, endangering the public health or the public safety. Milldams are sometimes destroyed
regulation of railways and other means of public conveyance, and of interments in burial grounds; the
upon this grounds; and churchyards which prove, in the advance of urban population, to be detrimental to
 the public health, or in danger of becoming so, are liable to be closed against further use for cemetery
purposes.

These citations from some of the highest judicial and text-book authorities in the United States clearly indicate the
wide scope and extent which has there been given to the doctrine us in our opinion that the provision of the statute in
question being a proper exercise of that power is not in violation of the terms of section 5 of the Philippine Bill, which
provide that "no law shall be enacted which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law," a provision which itself is adopted from the Constitution of the United States, and is found in substance in the
constitution of most if not all of the States of the Union.

The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be affirmed with the costs of this
instance against the appellant. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Moreland and Elliott, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines SECTION 2. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
Done in the City of Manila, this 25th day of October, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred
and eighty.
EN BANC
(SGD.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS
G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987
President
RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner, 
vs. Republic of the Philippines
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION COMMANDER, INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE,
BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO and THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY, REGION IV,
ILOILO CITY, respondents. The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they
were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of the above measure. 1 The
petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of
Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioner. a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of
the carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also
declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as raise by the petitioner, for lack of authority and also
for its presumed validity. 2

CRUZ, J.:
The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court,* 3 which upheld the trial court, ** and he
has now come before us in this petition for review on certiorari.
The essence of due process is distilled in the immortal cry of Themistocles to Alcibiades "Strike — but hear me first!"
It is this cry that the petitioner in effect repeats here as he challenges the constitutionality of Executive Order No.
626-A. The thrust of his petition is that the executive order is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes outright confiscation of
the carabao or carabeef being transported across provincial boundaries. His claim is that the penalty is invalid
because it is imposed without according the owner a right to be heard before a competent and impartial court as
The said executive order reads in full as follows: guaranteed by due process. He complains that the measure should not have been presumed, and so sustained, as
constitutional. There is also a challenge to the improper exercise of the legislative power by the former President
under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution. 4
WHEREAS, the President has given orders prohibiting the interprovincial movement of carabaos
and the slaughtering of carabaos not complying with the requirements of Executive Order No.
626 particularly with respect to age; While also involving the same executive order, the case of Pesigan v. Angeles  5 is not applicable here. The question
raised there was the necessity of the previous publication of the measure in the Official Gazette before it could be
considered enforceable. We imposed the requirement then on the basis of due process of law. In doing so, however,
WHEREAS, it has been observed that despite such orders the violators still manage to
this Court did not, as contended by the Solicitor General, impliedly affirm the constitutionality of Executive Order No.
circumvent the prohibition against inter-provincial movement of carabaos by transporting
626-A. That is an entirely different matter.
carabeef instead; and

This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in examining constitutional
WHEREAS, in order to achieve the purposes and objectives of Executive Order No. 626 and the
questions, they are nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same whenever warranted, subject only to review
prohibition against interprovincial movement of carabaos, it is necessary to strengthen the said
by the highest tribunal. 6 We have jurisdiction under the Constitution to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on
Executive Order and provide for the disposition of the carabaos and carabeef subject of the
appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of court may provide," final judgments and orders of lower courts in, among
violation;
others, all cases involving the constitutionality of certain measures. 7 This simply means that the resolution of such
cases may be made in the first instance by these lower courts.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the
powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby promulgate the following:
And while it is true that laws are presumed to be constitutional, that presumption is not by any means conclusive and
in fact may be rebutted. Indeed, if there be a clear showing of their invalidity, and of the need to declare them so,
SECTION 1. Executive Order No. 626 is hereby amended such that henceforth, no carabao then "will be the time to make the hammer fall, and heavily," 8 to recall Justice Laurel's trenchant warning. Stated
regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from otherwise, courts should not follow the path of least resistance by simply presuming the constitutionality of a law
one province to another. The carabao or carabeef transported in violation of this Executive when it is questioned. On the contrary, they should probe the issue more deeply, to relieve the abscess,
Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government, to be paraphrasing another distinguished jurist, 9 and so heal the wound or excise the affliction.
distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National
Meat Inspection Commission may ay see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers
through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos.
Judicial power authorizes this; and when the exercise is demanded, there should be no shirking of the task for fear of The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing 13 which, generally speaking, may not be
retaliation, or loss of favor, or popular censure, or any other similar inhibition unworthy of the bench, especially this dispensed with because they are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness. It is a gratifying commentary
Court. on our judicial system that the jurisprudence of this country is rich with applications of this guaranty as proof of our
fealty to the rule of law and the ancient rudiments of fair play. We have consistently declared that every person,
faced by the awesome power of the State, is entitled to "the law of the land," which Daniel Webster described almost
The challenged measure is denominated an executive order but it is really presidential decree, promulgating a new
two hundred years ago in the famous Dartmouth College Case, 14 as "the law which hears before it condemns,
rule instead of merely implementing an existing law. It was issued by President Marcos not for the purpose of taking
which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial." It has to be so if the rights of every person are to
care that the laws were faithfully executed but in the exercise of his legislative authority under Amendment No. 6. It
be secured beyond the reach of officials who, out of mistaken zeal or plain arrogance, would degrade the due
was provided thereunder that whenever in his judgment there existed a grave emergency or a threat or imminence
process clause into a worn and empty catchword.
thereof or whenever the legislature failed or was unable to act adequately on any matter that in his judgment
required immediate action, he could, in order to meet the exigency, issue decrees, orders or letters of instruction that
were to have the force and effect of law. As there is no showing of any exigency to justify the exercise of that This is not to say that notice and hearing are imperative in every case for, to be sure, there are a number of admitted
extraordinary power then, the petitioner has reason, indeed, to question the validity of the executive order. exceptions. The conclusive presumption, for example, bars the admission of contrary evidence as long as such
Nevertheless, since the determination of the grounds was supposed to have been made by the President "in his presumption is based on human experience or there is a rational connection between the fact proved and the fact
judgment, " a phrase that will lead to protracted discussion not really necessary at this time, we reserve resolution of ultimately presumed therefrom. 15 There are instances when the need for expeditions action will justify omission of
this matter until a more appropriate occasion. For the nonce, we confine ourselves to the more fundamental question these requisites, as in the summary abatement of a nuisance per se, like a mad dog on the loose, which may be
of due process. killed on sight because of the immediate danger it poses to the safety and lives of the people. Pornographic
materials, contaminated meat and narcotic drugs are inherently pernicious and may be summarily destroyed. The
passport of a person sought for a criminal offense may be cancelled without hearing, to compel his return to the
It is part of the art of constitution-making that the provisions of the charter be cast in precise and unmistakable
country he has fled. 16 Filthy restaurants may be summarily padlocked in the interest of the public health and bawdy
language to avoid controversies that might arise on their correct interpretation. That is the Ideal. In the case of the
houses to protect the public morals. 17 In such instances, previous judicial hearing may be omitted without violation
due process clause, however, this rule was deliberately not followed and the wording was purposely kept
of due process in view of the nature of the property involved or the urgency of the need to protect the general welfare
ambiguous. In fact, a proposal to delineate it more clearly was submitted in the Constitutional Convention of 1934,
from a clear and present danger.
but it was rejected by Delegate Jose P. Laurel, Chairman of the Committee on the Bill of Rights, who forcefully
argued against it. He was sustained by the body. 10
The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power which both restraints and is
restrained by due process. The police power is simply defined as the power inherent in the State to regulate liberty
The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain also conveniently resilient. This was felt
and property for the promotion of the general welfare. 18 By reason of its function, it extends to all the great public
necessary because due process is not, like some provisions of the fundamental law, an "iron rule" laying down an
needs and is described as the most pervasive, the least limitable and the most demanding of the three inherent
implacable and immutable command for all seasons and all persons. Flexibility must be the best virtue of the
powers of the State, far outpacing taxation and eminent domain. The individual, as a member of society, is hemmed
guaranty. The very elasticity of the due process clause was meant to make it adapt easily to every situation,
in by the police power, which affects him even before he is born and follows him still after he is dead — from the
enlarging or constricting its protection as the changing times and circumstances may require.
womb to beyond the tomb — in practically everything he does or owns. Its reach is virtually limitless. It is a
ubiquitous and often unwelcome intrusion. Even so, as long as the activity or the property has some relevance to the
Aware of this, the courts have also hesitated to adopt their own specific description of due process lest they confine public welfare, its regulation under the police power is not only proper but necessary. And the justification is found in
themselves in a legal straitjacket that will deprive them of the elbow room they may need to vary the meaning of the the venerable Latin maxims, Salus populi est suprema lex and Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which call for the
clause whenever indicated. Instead, they have preferred to leave the import of the protection open-ended, as it were, subordination of individual interests to the benefit of the greater number.
to be "gradually ascertained by the process of inclusion and exclusion in the course of the decision of cases as they
arise." 11 Thus, Justice Felix Frankfurter of the U.S. Supreme Court, for example, would go no farther than to define
It is this power that is now invoked by the government to justify Executive Order No. 626-A, amending the basic rule
due process — and in so doing sums it all up — as nothing more and nothing less than "the embodiment of the
in Executive Order No. 626, prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions. The original
sporting Idea of fair play." 12
measure was issued for the reason, as expressed in one of its Whereases, that "present conditions demand that the
carabaos and the buffaloes be conserved for the benefit of the small farmers who rely on them for energy needs."
When the barons of England extracted from their sovereign liege the reluctant promise that that Crown would We affirm at the outset the need for such a measure. In the face of the worsening energy crisis and the increased
thenceforth not proceed against the life liberty or property of any of its subjects except by the lawful judgment of his dependence of our farms on these traditional beasts of burden, the government would have been remiss, indeed, if it
peers or the law of the land, they thereby won for themselves and their progeny that splendid guaranty of fairness had not taken steps to protect and preserve them.
that is now the hallmark of the free society. The solemn vow that King John made at Runnymede in 1215 has since
then resounded through the ages, as a ringing reminder to all rulers, benevolent or base, that every person, when
A similar prohibition was challenged in United States v. Toribio, 19 where a law regulating the registration, branding
confronted by the stern visage of the law, is entitled to have his say in a fair and open hearing of his cause.
and slaughter of large cattle was claimed to be a deprivation of property without due process of law. The defendant
had been convicted thereunder for having slaughtered his own carabao without the required permit, and he appealed
The closed mind has no place in the open society. It is part of the sporting Idea of fair play to hear "the other side" to the Supreme Court. The conviction was affirmed. The law was sustained as a valid police measure to prevent the
before an opinion is formed or a decision is made by those who sit in judgment. Obviously, one side is only one-half indiscriminate killing of carabaos, which were then badly needed by farmers. An epidemic had stricken many of
of the question; the other half must also be considered if an impartial verdict is to be reached based on an informed these animals and the reduction of their number had resulted in an acute decline in agricultural output, which in turn
appreciation of the issues in contention. It is indispensable that the two sides complement each other, as unto the had caused an incipient famine. Furthermore, because of the scarcity of the animals and the consequent increase in
bow the arrow, in leading to the correct ruling after examination of the problem not from one or the other perspective their price, cattle-rustling had spread alarmingly, necessitating more effective measures for the registration and
only but in its totality. A judgment based on less that this full appraisal, on the pretext that a hearing is unnecessary branding of these animals. The Court held that the questioned statute was a valid exercise of the police power and
or useless, is tainted with the vice of bias or intolerance or ignorance, or worst of all, in repressive regimes, the declared in part as follows:
insolence of power.
To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first,
that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require
 such interference; and second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the previous hearing, to wit, the immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected and the urgency of the need to correct
accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. ... it.

From what has been said, we think it is clear that the enactment of the provisions of the statute In the case before us, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for the petitioner's peremptory treatment.
under consideration was required by "the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from The properties involved were not even inimical per se as to require their instant destruction. There certainly was no
those of a particular class" and that the prohibition of the slaughter of carabaos for human reason why the offense prohibited by the executive order should not have been proved first in a court of justice, with
consumption, so long as these animals are fit for agricultural work or draft purposes was a the accused being accorded all the rights safeguarded to him under the Constitution. Considering that, as we held
"reasonably necessary" limitation on private ownership, to protect the community from the loss in Pesigan v. Angeles, 21 Executive Order No. 626-A is penal in nature, the violation thereof should have been
of the services of such animals by their slaughter by improvident owners, tempted either by pronounced not by the police only but by a court of justice, which alone would have had the authority to impose the
greed of momentary gain, or by a desire to enjoy the luxury of animal food, even when by so prescribed penalty, and only after trial and conviction of the accused.
doing the productive power of the community may be measurably and dangerously affected.
We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the disposition of the confiscated property as prescribed
In the light of the tests mentioned above, we hold with the Toribio Case that the carabao, as the poor man's tractor, in the questioned executive order. It is there authorized that the seized property shall "be distributed to charitable
so to speak, has a direct relevance to the public welfare and so is a lawful subject of Executive Order No. 626. The institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in
method chosen in the basic measure is also reasonably necessary for the purpose sought to be achieved and not the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in
unduly oppressive upon individuals, again following the above-cited doctrine. There is no doubt that by banning the the case of carabaos." (Emphasis supplied.) The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous
slaughter of these animals except where they are at least seven years old if male and eleven years old if female condition, if condition it is. It is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One
upon issuance of the necessary permit, the executive order will be conserving those still fit for farm work or breeding searches in vain for the usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the said
and preventing their improvident depletion. officers must observe when they make their distribution. There is none. Their options are apparently boundless. Who
shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the officers
named can supply the answer, they and they alone may choose the grantee as they see fit, and in their own
But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful subject as the original executive order, we
exclusive discretion. Definitely, there is here a "roving commission," a wide and sweeping authority that is not
cannot say with equal certainty that it complies with the second requirement, viz., that there be a lawful method. We
"canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing," in short, a clearly profligate and therefore invalid delegation of
note that to strengthen the original measure, Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on
legislative powers.
the slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement, providing that "no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical
condition or purpose (sic) and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another." The object of the
prohibition escapes us. The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method
achieved by the questioned measure is missing employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly
oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in
his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the
We do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate
power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates
slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another.
against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the
Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them
officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.
to another province will make it easier to kill them there. As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply to it as
For these reasons, we hereby declare Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.
otherwise, so says executive order, it could be easily circumvented by simply killing the animal. Perhaps so.
However, if the movement of the live animals for the purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot be prohibited, it
should follow that there is no reason either to prohibit their transfer as, not to be flippant dead meat. We agree with the respondent court, however, that the police station commander who confiscated the petitioner's
carabaos is not liable in damages for enforcing the executive order in accordance with its mandate. The law was at
that time presumptively valid, and it was his obligation, as a member of the police, to enforce it. It would have been
Even if a reasonable relation between the means and the end were to be assumed, we would still have to reckon
impertinent of him, being a mere subordinate of the President, to declare the executive order unconstitutional and, on
with the sanction that the measure applies for violation of the prohibition. The penalty is outright confiscation of the
his own responsibility alone, refuse to execute it. Even the trial court, in fact, and the Court of Appeals itself did not
carabao or carabeef being transported, to be meted out by the executive authorities, usually the police only. In the
feel they had the competence, for all their superior authority, to question the order we now annul.
Toribio Case, the statute was sustained because the penalty prescribed was fine and imprisonment, to be imposed
by the court after trial and conviction of the accused. Under the challenged measure, significantly, no such trial is
prescribed, and the property being transported is immediately impounded by the police and declared, by the The Court notes that if the petitioner had not seen fit to assert and protect his rights as he saw them, this case would
measure itself, as forfeited to the government. never have reached us and the taking of his property under the challenged measure would have become
a faitaccompli despite its invalidity. We commend him for his spirit. Without the present challenge, the matter would
have ended in that pump boat in Masbate and another violation of the Constitution, for all its obviousness, would
In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander, were returned to the
have been perpetrated, allowed without protest, and soon forgotten in the limbo of relinquished rights.
petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00, which was
ordered confiscated upon his failure to produce the carabaos when ordered by the trial court. The executive order
defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out The strength of democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees but in the courage of the people to invoke them
forthright. The measure struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, whenever they are ignored or violated. Rights are but weapons on the wall if, like expensive tapestry, all they do is
thus denying him the centuries-old guaranty of elementary fair play. embellish and impress. Rights, as weapons, must be a promise of protection. They become truly meaningful, and
fulfill the role assigned to them in the free society, if they are kept bright and sharp with use by those who are not
afraid to assert them.
It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice and hearing may be validly dispensed with
notwithstanding the usual requirement for these minimum guarantees of due process. It is also conceded that
summary action may be validly taken in administrative proceedings as procedural due process is not necessarily
judicial only. 20 In the exceptional cases accepted, however. there is a justification for the omission of the right to a
WHEREFORE, Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby declared unconstitutional. Except as affirmed above, the
decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The supersedeas bond is cancelled and the amount thereof is ordered
restored to the petitioner. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines Respondent PRC filed a motion to dismiss on October 21, 1987 on the ground that the lower court had no jurisdiction
SUPREME COURT to review and to enjoin the enforcement of its resolution. In an Order of October 21, 1987, the lower court declared
Manila that it had jurisdiction to try the case and enjoined the respondent commission from enforcing and giving effect to
Resolution No. 105 which it found to be unconstitutional.

FIRST DIVISION
Not satisfied therewith, respondent PRC, on November 10, 1986, filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for the
nullification of the above Order of the lower court. Said petiton was granted in the Decision of the Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 77372 April 29, 1988 promulagated on January 13, 1987, to wit:

LUPO L. LUPANGCO, RAYMOND S. MANGKAL, NORMAN A. MESINA, ALEXANDER R. REGUYAL, JOCELYN WHEREFORE, finding the petition meritorious the same is hereby GRANTED and the other
P. CATAPANG, ENRICO V. REGALADO, JEROME O. ARCEGA, ERNESTOC. BLAS, JR., ELPEDIO M. dated October 21, 1986 issued by respondent court is declared null and void. The respondent
ALMAZAN, KARL CAESAR R. RIMANDO, petitioner,  court is further directed to dismiss with prejudice Civil Case No. 86-37950 for want of jurisdiction
vs. over the subject matter thereof. No cost in this instance.
COURT OF APPEALS and PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION, respondent.
SO ORDERED. 2
Balgos & Perez Law Offices for petitioners.
Hence, this petition.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
The Court of Appeals, in deciding that the Regional Trial Court of Manila had no jurisdiction to entertain the case and
to enjoin the enforcement of the Resolution No. 105, stated as its basis its conclusion that the Professional
Regulation Commission and the Regional Trial Court are co-equal bodies. Thus it held —
GANCAYCO, J.:
That the petitioner Professional Regulatory Commission is at least a co-equal body with the
Regional Trial Court is beyond question, and co-equal bodies have no power to control each
Is the Regional Trial Court of the same category as the Professional Regulation Commission so that it cannot pass
other or interfere with each other's acts. 3
upon the validity of the administrative acts of the latter? Can this Commission lawfully prohibit the examiness from
attending review classes, receiving handout materials, tips, or the like three (3) days before the date of the
examination? Theses are the issues presented to the court by this petition for certiorari to review the decision of the To strenghten its position, the Court of Appeals relied heavily on National Electrification Administration vs.
Court of Appeals promulagated on January 13, 1987, in CA-G.R. SP No. 10598, * declaring null and void the other Mendoza,  4 which cites Pineda vs. Lantin  5 and Philippine Pacific Fishing, Inc. vs. Luna, 6 where this Court held that
dated Ocober 21, 1986 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 32 in Civil Case No. 86-37950 entitled " a Court of First Instance cannot interfere with the orders of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the two being
Lupo L. Lupangco, et al. vs. Professional Regulation Commission." co-equal bodies.

The records shows the following undisputed facts: After a close scrutiny of the facts and the record of this case,

On or about October 6, 1986, herein respondent Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) issued Resolution No. We rule in favor of the petitioner.
105 as parts of its "Additional Instructions to Examiness," to all those applying for admission to take the licensure
examinations in accountancy. The resolution embodied the following pertinent provisions:
The cases cited by respondent court are not in point. It is glaringly apparent that the reason why this Court ruled that
the Court of First Instance could not interfere with the orders of the Securities and Exchange Commission was that
No examinee shall attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like conducted by, or this was so provided for by the law. In Pineda vs. Lantin, We explained that whenever a party is aggrieved by or
shall receive any hand-out, review material, or any tip from any school, college or university, or disagree with an order or ruling of the Securities and Exchange Commission, he cannot seek relief from courts of
any review center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor official or employee of any of general jurisdiction since under the Rules of Court and Commonwealth Act No. 83, as amended by Republic Act No.
the aforementioned or similars institutions during the three days immediately proceeding every 635, creating and setting forth the powers and functions of the old Securities and Exchange Commission, his remedy
examination day including examination day. is to go the Supreme Court on a petition for review. Likewise, in Philippine Pacific Fishing Co., Inc. vs. Luna,it was
stressed that if an order of the Securities and Exchange Commission is erroneous, the appropriate remedy take is
first, within the Commission itself, then, to the Supreme Court as mandated in Presidential Decree No. 902-A, the
Any examinee violating this instruction shall be subject to the sanctions prescribed by Sec. 8,
law creating the new Securities and Exchange Commission. Nowhere in the said cases was it held that a Court of
Art. III of the Rules and Regulations of the Commission. 1
First Instance has no jurisdiction over all other government agencies. On the contrary, the ruling was specifically
limited to the Securities and Exchange Commission.
On October 16, 1986, herein petitioners, all reviewees preparing to take the licensure examinations in accountancy
schedule on October 25 and November 2 of the same year, filed on their own behalf of all others similarly situated
The respondent court erred when it place the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Professional Regulation
like them, with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, a complaint for injuction with a prayer with the
Commsision in the same category. As alraedy mentioned, with respect to the Securities and Exchange Commission,
issuance of a writ of a preliminary injunction against respondent PRC to restrain the latter from enforcing the above-
the laws cited explicitly provide with the procedure that need be taken when one is aggrieved by its order or ruling.
mentioned resolution and to declare the same unconstitution.
Upon the other hand, there is no law providing for the next course of action for a party who wants to question a ruling
or order of the Professional Regulation Commission. Unlike Commonwealth Act No. 83 and Presidential Decree No. In San Miguel Corporation vs. Avelino, 13 We ruled that a judge of the Court of First Instance has the authority to
902-A, there is no provision in Presidential Decree No. 223, creating the Professional Regulation Commission, that decide on the validity of a city tax ordinance even after its validity had been contested before the Secretary of Justice
orders or resolutions of the Commission are appealable either to the Court of Appeals or to theSupreme Court. and an opinion thereon had been rendered.
Consequently, Civil Case No. 86-37950, which was filed in order to enjoin the enforcement of a resolution of the
respondent Professional Regulation Commission alleged to be unconstitutional, should fall within the general
In view of the foregoing, We find no cogent reason why Resolution No. 105, issued by the respondent Professional
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, now the Regional Trial Court. 7
Regulation Commission, should be exempted from the general jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.

What is clear from Presidential Decree No. 223 is that the Professional Regulation Commission is attached to the
Respondent PRC, on the other hand, contends that under Section 9, paragraph 3 of B.P. Blg. 129, it is the Court of
Office of the President for general direction and coordination. 8 Well settled in our jurisprudence is the view that even
Appeals which has jurisdiction over the case. The said law provides:
acts of the Office of the President may be reviewed by the Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court).
In Medalla vs. Sayo, 9 this rule was thoroughly propounded on, to wit:
SEC. 9. Jurisdiction. — The Intermediate Appellate Court shall exercise:
In so far as jurisdiction of the Court below to review by certiorari decisions and/or resolutions of
the Civil Service Commission and of the residential Executive Asssistant is concerned, there xxx xxx xxx
should be no question but that the power of judicial review should be upheld. The following
rulings buttress this conclusion:
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders, or
awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or
The objection to a judicial review of a Presidential act arises from a failure to commissions, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in
recognize the most important principle in our system of government, i.e., the accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third
separation of powers into three co-equal departments, the executives, the paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of
legislative and the judicial, each supreme within its own assigned powers 1948.
and duties. When a presidential act is challenged before the courts of
justice, it is not to be implied therefrom that the Executive is being made
The contention is devoid of merit.
subject and subordinate to the courts. The legality of his acts are under
judicial review, not because the Executive is inferior to the courts, but
because the law is above the Chief Executive himself, and the courts seek In order to invoke the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals as provided for in Section 9, paragraph
only to interpret, apply or implement it (the law). A judicial review of the 3 of B.P. Blg. 129, there has to be a final order or ruling which resulted from proceedings wherein the administrative
President's decision on a case of an employee decided by the Civil Service body involved exercised its quasi-judicial functions. In Black's Law Dictionary, quasi-judicial is defined as a term
Board of Appeals should be viewed in this light and the bringing of the case applied to the action, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies required to investigate facts, or
to the Courts should be governed by the same principles as govern the ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action,
jucucial review of all administrative acts of all administrative officers. 10 and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. To expound thereon, quasi-judicial adjudication would mean a
determination of rights, privileges and duties resulting in a decision or order which applies to a specific
situation . 14This does not cover rules and regulations of general applicability issued by the administrative body to
Republic vs. Presiding Judge, CFI of Lanao del Norte, Br. II, 11 is another case in point. Here, "the Executive Office"'
implement its purely administrative policies and functions like Resolution No. 105 which was adopted by the
of the Department of Education and Culture issued Memorandum Order No. 93 under the authority of then Secretary
respondent PRC as a measure to preserve the integrity of licensure examinations.
of Education Juan Manuel. As in this case, a complaint for injunction was filed with the Court of First Instance of
Lanao del Norte because, allegedly, the enforcement of the circular would impair some contracts already entered
into by public school teachers. It was the contention of petitioner therein that "the Court of First Instance is not The above rule was adhered to in Filipinas Engineering and Machine Shop vs. Ferrer. 15 In this case, the issue
empowered to amend, reverse and modify what is otherwise the clear and explicit provision of the memorandum presented was whether or not the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction over a case involving an order of the
circular issued by the Executive Office which has the force and effect of law." In resolving the issue, We held: Commission on Elections awarding a contract to a private party which originated from an invitation to bid. The said
issue came about because under the laws then in force, final awards, judgments, decisions or orders of the
Commission on Elections fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court by way of certiorari. Hence, it has
... We definitely state that respondent Court lawfully acquired jurisdiction in Civil Case No. II-240
been consistently held that "it is the Supreme Court, not the Court of First Instance, which has exclusive jurisdiction
(8) because the plaintiff therein asked the lower court for relief, in the form of injunction, in
to review on certiorari final decisions, orders, or rulings of the Commission on Elections relative to the conduct of
defense of a legal right (freedom to enter into contracts) . . . . .
elections and the enforcement of election laws." 16

Hence there is a clear infringement of private respondent's constitutional right to enter into
As to whether or not the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction in saidcase, We said:
agreements not contrary to law, which might run the risk of being violated by the threatened
implementation of Executive Office Memorandum Circular No. 93, dated February 5, 1968,
which prohibits, with certain exceptions, cashiers and disbursing officers from honoring special We are however, far from convinced that an order of the COMELEC awarding a contract to a
powers of attorney executed by the payee employees. The respondent Court is not only right but private party, as a result of its choice among various proposals submitted in response to its
duty bound to take cognizance of cases of this nature wherein a constitutional and statutory right invitation to bid comes within the purview of a "final order" which is exclusively and directly
is allegedly infringed by the administrative action of a government office. Courts of first Instance appealable to this court on certiorari. What is contemplated by the term "final orders, rulings and
have original jurisdiction over all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is not capable decisions, of the COMELEC reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court as provided by law
of pecuniary estimation (Sec. 44, Republic Act 296, as amended). 12 (Emphasis supplied.) are those rendered in actions or proceedings before the COMELEC and taken cognizance of by
the said body in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. (Emphasis supplied.)
 xxx xxx xxx Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on the examinees' right to liberty
guaranteed by the Constitution. Respondent PRC has no authority to dictate on the reviewees as to how they should
prepare themselves for the licensure examinations. They cannot be restrained from taking all the lawful steps
We agree with petitioner's contention that the order of the Commission granting the award to a
needed to assure the fulfillment of their ambition to become public accountants. They have every right to make use
bidder is not an order rendered in a legal controversy before it wherein the parties filed their
of their faculties in attaining success in their endeavors. They should be allowed to enjoy their freedom to acquire
respective pleadings and presented evidence after which the questioned order was issued; and
useful knowledge that will promote their personal growth. As defined in a decision of the United States Supreme
that this order of the commission was issued pursuant to its authority to enter into contracts in
Court:
relation to election purposes. In short, the COMELEC resolution awarding the contract in favor
of Acme was not issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions but merely as an incident of its
inherent administrative functions over the conduct of elections, and hence, the said resolution The term "liberty" means more than mere freedom from physical restraint or the bounds of a
may not be deemed as a "final order reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court. Being non- prison. It means freedom to go where one may choose and to act in such a manner not
judicial in character, no contempt order may be imposed by the COMELEC from said order, and inconsistent with the equal rights of others, as his judgment may dictate for the promotion of his
no direct and exclusive appeal by certiorari to this Tribunal lie from such order. Any question happiness, to pursue such callings and vocations as may be most suitable to develop his
arising from said order may be well taken in an ordinary civil action before the trial courts. capacities, and giv to them their highest enjoyment. 23
(Emphasis supplied.) 17
Another evident objection to Resolution No. 105 is that it violates the academic freedom of the schools concerned.
One other case that should be mentioned in this regard is Salud vs. Central Bank of the Philippines. 18 Here, Respondent PRC cannot interfere with the conduct of review that review schools and centers believe would best
petitioner Central Bank, like respondent in this case, argued that under Section 9, paragraph 3 of B.P. Blg. 129, enable their enrolees to meet the standards required before becoming a full fledged public accountant. Unless the
orders of the Monetary Board are appealable only to the Intermediate Appellate Court. Thus: means or methods of instruction are clearly found to be inefficient, impractical, or riddled with corruption, review
schools and centers may not be stopped from helping out their students. At this juncture, We call attention to Our
pronouncement in Garcia vs. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, 24 regarding academic
The Central Bank and its Liquidator also postulate, for the very first time, that the Monetary
freedom to wit:
Board is among the "quasi-judicial ... boards" whose judgments are within the exclusive
appellate jurisdiction of the IAC; hence, it is only said Court, "to the exclusion of the Regional
Trial Courts," that may review the Monetary Board's resolutions. 19 ... It would follow then that the school or college itself is possessed of such a right. It decides for
itself its aims and objectives and how best to attain them. It is free from outside coercion or
interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. It has a
Anent the posture of the Central Bank, We made the following pronouncement:
wide sphere of autonomy certainly extending to the choice of students. This constitutional
provision is not to be construed in a niggardly manner or in a grudging fashion.
The contention is utterly devoid of merit. The IAC has no appellate jurisdiction over resolution or
orders of the Monetary Board. No law prescribes any mode of appeal from the Monetary Board
Needless to say, the enforcement of Resolution No. 105 is not a guarantee that the alleged leakages in the licensure
to the IAC. 20
examinations will be eradicated or at least minimized. Making the examinees suffer by depriving them of legitimate
means of review or preparation on those last three precious days-when they should be refreshing themselves with all
In view of the foregoing, We hold that the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to entertain Civil Case No. 86-37950 that they have learned in the review classes and preparing their mental and psychological make-up for the
and enjoin the respondent PRC from enforcing its resolution. examination day itself-would be like uprooting the tree to get ride of a rotten branch. What is needed to be done by
the respondent is to find out the source of such leakages and stop it right there. If corrupt officials or personnel
should be terminated from their loss, then so be it. Fixers or swindlers should be flushed out. Strict guidelines to be
Although We have finally settled the issue of jurisdiction, We find it imperative to decide once and for all the validity observed by examiners should be set up and if violations are committed, then licenses should be suspended or
of Resolution No. 105 so as to provide the much awaited relief to those who are and will be affected by it. revoked. These are all within the powers of the respondent commission as provided for in Presidential Decree No.
223. But by all means the right and freedom of the examinees to avail of all legitimate means to prepare for the
Of course, We realize that the questioned resolution was adopted for a commendable purpose which is "to preserve examinations should not be curtailed.
the integrity and purity of the licensure examinations." However, its good aim cannot be a cloak to conceal its
constitutional infirmities. On its face, it can be readily seen that it is unreasonable in that an examinee cannot In the light of the above, We hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
even attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like, or receive any hand-out, review material, or any tip No. 10591 and another judgment is hereby rendered declaring Resolution No. 105 null and void and of no force and
from any school, collge or university, or any review center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor, official or effect for being unconstitutional. This decision is immediately executory. No costs.
employee of any of the aforementioned or similar institutions . ... 21

SO ORDERED.
The unreasonableness is more obvious in that one who is caught committing the prohibited acts even without any ill
motives will be barred from taking future examinations conducted by the respondent PRC. Furthermore, it is
inconceivable how the Commission can manage to have a watchful eye on each and every examinee during the Narvasa and Cruz, JJ., concur.
three days before the examination period.
Griño-Aquino, J., took no part.
It is an aixiom in administrative law that administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the
issuance of rules and regulations. To be valid, such rules and regulations must be reasonable and fairly adapted to
the end in view. If shown to bear no reasonable relation to the purposes for which they are authorized to be issued,
then they must be held to be invalid. 22
 Republic of the Philippines uncertain, and likewise for the alleged invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty against self-incrimination; that
SUPREME COURT Section 2 of the challenged ordinance classifying motels into two classes and requiring the maintenance of certain
Manila minimum facilities in first class motels such as a telephone in each room, a dining room or, restaurant and laundry
similarly offends against the due process clause for being arbitrary, unreasonable and oppressive, a conclusion
which applies to the portion of the ordinance requiring second class motels to have a dining room; that the provision
EN BANC
of Section 2 of the challenged ordinance prohibiting a person less than 18 years old from being accepted in such
hotels, motels, lodging houses, tavern or common inn unless accompanied by parents or a lawful guardian and
G.R. No. L-24693             July 31, 1967 making it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of such establishments to lease
any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours, runs counter to the due process guaranty for lack of
certainty and for its unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive character; and that insofar as the penalty provided for in
ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., HOTEL DEL MAR INC. and GO Section 4 of the challenged ordinance for a subsequent conviction would, cause the automatic cancellation of the
CHIU, petitioners-appellees,  license of the offended party, in effect causing the destruction of the business and loss of its investments, there is
vs. once again a transgression of the due process clause.
THE HONORABLE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, respondent-appellant. 
VICTOR ALABANZA, intervenor-appellee.
There was a plea for the issuance of preliminary injunction and for a final judgment declaring the above ordinance
null and void and unenforceable. The lower court on July 6, 1963 issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering
Panganiban, Abad and Associates Law Office for respondent-appellant. respondent Mayor to refrain from enforcing said Ordinance No. 4760 from and after July 8, 1963.
J. M. Aruego, Tenchavez and Associates for intervenor-appellee.

In the a answer filed on August 3, 1963, there was an admission of the personal circumstances regarding the
FERNANDO, J.: respondent Mayor and of the fact that petitioners are licensed to engage in the hotel or motel business in the City of
Manila, of the provisions of the cited Ordinance but a denial of its alleged nullity, whether on statutory or
The principal question in this appeal from a judgment of the lower court in an action for prohibition is whether constitutional grounds. After setting forth that the petition did fail to state a cause of action and that the challenged
Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due process clause. The lower court held that it is and ordinance bears a reasonable relation, to a proper purpose, which is to curb immorality, a valid and proper exercise
adjudged it "unconstitutional, and, therefore, null and void." For reasons to be more specifically set forth, such of the police power and that only the guests or customers not before the court could complain of the alleged invasion
judgment must be reversed, there being a failure of the requisite showing to sustain an attack against its validity. of the right to privacy and the guaranty against self incrimination, with the assertion that the issuance of the
preliminary injunction ex parte was contrary to law, respondent Mayor prayed for, its dissolution and the dismissal of
the petition.
The petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 was filed on July 5, 1963 by the petitioners, Ermita-Malate
Hotel and Motel Operators Association, one of its members, Hotel del Mar Inc., and a certain Go Chiu, who is "the
president and general manager of the second petitioner" against the respondent Mayor of the City of Manila who was Instead of evidence being offered by both parties, there was submitted a stipulation of facts dated September 28,
sued in his capacity as such "charged with the general power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila 1964, which reads:
and to give the necessary orders for the faithful execution and enforcement of such ordinances." (par. 1). It was
alleged that the petitioner non-stock corporation is dedicated to the promotion and protection of the interest of its 1. That the petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. and Hotel del Mar Inc.
eighteen (18) members "operating hotels and motels, characterized as legitimate businesses duly licensed by both are duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, both with offices in the City of Manila,
national and city authorities, regularly paying taxes, employing and giving livelihood to not less than 2,500 person while the petitioner Go Chin is the president and general manager of Hotel del Mar Inc., and the intervenor
and representing an investment of more than P3 million." 1 (par. 2). It was then alleged that on June 13, 1963, the Victor Alabanza is a resident of Baguio City, all having the capacity to sue and be sued;
Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760, approved on June 14, 1963 by the then Vice-
Mayor Herminio Astorga, who was at the time acting as Mayor of the City of Manila. (par. 3).
2. That the respondent Mayor is the duly elected and incumbent City Mayor and chief executive of the City
of Manila charged with the general power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to give
After which the alleged grievances against the ordinance were set forth in detail. There was the assertion of its being the necessary orders for the faithful execution and enforcement of such ordinances;
beyond the powers of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila to enact insofar as it would regulate motels, on the
ground that in the revised charter of the City of Manila or in any other law, no reference is made to motels; that
Section 1 of the challenged ordinance is unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable and violative of due 3. That the petitioners are duly licensed to engage in the business of operating hotels and motels in Malate
process insofar as it would impose P6,000.00 fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for second class and Ermita districts in Manila;
motels; that the provision in the same section which would require the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized
representative of a hotel, motel, or lodging house to refrain from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer or
4. That on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760, which
letting any room or other quarter to any person or persons without his filling up the prescribed form in a lobby open to
was approved on June 14, 1963, by Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga, then the acting City Mayor of Manila, in
public view at all times and in his presence, wherein the surname, given name and middle name, the date of birth,
the absence of the respondent regular City Mayor, amending sections 661, 662, 668-a, 668-b and 669 of
the address, the occupation, the sex, the nationality, the length of stay and the number of companions in the room, if
the compilation of the ordinances of the City of Manila besides inserting therein three new sections. This
any, with the name, relationship, age and sex would be specified, with data furnished as to his residence certificate
ordinance is similar to the one vetoed by the respondent Mayor (Annex A) for the reasons stated in its 4th
as well as his passport number, if any, coupled with a certification that a person signing such form has personally
Indorsement dated February 15, 1963 (Annex B);
filled it up and affixed his signature in the presence of such owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized
representative, with such registration forms and records kept and bound together, it also being provided that the
premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging houses would be open for inspection either by the City 5. That the explanatory note signed by then Councilor Herminio Astorga was submitted with the proposed
Mayor, or the Chief of Police, or their duly authorized representatives is unconstitutional and void again on due ordinance (now Ordinance 4760) to the Municipal Board, copy of which is attached hereto as Annex C;
process grounds, not only for being arbitrary, unreasonable or oppressive but also for being vague, indefinite and
 6. That the City of Manila derived in 1963 an annual income of P101,904.05 from license fees paid by the if it could be deprived or allowed itself to be deprived of its competence to promote public health, public morals,
105 hotels and motels (including herein petitioners) operating in the City of Manila.1äwphï1.ñët public safety and the genera welfare.6 Negatively put, police power is "that inherent and plenary power in the State
which enables it to prohibit all that is hurt full to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society. 7
Thereafter came a memorandum for respondent on January 22, 1965, wherein stress was laid on the presumption of
the validity of the challenged ordinance, the burden of showing its lack of conformity to the Constitution resting on the There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to
party who assails it, citing not only U.S. v. Salaveria, but likewise applicable American authorities. Such a public morals. The explanatory note of the Councilor Herminio Astorga included as annex to the stipulation of facts,
memorandum likewise refuted point by point the arguments advanced by petitioners against its validity. Then barely speaks of the alarming increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manila traceable in great part to
two weeks later, on February 4, 1965, the memorandum for petitioners was filed reiterating in detail what was set the existence of motels, which "provide a necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit" and thus
forth in the petition, with citations of what they considered to be applicable American authorities and praying for a become the "ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers." The challenged ordinance then proposes to check the
judgment declaring the challenged ordinance "null and void and unenforceable" and making permanent the writ of clandestine harboring of transients and guests of these establishments by requiring these transients and guests to fill
preliminary injunction issued. up a registration form, prepared for the purpose, in a lobby open to public view at all times, and by introducing
several other amendatory provisions calculated to shatter the privacy that characterizes the registration of transients
and guests." Moreover, the increase in the licensed fees was intended to discourage "establishments of the kind
After referring to the motels and hotels, which are members of the petitioners association, and referring to the
from operating for purpose other than legal" and at the same time, to increase "the income of the city government." It
alleged constitutional questions raised by the party, the lower court observed: "The only remaining issue here being
would appear therefore that the stipulation of facts, far from sustaining any attack against the validity of the
purely a question of law, the parties, with the nod of the Court, agreed to file memoranda and thereafter, to submit
ordinance, argues eloquently for it.
the case for decision of the Court." It does appear obvious then that without any evidence submitted by the parties,
the decision passed upon the alleged infirmity on constitutional grounds of the challenged ordinance, dismissing as
is undoubtedly right and proper the untenable objection on the alleged lack of authority of the City of Manila to It is a fact worth noting that this Court has invariably stamped with the seal of its approval, ordinances punishing
regulate motels, and came to the conclusion that "the challenged Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila, would be vagrancy and classifying a pimp or procurer as a vagrant; 8 provide a license tax for and regulating the maintenance
unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void." It made permanent the preliminary injunction issued against or operation of public dance halls;9 prohibiting gambling;10 prohibiting jueteng;11 and monte;12 prohibiting playing of
respondent Mayor and his agents "to restrain him from enforcing the ordinance in question." Hence this appeal. panguingui on days other than Sundays or legal holidays;13 prohibiting the operation of pinball machines; 14 and
prohibiting any person from keeping, conducting or maintaining an opium joint or visiting a place where opium is
smoked or otherwise used,15 all of which are intended to protect public morals.
As noted at the outset, the judgment must be reversed. A decent regard for constitutional doctrines of a fundamental
character ought to have admonished the lower court against such a sweeping condemnation of the challenged
ordinance. Its decision cannot be allowed to stand, consistently with what has hitherto been the accepted standards On the legislative organs of the government, whether national or local, primarily rest the exercise of the police power,
of constitutional adjudication, in both procedural and substantive aspects. which, it cannot be too often emphasized, is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace,
good order, safety and general welfare of the people. In view of the requirements of due process, equal protection
and other applicable constitutional guaranties however, the exercise of such police power insofar as it may affect the
Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the absence of any evidence to offset the presumption of
life, liberty or property of any person is subject to judicial inquiry. Where such exercise of police power may be
validity that attaches to a challenged statute or ordinance. As was expressed categorically by Justice Malcolm: "The
considered as either capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, a denial of due process or a violation of any
presumption is all in favor of validity x x x . The action of the elected representatives of the people cannot be lightly
other applicable constitutional guaranty may call for correction by the courts.
set aside. The councilors must, in the very nature of things, be familiar with the necessities of their particular
municipality and with all the facts and circumstances which surround the subject and necessitate action. The local
legislative body, by enacting the ordinance, has in effect given notice that the regulations are essential to the well We are thus led to considering the insistent, almost shrill tone, in which the objection is raised to the question of due
being of the people x x x . The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear process.16 There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It furnishes though a standard to which the
invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation. 2 governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be
valid. What then is the standard of due process which must exist both as a procedural and a substantive requisite to
free the challenged ordinance, or any governmental action for that matter, from the imputation of legal infirmity
It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the necessity for evidence to rebut it is
sufficient to spell its doom? It is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice.
unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face which is not the case here. The principle has been
Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided. To satisfy the due process requirement, official
nowhere better expressed than in the leading case of O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co.,3 where the
action, to paraphrase Cardozo, must not outrun the bounds of reason and result in sheer oppression. Due process is
American Supreme Court through Justice Brandeis tersely and succinctly summed up the matter thus: The statute
thus hostile to any official action marred by lack of reasonableness. Correctly it has been identified as freedom from
here questioned deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the police power. We are asked to declare it void on
arbitrariness. It is the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play.17 It exacts fealty "to those strivings for justice" and
the ground that the specific method of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due
judges the act of officialdom of whatever branch "in the light of reason drawn from considerations of fairness that
process of law. As underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the
reflect [democratic] traditions of legal and political thought."18 It is not a narrow or "technical conception with fixed
resumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the
content unrelated to time, place and circumstances," 19 decisions based on such a clause requiring a "close and
statute." No such factual foundation being laid in the present case, the lower court deciding the matter on the
perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles of our society."20 Questions of due process are not to be treated
pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the presumption of validity must prevail and the judgment against the
narrowly or pedantically in slavery to form or phrases. 21
ordinance set aside.

It would thus be an affront to reason to stigmatize an ordinance enacted precisely to meet what a municipal
Nor may petitioners assert with plausibility that on its face the ordinance is fatally defective as being repugnant to the
lawmaking body considers an evil of rather serious proportion an arbitrary and capricious exercise of authority. It
due process clause of the Constitution. The mantle of protection associated with the due process guaranty does not
would seem that what should be deemed unreasonable and what would amount to an abdication of the power to
cover petitioners. This particular manifestation of a police power measure being specifically aimed to safeguard
govern is inaction in the face of an admitted deterioration of the state of public morals. To be more specific, the
public morals is immune from such imputation of nullity resting purely on conjecture and unsupported by anything of
Municipal Board of the City of Manila felt the need for a remedial measure. It provided it with the enactment of the
substance. To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police power which has been
challenged ordinance. A strong case must be found in the records, and, as has been set forth, none is even
properly characterized as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, 4 extending as it does "to all
attempted here to attach to an ordinance of such character the taint of nullity for an alleged failure to meet the due
the great public needs."5 It would be, to paraphrase another leading decision, to destroy the very purpose of the state
process requirement. Nor does it lend any semblance even of deceptive plausibility to petitioners' indictment of
Ordinance No. 4760 on due process grounds to single out such features as the increased fees for motels and hotels, business and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to
the curtailment of the area of freedom to contract, and, in certain particulars, its alleged vagueness. secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state x x x To this fundamental aim of our Government the
rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be
made to prevail over authority because then society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail
Admittedly there was a decided increase of the annual license fees provided for by the challenged ordinance for
over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty
hotels and motels, 150% for the former and over 200% for the latter, first-class motels being required to pay a
and authority in his mind through education and personal discipline, so that there may be established the resultant
P6,000 annual fee and second-class motels, P4,500 yearly. It has been the settled law however, as far back as 1922
equilibrium, which means peace and order and happiness for all.29
that municipal license fees could be classified into those imposed for regulating occupations or regular enterprises,
for the regulation or restriction of non-useful occupations or enterprises and for revenue purposes only. 22 As was
explained more in detail in the above Cu Unjieng case: (2) Licenses for non-useful occupations are also incidental to It is noteworthy that the only decision of this Court nullifying legislation because of undue deprivation of freedom to
the police power and the right to exact a fee may be implied from the power to license and regulate, but in fixing contract, People v. Pomar,30 no longer "retains its virtuality as a living principle. The policy of laissez faire has to
amount of the license fees the municipal corporations are allowed a much wider discretion in this class of cases than some extent given way to the assumption by the government of the right of intervention even in contractual relations
in the former, and aside from applying the well-known legal principle that municipal ordinances must not be affected with public interest. 31 What may be stressed sufficiently is that if the liberty involved were freedom of the
unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a general rule, declined to interfere with such discretion. mind or the person, the standard for the validity of governmental acts is much more rigorous and exacting, but where
The desirability of imposing restraint upon the number of persons who might otherwise engage in non-useful the liberty curtailed affects at the most rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measure is wider.32 How
enterprises is, of course, generally an important factor in the determination of the amount of this kind of license fee. justify then the allegation of a denial of due process?
Hence license fees clearly in the nature of privilege taxes for revenue have frequently been upheld, especially in of
licenses for the sale of liquors. In fact, in the latter cases the fees have rarely been declared unreasonable. 23
Lastly, there is the attempt to impugn the ordinance on another due process ground by invoking the principles of
vagueness or uncertainty. It would appear from a recital in the petition itself that what seems to be the gravamen of
24
Moreover in the equally leading case of Lutz v. Araneta  this Court affirmed the doctrine earlier announced by the the alleged grievance is that the provisions are too detailed and specific rather than vague or uncertain. Petitioners,
American Supreme Court that taxation may be made to implement the state's police power. Only the other day, this however, point to the requirement that a guest should give the name, relationship, age and sex of the companion or
Court had occasion to affirm that the broad taxing authority conferred by the Local Autonomy Act of 1959 to cities companions as indefinite and uncertain in view of the necessity for determining whether the companion or
and municipalities is sufficiently plenary to cover a wide range of subjects with the only limitation that the tax so companions referred to are those arriving with the customer or guest at the time of the registry or entering the room
levied is for public purposes, just and uniform.25 With him at about the same time or coming at any indefinite time later to join him; a proviso in one of its sections
which cast doubt as to whether the maintenance of a restaurant in a motel is dependent upon the discretion of its
owners or operators; another proviso which from their standpoint would require a guess as to whether the "full rate of
As a matter of fact, even without reference to the wide latitude enjoyed by the City of Manila in imposing licenses for
payment" to be charged for every such lease thereof means a full day's or merely a half-day's rate. It may be asked,
revenue, it has been explicitly held in one case that "much discretion is given to municipal corporations in
do these allegations suffice to render the ordinance void on its face for alleged vagueness or uncertainty? To ask the
determining the amount," here the license fee of the operator of a massage clinic, even if it were viewed purely as a
question is to answer it. From Connally v. General Construction Co.33 to Adderley v. Florida,34 the principle has been
police power measure.26 The discussion of this particular matter may fitly close with this pertinent citation from
consistently upheld that what makes a statute susceptible to such a charge is an enactment either forbidding or
another decision of significance: "It is urged on behalf of the plaintiffs-appellees that the enforcement of the
requiring the doing of an act that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to
ordinance could deprive them of their lawful occupation and means of livelihood because they can not rent stalls in
its application. Is this the situation before us? A citation from Justice Holmes would prove illuminating: "We agree to
the public markets. But it appears that plaintiffs are also dealers in refrigerated or cold storage meat, the sale of
all the generalities about not supplying criminal laws with what they omit but there is no canon against using common
which outside the city markets under certain conditions is permitted x x x . And surely, the mere fact, that some
sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean." 35
individuals in the community may be deprived of their present business or a particular mode of earning a living
cannot prevent the exercise of the police power. As was said in a case, persons licensed to pursue occupations
which may in the public need and interest be affected by the exercise of the police power embark in these That is all then that this case presents. As it stands, with all due allowance for the arguments pressed with such vigor
occupations subject to the disadvantages which may result from the legal exercise of that power." 27 and determination, the attack against the validity of the challenged ordinance cannot be considered a success. Far
from it. Respect for constitutional law principles so uniformly held and so uninterruptedly adhered to by this Court
compels a reversal of the appealed decision.
Nor does the restriction on the freedom to contract, insofar as the challenged ordinance makes it unlawful for the
owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of any hotel, motel, lodging house, tavern, common inn or
the like, to lease or rent room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours, with a proviso that in all cases full Wherefore, the judgment of the lower court is reversed and the injunction issued lifted forthwith. With costs.
payment shall be charged, call for a different conclusion. Again, such a limitation cannot be viewed as a
transgression against the command of due process. It is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary. Precisely it was intended
Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and Angeles, JJ., concur.
to curb the opportunity for the immoral or illegitimate use to which such premises could be, and, according to the
Concepcion, C.J. and Dizon, J., are on leave.
explanatory note, are being devoted. How could it then be arbitrary or oppressive when there appears a
correspondence between the undeniable existence of an undesirable situation and the legislative attempt at
correction. Moreover, petitioners cannot be unaware that every regulation of conduct amounts to curtailment of
liberty which as pointed out by Justice Malcolm cannot be absolute. Thus: "One thought which runs through all these
different conceptions of liberty is plainly apparent. It is this: 'Liberty' as understood in democracies, is not license; it is
'liberty regulated by law.' Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the greater good
of the peace and order of society and the general well-being. No man can do exactly as he pleases. Every man must
renounce unbridled license. The right of the individual is necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by general law
for the common good x x x The liberty of the citizen may be restrained in the interest of the public health, or of the
public order and safety, or otherwise within the proper scope of the police power." 28

A similar observation was made by Justice Laurel: "Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of said
law, and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with
 Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a corporation engaged in the business of
EN BANC operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging houses.5 It built and opened Victoria Court in Malate which was
licensed as a motel although duly accredited with the Department of Tourism as a hotel. 6 On 28 June 1993, MTDC
filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining
G.R. No. 118127             April 12, 2005
Order7 (RTC Petition) with the lower court impleading as defendants, herein petitioners City of Manila, Hon. Alfredo
S. Lim (Lim), Hon. Joselito L. Atienza, and the members of the City Council of Manila (City Council).  MTDC prayed
CITY OF MANILA, HON. ALFREDO S. LIM as the Mayor of the City of Manila, HON. JOSELITO L. ATIENZA, in that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid
his capacity as Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila and Presiding Officer of the City Council of Manila, HON. and unconstitutional.8
ERNESTO A. NIEVA, HON. GONZALO P. GONZALES, HON. AVELINO S. CAILIAN, HON. ROBERTO C.
OCAMPO, HON. ALBERTO DOMINGO, HON. HONORIO U. LOPEZ, HON. FRANCISCO G. VARONA, JR., HON.
Enacted by the City Council9 on 9 March 1993 and approved by petitioner City Mayor on 30 March 1993, the
ROMUALDO S. MARANAN, HON. NESTOR C. PONCE, JR., HON. HUMBERTO B. BASCO, HON. FLAVIANO F.
said Ordinance is entitled–
CONCEPCION, JR., HON. ROMEO G. RIVERA, HON. MANUEL M. ZARCAL, HON. PEDRO S. DE JESUS, HON.
BERNARDITO C. ANG, HON. MANUEL L. QUIN, HON. JHOSEP Y. LOPEZ, HON. CHIKA G. GO, HON.
VICTORIANO A. MELENDEZ, HON. ERNESTO V.P. MACEDA, JR., HON. ROLANDO P. NIETO, HON. DANILO AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES
V. ROLEDA, HON. GERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR., HON. MA. PAZ E. HERRERA, HON. JOEY D. HIZON, HON. PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN
FELIXBERTO D. ESPIRITU, HON. KARLO Q. BUTIONG, HON. ROGELIO P. DELA PAZ, HON. BERNARDO D. THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR
RAGAZA, HON. MA. CORAZON R. CABALLES, HON. CASIMIRO C. SISON, HON. BIENVINIDO M. ABANTE, OTHER PURPOSES.10
JR., HON. MA. LOURDES M. ISIP, HON. ALEXANDER S. RICAFORT, HON. ERNESTO F. RIVERA, HON.
LEONARDO L. ANGAT, and HON. JOCELYN B. DAWIS, in their capacity as councilors of the City of
The Ordinance is reproduced in full, hereunder:
Manila,Petitioner, 
vs.
HON. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR., as Presiding Judge, RTC, Manila and MALATE TOURIST SECTION 1. Any provision of existing laws and ordinances to the contrary notwithstanding, no person,
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondents. partnership, corporation or entity shall, in the Ermita-Malate area bounded by Teodoro M. Kalaw Sr.
Street in the North, Taft Avenue in the East, Vito Cruz Street in the South and Roxas Boulevard in the
West, pursuant to P.D. 499 be allowed or authorized to contract and engage in, any business
DECISION
providing certain forms of amusement, entertainment, services and facilities where women are
used as tools in entertainment and which tend to disturb the community, annoy the inhabitants,
TINGA, J.: and adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community, such as but not limited to:

I know only that what is moral is what you feel good after and what is immoral is what you feel bad after. 1. Sauna Parlors
2. Massage Parlors
3. Karaoke Bars
Ernest Hermingway
4. Beerhouses
Death in the Afternoon, Ch. 1
5. Night Clubs
6. Day Clubs
It is a moral and political axiom that any dishonorable act, if performed by oneself, is less immoral than if 7. Super Clubs
performed by someone else, who would be well-intentioned in his dishonesty. 8. Discotheques
9. Cabarets
10. Dance Halls
J. Christopher  Gerald 11. Motels
Bonaparte in Egypt, Ch. I 12. Inns

The Court's commitment to the protection of morals is secondary to its fealty to the fundamental law of the land. It is SEC. 2 The City Mayor, the City Treasurer or any person acting in behalf of the said officials are
foremost a guardian of the Constitution but not the conscience of individuals. And if it need be, the Court will not prohibited from issuing permits, temporary or otherwise, or from granting licenses and accepting
hesitate to "make the hammer fall, and heavily" in the words of Justice Laurel, and uphold the constitutional payments for the operation of business enumerated in the preceding section.
guarantees when faced with laws that, though not lacking in zeal to promote morality, nevertheless fail to pass the
test of constitutionality.
SEC. 3. Owners and/or operator of establishments engaged in, or devoted to, the businesses
1  enumerated in Section 1 hereof are hereby given three (3) months from the date of approval of this
The pivotal issue in this Petition under Rule 45 (then Rule 42) of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure seeking the ordinance within which to wind up business operations or to transfer to any place outside of the
reversal of the Decision2 in Civil Case No. 93-66511 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 18 (lower Ermita-Malate area or convert said businesses to other kinds of business allowable within the
court),3 is the validity of Ordinance No. 7783 (the Ordinance) of the City of Manila.4 area, such as but not limited to:

The antecedents are as follows: 1. Curio or antique shop

2. Souvenir Shops
3. Handicrafts display centers
 4. Art galleries In their Answer15 dated 23 July 1993, petitioners City of Manila and Lim maintained that the City Council had the
5. Records and music shops power to "prohibit certain forms of entertainment in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the community"
6. Restaurants as provided for in Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Local Government Code,16 which  reads,  thus:
7. Coffee shops
8. Flower shops
Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The sangguniang panlungsod, as the
legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the
9. Music lounge and sing-along restaurants, with well-defined activities for wholesome family general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper
entertainment that cater to both local and foreign clientele. exercise of the corporate powers of the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:

10. Theaters engaged in the exhibition, not only of motion pictures but also of cultural shows, ....
stage and theatrical plays, art exhibitions, concerts and the like.
(4) Regulate activities relative to the use of land, buildings and structures within the city in order to promote
11. Businesses allowable within the law and medium intensity districts as provided for in the the general welfare and for said purpose shall:
zoning ordinances for Metropolitan Manila, except new warehouse or open-storage depot, dock
or yard, motor repair shop, gasoline service station, light industry with any machinery, or funeral
....
establishments.

(vii) Regulate the establishment, operation, and maintenance of any entertainment or

SEC. 4. Any person violating any provisions of this ordinance, shall upon conviction, be punished
amusement facilities, including theatrical performances, circuses, billiard pools, public dancing
by imprisonment of one (1) year or fine of FIVE THOUSAND (P5,000.00) PESOS, or both, at the
schools, public dance halls, sauna baths, massage parlors, and other places for entertainment
discretion of the Court, PROVIDED, that in case of juridical person, the President, the General Manager,
or amusement; regulate such other events or activities for amusement or entertainment,
or person-in-charge of operation shall be liable thereof; PROVIDED FURTHER, that in case of
particularly those which tend to disturb the community or annoy the inhabitants, or require the
subsequent violation and conviction, the premises of the erring establishment shall be closed and
suspension or suppression of the same; or, prohibit certain forms of amusement or
padlocked permanently.
entertainment in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the community.

SEC. 5. This ordinance shall take effect upon approval.

Citing Kwong Sing v. City of Manila,17 petitioners insisted that the power of regulation spoken of in the above-quoted
provision included the power to control, to govern and to restrain places of exhibition and amusement. 18
Enacted by the City Council of Manila at its regular session today, March 9, 1993.
Petitioners likewise asserted that the Ordinance was enacted by the City Council of Manila to protect the social and
Approved by His Honor, the Mayor on March 30, 1993. (Emphasis supplied) moral welfare of the community in conjunction with its police power as found in Article III, Section 18(kk) of Republic
Act No. 409,19 otherwise known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila (Revised Charter of Manila) 20 which
reads, thus:
In the RTC Petition, MTDC argued that the Ordinance erroneously and improperly included in its enumeration of
prohibited establishments, motels and inns such as MTDC's Victoria Court considering that these were not
establishments for "amusement" or "entertainment" and they were not "services or facilities for entertainment," nor ARTICLE III
did they use women as "tools for entertainment," and neither did they "disturb the community," "annoy the
inhabitants" or "adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community." 11
THE MUNICIPAL BOARD

MTDC further advanced that the Ordinance was invalid and unconstitutional for the following reasons: (1) The City
Section 18. Legislative powers. – The Municipal Board shall have the following legislative powers:
Council has no power to prohibit the operation of motels as Section 458 (a) 4 (iv)12 of the Local Government Code of
1991 (the Code) grants to the City Council only the power to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance
of hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments; (2) The Ordinance is void (kk) To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the
as it is violative of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 49913 which specifically declared portions of the Ermita-Malate area furtherance of the prosperity, and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience,
as a commercial zone with certain restrictions; (3) The Ordinance does not constitute a proper exercise of police and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants, and such others as may be necessary to carry into
power as the compulsory closure of the motel business has no reasonable relation to the legitimate municipal effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this chapter; and to fix penalties for the violation
interests sought to be protected; (4) The Ordinance constitutes an ex post facto law by punishing the operation of of ordinances which shall not exceed two hundred pesos fine or six months' imprisonment, or both such
Victoria Court which was a legitimate business prior to its enactment; (5) The Ordinance violates MTDC's fine and imprisonment, for a single offense.
constitutional rights in that: (a) it is confiscatory and constitutes an invasion of plaintiff's property rights; (b) the City
Council has no power to find as a fact that a particular thing is a nuisance per se nor does it have the power to
Further, the petitioners noted, the Ordinance had the presumption of validity; hence, private respondent had the
extrajudicially destroy it; and (6) The Ordinance constitutes a denial of equal protection under the law as no
burden to prove its illegality or unconstitutionality. 21
reasonable basis exists for prohibiting the operation of motels and inns, but not pension houses, hotels, lodging
houses or other similar establishments, and for prohibiting said business in the Ermita-Malate area but not outside of
this area.14 Petitioners also maintained that there was no inconsistency between P.D. 499 and the Ordinance as the latter simply
disauthorized certain forms of businesses and allowed the Ermita-Malate area to remain a commercial
zone.22 The Ordinance, the petitioners likewise claimed, cannot be assailed as ex post facto as it was prospective in
operation.23 The Ordinance also did not infringe the equal protection clause and cannot be denounced as class to the procedure prescribed by law, it  must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not
legislation as there existed substantial and real differences between the Ermita-Malate area and other places in the contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or
City of Manila.24 discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy;
and (6) must not be unreasonable. 37
On 28 June 1993, respondent Judge Perfecto A.S. Laguio, Jr. (Judge Laguio) issued an ex-parte temporary
restraining order against the enforcement of the Ordinance.25 And on 16 July 1993, again in an intrepid gesture, he Anent the first criterion, ordinances shall only be valid when they are not contrary to the Constitution and to the
granted the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by MTDC.26 laws.38 The Ordinance must satisfy two requirements: it must pass muster under the test of constitutionality and the
test of consistency with the prevailing laws. That ordinances should be constitutional uphold the principle of the
supremacy of the Constitution. The requirement that the enactment must not violate existing law gives stress to the
After trial, on 25 November 1994, Judge Laguio rendered the assailed Decision, enjoining the petitioners from
precept that local government units are able to legislate only by virtue of their derivative legislative power, a
implementing the Ordinance. The dispositive portion of said Decision reads:27
delegation of legislative power from the national legislature.  The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or
exercise powers higher than those of the latter.39
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring Ordinance No. 778[3], Series of 1993, of the City of
Manila null and void, and making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction that had been issued by this
This relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has not been enfeebled by the new
Court against the defendant. No costs.
provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy. The national legislature is still the principal
of the local government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it. 40
SO ORDERED.28
The Ordinance was passed by the City Council in the exercise of its police power, an enactment of the City Council
Petitioners filed with the lower court a Notice of Appeal29 on 12 December 1994, manifesting that they are elevating acting as agent of Congress. Local government units, as agencies of the State, are endowed with police power in
the case to this Court under then Rule 42 on pure questions of law.30 order to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their creation. 41 This delegated police power is
found in Section 16 of the Code, known as the general welfare clause, viz:
On 11 January 1995, petitioners filed the present Petition, alleging that the following errors were committed by the
lower court in its ruling: (1) It erred in concluding that the subject ordinance is ultra vires, or otherwise, unfair, SECTION 16. General Welfare.Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly
unreasonable and oppressive exercise of police power; (2) It erred in holding that the granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for
questioned Ordinancecontravenes P.D. 49931 which allows operators of all kinds of commercial establishments, its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general
except those specified therein; and (3) It erred in declaring the Ordinance void and unconstitutional.32 welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support,
among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the
right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-
In the Petition and in its Memorandum,33 petitioners in essence repeat the assertions they made before the lower
reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and
court. They contend that the assailed Ordinance was enacted in the exercise of the inherent and plenary power of
social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the
the State and the general welfare clause exercised by local government units provided for in Art. 3, Sec. 18 (kk) of
comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
the Revised Charter of Manila and conjunctively, Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Code. 34 They allege that
the Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power; it does not contravene P.D. 499; and that it enjoys the presumption
of validity.35 Local government units exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies; in this case,
the sangguniang panlungsod or the city council. The Code empowers the legislative bodies to "enact ordinances,
approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the province/city/municipality and its inhabitants
In its Memorandum36 dated 27 May 1996, private respondent maintains that the Ordinance is ultra vires and that it is
pursuant to Section 16 of the Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the province/city/
void for being repugnant to the general law. It reiterates that the questioned Ordinance is not a valid exercise of
municipality provided under the Code. 42 The inquiry in this Petition is concerned with the validity of the exercise of
police power; that it is violative of due process, confiscatory and amounts to an arbitrary interference with its lawful
such delegated power.
business; that it is violative of the equal protection clause; and that it confers on petitioner City Mayor or any officer
unregulated discretion in the execution of the Ordinance absent rules to guide and control his actions.
The Ordinance contravenes 
the Constitution
This is an opportune time to express the Court's deep sentiment and tenderness for the Ermita-Malate area being its
home for several decades. A long-time resident, the Court witnessed the area's many turn of events. It relished its
glory days and endured its days of infamy. Much as the Court harks back to the resplendent era of the Old Manila The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching, is subordinate to the constitutional limitations
and yearns to restore its lost grandeur, it believes that the Ordinance is not the fitting means to that end.  The Court thereon; and is subject to the limitation that its exercise must be reasonable and for the public good. 43 In the case at
is of the opinion, and so holds, that the lower court did not err in declaring the Ordinance, as it did, ultra vires and bar, the enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is unconstitutional and
therefore null and void. repugnant to general laws.

The Ordinance is so replete with constitutional infirmities that almost every sentence thereof violates a constitutional The relevant constitutional provisions are the following:
provision. The prohibitions and sanctions therein transgress the cardinal rights of persons enshrined by the
Constitution. The Court is called upon to shelter these rights from attempts at rendering them worthless.
SEC. 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the
promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that for an ordinance to be valid, democracy.44
it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and must be passed according
 SEC. 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental Requisites for the valid exercise
equality before the law of women and men.45 of Police Power are not met

SEC. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of the Ordinance, and to free it
person be denied the equal protection of laws.46 from the imputation of constitutional infirmity, not only must it appear that the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights, but the means adopted must
be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. 60It must
Sec. 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. 47
be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work.  A
reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the police measure and the means employed for its
A. The Ordinance infringes accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to
the Due Process Clause private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded. 61

The constitutional safeguard of due process is embodied in the fiat "(N)o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into
property without due process of law. . . ."48 private rights62 a violation of the due process clause.

There is no controlling and precise definition of due process.  It furnishes though a standard to which governmental The Ordinance was enacted to address and arrest the social ills purportedly spawned by the establishments in the
action should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid.  This Ermita-Malate area which are allegedly operated under the deceptive veneer of legitimate, licensed and tax-paying
standard is aptly described as a responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of nightclubs, bars, karaoke bars, girlie houses, cocktail lounges, hotels and motels.  Petitioners insist that even the
justice,49and as such it is a limitation upon the exercise of the police power.50 Court in the case of Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila63 had already
taken judicial notice of the "alarming increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manila traceable in
great part to existence of motels, which provide a necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit
The purpose of the guaranty is to prevent governmental encroachment against the life, liberty and property of
and thus become the ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers."64
individuals; to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of the government, unrestrained by the
established principles of private rights and distributive justice; to protect property from confiscation by legislative
enactments, from seizure, forfeiture, and destruction without a trial and conviction by the ordinary mode of judicial The object of the Ordinance was, accordingly, the promotion and protection of the social and moral values of the
procedure; and to secure to all persons equal and impartial justice and the benefit of the general law.51 community. Granting for the sake of argument that the objectives of the Ordinance are within the scope of the City
Council's police powers, the means employed for the accomplishment thereof were unreasonable and unduly
oppressive.
The guaranty serves as a protection against arbitrary regulation, and private corporations and partnerships are
"persons" within the scope of the guaranty insofar as their property is concerned.52
It is undoubtedly one of the fundamental duties of the City of Manila to make all reasonable regulations looking to the
promotion of the moral and social values of the community. However, the worthy aim of fostering public morals and
This clause has been interpreted as imposing two separate limits on government, usually called "procedural due
the eradication of the community's social ills can be achieved through means less restrictive of private rights; it can
process" and "substantive due process."
be attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. The closing down and transfer of
businesses or their conversion into businesses "allowed" under the Ordinance have no reasonable relation to the
Procedural due process, as the phrase implies, refers to the procedures that the government must follow before it accomplishment of its purposes. Otherwise stated, the prohibition of the enumerated establishments will not per
deprives a person of life, liberty, or property. Classic procedural due process issues are concerned with what kind of seprotect and promote the social and moral welfare of the community; it will not in itself eradicate the alluded social
notice and what form of hearing the government must provide when it takes a particular action. 53 ills of prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it arrest the spread of sexual disease in Manila.

Substantive due process, as that phrase connotes, asks whether the government has an adequate reason for taking Conceding for the nonce that the Ermita-Malate area teems with houses of ill-repute and establishments of the like
away a person's life, liberty, or property. In other words, substantive due process looks to whether there is a which the City Council may lawfully prohibit,65 it is baseless and insupportable to bring within that classification sauna
sufficient justification for the government's action.54 Case law in the United States (U.S.) tells us that whether there is parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars, night clubs, day clubs, super clubs, discotheques, cabarets, dance halls,
such a justification depends very much on the level of scrutiny used.55 For example, if a law is in an area where only motels and inns. This is not warranted under the accepted definitions of these terms. The enumerated
rational basis review is applied, substantive due process is met so long as the law is rationally related to a legitimate establishments are lawful pursuits which are not per se offensive to the moral welfare of the community.
government purpose.  But if it is an area where strict scrutiny is used, such as for protecting fundamental rights, then
the government will meet substantive due process only if it can prove that the law is necessary to achieve a
That these are used as arenas to consummate illicit sexual affairs and as venues to further the illegal prostitution is
compelling government purpose.56
of no moment. We lay stress on the acrid truth that sexual immorality, being a human frailty, may take place in the
most innocent of places that it may even take place in the substitute establishments enumerated under Section 3 of
The police power granted to local government units must always be exercised with utmost observance of the rights the Ordinance.  If the flawed logic of the Ordinance were to be followed, in the remote instance that an immoral
of the people to due process and equal protection of the law. Such power cannot be exercised whimsically, arbitrarily sexual act transpires in a church cloister or a court chamber, we would behold the spectacle of the City of Manila
or despotically57 as its exercise is subject to a qualification, limitation or restriction demanded by the respect and ordering the closure of the church or court concerned.  Every house, building, park, curb, street or even vehicles for
regard due to the prescription of the fundamental law, particularly those forming part of the Bill of Rights. Individual that matter will not be exempt from the prohibition. Simply because there are no "pure" places where there are
rights, it bears emphasis, may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate impure men. Indeed, even the Scripture and the Tradition of Christians churches continually recall the presence
demands of public interest or public welfare.58 Due process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with and universality of sin in man's history.66
the rights of the person to his life, liberty and property. 59
The problem, it needs to be pointed out, is not the establishment, which by its nature cannot be said to be injurious to happiness by free men. In a Constitution for a free people, there can be no doubt that the meaning of
the health or comfort of the community and which in itself is amoral, but the deplorable human activity that may occur "liberty" must be broad indeed.
within its premises. While a motel may be used as a venue for immoral sexual activity, it cannot for that reason alone
be punished. It cannot be classified as a house of ill-repute or as a nuisance per se on a mere likelihood or a naked
In another case, it also confirmed that liberty protected by the due process clause includes personal decisions
assumption. If that were so and if that were allowed, then the Ermita-Malate area would not only be purged of its
relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education. In explaining the
supposed social ills, it would be extinguished of its soul as well as every human activity, reprehensible or not, in its
respect the Constitution demands for the autonomy of the person in making these choices, the U.S. Supreme Court
every nook and cranny would be laid bare to the estimation of the authorities.
explained:

The Ordinance seeks to legislate morality but fails to address the core issues of morality. Try as the Ordinance may
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices
to shape morality, it should not foster the illusion that it can make a moral man out of it because immorality is not a
central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
thing, a building or establishment; it is in the hearts of men. The City Council instead should regulate human conduct
Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of
that occurs inside the establishments, but not to the detriment of liberty and privacy which are covenants, premiums
universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of
and blessings of democracy.
personhood where they formed under compulsion of the State. 71

While petitioners' earnestness at curbing clearly objectionable social ills is commendable, they unwittingly punish
Persons desirous to own, operate and patronize the enumerated establishments under Section 1 of
even the proprietors and operators of "wholesome," "innocent" establishments. In the instant case, there is a clear
the Ordinancemay seek autonomy for these purposes.
invasion of personal or property rights, personal in the case of those individuals desirous of owning, operating and
patronizing those motels and property in terms of the investments made and the salaries to be paid to those therein
employed. If the City of Manila so desires to put an end to prostitution, fornication and other social ills, it can instead Motel patrons who are single and unmarried may invoke this right to autonomy to consummate their bonds in
impose reasonable regulations such as daily inspections of the establishments for any violation of the conditions of intimate sexual conduct within the motel's premisesbe it stressed that their consensual sexual behavior does not
their licenses or permits; it may exercise its authority to suspend or revoke their licenses for these violations; 67 and it contravene any fundamental state policy as contained in the Constitution. 72   Adults have a right to choose to forge
may even impose increased license fees. In other words, there are other means to reasonably accomplish the such relationships with others in the confines of their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons.
desired end. The liberty protected by the Constitution allows persons the right to make this choice. 73 Their right to liberty under the
due process clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government, as
Means employed are long as they do not run afoul of the law. Liberty should be the rule and restraint the exception.
constitutionally infirm
Liberty in the constitutional sense not only means freedom from unlawful government restraint; it must include
The Ordinance disallows the operation of sauna parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars, beerhouses, night clubs, privacy as well, if it is to be a repository of freedom. The right to be let alone is the beginning of all freedomit is the
day clubs, super clubs, discotheques, cabarets, dance halls, motels and inns in the Ermita-Malate area. In Section 3 most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.74
thereof, owners and/or operators of the enumerated establishments are given three (3) months from the date of
approval of the Ordinance within which "to wind up business operations or to transfer to any place outside the The concept of liberty compels respect for the individual whose claim to privacy and interference demands respect.
Ermita-Malate area or convert said businesses to other kinds of business allowable within the area." Further, it states As the case of Morfe v. Mutuc,75 borrowing the words of Laski, so very aptly stated:
in Section 4 that in cases of subsequent violations of the provisions of the Ordinance, the "premises of the erring
establishment shall be closed and padlocked permanently."
Man is one among many, obstinately refusing reduction to unity. His separateness, his isolation, are
indefeasible; indeed, they are so fundamental that they are the basis on which his civic obligations are
It is readily apparent that the means employed by the Ordinance for the achievement of its purposes, the built. He cannot abandon the consequences of his isolation, which are, broadly speaking, that his
governmental interference itself, infringes on the constitutional guarantees of a person's fundamental right to liberty experience is private, and the will built out of that experience personal to himself. If he surrenders his will
and property. to others, he surrenders himself. If his will is set by the will of others, he ceases to be a master of himself. I
cannot believe that a man no longer a master of himself is in any real sense free.
Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include "the right to exist and the right
to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right was recognized in Morfe, the invasion of which should be justified
of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been by a compelling state interest. Morfe accorded recognition to the right to privacy independently of its identification
endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the common welfare." 68 In accordance with liberty; in itself it is fully deserving of constitutional protection. Governmental powers should stop short of certain
with this case, the rights of the citizen to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; intrusions into the personal life of the citizen.76
to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; and to pursue any avocation are all deemed embraced in the concept of
liberty.69
There is a great temptation to have an extended discussion on these civil liberties but the Court chooses to exercise
restraint and restrict itself to the issues presented when it should. The previous pronouncements of the Court are not
70 
The U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Roth v. Board of Regents, sought to clarify the meaning of "liberty."  It said: to be interpreted as a license for adults to engage in criminal conduct. The reprehensibility of such conduct is not
diminished. The Court only reaffirms and guarantees their right to make this choice. Should they be prosecuted for
While the Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty. . . guaranteed [by the Fifth and their illegal conduct, they should suffer the consequences of the choice they have made. That, ultimately, is their
Fourteenth Amendments], the term denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of choice.
the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge,
to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own Modality employed is
conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized…as essential to the orderly pursuit of unlawful taking
In addition, the Ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive as it substantially divests the respondent of the beneficial The Ordinance gives the owners and operators of the "prohibited" establishments three (3) months from its approval
use of its property.77 The Ordinance in Section 1 thereof forbids the running of the enumerated businesses in the within which to "wind up business operations or to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate area or convert
Ermita-Malate area and in Section 3 instructs its owners/operators to wind up business operations or to transfer said businesses to other kinds of business allowable within the area." The directive to "wind up business operations"
outside the area or convert said businesses into allowed businesses. An ordinance which permanently restricts the amounts to a closure of the establishment, a permanent deprivation of property, and is practically confiscatory. 
use of property that it can not be used for any reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation and must be recognized Unless the owner converts his establishment to accommodate an "allowed" business, the structure which housed the
as a taking of the property without just compensation. 78 It is intrusive and violative of the private property rights of previous business will be left empty and gathering dust. Suppose he transfers it to another area, he will likewise
individuals. leave the entire establishment idle. Consideration must be given to the substantial amount of money invested to build
the edifices which the owner reasonably expects to be returned within a period of time. It is apparent that
the Ordinance leaves no reasonable economically viable use of property in a manner that interferes with reasonable
The Constitution expressly provides in Article III, Section 9, that "private property shall not be taken for public use
expectations for use.
without just compensation." The provision is the most important protection of property rights in the Constitution. This
is a restriction on the general power of the government to take property. The constitutional provision is about
ensuring that the government does not confiscate the property of some to give it to others. In part too, it is about loss The second and third options to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate area or to convert into allowed
spreading. If the government takes away a person's property to benefit society, then society should pay. The businessesare confiscatory as well. The penalty of permanent closure in cases of subsequent violations found in
principal purpose of the guarantee is "to bar the Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens Section 4 of the Ordinance is also equivalent to a "taking" of private property.
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole. 79
The second option instructs the owners to abandon their property and build another one outside the Ermita-Malate
There are two different types of taking that can be identified. A "possessory" taking occurs when the government area.  In every sense, it qualifies as a taking without just compensation with an additional burden imposed on the
confiscates or physically occupies property. A "regulatory" taking occurs when the government's regulation leaves no owner to build another establishment solely from his coffers. The proffered solution does not put an end to the
reasonable economically viable use of the property. 80 "problem," it merely relocates it. Not only is this impractical, it is unreasonable, onerous and oppressive. The
conversion into allowed enterprises is just as ridiculous. How may the respondent convert a motel into a restaurant
In the landmark case of Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon,81 it was held that a taking also could be found if government or a coffee shop, art gallery or music lounge without essentially destroying its property? This is a taking of private
regulation of the use of property went "too far."  When regulation reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not in all property without due process of law, nay, even without compensation.
cases there must be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to support the act. While property may be
regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking. 82 The penalty of closure likewise constitutes unlawful taking that should be compensated by the government. The
burden on the owner to convert or transfer his business, otherwise it will be closed permanently after a subsequent
No formula or rule can be devised to answer the questions of what is too far and when regulation becomes a taking. violation should be borne by the public as this end benefits them as a whole.
In Mahon, Justice Holmes recognized that it was "a question of degree and therefore cannot be disposed of by
general propositions." On many other occasions as well, the U.S. Supreme Court has said that the issue of when Petitioners cannot take refuge in classifying the measure as a zoning ordinance. A zoning ordinance, although a
regulation constitutes a taking is a matter of considering the facts in each case. The Court asks whether justice and valid exercise of police power, which limits a "wholesome" property to a use which can not reasonably be made of it
fairness require that the economic loss caused by public action must be compensated by the government and thus constitutes the taking of such property without just compensation.  Private property which is not noxious nor intended
borne by the public as a whole, or whether the loss should remain concentrated on those few persons subject to the for noxious purposes may not, by zoning, be destroyed without compensation. Such principle finds no support in the
public action.83 principles of justice as we know them.  The police powers of local government units which have always received
broad and liberal interpretation cannot be stretched to cover this particular taking.
What is crucial in judicial consideration of regulatory takings is that government regulation is a taking if it leaves no
reasonable economically viable use of property in a manner that interferes with reasonable expectations for use. 84 A Distinction should be made between destruction from necessity and eminent domain.  It needs restating that the
regulation that permanently denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land is, from the owner's point of property taken in the exercise of police power is destroyed because it is noxious or intended for a noxious purpose
view, equivalent to a "taking" unless principles of nuisance or property law that existed when the owner acquired the while the property taken under the power of eminent domain is intended for a public use or purpose and is therefore
land make the use prohibitable.85 When the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically "wholesome."89 If it be of public benefit that a "wholesome" property remain unused or relegated to a particular
beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his property economically idle, he has suffered a purpose, then certainly the public should bear the cost of reasonable compensation for the condemnation of private
taking.86 property for public use.90

A regulation which denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land will require compensation under the Further, the Ordinance fails to set up any standard to guide or limit the petitioners' actions. It in no way controls or
takings clause. Where a regulation places limitations on land that fall short of eliminating all economically beneficial guides the discretion vested in them. It provides no definition of the establishments covered by it and it fails to set
use, a taking nonetheless may have occurred, depending on a complex of factors including the regulation's forth the conditions when the establishments come within its ambit of prohibition. The Ordinance confers upon the
economic effect on the landowner, the extent to which the regulation interferes with reasonable investment-backed mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to close down establishments. Ordinances such as this, which make possible
expectations and the character of government action. These inquiries are informed by the purpose of the takings abuses in its execution, depending upon no conditions or qualifications whatsoever other than the unregulated
clause which is to prevent the government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all arbitrary will of the city authorities as the touchstone by which its validity is to be tested, are unreasonable and
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.87 invalid. The Ordinance should have established a rule by which its impartial enforcement could be secured. 91

A restriction on use of property may also constitute a "taking" if not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a Ordinances placing restrictions upon the lawful use of property must, in order to be valid and constitutional, specify
substantial public purpose or if it has an unduly harsh impact on the distinct investment-backed expectations of the the rules and conditions to be observed and conduct to avoid; and must not admit of the exercise, or of an
owner.88 opportunity for the exercise, of unbridled discretion by the law enforcers in carrying out its provisions. 92
Thus, in Coates v. City of Cincinnati,93 as cited in People v. Nazario,94      the U.S. Supreme Court struck down an persons shall be denied the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in like
ordinance that had made it illegal for "three or more persons to assemble on any sidewalk and there conduct circumstances.99 The "equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws."100 It limits
themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by." The ordinance was nullified as it imposed no standard at governmental discrimination. The equal protection clause extends to artificial persons but only insofar as their
all "because one may never know in advance what 'annoys some people but does not annoy others.' " property is concerned.101

Similarly, the Ordinance does not specify the standards to ascertain which establishments "tend to disturb the The Court has explained the scope of the equal protection clause in this wise:
community," "annoy the inhabitants," and "adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community." The cited
case supports the nullification of the Ordinance for lack of comprehensible standards to guide the law enforcers in
… What does it signify? To quote from J.M. Tuason & Co. v. Land Tenure Administration: "The ideal
carrying out its provisions.
situation is for the law's benefits to be available to all, that none be placed outside the sphere of its
coverage. Only thus could chance and favor be excluded and the affairs of men governed by that serene
Petitioners cannot therefore order the closure of the enumerated establishments without infringing the due process and impartial uniformity, which is of the very essence of the idea of law." There is recognition, however, in
clause. These lawful establishments may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their business.  This is a the opinion that what in fact exists "cannot approximate the ideal. Nor is the law susceptible to the
sweeping exercise of police power that is a result of a lack of imagination on the part of the City Council and which reproach that it does not take into account the realities of the situation. The constitutional guarantee then is
amounts to an interference into personal and private rights which the Court will not countenance. In this regard, we not to be given a meaning that disregards what is, what does in fact exist. To assure that the general
take a resolute stand to uphold the constitutional guarantee of the right to liberty and property. welfare be promoted, which is the end of law, a regulatory measure may cut into the rights to liberty and
property. Those adversely affected may under such circumstances invoke the equal protection clause only
if they can show that the governmental act assailed, far from being inspired by the attainment of the
Worthy of note is an example derived from the U.S. of a reasonable regulation which is a far cry from the ill-
common weal was prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that finds no
considered Ordinance enacted by the City Council.
support in reason." Classification is thus not ruled out, it being sufficient to quote from the Tuason decision
anew "that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all
In FW/PBS, INC. v. Dallas,95 the city of Dallas adopted a comprehensive ordinance regulating "sexually oriented persons must be treated in the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in the privileges
businesses," which are defined to include adult arcades, bookstores, video stores, cabarets, motels, and theaters as conferred and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the
well as escort agencies, nude model studio and sexual encounter centers. Among other things, the ordinance principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances which, if
required that such businesses be licensed. A group of motel owners were among the three groups of businesses that not identical, are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a
filed separate suits challenging the ordinance. The motel owners asserted that the city violated the due process class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally
clause by failing to produce adequate support for its supposition that renting room for fewer than ten (10) hours binding on the rest.102
resulted in increased crime and other secondary effects. They likewise argued than the ten (10)-hour limitation on
the rental of motel rooms placed an unconstitutional burden on the right to freedom of association. Anent the first
Legislative bodies are allowed to classify the subjects of legislation. If the classification is reasonable, the law may
contention, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the reasonableness of the legislative judgment combined with a study
operate only on some and not all of the people without violating the equal protection clause. 103 The classification
which the city considered, was adequate to support the city's determination that motels permitting room rentals for
must, as an indispensable requisite, not be arbitrary. To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements:
fewer than ten (10 ) hours should be included within the licensing scheme. As regards the second point, the Court
held that limiting motel room rentals to ten (10) hours will have no discernible effect on personal bonds as those
bonds that are formed from the use of a motel room for fewer than ten (10) hours are not those that have played a 1) It must be based on substantial distinctions.
critical role in the culture and traditions of the nation by cultivating and transmitting shared ideals and beliefs.
2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law.
The ordinance challenged in the above-cited case merely regulated the targeted businesses. It imposed reasonable
restrictions; hence, its validity was upheld.
3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only.

The case of Ermita Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila,96 it needs pointing
4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.104
out, is also different from this case in that what was involved therein was a measure which regulated the mode in
which motels may conduct business in order to put an end to practices which could encourage vice and immorality.
Necessarily, there was no valid objection on due process or equal protection grounds as the ordinance did not In the Court's view, there are no substantial distinctions between motels, inns, pension houses, hotels, lodging
prohibit motels. The Ordinance in this case however is not a regulatory measure but is an exercise of an assumed houses or other similar establishments. By definition, all are commercial establishments providing lodging and
power to prohibit.97 usually meals and other services for the public. No reason exists for prohibiting motels and inns but not pension
houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. The classification in the instant case is invalid as
similar subjects are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is arbitrary as it does
The foregoing premises show that the Ordinance is an unwarranted and unlawful curtailment of property and
not rest on substantial distinctions bearing a just and fair relation to the purpose of the Ordinance.
personal rights of citizens. For being unreasonable and an undue restraint of trade, it cannot, even under the guise of
exercising police power, be upheld as valid.
The Court likewise cannot see the logic for prohibiting the business and operation of motels in the Ermita-Malate
area but not outside of this area.  A noxious establishment does not become any less noxious if located outside the
B.  The Ordinance violates Equal
area.
Protection Clause

Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights The standard "where women are used as tools for entertainment" is also discriminatory as prostitutionone of the
conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently, so as to hinted ills the Ordinance aims to banishis not a profession exclusive to women. Both men and women have an
give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others.98 The guarantee means that no person or class of equal propensity to engage in prostitution. It is not any less grave a sin when men engage in it. And why would the
assumption that there is an ongoing immoral activity apply only when women are employed and be inapposite when or amusement; regulate such other events or activities for amusement or entertainment,
men are in harness? This discrimination based on gender violates equal protection as it is not substantially related to particularly those which tend to disturb the community or annoy the inhabitants, or require the
important government objectives. 105 Thus, the discrimination is invalid. suspension or suppression of the same; or, prohibit certain forms of amusement or
entertainment in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the community.
Failing the test of constitutionality, the Ordinance likewise failed to pass the test of consistency with prevailing laws.
Clearly, with respect to cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses, and
other similar establishments, the only power of the City Council to legislate relative thereto is to regulate them to
C.    The Ordinance is repugnant
promote the general welfare. The Code still withholds from cities the power to suppress and prohibit altogether the
to general laws; it is ultra vires
establishment, operation and maintenance of such establishments. It is well to recall the rulings of the Court
in Kwong Sing v. City of Manila106 that:
The Ordinance is in contravention of the Code as the latter merely empowers local government units to regulate, and
not prohibit, the establishments enumerated in Section 1 thereof.
The word "regulate," as used in subsection (l), section 2444 of the Administrative Code, means and
includes the power to control, to govern, and to restrain; but "regulate" should not be construed as
The power of the City Council to regulate by ordinances the establishment, operation, and maintenance of motels, synonymous with "suppress" or "prohibit." Consequently, under the power to regulate laundries, the
hotels and other similar establishments is found in Section 458 (a) 4 (iv), which provides that: municipal authorities could make proper police regulations as to the mode in which the employment or
business shall be exercised.107
Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The sangguniang panlungsod, as the
legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the And in People v. Esguerra,108 wherein the Court nullified an ordinance of the Municipality of Tacloban which
general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper prohibited the selling, giving and dispensing of liquor ratiocinating that the municipality is empowered only to regulate
exercise of the corporate powers of the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall: the same and not prohibit. The Court therein declared that:

.  .  . (A)s a general rule when a municipal corporation is specifically given authority or power to regulate or to
license and regulate the liquor traffic, power to prohibit is impliedly withheld. 109
(4) Regulate activities relative to the use of land, buildings and structures within the city in order to promote
the general welfare and for said purpose shall: These doctrines still hold contrary to petitioners' assertion 110 that they were modified by the Code vesting upon City
Councils prohibitory powers.
.  .  .
Similarly, the City Council exercises regulatory powers over public dancing schools, public dance halls, sauna baths,
massage parlors, and other places for entertainment or amusement as found in the first clause of Section 458 (a) 4
(iv) Regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, (vii). Its powers to regulate, suppress and suspend "such other events or activities for amusement or entertainment,
motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses, and other similar establishments, including tourist guides particularly those which tend to disturb the community or annoy the inhabitants" and to "prohibit certain forms of
and transports .  .  .  . amusement or entertainment in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the community" are stated in the
second and third clauses, respectively of the same Section.  The several powers of the City Council as provided in
While its power to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of any entertainment or amusement Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Code, it is pertinent to emphasize, are separated by semi-colons (;), the use of which
facilities, and to prohibit certain forms of amusement or entertainment is provided under Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the indicates that the clauses in which these powers are set forth are independent of each other albeit closely related to
Code, which reads as follows: justify being put together in a single enumeration or paragraph. 111 These powers, therefore, should not be confused,
commingled or consolidated as to create a conglomerated and unified power of regulation, suppression and
prohibition.112
Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The sangguniang panlungsod, as the
legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the
general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper The Congress unequivocably specified the establishments and forms of amusement or entertainment subject to
exercise of the corporate powers of the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall: regulation among which are beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses, and other similar
establishments (Section 458 (a) 4 (iv)), public dancing schools, public dance halls, sauna baths, massage parlors,
and other places for entertainment or amusement (Section 458 (a) 4 (vii)). This enumeration therefore cannot be
.  .  . included as among "other events or activities for amusement or entertainment, particularly those which tend to
disturb the community or annoy the inhabitants" or "certain forms of amusement or entertainment" which the City
(4) Regulate activities relative to the use of land, buildings and structures within the city in order to promote Council may suspend, suppress or prohibit.
the general welfare and for said purpose shall:
The rule is that the City Council has only such powers as are expressly granted to it and those which are necessarily
.  .  . implied or incidental to the exercise thereof.  By reason of its limited powers and the nature thereof, said powers are
to be construed strictissimi juris and any doubt or ambiguity arising out of the terms used in granting said powers
must be construed against the City Council.113 Moreover, it is a general rule in statutory construction that the express
(vii) Regulate the establishment, operation, and maintenance of any entertainment or mention of one person, thing, or consequence is tantamount to an express exclusion of all others. Expressio unius
amusement facilities, including theatrical performances, circuses, billiard pools, public dancing est exclusio alterium. This maxim is based upon the rules of logic and the natural workings of human mind. It is
schools, public dance halls, sauna baths, massage parlors, and other places for entertainment
particularly applicable in the construction of such statutes as create new rights or remedies, impose penalties or (1) Approve ordinances and pass resolutions necessary for an efficient and effective city government, and
punishments, or otherwise come under the rule of strict construction.114 in this connection, shall:

The argument that the City Council is empowered to enact the Ordinance by virtue of the general welfare clause of .  .  .
the Code and of Art. 3, Sec. 18 (kk) of the Revised Charter of Manila is likewise without merit. On the first point, the
ruling of the Court in People v. Esguerra,115 is instructive. It held that:
(v) Enact ordinances intended to prevent, suppress and impose  appropriate penalties for habitual
drunkenness in public places, vagrancy, mendicancy,  prostitution, establishment and maintenance of     
The powers conferred upon a municipal council in the general welfare clause, or section 2238 of the houses of ill repute, gambling and other prohibited games of chance,  fraudulent devices and ways to
Revised Administrative Code, refers to matters not covered by the other provisions of the same Code, and obtain money or property, drug addiction, maintenance of drug dens, drug pushing, juvenile delinquency,
therefore it can not be applied to intoxicating liquors, for the power to regulate the selling, giving away and the printing, distribution or exhibition of obscene or pornographic materials or publications, and such other
dispensing thereof is granted specifically by section 2242 (g) to municipal councils. To hold that, under the activities inimical  to the welfare and morals of the inhabitants of the city;
general power granted by section 2238,  a municipal council may enact the ordinance in question,
notwithstanding the provision of section 2242 (g), would be to make the latter superfluous and nugatory,
.  .  .
because the power to prohibit, includes the power to regulate, the selling, giving away and dispensing of
intoxicating liquors.
If it were the intention of Congress to confer upon the City Council the power to prohibit the establishments
enumerated in Section 1 of the Ordinance, it would have so declared in uncertain terms by adding them to the list of
On the second point, it suffices to say that the Code being a later expression of the legislative will must necessarily
the matters it may prohibit under the above-quoted Section. The Ordinance now vainly attempts to lump these
prevail and override the earlier law, the Revised Charter of Manila. Legis posteriores priores contrarias abrogant, or
establishments with houses of ill-repute and expand the City Council's powers in the second and third clauses of
later statute repeals prior ones which are repugnant thereto. As between two laws on the same subject matter, which
Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Code in an effort to overreach its prohibitory powers. It is evident that these
are irreconcilably inconsistent, that which is passed later prevails, since it is the latest expression of legislative
establishments may only be regulated in their establishment, operation and maintenance.
will.116 If there is an inconsistency or repugnance between two statutes, both relating to the same subject matter,
which cannot be removed by any fair and reasonable method of interpretation, it is the latest expression of the
legislative will which must prevail and override the earlier. 117 It is important to distinguish the punishable activities from the establishments themselves. That these establishments
are recognized legitimate enterprises can be gleaned from another Section of the Code. Section 131 under the Title
on Local Government Taxation expressly mentioned proprietors or operators of massage clinics, sauna, Turkish and
Implied repeals are those which take place when a subsequently enacted law contains provisions contrary to those
Swedish baths, hotels, motels and lodging houses as among the "contractors" defined in paragraph (h) thereof.  The
of an existing law but no provisions expressly repealing them. Such repeals have been divided into two general
same Section also defined "amusement" as a "pleasurable diversion and entertainment," "synonymous to relaxation,
classes: those which occur where an act is so inconsistent or irreconcilable with an existing prior act that only one of
avocation, pastime or fun;" and "amusement places" to include "theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses and other
the two can remain in force and those which occur when an act covers the whole subject of an earlier act and is
places of amusement where one seeks admission to entertain oneself by seeing or viewing the show or
intended to be a substitute therefor. The validity of such a repeal is sustained on the ground that the latest
performances." Thus, it can be inferred that the Code considers these establishments as legitimate enterprises and
expression of the legislative will should prevail.118
activities. It is well to recall the maxim reddendo singula singulis which means that words in different parts of a
statute must be referred to their appropriate connection, giving to each in its place, its proper force and effect, and, if
In addition, Section 534(f) of the Code states that "All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, possible, rendering none of them useless or superfluous, even if strict grammatical construction demands otherwise.
executive orders, proclamations and administrative regulations, or part or parts thereof which are inconsistent with Likewise, where words under consideration appear in different sections or are widely dispersed throughout an act the
any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly." Thus, submitting to petitioners' same principle applies.120
interpretation that the Revised Charter of Manila empowers the City Council to prohibit motels, that portion of the
Charter stating such must be considered repealed by the Code as it is at variance with the latter's provisions granting
Not only does the Ordinance contravene the Code, it likewise runs counter to the provisions of P.D. 499. As correctly
the City Council mere regulatory powers.
argued by MTDC, the statute had already converted the residential Ermita-Malate area into a commercial area. The
decree allowed the establishment and operation of all kinds of commercial establishments except warehouse or
It is well to point out that petitioners also cannot seek cover under the general welfare clause authorizing the open storage depot, dump or yard, motor repair shop, gasoline service station, light industry with any machinery or
abatement of nuisances without judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a nuisance per se, or one which affects funeral establishment. The rule is that for an ordinance to be valid and to have force and effect, it must not only be
the immediate safety of persons and property and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity. It within the powers of the council to enact but the same must not be in conflict with or repugnant to the general
can not be said that motels are injurious to the rights of property, health or comfort of the community. It is a legitimate law.121As succinctly illustrated in Solicitor General v. Metropolitan Manila Authority:122
business. If it be a nuisance per accidens it may be so proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose. A motel is
not per se a nuisance warranting its summary abatement without judicial intervention. 119
The requirement that the enactment must not violate existing law explains itself. Local political subdivisions
are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power from the national legislature
Notably, the City Council was conferred powers to prevent and prohibit certain activities and establishments in (except only that the power to create their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes is conferred by the
another section of the Code which is reproduced as follows: Constitution itself). They are mere agents vested with what is called the power of subordinate legislation.
As delegates of the Congress, the local government units cannot contravene but must obey at all times the
will of their principal. In the case before us, the enactment in question, which are merely local in origin
Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The sangguniang panlungsod, as the
cannot prevail against the decree, which has the force and effect of a statute.123
legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the
general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper
exercise of the corporate powers of the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall: Petitioners contend that the Ordinance enjoys the presumption of validity. While this may be the rule, it has already
been held that although the presumption is always in favor of the validity or reasonableness of the ordinance, such
presumption must nevertheless be set aside when the invalidity or unreasonableness appears on the face of the
ordinance itself or is established by proper evidence. The exercise of police power by the local government is valid
unless it contravenes the fundamental law of the land, or an act of the legislature, or unless it is against public policy
or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating or in derogation of a common right. 124

Conclusion

All considered, the Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property rights and impairs personal privileges. It is
constitutionally infirm. The Ordinance contravenes statutes; it is discriminatory and unreasonable in its operation; it is
not sufficiently detailed and explicit that abuses may attend the enforcement of its sanctions. And not to be forgotten,
the City Council under the Code had no power to enact the Ordinance and is therefore ultra vires, null and void.

Concededly, the challenged Ordinance was enacted with the best of motives and shares the concern of the public for
the cleansing of the Ermita-Malate area of its social sins. Police power legislation of such character deserves the full
endorsement of the judiciary we reiterate our support for it. But inspite of its virtuous aims, the enactment of
the Ordinance has no statutory or constitutional authority to stand on. Local legislative bodies, in this case, the City
Council, cannot prohibit the operation of the enumerated establishments under Section 1 thereof or order their
transfer or conversion without infringing the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection of laws
not even under the guise of police power.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the Regional Trial Court declaring
the Ordinancevoid is AFFIRMED.  Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo,
Sr., Azcuna, Chico-Nazario and Garcia, JJ., concur
Panganiban, J., in the result.
Ynares- Santiago, J., concur in the result only.
 Republic of the Philippines SEC. 3. Pursuant to the above policy, short-time admission and rate [sic], wash-up rate or other similarly concocted
SUPREME COURT terms, are hereby prohibited in hotels, motels, inns, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in
Manila the City of Manila.

EN BANC SEC. 4. Definition of Term[s]. Short-time admission shall mean admittance and charging of room rate for less than
twelve (12) hours at any given time or the renting out of rooms more than twice a day or any other term that may be
concocted by owners or managers of said establishments but would mean the same or would bear the same
G.R. No. 122846               January 20, 2009
meaning.

WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM CORPORATION and STA. MESA TOURIST & DEVELOPMENT
SEC. 5. Penalty Clause. Any person or corporation who shall violate any provision of this ordinance shall upon
CORPORATION, Petitioners, 
conviction thereof be punished by a fine of Five Thousand (₱5,000.00) Pesos or imprisonment for a period of not
vs.
exceeding one (1) year or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court; Provided, That in case of
CITY OF MANILA, represented by DE CASTRO, MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM, Respondent.
[a] juridical person, the president, the manager, or the persons in charge of the operation thereof shall be liable:
Provided, further, That in case of subsequent conviction for the same offense, the business license of the guilty party
DECISION shall automatically be cancelled.

Tinga, J.: SEC. 6. Repealing Clause. Any or all provisions of City ordinances not consistent with or contrary to this measure or
any portion hereof are hereby deemed repealed.
With another city ordinance of Manila also principally involving the tourist district as subject, the Court is confronted
anew with the incessant clash between government power and individual liberty in tandem with the archetypal SEC. 7. Effectivity. This ordinance shall take effect immediately upon approval.
tension between law and morality.
Enacted by the city Council of Manila at its regular session today, November 10, 1992.
In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr.,1 the Court affirmed the nullification of a city ordinance barring the operation of motels
and inns, among other establishments, within the Ermita-Malate area. The petition at bar assails a similarly-
Approved by His Honor, the Mayor on December 3, 1992.
motivated city ordinance that prohibits those same establishments from offering short-time admission, as well as pro-
rated or "wash up" rates for such abbreviated stays. Our earlier decision tested the city ordinance against our sacred
constitutional rights to liberty, due process and equal protection of law. The same parameters apply to the present On December 15, 1992, the Malate Tourist and Development Corporation (MTDC) filed a complaint for declaratory
petition. relief with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order ( TRO) 5 with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 9 impleading as defendant, herein respondent City of Manila (the City) represented
by Mayor Lim.6 MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its prohibited
This Petition2 under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, which seeks the reversal of the Decision 3 in
establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional. MTDC claimed that as owner and operator of the Victoria
C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 33316 of the Court of Appeals, challenges the validity of Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 entitled,
Court in Malate, Manila it was authorized by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 259 to admit customers on a short time
"An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in
basis as well as to charge customers wash up rates for stays of only three hours.
Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila" (the
Ordinance).
On December 21, 1992, petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC) and Sta. Mesa
Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC) filed a motion to intervene and to admit attached complaint-in-
I.
intervention7 on the ground that the Ordinance directly affects their business interests as operators of drive-in-hotels
and motels in Manila.8 The three companies are components of the Anito Group of Companies which owns and
The facts are as follows: operates several hotels and motels in Metro Manila.9

On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim (Mayor Lim) signed into law the Ordinance. 4 The Ordinance is On December 23, 1992, the RTC granted the motion to intervene. 10 The RTC also notified the Solicitor General of
reproduced in full, hereunder: the proceedings pursuant to then Rule 64, Section 4 of the Rules of Court. On the same date, MTDC moved to
withdraw as plaintiff.11
SECTION 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby the declared policy of the City Government to protect the best interest,
health and welfare, and the morality of its constituents in general and the youth in particular. On December 28, 1992, the RTC granted MTDC's motion to withdraw. 12 The RTC issued a TRO on January 14,
1993, directing the City to cease and desist from enforcing the Ordinance.13 The City filed an Answer dated January
22, 1993 alleging that the Ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police power. 14
SEC. 2. Title. This ordinance shall be known as "An Ordinance" prohibiting short time admission in hotels, motels,
lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila.
On February 8, 1993, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering the city to desist from the enforcement
of the Ordinance.15 A month later, on March 8, 1993, the Solicitor General filed his Comment arguing that the
Ordinance is constitutional.
During the pre-trial conference, the WLC, TC and STDC agreed to submit the case for decision without trial as the TC, WLC and STDC come to this Court via petition for review on certiorari.25 In their petition and Memorandum,
case involved a purely legal question.16 On October 20, 1993, the RTC rendered a decision declaring the Ordinance petitioners in essence repeat the assertions they made before the Court of Appeals. They contend that the assailed
null and void. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: Ordinance is an invalid exercise of police power.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, [O]rdinance No. 7774 of the City of Manila is hereby declared null and II.
void.
We must address the threshold issue of petitioners’ standing. Petitioners allege that as owners of establishments
Accordingly, the preliminary injunction heretofor issued is hereby made permanent. offering "wash-up" rates, their business is being unlawfully interfered with by the Ordinance. However, petitioners
also allege that the equal protection rights of their clients are also being interfered with. Thus, the crux of the matter
is whether or not these establishments have the requisite standing to plead for protection of their patrons' equal
SO ORDERED.17
protection rights.

The RTC noted that the ordinance "strikes at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed and jealously guarded
Standing or locus standi is the ability of a party to demonstrate to the court sufficient connection to and harm from
by the Constitution."18 Reference was made to the provisions of the Constitution encouraging private enterprises and
the law or action challenged to support that party's participation in the case. More importantly, the doctrine of
the incentive to needed investment, as well as the right to operate economic enterprises. Finally, from the
standing is built on the principle of separation of powers,26 sparing as it does unnecessary interference or invalidation
observation that the illicit relationships the Ordinance sought to dissuade could nonetheless be consummated by
by the judicial branch of the actions rendered by its co-equal branches of government.
simply paying for a 12-hour stay, the RTC likened the law to the ordinance annulled in Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate
Court,19 where the legitimate purpose of preventing indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos was sought to be effected
through an inter-province ban on the transport of carabaos and carabeef. The requirement of standing is a core component of the judicial system derived directly from the Constitution. 27 The
constitutional component of standing doctrine incorporates concepts which concededly are not susceptible of precise
definition.28 In this jurisdiction, the extancy of "a direct and personal interest" presents the most obvious cause, as
The City later filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court.20 The petition was docketed as G.R.
well as the standard test for a petitioner's standing.29 In a similar vein, the United States Supreme Court reviewed
No. 112471. However in a resolution dated January 26, 1994, the Court treated the petition as a petition
and elaborated on the meaning of the three constitutional standing requirements of injury, causation, and
for certiorari and referred the petition to the Court of Appeals. 21
redressability in Allen v. Wright.30

Before the Court of Appeals, the City asserted that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power pursuant to
Nonetheless, the general rules on standing admit of several exceptions such as the overbreadth doctrine, taxpayer
Section 458 (4)(iv) of the Local Government Code which confers on cities, among other local government units, the
suits, third party standing and, especially in the Philippines, the doctrine of transcendental importance. 31
power:

For this particular set of facts, the concept of third party standing as an exception and the overbreadth doctrine are
[To] regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns,
appropriate. In Powers v. Ohio,32 the United States Supreme Court wrote that: "We have recognized the right of
pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports. 22
litigants to bring actions on behalf of third parties, provided three important criteria are satisfied: the litigant must
have suffered an ‘injury-in-fact,’ thus giving him or her a "sufficiently concrete interest" in the outcome of the issue in
The Ordinance, it is argued, is also a valid exercise of the power of the City under Article III, Section 18(kk) of the dispute; the litigant must have a close relation to the third party; and there must exist some hindrance to the third
Revised Manila Charter, thus: party's ability to protect his or her own interests."33 Herein, it is clear that the business interests of the petitioners are
likewise injured by the Ordinance. They rely on the patronage of their customers for their continued viability which
appears to be threatened by the enforcement of the Ordinance. The relative silence in constitutional litigation of such
"to enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the special interest groups in our nation such as the American Civil Liberties Union in the United States may also be
prosperity and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience and general welfare of the city construed as a hindrance for customers to bring suit.34
and its inhabitants, and such others as be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties
conferred by this Chapter; and to fix penalties for the violation of ordinances which shall not exceed two hundred
pesos fine or six months imprisonment, or both such fine and imprisonment for a single offense. 23 American jurisprudence is replete with examples where parties-in-interest were allowed standing to advocate or
invoke the fundamental due process or equal protection claims of other persons or classes of persons injured by
state action. In Griswold v. Connecticut,35 the United States Supreme Court held that physicians had standing to
Petitioners argued that the Ordinance is unconstitutional and void since it violates the right to privacy and the challenge a reproductive health statute that would penalize them as accessories as well as to plead the constitutional
freedom of movement; it is an invalid exercise of police power; and it is an unreasonable and oppressive interference protections available to their patients. The Court held that:
in their business.

"The rights of husband and wife, pressed here, are likely to be diluted or adversely affected unless those rights are
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the Ordinance. 24 First, it considered in a suit involving those who have this kind of confidential relation to them." 36
held that the Ordinance did not violate the right to privacy or the freedom of movement, as it only penalizes the
owners or operators of establishments that admit individuals for short time stays. Second, the virtually limitless reach
of police power is only constrained by having a lawful object obtained through a lawful method. The lawful objective An even more analogous example may be found in Craig v. Boren,37 wherein the United States Supreme Court held
of the Ordinance is satisfied since it aims to curb immoral activities. There is a lawful method since the that a licensed beverage vendor has standing to raise the equal protection claim of a male customer challenging a
establishments are still allowed to operate. Third, the adverse effect on the establishments is justified by the well- statutory scheme prohibiting the sale of beer to males under the age of 21 and to females under the age of 18. The
being of its constituents in general. Finally, as held in Ermita-Malate Motel Operators Association v. City Mayor of United States High Court explained that the vendors had standing "by acting as advocates of the rights of third
Manila, liberty is regulated by law. parties who seek access to their market or function."38
Assuming arguendo that petitioners do not have a relationship with their patrons for the former to assert the rights of guarantees to the people. The Bill of Rights stands as a rebuke to the seductive theory of Macchiavelli, and,
the latter, the overbreadth doctrine comes into play. In overbreadth analysis, challengers to government action are in sometimes even, the political majorities animated by his cynicism.
effect permitted to raise the rights of third parties. Generally applied to statutes infringing on the freedom of speech,
the overbreadth doctrine applies when a statute needlessly restrains even constitutionally guaranteed rights. 39 In this
Even as we design the precedents that establish the framework for analysis of due process or equal protection
case, the petitioners claim that the Ordinance makes a sweeping intrusion into the right to liberty of their clients. We
questions, the courts are naturally inhibited by a due deference to the co-equal branches of government as they
can see that based on the allegations in the petition, the Ordinance suffers from overbreadth.
exercise their political functions. But when we are compelled to nullify executive or legislative actions, yet another
form of caution emerges. If the Court were animated by the same passing fancies or turbulent emotions that motivate
We thus recognize that the petitioners have a right to assert the constitutional rights of their clients to patronize their many political decisions, judicial integrity is compromised by any perception that the judiciary is merely the third
establishments for a "wash-rate" time frame. political branch of government. We derive our respect and good standing in the annals of history by acting as
judicious and neutral arbiters of the rule of law, and there is no surer way to that end than through the development
of rigorous and sophisticated legal standards through which the courts analyze the most fundamental and far-
III.
reaching constitutional questions of the day.

To students of jurisprudence, the facts of this case will recall to mind not only the recent City of Manila ruling, but our
B.
1967 decision in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operations Association, Inc., v. Hon. City Mayor of Manila. 40Ermita-
Malate concerned the City ordinance requiring patrons to fill up a prescribed form stating personal information such
as name, gender, nationality, age, address and occupation before they could be admitted to a motel, hotel or lodging The primary constitutional question that confronts us is one of due process, as guaranteed under Section 1, Article III
house. This earlier ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices deemed harmful to public morals. of the Constitution. Due process evades a precise definition. 48 The purpose of the guaranty is to prevent arbitrary
A purpose similar to the annulled ordinance in City of Manila which sought a blanket ban on motels, inns and similar governmental encroachment against the life, liberty and property of individuals. The due process guaranty serves as
establishments in the Ermita-Malate area. However, the constitutionality of the ordinance in Ermita-Malate was a protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure. Even corporations and partnerships are protected by the guaranty
sustained by the Court. insofar as their property is concerned.

The common thread that runs through those decisions and the case at bar goes beyond the singularity of the The due process guaranty has traditionally been interpreted as imposing two related but distinct restrictions on
localities covered under the respective ordinances. All three ordinances were enacted with a view of regulating public government, "procedural due process" and "substantive due process." Procedural due process refers to the
morals including particular illicit activity in transient lodging establishments. This could be described as the middle procedures that the government must follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or property. 49 Procedural due
case, wherein there is no wholesale ban on motels and hotels but the services offered by these establishments have process concerns itself with government action adhering to the established process when it makes an intrusion into
been severely restricted. At its core, this is another case about the extent to which the State can intrude into and the private sphere. Examples range from the form of notice given to the level of formality of a hearing.
regulate the lives of its citizens.
If due process were confined solely to its procedural aspects, there would arise absurd situation of arbitrary
The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions including City of Manila has held that for an government action, provided the proper formalities are followed. Substantive due process completes the protection
ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and pass envisioned by the due process clause. It inquires whether the government has sufficient justification for depriving a
according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) person of life, liberty, or property.50
must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or
discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy;
The question of substantive due process, moreso than most other fields of law, has reflected dynamism in
and (6) must not be unreasonable.41
progressive legal thought tied with the expanded acceptance of fundamental freedoms. Police power, traditionally
awesome as it may be, is now confronted with a more rigorous level of analysis before it can be upheld. The vitality
The Ordinance prohibits two specific and distinct business practices, namely wash rate admissions and renting out a though of constitutional due process has not been predicated on the frequency with which it has been utilized to
room more than twice a day. The ban is evidently sought to be rooted in the police power as conferred on local achieve a liberal result for, after all, the libertarian ends should sometimes yield to the prerogatives of the State.
government units by the Local Government Code through such implements as the general welfare clause. Instead, the due process clause has acquired potency because of the sophisticated methodology that has emerged
to determine the proper metes and bounds for its application.
A.
C.
Police power, while incapable of an exact definition, has been purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its
comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and flexible response as the The general test of the validity of an ordinance on substantive due process grounds is best tested when assessed
conditions warrant.42 Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its corresponding right to with the evolved footnote 4 test laid down by the U.S. Supreme Court in U.S. v. Carolene Products. 51 Footnote 4 of
protect itself and its people.43 Police power has been used as justification for numerous and varied actions by the the Carolene Products case acknowledged that the judiciary would defer to the legislature unless there is a
State. These range from the regulation of dance halls,44 movie theaters,45 gas stations46 and cockpits.47 The discrimination against a "discrete and insular" minority or infringement of a "fundamental right." 52 Consequently, two
awesome scope of police power is best demonstrated by the fact that in its hundred or so years of presence in our standards of judicial review were established: strict scrutiny for laws dealing with freedom of the mind or restricting
nation’s legal system, its use has rarely been denied. the political process, and the rational basis standard of review for economic legislation.

The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered establishments for illicit sex, A third standard, denominated as heightened or immediate scrutiny, was later adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court
prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of for evaluating classifications based on gender53 and legitimacy.54 Immediate scrutiny was adopted by the U.S.
the police power of the State. Yet the desirability of these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their Supreme Court in Craig,55 after the Court declined to do so in Reed v. Reed. 56 While the test may have first been
achievement. Those means must align with the Constitution, and our emerging sophisticated analysis of its articulated in equal protection analysis, it has in the United States since been applied in all substantive due process
cases as well.
We ourselves have often applied the rational basis test mainly in analysis of equal protection challenges. 57 Using the and fornications’ in Manila since they ‘provide the necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit
rational basis examination, laws or ordinances are upheld if they rationally further a legitimate governmental and thus became the ‘ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers.’" 68 Whether or not this depiction of a mise-en-
interest.58 Under intermediate review, governmental interest is extensively examined and the availability of less scene of vice is accurate, it cannot be denied that legitimate sexual behavior among willing married or consenting
restrictive measures is considered.59 Applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of compelling, rather than single adults which is constitutionally protected 69 will be curtailed as well, as it was in the City of Manila case. Our
substantial, governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive means for achieving that interest. holding therein retains significance for our purposes:

In terms of judicial review of statutes or ordinances, strict scrutiny refers to the standard for determining the quality The concept of liberty compels respect for the individual whose claim to privacy and interference demands respect.
and the amount of governmental interest brought to justify the regulation of fundamental freedoms. 60 Strict scrutiny is As the case of Morfe v. Mutuc, borrowing the words of Laski, so very aptly stated:
used today to test the validity of laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender, or race as well as other
fundamental rights as expansion from its earlier applications to equal protection. 61 The United States Supreme Court
Man is one among many, obstinately refusing reduction to unity. His separateness, his isolation, are indefeasible;
has expanded the scope of strict scrutiny to protect fundamental rights such as suffrage, 62 judicial access63and
indeed, they are so fundamental that they are the basis on which his civic obligations are built. He cannot abandon
interstate travel.64
the consequences of his isolation, which are, broadly speaking, that his experience is private, and the will built out of
that experience personal to himself. If he surrenders his will to others, he surrenders himself. If his will is set by the
If we were to take the myopic view that an Ordinance should be analyzed strictly as to its effect only on the will of others, he ceases to be a master of himself. I cannot believe that a man no longer a master of himself is in any
petitioners at bar, then it would seem that the only restraint imposed by the law which we are capacitated to act upon real sense free.
is the injury to property sustained by the petitioners, an injury that would warrant the application of the most
deferential standard – the rational basis test. Yet as earlier stated, we recognize the capacity of the petitioners to
Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right was recognized in Morfe, the invasion of which should be justified
invoke as well the constitutional rights of their patrons – those persons who would be deprived of availing short time
by a compelling state interest. Morfe accorded recognition to the right to privacy independently of its identification
access or wash-up rates to the lodging establishments in question.
with liberty; in itself it is fully deserving of constitutional protection. Governmental powers should stop short of certain
intrusions into the personal life of the citizen.70
Viewed cynically, one might say that the infringed rights of these customers were are trivial since they seem shorn of
political consequence. Concededly, these are not the sort of cherished rights that, when proscribed, would impel the
We cannot discount other legitimate activities which the Ordinance would proscribe or impair. There are very
people to tear up their cedulas. Still, the Bill of Rights does not shelter gravitas alone. Indeed, it is those "trivial" yet
legitimate uses for a wash rate or renting the room out for more than twice a day. Entire families are known to
fundamental freedoms – which the people reflexively exercise any day without the impairing awareness of their
choose pass the time in a motel or hotel whilst the power is momentarily out in their homes. In transit passengers
constitutional consequence – that accurately reflect the degree of liberty enjoyed by the people. Liberty, as integrally
who wish to wash up and rest between trips have a legitimate purpose for abbreviated stays in motels or hotels.
incorporated as a fundamental right in the Constitution, is not a Ten Commandments-style enumeration of what may
Indeed any person or groups of persons in need of comfortable private spaces for a span of a few hours with
or what may not be done; but rather an atmosphere of freedom where the people do not feel labored under a Big
purposes other than having sex or using illegal drugs can legitimately look to staying in a motel or hotel as a
Brother presence as they interact with each other, their society and nature, in a manner innately understood by them
convenient alternative.
as inherent, without doing harm or injury to others.

E.
D.

That the Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a product and the petitioners of
The rights at stake herein fall within the same fundamental rights to liberty which we upheld in City of Manila v. Hon.
lucrative business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the Ordinance as a police power
Laguio, Jr. We expounded on that most primordial of rights, thus:
measure. It must appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require an interference with private rights and the means must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of
Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include "the right to exist and the right the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights.71 It must also be evident that no other alternative for the
to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation must
of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been exist between the purposes of the measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the
endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the common welfare."[ 65] In accordance guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to
with this case, the rights of the citizen to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; be arbitrarily invaded.72
to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; and to pursue any avocation are all deemed embraced in the concept of
liberty.[66]
Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into
private rights. As held in Morfe v. Mutuc, the exercise of police power is subject to judicial review when life, liberty or
The U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Roth v. Board of Regents, sought to clarify the meaning of "liberty." It said: property is affected.73 However, this is not in any way meant to take it away from the vastness of State police power
whose exercise enjoys the presumption of validity.74
While the Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty . . . guaranteed [by the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments], the term denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to Similar to the Comelec resolution requiring newspapers to donate advertising space to candidates, this Ordinance is
contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a a blunt and heavy instrument.75 The Ordinance makes no distinction between places frequented by patrons engaged
home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy in illicit activities and patrons engaged in legitimate actions. Thus it prevents legitimate use of places where illicit
those privileges long recognized . . . as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. In a Constitution for activities are rare or even unheard of. A plain reading of section 3 of the Ordinance shows it makes no classification
a free people, there can be no doubt that the meaning of "liberty" must be broad indeed. 67 [Citations omitted] of places of lodging, thus deems them all susceptible to illicit patronage and subject them without exception to the
unjustified prohibition.
It cannot be denied that the primary animus behind the ordinance is the curtailment of sexual behavior. The City
asserts before this Court that the subject establishments "have gained notoriety as venue of ‘prostitution, adultery
The Court has professed its deep sentiment and tenderness of the Ermita-Malate area, its longtime home, 76 and it is WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED, and the Decision of
skeptical of those who wish to depict our capital city – the Pearl of the Orient – as a modern-day Sodom or the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9, is REINSTATED. Ordinance No. 7774 is hereby declared
Gomorrah for the Third World set. Those still steeped in Nick Joaquin-dreams of the grandeur of Old Manila will have UNCONSTITUTIONAL. No pronouncement as to costs.
to accept that Manila like all evolving big cities, will have its problems. Urban decay is a fact of mega cities such as
Manila, and vice is a common problem confronted by the modern metropolis wherever in the world. The solution to
SO ORDERED.
such perceived decay is not to prevent legitimate businesses from offering a legitimate product. Rather, cities revive
themselves by offering incentives for new businesses to sprout up thus attracting the dynamism of individuals that
would bring a new grandeur to Manila. DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
The behavior which the Ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited and could in fact be diminished simply
by applying existing laws. Less intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of prostitutes and drug dealers
through active police work would be more effective in easing the situation. So would the strict enforcement of existing
laws and regulations penalizing prostitution and drug use. These measures would have minimal intrusion on the
businesses of the petitioners and other legitimate merchants. Further, it is apparent that the Ordinance can easily be
circumvented by merely paying the whole day rate without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit activities.
Moreover, drug dealers and prostitutes can in fact collect "wash rates" from their clientele by charging their
customers a portion of the rent for motel rooms and even apartments.

IV.

We reiterate that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the
legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. The State is a leviathan that must be restrained from
needlessly intruding into the lives of its citizens. However well-intentioned the Ordinance may be, it is in effect an
arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the rights of the establishments as well as their patrons. The Ordinance
needlessly restrains the operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting the rights of their patrons
without sufficient justification. The Ordinance rashly equates wash rates and renting out a room more than twice a
day with immorality without accommodating innocuous intentions.

The promotion of public welfare and a sense of morality among citizens deserves the full endorsement of the
judiciary provided that such measures do not trample rights this Court is sworn to protect. 77 The notion that the
promotion of public morality is a function of the State is as old as Aristotle. 78 The advancement of moral relativism as
a school of philosophy does not de-legitimize the role of morality in law, even if it may foster wider debate on which
particular behavior to penalize. It is conceivable that a society with relatively little shared morality among its citizens
could be functional so long as the pursuit of sharply variant moral perspectives yields an adequate accommodation
of different interests.79

To be candid about it, the oft-quoted American maxim that "you cannot legislate morality" is ultimately illegitimate as
a matter of law, since as explained by Calabresi, that phrase is more accurately interpreted as meaning that efforts
to legislate morality will fail if they are widely at variance with public attitudes about right and wrong. 80 Our penal
laws, for one, are founded on age-old moral traditions, and as long as there are widely accepted distinctions between
right and wrong, they will remain so oriented.

Yet the continuing progression of the human story has seen not only the acceptance of the right-wrong distinction,
but also the advent of fundamental liberties as the key to the enjoyment of life to the fullest. Our democracy is
distinguished from non-free societies not with any more extensive elaboration on our part of what is moral and
immoral, but from our recognition that the individual liberty to make the choices in our lives is innate, and protected
by the State. Independent and fair-minded judges themselves are under a moral duty to uphold the Constitution as
the embodiment of the rule of law, by reason of their expression of consent to do so when they take the oath of
office, and because they are entrusted by the people to uphold the law.81

Even as the implementation of moral norms remains an indispensable complement to governance, that prerogative
is hardly absolute, especially in the face of the norms of due process of liberty. And while the tension may often be
left to the courts to relieve, it is possible for the government to avoid the constitutional conflict by employing more
judicious, less drastic means to promote morality.
 Republic of the Philippines G.R. No. 133640,1 entitled "Rodolfo S. Beltran, doing business under the name and style, Our Lady of Fatima Blood
SUPREME COURT Bank, et al., vs. The Secretary of Health" and G.R. No. 133661, 2 entitled "Doctors Blood Bank Center vs. Department
of Health" are petitions for certiorari and mandamus, respectively, seeking the annulment of the following: (1) Section
7 of Republic Act No. 7719; and, (2) Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 9, series of 1995. Both petitions likewise pray
EN BANC
for the issuance of a writ of prohibitory injunction enjoining the Secretary of Health from implementing and enforcing
the aforementioned law and its Implementing Rules and Regulations; and, for a mandatory injunction ordering and
G.R. No. 133640 November 25, 2005 commanding the Secretary of Health to grant, issue or renew petitioners’ license to operate free standing blood
banks (FSBB).
RODOLFO S. BELTRAN, doing business under the name and style, OUR LADY OF FATIMA BLOOD BANK,
FELY G. MOSALE, doing business under the name and style, MOTHER SEATON BLOOD BANK; PEOPLE’S The above cases were consolidated in a resolution of the Court En Banc dated June 2, 1998.3
BLOOD BANK, INC.; MARIA VICTORIA T. VITO, M.D., doing business under the name and style, AVENUE
BLOOD BANK; JESUS M. GARCIA, M.D., doing business under the name and style, HOLY REDEEMER
G.R. No. 139147,4 entitled "Rodolfo S. Beltran, doing business under the name and style, Our Lady of Fatima Blood
BLOOD BANK, ALBERT L. LAPITAN, doing business under the name and style, BLUE CROSS BLOOD
Bank, et al., vs. The Secretary of Health," on the other hand, is a petition to show cause why respondent Secretary of
TRANSFUSION SERVICES; EDGARDO R. RODAS, M.D., doing business under the name and style, RECORD
Health should not be held in contempt of court.
BLOOD BANK, in their individual capacities and for and in behalf of PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF BLOOD
BANKS, Petitioners, 
vs. This case was originally assigned to the Third Division of this Court and later consolidated with G.R. Nos. 133640
THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH, Respondent. and 133661 in a resolution dated August 4, 1999. 5

x ------------------------------------------------ x Petitioners comprise the majority of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Association of Blood Banks, a duly
registered non-stock and non-profit association composed of free standing blood banks.
G.R. No. 133661
Public respondent Secretary of Health is being sued in his capacity as the public official directly involved and
charged with the enforcement and implementation of the law in question.
DOCTORS’ BLOOD CENTER, Petitioner, 
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, Respondent. The facts of the case are as follows:

x --------------------------------------------- x Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 was enacted into law on April 2, 1994. The Act
seeks to provide 
G.R. No. 139147
an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary blood donation and by regulating blood banks in the
country. It was approved by then President Fidel V. Ramos on May 15, 1994 and was subsequently published in the
RODOLFO S. BELTRAN, doing business under the name and style, OUR LADY OF FATIMA BLOOD BANK, Official Gazette on August 18, 1994. The law took effect on August 23, 1994.
FELY G. MOSALE, doing business under the name and style, MOTHER SEATON BLOOD BANK; PEOPLE’S
BLOOD BANK, INC.; MARIA VICTORIA T. VITO, M.D., doing business under the name and style, AVENUE
On April 28, 1995, Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995, constituting the Implementing Rules and Regulations
BLOOD BANK; JESUS M. GARCIA, M.D., doing business under the name and style, HOLY REDEEMER
of said law was promulgated by respondent Secretary of the Department of Health (DOH).6
BLOOD BANK, ALBERT L. LAPITAN, doing business under the name and style, BLUE CROSS BLOOD
TRANSFUSION SERVICES; EDGARDO R. RODAS, M.D., doing business under the name and style, RECORD
BLOOD BANK, in their Individual capacities and for and in behalf of PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF BLOOD Section 7 of R.A. 7719 7 provides:
BANKS, Petitioners, 
vs.
"Section 7. Phase-out of Commercial Blood Banks - All commercial blood banks shall be phased-out over a
THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH, Respondent.
period of two (2) years after the effectivity of this Act, extendable to a maximum period of two (2) years by the
Secretary."
DECISION
Section 23 of Administrative Order No. 9 provides:
AZCUNA, J.:
"Section 23. Process of Phasing Out. -- The Department shall effect the phasing-out of all commercial blood banks
Before this Court are petitions assailing primarily the constitutionality of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 7719, over a period of two (2) years, extendible for a maximum period of two (2) years after the effectivity of R.A. 7719.
otherwise known as the "National Blood Services Act of 1994," and the validity of Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 9, The decision to extend shall be based on the result of a careful study and review of the blood supply and demand
series of 1995 or the Rules and Regulations Implementing Republic Act No. 7719. and public safety."8
Blood banking and blood transfusion services in the country have been arranged in four (4) categories: blood centers donors are those who receive remuneration for donating their blood. Blood donors of the PNRC and government-run
run by the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC), government-run blood services, private hospital blood banks, and hospitals, on the other hand, are mostly voluntary. 14
commercial blood services.
It was further found, among other things, that blood sold by persons to blood commercial banks are three times more
Years prior to the passage of the National Blood Services Act of 1994, petitioners have already been operating likely to have any of the four (4) tested infections or blood transfusion transmissible diseases, namely, malaria,
commercial blood banks under Republic Act No. 1517, entitled "An Act Regulating the Collection, Processing and syphilis, Hepatitis B and Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) than those donated to PNRC.15
Sale of Human Blood, and the Establishment and Operation of Blood Banks and Blood Processing Laboratories."
The law, which was enacted on June 16, 1956, allowed the establishment and operation by licensed physicians of
Commercial blood banks give paid donors varying rates around ₱50 to ₱150, and because of this arrangement,
blood banks and blood processing laboratories. The Bureau of Research and Laboratories (BRL) was created in
many of these donors are poor, and often they are students, who need cash immediately. Since they need the
1958 and was given the power to regulate clinical laboratories in 1966 under Republic Act No. 4688. In 1971, the
money, these donors are not usually honest about their medical or social history. Thus, blood from healthy, voluntary
Licensure Section was created within the BRL. It was given the duty to enforce the licensure requirements for blood
donors who give their true medical and social history are about three times much safer than blood from paid
banks as well as clinical laboratories. Due to this development, Administrative Order No. 156, Series of 1971, was
donors.16
issued. The new rules and regulations triggered a stricter enforcement of the Blood Banking Law, which was
characterized by frequent spot checks, immediate suspension and communication of such suspensions to hospitals,
a more systematic record-keeping and frequent communication with blood banks through monthly information What the study also found alarming is that many Filipino doctors are not yet fully trained on the specific indications
bulletins. Unfortunately, by the 1980’s, financial difficulties constrained the BRL to reduce the frequency of its for blood component transfusion. They are not aware of the lack of blood supply and do not feel the need to adjust
supervisory visits to the blood banks. 9 their practices and use of blood and blood products. It also does not matter to them where the blood comes from.17

Meanwhile, in the international scene, concern for the safety of blood and blood products intensified when the On August 23, 1994, the National Blood Services Act providing for the phase out of commercial blood banks took
dreaded disease Acute Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) was first described in 1979. In 1980, the International effect. On April 28, 1995, Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995, constituting the Implementing Rules and
Society of Blood Transfusion (ISBT) formulated the Code of Ethics for Blood Donation and Transfusion. In 1982, the Regulations of said law was promulgated by DOH.
first case of transfusion-associated AIDS was described in an infant. Hence, the ISBT drafted in 1984, a model for a
national blood policy outlining certain principles that should be taken into consideration. By 1985, the ISBT had
The phase-out period was extended for two years by the DOH pursuant to Section 7 of Republic Act No. 7719 and
disseminated guidelines requiring AIDS testing of blood and blood products for transfusion. 10
Section 23 of its Implementing Rules and Regulations. Pursuant to said Act, all commercial blood banks should have
been phased out by May 28, 1998. Hence, petitioners were granted by the Secretary of Health their licenses to open
In 1989, another revision of the Blood Banking Guidelines was made. The DOH issued Administrative Order No. 57, and operate a blood bank only until May 27, 1998.
Series of 1989, which classified banks into primary, secondary and tertiary depending on the services they provided.
The standards were adjusted according to this classification. For instance, floor area requirements varied according
On May 20, 1998, prior to the expiration of the licenses granted to petitioners, they filed a petition for certiorari with
to classification level. The new guidelines likewise required Hepatitis B and HIV testing, and that the blood bank be
application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order under Rule 65 of the
headed by a pathologist or a hematologist.11
Rules of Court assailing the constitutionality and validity of the aforementioned Act and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations. The case was entitled "Rodolfo S. Beltran, doing business under the name and style, Our Lady of
In 1992, the DOH issued Administrative Order No. 118-A institutionalizing the National Blood Services Program Fatima Blood Bank," docketed as G.R. No. 133640.
(NBSP). The BRL was designated as the central office primarily responsible for the NBSP. The program paved the
way for the creation of a committee that will implement the policies of the program and the formation of the Regional
On June 1, 1998, petitioners filed an Amended Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary
Blood Councils.
Restraining Order, writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and/or status quo ante order.18

In August 1992, Senate Bill No. 1011, entitled "An Act Promoting Voluntary Blood Donation, Providing for an
In the aforementioned petition, petitioners assail the constitutionality of the questioned legal provisions, namely,
Adequate Supply of Safe Blood, Regulating Blood Banks and Providing Penalties for Violations Thereof, and for
Section 7 of Republic Act No. 7719 and Section 23 of Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995, on the following
other Purposes" was introduced in the Senate. 12
grounds: 19

Meanwhile, in the House of Representatives, House Bills No. 384, 546, 780 and 1978 were being deliberated to
1. The questioned legal provisions of the National Blood Services Act and its Implementing Rules violate the equal
address the issue of safety of the Philippine blood bank system. Subsequently, the Senate and House Bills were
protection clause for irrationally discriminating against free standing blood banks in a manner which is not germane
referred to the appropriate committees and subsequently consolidated. 13
to the purpose of the law;

In January of 1994, the New Tropical Medicine Foundation, with the assistance of the U.S. Agency for International
2. The questioned provisions of the National Blood Services Act and its Implementing Rules represent undue
Development (USAID) released its final report of a study on the Philippine blood banking system entitled "Project to
delegation if not outright abdication of the police power of the state; and,
Evaluate the Safety of the Philippine Blood Banking System." It was revealed that of the blood units collected in
1992, 64.4 % were supplied by commercial blood banks, 14.5% by the PNRC, 13.7% by government hospital-based
blood banks, and 7.4% by private hospital-based blood banks. During the time the study was made, there were only 3. The questioned provisions of the National Blood Services Act and its Implementing Rules are unwarranted
twenty-four (24) registered or licensed free-standing or commercial blood banks in the country. Hence, with these deprivation of personal liberty.
numbers in mind, the study deduced that each commercial blood bank produces five times more blood than the Red
Cross and fifteen times more than the government-run blood banks. The study, therefore, showed that the
Philippines heavily relied on commercial sources of blood. The study likewise revealed that 99.6% of the donors of On May 22, 1998, the Doctors Blood Center filed a similar petition for mandamus with a prayer for the issuance of a
commercial blood banks and 77.0% of the donors of private-hospital based blood banks are paid donors. Paid temporary restraining order, preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction before this Court entitled "Doctors
Blood Center vs. Department of Health," docketed as G.R. No. 133661. 20 This was consolidated with G.R. No. The Presiding Officer [Senator Aquino]: What does the sponsor say?
133640.21
Senator Webb: Mr. President, just for clarity, I would like to find out how the Gentleman defines a commercial blood
Similarly, the petition attacked the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7719 and its implementing rules and bank. I am at a loss at times what a commercial blood bank really is.
regulations, thus, praying for the issuance of a license to operate commercial blood banks beyond May 27, 1998.
Specifically, with regard to Republic Act No. 7719, the petition submitted the following questions 22 for resolution:
Senator Mercado: We have a definition, I believe, in the measure, Mr. President.

1. Was it passed in the exercise of police power, and was it a valid exercise of such power?
The Presiding Officer [Senator Aquino]: It is a business where profit is considered.

2. Does it not amount to deprivation of property without due process?

Senator Mercado: If the Chairman of the Committee would accept it, we can put a provision on Section 3, a
definition of a commercial blood bank, which, as defined in this law, exists for profit and engages in the buying and
3. Does it not unlawfully impair the obligation of contracts? selling of blood or its components.

4. With the commercial blood banks being abolished and with no ready machinery to deliver the same supply and Senator Webb: That is a good description, Mr. President.
services, does R.A. 7719 truly serve the public welfare?
…
On June 2, 1998, this Court issued a Resolution directing respondent DOH to file a consolidated comment. In the
same Resolution, the Court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) for respondent to cease and desist from
Senator Mercado: I refer, Mr. President, to a letter written by Dr. Jaime Galvez-Tan, the Chief of Staff,
implementing and enforcing Section 7 of Republic Act No. 7719 and its implementing rules and regulations until
Undersecretary of Health, to the good Chairperson of the Committee on Health.
further orders from the Court.23

In recommendation No. 4, he says:

On August 26, 1998, respondent Secretary of Health filed a Consolidated Comment on the petitions for certiorari and
mandamus in G.R. Nos. 133640 and 133661, with opposition to the issuance of a temporary restraining order. 24
"The need to phase out all commercial blood banks within a two-year period will give the Department of Health
enough time to build up government’s capability to provide an adequate supply of blood for the needs of the
In the Consolidated Comment, respondent Secretary of Health submitted that blood from commercial blood banks is
nation...the use of blood for transfusion is a medical service and not a sale of commodity."
unsafe and therefore the State, in the exercise of its police power, can close down commercial blood banks to
protect the public. He cited the record of deliberations on Senate Bill No. 1101 which later became Republic Act No.
7719, and the sponsorship speech of Senator Orlando Mercado. Taking into consideration the experience of the National Kidney Institute, which has succeeded in making the
hospital 100 percent dependent on voluntary blood donation, here is a success story of a hospital that does not buy
blood. All those who are operated on and need blood have to convince their relatives or have to get volunteers who
The rationale for the closure of these commercial blood banks can be found in the deliberations of Senate Bill No.
would donate blood…
1011, excerpts of which are quoted below:

If we give the responsibility of the testing of blood to those commercial blood banks, they will cut corners because it
Senator Mercado: I am providing over a period of two years to phase out all commercial blood banks. So that in the
will protect their profit.
end, the new section would have a provision that states:

In the first place, the people who sell their blood are the people who are normally in the high-risk category. So we
"ALL COMMERCIAL BLOOD BANKS SHALL BE PHASED OUT OVER A PERIOD OF TWO YEARS AFTER THE
should stop the system of selling and buying blood so that we can go into a national voluntary blood program.
EFFECTIVITY OF THIS ACT. BLOOD SHALL BE COLLECTED FROM VOLUNTARY DONORS ONLY AND THE
SERVICE FEE TO BE CHARGED FOR EVERY BLOOD PRODUCT ISSUED SHALL BE LIMITED TO THE
NECESSARY EXPENSES ENTAILED IN COLLECTING AND PROCESSING OF BLOOD. THE SERVICE FEE It has been said here in this report, and I quote:
SHALL BE MADE UNIFORM THROUGH GUIDELINES TO BE SET BY THE DEPARTMENTOF HEALTH."
"Why is buying and selling of blood not safe? This is not safe because a donor who expects payment for his blood
I am supporting Mr. President, the finding of a study called "Project to Evaluate the Safety of the Philippine Blood will not tell the truth about his illnesses and will deny any risky social behavior such as sexual promiscuity which
Banking System." This has been taken note of. This is a study done with the assistance of the USAID by doctors increases the risk of having syphilis or AIDS or abuse of intravenous addictive drugs. Laboratory tests are of limited
under the New Tropical Medicine Foundation in Alabang. value and will not detect early infections. Laboratory tests are required only for four diseases in the Philippines.
There are other blood transmissible diseases we do not yet screen for and there could be others where there are no
tests available yet.
Part of the long-term measures proposed by this particular study is to improve laws, outlaw buying and selling of
blood and legally define good manufacturing processes for blood. This goes to the very heart of my amendment
which seeks to put into law the principle that blood should not be subject of commerce of man. A blood bank owner expecting to gain profit from selling blood will also try his best to limit his expenses. Usually he
tries to increase his profit by buying cheaper reagents or test kits, hiring cheaper manpower or skipping some tests
altogether. He may also try to sell blood even though these have infections in them. Because there is no existing
…
system of counterchecking these, the blood bank owner can usually get away with many unethical practices.
The experience of Germany, Mr. President is illustrative of this issue. The reason why contaminated blood was sold On July 15, 1999, petitioners in G.R. No. 133640 filed a Petition to Show Cause Why Public Respondent Should Not
was that there were corners cut by commercial blood banks in the testing process. They were protecting their be Held in Contempt of Court, docketed as G.R. No. 139147, citing public respondent’s willful disobedience of or
profits.25 resistance to the restraining order issued by the Court in the said case. Petitioners alleged that respondent’s act
constitutes circumvention of the temporary restraining order and a mockery of the authority of the Court and the
orderly administration of justice.29 Petitioners added that despite the issuance of the temporary restraining order in
The sponsorship speech of Senator Mercado further elucidated his stand on the issue:
G.R. No. 133640, respondent, in his effort to strike down the existence of commercial blood banks, disseminated
misleading information under the guise of health advisories, press releases, leaflets, brochures and flyers stating,
… among others, that "this year [1998] all commercial blood banks will be closed by 27 May. Those who need blood will
have to rely on government blood banks."30 Petitioners further claimed that respondent Secretary of Health
announced in a press conference during the Blood Donor’s Week that commercial blood banks are "illegal and
Senator Mercado: Today, across the country, hundreds of poverty-stricken, sickly and weak Filipinos, who, dangerous" and that they "are at the moment protected by a restraining order on the basis that their commercial
unemployed, without hope and without money to buy the next meal, will walk into a commercial blood bank, extend interest is more important than the lives of the people." These were all posted in bulletin boards and other
their arms and plead that their blood be bought. They will lie about their age, their medical history. They will lie about conspicuous places in all government hospitals as well as other medical and health centers. 31
when they last sold their blood. For doing this, they will receive close to a hundred pesos. This may tide them over
for the next few days. Of course, until the next bloodletting.
In respondent Secretary’s Comment to the Petition to Show Cause Why Public Respondent Should Not Be Held in
Contempt of Court, dated January 3, 2000, it was explained that nothing was issued by the department ordering the
This same blood will travel to the posh city hospitals and urbane medical centers. This same blood will now be closure of commercial blood banks. The subject health advisory leaflets pertaining to said closure pursuant to
bought by the rich at a price over 500% of the value for which it was sold. Between this buying and selling, obviously, Republic Act No. 7719 were printed and circulated prior to the Court’s issuance of a temporary restraining order on
someone has made a very fast buck. June 21, 1998.32

Every doctor has handled at least one transfusion-related disease in an otherwise normal patient. Patients come in Public respondent further claimed that the primary purpose of the information campaign was "to promote the
for minor surgery of the hand or whatever and they leave with hepatitis B. A patient comes in for an appendectomy importance and safety of voluntary blood donation and to educate the public about the hazards of patronizing blood
and he leaves with malaria. The worst nightmare: A patient comes in for a Caesarian section and leaves with AIDS. supplies from commercial blood banks." 33 In doing so, he was merely performing his regular functions and duties as
the Secretary of Health to protect the health and welfare of the public. Moreover, the DOH is the main proponent of
We do not expect good blood from donors who sell their blood because of poverty. The humane dimension of blood the voluntary blood donation program espoused by Republic Act No. 7719, particularly Section 4 thereof which
transfusion is not in the act of receiving blood, but in the act of giving it… provides that, in order to ensure the adequate supply of human blood, voluntary blood donation shall be promoted
through public education, promotion in schools, professional education, establishment of blood services network,
and walking blood donors.
For years, our people have been at the mercy of commercial blood banks that lobby their interests among medical
technologists, hospital administrators and sometimes even physicians so that a proactive system for collection of
blood from healthy donors becomes difficult, tedious and unrewarding. Hence, by authority of the law, respondent Secretary contends that he has the duty to promote the program of
voluntary blood donation. Certainly, his act of encouraging the public to donate blood voluntarily and educating the
people on the risks associated with blood coming from a paid donor promotes general health and welfare and which
The Department of Health has never institutionalized a comprehensive national program for safe blood and for should be given more importance than the commercial businesses of petitioners.34
voluntary blood donation even if this is a serious public health concern and has fallen for the linen of commercial
blood bankers, hook, line and sinker because it is more convenient to tell the patient to buy blood.
On July 29, 1999, interposing personal and substantial interest in the case as taxpayers and citizens, a Petition-in-
Intervention was filed interjecting the same arguments and issues as laid down by petitioners in G.R. No. 133640
Commercial blood banks hold us hostage to their threat that if we are to close them down, there will be no blood and 133661, namely, the unconstitutionality of the Acts, and, the issuance of a writ of prohibitory injunction. The
supply. This is true if the Government does not step in to ensure that safe supply of blood. We cannot allow intervenors are the immediate relatives of individuals who had died allegedly because of shortage of blood supply at
commercial interest groups to dictate policy on what is and what should be a humanitarian effort. This cannot and will a critical time.35
never work because their interest in blood donation is merely monetary. We cannot expect commercial blood banks
to take the lead in voluntary blood donation. Only the Government can do it, and the Government must do it." 26
The intervenors contended that Republic Act No. 7719 constitutes undue delegation of legislative powers and
unwarranted deprivation of personal liberty.36
On May 5, 1999, petitioners filed a Motion for Issuance of Expanded Temporary Restraining Order for the Court to
order respondent Secretary of Health to cease and desist from announcing the closure of commercial blood banks,
compelling the public to source the needed blood from voluntary donors only, and committing similar acts "that will In a resolution, dated September 7, 1999, and without giving due course to the aforementioned petition, the Court
ultimately cause the shutdown of petitioners’ blood banks." 27 granted the Motion for Intervention that was filed by the above intervenors on August 9, 1999.

On July 8, 1999, respondent Secretary filed his Comment and/or Opposition to the above motion stating that he has In his Comment to the petition-in-intervention, respondent Secretary of Health stated that the sale of blood is
not ordered the closure of commercial blood banks on account of the Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) issued on contrary to the spirit and letter of the Act that "blood donation is a humanitarian act" and "blood transfusion is a
June 2, 1998 by the Court. In compliance with the TRO, DOH had likewise ceased to distribute the health advisory professional medical service and not a sale of commodity (Section 2[a] and [b] of Republic Act No. 7719). The act of
leaflets, posters and flyers to the public which state that "blood banks are closed or will be closed." According to selling blood or charging fees other than those allowed by law is even penalized under Section 12." 37
respondent Secretary, the same were printed and circulated in anticipation of the closure of the commercial blood
banks in accordance with R.A. No. 7719, and were printed and circulated prior to the issuance of the TRO.28 Thus, in view of these, the Court is now tasked to pass upon the constitutionality of Section 7 of Republic Act No.
7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations.
In resolving the controversy, this Court deems it necessary to address the issues and/or questions raised by measures to attain this objective. One of these is the phase out of commercial blood banks in the country. The law
petitioners concerning the constitutionality of the aforesaid Act in G.R. No. 133640 and 133661 as summarized has sufficiently provided a definite standard for the guidance of the Secretary of Health in carrying out its provisions,
hereunder: that is, the promotion of public health by providing a safe and adequate supply of blood through voluntary blood
donation. By its provisions, it has conferred the power and authority to the Secretary of Health as to its execution, to
be exercised under and in pursuance of the law.
I

Congress may validly delegate to administrative agencies the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to
WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719 CONSTITUTES UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER;
implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies.40 The Secretary of Health has been given, under Republic
Act No. 7719, broad powers to execute the provisions of said Act. Section 11 of the Act states:
II
"SEC. 11. Rules and Regulations. – The implementation of the provisions of the Act shall be in accordance with the
WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719 AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS VIOLATE rules and regulations to be promulgated by the Secretary, within sixty (60) days from the approval hereof…"
THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE;
This is what respondent Secretary exactly did when DOH, by virtue of the administrative body’s authority and
III expertise in the matter, came out with Administrative Order No.9, series of 1995 or the Rules and Regulations
Implementing Republic Act No. 7719. Administrative Order. No. 9 effectively filled in the details of the law for its
proper implementation.
WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719 AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS VIOLATE
THE NON-IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE;
Specifically, Section 23 of Administrative Order No. 9 provides that the phase-out period for commercial blood banks
shall be extended for another two years until May 28, 1998 "based on the result of a careful study and review of the
IV blood supply and demand and public safety." This power to ascertain the existence of facts and conditions upon
which the Secretary may effect a period of extension for said phase-out can be delegated by Congress. The true
WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719 AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS distinction between the power to make laws and discretion as to its execution is illustrated by the fact that the
CONSTITUTE DEPRIVATION OF PERSONAL LIBERTY AND PROPERTY; delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an
authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be
done; to the latter no valid objection can be made. 41
V

In this regard, the Secretary did not go beyond the powers granted to him by the Act when said phase-out period
WHETHER OR NOT R.A. 7719 IS A VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER; and, was extended in accordance with the Act as laid out in Section 2 thereof:

VI "SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy – In order to promote public health, it is hereby declared the policy of the state:

WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719 AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS TRULY a) to promote and encourage voluntary blood donation by the citizenry and to instill public consciousness of the
SERVE PUBLIC WELFARE. principle that blood donation is a humanitarian act;

As to the first ground upon which the constitutionality of the Act is being challenged, it is the contention of petitioners b) to lay down the legal principle that the provision of blood for transfusion is a medical service and not a sale of
that the phase out of commercial or free standing blood banks is unconstitutional because it is an improper and commodity;
unwarranted delegation of legislative power. According to petitioners, the Act was incomplete when it was passed by
the Legislature, and the latter failed to fix a standard to which the Secretary of Health must conform in the
performance of his functions. Petitioners also contend that the two-year extension period that may be granted by the c) to provide for adequate, safe, affordable and equitable distribution of blood supply and blood products;
Secretary of Health for the phasing out of commercial blood banks pursuant to Section 7 of the Act constrained the
Secretary to legislate, thus constituting undue delegation of legislative power. d) to inform the public of the need for voluntary blood donation to curb the hazards caused by the commercial sale of
blood;
In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to inquire whether
the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the Legislature so that nothing was e) to teach the benefits and rationale of voluntary blood donation in the existing health subjects of the formal
left to the judgment of the administrative body or any other appointee or delegate of the Legislature. 38 Except as to education system in all public and private schools as well as the non-formal system;
matters of detail that may be left to be filled in by rules and regulations to be adopted or promulgated by executive
officers and administrative boards, an act of the Legislature, as a general rule, is incomplete and hence invalid if it
does not lay down any rule or definite standard by which the administrative board may be guided in the exercise of f) to mobilize all sectors of the community to participate in mechanisms for voluntary and non-profit collection of
the discretionary powers delegated to it.39 blood;

Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 is complete in itself. It is clear from the provisions g) to mandate the Department of Health to establish and organize a National Blood Transfusion Service Network in
of the Act that the Legislature intended primarily to safeguard the health of the people and has mandated several order to rationalize and improve the provision of adequate and safe supply of blood;
h) to provide for adequate assistance to institutions promoting voluntary blood donation and providing non-profit Two, the classification, and the consequent phase out of commercial blood banks is germane to the purpose of the
blood services, either through a system of reimbursement for costs from patients who can afford to pay, or donations law, that is, to provide the nation with an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary blood donation and
from governmental and non-governmental entities; treating blood transfusion as a humanitarian or medical service rather than a commodity. This necessarily involves
the phase out of commercial blood banks based on the fact that they operate as a business enterprise, and they
source their blood supply from paid blood donors who are considered unsafe compared to voluntary blood donors as
i) to require all blood collection units and blood banks/centers to operate on a non-profit basis;
shown by the USAID-sponsored study on the Philippine blood banking system.

j) to establish scientific and professional standards for the operation of blood collection units and blood banks/centers
Three, the Legislature intended for the general application of the law. Its enactment was not solely to address the
in the Philippines;
peculiar circumstances of the situation nor was it intended to apply only to the existing conditions.

k) to regulate and ensure the safety of all activities related to the collection, storage and banking of blood; and,
Lastly, the law applies equally to all commercial blood banks without exception.

l) to require upgrading of blood banks/centers to include preventive services and education to control spread of blood
Having said that, this Court comes to the inquiry as to whether or not Republic Act No. 7719 constitutes a valid
transfusion transmissible diseases."
exercise of police power.

Petitioners also assert that the law and its implementing rules and regulations violate the equal protection clause
The promotion of public health is a fundamental obligation of the State. The health of the people is a primordial
enshrined in the Constitution because it unduly discriminates against commercial or free standing blood banks in a
governmental concern. Basically, the National Blood Services Act was enacted in the exercise of the State’s police
manner that is not germane to the purpose of the law.42
power in order to promote and preserve public health and safety.

What may be regarded as a denial of the equal protection of the laws is a question not always easily determined. No
Police power of the state is validly exercised if (a) the interest of the public generally, as distinguished from those of
rule that will cover every case can be formulated. Class legislation, discriminating against some and favoring others
a particular class, requires the interference of the State; and, (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to
is prohibited but classification on a reasonable basis and not made arbitrarily or capriciously is permitted. The
the attainment of the objective sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. 46
classification, however, to be reasonable: (a) must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences;
(b) must be germane to the purpose of the law; (c) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and, (d) must apply
equally to each member of the class.43 In the earlier discussion, the Court has mentioned of the avowed policy of the law for the protection of public health
by ensuring an adequate supply of safe blood in the country through voluntary blood donation. Attaining this
objective requires the interference of the State given the disturbing condition of the Philippine blood banking system.
Republic Act No. 7719 or The National Blood Services Act of 1994, was enacted for the promotion of public health
and welfare. In the aforementioned study conducted by the New Tropical Medicine Foundation, it was revealed that
the Philippine blood banking system is disturbingly primitive and unsafe, and with its current condition, the spread of In serving the interest of the public, and to give meaning to the purpose of the law, the Legislature deemed it
infectious diseases such as malaria, AIDS, Hepatitis B and syphilis chiefly from blood transfusion is unavoidable. necessary to phase out commercial blood banks. This action may seriously affect the owners and operators, as well
The situation becomes more distressing as the study showed that almost 70% of the blood supply in the country is as the employees, of commercial blood banks but their interests must give way to serve a higher end for the interest
sourced from paid blood donors who are three times riskier than voluntary blood donors because they are unlikely to of the public.
disclose their medical or social history during the blood screening. 44
The Court finds that the National Blood Services Act is a valid exercise of the State’s police power. Therefore, the
The above study led to the passage of Republic Act No. 7719, to instill public consciousness of the importance and Legislature, under the circumstances, adopted a course of action that is both necessary and reasonable for the
benefits of voluntary blood donation, safe blood supply and proper blood collection from healthy donors. To do this, common good. Police power is the State authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or
the Legislature decided to order the phase out of commercial blood banks to improve the Philippine blood banking property in order to promote the general welfare.47
system, to regulate the supply and proper collection of safe blood, and so as not to derail the implementation of the
voluntary blood donation program of the government. In lieu of commercial blood banks, non-profit blood banks or
It is in this regard that the Court finds the related grounds and/or issues raised by petitioners, namely, deprivation of
blood centers, in strict adherence to professional and scientific standards to be established by the DOH, shall be set
personal liberty and property, and violation of the non-impairment clause, to be unmeritorious.
in place.45

Petitioners are of the opinion that the Act is unconstitutional and void because it infringes on the freedom of choice of
Based on the foregoing, the Legislature never intended for the law to create a situation in which unjustifiable
an individual in connection to what he wants to do with his blood which should be outside the domain of State
discrimination and inequality shall be allowed. To effectuate its policy, a classification was made between nonprofit
intervention. Additionally, and in relation to the issue of classification, petitioners asseverate that, indeed, under the
blood banks/centers and commercial blood banks.
Civil Code, the human body and its organs like the heart, the kidney and the liver are outside the commerce of man
but this cannot be made to apply to human blood because the latter can be replenished by the body. To treat human
We deem the classification to be valid and reasonable for the following reasons: blood equally as the human organs would constitute invalid classification. 48

One, it was based on substantial distinctions. The former operates for purely humanitarian reasons and as a medical Petitioners likewise claim that the phase out of the commercial blood banks will be disadvantageous to them as it will
service while the latter is motivated by profit. Also, while the former wholly encourages voluntary blood donation, the affect their businesses and existing contracts with hospitals and other health institutions, hence Section 7 of the Act
latter treats blood as a sale of commodity. should be struck down because it violates the non-impairment clause provided by the Constitution.
As stated above, the State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with personal liberty, with property, 1. In G.R. Nos. 133640 and 133661, the Court UPHOLDS THE VALIDITY of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 7719,
and with business and occupations. Thus, persons may be subjected to certain kinds of restraints and burdens in otherwise known as the National Blood Services Act of 1994, and Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995 or the
order to secure the general welfare of the State and to this fundamental aim of government, the rights of the Rules and Regulations Implementing Republic Act No. 7719. The petitions are DISMISSED. Consequently, the
individual may be subordinated. 49 Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court on June 2, 1998, is LIFTED.

Moreover, in the case of Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon, 50 settled is the rule that the non- 2. In G.R. No. 139147, the petition seeking to cite the Secretary of Health in contempt of court is DENIED for lack of
impairment clause of the Constitution must yield to the loftier purposes targeted by the government. The right merit.
granted by this provision must submit to the demands and necessities of the State’s power of regulation. While the
Court understands the grave implications of Section 7 of the law in question, the concern of the Government in this
No costs.
case, however, is not necessarily to maintain profits of business firms. In the ordinary sequence of events, it is profits
that suffer as a result of government regulation.
SO ORDERED.
Furthermore, the freedom to contract is not absolute; all contracts and all rights are subject to the police power of the
State and not only may regulations which affect them be established by the State, but all such regulations must be ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
subject to change from time to time, as the general well-being of the community may require, or as the
circumstances may change, or as experience may demonstrate the necessity. 51 This doctrine was reiterated in the
Associate Justice
case of Vda. de Genuino v. Court of Agrarian Relations52 where the Court held that individual rights to contract and
to property have to give way to police power exercised for public welfare.

As for determining whether or not the shutdown of commercial blood banks will truly serve the general public
considering the shortage of blood supply in the country as proffered by petitioners, we maintain that the wisdom of
the Legislature in the lawful exercise of its power to enact laws cannot be inquired into by the Court. Doing so would
be in derogation of the principle of separation of powers.53

That, under the circumstances, proper regulation of all blood banks without distinction in order to achieve the
objective of the law as contended by petitioners is, of course, possible; but, this would be arguing on what the
law may be or should be and not what the law is. Between is and ought there is a far cry. The wisdom and propriety
of legislation is not for this Court to pass upon. 54

Finally, with regard to the petition for contempt in G.R. No. 139147, on the other hand, the Court finds respondent
Secretary of Health’s explanation satisfactory. The statements in the flyers and posters were not aimed at influencing
or threatening the Court in deciding in favor of the constitutionality of the law.

Contempt of court presupposes a contumacious attitude, a flouting or arrogant belligerence in defiance of the
court.55 There is nothing contemptuous about the statements and information contained in the health advisory that
were distributed by DOH before the TRO was issued by this Court ordering the former to cease and desist from
distributing the same.

In sum, the Court has been unable to find any constitutional infirmity in the questioned provisions of the National
Blood Services Act of 1994 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations.

The fundamental criterion is that all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute.
Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. For a law to be nullified, it must be shown that there is
a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. The ground for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable
doubt.56 Those who petition this Court to declare a law, or parts thereof, unconstitutional must clearly establish the
basis therefor. Otherwise, the petition must fail.

Based on the grounds raised by petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of the National Blood Services Act of
1994 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, the Court finds that petitioners have failed to overcome the
presumption of constitutionality of the law. As to whether the Act constitutes a wise legislation, considering the issues
being raised by petitioners, is for Congress to determine.57

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court renders judgment as follows:

 Republic of the Philippines 6. That Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company personnel manager, informed PBMEO
SUPREME COURT that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the union guaranteed by the Constitution but
Manila emphasized, however, that any demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice the
normal operation of the Company. For which reason, the Company, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon
warned the PBMEO representatives that workers who belong to the first and regular shifts, who
EN BANC 
without previous leave of absence approved by the Company, particularly , the officers present
who are the organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to report for work the following
G.R. No. L-31195 June 5, 1973 morning (March 4, 1969) shall be dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the existing
CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an illegal strike;
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION, NICANOR TOLENTINO, FLORENCIO,
PADRIGANO RUFINO, ROXAS MARIANO DE LEON, ASENCION PACIENTE, BONIFACIO VACUNA, 7. That at about 5:00 P.M. on March 3, 1969, another meeting was convoked Company
BENJAMIN PAGCU and RODULFO MUNSOD, petitioners,  represented by Atty. C.S. de Leon, Jr. The Union panel was composed of: Nicanor Tolentino,
vs. Rodolfo Munsod, Benjamin Pagcu and Florencio Padrigano. In this afternoon meeting of March
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC. and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents. 3, 1969, Company reiterated and appealed to the PBMEO representatives that while all workers
may join the Malacañang demonstration, the workers for the first and regular shift of March 4,
1969 should be excused from joining the demonstration and should report for work; and thus
L.S. Osorio & P.B. Castillo and J.C. Espinas & Associates for petitioners. utilize the workers in the 2nd and 3rd shifts in order not to violate the provisions of the CBA,
particularly Article XXIV: NO LOCKOUT — NO STRIKE'. All those who will not follow this
Demetrio B. Salem & Associates for private respondent. warning of the Company shall be dismiss; De Leon reiterated the Company's warning that the
officers shall be primarily liable being the organizers of the mass demonstration. The union
panel countered that it was rather too late to change their plans inasmuch as the Malacañang
MAKASIAR, J.: demonstration will be held the following morning; and

The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (hereinafter referred to as PBMEO) is a legitimate 8. That a certain Mr. Wilfredo Ariston, adviser of PBMEO sent a cablegram to the Company
labor union composed of the employees of the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and petitioners which was received 9:50 A.M., March 4, 1969, the contents of which are as follows:
Nicanor Tolentino, Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, 'REITERATING REQUEST EXCUSE DAY SHIFT EMPLOYEES JOINING DEMONSTRATION
Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod are officers and members of the petitioner Union. MARCH 4, 1969.' (Pars. 3-8, Annex "F", pp. 42-43, rec.)

Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass demonstration at Malacañang on March 4, Because the petitioners and their members numbering about 400 proceeded with the demonstration despite the
1969, in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police, to be participated in by the workers in the first shift (from pleas of the respondent Company that the first shift workers should not be required to participate in the
6 A.M. to 2 P.M.) as well as those in the regular second and third shifts (from 7 A.M. to 4 P.M. and from 8 A.M. to 5 demonstration and that the workers in the second and third shifts should be utilized for the demonstration from 6
P.M., respectively); and that they informed the respondent Company of their proposed demonstration. A.M. to 2 P.M. on March 4, 1969, respondent Company prior notice of the mass demonstration on March 4, 1969,
with the respondent Court, a charge against petitioners and other employees who composed the first shift, charging
The questioned order dated September 15, 1969, of Associate Judge Joaquin M. Salvador of the respondent Court them with a "violation of Section 4(a)-6 in relation to Sections 13 and 14, as well as Section 15, all of Republic Act
reproduced the following stipulation of facts of the parties — parties — No. 875, and of the CBA providing for 'No Strike and No Lockout.' " (Annex "A", pp. 19-20, rec.). The charge was
accompanied by the joint affidavit of Arthur L. Ang and Cesareo de Leon, Jr. (Annex "B", pp. 21-24, rec.). Thereafter,
a corresponding complaint was filed, dated April 18, 1969, by Acting Chief Prosecutor Antonio T. Tirona and Acting
3. That on March 2, 1969 complainant company learned of the projected mass demonstration at Prosecutor Linda P. Ilagan (Annex "C", pp. 25-30, rec.)
Malacañang in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig Police Department to be participated
by the first shift (6:00 AM-2:00 PM) workers as well as those working in the regular shifts (7:00
A.M. to 4:00 PM and 8:00 AM to 5:00 PM) in the morning of March 4, 1969; In their answer, dated May 9, 1969, herein petitioners claim that they did not violate the existing CBA because they
gave the respondent Company prior notice of the mass demonstration on March 4, 1969; that the said mass
demonstration was a valid exercise of their constitutional freedom of speech against the alleged abuses of some
4. That a meeting was called by the Company on March 3, 1969 at about 11:00 A.M. at the Pasig policemen; and that their mass demonstration was not a declaration of strike because it was not directed
Company's canteen, and those present were: for the Company: (1) Mr. Arthur L. Ang (2) Atty. S. against the respondent firm (Annex "D", pp. 31-34, rec.)
de Leon, Jr., (3) and all department and section heads. For the PBMEO (1) Florencio Padrigano,
(2) Rufino Roxas, (3) Mariano de Leon, (4) Asencion Paciente, (5) Bonifacio Vacuna and (6)
Benjamin Pagcu. After considering the aforementioned stipulation of facts submitted by the parties, Judge Joaquin M. Salvador, in an
order dated September 15, 1969, found herein petitioner PBMEO guilty of bargaining in bad faith and herein
petitioners Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin
5. That the Company asked the union panel to confirm or deny said projected mass Pagcu, Nicanor Tolentino and Rodulfo Munsod as directly responsible for perpetrating the said unfair labor practice
demonstration at Malacañang on March 4, 1969. PBMEO thru Benjamin Pagcu who acted as and were, as a consequence, considered to have lost their status as employees of the respondent Company (Annex
spokesman of the union panel, confirmed the planned demonstration and stated that the "F", pp. 42-56, rec.)
demonstration or rally cannot be cancelled because it has already been agreed upon in the
meeting. Pagcu explained further that the demonstration has nothing to do with the Company
because the union has no quarrel or dispute with Management; Herein petitioners claim that they received on September 23, 1969, the aforesaid order (p. 11, rec.); and that they
filed on September 29, 1969, because September 28, 1969 fell on Sunday (p. 59, rec.), a motion for reconsideration
of said order dated September 15, 1969, on the ground that it is contrary to law and the evidence, as well as asked (3) The freedoms of expression and of assembly as well as the right to petition are included among the immunities
for ten (10) days within which to file their arguments pursuant to Sections 15, 16 and 17 of the Rules of the CIR, as reserved by the sovereign people, in the rhetorical aphorism of Justice Holmes, to protect the ideas that we abhor or
amended (Annex "G", pp. 57-60, rec. ) hate more than the ideas we cherish; or as Socrates insinuated, not only to protect the minority who want to talk, but
also to benefit the majority who refuse to listen.6 And as Justice Douglas cogently stresses it, the liberties of one are
the liberties of all; and the liberties of one are not safe unless the liberties of all are protected. 7
In its opposition dated October 7, 1969, filed on October 11, 1969 (p. 63, rec.), respondent Company averred that
herein petitioners received on September 22, 1969, the order dated September 17 (should be September 15), 1969;
that under Section 15 of the amended Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations, herein petitioners had five (5) days (4) The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil rights but also political rights essential
from September 22, 1969 or until September 27, 1969, within which to file their motion for reconsideration; and that to man's enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to his full and complete fulfillment. Thru these freedoms the
because their motion for reconsideration was two (2) days late, it should be accordingly dismissed, invoking Bien vs. citizens can participate not merely in the periodic establishment of the government through their suffrage but also in
Castillo,1 which held among others, that a motion for extension of the five-day period for the filing of a motion for the administration of public affairs as well as in the discipline of abusive public officers. The citizen is accorded these
reconsideration should be filed before the said five-day period elapses (Annex "M", pp. 61-64, rec.). rights so that he can appeal to the appropriate governmental officers or agencies for redress and protection as well
as for the imposition of the lawful sanctions on erring public officers and employees.
Subsequently, herein petitioners filed on October 14, 1969 their written arguments dated October 11, 1969, in
support of their motion for reconsideration (Annex "I", pp. 65-73, rec.). (5) While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over property rights is
recognized.8 Because these freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society"
and the "threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions," they
In a resolution dated October 9, 1969, the respondent en banc dismissed the motion for reconsideration of herein
"need breathing space to survive," permitting government regulation only "with narrow specificity." 9
petitioners for being pro forma as it was filed beyond the reglementary period prescribed by its Rules (Annex "J", pp.
74-75, rec.), which herein petitioners received on October 28, 196 (pp. 12 & 76, rec.).
Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. If human rights are
extinguished by the passage of time, then the Bill of Rights is a useless attempt to limit the power of government and
At the bottom of the notice of the order dated October 9, 1969, which was released on October 24, 1969 and
ceases to be an efficacious shield against the tyranny of officials, of majorities, of the influential and powerful, and of
addressed to the counsels of the parties (pp. 75-76, rec.), appear the requirements of Sections 15, 16 and 17, as
oligarchs — political, economic or otherwise.
amended, of the Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations, that a motion for reconsideration shall be filed within five
(5) days from receipt of its decision or order and that an appeal from the decision, resolution or order of the C.I.R.,
sitting en banc, shall be perfected within ten (10) days from receipt thereof (p. 76, rec.). In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position as they are
essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions; 10 and such priority "gives these liberties
the sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions." 11
On October 31, 1969, herein petitioners filed with the respondent court a petition for relief from the order dated
October 9, 1969, on the ground that their failure to file their motion for reconsideration on time was due to excusable
negligence and honest mistake committed by the president of the petitioner Union and of the office clerk of their The superiority of these freedoms over property rights is underscored by the fact that a mere reasonable or rational
counsel, attaching thereto the affidavits of the said president and clerk (Annexes "K", "K-1" and "K-2", rec.). relation between the means employed by the law and its object or purpose — that the law is neither arbitrary nor
discriminatory nor oppressive — would suffice to validate a law which restricts or impairs property rights. 12 On the
other hand, a constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion, namely
Without waiting for any resolution on their petition for relief from the order dated October 9, 1969, herein petitioners
existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent. So it has
filed on November 3, 1969, with the Supreme Court, a notice of appeal (Annex "L", pp. 88-89, rec.).
been stressed in the main opinion of Mr. Justice Fernando in Gonzales vs. Comelec and reiterated by the writer of
the opinion in Imbong vs. Ferrer. 13 It should be added that Mr. Justice Barredo in Gonzales vs. Comelec, supra, like
I Justices Douglas, Black and Goldberg in N.Y. Times Co. vs. Sullivan, 14 believes that the freedoms of speech and of
the press as well as of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances are absolute when directed
against public officials or "when exercised in relation to our right to choose the men and women by whom we shall be
There is need of briefly restating basic concepts and principles which underlie the issues posed by the case at bar. governed," 15 even as Mr. Justice Castro relies on the balancing-of-interests test. 16 Chief Justice Vinson is partial to
the improbable danger rule formulated by Chief Judge Learned Hand, viz. — whether the gravity of the evil,
(1) In a democracy, the preservation and enhancement of the dignity and worth of the human personality is the discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free expression as is necessary to avoid the danger. 17
central core as well as the cardinal article of faith of our civilization. The inviolable character of man as an individual
must be "protected to the largest possible extent in his thoughts and in his beliefs as the citadel of his person." 2 II

(2) The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of liberty, equality and security "against the assaults of The respondent Court of Industrial Relations, after opining that the mass demonstration was not a declaration of
opportunism, the expediency of the passing hour, the erosion of small encroachments, and the scorn and derision of strike, concluded that by their "concerted act and the occurrence temporary stoppage of work," herein petitioners are
those who have no patience with general principles."3 guilty bargaining in bad faith and hence violated the collective bargaining agreement with private respondent
Philippine Blooming Mills Co., inc.. Set against and tested by foregoing principles governing a democratic society,
In the pithy language of Mr. Justice Robert Jackson, the purpose of the Bill of Rights is to withdraw "certain subjects such conclusion cannot be sustained. The demonstration held petitioners on March 4, 1969 before Malacañang was
from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials, and against alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen, not against their employer, herein private respondent firm, said
to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's rights to life, liberty and property, to free demonstrate was purely and completely an exercise of their freedom expression in general and of their right of
speech, or free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to a assembly and petition for redress of grievances in particular before appropriate governmental agency, the Chief
vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections."4 Laski proclaimed that "the happiness of the individual, not the Executive, again the police officers of the municipality of Pasig. They exercise their civil and political rights for their
well-being of the State, was the criterion by which its behaviour was to be judged. His interests, not its power, set the mutual aid protection from what they believe were police excesses. As matter of fact, it was the duty of herein private
limits to the authority it was entitled to exercise." 5 respondent firm to protect herein petitioner Union and its members fro the harassment of local police officers. It was
to the interest herein private respondent firm to rally to the defense of, and take up the cudgels for, its employees, so
that they can report to work free from harassment, vexation or peril and as consequence perform more efficiently advance of their projected demonstration and the company could have made arrangements to counteract or prevent
their respective tasks enhance its productivity as well as profits. Herein respondent employer did not even offer to whatever losses it might sustain by reason of the absence of its workers for one day, especially in this case when the
intercede for its employees with the local police. Was it securing peace for itself at the expenses of its workers? Was Union requested it to excuse only the day-shift employees who will join the demonstration on March 4, 1969 which
it also intimidated by the local police or did it encourage the local police to terrorize or vex its workers? Its failure to request the Union reiterated in their telegram received by the company at 9:50 in the morning of March 4, 1969, the
defend its own employees all the more weakened the position of its laborers the alleged oppressive police who might day of the mass demonstration (pp. 42-43, rec.). There was a lack of human understanding or compassion on the
have been all the more emboldened thereby subject its lowly employees to further indignities. part of the firm in rejecting the request of the Union for excuse from work for the day shifts in order to carry out its
mass demonstration. And to regard as a ground for dismissal the mass demonstration held against the Pasig police,
not against the company, is gross vindictiveness on the part of the employer, which is as unchristian as it is
In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression well as their right of assembly and of petition against
unconstitutional.
alleged persecution of local officialdom, the employees and laborers of herein private respondent firm were fighting
for their very survival, utilizing only the weapons afforded them by the Constitution — the untrammelled enjoyment of
their basic human rights. The pretension of their employer that it would suffer loss or damage by reason of the III
absence of its employees from 6 o'clock in the morning to 2 o'clock in the afternoon, is a plea for the preservation
merely of their property rights. Such apprehended loss or damage would not spell the difference between the life and
The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice. Because the refusal on the part of the respondent
death of the firm or its owners or its management. The employees' pathetic situation was a stark reality — abused,
firm to permit all its employees and workers to join the mass demonstration against alleged police abuses and the
harassment and persecuted as they believed they were by the peace officers of the municipality. As above intimated,
subsequent separation of the eight (8) petitioners from the service constituted an unconstitutional restraint on the
the condition in which the employees found themselves vis-a-vis the local police of Pasig, was a matter that vitally
freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom petition for redress of grievances, the respondent firm
affected their right to individual existence as well as that of their families. Material loss can be repaired or adequately
committed an unfair labor practice defined in Section 4(a-1) in relation to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875,
compensated. The debasement of the human being broken in morale and brutalized in spirit-can never be fully
otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 8 guarantees to the employees the right
evaluated in monetary terms. The wounds fester and the scars remain to humiliate him to his dying day, even as he
"to engage in concert activities for ... mutual aid or protection"; while Section 4(a-1) regards as an unfair labor
cries in anguish for retribution, denial of which is like rubbing salt on bruised tissues.
practice for an employer interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise their rights guaranteed in
Section Three."
As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights — freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition for
redress of grievances — over property rights has been sustained. 18 Emphatic reiteration of this basic tenet as a
We repeat that the obvious purpose of the mass demonstration staged by the workers of the respondent firm on
coveted boon — at once the shield and armor of the dignity and worth of the human personality, the all-consuming
March 4, 1969, was for their mutual aid and protection against alleged police abuses, denial of which was
ideal of our enlightened civilization — becomes Our duty, if freedom and social justice have any meaning at all for
interference with or restraint on the right of the employees to engage in such common action to better shield
him who toils so that capital can produce economic goods that can generate happiness for all. To regard the
themselves against such alleged police indignities. The insistence on the part of the respondent firm that the workers
demonstration against police officers, not against the employer, as evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and
for the morning and regular shift should not participate in the mass demonstration, under pain of dismissal, was as
hence a violation of the collective bargaining agreement and a cause for the dismissal from employment of the
heretofore stated, "a potent means of inhibiting speech." 22
demonstrating employees, stretches unduly the compass of the collective bargaining agreement, is "a potent means
of inhibiting speech" and therefore inflicts a moral as well as mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of free
expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition. 19 Such a concerted action for their mutual help and protection deserves at least equal protection as the concerted
action of employees in giving publicity to a letter complaint charging bank president with immorality, nepotism,
favoritism an discrimination in the appointment and promotion of ban employees. 23 We further ruled in the Republic
The collective bargaining agreement which fixes the working shifts of the employees, according to the respondent
Savings Bank case, supra, that for the employees to come within the protective mantle of Section 3 in relation to
Court Industrial Relations, in effect imposes on the workers the "duty ... to observe regular working hours." The strain
Section 4(a-1) on Republic Act No. 875, "it is not necessary that union activity be involved or that collective
construction of the Court of Industrial Relations that a stipulated working shifts deny the workers the right to stage
bargaining be contemplated," as long as the concerted activity is for the furtherance of their interests. 24
mass demonstration against police abuses during working hours, constitutes a virtual tyranny over the mind and life
the workers and deserves severe condemnation. Renunciation of the freedom should not be predicated on such a
slender ground. As stated clearly in the stipulation of facts embodied in the questioned order of respondent Court dated September
15, 1969, the company, "while expressly acknowledging, that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the Union
guaranteed by the Constitution," nonetheless emphasized that "any demonstration for that matter should not unduly
The mass demonstration staged by the employees on March 4, 1969 could not have been legally enjoined by any
prejudice the normal operation of the company" and "warned the PBMEO representatives that workers who belong
court, such an injunction would be trenching upon the freedom expression of the workers, even if it legally appears to
to the first and regular shifts, who without previous leave of absence approved by the Company, particularly the
be illegal picketing or strike. 20 The respondent Court of Industrial Relations in the case at bar concedes that the
officers present who are the organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to report for work the following morning
mass demonstration was not a declaration of a strike "as the same not rooted in any industrial dispute although there
(March 4, 1969) shall be dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be
is concerted act and the occurrence of a temporary stoppage work." (Annex "F", p. 45, rec.).
amounting to an illegal strike (;)" (p. III, petitioner's brief). Such threat of dismissal tended to coerce the employees
from joining the mass demonstration. However, the issues that the employees raised against the local police, were
The respondent firm claims that there was no need for all its employees to participate in the demonstration and that more important to them because they had the courage to proceed with the demonstration, despite such threat of
they suggested to the Union that only the first and regular shift from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. should report for work in order dismissal. The most that could happen to them was to lose a day's wage by reason of their absence from work on
that loss or damage to the firm will be averted. This stand failed appreciate the sine qua non of an effective the day of the demonstration. One day's pay means much to a laborer, more especially if he has a family to support.
demonstration especially by a labor union, namely the complete unity of the Union members as well as their total Yet, they were willing to forego their one-day salary hoping that their demonstration would bring about the desired
presence at the demonstration site in order to generate the maximum sympathy for the validity of their cause but also relief from police abuses. But management was adamant in refusing to recognize the superior legitimacy of their right
immediately action on the part of the corresponding government agencies with jurisdiction over the issues they of free speech, free assembly and the right to petition for redress.
raised against the local police. Circulation is one of the aspects of freedom of expression. 21 If demonstrators are
reduced by one-third, then by that much the circulation of the issues raised by the demonstration is diminished. The
Because the respondent company ostensibly did not find it necessary to demand from the workers proof of the truth
more the participants, the more persons can be apprised of the purpose of the rally. Moreover, the absence of one-
of the alleged abuses inflicted on them by the local police, it thereby concedes that the evidence of such abuses
third of their members will be regarded as a substantial indication of disunity in their ranks which will enervate their
should properly be submitted to the corresponding authorities having jurisdiction over their complaint and to whom
position and abet continued alleged police persecution. At any rate, the Union notified the company two days in
such complaint may be referred by the President of the Philippines for proper investigation and action with a view to period for appeal. The battle then would be reduced to a race for time. And in such a contest between an employer
disciplining the local police officers involved. and its laborer, the latter eventually loses because he cannot employ the best an dedicated counsel who can defend
his interest with the required diligence and zeal, bereft as he is of the financial resources with which to pay for
competent legal services. 28-a
On the other hand, while the respondent Court of Industrial Relations found that the demonstration "paralyzed to a
large extent the operations of the complainant company," the respondent Court of Industrial Relations did not make
any finding as to the fact of loss actually sustained by the firm. This significant circumstance can only mean that the VI
firm did not sustain any loss or damage. It did not present evidence as to whether it lost expected profits for failure to
comply with purchase orders on that day; or that penalties were exacted from it by customers whose orders could
The Court of Industrial Relations rule prescribes that motion for reconsideration of its order or writ should filed within
not be filled that day of the demonstration; or that purchase orders were cancelled by the customers by reason of its
five (5) days from notice thereof and that the arguments in support of said motion shall be filed within ten (10) days
failure to deliver the materials ordered; or that its own equipment or materials or products were damaged due to
from the date of filing of such motion for reconsideration (Sec. 16). As above intimated, these rules of procedure
absence of its workers on March 4, 1969. On the contrary, the company saved a sizable amount in the form of
were promulgated by the Court of Industrial Relations pursuant to a legislative delegation. 29
wages for its hundreds of workers, cost of fuel, water and electric consumption that day. Such savings could have
amply compensated for unrealized profits or damages it might have sustained by reason of the absence of its
workers for only one day. The motion for reconsideration was filed on September 29, 1969, or seven (7) days from notice on September 22,
1969 of the order dated September 15, 1969 or two (2) days late. Petitioners claim that they could have filed it on
September 28, 1969, but it was a Sunday.
IV

Does the mere fact that the motion for reconsideration was filed two (2) days late defeat the rights of the petitioning
Apart from violating the constitutional guarantees of free speech and assembly as well as the right to petition for
employees? Or more directly and concretely, does the inadvertent omission to comply with a mere Court of Industrial
redress of grievances of the employees, the dismissal of the eight (8) leaders of the workers for proceeding with the
Relations procedural rule governing the period for filing a motion for reconsideration or appeal in labor cases,
demonstration and consequently being absent from work, constitutes a denial of social justice likewise assured by
promulgated pursuant to a legislative delegation, prevail over constitutional rights? The answer should be obvious in
the fundamental law to these lowly employees. Section 5 of Article II of the Constitution imposes upon the State "the
the light of the aforecited cases. To accord supremacy to the foregoing rules of the Court of Industrial Relations over
promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all of the people," which guarantee is
basic human rights sheltered by the Constitution, is not only incompatible with the basic tenet of constitutional
emphasized by the other directive in Section 6 of Article XIV of the Constitution that "the State shall afford protection
government that the Constitution is superior to any statute or subordinate rules and regulations, but also does
to labor ...". Respondent Court of Industrial Relations as an agency of the State is under obligation at all times to give
violence to natural reason and logic. The dominance and superiority of the constitutional right over the aforesaid
meaning and substance to these constitutional guarantees in favor of the working man; for otherwise these
Court of Industrial Relations procedural rule of necessity should be affirmed. Such a Court of Industrial Relations rule
constitutional safeguards would be merely a lot of "meaningless constitutional patter." Under the Industrial Peace
as applied in this case does not implement or reinforce or strengthen the constitutional rights affected,' but instead
Act, the Court of Industrial Relations is enjoined to effect the policy of the law "to eliminate the causes of industrial
constrict the same to the point of nullifying the enjoyment thereof by the petitioning employees. Said Court of
unrest by encouraging and protecting the exercise by employees of their right to self-organization for the purpose of
Industrial Relations rule, promulgated as it was pursuant to a mere legislative delegation, is unreasonable and
collective bargaining and for the promotion of their moral, social and economic well-being." It is most unfortunate in
therefore is beyond the authority granted by the Constitution and the law. A period of five (5) days within which to file
the case at bar that respondent Court of Industrial Relations, the very governmental agency designed therefor, failed
a motion for reconsideration is too short, especially for the aggrieved workers, who usually do not have the ready
to implement this policy and failed to keep faith with its avowed mission — its raison d'etre — as ordained and
funds to meet the necessary expenses therefor. In case of the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, a period of
directed by the Constitution.
fifteen (15) days has been fixed for the filing of the motion for re hearing or reconsideration (See. 10, Rule 51; Sec. 1,
Rule 52; Sec. 1, Rule 56, Revised Rules of Court). The delay in the filing of the motion for reconsideration could
V have been only one day if September 28, 1969 was not a Sunday. This fact accentuates the unreasonableness of
the Court of Industrial are concerned.
It has been likewise established that a violation of a constitutional right divests the court of jurisdiction; and as a
consequence its judgment is null and void and confers no rights. Relief from a criminal conviction secured at the It should be stressed here that the motion for reconsideration dated September 27, 1969, is based on the ground
sacrifice of constitutional liberties, may be obtained through habeas corpus proceedings even long after the finality of that the order sought to be reconsidered "is not in accordance with law, evidence and facts adduced during the
the judgment. Thus, habeas corpus is the remedy to obtain the release of an individual, who is convicted by final hearing," and likewise prays for an extension of ten (10) days within which to file arguments pursuant to Sections 15,
judgment through a forced confession, which violated his constitutional right against self-incrimination; 25 or who is 16 and 17 of the Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations (Annex "G", pp. 57-60, rec.); although the arguments were
denied the right to present evidence in his defense as a deprivation of his liberty without due process of law, 26 even actually filed by the herein petitioners on October 14, 1969 (Annex "I", pp. 70-73, rec.), long after the 10-day period
after the accused has already served sentence for twenty-two years. 27 required for the filing of such supporting arguments counted from the filing of the motion for reconsideration. Herein
petitioners received only on October 28, 1969 the resolution dated October 9, 1969 dismissing the motion for
reconsideration for being pro forma since it was filed beyond the reglementary period (Annex "J", pp. 74-75, rec.)
Both the respondents Court of Industrial Relations and private firm trenched upon these constitutional immunities of
petitioners. Both failed to accord preference to such rights and aggravated the inhumanity to which the aggrieved
workers claimed they had been subjected by the municipal police. Having violated these basic human rights of the It is true that We ruled in several cases that where a motion to reconsider is filed out of time, or where the arguments
laborers, the Court of Industrial Relations ousted itself of jurisdiction and the questioned orders it issued in the instant in suppf such motion are filed beyond the 10 day reglementary period provided for by the Court of Industrial
case are a nullity. Recognition and protection of such freedoms are imperative on all public offices including the Relations rules, the order or decision subject of29-a reconsideration becomes final and unappealable. But in all these
courts 28 as well as private citizens and corporations, the exercise and enjoyment of which must not be nullified by cases, the constitutional rights of free expression, free assembly and petition were not involved.
mere procedural rule promulgated by the Court Industrial Relations exercising a purely delegate legislative power,
when even a law enacted by Congress must yield to the untrammelled enjoyment of these human rights. There is no
It is a procedural rule that generally all causes of action and defenses presently available must be specifically raised
time limit to the exercise of the freedoms. The right to enjoy them is not exhausted by the delivery of one speech, the
in the complaint or answer; so that any cause of action or defense not raised in such pleadings, is deemed waived.
printing of one article or the staging of one demonstration. It is a continuing immunity to be invoked and exercised
However, a constitutional issue can be raised any time, even for the first time on appeal, if it appears that the
when exigent and expedient whenever there are errors to be rectified, abuses to be denounced, inhumanities to be
determination of the constitutional issue is necessary to a decision of the case, the very lis mota of the case without
condemned. Otherwise these guarantees in the Bill of Rights would be vitiated by rule on procedure prescribing the
the resolution of which no final and complete determination of the dispute can be made. 30 It is thus seen that a
procedural rule of Congress or of the Supreme Court gives way to a constitutional right. In the instant case, the We hold that such criterion is not binding upon the Court of Industrial Relations. Under Section
procedural rule of the Court of Industrial Relations, a creature of Congress, must likewise yield to the constitutional 20 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, 'The Court of Industrial Relations shall adopt its, rules or
rights invoked by herein petitioners even before the institution of the unfair labor practice charged against them and procedure and shall have such other powers as generally pertain to a court of justice: Provided,
in their defense to the said charge. however, That in the hearing, investigation and determination of any question or controversy and
in exercising any duties and power under this Act, the Court shall act according to justice and
equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall
In the case at bar, enforcement of the basic human freedoms sheltered no less by the organic law, is a most
not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as
compelling reason to deny application of a Court of Industrial Relations rule which impinges on such human rights. 30-
it may deem just and equitable.' By this provision the industrial court is disengaged from the
a
rigidity of the technicalities applicable to ordinary courts. Said court is not even restricted to the
specific relief demanded by the parties but may issue such orders as may be deemed necessary
It is an accepted principle that the Supreme Court has the inherent power to "suspend its own rules or to except a or expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute or dispelling any doubts that may give rise to
particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice require." 30-b Mr. Justice Barredo in his future disputes. (Ang Tibay v. C.I.R., G.R. No. 46496, Feb. 17, 1940; Manila Trading & Supply
concurring opinion in Estrada vs. Sto. Domingo. 30-c reiterated this principle and added that Co. v. Phil. Labor, 71 Phil. 124.) For these reasons, We believe that this provision is ample
enough to have enabled the respondent court to consider whether or not its previous ruling that
petitioners constitute a minority was founded on fact, without regard to the technical meaning of
Under this authority, this Court is enabled to cove with all situations without concerning itself newly discovered evidence. ... (Alonso v. Villamor, 16 Phil. 315; Chua Kiong v. Whitaker, 46 Phil.
about procedural niceties that do not square with the need to do justice, in any case, without 578). (emphasis supplied.)
further loss of time, provided that the right of the parties to a full day in court is not substantially
impaired. Thus, this Court may treat an appeal as a certiorari and vice-versa. In other words,
when all the material facts are spread in the records before Us, and all the parties have been To apply Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules with "pedantic rigor" in the instant case is to rule in
duly heard, it matters little that the error of the court a quo is of judgment or of jurisdiction. We effect that the poor workers, who can ill-afford an alert competent lawyer, can no longer seek the sanctuary of human
can then and there render the appropriate judgment. Is within the contemplation of this doctrine freedoms secured to them by the fundamental law, simply because their counsel — erroneously believing that he
that as it is perfectly legal and within the power of this Court to strike down in an appeal acts received a copy of the decision on September 23, 1969, instead of September 22, 1969 - filed his motion for
without or in excess of jurisdiction or committed with grave abuse of discretion, it cannot be reconsideration September 29, 1969, which practically is only one day late considering that September 28, 1969 was
beyond the admit of its authority, in appropriate cases, to reverse in a certain proceed in any a Sunday.
error of judgment of a court a quo which cannot be exactly categorized as a flaw of jurisdiction. If
there can be any doubt, which I do not entertain, on whether or not the errors this Court has
Many a time, this Court deviated from procedure technicalities when they ceased to be instruments of justice, for the
found in the decision of the Court of Appeals are short of being jurisdiction nullities or excesses,
attainment of which such rules have been devised. Summarizing the jurisprudence on this score, Mr. Justice
this Court would still be on firm legal grounds should it choose to reverse said decision here and
Fernando, speaking for a unanimous Court in Palma vs. Oreta, 30-f Stated:
now even if such errors can be considered as mere mistakes of judgment or only as faults in the
exercise of jurisdiction, so as to avoid the unnecessary return of this case to the lower court for
the sole purpose of pursuing the ordinary course of an appeal. (Emphasis supplied). 30-d As was so aptly expressed by Justice Moreland in Alonso v. Villamor (16 Phil. 315 [1910]. The
Villamor decision was cited with approval in Register of Deeds v. Phil. Nat. Bank, 84 Phil. 600
[1949]; Potenciano v. Court of Appeals, 104 Phil. 156 [1958] and Uy v. Uy, 14243, June 30,
Insistence on the application of the questioned Court industrial Relations rule in this particular case at bar would an
1961, 2 SCRA 675.), decided as far back as 1910, "technicality. when it deserts its proper-office
unreasoning adherence to "Procedural niceties" which denies justice to the herein laborers, whose basic human
as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant
freedoms, including the right to survive, must be according supremacy over the property rights of their employer firm
consideration from courts." (Ibid., p, 322.) To that norm, this Court has remained committed. The
which has been given a full hearing on this case, especially when, as in the case at bar, no actual material damage
late Justice Recto in Blanco v. Bernabe, (63 Phil. 124 [1936]) was of a similar mind. For him the
has be demonstrated as having been inflicted on its property rights.
interpretation of procedural rule should never "sacrifice the ends justice." While "procedural laws
are no other than technicalities" view them in their entirety, 'they were adopted not as ends
If We can disregard our own rules when justice requires it, obedience to the Constitution renders more imperative the themselves for the compliance with which courts have organized and function, but as means
suspension of a Court of Industrial Relations rule that clash with the human rights sanctioned and shielded with conducive to the realization the administration of the law and of justice (Ibid., p.,128). We have
resolution concern by the specific guarantees outlined in the organic law. It should be stressed that the application in remained steadfastly opposed, in the highly rhetorical language Justice Felix, to "a sacrifice of
the instant case Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules relied upon by herein respondent firm is substantial rights of a litigant in altar of sophisticated technicalities with impairment of the sacred
unreasonable and therefore such application becomes unconstitutional as it subverts the human rights of petitioning principles of justice." (Potenciano v. Court of Appeals, 104 Phil. 156, 161 [1958]). As succinctly
labor union and workers in the light of the peculiar facts and circumstances revealed by the record. put by Justice Makalintal, they "should give way to the realities of the situation." (Urbayan v.
Caltex, L-15379, Aug. 31, 1962, 5 SCRA 1016, 1019). In the latest decision in point promulgated
in 1968, (Udan v. Amon, (1968, 23 SCRA citing McEntee v. Manotok, L-14968, Oct. 27, 1961, 3
The suspension of the application of Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules with reference to the case at SCRA 272.) Justice Zaldivar was partial to an earlier formulation of Justice Labrador that rules of
is also authorized by Section 20 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, the C.I.R. charter, which enjoins the Court of procedure "are not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense"; but are intended "to help
Industrial Relations to "act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to secure substantial justice." (Ibid., p. 843) ... 30-g
technicalities or legal forms ..."

Even if the questioned Court of Industrial Relations orders and rule were to be given effect, the dismissal or
On several occasions, We emphasized this doctrine which was re-stated by Mr. Justice Barredo, speaking for the termination of the employment of the petitioning eight (8) leaders of the Union is harsh for a one-day absence from
Court, in the 1970 case of Kapisanan, etc. vs. Hamilton, etc., et. al.,  30-e thus: work. The respondent Court itself recognized the severity of such a sanction when it did not include the dismissal of
the other 393 employees who are members of the same Union and who participated in the demonstration against the
As to the point that the evidence being offered by the petitioners in the motion for new trial is not Pasig police. As a matter of fact, upon the intercession of the Secretary of Labor, the Union members who are not
"newly discovered," as such term is understood in the rules of procedure for the ordinary courts, officers, were not dismissed and only the Union itself and its thirteen (13) officers were specifically named as
respondents in the unfair labor practice charge filed against them by the firm (pp. 16-20, respondent's Brief; Annexes nonetheless protected for they were engaged in concerted activity, in the exercise of their right
"A", "B" and "C", pp. 20-30, rec.). Counsel for respondent firm insinuates that not all the 400 or so employee of self organization that includes concerted activity for mutual aid and protection, (Section 3 of
participated in the demonstration, for which reason only the Union and its thirteen (13) officers were specifically the Industrial Peace Act ...) This is the view of some members of this Court. For, as has been
named in the unfair labor practice charge (p. 20, respondent's brief). If that were so, then many, if not all, of the aptly stated, the joining in protests or demands, even by a small group of employees, if in
morning and regular shifts reported for work on March 4, 1969 and that, as a consequence, the firm continued in furtherance of their interests as such, is a concerted activity protected by the Industrial Peace
operation that day and did not sustain any damage. Act. It is not necessary that union activity be involved or that collective bargaining be
contemplated. (Annot., 6 A.L.R. 2d 416 [1949]).
The appropriate penalty — if it deserves any penalty at all — should have been simply to charge said one-day
absence against their vacation or sick leave. But to dismiss the eight (8) leaders of the petitioner Union is a most xxx xxx xxx
cruel penalty, since as aforestated the Union leaders depend on their wages for their daily sustenance as well as that
of their respective families aside from the fact that it is a lethal blow to unionism, while at the same time
Instead of stifling criticism, the Bank should have allowed the respondents to air their
strengthening the oppressive hand of the petty tyrants in the localities.
grievances.

Mr. Justice Douglas articulated this pointed reminder:

xxx xxx xxx

The challenge to our liberties comes frequently not from those who consciously seek to destroy
The Bank defends its action by invoking its right to discipline for what it calls the respondents'
our system of Government, but from men of goodwill — good men who allow their proper
libel in giving undue publicity to their letter-charge. To be sure, the right of self-organization of
concerns to blind them to the fact that what they propose to accomplish involves an impairment
employees is not unlimited (Republic Aviation Corp. vs. NLRB 324 U.S. 793 [1945]), as the right
of liberty.
of the employer to discharge for cause (Philippine Education Co. v. Union of Phil. Educ.
Employees, L-13773, April 29, 1960) is undenied. The Industrial Peace Act does not touch the
... The Motives of these men are often commendable. What we must remember, however, is normal exercise of the right of the employer to select his employees or to discharge them. It is
thatpreservation of liberties does not depend on motives. A suppression of liberty has the same directed solely against the abuse of that right by interfering with the countervailing right of self
effect whether the suppress or be a reformer or an outlaw. The only protection against organization (Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB 313 U.S. 177 [1941])...
misguided zeal is a constant alertness of the infractions of the guarantees of liberty contained in
our Constitution. Each surrender of liberty to the demands of the moment makes easier another,
xxx xxx xxx
larger surrender. The battle over the Bill of Rights is a never ending one.

In the final sum and substance, this Court is in unanimity that the Bank's conduct, identified as
... The liberties of any person are the liberties of all of us.
an interference with the employees' right of self-organization or as a retaliatory action, and/or as
a refusal to bargain collectively, constituted an unfair labor practice within the meaning and
... In short, the Liberties of none are safe unless the liberties of all are protected. intendment of section 4(a) of the Industrial Peace Act. (Emphasis supplied.) 33

... But even if we should sense no danger to our own liberties, even if we feel secure because If free expression was accorded recognition and protection to fortify labor unionism in the Republic Savings case,
we belong to a group that is important and respected, we must recognize that our Bill of Rights supra, where the complaint assailed the morality and integrity of the bank president no less, such recognition and
is a code of fair play for the less fortunate that we in all honor and good conscience must be protection for free speech, free assembly and right to petition are rendered all the more justifiable and more
observe. 31 imperative in the case at bar, where the mass demonstration was not against the company nor any of its officers.

The case at bar is worse. WHEREFORE, judgement is hereby rendered:

Management has shown not only lack of good-will or good intention, but a complete lack of sympathetic (1) setting aside as null and void the orders of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations dated September 15 and
understanding of the plight of its laborers who claim that they are being subjected to indignities by the local police, It October 9, 1969; and
was more expedient for the firm to conserve its income or profits than to assist its employees in their fight for their
freedoms and security against alleged petty tyrannies of local police officers. This is sheer opportunism. Such
(2) directing the re instatement of the herein eight (8) petitioners, with full back pay from the date of their separation
opportunism and expediency resorted to by the respondent company assaulted the immunities and welfare of its
from the service until re instated, minus one day's pay and whatever earnings they might have realized from other
employees. It was pure and implement selfishness, if not greed.
sources during their separation from the service.

Of happy relevance is the 1967 case of Republic Savings Bank vs. C.I.R., 32 where the petitioner Bank dismissed
With costs against private respondent Philippine Blooming Company, Inc.
eight (8) employees for having written and published "a patently libelous letter ... to the Bank president demanding
his resignation on the grounds of immorality, nepotism in the appointment and favoritism as well as discrimination in
the promotion of bank employees." Therein, thru Mr. Justice Castro, We ruled: Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando and Esguerra, JJ., concur.

It will avail the Bank none to gloat over this admission of the respondents. Assuming that the Makalintal, C.J, took no part.
latter acted in their individual capacities when they wrote the letter-charge they were
  1649, 1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734, 1737-1742, 1744, 1746-1751, 1752,
1754, 1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800, 1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816,
1825-1826, 1829, 1831-1832, 1835-1836, 1839-1840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-1858,
1860, 1866, 1868, 1870, 1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952, 1963, 1965-1966,
1968-1984, 1986-2028, 2030-2044, 2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-492, 494-507, 509-510,
Manila
522, 524-528, 531-532, 536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567-568, 570, 574, 593,
594, 598-604, 609, 611- 647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-786, 788-852, 854-857.
EN BANC
f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81, 92, 94, 95,
G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985 107, 120, 122, 123.

LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433, 436-439.
INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners, 
vs. The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the ground that
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is submitted that in the
his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity absence of any showing that petitioners are personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-
as Director, Malacañang Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of publication of the presidential issuances in question 2 said petitioners are without the requisite legal personality to
Printing, respondents. institute this mandamus proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties" within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65
of the Rules of Court, which we quote:

SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully
ESCOLIN, J.: neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use a rd enjoyment of a right or
office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the
the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent commanding the defendant, immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required
public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters to be done to Protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the
of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders. petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant.

Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought: Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object
is to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific interest for their petition to be given
a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200, 234, 265, 286, due course.
298, 303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404, 406, 415, 427, 429, 445,
447, 473, 486, 491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594, 599, 644, 658, 661, 718, 731, The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs. Governor General, 3 this
733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961, 1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165, Court held that while the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to a private individual only in
1166, 1242, 1246, 1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826, those cases where he has some private or particular interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be
1829-1840, 1842-1847. protected, independent of that which he holds with the public at large," and "it is for the public officers exclusively to
apply for the writ when public rights are to be subserved [Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless,
b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153, 155, 161, "when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public
173, 180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213, 215-224, 226-228, 231-239, duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are
241-245, 248, 251, 253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-289, 291, 293, 297-299, 301-303, instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a
309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367, 370, 382, 385, 386, 396-397, 405, citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws [High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].
438-440, 444- 445, 473, 486, 488, 498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609,
610, 611, 612, 615, 641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837-839, 878-879, 881, 882, 939-940, Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual, as a proper party to the
964,997,1149-1178,1180-1278. mandamus proceedings brought to compel the Governor General to call a special election for the position of
municipal president in the town of Silay, Negros Occidental. Speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said:
c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.
We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the proposition that the
d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529, 1532, 1535, relator is a proper party to proceedings of this character when a public right is sought to be
1538, 1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600, 1606-1609, 1612-1628, 1630- enforced. If the general rule in America were otherwise, we think that it would not be applicable
to the case at bar for the reason 'that it is always dangerous to apply a general rule to a
 particular case without keeping in mind the reason for the rule, because, if under the particular Batasan Pambansa—and for the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative records—no such publicity
circumstances the reason for the rule does not exist, the rule itself is not applicable and reliance accompanies the law-making process of the President. Thus, without publication, the people have no means of
upon the rule may well lead to error' knowing what presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing
themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la
denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones,
No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by counsel for the
Circulares y Reales ordines dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad. 5
respondent. The circumstances which surround this case are different from those in the United
States, inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to these proceedings no other person
could be, as we have seen that it is not the duty of the law officer of the Government to appear The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in the Official
and represent the people in cases of this character. Gazette ... ." The word "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be
enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern is to be given substance
and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind,
The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the aforementioned case apply
leaves respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded from such publication.
squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right
recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were not allowed to institute this
proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate the same, considering that the The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law.
Solicitor General, the government officer generally empowered to represent the people, has entered his appearance Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a
for respondents in this case. burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances
which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be
published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned. 6
Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the
effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the
presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a
Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code: requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially
and specifically informed of its contents. As Justice Claudio Teehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ... In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form part of the law
of the land, the requirement of due process and the Rule of Law demand that the Official
Gazette as the official government repository promulgate and publish the texts of all such
The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said article. In a long line of
decrees, orders and instructions so that the people may know where to obtain their official and
decisions,4 this Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the
specific contents.
legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of publication is material for determining its
date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date
when it goes into effect. The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published, shall
have no force and effect. Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect this
decision might have on acts done in reliance of the validity of those presidential decrees which were published only
Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of
during the pendency of this petition, have put the question as to whether the Court's declaration of invalidity apply to
publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached
P.D.s which had been enforced or implemented prior to their publication. The answer is all too familiar. In similar
that said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself
situations in the past this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage
provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:
District vs. Baxter Bank 8 to wit:

Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important legisiative acts and
The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found to
resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive and
be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no
administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability; [3]
duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v. Shelby County, 118
decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may be
U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however,
deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such documents or
that such broad statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be
classes of documents as may be required so to be published by law; and [5] such documents or
taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an
classes of documents as the President of the Philippines shall determine from time to time to
operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot
have general applicability and legal effect, or which he may authorize so to be published. ...
always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to
invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects-with respect to particular conduct,
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior
which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of
basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or the nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand examination. These
otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a questions are among the most difficult of those which have engaged the attention of courts,
constructive one. state and federal and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a
principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.
Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws taken so vital
significance that at this time when the people have bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed solely
by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and deliberations in the
Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban  9 sustained the right of a party under the
Moratorium Law, albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said law was declared unconstitutional by this
Court.

Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is
"an operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased
by a new judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot
be justified."

From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the presidential decrees sought by
petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and
1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so published. 10 Neither the subject matters nor the texts of these PDs can be
ascertained since no copies thereof are available. But whatever their subject matter may be, it is undisputed that
none of these unpublished PDs has ever been implemented or enforced by the government. In Pesigan vs.
Angeles, 11 the Court, through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to apprise the public of the
contents of [penal] regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. " The cogency
of this holding is apparently recognized by respondent officials considering the manifestation in their comment that
"the government, as a matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting violations of criminal laws until the same shall have
been published in the Official Gazette or in some other publication, even though some criminal laws provide that they
shall take effect immediately.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential
issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.

SO ORDERED.

Relova, J., concurs.

Aquino, J., took no part.

Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.

 
 Republic of the Philippines On cross-examination, this witness declared:
SUPREME COURT
Manila
I worked with the accused up to March 1964.

EN BANC
NICOLAS MACAROLAY, 65 years of age, married, copra maker and resident of Pinagbayanan,
Pagbilao, Quezon —
G.R. No. L-44143 August 31, 1988
I resided at Pinagbayanan, Pagbilao, Quezon since 1959 up to the present. I know the accused
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff,  since 1959 when he opened a fishpond at Pinagbayanan, Pagbilao, Quezon. He still operates
vs. the fishpond up to the present and I know this fact as I am the barrio captain of Pinagbayanan.
EUSEBIO NAZARIO, accused-appellant.
On cross-examination, this witness declared:
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
I came to know the accused when he first operated his fishpond since 1959.
Teofilo Ragodon for accused-appellant.
On re-direct examination, this witness declared:
SARMIENTO, J.:
I was present during the catching of fish in 1967 and the accused was there.
The petitioner was charged with violation of certain municipal ordinances of the municipal council of Pagbilao, in
Quezon province. By way of confession and avoidance, the petitioner would admit having committed the acts
On re-cross examination, this witness declared:
charged but would claim that the ordinances are unconstitutional, or, assuming their constitutionality, that they do not
apply to him in any event.
I do not remember the month in 1962 when the accused caught fish.
The facts are not disputed:
RODOLFO R. ALVAREZ, 45 years old, municipal treasurer of Pagbilao, Quezon, married —
This defendant is charged of the crime of Violation of Municipal Ordinance in an information filed
by the provincial Fiscal, dated October 9, 1968, as follows: As Municipal Treasurer I am in charge of tax collection. I know the accused even before I was
Municipal Treasurer of Pagbilao. I have written the accused a letter asking him to pay his taxes
(Exhibit B). Said letter was received by the accused as per registry return receipt, Exhibit B-1.
That in the years 1964, 1965 and 1966, in the Municipality of Pagbilao,
The letter demanded for payment of P362.00, more or less, by way of taxes which he did not
Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
pay up to the present. The former Treasurer, Ceferino Caparros, also wrote a letter of demand
Court, the above-named accused, being then the owner and operator of a
to the accused (Exhibit C). On June 28, 1967, I sent a letter to the Fishery Commission (Exhibit
fishpond situated in the barrio of Pinagbayanan, of said municipality, did
D), requesting information if accused paid taxes with that office. The Commission sent me a
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously refuse and fail to pay the
certificate (Exhibits D-1, D-2 & D-3). The accused had a fishpond lease agreement. The taxes
municipal taxes in the total amount of THREE HUNDRED SIXTY TWO
unpaid were for the years 1964, 1965 and 1966.
PESOS AND SIXTY TWO CENTAVOS (P362.62), required of him as
fishpond operator as provided for under Ordinance No. 4, series of 1955, as
amended, inspite of repeated demands made upon him by the Municipal On cross-examination, this witness declared:
Treasurer of Pagbilao, Quezon, to pay the same.
I have demanded the taxes for 38.10 hectares.
Contrary to law.
On question of the court, this witness declared:
For the prosecution the following witnesses testified in substance as follows;
What I was collecting from the accused is the fee on fishpond operation, not rental.
MIGUEL FRANCIA, 39 years of age, married, farmer and resident of Lopez, Quezon —
The prosecution presented as part of their evidence Exhibits A, A-1, A-2, B, B-2, C, D, D-1, D-2,
In 1962 to 1967, I resided at Pinagbayanan, Pagbilao, Quezon. I know the accused as I worked D-3, E, F, F-1 and the same were admitted by the court, except Exhibits D, D-1, D-2 and D-3
in his fishpond in 1962 to 1964. The fishpond of Nazario is at Pinagbayanan, Pagbilao, Quezon. which were not admitted for being immaterial.
I worked in the clearing of the fishpond, the construction of the dikes and the catching of fish.
For the defense the accused EUSEBIO NAZARIO, 48 years of age, married, owner and general Agreement No. 1066, entered into by the accused and the government, through the Secretary of
manager of the ZIP Manufacturing Enterprises and resident of 4801 Old Sta. Mesa, Sampaloc, Agriculture and Natural Resources on August 21, 1959.
Manila, declared in substance as follows:
There is no question from the evidences presented that the 27.1998 hectares of land leased by
I have lived in Sta. Mesa, Manila, since 1949. I buy my Residence Certificates at Manila or at the defendant from the government for fishpond purposes was actually converted into fishpond
San Juan. In 1964, 1965 and 1966, I was living in Manila and my business is in Manila and my and used as such, and therefore defendant is an operator of a fishpond within the purview of the
family lives at Manila. I never resided at Pagbilao, Quezon. I do not own a house at Pagbilao. I ordinance in question. 1
am a lessee of a fishpond located at Pagbilao, Quezon, and I have a lease agreement to that
effect with the Philippine Fisheries Commission marked as Exhibit 1. In 1964, 1965 and 1966,
The trial Court 2 returned a verdict of guilty and disposed as follows:
the contract of lease, Exhibit 1, was still existing and enforceable. The Ordinances Nos. 4, 15
and 12, series of 1955, 1965 and 1966, were translated into English by the Institute of National
Language to better understand the ordinances. There were exchange of letters between me and VIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the Municipal Treasurer of Pagbilao regarding the payment of the taxes on my leased fishpond the crime of violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 4, series of 1955, as amended by Ordinance No. 15, series of 1965
situated at Pagbilao. There was a letter of demand for the payment of the taxes by the treasurer and further amended by Ordinance No. 12, series of 1966, of the Municipal Council of Pagbilao, Quezon; and hereby
(Exhibit 3) which I received by mail at my residence at Manila. I answered the letter of demand, sentences him to pay a fine of P50.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency at the rate of P8.00 a day,
Exhibit 3, with Exhibit 3-A. I requested an inspection of my fishpond to determine its condition as and to pay the costs of this proceeding.
it was not then in operation. The Municipal Treasurer Alvarez went there once in 1967 and he
found that it was destroyed by the typhoon and there were pictures taken marked as Exhibits 4,
SO ORDERED. 3
4-A, 4-B and 4C. I received another letter of demand, Exhibit 5, and I answered the same
(Exhibit 5-A). I copied my reference quoted in Exhibit 5-A from Administrative Order No. 6,
Exhibit 6. I received another letter of demand from Tomas Ornedo, Acting Municipal Treasurer of In this appeal, certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals, the petitioner alleges that:
Pagbilao, dated February 16, 1966, Exhibit 7, and I answered the same with the letter marked
as Exhibit 7-A, dated February 26, 1966. I received another letter of demand from Treasurer
Alvarez of Pagbilao, Exhibit 8, and I answered the same (Exhibit 8-A). In 1964, I went to I.
Treasurer Caparros to ask for an application for license tax and he said none and he told me just
to pay my taxes. I did not pay because up to now I do not know whether I am covered by the THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT ORDINANCE NO. 4, SERIES OF 1955, AS AMENDED
Ordinance or not. The letters of demand asked me to pay different amounts for taxes for the BY ORDINANCE NO. 15, SERIES OF 1965, AND AS FURTHER AMENDED BY ORDINANCE NO. 12, SERIES OF
fishpond. Because under Sec. 2309 of the Revised Administrative Code, municipal taxes lapse if 1966, OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF PAGBILAO, QUEZON, IS NULL AND VOID FOR BEING AMBIGUOUS AND
not paid and they are collecting on a lapsed ordinance. Because under the Tax Code, fishermen UNCERTAIN.
are exempted from percentage tax and privilege tax. There is no law empowering the
municipality to pass ordinance taxing fishpond operators.
II.

The defense presented as part of their evidence Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 3-A, 4, 4-B, 4-B, 4-C, 5, 5-A, 6,
6-A, 6-B, 6-C, 7, 7-A, 8 and 8-A and the same were admitted by the court. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE ORDINANCE IN QUESTION, AS AMENDED, IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING EX POST FACTO.

From their evidence the prosecution would want to show to the court that the accused, as lessee
or operator of a fishpond in the municipality of Pagbilao, refused, and still refuses, to pay the III.
municipal taxes for the years 1964, 1965 and 1966, in violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 4,
series of 1955, as amended by Municipal Ordinance No. 15, series of 1965, and finally amended THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE ORDINANCE IN QUESTION COVERS ONLY
by Municipal Ordinance No. 12, series of 1966. OWNERS OR OVERSEER OF FISHPONDS OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIP AND NOT TO LESSEES OF PUBLIC
LANDS.
On the other hand, the accused, by his evidence, tends to show to the court that the taxes
sought to be collected have already lapsed and that there is no law empowering municipalities to IV.
pass ordinances taxing fishpond operators. The defense, by their evidence, tried to show further
that, as lessee of a forest land to be converted into a fishpond, he is not covered by said
municipal ordinances; and finally that the accused should not be taxed as fishpond operator THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE QUESTIONED ORDINANCE, EVEN IF VALID,
because there is no fishpond yet being operated by him, considering that the supposed fishpond CANNOT BE ENFORCED BEYOND THE TERRITORIAL LIMITS OF PAGBILAO AND DOES NOT COVER NON-
was under construction during the period covered by the taxes sought to be collected. RESIDENTS. 4

Finally, the defendant claims that the ordinance in question is ultra vires as it is outside of the The ordinances in question are Ordinance No. 4, series of 1955, Ordinance No. 15, series of 1965, and Ordinance
power of the municipal council of Pagbilao, Quezon, to enact; and that the defendant claims that No. 12, series of 1966, of the Municipal Council of Pagbilao. Insofar as pertinent to this appeal, the salient portions
the ordinance in question is ambiguous and uncertain. thereof are hereinbelow quoted:

There is no question from the evidences presented that the accused is a lessee of a parcel of
forest land, with an area of 27.1998 hectares, for fishpond purposes, under Fishpond Lease
 Section 1. Any owner or manager of fishponds in places within the territorial limits of Pagbilao, activity" 19 that would supply the standards. "As thus limited, the objection that may be raised as to vagueness has
Quezon, shall pay a municipal tax in the amount of P3.00 per hectare of fishpond on part thereof been minimized, if not totally set at rest." 20 In his opinion, however, Justice Sanchez would stress that the conduct
per annum. 5 sought to be prohibited "is not clearly defined at all." 21 "As worded in R.A 4880, prohibited discussion could cover the
entire spectrum of expression relating to candidates and political parties." 22 He was unimpressed with the
"restrictions" Fernando's opinion had relied on: " 'Simple expressions of opinions and thoughts concerning the
xxx xxx xxx
election' and expression of 'views on current political problems or issues' leave the reader conjecture, to guesswork,
upon the extent of protection offered, be it as to the nature of the utterance ('simple expressions of opinion and
Sec. l (a). For the convenience of those who have or owners or managers of fishponds within thoughts') or the subject of the utterance ('current political problems or issues')." 23
the territorial limits of this municipality, the date of payment of municipal tax relative thereto, shall
begin after the lapse of three (3) years starting from the date said fishpond is approved by the
The Court likewise had occasion to apply the "balancing-of-interests" test, 24 insofar as the statute's ban on early
Bureau of Fisheries. 6
nomination of candidates was concerned: "The rational connection between the prohibition of Section 50-A and its
object, the indirect and modest scope of its restriction on the rights of speech and assembly, and the embracing
xxx xxx xxx public interest which Congress has found in the moderation of partisan political activity, lead us to the conclusion that
the statute may stand consistently with and does not offend the Constitution." 25 In that case, Castro would have the
balance achieved in favor of State authority at the "expense" of individual liberties.
Section 1. Any owner or manager of fishponds in places within the territorial limits of Pagbilao
shall pay a municipal tax in the amount of P3.00 per hectare or any fraction thereof per annum
beginning and taking effect from the year 1964, if the fishpond started operating before the year In the United States, which had ample impact on Castro's separate opinion, the balancing test finds a close kin,
1964. 7 referred to as the "less restrictive alternative " 26 doctrine, under which the court searches for alternatives available to
the Government outside of statutory limits, or for "less drastic means" 27 open to the State, that would render the
statute unnecessary. In United States v. Robel, 28 legislation was assailed, banning members of the (American)
The first objection refers to the ordinances being allegedly "ambiguous and uncertain." 8 The petitioner contends that Communist Party from working in any defense facility. The U.S. Supreme Court, in nullifying the statute, held that it
being a mere lessee of the fishpond, he is not covered since the said ordinances speak of "owner or manager." He impaired the right of association, and that in any case, a screening process was available to the State that would
likewise maintains that they are vague insofar as they reckon the date of payment: Whereas Ordinance No. 4 have enabled it to Identify dangerous elements holding defense positions. 29 In that event, the balance would have
provides that parties shall commence payment "after the lapse of three (3) years starting from the date said fishpond been struck in favor of individual liberties.
is approved by the Bureau of Fisheries." 9 Ordinance No. 12 states that liability for the tax accrues "beginning and
taking effect from the year 1964 if the fishpond started operating before the year 1964." 10
It should be noted that it is in free expression cases that the result is usually close. It is said, however, that the choice
of the courts is usually narrowed where the controversy involves say, economic rights, 30 or as in the Levycase,
As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men "of common military affairs, in which less precision in analysis is required and in which the competence of the legislature is
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." 11 It is repugnant to the presumed.
Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targetted
by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its
provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. In no way may the ordinances at bar be said to be tainted with the vice of vagueness. It is unmistakable from their
very provisions that the appellant falls within its coverage. As the actual operator of the fishponds, he comes within
the term " manager." He does not deny the fact that he financed the construction of the fishponds, introduced fish
But the act must be utterly vague on its face, that is to say, it cannot be clarified by either a saving clause or by fries into the fishponds, and had employed laborers to maintain them. 31 While it appears that it is the National
construction. Thus, in Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 12 the U.S. Supreme Court struck down an ordinance that had Government which owns them, 32 the Government never shared in the profits they had generated. It is therefore only
made it illegal for "three or more persons to assemble on any sidewalk and there conduct themselves in a manner logical that he shoulders the burden of tax under the said ordinances.
annoying to persons passing by." 13 Clearly, the ordinance imposed no standard at all "because one may never know
in advance what 'annoys some people but does not annoy others.' " 14
We agree with the trial court that the ordinances are in the character of revenue measures 33 designed to assist the
15 coffers of the municipality of Pagbilao. And obviously, it cannot be the owner, the Government, on whom liability
Coates highlights what has been referred to as a "perfectly vague"   act whose obscurity is evident on its face. It is should attach, for one thing, upon the ancient principle that the Government is immune from taxes and for another,
to be distinguished, however, from legislation couched in imprecise language — but which nonetheless specifies a since it is not the Government that had been making money from the venture.
standard though defectively phrased — in which case, it may be "saved" by proper construction.

Suffice it to say that as the actual operator of the fishponds in question, and as the recipient of profits brought about
It must further be distinguished from statutes that are apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain types of by the business, the appellant is clearly liable for the municipal taxes in question. He cannot say that he did not have
activities. In that event, such statutes may not be challenged whenever directed against such activities. In Parker v. a fair notice of such a liability to make such ordinances vague.
Levy, 16 a prosecution originally under the U.S. Uniform Code of Military Justice (prohibiting, specifically, "conduct
unbecoming an officer and gentleman"), the defendant, an army officer who had urged his men not to go to Vietnam
and called the Special Forces trained to fight there thieves and murderers, was not allowed to invoke the void for Neither are the said ordinances vague as to dates of payment. There is no merit to the claim that "the imposition of
vagueness doctrine on the premise that accepted military interpretation and practice had provided enough tax has to depend upon an uncertain date yet to be determined (three years after the 'approval of the fishpond' by
standards, and consequently, a fair notice that his conduct was impermissible. the Bureau of Fisheries, and upon an uncertain event (if the fishpond started operating before 1964), also to be
determined by an uncertain individual or individuals." 34 Ordinance No. 15, in making the tax payable "after the lapse
of three (3) years starting from the date said fishpond is approved by the Bureau of Fisheries," 35 is unequivocal
It is interesting that in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, 17 a divided Court sustained an act of Congress about the date of payment, and its amendment by Ordinance No. 12, reckoning liability thereunder "beginning and
(Republic Act No. 4880 penalizing "the too early nomination of candidates" 18 limiting the election campaign period, taking effect from the year 1964 if the fishpond started operating before the year 1964 ," 36 does not give rise to any
and prohibiting "partisan political activities"), amid challenges of vagueness and overbreadth on the ground that the ambiguity. In either case, the dates of payment have been definitely established. The fact that the appellant has
law had included an "enumeration of the acts deemed included in the terms 'election campaign' or 'partisan political been allegedly uncertain about the reckoning dates — as far as his liability for the years 1964, 1965, and 1966 is
concerned — presents a mere problem in computation, but it does not make the ordinances vague. In addition, the Gancayco, J., is on leave.
same would have been at most a difficult piece of legislation, which is not unfamiliar in this jurisdiction, but hardly a
vague law.

As it stands, then, liability for the tax accrues on January 1, 1964 for fishponds in operation prior thereto (Ordinance
No. 12), and for new fishponds, three years after their approval by the Bureau of Fisheries (Ordinance No. 15). This
is so since the amendatory act (Ordinance No. 12) merely granted amnesty unto old, delinquent fishpond operators.
It did not repeal its mother ordinances (Nos. 4 and 15). With respect to new operators, Ordinance No. 15 should still
prevail.

To the Court, the ordinances in question set forth enough standards that clarify imagined ambiguities. While such
standards are not apparent from the face thereof, they are visible from the intent of the said ordinances.

The next inquiry is whether or not they can be said to be ex post facto measures. The appellant argues that they are:
"Amendment No. 12 passed on September 19, 1966, clearly provides that the payment of the imposed tax shall
"beginning and taking effect from the year 1964, if the fishpond started operating before the year 1964.' In other
words, it penalizes acts or events occurring before its passage, that is to say, 1964 and even prior thereto." 37

The Court finds no merit in this contention. As the Solicitor General notes, "Municipal Ordinance No. 4 was passed
on May 14, 1955. 38 Hence, it cannot be said that the amendment (under Ordinance No. 12) is being made to apply
retroactively (to 1964) since the reckoning period is 1955 (date of enactment). Essentially, Ordinances Nos. 12 and
15 are in the nature of curative measures intended to facilitate and enhance the collection of revenues the originally
act, Ordinance No. 4, had prescribed. 39 Moreover, the act (of non-payment of the tax), had been, since 1955, made
punishable, and it cannot be said that Ordinance No. 12 imposes a retroactive penalty. As we have noted, it operates
to grant amnesty to operators who had been delinquent between 1955 and 1964. It does not mete out a penalty,
much less, a retrospective one.

The appellant assails, finally, the power of the municipal council of Pagbilao to tax "public forest land." 40 In Golden
Ribbon Lumber Co., Inc. v. City of Butuan  41 we held that local governments' taxing power does not extend to forest
products or concessions under Republic Act No. 2264, the Local Autonomy Act then in force. (Republic Act No. 2264
likewise prohibited municipalities from imposing percentage taxes on sales.)

First of all, the tax in question is not a tax on property, although the rate thereof is based on the area of fishponds
("P3.00 per hectare" 42). Secondly, fishponds are not forest lands, although we have held them to the agricultural
lands. 43 By definition, "forest" is "a large tract of land covered with a natural growth of trees and underbush; a large
wood." 44 (Accordingly, even if the challenged taxes were directed on the fishponds, they would not have been taxes
on forest products.)

They are, more accurately, privilege taxes on the business of fishpond maintenance. They are not charged against
sales, which would have offended the doctrine enshrined by Golden Ribbon Lumber, 45 but rather on occupation,
which is allowed under Republic Act No. 2264. 46 They are what have been classified as fixed annual taxes and this
is obvious from the ordinances themselves.

There is, then, no merit in the last objection.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. Costs against the appellant.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Cortes, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea,
JJ., concur.

Melencio-Herrera, and Regalado, J., took no part.

 Republic of the Philippines the Philippine Government and any foreign government, and those working in their respective households, and
SUPREME COURT members of religious orders or congregations, sect or denomination, who are not paid monetarily or in kind.
Manila
Violations of this ordinance is punishable by an imprisonment of not less than three (3) months to six (6) months or
EN BANC fine of not less than P100.00 but not more than P200.00 or both such fine and imprisonment, upon conviction. 5

G.R. No. L-29646 November 10, 1978 On May 4, 1968, private respondent Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho who was employed in Manila, filed a petition with the
Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch I, denominated as Civil Case No. 72797, praying for the issuance of the writ
of preliminary injunction and restraining order to stop the enforcement of Ordinance No. 6537 as well as for a
MAYOR ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, petitioner, 
judgment declaring said Ordinance No. 6537 null and void. 6
vs.
HIU CHIONG TSAI PAO HO and JUDGE FRANCISCO ARCA, respondents.
In this petition, Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho assigned the following as his grounds for wanting the ordinance declared
null and void:
Angel C. Cruz, Gregorio A. Ejercito, Felix C. Chaves & Jose Laureta for petitioner.

1) As a revenue measure imposed on aliens employed in the City of Manila, Ordinance No.
Sotero H. Laurel for respondents.
6537 is discriminatory and violative of the rule of the uniformity in taxation;

FERNANDEZ, J.:
2) As a police power measure, it makes no distinction between useful and non-useful
occupations, imposing a fixed P50.00 employment permit, which is out of proportion to the cost
This is a petition for certiorari to review tile decision dated September 17, 1968 of respondent Judge Francisco Arca of registration and that it fails to prescribe any standard to guide and/or limit the action of the
of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch I, in Civil Case No. 72797, the dispositive portion of winch reads. Mayor, thus, violating the fundamental principle on illegal delegation of legislative powers:

Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner and against the respondents, 3) It is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable, being applied only to aliens who are thus,
declaring Ordinance No. 6 37 of the City of Manila null and void. The preliminary injunction is deprived of their rights to life, liberty and property and therefore, violates the due process and
made permanent. No pronouncement as to cost. equal protection clauses of the Constitution. 7

SO ORDERED. On May 24, 1968, respondent Judge issued the writ of preliminary injunction and on September 17, 1968 rendered
judgment declaring Ordinance No. 6537 null and void and making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction. 8
Manila, Philippines, September 17, 1968.
Contesting the aforecited decision of respondent Judge, then Mayor Antonio J. Villegas filed the present petition on
March 27, 1969. Petitioner assigned the following as errors allegedly committed by respondent Judge in the latter's
(SGD.) FRANCISCO ARCA decision of September 17,1968: 9

Judge1
I

The controverted Ordinance No. 6537 was passed by the Municipal Board of Manila on February 22, 1968 and
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED A SERIOUS AND PATENT ERROR OF LAW IN
signed by the herein petitioner Mayor Antonio J. Villegas of Manila on March 27, 1968. 2
RULING THAT ORDINANCE NO. 6537 VIOLATED THE CARDINAL RULE OF UNIFORMITY
OF TAXATION.
City Ordinance No. 6537 is entitled:
II
AN ORDINANCE MAKING IT UNLAWFUL FOR ANY PERSON NOT A CITIZEN OF THE
PHILIPPINES TO BE EMPLOYED IN ANY PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT OR TO BE ENGAGED
RESPONDENT JUDGE LIKEWISE COMMITTED A GRAVE AND PATENT ERROR OF LAW IN
IN ANY KIND OF TRADE, BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION WITHIN THE CITY OF MANILA
RULING THAT ORDINANCE NO. 6537 VIOLATED THE PRINCIPLE AGAINST UNDUE
WITHOUT FIRST SECURING AN EMPLOYMENT PERMIT FROM THE MAYOR OF MANILA;
DESIGNATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. 3

III
Section 1 of said Ordinance No. 6537 4 prohibits aliens from being employed or to engage or participate in any
position or occupation or business enumerated therein, whether permanent, temporary or casual, without first
securing an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and paying the permit fee of P50.00 except persons
employed in the diplomatic or consular missions of foreign countries, or in the technical assistance programs of both
 RESPONDENT JUDGE FURTHER COMMITTED A SERIOUS AND PATENT ERROR OF LAW WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.
IN RULING THAT ORDINANCE NO. 6537 VIOLATED THE DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSES OF THE CONSTITUTION.
SO ORDERED.

Petitioner Mayor Villegas argues that Ordinance No. 6537 cannot be declared null and void on the ground that it
Barredo, Makasiar, Muñoz Palma, Santos and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
violated the rule on uniformity of taxation because the rule on uniformity of taxation applies only to purely tax or
revenue measures and that Ordinance No. 6537 is not a tax or revenue measure but is an exercise of the police
power of the state, it being principally a regulatory measure in nature. Castro, C.J., Antonio and Aquino, Fernando, JJ., concur in the result.

The contention that Ordinance No. 6537 is not a purely tax or revenue measure because its principal purpose is Concepcion, Jr., J., took no part.
regulatory in nature has no merit. While it is true that the first part which requires that the alien shall secure an
employment permit from the Mayor involves the exercise of discretion and judgment in the processing and approval
or disapproval of applications for employment permits and therefore is regulatory in character the second part which
requires the payment of P50.00 as employee's fee is not regulatory but a revenue measure. There is no logic or
justification in exacting P50.00 from aliens who have been cleared for employment. It is obvious that the purpose of
the ordinance is to raise money under the guise of regulation.

The P50.00 fee is unreasonable not only because it is excessive but because it fails to consider valid substantial
differences in situation among individual aliens who are required to pay it. Although the equal protection clause of the
Constitution does not forbid classification, it is imperative that the classification should be based on real and
substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of the particular legislation. The same amount of
P50.00 is being collected from every employed alien whether he is casual or permanent, part time or full time or
whether he is a lowly employee or a highly paid executive

Ordinance No. 6537 does not lay down any criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in the exercise of his discretion.
It has been held that where an ordinance of a municipality fails to state any policy or to set up any standard to guide
or limit the mayor's action, expresses no purpose to be attained by requiring a permit, enumerates no conditions for
its grant or refusal, and entirely lacks standard, thus conferring upon the Mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to
grant or deny the issuance of building permits, such ordinance is invalid, being an undefined and unlimited
delegation of power to allow or prevent an activity per se lawful. 10

In Chinese Flour Importers Association vs. Price Stabilization Board, 11 where a law granted a government agency
power to determine the allocation of wheat flour among importers, the Supreme Court ruled against the interpretation
of uncontrolled power as it vested in the administrative officer an arbitrary discretion to be exercised without a policy,
rule, or standard from which it can be measured or controlled.

It was also held in Primicias vs. Fugoso  12 that the authority and discretion to grant and refuse permits of all classes
conferred upon the Mayor of Manila by the Revised Charter of Manila is not uncontrolled discretion but legal
discretion to be exercised within the limits of the law.

Ordinance No. 6537 is void because it does not contain or suggest any standard or criterion to guide the mayor in
the exercise of the power which has been granted to him by the ordinance.

The ordinance in question violates the due process of law and equal protection rule of the Constitution.

Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila who may withhold or
refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a means of
livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit aliens within its territory, once an alien
is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee includes the means of
livelihood. The shelter of protection under the due process and equal protection clause is given to all persons, both
aliens and citizens. 13

The trial court did not commit the errors assigned.

 Republic of the Philippines (2) That it is violative of the due process clause of the Constitution: and.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
(3) That it is improper exercise of the police power of the state.

EN BANC
Counsel for the appellant holds out his brief as the "brief for the non-Christian tribes." It is said that as these less
civilized elements of the Filipino population are "jealous of their rights in a democracy," any attempt to treat them with
G.R. No. L-45987             May 5, 1939 discrimination or "mark them as inferior or less capable rate or less entitled" will meet with their instant challenge. As
the constitutionality of the Act here involved is questioned for purposes thus mentioned, it becomes imperative to
examine and resolve the issues raised in the light of the policy of the government towards the non-Christian tribes
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 
adopted and consistently followed from the Spanish times to the present, more often with sacrifice and tribulation but
vs.
always with conscience and humanity.
CAYAT, defendant-appellant.

As early as 1551, the Spanish Government had assumed an unvarying solicitous attitude toward these inhabitants,
Sinai Hamada y Cariño for appellant.
and in the different laws of the Indies, their concentration in so-called "reducciones" (communities) have been
Office of the Solicitor-General Tuason for appellee.
persistently attempted with the end in view of according them the "spiritual and temporal benefits" of civilized life.
Throughout the Spanish regime, it had been regarded by the Spanish Government as a sacred "duty to conscience
MORAN, J.: and humanity" to civilize these less fortunate people living "in the obscurity of ignorance" and to accord them the "the
moral and material advantages" of community life and the "protection and vigilance afforded them by the same laws."
(Decree of the Governor-General of the Philippines, Jan. 14, 1887.) This policy had not been deflected from during
Prosecuted for violation of Act No. 1639 (secs. 2 and 3), the accused, Cayat, a native of Baguio, Benguet, Mountain the American period. President McKinley in his instructions to the Philippine Commission of April 7, 1900, said:
Province, was sentenced by the justice of the peace court of Baguio to pay a fine of five pesos (P5) or suffer
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. On appeal of the Court of First Instance, the following information
was filed against him: In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the Islands, the Commission should adopt the same course
followed by Congress in permitting the tribes of our North American Indians to maintain their tribal
organization and government, and under which many of those tribes are now living in peace and
That on or about the 25th day of January, 1937, in the City of Baguio, Commonwealth of the Philippines, contentment, surrounded by civilization to which they are unable or unwilling to conform. Such tribal
and within the jurisdiction of this court, the above-named accused, Cayat, being a member of the non- government should, however, be subjected to wise and firm regulation; and, without undue or petty
Christian tribes, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and illegally receive, acquire, and have in his interference, constant and active effort should be exercised to prevent barbarous practices and introduce
possession and under his control or custody, one bottle of A-1-1 gin, an intoxicating liquor, other than the civilized customs.
so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to
make prior to the passage of Act No. 1639.
Since then and up to the present, the government has been constantly vexed with the problem of determining "those
practicable means of bringing about their advancement in civilization and material prosperity." (See, Act No. 253.)
Accused interposed a demurrer which was overruled. At the trial, he admitted all the facts alleged in the information, "Placed in an alternative of either letting them alone or guiding them in the path of civilization," the present
but pleaded not guilty to the charge for the reasons adduced in his demurrer and submitted the case on the government "has chosen to adopt the latter measure as one more in accord with humanity and with the national
pleadings. The trial court found him guilty of the crime charged and sentenced him to pay a fine of fifty pesos (P50) conscience." (Memorandum of Secretary of the Interior, quoted in Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil.,
or supper subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The case is now before this court on appeal. Sections 2 660, 714.) To this end, their homes and firesides have been brought in contact with civilized communities through a
and 3 of Act No. 1639 read: network of highways and communications; the benefits of public education have to them been extended; and more
lately, even the right of suffrage. And to complement this policy of attraction and assimilation, the Legislature has
SEC. 2. It shall be unlawful for any native of the Philippine Islands who is a member of a non-Christian passed Act No. 1639 undoubtedly to secure for them the blessings of peace and harmony; to facilitate, and not to
tribe within the meaning of the Act Numbered Thirteen hundred and ninety-seven, to buy, receive, have in mar, their rapid and steady march to civilization and culture. It is, therefore, in this light that the Act must be
his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the understood and applied.
so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to
make prior to the passage of this Act, except as provided in section one hereof; and it shall be the duty of It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not equal
any police officer or other duly authorized agent of the Insular or any provincial, municipal or township protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. And the classification, to be
government to seize and forthwith destroy any such liquors found unlawfully in the possession of any reasonable, (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be
member of a non-Christian tribe. limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class. (Borgnis vs. Falk
Co., 133 N.W., 209; Lindsley vs. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61; 55 Law. ed., Rubi vs. Provincial Board of
SEC. 3. Any person violating the provisions of section one or section two of this Act shall, upon conviction Mindoro, 39 Phil., 660; People and Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation vs. Vera and Cu Unjieng, 37 Off.
thereof, be punishable for each offense by a fine of not exceeding two hundred pesos or by imprisonment Gaz ., 187.)
for a term not exceeding six months, in the discretion of the court.
Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real and substantial, not merely imaginary or
The accused challenges the constitutionality of the Act on the following grounds: whimsical, distinctions. It is not based upon "accident of birth or parentage," as counsel to the appellant asserts, but
upon the degree of civilization and culture. "The term 'non-Christian tribes' refers, not to religious belief, but, in a way,
to the geographical area, and, more directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization, usually
(1) That it is discriminatory and denies the equal protection of the laws; living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities." (Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, supra.) This
distinction is unquestionably reasonable, for the Act was intended to meet the peculiar conditions existing in the non-
Christian tribes. The exceptional cases of certain members thereof who at present have reached a position of gratifying that the non-Christian tribes "far from retrograding, are definitely asserting themselves in a competitive
cultural equality with their Christian brothers, cannot affect the reasonableness of the classification thus established. world," as appellant's attorney impressively avers, and that they are "a virile, up-and -coming people eager to take
their place in the world's social scheme." As a matter of fact, there are now lawyers, doctors and other professionals
educated in the best institutions here and in America. Their active participation in the multifarious welfare activities of
That it is germane to the purposes of law cannot be doubted. The prohibition "to buy, receive, have in his
community life or in the delicate duties of government is certainly a source of pride and gratification to people of the
possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the so-called
Philippines. But whether conditions have so changed as to warrant a partial or complete abrogation of the law, is a
native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the
matter which rests exclusively within the prerogative of the National Assembly to determine. In the constitutional
passage of this Act.," is unquestionably designed to insure peace and order in and among the non-Christian tribes. It
scheme of our government, this court can go no farther than to inquire whether the Legislature had the power to
has been the sad experience of the past, as the observations of the lower court disclose, that the free use of highly
enact the law. If the power exists, and we hold it does exist, the wisdom of the policy adopted, and the adequacy
intoxicating liquors by the non-Christian tribes have often resulted in lawlessness and crimes, thereby hampering the
under existing conditions of the measures enacted to forward it, are matters which this court has no authority to pass
efforts of the government to raise their standard of life and civilization.
upon. And, if in the application of the law, the educated non-Christians shall incidentally suffer, the justification still
exists in the all-comprehending principle of salus populi suprema est lex. When the public safety or the public morals
The law is not limited in its application to conditions existing at the time of its enactment. It is intended to apply for all require the discontinuance of a certain practice by certain class of persons, the hand of the Legislature cannot be
times as long as those conditions exist. The Act was not predicated, as counsel for appellant asserts, upon the stayed from providing for its discontinuance by any incidental inconvenience which some members of the class may
assumption that the non-Christians are "impermeable to any civilizing influence." On the contrary, the Legislature suffer. The private interests of such members must yield to the paramount interests of the nation (Cf. Boston Beer
understood that the civilization of a people is a slow process and that hand in hand with it must go measures of Co. vs. Mass., 97 U.S., 25; 24 law. ed., 989).
protection and security.
Judgment is affirmed, with costs against appellant.
Finally, that the Act applies equally to all members of the class is evident from a perusal thereof. That it may be
unfair in its operation against a certain number non-Christians by reason of their degree of culture, is not an
Avanceña, C.J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, Laurel, and Conception, JJ., concur.
argument against the equality of its application.

Appellants contends that that provision of the law empowering any police officer or other duly authorized agent of the
government to seize and forthwith destroy any prohibited liquors found unlawfully in the possession of any member
of the non-Christian tribes is violative of the due process of law provided in the Constitution. But this provision is not
involved in the case at bar. Besides, to constitute due process of law, notice and hearing are not always necessary.
This rule is especially true where much must be left to the discretion of the administrative officials in applying a law to
particular cases. (McGehee, Due Process of Law p. 371, cited with approval in Rubi vs.Provincial Board of
Mindoro, supra.) Due process of law means simply: (1) that there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the
general powers of the legislative department of the government; (2) that it shall be reasonable in its operation; (3)
that it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and (4) that it shall be applicable
alike to all citizens of the state or to all of the class. (U.S. vs. Ling Su Fan, 10 Phil., 104, affirmed on appeal by the
United States Supreme Court, 218 U.S., 302: 54 Law. ed., 1049.) Thus, a person's property may be seized by the
government in payment of taxes without judicial hearing; or property used in violation of law may be confiscated
(U.S. vs. Surla, 20 Phil., 163, 167), or when the property constitutes corpus delicti, as in the instant case
(Moreno vs. Ago Chi, 12 Phil., 439, 442).

Neither is the Act an improper exercise of the police power of the state. It has been said that the police power is the
most insistent and least limitable of all powers of the government. It has been aptly described as a power co-
extensive with self-protection and constitutes the law of overruling necessity. Any measure intended to promote the
health, peace, morals, education and good order of the people or to increase the industries of the state, develop its
resources and add to its wealth and prosperity (Barbier vs. Connolly, 113 U.S., 27), is a legitimate exercise of the
police power, unless shown to be whimsical or capricious as to unduly interfere with the rights of an individual, the
same must be upheld.

Act No. 1639, as above stated, is designed to promote peace and order in the non-Christian tribes so as to remove
all obstacles to their moral and intellectual growth and, eventually, to hasten their equalization and unification with
the rest of their Christian brothers. Its ultimate purpose can be no other than to unify the Filipino people with a view
to a greater Philippines.

The law, then, does not seek to mark the non-Christian tribes as "an inferior or less capable race." On the contrary,
all measures thus far adopted in the promotion of the public policy towards them rest upon a recognition of their
inherent right to equality in tht enjoyment of those privileges now enjoyed by their Christian brothers. But as there
can be no true equality before the law, if there is, in fact, no equality in education, the government has endeavored,
by appropriate measures, to raise their culture and civilization and secure for them the benefits of their progress, with
the ultimate end in view of placing them with their Christian brothers on the basis of true equality. It is indeed
 Republic of the Philippines           Appellant questions the authority of the defendant Municipal Board to levy such an export tax, in view of
SUPREME COURT Section 2287 of the Revised Administrative Code which denies from municipal councils the power to impose an
Manila export tax. Section 2287 in part states: "It shall not be in the power of the municipal council to impose a tax in any
form whatever, upon goods and merchandise carried into the municipality, or out of the same, and any attempt to
impose an import or export tax upon such goods in the guise of an unreasonable charge for wharfage use of bridges
EN BANC
or otherwise, shall be void."

G.R. No. L-23794             February 17, 1968

          Subsequently, however, Section 2 of Republic Act 2264 effective June 19, 1959, gave chartered cities,
municipalities and municipal districts authority to levy for public purposes just and uniform taxes, licenses or fees.
ORMOC SUGAR COMPANY, INC., plaintiff-appellant,  Anent the inconsistency between Section 2287 of the Revised Administrative Code and Section 2 of Republic Act
vs. 2264, this Court, in Nin Bay Mining Co. v. Municipality of Roxas  4 held the former to have been repealed by the latter.
THE TREASURER OF ORMOC CITY, THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF ORMOC CITY, HON. ESTEBAN C. And expressing Our awareness of the transcendental effects that municipal export or import taxes or licenses will
CONEJOS as Mayor of Ormoc City and ORMOC CITY, defendants-appellees. have on the national economy, due to Section 2 of Republic Act 2264, We stated that there was no other alternative
until Congress acts to provide remedial measures to forestall any unfavorable results.
Ponce Enrile, Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Belo and Teehankee, Carreon & Tañada for plaintiff-appellant. 
Ramon O. de Veyra for defendants-appellees.           The point remains to be determined, however, whether constitutional limits on the power of taxation,
specifically the equal protection clause and rule of uniformity of taxation, were infringed.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
          The Constitution in the bill of rights provides: ". . . nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the
laws." (Sec. 1 [1], Art. III) In Felwa vs. Salas, 5 We ruled that the equal protection clause applies only to persons or
          On January 29, 1964, the Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed 1 Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1964, imposing things identically situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and a
"on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., in Ormoc City a municipal classification is reasonable where (1) it is based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2) these
tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to the United States of America and other foreign countries." 2 are germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future
conditions which are substantially identical to those of the present; (4) the classification applies only to those who
          Payments for said tax were made, under protest, by Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. on March 20, 1964 for belong to the same class.
P7,087.50 and on April 20, 1964 for P5,000, or a total of P12,087.50.
          A perusal of the requisites instantly shows that the questioned ordinance does not meet them, for it taxes only
          On June 1, 1964, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. filed before the Court of First Instance of Leyte, with service of centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. At the time of the
a copy upon the Solicitor General, a complaint 3 against the City of Ormoc as well as its Treasurer, Municipal Board taxing ordinance's enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is true, was the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc.
and Mayor, alleging that the afore-stated ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection Still, the classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing
clause (Sec. 1[1], Art. III, Constitution) and the rule of uniformity of taxation (Sec. 22[1]), Art. VI, Constitution), aside ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central, of the
from being an export tax forbidden under Section 2287 of the Revised Administrative Code. It further alleged that the same class as plaintiff, for the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar company is set up, it cannot be
tax is neither a production nor a license tax which Ormoc City under Section 15-kk of its charter and under Section 2 subject to the tax because the ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc City Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to
of Republic Act 2264, otherwise known as the Local Autonomy Act, is authorized to impose; and that the tax be levied upon.
amounts to a customs duty, fee or charge in violation of paragraph 1 of Section 2 of Republic Act 2264 because the
tax is on both the sale and export of sugar.           Appellant, however, is not entitled to interest; on the refund because the taxes were not arbitrarily collected
(Collector of Internal Revenue v. Binalbagan). 6 At the time of collection, the ordinance provided a sufficient basis to
          Answering, the defendants asserted that the tax ordinance was within defendant city's power to enact under preclude arbitrariness, the same being then presumed constitutional until declared otherwise.
the Local Autonomy Act and that the same did not violate the afore-cited constitutional limitations. After pre-trial and
submission of the case on memoranda, the Court of First Instance, on August 6, 1964, rendered a decision that           WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, the challenged ordinance is declared
upheld the constitutionality of the ordinance and declared the taxing power of defendant chartered city broadened by unconstitutional and the defendants-appellees are hereby ordered to refund the P12,087.50 plaintiff-appellant paid
the Local Autonomy Act to include all other forms of taxes, licenses or fees not excluded in its charter. under protest. No costs. So ordered.

          Appeal therefrom was directly taken to Us by plaintiff Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. Appellant alleges the same Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ.,
statutory and constitutional violations in the aforesaid taxing ordinance mentioned earlier. concur.1äwphï1.ñët

          Section 1 of the ordinance states: "There shall be paid to the City Treasurer on any and all productions of
centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Incorporated, in Ormoc City, a municipal tax equivalent to
one per centum (1%) per export sale to the United States of America and other foreign countries." Though referred to
as a tax on the export of centrifugal sugar produced at Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. For production of sugar alone is
not taxable; the only time the tax applies is when the sugar produced is exported.
 Republic of the Philippines We approach these issues with one important principle in mind, to wit, the presumption of the constitutionality of
SUPREME COURT statutes. The theory is that as the joint act of the Legislature and the Executive, every statute is supposed to have
Manila first been carefully studied and determined to be constitutional before it was finally enacted. Hence, unless it is
clearly shown that it is constitutionally flawed, the attack against its validity must be rejected and the law itself
upheld. To doubt is to sustain.
EN BANC

I
 

We consider first the objection based on Article VI, Sec. 26(l), of the Constitution providing that "Every bill passed by
G.R. No. 105371 November 11, 1993
the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof."

THE PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION, duly rep. by its President, BERNARDO P. ABESAMIS, Vice-
The purposes of this rule are: (1) to prevent hodge-podge or "log-rolling" legislation; (2) to prevent surprise or fraud
President for Legal Affairs, MARIANO M. UMALI, Director for Pasig, Makati, and Pasay, Metro Manila,
upon the legislature by means of provisions in bills of which the title gives no intimation, and which might therefore
ALFREDO C. FLORES, and Chairman of the Committee on Legal Aid, JESUS G. BERSAMIRA, Presiding
be overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and (3) to fairly apprise the people, through such
Judges of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 85, Quezon City and Branches 160, 167 and 166, Pasig, Metro
publication of legislative proceedings as is usually made, of the subject of legislation that is being considered, in
Manila, respectively: the NATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF THE JUDGES ASSOCIATION OF THE
order that they may have opportunity of being heard thereon, by petition or otherwise, if they shall so desire. 1
PHILIPPINES, composed of the METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT JUDGES ASSOCIATION rep. by its
President. REINATO QUILALA of the MUNICIPAL TRIAL CIRCUIT COURT, Manila; THE MUNICIPAL JUDGES
LEAGUE OF THE PHILIPPINES rep. by its President, TOMAS G. TALAVERA; by themselves and in behalf of It is the submission of the petitioners that Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 which withdrew the franking privilege from the
all the Judges of the Regional Trial and Shari'a Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts and Municipal Courts Judiciary is not expressed in the title of the law, nor does it reflect its purposes.
throughout the Country, petitioners, 
vs.
R.A. No. 7354 is entitled "An Act Creating the Philippine Postal Corporation, Defining its Powers, Functions and
HON. PETE PRADO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications,
Responsibilities, Providing for Regulation of the Industry and for Other Purposes Connected Therewith."
JORGE V. SARMIENTO, in his capacity as Postmaster General, and the PHILIPPINE POSTAL
CORP., respondents.
The objectives of the law are enumerated in Section 3, which provides:

The State shall pursue the following objectives of a nationwide postal system:
CRUZ, J.:
a) to enable the economical and speedy transfer of mail and other postal matters, from sender to
addressee, with full recognition of their privacy or confidentiality;
The basic issue raised in this petition is the independence of the Judiciary. It is asserted by the petitioners that this
hallmark of republicanism is impaired by the statute and circular they are here challenging. The Supreme Court is
itself affected by these measures and is thus an interested party that should ordinarily not also be a judge at the b) to promote international interchange, cooperation and understanding through the
same time. Under our system of government, however, it cannot inhibit itself and must rule upon the challenge, unhampered flow or exchange of postal matters between nations;
because no other office has the authority to do so. We shall therefore act upon this matter not with officiousness but
in the discharge of an unavoidable duty and, as always, with detachment and fairness.
c) to cause or effect a wide range of postal services to cater to different users and changing
needs, including but not limited to, philately, transfer of monies and valuables, and the like;
The main target of this petition is Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 as implemented by the Philippine Postal Corporation
through its Circular No.
d) to ensure that sufficient revenues are generated by and within the industry to finance the
92-28. These measures withdraw the franking privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional
overall cost of providing the varied range of postal delivery and messengerial services as well as
Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land Registration Commission and its
the expansion and continuous upgrading of service standards by the same.
Registers of Deeds, along with certain other government offices.

Sec. 35 of R.A. No. 7354, which is the principal target of the petition, reads as follows:
The petitioners are members of the lower courts who feel that their official functions as judges will be prejudiced by
the above-named measures. The National Land Registration Authority has taken common cause with them insofar
as its own activities, such as sending of requisite notices in registration cases, affect judicial proceedings. On its Sec. 35. Repealing Clause. — All acts, decrees, orders, executive orders, instructions, rules and
motion, it has been allowed to intervene. regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are repealed or modified
accordingly.
The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 on the grounds that: (1) its title embraces more than one
subject and does not express its purposes; (2) it did not pass the required readings in both Houses of Congress and All franking privileges authorized by law are hereby repealed, except those provided for under
printed copies of the bill in its final form were not distributed among the members before its passage; and (3) it is Commonwealth Act No. 265, Republic Acts Numbered 69, 180, 1414, 2087 and 5059. The
discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the Judiciary. Corporation may continue the franking privilege under Circular No. 35 dated October 24, 1977
 and that of the Vice President, under such arrangements and conditions as may obviate abuse The petitioners also invoke Sec. 74 of the Rules of the House of Representatives, requiring that amendment to any
or unauthorized use thereof. bill when the House and the Senate shall have differences thereon may be settled by a conference committee of
both chambers. They stress that Sec. 35 was never a subject of any disagreement between both Houses and so the
second paragraph could not have been validly added as an amendment.
The petitioners' contention is untenable. We do not agree that the title of the challenged act violates the Constitution.

These argument are unacceptable.

The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as comprehensive as to cover every
single detail of the measure. It has been held that if the title fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably
covers all the provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the legislature or the people, there is sufficient While it is true that a conference committee is the mechanism for compromising differences between the Senate and
compliance with the constitutional requirement. 2 the House, it is not limited in its jurisdiction to this question. Its broader function is described thus:

To require every end and means necessary for the accomplishment of the general objectives of the statute to be A conference committee may, deal generally with the subject matter or it may be limited to
expressed in its title would not only be unreasonable but would actually render legislation impossible. 3 As has been resolving the precise differences between the two houses. Even where the conference
correctly explained: committee is not by rule limited in its jurisdiction, legislative custom severely limits the freedom
with which new subject matter can be inserted into the conference bill. But occasionally a
conference committee produces unexpected results, results beyond its mandate, These
The details of a legislative act need not be specifically stated in its title, but matter germane to
excursions occur even where the rules impose strict limitations on conference committee
the subject as expressed in the title, and adopted to the accomplishment of the object in view,
jurisdiction. This is symptomatic of the authoritarian power of conference committee (Davies,
may properly be included in the act. Thus, it is proper to create in the same act the machinery by
Legislative Law and Process: In a Nutshell, 1986 Ed., p.81).
which the act is to be enforced, to prescribe the penalties for its infraction, and to remove
obstacles in the way of its execution. If such matters are properly connected with the subject as
expressed in the title, it is unnecessary that they should also have special mention in the title It is a matter of record that the conference Committee Report on the bill in question was returned to and duly
(Southern Pac. Co. v. Bartine, 170 Fed. 725). approved by both the Senate and the House of Representatives. Thereafter, the bill was enrolled with its certification
by Senate President Neptali A. Gonzales and Speaker Ramon V. Mitra of the House of Representatives as having
been duly passed by both Houses of Congress. It was then presented to and approved by President Corazon C.
This is particularly true of the repealing clause, on which Cooley writes: "The repeal of a statute on a given subject is
Aquino on April 3, 1992.
properly connected with the subject matter of a new statute on the same subject; and therefore a repealing section in
the new statute is valid, notwithstanding that the title is silent on the subject. It would be difficult to conceive of a
matter more germane to an act and to the object to be accomplished thereby than the repeal of previous legislations Under the doctrine of separation powers, the Court may not inquire beyond the certification of the approval of a bill
connected therewith."4 from the presiding officers of Congress. Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez7 laid down the rule that the
enrolled bill, is conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in matters that have to be entered in the journals like
the yeas and nays on the final reading of the
The reason is that where a statute repeals a former law, such repeal is the effect and not the subject of the statute;
bill).8 The journals are themselves also binding on the Supreme Court, as we held in the old (but still valid) case
and it is the subject, not the effect of a law, which is required to be briefly expressed in its title.5 As observed in one
of U.S. vs. Pons,9 where we explained the reason thus:
case,6 if the title of an act embraces only one subject, we apprehend it was never claimed that every other act which
repeals it or alters by implication must be mentioned in the title of the new act. Any such rule would be neither within
the reason of the Constitution, nor practicable. To inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine legislature when they are, as we have
said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the, letter and spirit of the organic laws by which
the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and independent
We are convinced that the withdrawal of the franking privilege from some agencies is germane to the
department of the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers and functions, of the
accomplishment of the principal objective of R.A. No. 7354, which is the creation of a more efficient and effective
Legislature.
postal service system. Our ruling is that, by virtue of its nature as a repealing clause, Section 35 did not have to be
expressly included in the title of the said law.
Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners' charges that an amendment was made upon
the last reading of the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 7354 and that copies thereof in its final form were not
II
distributed among the members of each House. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that the
measure was duly enacted i.e., in accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. We are bound by such
The petitioners maintain that the second paragraph of Sec. 35 covering the repeal of the franking privilege from the official assurances from a coordinate department of the government, to which we owe, at the very least, a becoming
petitioners and this Court under E.O. 207, PD 1882 and PD 26 was not included in the original version of Senate Bill courtesy.
No. 720 or House Bill No. 4200. As this paragraph appeared only in the Conference Committee Report, its addition,
violates Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution, reading as follows:
III

(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on
The third and most serious challenge of the petitioners is based on the equal protection clause.
separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members
three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its
immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no It is alleged that R.A. No. 7354 is discriminatory because while withdrawing the franking privilege from the Judiciary,
amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, it retains the same for the President of the Philippines, the Vice President of the Philippines; Senators and Members
and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal. of the House of Representatives, the Commission on Elections; former Presidents of the Philippines; the National
Census and Statistics Office; and the general public in the filing of complaints against public offices and officers. 10
The respondents counter that there is no discrimination because the law is based on a valid classification in In their Comment, the respondents point out that available data from the Postal Service Office show that from
accordance with the equal protection clause. In fact, the franking privilege has been withdrawn not only from the January 1988 to June 1992, the total volume of frank mails amounted to P90,424,175.00. Of this amount, frank mails
Judiciary but also the Office of Adult Education, the Institute of National Language; the Telecommunications Office; from the Judiciary and other agencies whose functions include the service of judicial processes, such as the
the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation; the National Historical Commission; the Armed Forces of the intervenor, the Department of Justice and the Office of the Ombudsman, amounted to P86,481,759. Frank mails
Philippines; the Armed Forces of the Philippines Ladies Steering Committee; the City and Provincial Prosecutors; the coming fromthe Judiciary amounted to P73,574,864.00, and those coming from the petitioners reached the total
Tanodbayan (Office of Special Prosecutor); the Kabataang Barangay; the Commission on the Filipino Language; the amount of P60,991,431.00. The respondents' conclusion is that because of this considerable volume of mail from the
Provincial and City Assessors; and the National Council for the Welfare of Disabled Persons. 11 Judiciary, the franking privilege must be withdrawn from it.

The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends The argument is self-defeating. The respondents are in effect saying that the franking privilege should be extended
the requirements of justice and fair play. It has nonetheless been embodied in a separate clause in Article III Sec. 1., only to those who do not need it very much, if at all, (like the widows of former Presidents) but not to those who need
of the Constitution to provide for a more, specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the it badly (especially the courts of justice). It is like saying that a person may be allowed cosmetic surgery although it is
government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular not really necessary but not an operation that can save his life.
act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal
protection clause.
If the problem of the respondents is the loss of revenues from the franking privilege, the remedy, it seems to us, is to
withdraw it altogether from all agencies of government, including those who do not need it. The problem is not solved
According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated by retaining it for some and withdrawing it from others, especially where there is no substantial distinction between
should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed, 12 Similar subjects, in other words, those favored, which may or may not need it at all, and the Judiciary, which definitely needs it. The problem is not
should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others. solved by violating the Constitution.

The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons or things without In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking privilege has been withdrawn, Section 35 has
distinction. This might in fact sometimes result in unequal protection, as where, for example, a law prohibiting mature placed the courts of justice in a category to which it does not belong. If it recognizes the need of the President of the
books to all persons, regardless of age, would benefit the morals of the youth but violate the liberty of adults. What Philippines and the members of Congress for the franking privilege, there is no reason why it should not recognize a
the clause requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. By classification is similar and in fact greater need on the part of the Judiciary for such privilege. While we may appreciate the
meant the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from all others in withdrawal of the franking privilege from the Armed Forces of the Philippines Ladies Steering Committee, we fail to
these same particulars. 13 understand why the Supreme Court should be similarly treated as that Committee. And while we may concede the
need of the National Census and Statistics Office for the franking privilege, we are intrigued that a similar if not
greater need is not recognized in the courts of justice.
What is the reason for the grant of the franking privilege in the first place? Is the franking privilege extended to the
President of the Philippines or the Commission on Elections or to former Presidents of the Philippines purely as
a courtesy from the lawmaking body? Is it offered because of the importance or status of the grantee or because of (On second thought, there does not seem to be any justifiable need for withdrawing the privilege from the Armed
its need for the privilege? Or have the grantees been chosen pell-mell, as it were, without any basis at all for the Forces of the Philippines Ladies Steering Committee, which, like former Presidents of the Philippines or their
selection? widows, does not send as much frank mail as the Judiciary.)

We reject outright the last conjecture as there is no doubt that the statute as a whole was carefully deliberated upon, It is worth observing that the Philippine Postal Corporation, as a government-controlled corporation, was created and
by the political departments before it was finally enacted. There is reason to suspect, however, that not enough care is expected to operate for the purpose of promoting the public service. While it may have been established primarily
or attention was given to its repealing clause, resulting in the unwitting withdrawal of the franking privilege from the for private gain, it cannot excuse itself from performing certain functions for the benefit of the public in exchange for
Judiciary. the franchise extended to it by the government and the many advantages it enjoys under its charter. 14Among the
services it should be prepared to extend is free carriage of mail for certain offices of the government that need the
franking privilege in the discharge of their own public functions.
We also do not believe that the basis of the classification was mere courtesy, for it is unimaginable that the political
departments would have intended this serious slight to the Judiciary as the third of the major and equal departments
the government. The same observations are made if the importance or status of the grantee was the criterion used We also note that under Section 9 of the law, the Corporation is capitalized at P10 billion pesos, 55% of which is
for the extension of the franking privilege, which is enjoyed by the National Census and Statistics Office and even supplied by the Government, and that it derives substantial revenues from the sources enumerated in Section 10, on
some private individuals but not the courts of justice. top of the exemptions it enjoys. It is not likely that the retention of the franking privilege of the Judiciary will cripple
the Corporation.
In our view, the only acceptable reason for the grant of the franking privilege was the perceived need of the grantee
for the accommodation, which would justify a waiver of substantial revenue by the Corporation in the interest of At this time when the Judiciary is being faulted for the delay in the administration of justice, the withdrawal from it of
providing for a smoother flow of communication between the government and the people. the franking privilege can only further deepen this serious problem. The volume of judicial mail, as emphasized by
the respondents themselves, should stress the dependence of the courts of justice on the postal service for
communicating with lawyers and litigants as part of the judicial process. The Judiciary has the lowest appropriation in
Assuming that basis, we cannot understand why, of all the departments of the government, it is the Judiciary, that
the national budget compared to the Legislative and Executive Departments; of the P309 billion budgeted for 1993,
has been denied the franking privilege. There is no question that if there is any major branch of the government that
only .84%, or less than 1%, is alloted for the judiciary. It should not be hard to imagine the increased difficulties of
needs the privilege, it is the Judicial Department, as the respondents themselves point out. Curiously, the
our courts if they have to affix a purchased stamp to every process they send in the discharge of their judicial
respondents would justify the distinction on the basis precisely of this need and, on this basis, deny the Judiciary the
functions.
franking privilege while extending it to others less deserving.
We are unable to agree with the respondents that Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 represents a valid exercise of
discretion by the Legislature under the police power. On the contrary, we find its repealing clause to be a
discriminatory provision that denies the Judiciary the equal protection of the laws guaranteed for all persons or things
similarly situated. The distinction made by the law is superficial. It is not based on substantial distinctions that make
real differences between the Judiciary and the grantees of the franking privilege.

This is not a question of wisdom or power into which the Judiciary may not intrude. It is a matter of arbitrariness that
this Court has the duty and power to correct.

IV

In sum, we sustain R.A. No. 7354 against the attack that its subject is not expressed in its title and that it was not
passed in accordance with the prescribed procedure. However, we annul Section 35 of the law as violative of Article
3, Sec. 1, of the Constitution providing that no person shall "be deprived of the equal protection of laws."

We arrive at these conclusions with a full awareness of the criticism it is certain to provoke. While ruling against the
discrimination in this case, we may ourselves be accused of similar discrimination through the exercise of our
ultimate power in our own favor. This is inevitable. Criticism of judicial conduct, however undeserved, is a fact of life
in the political system that we are prepared to accept.. As judges, we cannot debate with our detractors. We can only
decide the cases before us as law imposes on us the duty to be fair and our own conscience gives us the light to be
right.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is partially GRANTED and Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Circular No. 92-28 is SET ASIDE insofar as it withdraws the franking privilege from the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional trail Courts, the Municipal trial Courts, and the National Land
Registration Authority and its Register of Deeds to all of which offices the said privilege shall be RESTORED. The
temporary restraining order dated June 2, 1992, is made permanent.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Melo, Quiason, Puno and Vitug, JJ.,
concur.

Bellosillo, J., is on leave.

 Republic of the Philippines NOW, THEREFORE, pursuant to this policy, the Board hereby declares that no car beyond six
SUPREME COURT years shall be operated as taxi, and in implementation of the same hereby promulgates the
Manila following rules and regulations:

EN BANC 1. As of December 31, 1977, all taxis of Model 1971 and earlier are ordered withdrawn from
public service and thereafter may no longer be registered and operated as taxis. In the
registration of cards for 1978, only taxis of Model 1972 and later shall be accepted for
G.R. No. L-59234 September 30, 1982
registration and allowed for operation;

TAXICAB OPERATORS OF METRO MANILA, INC., FELICISIMO CABIGAO and ACE TRANSPORTATION
2. As of December 31, 1978, all taxis of Model 1972 are ordered withdrawn from public service
CORPORATION, petitioners, 
and thereafter may no longer be registered and operated as taxis. In the registration of cars for
vs.
1979, only taxis of Model 1973 and later shall be accepted for registration and allowed for
THE BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION and THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF LAND
operation; and every year thereafter, there shall be a six-year lifetime of taxi, to wit:
TRANSPORTATION, respondents.

1980 — Model 1974

1981 — Model 1975, etc.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

All taxis of earlier models than those provided above are hereby ordered withdrawn from public
This Petition for "Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus with Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order"
service as of the last day of registration of each particular year and their respective plates shall
filed by the Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc., Felicisimo Cabigao and Ace Transportation, seeks to declare
be surrendered directly to the Board of Transportation for subsequent turnover to the Land
the nullity of Memorandum Circular No. 77-42, dated October 10, 1977, of the Board of Transportation, and
Transportation Commission.
Memorandum Circular No. 52, dated August 15, 1980, of the Bureau of Land Transportation.

For an orderly implementation of this Memorandum Circular, the rules herein shall immediately
Petitioner Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI) is a domestic corporation composed of taxicab
be effective in Metro-Manila. Its implementation outside Metro- Manila shall be carried out only
operators, who are grantees of Certificates of Public Convenience to operate taxicabs within the City of Manila and
after the project has been implemented in Metro-Manila and only after the date has been
to any other place in Luzon accessible to vehicular traffic. Petitioners Ace Transportation Corporation and Felicisimo
determined by the Board. 1
Cabigao are two of the members of TOMMI, each being an operator and grantee of such certificate of public
convenience.
Pursuant to the above BOT circular, respondent Director of the Bureau of Land Transportation (BLT) issued
Implementing Circular No. 52, dated August 15, 1980, instructing the Regional Director, the MV Registrars and other
On October 10, 1977, respondent Board of Transportation (BOT) issued Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 which
personnel of BLT, all within the National Capitol Region, to implement said Circular, and formulating a schedule of
reads:
phase-out of vehicles to be allowed and accepted for registration as public conveyances. To quote said Circular:

SUBJECT: Phasing out and Replacement of

Pursuant to BOT Memo-Circular No. 77-42, taxi units with year models over six (6) years old are
now banned from operating as public utilities in Metro Manila. As such the units involved should
Old and Dilapidated Taxis be considered as automatically dropped as public utilities and, therefore, do not require any
further dropping order from the BOT.
WHEREAS, it is the policy of the government to insure that only safe and comfortable units are
used as public conveyances; Henceforth, taxi units within the National Capitol Region having year models over 6 years old
shall be refused registration. The following schedule of phase-out is herewith prescribed for the
guidance of all concerned:
WHEREAS, the riding public, particularly in Metro-Manila, has, time and again, complained
against, and condemned, the continued operation of old and dilapidated taxis;
Year Model Automatic Phase-Out Year
WHEREAS, in order that the commuting public may be assured of comfort, convenience, and
safety, a program of phasing out of old and dilapidated taxis should be adopted;   1980

WHEREAS, after studies and inquiries made by the Board of Transportation, the latter believes 1974 1981
that in six years of operation, a taxi operator has not only covered the cost of his taxis, but has
made reasonable profit for his investments; 1975 1982
 Presidential Decree No. 101 grants to the Board of Transportation the power
1976 1983

1977   4. To fix just and reasonable standards, classification, regulations, practices, measurements, or
service to be furnished, imposed, observed, and followed by operators of public utility motor
vehicles.
etc. etc.

Section 2 of said Decree provides procedural guidelines for said agency to follow in the exercise of its powers:
Strict compliance here is desired. 2
Sec. 2. Exercise of powers. — In the exercise of the powers granted in the preceding section,
In accordance therewith, cabs of model 1971 were phase-out in registration year 1978; those of model 1972, in the Board shag proceed promptly along the method of legislative inquiry.
1979; those of model 1973, in 1980; and those of model 1974, in 1981.
Apart from its own investigation and studies, the Board, in its discretion, may require the
On January 27, 1981, petitioners filed a Petition with the BOT, docketed as Case No. 80-7553, seeking to nullify MC cooperation and assistance of the Bureau of Transportation, the Philippine Constabulary,
No. 77-42 or to stop its implementation; to allow the registration and operation in 1981 and subsequent years of particularly the Highway Patrol Group, the support agencies within the Department of Public
taxicabs of model 1974, as well as those of earlier models which were phased-out, provided that, at the time of Works, Transportation and Communications, or any other government office or agency that may
registration, they are roadworthy and fit for operation. be able to furnish useful information or data in the formulation of the Board of any policy, plan or
program in the implementation of this Decree.
On February 16, 1981, petitioners filed before the BOT a "Manifestation and Urgent Motion", praying for an early
hearing of their petition. The case was heard on February 20, 1981. Petitioners presented testimonial and The Board may also can conferences, require the submission of position papers or other
documentary evidence, offered the same, and manifested that they would submit additional documentary proofs. documents, information, or data by operators or other persons that may be affected by the
Said proofs were submitted on March 27, 1981 attached to petitioners' pleading entitled, "Manifestation, Presentation implementation of this Decree, or employ any other suitable means of inquiry.
of Additional Evidence and Submission of the Case for Resolution." 3
In support of their submission that they were denied procedural due process, petitioners contend that they were not
On November 28, 1981, petitioners filed before the same Board a "Manifestation and Urgent Motion to Resolve or caged upon to submit their position papers, nor were they ever summoned to attend any conference prior to the
Decide Main Petition" praying that the case be resolved or decided not later than December 10, 1981 to enable issuance of the questioned BOT Circular.
them, in case of denial, to avail of whatever remedy they may have under the law for the protection of their interests
before their 1975 model cabs are phased-out on January 1, 1982. It is clear from the provision aforequoted, however, that the leeway accorded the Board gives it a wide range of
choice in gathering necessary information or data in the formulation of any policy, plan or program. It is not
Petitioners, through its President, allegedly made personal follow-ups of the case, but was later informed that the mandatory that it should first call a conference or require the submission of position papers or other documents from
records of the case could not be located. operators or persons who may be affected, this being only one of the options open to the Board, which is given wide
discretionary authority. Petitioners cannot justifiably claim, therefore, that they were deprived of procedural due
process. Neither can they state with certainty that public respondents had not availed of other sources of inquiry prior
On December 29, 1981, the present Petition was instituted wherein the following queries were posed for to issuing the challenged Circulars. operators of public conveyances are not the only primary sources of the data and
consideration by this Court: information that may be desired by the BOT.

A. Did BOT and BLT promulgate the questioned memorandum circulars in accord with the Dispensing with a public hearing prior to the issuance of the Circulars is neither violative of procedural due process.
manner required by Presidential Decree No. 101, thereby safeguarding the petitioners' As held in Central Bank vs. Hon. Cloribel and Banco Filipino, 44 SCRA 307 (1972):
constitutional right to procedural due process?

Pevious notice and hearing as elements of due process, are constitutionally required for the
B. Granting, arguendo, that respondents did comply with the procedural requirements imposed protection of life or vested property rights, as well as of liberty, when its limitation or loss takes
by Presidential Decree No. 101, would the implementation and enforcement of the assailed place in consequence of a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding, generally dependent upon a past
memorandum circulars violate the petitioners' constitutional rights to. act or event which has to be established or ascertained. It is not essential to the validity of
general rules or regulations promulgated to govern future conduct of a class or persons or
(1) Equal protection of the law; enterprises, unless the law provides otherwise. (Emphasis supplied)

(2) Substantive due process; and Petitioners further take the position that fixing the ceiling at six (6) years is arbitrary and oppressive because the
roadworthiness of taxicabs depends upon their kind of maintenance and the use to which they are subjected, and,
therefore, their actual physical condition should be taken into consideration at the time of registration. As public
(3) Protection against arbitrary and unreasonable contend, however, it is impractical to subject every taxicab to constant and recurring evaluation, not to speak of the
classification and standard? fact that it can open the door to the adoption of multiple standards, possible collusion, and even graft and corruption.
A reasonable standard must be adopted to apply to an vehicles affected uniformly, fairly, and justly. The span of six
On Procedural and Substantive Due Process: years supplies that reasonable standard. The product of experience shows that by that time taxis have fully
depreciated, their cost recovered, and a fair return on investment obtained. They are also generally dilapidated and
no longer fit for safe and comfortable service to the public specially considering that they are in continuous operation
practically 24 hours everyday in three shifts of eight hours per shift. With that standard of reasonableness and
absence of arbitrariness, the requirement of due process has been met.

On Equal Protection of the Law:

Petitioners alleged that the Circular in question violates their right to equal protection of the law because the same is
being enforced in Metro Manila only and is directed solely towards the taxi industry. At the outset it should be pointed
out that implementation outside Metro Manila is also envisioned in Memorandum Circular No. 77-42. To repeat the
pertinent portion:

For an orderly implementation of this Memorandum Circular, the rules herein shall immediately
be effective in Metro Manila. Its implementation outside Metro Manila shall be carried out only
after the project has been implemented in Metro Manila and only after the date has been
determined by the Board. 4

In fact, it is the understanding of the Court that implementation of the Circulars in Cebu City is already being effected,
with the BOT in the process of conducting studies regarding the operation of taxicabs in other cities.

The Board's reason for enforcing the Circular initially in Metro Manila is that taxicabs in this city, compared to those
of other places, are subjected to heavier traffic pressure and more constant use. This is of common knowledge.
Considering that traffic conditions are not the same in every city, a substantial distinction exists so that infringement
of the equal protection clause can hardly be successfully claimed.

As enunciated in the preambular clauses of the challenged BOT Circular, the overriding consideration is the safety
and comfort of the riding public from the dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise, of its
police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare
of the people. It can prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare of society. 5 It may also regulate property
rights. 6 In the language of Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando "the necessities imposed by public welfare may justify
the exercise of governmental authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their
interests are disregarded". 7

In so far as the non-application of the assailed Circulars to other transportation services is concerned, it need only be
recalled that the equal protection clause does not imply that the same treatment be accorded all and sundry. It
applies to things or persons Identically or similarly situated. It permits of classification of the object or subject of the
law provided classification is reasonable or based on substantial distinction, which make for real differences, and that
it must apply equally to each member of the class. 8 What is required under the equal protection clause is the uniform
operation by legal means so that all persons under Identical or similar circumstance would be accorded the same
treatment both in privilege conferred and the liabilities imposed. 9 The challenged Circulars satisfy the foregoing
criteria.

Evident then is the conclusion that the questioned Circulars do not suffer from any constitutional infirmity. To declare
a law unconstitutional, the infringement of constitutional right must be clear, categorical and undeniable. 10

WHEREFORE, the Writs prayed for are denied and this Petition is hereby dismissed. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 Chairman of the Medical Board or his duly authorized representative; (e) a representative of the Philippine Medical
Association; (f) the Dean of the College of Medicine, University of the Philippines; (g) a representative of the Council
of Deans of Philippine Medical Schools; and (h) a representative of the Association of Philippine Medical Colleges,
as members. The functions of the Board of Medical Education specified in Section 5 of the statute include the
following:
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
(a) To determine and prescribe equirements for admission into a recognized college of medicine;
Manila

(b) To determine and prescribe requirements for minimum physical facilities of colleges of medicine, to wit:
EN BANC
buildings, including hospitals, equipment and supplies, apparatus, instruments, appliances, laboratories,
bed capacity for instruction purposes, operating and delivery rooms, facilities for outpatient services, and
G.R. No. 78164               July 31, 1987 others, used for didactic and practical instruction in accordance with modern trends;

TERESITA TABLARIN, MA, LUZ CIRIACO, MA NIMFA B. ROVIRA, EVANGELINA S. LABAO, in their behalf (c) To determine and prescribe the minimum number and minimum qualifications of teaching personnel,
and in behalf of applicants for admission into the Medical Colleges during the school year 1987-88 and including student-teachers ratio;
future years who have not taken or successfully hurdled tile National Medical Admission Test
(NMAT).petitioners, 
(d) To determine and prescribe the minimum required curriculum leading to the degree of Doctor of
vs.
Medicine;
THE HONORABLE JUDGE ANGELINA S. GUTIERREZ, Presiding Judge of Branch XXXVII of the Regional
Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region with seat at Manila, THE HONORABLE SECRETARY
LOURDES QUISUMBING, in her capacity as Chairman of the BOARD OF MEDICAL EDUCATION, and THE (e) To authorize the implementation of experimental medical curriculum in a medical school that has
CENTER FOR EDUCATIONAL MEASUREMENT (CEM), respondents. exceptional faculty and instrumental facilities. Such an experimental curriculum may prescribe admission
and graduation requirements other than those prescribed in this Act; Provided, That only exceptional
students shall be enrolled in the experimental curriculum;
FELICIANO, J.:

(f) To accept applications for certification for admission to a medical school and keep a register of those
The petitioners sought admission into colleges or schools of medicine for the school year 1987-1988. However, the
issued said certificate; and to collect from said applicants the amount of twenty-five pesos each which
petitioners either did not take or did not successfully take the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) required by
shall accrue to the operating fund of the Board of Medical Education;
the Board of Medical Education, one of the public respondents, and administered by the private respondent, the
Center for Educational Measurement (CEM).
(g) To select, determine and approve hospitals or some departments of the hospitals for training which
comply with the minimum specific physical facilities as provided in subparagraph (b) hereof; and
On 5 March 1987, the petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, a Petition for
Declaratory Judgment and Prohibition with a prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. The
petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of Medical Education and the (h) To promulgate and prescribe and enforce the necessary rules and regulations for the proper
Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, implementation of the foregoing functions. (Emphasis supplied)
and MECS Order No. 52, series of 1985, dated 23 August 1985 and from requiring the taking and passing of the
NMAT as a condition for securing certificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding with accepting applications
Section 7 prescribes certain minimum requirements for applicants to medical schools:
for taking the NMAT and from administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. After hearing
on the petition for issuance of preliminary injunction, the trial court denied said petition on 20 April 1987. The NMAT
was conducted and administered as previously scheduled. Admission requirements. — The medical college may admit any student who has not been convicted by
any court of competent jurisdiction of any offense involving moral turpitude and who presents (a) a record
of completion of a bachelor's degree in science or arts; (b) a certificate of eligibility for entrance to a
Petitioners accordingly filed this Special Civil Action for certiorari with this Court to set aside the Order of the
medical school from the Board of Medical Education; (c) a certificate of good moral character issued by
respondent judge denying the petition for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
two former professors in the college of liberal arts; and (d) birth certificate. Nothing in this act shall be
construed to inhibit any college of medicine from establishing, in addition to the preceding, other entrance
Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 4224 and 5946, known as the "Medical Act of 1959" defines requirements that may be deemed admissible.
its basic objectives in the following manner:
x x x           x x x          x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Section 1. Objectives. — This Act provides for and shall govern (a) the standardization and regulation of
medical education (b) the examination for registration of physicians; and (c) the supervision, control and
MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, issued by the then Minister of Education, Culture and Sports and dated 23 August
regulation of the practice of medicine in the Philippines. (Underscoring supplied)
1985, established a uniform admission test called the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) as an additional
requirement for issuance of a certificate of eligibility for admission into medical schools of the Philippines, beginning
The statute, among other things, created a Board of Medical Education which is composed of (a) the Secretary of with the school year 1986-1987. This Order goes on to state that:
Education, Culture and Sports or his duly authorized representative, as Chairman; (b) the Secretary of Health or his
duly authorized representative; (c) the Director of Higher Education or his duly authorized representative; (d) the
 2. The NMAT, an aptitude test, is considered as an instrument toward upgrading the selection of Article II of the 1987 Constitution sets forth in its second half certain "State policies" which the government is
applicants for admission into the medical schools and its calculated to improve the quality of medical enjoined to pursue and promote. The petitioners here have not seriously undertaken to demonstrate to what extent
education in the country. The cutoff score for the successful applicants, based on the scores on the NMAT, or in what manner the statute and the administrative order they assail collide with the State policies embodied in
shall be determined every year by the Board of Medical Education after consultation with the Association Sections 11, 13 and 17. They have not, in other words, discharged the burden of proof which lies upon them. This
of Philippine Medical Colleges. The NMAT rating of each applicant, together with the other admission burden is heavy enough where the constitutional provision invoked is relatively specific, rather than abstract, in
requirements as presently called for under existing rules, shall serve as a basis for the issuance of the character and cast in behavioral or operational terms. That burden of proof becomes of necessity heavier where the
prescribed certificate of elegibility for admission into the medical colleges. constitutional provision invoked is cast, as the second portion of Article II is cast, in language descriptive of basic
policies, or more precisely, of basic objectives of State policy and therefore highly generalized in tenor. The
petitioners have not made their case, even a prima facie case, and we are not compelled to speculate and to
3. Subject to the prior approval of the Board of Medical Education, each medical college may give other
imagine how the legislation and regulation impugned as unconstitutional could possibly offend the constitutional
tests for applicants who have been issued a corresponding certificate of eligibility for admission that will
provisions pointed to by the petitioners.
yield information on other aspects of the applicant's personality to complement the information derived
from the NMAT.
Turning to Article XIV, Section 1, of the 1987 Constitution, we note that once more petitioners have failed to
demonstrate that the statute and regulation they assail in fact clash with that provision. On the contrary we may note-
x x x           x x x          x x x
in anticipation of discussion infra — that the statute and the regulation which petitioners attack are in fact designed
to promote "quality education" at the level of professional schools. When one reads Section 1 in relation to Section 5
8. No applicant shall be issued the requisite Certificate of Eligibility for Admission (CEA), or admitted for (3) of Article XIV as one must one cannot but note that the latter phrase of Section 1 is not to be read with absolute
enrollment as first year student in any medical college, beginning the school year, 1986-87, without the literalness. The State is not really enjoined to take appropriate steps to make quality education " accessible
required NMAT qualification as called for under this Order. (Underscoring supplied) to all who might for any number of reasons wish to enroll in a professional school but rather merely to make such
education accessible to all who qualify under "fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements.
"
Pursuant to MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, the private respondent Center conducted NMATs for entrance to medical
colleges during the school year 1986-1987. In December 1986 and in April 1987, respondent Center conducted the
NMATs for admission to medical colleges during the school year 1987.1988.1avvphi1 2. In the trial court, petitioners had made the argument that Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as
amended, offend against the constitutional principle which forbids the undue delegation of legislative power, by
failing to establish the necessary standard to be followed by the delegate, the Board of Medical Education. The
Petitioners raise the question of whether or not a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued to enjoin the general principle of non-delegation of legislative power, which both flows from the reinforces the more fundamental
enforcement of Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, rule of the separation and allocation of powers among the three great departments of government, 1 must be applied
pending resolution of the issue of constitutionality of the assailed statute and administrative order. We regard this with circumspection in respect of statutes which like the Medical Act of 1959, deal with subjects as obviously
issue as entirely peripheral in nature. It scarcely needs documentation that a court would issue a writ of preliminary complex and technical as medical education and the practice of medicine in our present day world. Mr. Justice
injunction only when the petitioner assailing a statute or administrative order has made out a case of Laurel stressed this point 47 years ago in Pangasinan Transportation Co., Inc. vs. The Public Service Commission:2
unconstitutionality strong enough to overcome, in the mind of the judge, the presumption of constitutionality, aside
from showing a clear legal right to the remedy sought. The fundamental issue is of course the constitutionality of the
statute or order assailed. One thing, however, is apparent in the development of the principle of separation of powers and that is that
the maxim of delegatus non potest delegare or delegate potestas non potest delegare, adopted this
practice (Delegibus et Consuetudiniis Anglia edited by G.E. Woodbine, Yale University Press, 1922, Vol. 2,
1. The petitioners invoke a number of provisions of the 1987 Constitution which are, in their assertion, violated by the p. 167) but which is also recognized in principle in the Roman Law (d. 17.18.3) has been made to adapt
continued implementation of Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act 2381, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, s. itself to the complexities of modern government, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits of the
1985. The provisions invoked read as follows: principle of "subordinate legislation," not only in the United States and England but in practically all modern
governments. (People vs. Rosenthal and Osmena [68 Phil. 318, 1939]. Accordingly, with the growing
(a) Article 11, Section 11: "The state values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation and the increased
of human rights. " difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of greater
power by the legislature, and toward the approval of the practice by the courts." 3
(b) ArticleII, Section l3: "The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation building and shall
promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual and social well being. It shall inculcate in The standards set for subordinate legislation in the exercise of rule making authority by an administrative agency like
the youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs." the Board of Medical Education are necessarily broad and highly abstract. As explained by then Mr. Justice
Fernando in Edu v. Ericta4 —
(c) Article II, Section 17: "The State shall give priority to education, science and technology, arts, culture
and sports to foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress and to promote total human The standard may be either expressed or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily
liberation and development. " met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy
and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law, clearly the legislative objective is
public safety. What is sought to be attained as in Calalang v. Williams is "safe transit upon the roads. 5
(d) Article XIV, Section l: "The State shall protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education
at all levels and take appropriate steps to make such education accessible to all. "
We believe and so hold that the necessary standards are set forth in Section 1 of the 1959 Medical Act: "the
standardization and regulation of medical education" and in Section 5 (a) and 7 of the same Act, the body of the
(e) Article XIV, Section 5 (3): "Every citizen has a right to select a profession or course of study, subject to statute itself, and that these considered together are sufficient compliance with the requirements of the non-
fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements." delegation principle.
3. The petitioners also urge that the NMAT prescribed in MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, is an "unfair, unreasonable infringes the requirements of equal protection. They assert, in other words, that students seeking admission during a
and inequitable requirement," which results in a denial of due process. Again, petitioners have failed to specify just given school year, e.g., 1987-1988, when subjected to a different cutoff score than that established for an, e.g.,
what factors or features of the NMAT render it "unfair" and "unreasonable" or "inequitable." They appear to suggest earlier school year, are discriminated against and that this renders the MECS Order "arbitrary and capricious." The
that passing the NMAT is an unnecessary requirement when added on top of the admission requirements set out in force of this argument is more apparent than real. Different cutoff scores for different school years may be dictated
Section 7 of the Medical Act of 1959, and other admission requirements established by internal regulations of the by differing conditions obtaining during those years. Thus, the appropriate cutoff score for a given year may be a
various medical schools, public or private. Petitioners arguments thus appear to relate to utility and wisdom or function of such factors as the number of students who have reached the cutoff score established the preceding
desirability of the NMAT requirement. But constitutionality is essentially a question of power or authority: this Court year; the number of places available in medical schools during the current year; the average score attained during
has neither commission or competence to pass upon questions of the desirability or wisdom or utility of legislation or the current year; the level of difficulty of the test given during the current year, and so forth. To establish a permanent
administrative regulation. Those questions must be address to the political departments of the government not to the and immutable cutoff score regardless of changes in circumstances from year to year, may wen result in an
courts. unreasonable rigidity. The above language in MECS Order No. 52, far from being arbitrary or capricious, leaves the
Board of Medical Education with the measure of flexibility needed to meet circumstances as they change.
There is another reason why the petitioners' arguments must fail: the legislative and administrative provisions
impugned by them constitute, to the mind of the Court, a valid exercise of the police power of the state. The police We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain minimum scores therein as a condition for admission
power, it is commonplace learning, is the pervasive and non-waivable power and authority of the sovereign to secure to medical schools in the Philippines, do not constitute an unconstitutional imposition.
and promote an the important interests and needs — in a word, the public order — of the general community. 6 An
important component of that public order is the health and physical safety and well being of the population, the
WHEREFORE, the Petition for certiorari is DISMISSED and the Order of the respondent trial court denying the
securing of which no one can deny is a legitimate objective of governmental effort and regulation. 7
petition for a writ of preliminary injunction is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there is some reasonable relation between the
SO ORDERED.
prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to medical school on the one hand, and the securing
of the health and safety of the general community, on the other hand. This question is perhaps most usefully
approached by recalling that the regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
as a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public.8 That the power to regulate and control the Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.
practice of medicine includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine,
is also well recognized. thus, legislation and administrative regulations requiring those who wish to practice medicine
first to take and pass medical board examinations have long ago been recognized as valid exercises of
governmental power.9 Similarly, the establishment of minimum medical educational requirements — i.e., the
completion of prescribed courses in a recognized medical school — for admission to the medical profession, has
also been sustained as a legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of the state. 10 What we have before us in the
instant case is closely related: the regulation of access to medical schools. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, as noted
earlier, articulates the rationale of regulation of this type: the improvement of the professional and technical quality of
the graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the quality of those admitted to the student body of the medical
schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the process of admission, selectivity consisting, among other
things, of limiting admission to those who exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for medical studies and
eventually for medical practice. The need to maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high standards in our
professional schools in general, and medical schools in particular, in the current stage of our social and economic
development, are widely known.

We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a means for achieving its
stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our] medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality of
medical education in the country." Given the widespread use today of such admission tests in, for instance, medical
schools in the United States of America (the Medical College Admission Test [MCAT] 11 and quite probably in other
countries with far more developed educational resources than our own, and taking into account the failure or inability
of the petitioners to even attempt to prove otherwise, we are entitled to hold that the NMAT is reasonably related to
the securing of the ultimate end of legislation and regulation in this area. That end, it is useful to recall, is the
protection of the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in those who would
undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease or trauma.

4. Petitioners have contended, finally, that MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, is in conflict with the equal protection clause
of the Constitution. More specifically, petitioners assert that that portion of the MECS Order which provides that

the cutoff score for the successful applicants, based on the scores on the NMAT, shall be determined
every-year by the Board of Medical 11 Education after consultation with the Association of Philippine
Medical Colleges. (Emphasis supplied)
 Republic of the Philippines Sec. 91. The Civil Service Law and its implementing rules and regulations shall apply to all
SUPREME COURT personnel of the Department.
Manila
he is covered by the Civil Service Law, particularly Sec. 42 of PD 807 of the Civil Service Decree, which limits the
EN BANC  maximum period of suspension to ninety (90) days, thus:

G.R. No. 113811 October 7, 1994 Sec. 42. Lifting of Preventive Suspension Pending Administrative Investigation. — When the
administrative case against the officer or employee under preventive suspension is not finally
decided by the disciplining authority within the period of ninety (90) days after the date of
ISHMAEL HIMAGAN, petitioner, 
suspension of the respondent who is not a presidential appointee, the respondent shall be
vs.
automatically reinstated in the service; Provided, That when the delay in the disposition of the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HON. JUDGE HILARIO MAPAYO, RTC, Br. 11, Davao City, respondents.
case is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, the period of delay shall not be
counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided.
Victorio S. Advincula for petitioner.
He claims that an imposition of preventive suspension of over 90 days is contrary to the Civil Service Law and would
KAPUNAN, J.: be a violation of his constitutional right to equal protection of laws. He further asserts that the requirements in
Sec. 47 of R.A. 6975 that "the court shall immediately suspend the accused from office until the case is terminated"
and the succeeding sentence, "Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety
Petitioner, a policeman assigned with the medical company of the Philippine National Police Regional Headquarters (90) days from arraignment of the accused" are both substantive and should be taken together to mean that if the
at Camp Catitigan, Davao City, was implicated in the killing of Benjamin Machitar, Jr. and the attempted murder of case is not terminated within 90 days, the period of preventive suspension must be lifted because of the command
Bernabe Machitar. After the informations for murder1 and attempted murder2 were filed with the Regional Trial Court, that the trial must be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment.
Branch 11, Davao City, on September 16, 1992, the trial court issued an Order suspending petitioner until the
termination of the case on the basis of Section 47, R.A. 6975, otherwise known as Department of Interior and Local
Government Act of 1990, which provides: We disagree.

Sec. 47. Preventive Suspension Pending Criminal Case. — Upon the filing of a complaint or First. The language of the first sentence of Sec. 47 of R.A. 6975 is clear, plain and free from ambiguity. It gives no
information sufficient in form and substance against a member of the PNP for grave felonies other meaning than that the suspension from office of the member of the PNP charged with grave offense where the
where the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1) day or more, the court shall penalty is six years and one day or more shall last until the termination of the case. The suspension cannot be lifted
immediately suspend the accused from office until the case is terminated. Such case shall be before the termination of the case. The second sentence of the same Section providing that the trial must be
subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment does not qualify or limit the first sentence. The two can stand
the accused (Emphasis ours). independently of each other. The first refers to the period of suspension. The second deals with the time frame within
which the trial should be finished.
On October 11, 1993, petitioner filed a motion to lift the order for his suspension, 3 relying on Section 42 of P.D. 807
of the Civil Service Decree, that his suspension should be limited to ninety (90) days and, also, on our ruling Suppose the trial is not terminated within ninety days from arraignment, should the suspension of accused be lifted?
in Deloso v. Sandiganbayan,4 and Layno v. Sandiganbayan.5 In his order dated December 14, 19936 respondent The answer is certainly no. While the law uses the mandatory word "shall" before the phrase "be terminated within
judge denied the motion pointing out that under Section 47 of R.A. 6975, the accused shall be suspended from office ninety (90) days", there is nothing in R.A. 6975 that suggests that the preventive suspension of the accused will be
until his case is terminated. The motion for reconsideration of the order of denial was, likewise, denied. 7 Hence, the lifted if the trial is not terminated within that period. Nonetheless, the Judge who fails to decide the case within the
petition for certiorari and mandamus to set aside the orders of respondent Judge and to command him to lift period without justifiable reason may be subject to administrative sanctions and, in appropriate cases where the facts
petitioner's preventive suspension. so warrant, to criminal8 or civil liability.9 If the trial is unreasonably delayed without fault of the accused such that he is
deprived of his right to a speedy trial, he is not without a remedy. He may ask for the dismissal of the case. Should
the court refuse to dismiss the case, the accused can compel its dismissal by certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or
We find the petition devoid of merit. secure his liberty by habeas corpus. 10

There is no question that the case of petitioner who is charged with murder and attempted murder under the Revised Second. Petitioner misapplies Sec. 42 of PD 807. A meticulous reading of the section clearly shows that it refers to
Penal Code falls squarely under Sec. 47 of RA 6975 which specifically applies to members of the PNP. In dispute the lifting of preventive suspension in pending administrative investigation, not in criminal cases, as here. What is
however, is whether the provision limits the period of suspension to 90 days, considering that while the first sentence more, Section 42 expressly limits the period of preventive suspension to ninety (90) days. Sec. 91 of R.A. 6975
of Sec. 47 provides that the accused who is charged with grave felonies where the penalty imposed is six (6) years which states that "The Civil Service Law and its implementing rules shall apply to all personnel of the Department"
and one (1) day shall be suspended from office "until the case is terminated", the second sentence of the same simply means that the provisions of the Civil Service Law and its implementing rules and regulations are applicable
section mandates that the case, which shall be subject to continuous trial, shall be terminated within 90 days from to members of the Philippine National Police insofar as the provisions, rules and regulations are not inconsistent with
the arraignment of the accused. R.A. 6975. Certainly, Section 42 of the Civil Service Decree which limits the preventive suspension to ninety (90)
days cannot apply to members of the PNP because Sec. 47 of R.A. 6995 provides differently, that is, the suspension
Petitioner posits that as a member of the Philippine National Police, under Sec. 91 of RA 6975 which reads: where the penalty imposed by law exceeds six (6) years shall continue until the case is terminated.
Third. Petitioner's reliance on Layno and Deloso is misplaced. These cases all stemmed from charges in violation of The case of Deloso, likewise, involved another elective official who
R.A. 3019 (1060), otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act which, unlike was preventively suspended as provincial governor, also under RA 3019 the Anti-Graft Law. This Court, faced with
R.A. 6975, is silent on the duration of the preventive suspension. Sec. 13 of R.A. 3019 reads as follows: similar factual circumstances as in Layno, applied the ruling in the latter case "in relation to the principles of due
process and equal protection."
Suspension and loss of benefits. — Any public officer against whom any criminal prosecution
under a valid information under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on It is readily apparent that Section 13 of R.A. 3019 upon which the preventive suspension of the accused
bribery is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final in Laynoand Deloso was based is silent with respect to the duration of the preventive suspension, such that the
judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he suspension of the accused therein for a prolonged and unreasonable length of time raised a due process question.
shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive Not so in the instant case. Petitioner is charged with murder under the Revised Penal Code and it is undisputed that
during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against he falls squarely under Sec. 47 of R.A. 6975 which categorically states that his suspension shall last until the case is
him. terminated. The succeeding sentence of the same section requires the case to be subjected to continuous trial which
shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused. As previously emphasized, nowhere in
the law does it say that after the lapse of the 90-day period for trial, the preventive suspension should be lifted. The
In the case of Layno, the duly elected mayor of Lianga, Surigao del Sur, was preventively suspended after an
law is clear, the ninety (90) days duration applies to the trial of the case not to the suspension. Nothing else should
information was filed against him for offenses under R.A. 3019 (1060), the Anti-Graft Corrupt Practices Act. He had
be read into the law. When the words and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning
been suspended for four (4) months at the time he filed a motion to lift his preventive suspension. We held that his
determined from the language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says. 12
indefinite preventive suspension violated the "equal protection clause" and shortened his term of office. Thus:

Fourth. From the deliberations of the Bicameral Conference Committee on National Defense relative to the bill that
2. Petitioner is a duly elected municipal mayor of Lianga, Surigao del Sur. His term of office does
became R.A. 6975, the meaning of Section 47 of R.A. 6975 insofar as the period of suspension is concerned
not expire until 1986. Were it not for this information and the suspension decreed by the
becomes all the more clear. We quote:
Sandiganbayan according to the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, he would have been all
this while in the full discharge of his functions as such municipal mayor. He was elected
precisely to do so. As of October 26, 1983, he has been unable to. It is a basic assumption of So other than that in that particular section, ano ba itong "Jurisdiction in
the electoral process implicit in the right of suffrage that the people are entitled to the services of Criminal Cases?" What is this all about?
elective officials of their choice. For misfeasance or malfeasance, any of them could, of course,
be proceeded against administratively or, as in this instance, criminally. In either case, his
REP. ZAMORA. In case they are charged with crimes.
culpability must be established. Moreover, if there be a criminal action, he is entitled to the
constitutional presumption of innocence. A preventive suspension may be justified. Its
continuance, however, for an unreasonable length of time raises a due process question. For THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Ah, the previous one is administrative,
even if thereafter he were acquitted, in the meanwhile his right to hold office had been nullified. no. Now, if it is charged with a crime, regular courts.
Clearly, there would be in such a case an injustice suffered by him. Nor is he the only victim.
There is injustice inflicted likewise on the people of Lianga. They were deprived of the services
SEN. GONZALES. Ano, the courts mismo ang magsasabing . . .
of the man they had elected to serve as mayor. In that sense, to paraphrase Justice Cardozo,
the protracted continuance of this preventive suspension had outrun the bounds of reason and
resulted in sheer oppression. A denial of due process is thus quite manifest. It is to avoid such THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). No, the jurisdiction.
an unconstitutional application that the order of suspension should be lifted.
REP. ZAMORA. The jurisdiction if there is robbery.
3. Nor is it solely the denial of procedural due process that is apparent. There is likewise an
equal protection question. If the case against petitioner Layno were administrative in character
the Local Government Code would be applicable. It is therein clearly provided that while THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Okay. "Preventive Suspension Pending
preventive suspension is allowable for the causes therein enumerated, there is this emphatic Criminal Case. Upon the filing of a complaint or informations sufficient in
limitation on the duration thereof: "In all cases, preventive suspension shall not extend beyond form and substance against a member of the PNP for grave felonies where
sixty days after the start of said suspension." It may be recalled that the principle against the penalty imposed by law is six years and one day or more, the court shall
indefinite suspension applies equally to national government officials. So it was held in the immediately suspend the accused from the office until the case is
leading case of Garcia v. Hon. Executive Secretary. According to the opinion of Justice Barrera: terminated."
"To adopt the theory of respondents that an officer appointed by the President, facing
administrative charges, can be preventively suspended indefinitely, would be to countenance a REP. ALBANO. Where are we now Mr. Chairman.
situation where the preventive suspension can, in effect, be the penalty itself without a finding of
guilt after due hearing, contrary to the express mandate of the Constitution and the Civil Service
law." Further: "In the guise of a preventive suspension, his term of office could be shortened and THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Grave felonies ito e. Six years and one
he could in effect, be removed without a finding of a cause duly established after due hearing, in day or more.
violation of the Constitution. Clearly then, the policy of the law mandated by the Constitution
frowns at a suspension of indefinite duration. In this particular case, the mere fact that petitioner SEN. SAGUISAG. Kung five years and litigation ng Supreme Court, ganoon
is facing a charge under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act does not justify a different rule ba and . . .?
of law. To do so would be to negate the safeguard of the equal protection guarantee. 11
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Hindi, dahil iyong iba panay disciplinary SEN. PIMENTEL. I know, but, iyon na nga, we are looking at some solution
iyon e. to a particular situation.

SEN. PIMENTEL. Anong page iyan, Rene? SEN. ANGARA. Let's have continuous hearing and be terminated not later
than ninety days.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Page 29 — Preventive Suspension.
REP. ZAMORA. Ang point ni Ernie, that's really only the directory. All of
these, well, looks exactly the same thing.
REP. GUTANG. Ang complaint kasi ng mga tao, pagka may pulis na may
criminal case at may baril pa rin at nag-uuniforme, hindi magandang
tingnan e. So parang natatakot iyong mga witnesses. SEN. ANGARA. No, but at least, we will shorten it up in a case like this. We
are really keen on having it quick, swift.
SEN. GONZALES. Anyway, kung ma-exempt na rito naman siya e.
SEN. PIMENTEL. Swift justice.
REP. GUTANG. Mayroong entitlement to reinstatement and pay. . . .
REP. ALBANO. Mr. Chairman.
xxx xxx xxx
THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. MACEDA). Yes.
SEN. PIMENTEL. Dito sa "Preventive Suspension Pending Criminal Case."
Okay ito but I think we should also mandate the early termination of the REP. ALBANO. Following the Veloso case in Anti-graft cases before the
case. Ibig sabihin, okay, hindi ba "the suspension of the accused from office Sandiganbayan, the preventive suspension is only ninety days. In no case
until the case is terminated?" Alam naman natin ang takbo ng mga kaso rito shall it go beyond ninety days which can also be applicable here because
sa ating bansa e. this is a preventive suspension.

REP. ZAMORA. Twenty days, okay na. SEN. PIMENTEL. No, because you can legislate at least.

SEN. PIMENTEL. Hindi, and ibig kong sabihin, let us just assume that a SEN. SAGUISAG. But then the case may be anti-graft ha. The case filed
case can be, as Rene pointed out, can run to six years bago against a policeman may be anti-graft in nature. . .
ma-terminate, sometimes ten years pa nga e. Okay, but maybe we should
mandate. . .
SEN. PIMENTEL. Correct, correct, but is that a constitutional provision? Is
it?
REP. ZAMORA. Continuous hearing.
REP. ALBANO. No, but as a standard procedure.
SEN. PIMENTEL. Not only that, but the case must be terminated within a
period.
SEN. PIMENTEL. Then you can legislate.

REP. ALBANO. Ninety days na ho sa Supreme Court the trial.

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). No, because this particular provision is
for criminal cases. I know anti-graft is a criminal case but here we are
SEN. PIMENTEL. Ha? talking, let's say, of murder, rape, treason, robbery. That's why it is in that
context that there is a difference between a purely anti-graft case and a
criminal case which could be a serious case since it is six years and one
REP. ALBANO. The trial must be done within ninety days,
day or more, so it must be already a grave felony.

SEN. PIMENTEL. Ang ibig kong sabihin kung maari sanang ilagay rito that
xxx xxx xxx
the case shall also be terminated in one year from the time . . . aywan ko
kung kaya nating gawin iyon.
REP. ALBANO. . . .
REP. ALBANO. One solution, Mr. Chairman.
What I mean to say is, preventive suspension, we can use the 
Veloso case.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Criminal case? Hindi ba that has all
been held as directory even if you put it in the law?
 THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). No, that's too short, that's what I am Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug and Mendoza, JJ.,
saying. The feeling here is, for policeman, we have to be stricter especially concur.
if it is a criminal case.
Feliciano, Padilla and Bidin, JJ., are on leave.
What Rene is just trying to say is, he is agreeable that the suspension is
until the case is terminated, but he just wants some administrative
balancing to expedite it. So let us study what kind of language could be
done along that line. So just on the National Police Commission . . .

SEN. ANGARA. Can I suggest a language that may reflect. . .

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Okay, please.

SEN. ANGARA. "Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and be

terminated not later than . . ." whatever we agree.

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Okay, so let's study that.

So if there are any further amendments to Chapter 2 on the National Police

Commission. . . . . . 13

The foregoing discussions reveal the legislative intent to place on preventive suspension a member of the PNP
charged with grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law exceeds six years of imprisonment and which
suspension continues until the case against him is terminated.

The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other classes of persons charged criminally or
administratively insofar as the application of the rule on preventive suspension is concerned is that policemen carry
weapons and the badge of the law which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them, as succinctly
brought out in the legislative discussions.

If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is reinstated to his post while his case is
pending, his victim and the witnesses against him are obviously exposed to constant threat and thus easily cowed to
silence by the mere fact that the accused is in uniform and armed. The imposition of preventive suspension for over
90 days under Section 47 of
R.A. 6975 does not violate the suspended policeman's constitutional right to equal protection of the laws.

The equal protection clause exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is intended to eliminate discrimination and
oppression based on inequality. Recognizing the existence of real differences among men, the equal protection
clause does not demand absolute equality. It merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to the privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. 14 Thus, the equal protection
clause does not absolutely forbid classifications, such as the one which exists in the instant case. If the classification
is based on real and substantial differences; 15 is germane to the purpose of the law; 16 applies to all members of the
same
class; 17 and applies to current as well as future conditions, 18 the classification may not be impugned as violating the
Constitution's equal protection guarantee. A distinction based on real and reasonable considerations related to a
proper legislative purpose such as that which exists here is neither unreasonable, capricious nor unfounded.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
 under salary grade 19 and below shall be in accordance with the rates prescribed under Republic
EN BANC Act No. 6758. [emphasis supplied]

G.R. No. 148208             December 15, 2004 The thrust of petitioner's challenge is that the above proviso makes an unconstitutional cut between two
classes of employees in the BSP, viz: (1) the BSP officers or those exempted from the coverage of the Salary
Standardization Law (SSL) (exempt class); and (2) the rank-and-file (Salary Grade [SG] 19 and below), or those not
CENTRAL BANK (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner, 
exempted from the coverage of the SSL (non-exempt class). It is contended that this classification is "a classic case
vs.
of class legislation," allegedly not based on substantial distinctions which make real differences, but solely on the SG
BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS and the EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, respondents.
of the BSP personnel's position. Petitioner also claims that it is not germane to the purposes of Section 15(c), Article
II of R.A. No. 7653, the most important of which is to establish professionalism and excellence at all levels in the
BSP.1 Petitioner offers the following sub-set of arguments:
DECISION
a. the legislative history of R.A. No. 7653 shows that the questioned proviso does not appear in the original
PUNO, J.:
and amended versions of House Bill No. 7037, nor in the original version of Senate Bill No. 1235; 2

Can a provision of law, initially valid, become subsequently unconstitutional, on the ground that

b. subjecting the compensation of the BSP rank-and-file employees to the rate prescribed by the SSL
its continuedoperation would violate the equal protection of the law? We hold that with the passage of the
actually defeats the purpose of the law3 of establishing professionalism and excellence at all levels in the
subsequent laws amending the charter of seven (7) other governmental financial institutions (GFIs), the continued
BSP; 4(emphasis supplied)
operation of the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7653, constitutes invidious
discrimination on the 2,994 rank-and-file employees of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP).
c. the assailed proviso was the product of amendments introduced during the deliberation of Senate Bill
No. 1235, without showing its relevance to the objectives of the law, and even admitted by one senator as
I.
discriminatory against low-salaried employees of the BSP;5

The Case
d. GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS personnel are all exempted from the coverage of the SSL; thus within the
class of rank-and-file personnel of government financial institutions (GFIs), the BSP rank-and-file are also
First the facts. discriminated upon;6 and

On July 3, 1993, R.A. No. 7653 (the New Central Bank Act) took effect. It abolished the old Central Bank of the e. the assailed proviso has caused the demoralization among the BSP rank-and-file and resulted in the
Philippines, and created a new BSP. gross disparity between their compensation and that of the BSP officers'.7

On June 8, 2001, almost eight years after the effectivity of R.A. No. 7653, petitioner Central Bank (now BSP) In sum, petitioner posits that the classification is not reasonable but arbitrary and capricious, and violates the equal
Employees Association, Inc., filed a petition for prohibition against BSP and the Executive Secretary of the Office of protection clause of the Constitution. 8 Petitioner also stresses: (a) that R.A. No. 7653 has a separability clause, which
the President, to restrain respondents from further implementing the last proviso in Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. will allow the declaration of the unconstitutionality of the proviso in question without affecting the other provisions;
No. 7653, on the ground that it is unconstitutional. and (b) the urgency and propriety of the petition, as some 2,994 BSP rank-and-file employees have
been prejudiced since 1994 when the proviso was implemented. Petitioner concludes that: (1) since the
inequitable proviso has no force and effect of law, respondents' implementation of such amounts to lack of
Article II, Section 15(c) of R.A. No. 7653 provides: jurisdiction; and (2) it has no appeal nor any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course except
through this petition for prohibition, which this Court should take cognizance of, considering the transcendental
Section 15. Exercise of Authority - In the exercise of its authority, the Monetary Board shall: importance of the legal issue involved. 9

xxx       xxx       xxx Respondent BSP, in its comment,10 contends that the provision does not violate the equal protection clause and can
stand the constitutional test, provided it is construed in harmony with other provisions of the same law, such as
"fiscal and administrative autonomy of BSP," and the mandate of the Monetary Board to "establish professionalism
(c) establish a human resource management system which shall govern the selection, hiring, appointment, and excellence at all levels in accordance with sound principles of management."
transfer, promotion, or dismissal of all personnel. Such system shall aim to establish professionalism and
excellence at all levels of the Bangko Sentral in accordance with sound principles of management.
The Solicitor General, on behalf of respondent Executive Secretary, also defends the validity of the provision. Quite
simplistically, he argues that the classification is based on actual and real differentiation, even as it adheres to the
A compensation structure, based on job evaluation studies and wage surveys and subject to the Board's enunciated policy of R.A. No. 7653 to establish professionalism and excellence within the BSP subject to prevailing
approval, shall be instituted as an integral component of the Bangko Sentral's human resource laws and policies of the national government.11
development program: Provided, That the Monetary Board shall make its own system conform as closely
as possible with the principles provided for under Republic Act No. 6758 [Salary Standardization
Act]. Provided, however, That compensation and wage structure of employees whose positions fall II.
 Issue another.17 The classification must also be germane to the purpose of the law and must apply to all those belonging to
the same class.18
Thus, the sole - albeit significant - issue to be resolved in this case is whether the last paragraph of Section 15(c),
Article II of R.A. No. 7653, runs afoul of the constitutional mandate that "No person shall be. . . denied the equal In the case at bar, it is clear in the legislative deliberations that the exemption of officers (SG 20 and above) from the
protection of the laws."12 SSL was intended to address the BSP's lack of competitiveness in terms of attracting competent officers and
executives. It was not intended to discriminate against the rank-and-file. If the end-result did in fact lead to a disparity
of treatment between the officers and the rank-and-file in terms of salaries and benefits, the discrimination or
III.
distinction has a rational basis and is not palpably, purely, and entirely arbitrary in the legislative sense. 19

Ruling
That the provision was a product of amendments introduced during the deliberation of the Senate Bill does not
detract from its validity. As early as 1947 and reiterated in subsequent cases,20 this Court has subscribed to the
A. UNDER THE PRESENT STANDARDS OF EQUAL PROTECTION, conclusiveness of an enrolled bill to refuse invalidating a provision of law, on the ground that the bill from which it
SECTION 15(c), ARTICLE II OF R.A. NO. 7653 IS VALID. originated contained no such provision and was merely inserted by the bicameral conference committee of both
Houses.
Jurisprudential standards for equal protection challenges indubitably show that the classification created by the
questioned proviso, on its face and in its operation, bears no constitutional infirmities. Moreover, it is a fundamental and familiar teaching that all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the
constitutionality of a statute. 21 An act of the legislature, approved by the executive, is presumed to be within
constitutional limitations.22 To justify the nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the
It is settled in constitutional law that the "equal protection" clause does not prevent the Legislature from establishing Constitution, not a doubtful and equivocal breach.23
classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules shall operate - so long as the classification is not
unreasonable. As held in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union,13 and reiterated in a long line of cases: 14
B. THE ENACTMENT, HOWEVER, OF SUBSEQUENT LAWS -
EXEMPTING ALL OTHER RANK-AND-FILE EMPLOYEES
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws OF GFIs FROM THE SSL - RENDERS THE CONTINUED
upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional APPLICATION OF THE CHALLENGED PROVISION
prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. A VIOLATION OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.
Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but
on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights.
The Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as though they While R.A. No. 7653 started as a valid measure well within the legislature's power, we hold that the enactment of
were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It subsequent laws exempting all rank-and-file employees of other GFIs leeched all validity out of the
does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory challenged proviso.
within which it is to operate.
1. The concept of relative constitutionality.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as in
the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice
The constitutionality of a statute cannot, in every instance, be determined by a mere comparison of its provisions
because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple
with applicable provisions of the Constitution, since the statute may be constitutionally valid as applied to one set of
inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere
facts and invalid in its application to another.24
fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a valid
classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on substantial
distinctions which make for real differences, that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must A statute valid at one time may become void at another time because of altered circumstances.25 Thus, if a statute
not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. This in its practical operation becomes arbitrary or confiscatory, its validity, even though affirmed by a former adjudication,
Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable is open to inquiry and investigation in the light of changed conditions.26
foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.
Demonstrative of this doctrine is Vernon Park Realty v. City of Mount Vernon,27 where the Court of Appeals of
In the exercise of its power to make classifications for the purpose of enacting laws over matters within its New York declared as unreasonable and arbitrary a zoning ordinance which placed the plaintiff's property in a
jurisdiction, the state is recognized as enjoying a wide range of discretion. It is not necessary that the residential district, although it was located in the center of a business area. Later amendments to the ordinance then
classification be based on scientific or marked differences of things or in their relation. Neither is it prohibited the use of the property except for parking and storage of automobiles, and service station within a parking
necessary that the classification be made with mathematical nicety. Hence, legislative classification may in area. The Court found the ordinance to constitute an invasion of property rights which was contrary to constitutional
many cases properly rest on narrow distinctions, for the equal protection guaranty does not preclude the due process. It ruled:
legislature from recognizing degrees of evil or harm, and legislation is addressed to evils as they may
appear. (citations omitted)
While the common council has the unquestioned right to enact zoning laws respecting the use of property
in accordance with a well-considered and comprehensive plan designed to promote public health, safety
Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification. 15 The equal protection clause is not infringed and general welfare, such power is subject to the constitutional limitation that it may not be exerted
by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class. 16 If the groupings are characterized arbitrarily or unreasonably and this is so whenever the zoning ordinance precludes the use of the property
by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from for any purpose for which it is reasonably adapted. By the same token, an ordinance valid when
adopted will nevertheless be stricken down as invalid when, at a later time, its operation under
 changed conditions proves confiscatory such, for instance, as when the greater part of its value is liability because they were not yet in existence when the statutes were enacted. The Court ruled that the statutes
destroyed, for which the courts will afford relief in an appropriate case. 28 (citations omitted, emphasis became invalid as denying "equal protection of the law," in view of changed conditions since their enactment.
supplied)
In another U.S. case, Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Faulkner,33 the Court of Appeals of Kentucky declared
In the Philippine setting, this Court declared the continued enforcement of a valid law as unconstitutional as a unconstitutional a provision of a statute which imposed a duty upon a railroad company of proving that it was free
consequence of significant changes in circumstances. Rutter v. Esteban29 upheld the constitutionality of the from negligence in the killing or injury of cattle by its engine or cars. This, notwithstanding that the
moratorium law - its enactment and operation being a valid exercise by the State of its police power 30 - but also ruled constitutionality of the statute, enacted in 1893, had been previously sustained. Ruled the Court:
that the continued enforcement of the otherwise valid law would be unreasonable and oppressive. It noted
the subsequent changes in the country's business, industry and agriculture. Thus, the law was set aside because
The constitutionality of such legislation was sustained because it applied to all similar corporations and
its continued operation would be grossly discriminatory and lead to the oppression of the creditors. The landmark
had for its object the safety of persons on a train and the protection of property…. Of course, there were
ruling states:31
no automobiles in those days. The subsequent inauguration and development of transportation by motor
vehicles on the public highways by common carriers of freight and passengers created even greater risks
The question now to be determined is, is the period of eight (8) years which Republic Act No. 342 grants to the safety of occupants of the vehicles and of danger of injury and death of domestic animals. Yet,
to debtors of a monetary obligation contracted before the last global war and who is a war sufferer with a under the law the operators of that mode of competitive transportation are not subject to the same
claim duly approved by the Philippine War Damage Commission reasonable under the present extraordinary legal responsibility for killing such animals on the public roads as are railroad companies for
circumstances? killing them on their private rights of way.

It should be noted that Republic Act No. 342 only extends relief to debtors of prewar obligations who The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Brandeis in Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Walters, 294
suffered from the ravages of the last war and who filed a claim for their losses with the Philippine War U.S. 405, 55 S.Ct. 486, 488, 79 L.Ed. 949, stated, "A statute valid when enacted may become invalid
Damage Commission. It is therein provided that said obligation shall not be due and demandable for a by change in the conditions to which it is applied. The police power is subject to the constitutional
period of eight (8) years from and after settlement of the claim filed by the debtor with said Commission. limitation that it may not be exerted arbitrarily or unreasonably." A number of prior opinions of that court
The purpose of the law is to afford to prewar debtors an opportunity to rehabilitate themselves by giving are cited in support of the statement. The State of Florida for many years had a statute, F.S.A. § 356.01 et
them a reasonable time within which to pay their prewar debts so as to prevent them from being victimized seq. imposing extraordinary and special duties upon railroad companies, among which was that a railroad
by their creditors. While it is admitted in said law that since liberation conditions have gradually returned to company was liable for double damages and an attorney's fee for killing livestock by a train without the
normal, this is not so with regard to those who have suffered the ravages of war and so it was therein owner having to prove any act of negligence on the part of the carrier in the operation of its train. In
declared as a policy that as to them the debt moratorium should be continued in force (Section 1). Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Ivey, it was held that the changed conditions brought about by motor
vehicle transportation rendered the statute unconstitutional since if a common carrier by motor vehicle had
killed the same animal, the owner would have been required to prove negligence in the operation of its
But we should not lose sight of the fact that these obligations had been pending since 1945 as a result of
equipment. Said the court, "This certainly is not equal protection of the law."34 (emphasis supplied)
the issuance of Executive Orders Nos. 25 and 32 and at present their enforcement is still inhibited
because of the enactment of Republic Act No. 342 and would continue to be unenforceable during the
eight-year period granted to prewar debtors to afford them an opportunity to rehabilitate themselves, which Echoes of these rulings resonate in our case law, viz:
in plain language means that the creditors would have to observe a vigil of at least twelve (12) years
before they could effect a liquidation of their investment dating as far back as 1941. his period seems to us
[C]ourts are not confined to the language of the statute under challenge in determining whether that statute
unreasonable, if not oppressive. While the purpose of Congress is plausible, and should be commended,
has any discriminatory effect. A statute nondiscriminatory on its face may be grossly discriminatory
the relief accorded works injustice to creditors who are practically left at the mercy of the debtors. Their
in its operation. Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied
hope to effect collection becomes extremely remote, more so if the credits are unsecured. And the
and administered by public authority with an evil eye and unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust
injustice is more patent when, under the law, the debtor is not even required to pay interest during the
and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of
operation of the relief, unlike similar statutes in the United States.
equal justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution. 35 (emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

xxx       xxx       xxx

[W]e see no difference between a law which denies equal protection and a law which permits of
such denial. A law may appear to be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it permits of unjust
In the face of the foregoing observations, and consistent with what we believe to be as the only course and illegal discrimination, it is within the constitutional prohibition….. In other words, statutes may be
dictated by justice, fairness and righteousness, we feel that the only way open to us under the present adjudged unconstitutional because of their effect in operation…. If a law has the effect of denying the
circumstances is to declare that the continued operation and enforcement of Republic Act No. 342 equal protection of the law it is unconstitutional. ….36 (emphasis supplied, citations omitted
at the present time is unreasonable and oppressive, and should not be prolonged a minute longer,
and, therefore, the same should be declared null and void and without effect. (emphasis supplied,
3. Enactment of R.A. Nos. 7907 + 8282 + 8289 + 8291 + 8523 + 8763
citations omitted)
+ 9302 = consequential unconstitutionality of challenged proviso.

2. Applicability of the equal protection clause.

According to petitioner, the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653 is also violative of the equal
protection clause because after it was enacted, the charters of the GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS were also amended,
In the realm of equal protection, the U.S. case of Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Ivey32 is illuminating. The but the personnel of the latter GFIs were all exempted from the coverage of the SSL. 37 Thus, within the class of rank-
Supreme Court of Florida ruled against the continued application of statutes authorizing the recovery of double and-file personnel of GFIs, the BSP rank-and-file are also discriminated upon.
damages plus attorney's fees against railroad companies, for animals killed on unfenced railroad right of way without
proof of negligence. Competitive motor carriers, though creating greater hazards, were not subjected to similar
Indeed, we take judicial notice that after the new BSP charter was enacted in 1993, Congress also undertook the benefits; prescribe their duties and establish such methods and procedures as may be necessary to insure
amendment of the charters of the GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS, and three other GFIs, from 1995 to 2004, viz: the efficient, honest and economical administration of the provisions and purposes of this Act: Provided,
however, That the personnel of the SSS below the rank of Vice President shall be appointed by the SSS
President: Provided, further, That the personnel appointed by the SSS President, except those below the
1. R.A. No. 7907 (1995) for Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP);
rank of assistant manager, shall be subject to the confirmation by the Commission; Provided further, That
the personnel of the SSS shall be selected only from civil service eligibles and be subject to civil service
2. R.A. No. 8282 (1997) for Social Security System (SSS); rules and regulations: Provided, finally, That the SSS shall be exempt from the provisions of Republic
Act No. 6758 and Republic Act No. 7430. (emphasis supplied)
3. R.A. No. 8289 (1997) for Small Business Guarantee and Finance Corporation, (SBGFC);
3. SBGFC (R.A. No. 8289)
4. R.A. No. 8291 (1997) for Government Service Insurance System (GSIS);
Section 8. [Amending R.A. No. 6977, Section 11]:
5. R.A. No. 8523 (1998) for Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP);
xxx       xxx       xxx
6. R.A. No. 8763 (2000) for Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC);38 and
The Small Business Guarantee and Finance Corporation shall:
7. R.A. No. 9302 (2004) for Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC).
xxx       xxx       xxx
It is noteworthy, as petitioner points out, that the subsequent charters of the seven other GFIs share this
common proviso: a blanket exemption of all their employees from the coverage of the SSL, expressly or (e) notwithstanding the provisions of Republic Act No. 6758, and Compensation Circular No. 10,
impliedly, as illustrated below: series of 1989 issued by the Department of Budget and Management, the Board of Directors of SBGFC
shall have the authority to extend to the employees and personnel thereof the allowance and fringe
benefits similar to those extended to and currently enjoyed by the employees and personnel of
1. LBP (R.A. No. 7907) other government financial institutions. (emphases supplied)

Section 10. Section 90 of [R.A. No. 3844] is hereby amended to read as follows: 4. GSIS (R.A. No. 8291)

Section 90. Personnel. - Section 1. [Amending Section 43(d)].

xxx       xxx       xxx xxx       xxx       xxx

All positions in the Bank shall be governed by a compensation, position classification system and Sec. 43. Powers and Functions of the Board of Trustees. - The Board of Trustees shall have the following
qualification standards approved by the Bank's Board of Directors based on a comprehensive job analysis powers and functions:
and audit of actual duties and responsibilities. The compensation plan shall be comparable with the
prevailing compensation plans in the private sector and shall be subject to periodic review by the Board no
more than once every two (2) years without prejudice to yearly merit reviews or increases based on xxx       xxx       xxx
productivity and profitability. The Bank shall therefore be exempt from existing laws, rules and
regulations on compensation, position classification and qualification standards. It shall however
(d) upon the recommendation of the President and General Manager, to approve the GSIS' organizational
endeavor to make its system conform as closely as possible with the principles under Republic Act No.
and administrative structures and staffing pattern, and to establish, fix, review, revise and adjust the
6758. (emphasis supplied)
appropriate compensation package for the officers and employees of the GSIS with reasonable
allowances, incentives, bonuses, privileges and other benefits as may be necessary or proper for the
xxx       xxx       xxx effective management, operation and administration of the GSIS, which shall be exempt from Republic
Act No. 6758, otherwise known as the Salary Standardization Law and Republic Act No. 7430,
otherwise known as the Attrition Law. (emphasis supplied)
2. SSS (R.A. No. 8282)

xxx       xxx       xxx

Section 1. [Amending R.A. No. 1161, Section 3(c)]:

5. DBP (R.A. No. 8523)

xxx       xxx       xxx

Section 6. [Amending E.O. No. 81, Section 13]:

(c)The Commission, upon the recommendation of the SSS President, shall appoint an actuary and such
other personnel as may [be] deemed necessary; fix their reasonable compensation, allowances and other
 Section 13. Other Officers and Employees. - The Board of Directors shall provide for an organization and standards. It shall however endeavor to make its system conform as closely as possible with the
staff of officers and employees of the Bank and upon recommendation of the President of the Bank, fix principles under Republic Act No. 6758, as amended. (emphases supplied)
their remunerations and other emoluments. All positions in the Bank shall be governed by the
compensation, position classification system and qualification standards approved by the Board of
Thus, eleven years after the amendment of the BSP charter, the rank-and-file of seven other GFIs were
Directors based on a comprehensive job analysis of actual duties and responsibilities. The compensation
granted the exemption that was specifically denied to the rank-and-file of the BSP. And as if to add insult to
plan shall be comparable with the prevailing compensation plans in the private sector and shall be subject
petitioner's injury, even the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was granted the same blanket exemption
to periodic review by the Board of Directors once every two (2) years, without prejudice to yearly merit or
from the SSL in 2000!39
increases based on the Bank's productivity and profitability. The Bank shall, therefore, be exempt from
existing laws, rules, and regulations on compensation, position classification and qualification
standards. The Bank shall however, endeavor to make its system conform as closely as possible The prior view on the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7653 was confined to an evaluation of its classification
with the principles under Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. between the rank-and-file and the officers of the BSP, found reasonable because there were substantial
6758, as amended). (emphasis supplied) distinctions that made real differences between the two classes.

6. HGC (R.A. No. 8763) The above-mentioned subsequent enactments, however, constitute significant changes in circumstancethat
considerably alter the reasonability of the continued operation of the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II
of Republic Act No. 7653, thereby exposing the proviso to more serious scrutiny. This time, the scrutiny
Section 9. Powers, Functions and Duties of the Board of Directors. - The Board shall have the following powers,
relates to the constitutionality of the classification - albeit made indirectly as a consequence of the passage of eight
functions and duties:
other laws - between the rank-and-file of the BSP and the seven other GFIs. The classification must not only be
reasonable, but must also apply equally to all members of the class. The proviso may be fair on its face and
xxx       xxx       xxx impartial in appearance but it cannot be grossly discriminatory in its operation, so as practically to make unjust
distinctions between persons who are without differences.40
(e) To create offices or positions necessary for the efficient management, operation and administration of
the Corporation: Provided, That all positions in the Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC) shall be governed Stated differently, the second level of inquiry deals with the following questions: Given that Congress chose to
by a compensation and position classification system and qualifications standards approved by the exempt other GFIs (aside the BSP) from the coverage of the SSL, can the exclusion of the rank-and-file employees
Corporation's Board of Directors based on a comprehensive job analysis and audit of actual duties and of the BSP stand constitutional scrutiny in the light of the fact that Congress did not exclude the rank-and-file
responsibilities: Provided, further, That the compensation plan shall be comparable with the employees of the other GFIs? Is Congress' power to classify so unbridled as to sanction unequal and discriminatory
prevailing compensation plans in the private sector and which shall be exempt from Republic Act treatment, simply because the inequity manifested itself, not instantly through a single overt act, but gradually and
No. 6758, otherwise known as the Salary Standardization Law, and from other laws, rules and progressively, through seven separate acts of Congress? Is the right to equal protection of the law bounded in time
regulations on salaries and compensations; and to establish a Provident Fund and determine the and space that: (a) the right can only be invoked against a classification made directly and deliberately, as opposed
Corporation's and the employee's contributions to the Fund; (emphasis supplied) to a discrimination that arises indirectly, or as a consequence of several other acts; and (b) is the legal analysis
confined to determining the validity within the parameters of the statute or ordinance (where the inclusion or
exclusion is articulated), thereby proscribing any evaluation vis-à-vis the grouping, or the lack thereof, among several
xxx       xxx       xxx
similar enactments made over a period of time?

7. PDIC (R.A. No. 9302)

In this second level of scrutiny, the inequality of treatment cannot be justified on the mere assertion that each
exemption (granted to the seven other GFIs) rests "on a policy determination by the legislature." All legislative
Section 2. Section 2 of [Republic Act No. 3591, as amended] is hereby further amended to read: enactments necessarily rest on a policy determination - even those that have been declared to contravene the
Constitution. Verily, if this could serve as a magic wand to sustain the validity of a statute, then no due process and
equal protection challenges would ever prosper. There is nothing inherently sacrosanct in a policy determination
xxx       xxx       xxx made by Congress or by the Executive; it cannot run riot and overrun the ramparts of protection of the Constitution.

3. In fine, the "policy determination" argument may support the inequality of treatment between the rank-and-file and
the officers of the BSP, but it cannot justify the inequality of treatment between BSP rank-and-file and other GFIs'
xxx       xxx       xxx who are similarly situated. It fails to appreciate that what is at issue in the second level of scrutiny is not
the declared policy of each law per se, but the oppressive results of Congress' inconsistent and unequal
policytowards the BSP rank-and-file and those of the seven other GFIs. At bottom, the second challenge to the
A compensation structure, based on job evaluation studies and wage surveys and subject to the Board's constitutionality of Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act No. 7653 is premised precisely on the irrational
approval, shall be instituted as an integral component of the Corporation's human resource development discriminatory policy adopted by Congress in its treatment of persons similarly situated. In the field of equal
program: Provided, That all positions in the Corporation shall be governed by a compensation, position protection, the guarantee that "no person shall be … denied the equal protection of the laws" includes the prohibition
classification system and qualification standards approved by the Board based on a comprehensive job against enacting laws that allow invidious discrimination, directly or indirectly. If a law has the effect of denying the
analysis and audit of actual duties and responsibilities. The compensation plan shall be comparable equal protection of the law, or permits such denial, it is unconstitutional. 41
with the prevailing compensation plans of other government financial institutions and shall be
subject to review by the Board no more than once every two (2) years without prejudice to yearly merit
reviews or increases based on productivity and profitability. The Corporation shall therefore be exempt It is against this standard that the disparate treatment of the BSP rank-and-file from the other GFIs cannot stand
from existing laws, rules and regulations on compensation, position classification and qualification judicial scrutiny. For as regards the exemption from the coverage of the SSL, there exist no substantial distinctions
so as to differentiate, the BSP rank-and-file from the other rank-and-file of the seven GFIs. On the contrary, our
legal history shows that GFIs have long been recognized as comprising one distinct class, separate from Clearly, under R.A. No. 6758, the rank-and-file of all GFIs were similarly situated in all aspects pertaining to
other governmental entities. compensation and position classification, in consonance with Section 5, Article IX-B of the 1997 Constitution. 47

Before the SSL, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 985 (1976) declared it as a State policy (1) to provide equal pay for Then came the enactment of the amended charter of the BSP, implicitly exempting the Monetary Board from the
substantially equal work, and (2) to base differences in pay upon substantive differences in duties and SSL by giving it express authority to determine and institute its own compensation and wage structure. However,
responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the positions. P.D. No. 985 was passed to address disparities in employees whose positions fall under SG 19 and below were specifically limited to the rates prescribed under the
pay among similar or comparable positions which had given rise to dissension among government employees. But SSL.
even then, GFIs and government-owned and/or controlled corporations (GOCCs) were already identified as a
distinct class among government employees. Thus, Section 2 also provided, "[t]hat notwithstanding a
Subsequent amendments to the charters of other GFIs followed. Significantly, each government financial
standardized salary system established for all employees, additional financial incentives may be established by
institution (GFI) was not only expressly authorized to determine and institute its own compensation and wage
government corporation and financial institutions for their employees to be supported fully from their corporate funds
structure, but also explicitly exempted - without distinction as to salary grade or position - all employees of
and for such technical positions as may be approved by the President in critical government agencies." 42
the GFI from the SSL.

The same favored treatment is made for the GFIs and the GOCCs under the SSL. Section 3(b) provides that one of
It has been proffered that legislative deliberations justify the grant or withdrawal of exemption from the SSL, based
the principles governing the Compensation and Position Classification System of the Government is that: "[b]asic
on the perceived need "to fulfill the mandate of the institution concerned considering, among others, that: (1) the
compensation for all personnel in the government and government-owned or controlled corporations and financial
GOCC or GFI is essentially proprietary in character; (2) the GOCC or GFI is in direct competition with
institutions shall generally be comparable with those in the private sector doing comparable work, and must be in
their [sic] counterparts in the private sector, not only in terms of the provisions of goods or services, but also in terms
accordance with prevailing laws on minimum wages."
of hiring and retaining competent personnel; and (3) the GOCC or GFI are or were [sic] experiencing difficulties
filling up plantilla positions with competent personnel and/or retaining these personnel. The need for the scope of
Thus, the BSP and all other GFIs and GOCCs were under the unified Compensation and Position Classification exemption necessarily varies with the particular circumstances of each institution, and the corresponding variance in
System of the SSL,43 but rates of pay under the SSL were determined on the basis of, among others, prevailing rates the benefits received by the employees is merely incidental."
in the private sector for comparable work. Notably, the Compensation and Position Classification System was to be
governed by the following principles: (a) just and equitable wages, with the ratio of compensation between pay
The fragility of this argument is manifest. First, the BSP is the central monetary authority,48 and the banker of the
distinctions maintained at equitable levels;44 and (b) basic compensation generally comparable with the private
government and all its political subdivisions.49 It has the sole power and authority to issue currency;50 provide
sector, in accordance with prevailing laws on minimum wages.45 Also, the Department of Budget and Management
policy directions in the areas of money, banking, and credit; and supervise banks and regulate finance companies
was directed to use, as guide for preparing the Index of Occupational Services, the Benchmark Position Schedule,
and non-bank financial institutions performing quasi-banking functions, including the exempted GFIs.51 Hence, the
and the following factors:46
argument that the rank-and-file employees of the seven GFIs were exempted because of the importance of their
institution's mandate cannot stand any more than an empty sack can stand.
(1) the education and experience required to perform the duties and responsibilities of the positions;
Second, it is certainly misleading to say that "the need for the scope of exemption necessarily varies with the
(2) the nature and complexity of the work to be performed; particular circumstances of each institution." Nowhere in the deliberations is there a cogent basis for the exclusion of
the BSP rank-and-file from the exemption which was granted to the rank-and-file of the other GFIs and the SEC. As
point in fact, the BSP and the seven GFIs are similarly situated in so far as Congress deemed it necessary for these
(3) the kind of supervision received;
institutions to be exempted from the SSL. True, the SSL-exemption of the BSP and the seven GFIs was granted in
the amended charters of each GFI, enacted separately and over a period of time. But it bears emphasis that, while
(4) mental and/or physical strain required in the completion of the work; each GFI has a mandate different and distinct from that of another, the deliberations show that the raison d'être of
the SSL-exemption was inextricably linked to and for the most part based on factors common to the eight GFIs, i.e.,
(1) the pivotal role they play in the economy; (2) the necessity of hiring and retaining qualified and effective
(5) nature and extent of internal and external relationships; personnel to carry out the GFI's mandate; and (3) the recognition that the compensation package of these GFIs is
not competitive, and fall substantially below industry standards. Considering further that (a) the BSP was the first GFI
(6) kind of supervision exercised; granted SSL exemption; and (b) the subsequent exemptions of other GFIs did not distinguish between the officers
and the rank-and-file; it is patent that the classification made between the BSP rank-and-file and those of the
other seven GFIs was inadvertent, and NOT intended, i.e., it was not based on any substantial distinction vis-à-vis
(7) decision-making responsibility; the particular circumstances of each GFI. Moreover, the exemption granted to two GFIs makes express reference
to allowance and fringe benefits similar to those extended to and currently enjoyed by the employees and personnel
(8) responsibility for accuracy of records and reports; of other GFIs,52 underscoring that GFIs are a particular class within the realm of government entities.

(9) accountability for funds, properties and equipment; and It is precisely this unpremeditated discrepancy in treatment of the rank-and-file of the BSP - made manifest and
glaring with each and every consequential grant of blanket exemption from the SSL to the other GFIs - that cannot
be rationalized or justified. Even more so, when the SEC - which is not a GFI - was given leave to have a
(10) hardship, hazard and personal risk involved in the job. compensation plan that "shall be comparable with the prevailing compensation plan in the [BSP] and other
[GFIs],"53then granted a blanket exemption from the SSL, and its rank-and-file endowed a more preferred treatment
The Benchmark Position Schedule enumerates the position titles that fall within Salary Grades 1 to 20. than the rank-and-file of the BSP.
The violation to the equal protection clause becomes even more pronounced when we are faced with this undeniable would also deny based on the challenged proviso. The Court held that social justice and public interest demanded
truth: that if Congress had enacted a law for the sole purpose of exempting the eight GFIs from the coverage of the the resolution of the constitutionality of the proviso. And so it is with the challenged proviso in the case at bar.
SSL, the exclusion of the BSP rank-and-file employees would have been devoid of any substantial or material basis.
It bears no moment, therefore, that the unlawful discrimination was not a direct result arising from one law. "Nemo
It bears stressing that the exemption from the SSL is a "privilege" fully within the legislative prerogative to give or
potest facere per alium quod non potest facere per directum." No one is allowed to do indirectly what he is prohibited
deny. However, its subsequent grant to the rank-and-file of the seven other GFIs and continued denial to the BSP
to do directly.
rank-and-file employees breached the latter's right to equal protection. In other words, while the granting of a
privilege per se is a matter of policy exclusively within the domain and prerogative of Congress, the validity or legality
It has also been proffered that "similarities alone are not sufficient to support the conclusion that rank-and-file of the exercise of this prerogative is subject to judicial review.58 So when the distinction made is superficial, and not
employees of the BSP may be lumped together with similar employees of the other GOCCs for purposes of based on substantial distinctions that make real differences between those included and excluded, it becomes a
compensation, position classification and qualification standards. The fact that certain persons have some attributes matter of arbitrariness that this Court has the duty and the power to correct.59 As held in the United Kingdom case
in common does not automatically make them members of the same class with respect to a legislative classification." of Hooper v. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions,60 once the State has chosen to confer benefits,
Cited is the ruling in Johnson v. Robinson:54 "this finding of similarity ignores that a common characteristic shared "discrimination" contrary to law may occur where favorable treatment already afforded to one group is refused to
by beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries alike, is not sufficient to invalidate a statute when other characteristics peculiar another, even though the State is under no obligation to provide that favorable treatment. 61
to only one group rationally explain the statute's different treatment of the two groups."
The disparity of treatment between BSP rank-and-file and the rank-and-file of the other seven GFIs definitely bears
The reference to Johnson is inapropos. In Johnson, the US Court sustained the validity of the classification as there the unmistakable badge of invidious discrimination - no one can, with candor and fairness, deny the discriminatory
were quantitative and qualitative distinctions, expressly recognized by Congress, which formed a rational character of the subsequent blanket and total exemption of the seven other GFIs from the SSL when such was
basis for the classification limiting educational benefits to military service veterans as a means of helping them withheld from the BSP. Alikes are being treated as unalikes without any rational basis.
readjust to civilian life. The Court listed the peculiar characteristics as follows:
Again, it must be emphasized that the equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality but it requires
First, the disruption caused by military service is quantitatively greater than that caused by alternative that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges
civilian service. A conscientious objector performing alternative service is obligated to work for two years. conferred and liabilities enforced. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that
Service in the Armed Forces, on the other hand, involves a six-year commitment… equal protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances which, if not identical, are
analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the
same fashion; whatever restrictions cast on some in the group is equally binding on the rest.62
xxx       xxx       xxx

In light of the lack of real and substantial distinctions that would justify the unequal treatment between the rank-and-
Second, the disruptions suffered by military veterans and alternative service performers are qualitatively
file of BSP from the seven other GFIs, it is clear that the enactment of the seven subsequent charters has rendered
different. Military veterans suffer a far greater loss of personal freedom during their service careers.
the continued application of the challenged proviso anathema to the equal protection of the law, and the same
Uprooted from civilian life, the military veteran becomes part of the military establishment, subject to its
should be declared as an outlaw.
discipline and potentially hazardous duty. Congress was acutely aware of the peculiar disabilities caused
by military service, in consequence of which military servicemen have a special need for readjustment
benefits…55 (citations omitted) IV.

In the case at bar, it is precisely the fact that as regards the exemption from the SSL, there are no Equal Protection Under International Lens
characteristics peculiar only to the seven GFIs or their rank-and-file so as to justify the exemption which
BSP rank-and-file employees were denied (not to mention the anomaly of the SEC getting one). The distinction
In our jurisdiction, the standard and analysis of equal protection challenges in the main have followed the "rational
made by the law is not only superficial,56 but also arbitrary. It is not based on substantial distinctions that make real
basis" test, coupled with a deferential attitude to legislative classifications 63 and a reluctance to invalidate a law
differences between the BSP rank-and-file and the seven other GFIs.
unless there is a showing of a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. 64

Moreover, the issue in this case is not - as the dissenting opinion of Mme. Justice Carpio-Morales would put it -
A. Equal Protection in the United States
whether "being an employee of a GOCC or GFI is reasonable and sufficient basis for exemption" from R.A. No.
6758. It is Congress itself that distinguished the GFIs from other government agencies, not once but eight
times, through the enactment of R.A. Nos. 7653, 7907, 8282, 8289, 8291, 8523, 8763, and 9302. These laws may In contrast, jurisprudence in the U.S. has gone beyond the static "rational basis" test. Professor Gunther
have created a "preferred sub-class within government employees," but the present challenge is not directed at the highlights the development in equal protection jurisprudential analysis, to wit: 65
wisdom of these laws. Rather, it is a legal conundrum involving the exercise of legislative power, the validity of which
must be measured not only by looking at the specific exercise in and by itself (R.A. No. 7653), but also as to
Traditionally, equal protection supported only minimal judicial intervention in most contexts. Ordinarily,
the legal effects brought about by seven separate exercises - albeit indirectly and without intent.
the command of equal protection was only that government must not impose differences in treatment
"except upon some reasonable differentiation fairly related to the object of regulation." The old variety of
Thus, even if petitioner had not alleged "a comparable change in the factual milieu as regards the compensation, equal protection scrutiny focused solely on the means used by the legislature: it insisted merely that the
position classification and qualification standards of the employees of the BSP (whether of the executive level or of classification in the statute reasonably relates to the legislative purpose. Unlike substantive due
the rank-and-file) since the enactment of the new Central Bank Act" is of no moment. In GSIS v. Montesclaros,57 this process, equal protection scrutiny was not typically concerned with identifying "fundamental values" and
Court resolved the issue of constitutionality notwithstanding that claimant had manifested that she was no longer restraining legislative ends. And usually the rational classification requirement was readily satisfied: the
interested in pursuing the case, and even when the constitutionality of the said provision was not squarely raised as courts did not demand a tight fit between classification and purpose; perfect congruence between means
an issue, because the issue involved not only the claimant but also others similarly situated and whose claims GSIS and ends was not required.
xxx       xxx       xxx adversely affected and the recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular classification is
drawn.
[From marginal intervention to major cutting edge: The Warren Court's "new equal protection" and the
two-tier approach.] Justice Marshall's "sliding scale" approach describes many of the modern decisions, although it is a
formulation that the majority refused to embrace. But the Burger Court's results indicate at least two
significant changes in equal protection law: First, invocation of the "old" equal protection formula no
From its traditional modest role, equal protection burgeoned into a major intervention tool during the
longer signals, as it did with the Warren Court, an extreme deference to legislative classifications and a
Warren era, especially in the 1960s. The Warren Court did not abandon the deferential ingredients of the
virtually automatic validation of challenged statutes. Instead, several cases, even while voicing the minimal
old equal protection: in most areas of economic and social legislation, the demands imposed by equal
"rationality" "hands-off" standards of the old equal protection, proceed to find the statute
protection remained as minimal as ever…But the Court launched an equal protection revolution by finding
unconstitutional. Second, in some areas the modern Court has put forth standards for equal protection
large new areas for strict rather than deferential scrutiny. A sharply differentiated two-tier
review that, while clearly more intensive than the deference of the "old" equal protection, are less
approach evolved by the late 1960s: in addition to the deferential "old" equal protection, a "new" equal
demanding than the strictness of the "new" equal protection. Sex discrimination is the best established
protection, connoting strict scrutiny, arose…. The intensive review associated with the new equal
example of an "intermediate" level of review. Thus, in one case, the Court said that "classifications by
protection imposed two demands - a demand not only as to means but also one as to ends. Legislation
gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement
qualifying for strict scrutiny required a far closer fit between classification and statutory purpose than the
of those objectives." That standard is "intermediate" with respect to both ends and means: where ends
rough and ready flexibility traditionally tolerated by the old equal protection: means had to be shown
must be "compelling" to survive strict scrutiny and merely "legitimate" under the "old" mode, "important"
"necessary" to achieve statutory ends, not merely "reasonably related" ones. Moreover, equal
objectives are required here; and where means must be "necessary" under the "new" equal protection, and
protection became a source of ends scrutiny as well: legislation in the areas of the new equal protection
merely "rationally related" under the "old" equal protection, they must be "substantially related" to survive
had to be justified by "compelling" state interests, not merely the wide spectrum of "legitimate" state ends.
the "intermediate" level of review. (emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

The Warren Court identified the areas appropriate for strict scrutiny by searching for two

B. Equal Protection in Europe
characteristics: the presence of a "suspect" classification; or an impact on "fundamental" rights or
interests. In the category of "suspect classifications," the Warren Court's major contribution was to intensify
the strict scrutiny in the traditionally interventionist area of racial classifications. But other cases also The United Kingdom and other members of the European Community have also gone forward in discriminatory
suggested that there might be more other suspect categories as well: illegitimacy and wealth for example. legislation and jurisprudence. Within the United Kingdom domestic law, the most extensive list of protected grounds
But it was the 'fundamental interests" ingredient of the new equal protection that proved particularly can be found in Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). It prohibits discrimination on
dynamic, open-ended, and amorphous….. [Other fundamental interests included voting, criminal appeals, grounds such as "sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association
and the right of interstate travel ….] with a national minority, property, birth or other status." This list is illustrative and not exhaustive. Discrimination on
the basis of race, sex and religion is regarded as grounds that require strict scrutiny. A further indication that
certain forms of discrimination are regarded as particularly suspect under the Covenant can be gleaned from
xxx       xxx       xxx
Article 4, which, while allowing states to derogate from certain Covenant articles in times of national emergency,
prohibits derogation by measures that discriminate solely on the grounds of "race, colour, language, religion or social
The Burger Court and Equal Protection. origin."67

The Burger Court was reluctant to expand the scope of the new equal protection, although its best Moreover, the European Court of Human Rights has developed a test of justification which varies with the ground
established ingredient retains vitality. There was also mounting discontent with the rigid two-tier of discrimination. In the Belgian Linguistics case68 the European Court set the standard of justification at a low
formulations of the Warren Court's equal protection doctrine. It was prepared to use the clause as an level: discrimination would contravene the Convention only if it had no legitimate aim, or there was no reasonable
interventionist tool without resorting to the strict language of the new equal protection…. [Among the relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised. 69 But over the years,
fundamental interests identified during this time were voting and access to the ballot, while "suspect" the European Court has developed a hierarchy of grounds covered by Article 14 of the ECHR, a much higher
classifications included sex, alienage and illegitimacy.] level of justification being required in respect of those regarded as "suspect" (sex, race, nationality,
illegitimacy, or sexual orientation) than of others. Thus, in Abdulaziz, 70 the European Court declared that:
xxx       xxx       xxx
. . . [t]he advancement of the equality of the sexes is today a major goal in the member States of the
Council of Europe. This means that very weighty reasons would have to be advanced before a difference
Even while the two-tier scheme has often been adhered to in form, there has also been an increasingly of treatment on the ground of sex could be regarded as compatible with the Convention.
noticeable resistance to the sharp difference between deferential "old" and interventionist "new" equal
protection. A number of justices sought formulations that would blur the sharp distinctions of the two-tiered
approach or that would narrow the gap between strict scrutiny and deferential review. The most elaborate And in Gaygusuz v. Austria,71 the European Court held that "very weighty reasons would have to be put forward
attack came from Justice Marshall, whose frequently stated position was developed most elaborately in his before the Court could regard a difference of treatment based exclusively on the ground of nationality as compatible
dissent in the Rodriguez case: 66 with the Convention."72 The European Court will then permit States a very much narrower margin of
appreciation in relation to discrimination on grounds of sex, race, etc., in the application of the Convention rights
than it will in relation to distinctions drawn by states between, for example, large and small land-owners. 73
The Court apparently seeks to establish [that] equal protection cases fall into one of two neat categories
which dictate the appropriate standard of review - strict scrutiny or mere rationality. But this (sic) Court's
[decisions] defy such easy categorization. A principled reading of what this Court has done reveals that it C. Equality under International Law
has applied a spectrum of standards in reviewing discrimination allegedly violative of the equal protection
clause. This spectrum clearly comprehends variations in the degree of care with which Court will scrutinize
particular classification, depending, I believe, on the constitutional and societal importance of the interests
The principle of equality has long been recognized under international law. Article 1 of the Universal Declaration . . . "discrimination" as used in the [ICCPR] should be understood to imply any distinction, exclusion,
of Human Rights proclaims that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. Non- restriction or preference which is based on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion,
discrimination, together with equality before the law and equal protection of the law without any discrimination, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status, and which has
constitutes basic principles in the protection of human rights. 74 the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by all persons,
on an equal footing, of all rights and freedoms. 91 (emphasis supplied)
Most, if not all, international human rights instruments include some prohibition on discrimination and/or
provisions about equality.75 The general international provisions pertinent to discrimination and/or equality are the Thus, the two-tier analysis made in the case at bar of the challenged provision, and its conclusion of
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR);76 the International Covenant on Economic, Social and unconstitutionality by subsequent operation, are in cadence and in consonance with the progressive trend
Cultural Rights (ICESCR); the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination of other jurisdictions and in international law. There should be no hesitation in using the equal protection clause
(CERD);77 the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW); and the as a major cutting edge to eliminate every conceivable irrational discrimination in our society. Indeed, the social
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). justice imperatives in the Constitution, coupled with the special status and protection afforded to labor, compel this
approach.92
In the broader international context, equality is also enshrined in regional instruments such as the American
Convention on Human Rights; 78 the African Charter on Human and People's Rights;79 the European Convention on Apropos the special protection afforded to labor under our Constitution and international law, we held in
Human Rights;80 the European Social Charter of 1961 and revised Social Charter of 1996; and the European Union International School Alliance of Educators v. Quisumbing: 93
Charter of Rights (of particular importance to European states). Even the Council of the League of Arab States has
adopted the Arab Charter on Human Rights in 1994, although it has yet to be ratified by the Member States of the
That public policy abhors inequality and discrimination is beyond contention. Our Constitution and laws
League.81
reflect the policy against these evils. The Constitution in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights
exhorts Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right
The equality provisions in these instruments do not merely function as traditional "first generation" rights, of all people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities." The very broad Article
commonly viewed as concerned only with constraining rather than requiring State action. Article 26 of the 19 of the Civil Code requires every person, "in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
ICCPR requires "guarantee[s]" of "equal and effective protection against discrimination" while Articles 1 and 14 of the duties, [to] act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith."
American and European Conventions oblige States Parties "to ensure ... the full and free exercise of [the rights
guaranteed] ... without any discrimination" and to "secure without discrimination" the enjoyment of the rights
International law, which springs from general principles of law, likewise proscribes discrimination. General
guaranteed.82 These provisions impose a measure of positive obligation on States Parties to take steps to
principles of law include principles of equity, i.e., the general principles of fairness and justice, based on
eradicate discrimination.
the test of what is reasonable. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
In the employment field, basic detailed minimum standards ensuring equality and prevention of discrimination, are Racial Discrimination, the Convention against Discrimination in Education, the Convention (No. 111)
laid down in the ICESCR83 and in a very large number of Conventions administered by the International Labour Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation - all embody the general principle
Organisation, a United Nations body. 84 Additionally, many of the other international and regional human rights against discrimination, the very antithesis of fairness and justice. The Philippines, through its Constitution,
instruments have specific provisions relating to employment.85 has incorporated this principle as part of its national laws.

The United Nations Human Rights Committee has also gone beyond the earlier tendency to view the In the workplace, where the relations between capital and labor are often skewed in favor of capital,
prohibition against discrimination (Article 26) as confined to the ICCPR rights. 86 In Broeks87 and Zwaan-de inequality and discrimination by the employer are all the more reprehensible.
Vries,88the issue before the Committee was whether discriminatory provisions in the Dutch Unemployment Benefits
Act (WWV) fell within the scope of Article 26. The Dutch government submitted that discrimination in social security
The Constitution specifically provides that labor is entitled to "humane conditions of work." These
benefit provision was not within the scope of Article 26, as the right was contained in the ICESCR and not the
conditions are not restricted to the physical workplace - the factory, the office or the field - but include as
ICCPR. They accepted that Article 26 could go beyond the rights contained in the Covenant to other civil and political
well the manner by which employers treat their employees.
rights, such as discrimination in the field of taxation, but contended that Article 26 did not extend to the social,
economic, and cultural rights contained in ICESCR. The Committee rejected this argument. In its view, Article 26
applied to rights beyond the Covenant including the rights in other international treaties such as the right to social The Constitution also directs the State to promote "equality of employment opportunities for all." Similarly,
security found in ICESCR: the Labor Code provides that the State shall "ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or
creed." It would be an affront to both the spirit and letter of these provisions if the State, in spite of its
primordial obligation to promote and ensure equal employment opportunities, closes its eyes to unequal
Although Article 26 requires that legislation should prohibit discrimination, it does not of itself contain any
and discriminatory terms and conditions of employment.
obligation with respect to the matters that may be provided for by legislation. Thus it does not, for example,
require any state to enact legislation to provide for social security. However, when such legislation is
adopted in the exercise of a State's sovereign power, then such legislation must comply with Article 26 of xxx       xxx       xxx
the Covenant.89
Notably, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, in Article 7 thereof,
Breaches of the right to equal protection occur directly or indirectly. A classification may be struck down if it has provides:
the purpose or effect of violating the right to equal protection. International law recognizes that discrimination may
occur indirectly, as the Human Rights Committee90 took into account the definitions of discrimination adopted by
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of just and
CERD and CEDAW in declaring that:
[favorable] conditions of work, which ensure, in particular:
 a. Remuneration which provides all workers, as a minimum, with: and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular
conception may at least be approximated. 104
i. Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without distinction of any
kind, in particular women being guaranteed conditions of work not inferior to those V.
enjoyed by men, with equal pay for equal work;
A Final Word
xxx       xxx       xxx
Finally, concerns have been raised as to the propriety of a ruling voiding the challenged provision. It has been
The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of proffered that the remedy of petitioner is not with this Court, but with Congress, which alone has the power to erase
"equal pay for equal work." Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and any inequity perpetrated by R.A. No. 7653. Indeed, a bill proposing the exemption of the BSP rank-and-file from the
responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries. (citations omitted) SSL has supposedly been filed.

Congress retains its wide discretion in providing for a valid classification, and its policies should be accorded Under most circumstances, the Court will exercise judicial restraint in deciding questions of constitutionality,
recognition and respect by the courts of justice except when they run afoul of the Constitution. 94 The deference recognizing the broad discretion given to Congress in exercising its legislative power. Judicial scrutiny would be
stops where the classification violates a fundamental right, or prejudices persons accorded special based on the "rational basis" test, and the legislative discretion would be given deferential treatment. 105
protection by the Constitution. When these violations arise, this Court must discharge its primary role as the
vanguard of constitutional guaranties, and require a stricter and more exacting adherence to constitutional
But if the challenge to the statute is premised on the denial of a fundamental right, or the perpetuation of
limitations. Rational basis should not suffice.
prejudice against persons favored by the Constitution with special protection, judicial scrutiny ought to be
more strict. A weak and watered down view would call for the abdication of this Court's solemn duty to strike down
Admittedly, the view that prejudice to persons accorded special protection by the Constitution requires a stricter any law repugnant to the Constitution and the rights it enshrines. This is true whether the actor committing the
judicial scrutiny finds no support in American or English jurisprudence. Nevertheless, these foreign decisions and unconstitutional act is a private person or the government itself or one of its instrumentalities. Oppressive acts will be
authorities are not per se controlling in this jurisdiction. At best, they are persuasive and have been used to support struck down regardless of the character or nature of the actor. 106
many of our decisions.95 We should not place undue and fawning reliance upon them and regard them as
indispensable mental crutches without which we cannot come to our own decisions through the employment of our
Accordingly, when the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations, the issue on whether
own endowments. We live in a different ambience and must decide our own problems in the light of our own interests
or not the prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met, or the limitations respected, is justiciable
and needs, and of our qualities and even idiosyncrasies as a people, and always with our own concept of law and
or non-political, the crux of the problem being one of legality or validity of the contested act, not its wisdom.
justice.96 Our laws must be construed in accordance with the intention of our own lawmakers and such intent may be
Otherwise, said qualifications, conditions or limitations - particularly those prescribed or imposed by the
deduced from the language of each law and the context of other local legislation related thereto. More importantly,
Constitution - would be set at naught. What is more, the judicial inquiry into such issue and the settlement
they must be construed to serve our own public interest which is the be-all and the end-all of all our laws. And it need
thereof are the main functions of courts of justice under the Presidential form of government adopted in our
not be stressed that our public interest is distinct and different from others. 97
1935 Constitution, and the system of checks and balances, one of its basic predicates. As a
consequence, We have neither the authority nor the discretion to decline passing upon said issue,
In the 2003 case of Francisco v. House of Representatives, this Court has stated that: "[A]merican jurisprudence and but are under the ineluctable obligation - made particularly more exacting and peremptory by our
authorities, much less the American Constitution, are of dubious application for these are no longer controlling within oath, as members of the highest Court of the land, to support and defend the Constitution - to
our jurisdiction and have only limited persuasive merit insofar as Philippine constitutional law is concerned....[I]n settle it. This explains why, in Miller v. Johnson, it was held that courts have a "duty, rather than a power",
resolving constitutional disputes, [this Court] should not be beguiled by foreign jurisprudence some of which are to determine whether another branch of the government has "kept within constitutional limits." Not satisfied
hardly applicable because they have been dictated by different constitutional settings and needs." 98 Indeed, although with this postulate, the court went farther and stressed that, if the Constitution provides how it may be
the Philippine Constitution can trace its origins to that of the United States, their paths of development have long amended - as it is in our 1935 Constitution - "then, unless the manner is followed, the judiciary as the
since diverged. 99 interpreter of that constitution, will declare the amendment invalid." In fact, this very Court - speaking
through Justice Laurel, an outstanding authority on Philippine Constitutional Law, as well as one of the
highly respected and foremost leaders of the Convention that drafted the 1935 Constitution - declared, as
Further, the quest for a better and more "equal" world calls for the use of equal protection as a tool of effective
early as July 15, 1936, that "(i)n times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of
judicial intervention.
the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial
department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of
Equality is one ideal which cries out for bold attention and action in the Constitution. The Preamble powers between the several departments" of the government. 107 (citations omitted; emphasis supplied)
proclaims "equality" as an ideal precisely in protest against crushing inequities in Philippine society. The
command to promote social justice in Article II, Section 10, in "all phases of national development," further
In the case at bar, the challenged proviso operates on the basis of the salary grade or officer-employee status. It is
explicitated in Article XIII, are clear commands to the State to take affirmative action in the direction of
akin to a distinction based on economic class and status, with the higher grades as recipients of a benefit
greater equality.… [T]here is thus in the Philippine Constitution no lack of doctrinal support for a more
specifically withheld from the lower grades. Officers of the BSP now receive higher compensation packages that are
vigorous state effort towards achieving a reasonable measure of equality. 100
competitive with the industry, while the poorer, low-salaried employees are limited to the rates prescribed by the
SSL. The implications are quite disturbing: BSP rank-and-file employees are paid the strictly regimented rates of the
Our present Constitution has gone further in guaranteeing vital social and economic rights to marginalized groups of SSL while employees higher in rank - possessing higher and better education and opportunities for career
society, including labor.101 Under the policy of social justice, the law bends over backward to accommodate the advancement - are given higher compensation packages to entice them to stay. Considering that majority, if not
interests of the working class on the humane justification that those with less privilege in life should have more in all, the rank-and-file employees consist of people whose status and rank in life are less and limited,
law.102 And the obligation to afford protection to labor is incumbent not only on the legislative and executive branches especially in terms of job marketability, it is they - and not the officers - who have the real economic and
but also on the judiciary to translate this pledge into a living reality. 103 Social justice calls for the humanization of laws financial need for the adjustment This is in accord with the policy of the Constitution "to free the people from
poverty, provide adequate social services, extend to them a decent standard of living, and improve the quality of life
for all."108 Any act of Congress that runs counter to this constitutional desideratum deserves strict scrutiny by
this Court before it can pass muster.

To be sure, the BSP rank-and-file employees merit greater concern from this Court. They represent the more
impotent rank-and-file government employees who, unlike employees in the private sector, have no specific right to
organize as a collective bargaining unit and negotiate for better terms and conditions of employment, nor the power
to hold a strike to protest unfair labor practices. Not only are they impotent as a labor unit, but their efficacy to lobby
in Congress is almost nil as R.A. No. 7653 effectively isolated them from the other GFI rank-and-file in
compensation. These BSP rank-and-file employees represent the politically powerless and they should not be
compelled to seek a political solution to their unequal and iniquitous treatment. Indeed, they have waited for
many years for the legislature to act. They cannot be asked to wait some more for discrimination cannot be given
any waiting time. Unless the equal protection clause of the Constitution is a mere platitude, it is the Court's duty to
save them from reasonless discrimination.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, we hold that the continued operation and implementation of the last proviso of Section 15(c),
Article II of Republic Act No. 7653 is unconstitutional.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, Azcuna, Tinga, and Chico-
Nazario, JJ., concur.

Panganiban, Carpio, Carpio-Morales, and Garcia, JJ., see dissenting.

Corona, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., on leave.
 House Bill (HB) No. 9000 entitled "AN ACT ALLOWING THE USE OF MASS MEDIA FOR ELECTION
EN BANC PROPAGANDA, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 881, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS
THE ‘OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE,’ AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES;" 1
G.R. No. 147387               December 10, 2003
…
RODOLFO C. FARIÑAS, MANUEL M. GARCIA, FRANCIS G. ESCUDERO, and AGAPITO A. AQUINO, AS
MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND ALSO AS TAXPAYERS, IN THEIR OWN BEHALF Senate Bill (SB) No. 1742 entitled "AN ACT TO ENHANCE THE HOLDING OF FREE, ORDERLY, HONEST,
AND IN REPRESENTATION OF THE MEMBERS OF THE MINORITY IN THE HOUSE OF PEACEFUL, AND CREDIBLE ELECTIONS THROUGH FAIR ELECTION PRACTICES." 2
REPRESENTATIVES,petitioners, 
vs.
A Bicameral Conference Committee, composed of eight members of the Senate3 and sixteen (16) members of the
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON. FELICIANO R. BELMONTE, JR.,
House of Representatives,4 was formed to reconcile the conflicting provisions of the House and Senate versions of
SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, SECRETARY OF THE SENATE, AND
the bill.
SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.

On November 29, 2000, the Bicameral Conference Committee submitted its Report, 5 signed by its members,
x-----------------------x
recommending the approval of the bill as reconciled and approved by the conferees.

G.R. No. 152161

During the plenary session of the House of Representatives on February 5, 2001, Rep. Jacinto V. Paras proposed
an amendment to the Bicameral Conference Committee Report. Rep. Didagen P. Dilangalen raised a point of order
CONG. GERRY A. SALAPUDDIN, petitioner,  commenting that the House could no longer submit an amendment thereto. Rep. Sergio A.F. Apostol thereupon
vs. moved that the House return the report to the Bicameral Conference Committee in view of the proposed amendment
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent. thereto. Rep. Dilangalen expressed his objection to the proposal. However, upon viva voce voting, the majority of the
House approved the return of the report to the Bicameral Conference Committee for proper action. 6
DECISION
In view of the proposed amendment, the House of Representatives elected anew its conferees 7 to the Bicameral
Conference Committee.8 Then again, for unclear reasons, upon the motion of Rep. Ignacio R. Bunye, the House
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
elected another set of conferees 9 to the Bicameral Conference Committee. 10

Before the Court are two Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, seeking to declare as
On February 7, 2001, during the plenary session of the House of Representatives, Rep. Bunye moved that the
unconstitutional Section 14 of Republic Act No. 9006 (The Fair Election Act), insofar as it expressly repeals Section
House consider the Bicameral Conference Committee Report on the contrasting provisions of HB No. 9000 and SB
67 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (The Omnibus Election Code) which provides:
No. 1742. Rep. Dilangalen observed that the report had been recommitted to the Bicameral Conference Committee.
The Chair responded that the Bicameral Conference Report was a new one, and was a result of the reconvening of a
SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office. – Any elective official, whether national or local, running for any office new Bicameral Conference Committee. Rep. Dilangalen then asked that he be given time to examine the new report.
other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for President and Vice-President, shall be Upon motion of Rep. Apostol, the House deferred the approval of the report until the other members were given a
considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. copy thereof.11

The petition for certiorari and prohibition in G.R. No. 147387 was filed by Rodolfo C. Fariñas, Manuel M. Garcia, After taking up other pending matters, the House proceeded to vote on the Bicameral Conference Committee Report
Francis G. Escudero and Agapito A. Aquino. At the time of filing of the petition, the petitioners were members of the on the disagreeing provisions of HB No. 9000 and SB No. 1742. The House approved the report with 125 affirmative
minority bloc in the House of Representatives. Impleaded as respondents are: the Executive Secretary, then votes, 3 negative votes and no abstention. In explaining their negative votes, Reps. Fariñas and Garcia expressed
Speaker of the House of Representatives Feliciano R. Belmonte, Jr., the Commission on Elections, the Secretary of their belief that Section 14 thereof was a rider. Even Rep. Escudero, who voted in the affirmative, expressed his
the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG), the Secretary of the Senate and the Secretary General doubts on the constitutionality of Section 14. Prior to casting his vote, Rep. Dilangalen observed that no senator
of the House of Representatives. signed the Bicameral Conference Committee Report and asked if this procedure was regular. 12

The petition for prohibition in G.R. No. 152161 was filed by Gerry A. Salapuddin, then also a member of the House of On the same day, the Senate likewise approved the Bicameral Conference Committee Report on the contrasting
Representatives. Impleaded as respondent is the COMELEC. provisions of SB No. 1742 and HB No. 9000.

Legislative History of Republic Act No. 9006 Thereafter, Rep. Act No. 9006 was duly signed by then Senate President Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. and then Speaker of
the House of Representatives Feliciano R. Belmonte, Jr. and was duly certified by the Secretary of the Senate
Lutgardo B. Barbo and the Secretary General of the House of Representatives Robert P. Nazareno as "the
Rep. Act No. 9006, entitled "An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible consolidation of House Bill No. 9000 and Senate Bill No. 1742," and "finally passed by both Houses on February 7,
Elections through Fair Election Practices," is a consolidation of the following bills originating from the House of 2001."
Representatives and the Senate, respectively:
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed Rep. Act No. 9006 into law on February 12, 2001. For their part, the respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, urge this Court to dismiss the petitions
contending, preliminarily, that the petitioners have no legal standing to institute the present suit. Except for the fact
that their negative votes were overruled by the majority of the members of the House of Representatives, the
The Petitioners’ Case
petitioners have not shown that they have suffered harm as a result of the passage of Rep. Act No. 9006. Neither do
petitioners have any interest as taxpayers since the assailed statute does not involve the exercise by Congress of its
The petitioners now come to the Court alleging in the main that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, insofar as it repeals taxing or spending power.
Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is unconstitutional for being in violation of Section 26(1), Article VI of the
Constitution, requiring every law to have only one subject which should be expressed in its title.
Invoking the "enrolled bill" doctrine, the respondents refute the petitioners’ allegations that "irregularities" attended
the enactment of Rep. Act No. 9006. The signatures of the Senate President and the Speaker of the House,
According to the petitioners, the inclusion of Section 14 repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code in Rep. appearing on the bill and the certification signed by the respective Secretaries of both houses of Congress, constitute
Act No. 9006 constitutes a proscribed rider. They point out the dissimilarity in the subject matter of Rep. Act No. proof beyond cavil that the bill was duly enacted into law.
9006, on the one hand, and Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, on the other. Rep. Act No. 9006 primarily
deals with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda and the elimination of unfair election
The respondents contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election
practices, while Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an
Code, is not a proscribed rider nor does it violate Section 26(1) of Article VI of the Constitution. The title of Rep. Act
office other than the one they are holding in a permanent capacity by considering them as ipso facto resigned
No. 9006, "An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair
therefrom upon filing of the certificate of candidacy. The repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is thus
Election Practices," is so broad that it encompasses all the processes involved in an election exercise, including the
not embraced in the title, nor germane to the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006.
filing of certificates of candidacy by elective officials.

The petitioners also assert that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 violates the equal protection clause of the
They argue that the repeal of Section 67 is germane to the general subject of Rep. Act No. 9006 as expressed in its
Constitution because it repeals Section 67 only of the Omnibus Election Code, leaving intact Section 66 thereof
title as it eliminates the effect of prematurely terminating the term of an elective official by his filing of a certificate of
which imposes a similar limitation to appointive officials, thus:
candidacy for an office other than the one which he is permanently holding, such that he is no longer considered ipso
facto resigned therefrom. The legislature, by including the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code in Rep.
SEC. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position. – Any person holding a public appointive office or position, Act No. 9006, has deemed it fit to remove the "unfairness" of considering an elective official ipso facto resigned from
including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in government-owned his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for another elective office. With the repeal of Section 67, all
or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of elective officials are now placed on equal footing as they are allowed to finish their respective terms even if they run
candidacy. for any office, whether the presidency, vice-presidency or other elective positions, other than the one they are
holding in a permanent capacity.
They contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 discriminates against appointive officials. By the repeal of
Section 67, an elective official who runs for office other than the one which he is holding is no longer considered ipso The respondents assert that the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code need not be expressly stated in
facto resigned therefrom upon filing his certificate of candidacy. Elective officials continue in public office even as the title of Rep. Act No. 9006 as the legislature is not required to make the title of the act a complete index of its
they campaign for reelection or election for another elective position. On the other hand, Section 66 has been contents. It must be deemed sufficient that the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general
retained; thus, the limitation on appointive officials remains - they are still considered ipso facto resigned from their subject which the statute seeks to effect without expressing each and every means necessary for its
offices upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy. accomplishment. Section 26(1) of Article VI of the Constitution merely calls for all the parts of an act relating to its
subject to find expression in its title. Mere details need not be set forth.
The petitioners assert that Rep. Act No. 9006 is null and void in its entirety as irregularities attended its enactment
into law. The law, not only Section 14 thereof, should be declared null and void. Even Section 16 of the law which According to the respondents, Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, insofar as it repeals Section 67, leaving Section 66
provides that "[t]his Act shall take effect upon its approval" is a violation of the due process clause of the of the Omnibus Election Code intact and effective, does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
Constitution, as well as jurisprudence, which require publication of the law before it becomes effective. Section 67 pertains to elective officials while Section 66 pertains to appointive officials. A substantial distinction
exists between these two sets of officials; elective officials occupy their office by virtue of their mandate based upon
the popular will, while the appointive officials are not elected by popular will. The latter cannot, therefore, be similarly
Finally, the petitioners maintain that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is a good law; hence, should not have treated as the former. Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated are treated alike,
been repealed. The petitioners cited the ruling of the Court in Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr., 13 that Section 67 of the Omnibus both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.
Election Code is based on the constitutional mandate on the "Accountability of Public Officers:" 14

Further, Section 16, or the "Effectivity" clause, of Rep. Act No. 9006 does not run afoul of the due process clause of
Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, the Constitution as it does not entail any arbitrary deprivation of life, liberty and property. Specifically, the section
serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead providing for penalties in cases of violations thereof presume that the formalities of the law would be observed, i.e.,
modest lives. charges would first be filed, and the accused would be entitled to a hearing before judgment is rendered by a court
having jurisdiction. In any case, the issue about lack of due process is premature as no one has, as yet, been
Consequently, the respondents Speaker and Secretary General of the House of Representatives acted with grave charged with violation of Rep. Act No. 9006.
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction for not considering those members of the House who
ran for a seat in the Senate during the May 14, 2001 elections as ipso facto resigned therefrom, upon the filing of Finally, the respondents submit that the respondents Speaker and Secretary General of the House of
their respective certificates of candidacy. Representatives did not commit grave abuse of discretion in not excluding from the Rolls those members thereof
who ran for the Senate during the May 14, 2001 elections. These respondents merely complied with Rep. Act No.
The Respondents’ Arguments 9006, which enjoys the presumption of validity until declared otherwise by the Court.
 The Court’s Ruling Proceeding from these guideposts, the Court shall now resolve the substantial issues raised by the petitions.

Before resolving the petitions on their merits, the Court shall first rule on the procedural issue raised by the Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is Not a Rider32
respondents, i.e., whether the petitioners have the legal standing or locus standi to file the petitions at bar.
At the core of the controversy is Section 14, the repealing clause of Rep. Act No. 9006, which provides:
The petitions were filed by the petitioners in their capacities as members of the House of Representatives, and as
taxpayers and registered voters.
Sec. 14. Sections 67 and 85 of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881) and Sections 10 and 11 of
Republic Act No. 6646 are hereby repealed. As a consequence, the first proviso in the third paragraph of Section 11
Generally, a party who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case of Republic Act No. 8436 is rendered ineffective. All laws, presidential decrees, executive orders, rules and
such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. 15 The rationale for requiring a regulations, or any part thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified or
party who challenges the constitutionality of a statute to allege such a personal stake in the outcome of the amended accordingly.
controversy is "to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." 16
The repealed provision, Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, quoted earlier, reads:

However, being merely a matter of procedure, this Court, in several cases involving issues of "overarching
SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office. – Any elective official, whether national or local, running for any office
significance to our society,"17 had adopted a liberal stance on standing. Thus, in Tatad v. Secretary of the
other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for President and Vice-President, shall be
Department of Energy,18 this Court brushed aside the procedural requirement of standing, took cognizance of, and
considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
subsequently granted, the petitions separately filed by then Senator Francisco Tatad and several members of the
House of Representatives assailing the constitutionality of Rep. Act No. 8180 (An Act Deregulating the Downstream
Oil Industry and For Other Purposes). Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution provides:

The Court likewise took cognizance of the petition filed by then members of the House of Representatives which SEC. 26 (1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title
impugned as unconstitutional the validity of a provision of Rep. Act No. 6734 (Organic Act for the Autonomous thereof.
Region in Muslim Mindanao) in Chiongbian v. Orbos. 19 Similarly, the Court took cognizance of the petition filed by
then members of the Senate, joined by other petitioners, which challenged the validity of Rep. Act No. 7716
The proscription is aimed against the evils of the so-called omnibus bills and log-rolling legislation as well as
(Expanded Value Added Tax Law) in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance.20
surreptitious and/or unconsidered encroaches. The provision merely calls for all parts of an act relating to its subject
finding expression in its title.33
Members of Congress, such as the petitioners, were likewise allowed by this Court to challenge the validity of acts,
decisions, rulings, or orders of various government agencies or instrumentalities in Del Mar v. Philippine Amusement
To determine whether there has been compliance with the constitutional requirement that the subject of an act shall
and Gaming Corporation,21 Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, Jr.,22 Philippine Constitution Association v.
be expressed in its title, the Court laid down the rule that –
Enriquez,23Albano v. Reyes,24 and Bagatsing v. Committee on Privatization. 25

Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so narrowly construed as to
Certainly, the principal issue posed by the petitions, i.e., whether Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, which
cripple or impede the power of legislation. The requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title
this Court had declared in Dimaporo26 as deriving its existence from the constitutional provision on accountability of
should receive a reasonable and not a technical construction. It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough
public officers, has been validly repealed by Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, is one of "overarching significance"
reasonably to include the general object which a statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and every end and
that justifies this Court’s adoption of a liberal stance vis-à-vis the procedural matter on standing. Moreover, with the
means necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of that object. Mere details need not be set forth. The title
national elections barely seven months away, it behooves the Court to confront the issue now and resolve the same
need not be an abstract or index of the Act.34
forthrightly. The following pronouncement of the Court is quite apropos:

The title of Rep. Act No. 9006 reads: "An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and
... All await the decision of this Court on the constitutional question. Considering, therefore, the importance which the
Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices." Section 2 of the law provides not only the declaration of
instant case has assumed and to prevent multiplicity of suits, strong reasons of public policy demand that [its]
principles but also the objectives thereof:
constitutionality . . . be now resolved. It may likewise be added that the exceptional character of the situation that
confronts us, the paramount public interest, and the undeniable necessity for a ruling, the national elections beings
barely six months away, reinforce our stand. 27 Sec. 2. Declaration of Principles. – The State shall, during the election period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment or
utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of media of communication or information to guarantee or
ensure equal opportunity for public service, including access to media time and space, and the equitable right to
Every statute is presumed valid.28 The presumption is that the legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible and just
reply, for public information campaigns and fora among candidates and assure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and
law and one which operates no further than may be necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the law.29
credible elections.

It is equally well-established, however, that the courts, as guardians of the Constitution, have the inherent authority
The State shall ensure that bona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment and
to determine whether a statute enacted by the legislature transcends the limit imposed by the fundamental law.30And
discrimination.35
where the acts of the other branches of government run afoul of the Constitution, it is the judiciary’s solemn and
sacred duty to nullify the same.31
The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of Rep. Act No. 9006 are comprehensive enough to include THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code within its contemplation. To require that the said repeal of
Section 67 of the Code be expressed in the title is to insist that the title be a complete index of its content. 36
Yes. Anyway, let’s listen to Congressman Marcos.

The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, which imposes a limitation on elective
REP. MARCOS:
officials who run for an office other than the one they are holding, to the other provisions of Rep. Act No. 9006, which
deal with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda, does not violate the "one subject-one
title" rule. This Court has held that an act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any Mr. Chairman, may I just make the observation that although it is true that the bulk of provisions deals with the area
number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the of propaganda and political advertising, the complete title is actually one that indulge full coverage. It says "An Act to
general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of enhance the holding of free, orderly, honest ... elections through fair election practices." But as you said, we will put
carrying out the general subject.37 that aside to discuss later one.

The deliberations of the Bicameral Conference Committee on the particular matter are particularly instructive: Secondly, I think the Declaration of Principles contained in Section 2, paragraph 2 is perfectly adequate in that it
says that it shall ensure candidates for public office that may be free from any form of harassment and
discrimination.
SEN. LEGARDA-LEVISTE:

Surely this provision in Section 67 of the old Election Code of the existing Omnibus Election Code is a form of
Yes, Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to clarify.
harassment or discrimination. And so I think that in the effort at leveling the playing field, we can cover this and it
should not be considered a rider.
So all we’re looking for now is an appropriate title to make it broader so that it would cover this provision [referring to
the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code], is that correct? That’s all. Because I believe ...
SEN. LEGARDA-LEVISTE:

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. SYJUCO):

I agree, Mr. Chairman. I think the Congresswoman from Ilocos had very clearly put it, that it is covered in the
Declaration of Principles and in the objective of this bill. And therefore, I hope that the House contingent would agree
We are looking for an appropriate coverage which will result in the nomenclature or title. to this so that we can finish it now. And it expressly provides for fair election practices because ...

SEN. LEGARDA-LEVISTE: THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):

Because I really do not believe that it is out of place. I think that even with the term "fair election practice," it really Yeah, I think what is on the table is that we are not disputing this, but we are looking for a title that is more generic so
covers it, because as expressed by Senator Roco, those conditions inserted earlier seemed unfair and it is an that then we have less of an objection on constitutionality. I think that’s the theory. So, there is acceptance of this.
election practice and, therefore, I think, I’m very comfortable with the title "Fair Election Practice" so that we can get
over with these things so that we don’t come back again until we find the title. I mean, it’s one provision which I think
Maybe we should not call it na limitation on elected officials. Maybe we should say the special provision on elected
is fair for everybody. It may seem like a limitation but this limitation actually provides for fairness in election practices
officials. So how is that? Alam mo ito ...
as the title implies.

REP. MARCOS:
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. SYJUCO):

I think we just change the Section 1, the short title.

Yes.

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):

SEN. LEGARDA-LEVISTE:

Also, Then we say - - on the short title of the Act, we say ...
So I would want to beg the House contingent, let’s get it over with. To me, ha, it’s not a very touchy issue. For me,
it’s even a very correct provision. I feel very comfortable with it and it was voted in the Senate, at least, so I would
like to appeal to the ... para matapos na, then we come back as a Bicam just for the title Is that what you’re ...? REP. MARCOS:

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. SYJUCO): What if we say fair election practices? Maybe that should be changed...

It’s not the title per se, it’s the coverage. So if you will just kindly bear with us. I’m happy that there is already one THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
comfortable senator there among ... several of us were also comfortable with it. But it would be well that when we
rise from this Bicam that we’re all comfortable with it.
O, sige, fine, fine. Let’s a brainstorm. Equal...
REP. PADILLA: It shall be cited as Fair Election Act.

Mr. Chairman, why don’t we use "An Act rationalizing the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible (Informal discussions)
elections, amending for the purpose Batasang Pambansa known as the Omnibus Election Code?"
REP. PICHAY:
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
Approve na iyan.
Why don’t we remove "fair" and then this shall be cited as Election Practices Act?"
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
REP. PICHAY:
Done. So, okay na iyon. The title will be "Fair Election Act."
That’s not an election practice. That’s a limitation.
The rest wala nang problema ano?
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
VOICES:
Ah - - - ayaw mo iyong practice. O, give me another noun.
Wala na.
REP. MARCOS:
REP. MACARAMBON:
The Fair Election.
Wala na iyong practices?
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
O, Fair Election Act.
Wala na, wala na. Mahina tayo sa practice, eh.
REP. MACARAMBON:
O, wala na? We will clean up.
Nagbi-brainstorm tayo dito, eh. How about if we change the title to enhance the holding of free, orderly, honest,
peaceful and ensure equal opportunity for public service through fair election practices?
REP. MARCOS:

REP. PICHAY:
Title?

Fair election practices?

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):

REP. MACARAMBON:
The short title, "This Act ..."

Yeah. To ensure equal opportunity for public service through fair ...
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. SYJUCO):

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):

You’re back to your No. 21 already.

Wala nang practices nga.

REP. MARCOS:

REP. PICHAY:
The full title, the same?

Wala nang practices.

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):

Iyon na nga. The full title is "An Act to enhance the holding ..." That’s the House version, eh, dahil pareho, hindi ba? Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is that under Section 55, Chapter 8, Title I,
Then the short title "This Act shall be known as the Fair Election Act." 38 Subsection A. Civil Service Commission, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292),
appointive officials, as officers and employees in the civil service, are strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan
political activity or take part in any election except to vote. Under the same provision, elective officials, or officers or
The legislators considered Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as a form of harassment or discrimination that
employees holding political offices, are obviously expressly allowed to take part in political and electoral activities. 49
had to be done away with and repealed. The executive department found cause with Congress when the President
of the Philippines signed the measure into law. For sure, some sectors of society and in government may believe
that the repeal of Section 67 is bad policy as it would encourage political adventurism. But policy matters are not the By repealing Section 67 but retaining Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, the legislators deemed it proper to
concern of the Court. Government policy is within the exclusive dominion of the political branches of the treat these two classes of officials differently with respect to the effect on their tenure in the office of the filing of the
government.39 It is not for this Court to look into the wisdom or propriety of legislative determination. Indeed, whether certificates of candidacy for any position other than those occupied by them. Again, it is not within the power of the
an enactment is wise or unwise, whether it is based on sound economic theory, whether it is the best means to Court to pass upon or look into the wisdom of this classification.
achieve the desired results, whether, in short, the legislative discretion within its prescribed limits should be
exercised in a particular manner are matters for the judgment of the legislature, and the serious conflict of opinions
Since the classification justifying Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, i.e., elected officials vis-a-vis appointive officials,
does not suffice to bring them within the range of judicial cognizance.40 Congress is not precluded from repealing
is anchored upon material and significant distinctions and all the persons belonging under the same classification are
Section 67 by the ruling of the Court in Dimaporo v. Mitra41 upholding the validity of the provision and by its
similarly treated, the equal protection clause of the Constitution is, thus, not infringed.
pronouncement in the same case that the provision has a laudable purpose. Over time, Congress may find it
imperative to repeal the law on its belief that the election process is thereby enhanced and the paramount objective
of election laws – the fair, honest and orderly election of truly deserving members of Congress – is achieved. The Enrolled Bill Doctrine
Is Applicable In this Case
Moreover, the avowed purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be embraced in its title is
to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of its provisions, and prevent the enactment into law Not content with their plea for the nullification of Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, the petitioners insist that the entire
of matters which have not received the notice, action and study of the legislators and the public. 42 In this case, it law should be nullified. They contend that irregularities attended the passage of the said law particularly in the House
cannot be claimed that the legislators were not apprised of the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as of Representatives catalogued thus:
the same was amply and comprehensively deliberated upon by the members of the House. In fact, the petitioners, as
members of the House of Representatives, expressed their reservations regarding its validity prior to casting their
a. Creation of two (2) sets of BCC (Bicameral Conference Committee) members by the House during its
votes. Undoubtedly, the legislators were aware of the existence of the provision repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus
session on February 5, 2001;
Election Code.

b. No communication from the Senate for a conference on the compromise bill submitted by the BCC on
Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006
November 29, 2000;
Is Not Violative of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Constitution43
c. The new Report submitted by the 2nd/3rd BCC was presented for approval on the floor without copies
thereof being furnished the members;
The petitioners’ contention, that the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code pertaining to elective officials
gives undue benefit to such officials as against the appointive ones and violates the equal protection clause of the
constitution, is tenuous. d. The 2nd/3rd BCC has no record of its proceedings, and the Report submitted by it was not signed by
the Chairman (Sen. Roco) thereof as well as its senator-members at the time it was presented to and
rammed for approval by the House;
The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification. If
the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and
regulated differently from the other. 44 The Court has explained the nature of the equal protection guarantee in this e. There was no meeting actually conducted by the 2nd/3rd BCC and that its alleged Report was instantly
manner: made and passed around for the signature of the BCC members;

The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile f. The Senate has no record of the creation of a 2nd BCC but only of the first one that convened on
discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited either in the November 23, 2000;
object to which it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among
residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as
to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which g. The "Effectivity" clauses of SB No. 1741 and HB No. 9000, as well as that of the compromise bill
applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and submitted by the BCC that convened on November 20, 2000, were couched in terms that comply with the
reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not. 45 publication required by the Civil Code and jurisprudence, to wit:

Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy their office ...
by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed
therefrom only upon stringent conditions. 46 On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their However, it was surreptitiously replaced in its final form as it appears in § 16, R.A. No. 9006, with the provision that
designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity "This Act shall take effect immediately upon its approval;"
and are entitled to security of tenure47 while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.48
 h. The copy of the compromise bill submitted by the 2nd/3rd BCC that was furnished the members during In conclusion, it bears reiterating that one of the firmly entrenched principles in constitutional law is that the courts do
its consideration on February 7, 2001, did not have the same § 16 as it now appears in RA No. 9006, but § not involve themselves with nor delve into the policy or wisdom of a statute. That is the exclusive concern of the
16 of the compromise bill, HB 9000 and SB 1742, reasons for which no objection thereto was made; legislative branch of the government. When the validity of a statute is challenged on constitutional grounds, the sole
function of the court is to determine whether it transcends constitutional limitations or the limits of legislative
power.57No such transgression has been shown in this case.
i. The alleged BCC Report presented to the House on February 7, 2001, did not "contain a detailed,
sufficiently explicit statement of the changes in or amendments to the subject measure;" and
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
j. The disappearance of the "Cayetano amendment," which is Section 12 of the compromise bill submitted
by the BCC. In fact, this was the subject of the purported proposed amendment to the compromise bill of SO ORDERED.
Member Paras as stated in paragraph 7 hereof. The said provision states, thusly:
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-
Sec. 12. Limitation on Elected Officials. – Any elected official who runs for president and vice-president shall be Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of the certificate of candidacy. 50

The petitioners, thus, urge the Court to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. The Court is not persuaded. Under the
"enrolled bill doctrine," the signing of a bill by the Speaker of the House and the Senate President and the
certification of the Secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed are conclusive of its due enactment. A
review of cases51 reveals the Court’s consistent adherence to the rule. The Court finds no reason to deviate from the
salutary rule in this case where the irregularities alleged by the petitioners mostly involved the internal rules of
Congress, e.g., creation of the 2nd or 3rd Bicameral Conference Committee by the House. This Court is not the
proper forum for the enforcement of these internal rules of Congress, whether House or Senate. Parliamentary rules
are merely procedural and with their observance the courts have no concern. 52 Whatever doubts there may be as to
the formal validity of Rep. Act No. 9006 must be resolved in its favor. The Court reiterates its ruling in Arroyo v. De
Venecia,53 viz.:

But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the courts the power to inquire into
allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its own rules, in the absence of
showing that there was a violation of a constitutional provision or the rights of private individuals. In Osmeña v.
Pendatun, it was held: "At any rate, courts have declared that ‘the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to
revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.’ And it has been said that
‘Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no concern. They may be
waived or disregarded by the legislative body.’ Consequently, ‘mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not
invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite number of members have agreed to a
particular measure.’"

The Effectivity Clause

Is Defective

Finally, the "Effectivity" clause (Section 16) of Rep. Act No. 9006 which provides that it "shall take effect immediately
upon its approval," is defective. However, the same does not render the entire law invalid. In Tañada v. Tuvera, 54 this
Court laid down the rule:

... the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication
itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislator may make the law
effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date without its previous publication.

Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-
period shall be shortened or extended….55

Following Article 2 of the Civil Code 56 and the doctrine enunciated in Tañada, Rep. Act No. 9006, notwithstanding its
express statement, took effect fifteen days after its publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general
circulation.
 Republic of the Philippines Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT community is a marginalized and under-represented sector
SUPREME COURT that is particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and gender identity; that LGBTs are victims of
Baguio City exclusion, discrimination, and violence; that because of negative societal attitudes, LGBTs are constrained to hide
their sexual orientation; and that Ang Ladlad complied with the 8-point guidelines enunciated by this Court in Ang
Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections.6 Ang Ladlad laid out its national membership base
EN BANC
consisting of individual members and organizational supporters, and outlined its platform of governance. 7

G.R. No. 190582               April 8, 2010

On November 11, 2009, after admitting the petitioner’s evidence, the COMELEC (Second Division) dismissed the
Petition on moral grounds, stating that:
ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY represented herein by its Chair, DANTON REMOTO, Petitioner, 
vs.
x x x This Petition is dismissible on moral grounds. Petitioner defines the Filipino Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS Respondent.
Transgender (LGBT) Community, thus:

DECISION
x x x a marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual
orientation and gender identity.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
and proceeded to define sexual orientation as that which:
... [F]reedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The
test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order.
x x x refers to a person’s capacity for profound emotional, affectional and sexual attraction to, and intimate and
sexual relations with, individuals of a different gender, of the same gender, or more than one gender."
Justice Robert A. Jackson
This definition of the LGBT sector makes it crystal clear that petitioner tolerates immorality which offends religious
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette 1 beliefs. In Romans 1:26, 27, Paul wrote:

One unavoidable consequence of everyone having the freedom to choose is that others may make different choices For this cause God gave them up into vile affections, for even their women did change the natural use into that which
– choices we would not make for ourselves, choices we may disapprove of, even choices that may shock or offend is against nature: And likewise also the men, leaving the natural use of the woman, burned in their lust one toward
or anger us. However, choices are not to be legally prohibited merely because they are different, and the right to another; men with men working that which is unseemly, and receiving in themselves that recompense of their error
disagree and debate about important questions of public policy is a core value protected by our Bill of Rights. Indeed, which was meet.
our democracy is built on genuine recognition of, and respect for, diversity and difference in opinion.
In the Koran, the hereunder verses are pertinent:
Since ancient times, society has grappled with deep disagreements about the definitions and demands of morality. In
many cases, where moral convictions are concerned, harmony among those theoretically opposed is an
For ye practice your lusts on men in preference to women "ye are indeed a people transgressing beyond bounds."
insurmountable goal. Yet herein lies the paradox – philosophical justifications about what is moral are indispensable
(7.81) "And we rained down on them a shower (of brimstone): Then see what was the end of those who indulged in
and yet at the same time powerless to create agreement. This Court recognizes, however, that practical solutions
sin and crime!" (7:84) "He said: "O my Lord! Help Thou me against people who do mischief" (29:30).
are preferable to ideological stalemates; accommodation is better than intransigence; reason more worthy than
rhetoric. This will allow persons of diverse viewpoints to live together, if not harmoniously, then, at least, civilly.
As correctly pointed out by the Law Department in its Comment dated October 2, 2008:
Factual Background
The ANG LADLAD apparently advocates sexual immorality as indicated in the Petition’s par. 6F: ‘Consensual
partnerships or relationships by gays and lesbians who are already of age’. It is further indicated in par. 24 of the
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with an application for a writ of preliminary
Petition which waves for the record: ‘In 2007, Men Having Sex with Men or MSMs in the Philippines were estimated
mandatory injunction, filed by Ang Ladlad LGBT Party (Ang Ladlad) against the Resolutions of the Commission on
as 670,000 (Genesis 19 is the history of Sodom and Gomorrah).
Elections (COMELEC) dated November 11, 2009 2 (the First Assailed Resolution) and December 16, 2009 3 (the
Second Assailed Resolution) in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) (collectively, the Assailed Resolutions). The case has its roots
in the COMELEC’s refusal to accredit Ang Ladlad as a party-list organization under Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, Laws are deemed incorporated in every contract, permit, license, relationship, or accreditation. Hence, pertinent
otherwise known as the Party-List System Act.4 provisions of the Civil Code and the Revised Penal Code are deemed part of the requirement to be complied with for
accreditation.
Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals,
or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs). Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first applied for registration with the ANG LADLAD collides with Article 695 of the Civil Code which defines nuisance as ‘Any act, omission,
COMELEC in 2006. The application for accreditation was denied on the ground that the organization had no establishment, business, condition of property, or anything else which x x x (3) shocks, defies; or disregards decency
substantial membership base. On August 17, 2009, Ang Ladlad again filed a Petition5 for registration with the or morality x x x
COMELEC.
It also collides with Article 1306 of the Civil Code: ‘The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and
terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of
public order or public policy. Art 1409 of the Civil Code provides that ‘Contracts whose cause, object or purpose is Representatives.
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy’ are inexistent and void from the beginning.
If entry into the party-list system would depend only on the ability of an organization to represent its constituencies,
Finally to safeguard the morality of the Filipino community, the Revised Penal Code, as amended, penalizes then all representative organizations would have found themselves into the party-list race. But that is not the
‘Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions and indecent shows’ as follows: intention of the framers of the law. The party-list system is not a tool to advocate tolerance and acceptance of
misunderstood persons or groups of persons. Rather, the party-list system is a tool for the realization of aspirations
of marginalized individuals whose interests are also the nation’s  – only that their interests have not been brought to
Art. 201. Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions, and indecent shows. — The penalty of prision
the attention of the nation because of their under representation. Until the time comes when Ladlad is able to justify
mayor or a fine ranging from six thousand to twelve thousand pesos, or both such imprisonment and fine, shall be
that having mixed sexual orientations and transgender identities is beneficial to the nation, its application for
imposed upon:
accreditation under the party-list system will remain just that.

1. Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim doctrines openly contrary to public morals;
II. No substantial differentiation

2. (a) The authors of obscene literature, published with their knowledge in any form; the editors publishing
In the United States, whose equal protection doctrine pervades Philippine jurisprudence, courts do not recognize
such literature; and the owners/operators of the establishment selling the same;
lesbians, gays, homosexuals, and bisexuals (LGBT) as a "special class" of individuals. x x x Significantly, it has also
been held that homosexuality is not a constitutionally protected fundamental right, and that "nothing in the U.S.
(b) Those who, in theaters, fairs, cinematographs or any other place, exhibit indecent or immoral Constitution discloses a comparable intent to protect or promote the social or legal equality of homosexual relations,"
plays, scenes, acts or shows, it being understood that the obscene literature or indecent or as in the case of race or religion or belief.
immoral plays, scenes, acts or shows, whether live or in film, which are prescribed by virtue
hereof, shall include those which: (1) glorify criminals or condone crimes; (2) serve no other
xxxx
purpose but to satisfy the market for violence, lust or pornography; (3) offend any race or
religion; (4) tend to abet traffic in and use of prohibited drugs; and (5) are contrary to law, public
order, morals, good customs, established policies, lawful orders, decrees and edicts. Thus, even if society’s understanding, tolerance, and acceptance of LGBT’s is elevated, there can be no denying
that Ladlad constituencies are still males and females, and they will remain either male or female protected by the
same Bill of Rights that applies to all citizens alike.
3. Those who shall sell, give away or exhibit films, prints, engravings, sculpture or literature which are
offensive to morals.
xxxx
Petitioner should likewise be denied accreditation not only for advocating immoral doctrines but likewise for not being
truthful when it said that it "or any of its nominees/party-list representatives have not violated or failed to comply with IV. Public Morals
laws, rules, or regulations relating to the elections."
x x x There is no question about not imposing on Ladlad Christian or Muslim religious practices. Neither is there any
Furthermore, should this Commission grant the petition, we will be exposing our youth to an environment that does attempt to any particular religious group’s moral rules on Ladlad. Rather, what are being adopted as moral
not conform to the teachings of our faith. Lehman Strauss, a famous bible teacher and writer in the U.S.A. said in parameters and precepts are generally accepted public morals. They are possibly religious-based, but as a society,
one article that "older practicing homosexuals are a threat to the youth." As an agency of the government, ours too is the Philippines cannot ignore its more than 500 years of Muslim and Christian upbringing, such that some moral
the State’s avowed duty under Section 13, Article II of the Constitution to protect our youth from moral and spiritual precepts espoused by said religions have sipped [sic] into society and these are not publicly accepted moral norms.
degradation.8
V. Legal Provisions
When Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration,9 three commissioners voted to overturn the First Assailed Resolution
(Commissioners Gregorio Y. Larrazabal, Rene V. Sarmiento, and Armando Velasco), while three commissioners
But above morality and social norms, they have become part of the law of the land. Article 201 of the Revised Penal
voted to deny Ang Ladlad’s Motion for Reconsideration (Commissioners Nicodemo T. Ferrer, Lucenito N. Tagle, and
Code imposes the penalty of prision mayor upon "Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim doctrines openly
Elias R. Yusoph). The COMELEC Chairman, breaking the tie and speaking for the majority in his Separate Opinion,
contrary to public morals." It penalizes "immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibition and indecent shows."
upheld the First Assailed Resolution, stating that:
"Ang Ladlad" apparently falls under these legal provisions. This is clear from its Petition’s paragraph 6F:
"Consensual partnerships or relationships by gays and lesbians who are already of age’ It is further indicated in par.
I. The Spirit of Republic Act No. 7941 24 of the Petition which waves for the record: ‘In 2007, Men Having Sex with Men or MSMs in the Philippines were
estimated as 670,000. Moreoever, Article 694 of the Civil Code defines "nuisance" as any act, omission x x x or
anything else x x x which shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality x x x." These are all unlawful. 10
Ladlad is applying for accreditation as a sectoral party in the party-list system. Even assuming that it has properly
proven its under-representation and marginalization, it cannot be said that Ladlad’s expressed sexual orientations
per se would benefit the nation as a whole. On January 4, 2010, Ang Ladlad filed this Petition, praying that the Court annul the Assailed Resolutions and direct
the COMELEC to grant Ang Ladlad’s application for accreditation. Ang Ladlad also sought the issuance ex parte of a
preliminary mandatory injunction against the COMELEC, which had previously announced that it would begin
Section 2 of the party-list law unequivocally states that the purpose of the party-list system of electing congressional
printing the final ballots for the May 2010 elections by January 25, 2010.
representatives is to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and under-represented sectors, organizations
On January 6, 2010, we ordered the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file its Comment on behalf of indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
COMELEC not later than 12:00 noon of January 11, 2010. 11 Instead of filing a Comment, however, the OSG filed a professionals) may be registered under the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW
Motion for Extension, requesting that it be given until January 16, 2010 to Comment. 12 Somewhat surprisingly, the Labor Party v. Commission on Elections,20 "the enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not
OSG later filed a Comment in support of petitioner’s application. 13 Thus, in order to give COMELEC the opportunity exclusive". The crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular
to fully ventilate its position, we required it to file its own comment. 14 The COMELEC, through its Law Department, organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.
filed its Comment on February 2, 2010. 15
Respondent also argues that Ang Ladlad made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged that it had
In the meantime, due to the urgency of the petition, we issued a temporary restraining order on January 12, 2010, nationwide existence through its members and affiliate organizations. The COMELEC claims that upon verification
effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court, directing the COMELEC to cease and desist by its field personnel, it was shown that "save for a few isolated places in the country, petitioner does not exist in
from implementing the Assailed Resolutions.16 almost all provinces in the country."21

Also, on January 13, 2010, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) filed a Motion to Intervene or to Appear as This argument that "petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national existence" is a
Amicus Curiae, attaching thereto its Comment-in-Intervention.17 The CHR opined that the denial of Ang new one; previously, the COMELEC claimed that petitioner was "not being truthful when it said that it or any of its
Ladlad’spetition on moral grounds violated the standards and principles of the Constitution, the Universal Declaration nominees/party-list representatives have not violated or failed to comply with laws, rules, or regulations relating to
of Human Rights (UDHR), and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). On January 19, the elections." Nowhere was this ground for denial of petitioner’s accreditation mentioned or even alluded to in the
2010, we granted the CHR’s motion to intervene. Assailed Resolutions. This, in itself, is quite curious, considering that the reports of petitioner’s alleged non-existence
were already available to the COMELEC prior to the issuance of the First Assailed Resolution. At best, this is
irregular procedure; at worst, a belated afterthought, a change in respondent’s theory, and a serious violation of
On January 26, 2010, Epifanio D. Salonga, Jr. filed his Motion to Intervene 18 which motion was granted on February
petitioner’s right to procedural due process.
2, 2010.19

Nonetheless, we find that there has been no misrepresentation. A cursory perusal of Ang Ladlad’s initial petition
The Parties’ Arguments
shows that it never claimed to exist in each province of the Philippines. Rather, petitioner alleged that the LGBT
community in the Philippines was estimated to constitute at least 670,000 persons; that it had 16,100 affiliates and
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by using religious dogma, members around the country, and 4,044 members in its electronic discussion group. 22 Ang Ladlad also represented
violated the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed itself to be "a national LGBT umbrella organization with affiliates around the Philippines composed of the following
Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection of LGBT networks:"
laws, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines’ international obligations against discrimination based on
sexual orientation.
§ Abra Gay Association
§ Aklan Butterfly Brigade (ABB) – Aklan
The OSG concurred with Ang Ladlad’s petition and argued that the COMELEC erred in denying petitioner’s § Albay Gay Association
application for registration since there was no basis for COMELEC’s allegations of immorality. It also opined that § Arts Center of Cabanatuan City – Nueva Ecija
LGBTs have their own special interests and concerns which should have been recognized by the COMELEC as a § Boys Legion – Metro Manila
separate classification. However, insofar as the purported violations of petitioner’s freedom of speech, expression, § Cagayan de Oro People Like Us (CDO PLUS)
and assembly were concerned, the OSG maintained that there had been no restrictions on these rights. § Can’t Live in the Closet, Inc. (CLIC) – Metro Manila
§ Cebu Pride – Cebu City
§ Circle of Friends
In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine national political § Dipolog Gay Association – Zamboanga del Norte
agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first § Gay, Bisexual, & Transgender Youth Association (GABAY)
time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner § Gay and Lesbian Activists Network for Gender Equality (GALANG) – Metro Manila
made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national existence contrary to actual verification reports § Gay Men’s Support Group (GMSG) – Metro Manila
by COMELEC’s field personnel. § Gay United for Peace and Solidarity (GUPS) – Lanao del Norte
§ Iloilo City Gay Association – Iloilo City
Our Ruling § Kabulig Writer’s Group – Camarines Sur
§ Lesbian Advocates Philippines, Inc. (LEAP)
§ LUMINA – Baguio City
We grant the petition. § Marikina Gay Association – Metro Manila
§ Metropolitan Community Church (MCC) – Metro Manila
Compliance with the Requirements of the Constitution and Republic Act No. 7941 § Naga City Gay Association – Naga City
§ ONE BACARDI
§ Order of St. Aelred (OSAe) – Metro Manila
The COMELEC denied Ang Ladlad’s application for registration on the ground that the LGBT sector is neither § PUP LAKAN
enumerated in the Constitution and RA 7941, nor is it associated with or related to any of the sectors in the § RADAR PRIDEWEAR
enumeration. § Rainbow Rights Project (R-Rights), Inc. – Metro Manila
§ San Jose del Monte Gay Association – Bulacan
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the proposition that only those § Sining Kayumanggi Royal Family – Rizal
sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, § Society of Transexual Women of the Philippines (STRAP) – Metro Manila
 § Soul Jive – Antipolo, Rizal contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion,
§ The Link – Davao City provided it does not offend compelling state interests. 27
§ Tayabas Gay Association – Quezon
§ Women’s Bisexual Network – Metro Manila
Public Morals as a Ground to Deny Ang Ladlad’s Petition for Registration
§ Zamboanga Gay Association – Zamboanga City23

Respondent suggests that although the moral condemnation of homosexuality and homosexual conduct may be
Since the COMELEC only searched for the names ANG LADLAD LGBT or LADLAD LGBT, it is no surprise that they
religion-based, it has long been transplanted into generally accepted public morals. The COMELEC argues:
found that petitioner had no presence in any of these regions. In fact, if COMELEC’s findings are to be believed,
petitioner does not even exist in Quezon City, which is registered as Ang Ladlad’s principal place of business.
Petitioner’s accreditation was denied not necessarily because their group consists of LGBTs but because of the
danger it poses to the people especially the youth. Once it is recognized by the government, a sector which believes
Against this backdrop, we find that Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the legal
that there is nothing wrong in having sexual relations with individuals of the same gender is a bad example. It will
requirements for accreditation. Indeed, aside from COMELEC’s moral objection and the belated allegation of non-
bring down the standard of morals we cherish in our civilized society. Any society without a set of moral precepts is
existence, nowhere in the records has the respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to register as
in danger of losing its own existence. 28
a party-list organization under any of the requisites under RA 7941 or the guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani. The
difference, COMELEC claims, lies in Ang Ladlad’s morality, or lack thereof.
We are not blind to the fact that, through the years, homosexual conduct, and perhaps homosexuals themselves,
have borne the brunt of societal disapproval. It is not difficult to imagine the reasons behind this censure – religious
Religion as the Basis for Refusal to Accept Ang Ladlad’s Petition for Registration
beliefs, convictions about the preservation of marriage, family, and procreation, even dislike or distrust of
homosexuals themselves and their perceived lifestyle. Nonetheless, we recall that the Philippines has not seen fit to
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that "[n]o law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, criminalize homosexual conduct. Evidently, therefore, these "generally accepted public morals" have not been
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is "government convincingly transplanted into the realm of law.29
neutrality in religious matters."24 Clearly, "governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this
policy of neutrality."25 We thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to
The Assailed Resolutions have not identified any specific overt immoral act performed by Ang Ladlad. Even the OSG
utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.
agrees that "there should have been a finding by the COMELEC that the group’s members have committed or are
committing immoral acts."30 The OSG argues:
Rather than relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the Assailed Resolutions should depend, instead, on whether
the COMELEC is able to advance some justification for its rulings beyond mere conformity to religious doctrine.
x x x A person may be sexually attracted to a person of the same gender, of a different gender, or more than one
Otherwise stated, government must act for secular purposes and in ways that have primarily secular effects. As we
gender, but mere attraction does not translate to immoral acts. There is a great divide between thought and action.
held in Estrada v. Escritor:26
Reduction ad absurdum. If immoral thoughts could be penalized, COMELEC would have its hands full of
disqualification cases against both the "straights" and the gays." Certainly this is not the intendment of the law. 31
x x x The morality referred to in the law is public and necessarily secular, not religious as the dissent of Mr. Justice
Carpio holds. "Religious teachings as expressed in public debate may influence the civil public order but public moral
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why special protection is required
disputes may be resolved only on grounds articulable in secular terms." Otherwise, if government relies upon
for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended to justify its position that petitioner’s admission into the
religious beliefs in formulating public policies and morals, the resulting policies and morals would require conformity
party-list system would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of society. We, of course, do not
to what some might regard as religious programs or agenda. The non-believers would therefore be compelled to
suggest that the state is wholly without authority to regulate matters concerning morality, sexuality, and sexual
conform to a standard of conduct buttressed by a religious belief, i.e., to a "compelled religion," anathema to religious
relations, and we recognize that the government will and should continue to restrict behavior considered detrimental
freedom. Likewise, if government based its actions upon religious beliefs, it would tacitly approve or endorse that
to society. Nonetheless, we cannot countenance advocates who, undoubtedly with the loftiest of intentions, situate
belief and thereby also tacitly disapprove contrary religious or non-religious views that would not support the policy.
morality on one end of an argument or another, without bothering to go through the rigors of legal reasoning and
As a result, government will not provide full religious freedom for all its citizens, or even make it appear that those
explanation. In this, the notion of morality is robbed of all value. Clearly then, the bare invocation of morality will not
whose beliefs are disapproved are second-class citizens.1avvphi1
remove an issue from our scrutiny.

In other words, government action, including its proscription of immorality as expressed in criminal law like
We also find the COMELEC’s reference to purported violations of our penal and civil laws flimsy, at best;
concubinage, must have a secular purpose. That is, the government proscribes this conduct because it is
disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as "any act, omission, establishment,
"detrimental (or dangerous) to those conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human society"
condition of property, or anything else which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or morality," the remedies for
and not because the conduct is proscribed by the beliefs of one religion or the other. Although admittedly, moral
which are a prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without
judgments based on religion might have a compelling influence on those engaged in public deliberations over what
judicial proceedings.32 A violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond
actions would be considered a moral disapprobation punishable by law. After all, they might also be adherents of a
reasonable doubt to support a criminal conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation
religion and thus have religious opinions and moral codes with a compelling influence on them; the human mind
of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution of civil or criminal
endeavors to regulate the temporal and spiritual institutions of society in a uniform manner, harmonizing earth with
proceedings and a judicial determination of liability or culpability.
heaven. Succinctly put, a law could be religious or Kantian or Aquinian or utilitarian in its deepest roots, but it must
have an articulable and discernible secular purpose and justification to pass scrutiny of the religion clauses. x x x
Recognizing the religious nature of the Filipinos and the elevating influence of religion in society, however, the As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion of
Philippine constitution's religion clauses prescribe not a strict but a benevolent neutrality. Benevolent neutrality homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlad’s registration on purely moral
recognizes that government must pursue its secular goals and interests but at the same time strive to uphold grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any
religious liberty to the greatest extent possible within flexible constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality substantial public interest. Respondent’s blanket justifications give rise to the inevitable conclusion that the
COMELEC targets homosexuals themselves as a class, not because of any particular morally reprehensible act. It is proposed for public deliberation. Through a constitutionally designed process, the people deliberate and decide.
this selective targeting that implicates our equal protection clause. Majority rule is a necessary principle in this democratic governance. Thus, when public deliberation on moral
judgments is finally crystallized into law, the laws will largely reflect the beliefs and preferences of the majority, i.e.,
the mainstream or median groups. Nevertheless, in the very act of adopting and accepting a constitution and the
Equal Protection
limits it specifies – including protection of religious freedom "not only for a minority, however small – not only for a
majority, however large – but for each of us" – the majority imposes upon itself a self-denying ordinance. It promises
Despite the absolutism of Article III, Section 1 of our Constitution, which provides "nor shall any person be denied not to do what it otherwise could do: to ride roughshod over the dissenting minorities.
equal protection of the laws," courts have never interpreted the provision as an absolute prohibition on classification.
"Equality," said Aristotle, "consists in the same treatment of similar persons." 33 The equal protection clause
Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society, and this freedom applies
guarantees that no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by
not only to those that are favorably received but also to those that offend, shock, or disturb. Any restriction imposed
other persons or other classes in the same place and in like circumstances.34
in this sphere must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. Absent any compelling state interest, it is not for
the COMELEC or this Court to impose its views on the populace. Otherwise stated, the COMELEC is certainly not
Recent jurisprudence has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we free to interfere with speech for no better reason than promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored
will uphold the classification as long as it bears a rational relationship to some legitimate government end. 35 In one.
Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 36 we declared that "[i]n our jurisdiction, the
standard of analysis of equal protection challenges x x x have followed the ‘rational basis’ test, coupled with a
This position gains even more force if one considers that homosexual conduct is not illegal in this country. It follows
deferential attitude to legislative classifications and a reluctance to invalidate a law unless there is a showing of a
that both expressions concerning one’s homosexuality and the activity of forming a political association that supports
clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution." 37
LGBT individuals are protected as well.

The COMELEC posits that the majority of the Philippine population considers homosexual conduct as immoral and
Other jurisdictions have gone so far as to categorically rule that even overwhelming public perception that
unacceptable, and this constitutes sufficient reason to disqualify the petitioner. Unfortunately for the respondent, the
homosexual conduct violates public morality does not justify criminalizing same-sex conduct. 41 European and United
Philippine electorate has expressed no such belief. No law exists to criminalize homosexual behavior or expressions
Nations judicial decisions have ruled in favor of gay rights claimants on both privacy and equality grounds, citing
or parties about homosexual behavior. Indeed, even if we were to assume that public opinion is as the COMELEC
general privacy and equal protection provisions in foreign and international texts. 42 To the extent that there is much to
describes it, the asserted state interest here – that is, moral disapproval of an unpopular minority – is not a legitimate
learn from other jurisdictions that have reflected on the issues we face here, such jurisprudence is certainly
state interest that is sufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the equal protection clause. The COMELEC’s
illuminating. These foreign authorities, while not formally binding on Philippine courts, may nevertheless have
differentiation, and its unsubstantiated claim that Ang Ladlad cannot contribute to the formulation of legislation that
persuasive influence on the Court’s analysis.
would benefit the nation, furthers no legitimate state interest other than disapproval of or dislike for a disfavored
group.
In the area of freedom of expression, for instance, United States courts have ruled that existing free speech
doctrines protect gay and lesbian rights to expressive conduct. In order to justify the prohibition of a particular
From the standpoint of the political process, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender have the same interest in
expression of opinion, public institutions must show that their actions were caused by "something more than a mere
participating in the party-list system on the same basis as other political parties similarly situated. State intrusion in
desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint." 43
this case is equally burdensome. Hence, laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and
they deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented
sectors. With respect to freedom of association for the advancement of ideas and beliefs, in Europe, with its vibrant human
rights tradition, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has repeatedly stated that a political party may
campaign for a change in the law or the constitutional structures of a state if it uses legal and democratic means and
It bears stressing that our finding that COMELEC’s act of differentiating LGBTs from heterosexuals insofar as the
the changes it proposes are consistent with democratic principles. The ECHR has emphasized that political ideas
party-list system is concerned does not imply that any other law distinguishing between heterosexuals and
that challenge the existing order and whose realization is advocated by peaceful means must be afforded a proper
homosexuals under different circumstances would similarly fail. We disagree with the OSG’s position that
opportunity of expression through the exercise of the right of association, even if such ideas may seem shocking or
homosexuals are a class in themselves for the purposes of the equal protection clause. 38 We are not prepared to
unacceptable to the authorities or the majority of the population. 44 A political group should not be hindered solely
single out homosexuals as a separate class meriting special or differentiated treatment. We have not received
because it seeks to publicly debate controversial political issues in order to find solutions capable of satisfying
sufficient evidence to this effect, and it is simply unnecessary to make such a ruling today. Petitioner itself has
everyone concerned.45 Only if a political party incites violence or puts forward policies that are incompatible with
merely demanded that it be recognized under the same basis as all other groups similarly situated, and that the
democracy does it fall outside the protection of the freedom of association guarantee. 46
COMELEC made "an unwarranted and impermissible classification not justified by the circumstances of the case."

We do not doubt that a number of our citizens may believe that homosexual conduct is distasteful, offensive, or even
Freedom of Expression and Association
defiant. They are entitled to hold and express that view. On the other hand, LGBTs and their supporters, in all
likelihood, believe with equal fervor that relationships between individuals of the same sex are morally equivalent to
Under our system of laws, every group has the right to promote its agenda and attempt to persuade society of the heterosexual relationships. They, too, are entitled to hold and express that view. However, as far as this Court is
validity of its position through normal democratic means. 39 It is in the public square that deeply held convictions and concerned, our democracy precludes using the religious or moral views of one part of the community to exclude from
differing opinions should be distilled and deliberated upon. As we held in Estrada v. Escritor: 40 consideration the values of other members of the community.

In a democracy, this common agreement on political and moral ideas is distilled in the public square. Where citizens Of course, none of this suggests the impending arrival of a golden age for gay rights litigants. It well may be that this
are free, every opinion, every prejudice, every aspiration, and every moral discernment has access to the public Decision will only serve to highlight the discrepancy between the rigid constitutional analysis of this Court and the
square where people deliberate the order of their life together. Citizens are the bearers of opinion, including opinion more complex moral sentiments of Filipinos. We do not suggest that public opinion, even at its most liberal, reflect a
shaped by, or espousing religious belief, and these citizens have equal access to the public square. In this clear-cut strong consensus favorable to gay rights claims and we neither attempt nor expect to affect individual
representative democracy, the state is prohibited from determining which convictions and moral judgments may be perceptions of homosexuality through this Decision.
The OSG argues that since there has been neither prior restraint nor subsequent punishment imposed on Ang enumerated as a status or ratio for discrimination in Article 26 of the ICCPR, the ICCPR Human Rights Committee
Ladlad, and its members have not been deprived of their right to voluntarily associate, then there has been no has opined that the reference to "sex" in Article 26 should be construed to include "sexual orientation." 48Additionally,
restriction on their freedom of expression or association. The OSG argues that: a variety of United Nations bodies have declared discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation to be prohibited
under various international agreements.49
There was no utterance restricted, no publication censored, or any assembly denied. [COMELEC] simply exercised
its authority to review and verify the qualifications of petitioner as a sectoral party applying to participate in the party- The UDHR provides:
list system. This lawful exercise of duty cannot be said to be a transgression of Section 4, Article III of the
Constitution.
Article 21.

xxxx
(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen
representatives.
A denial of the petition for registration x x x does not deprive the members of the petitioner to freely take part in the
conduct of elections. Their right to vote will not be hampered by said denial. In fact, the right to vote is a
Likewise, the ICCPR states:
constitutionally-guaranteed right which cannot be limited.

Article 25
As to its right to be elected in a genuine periodic election, petitioner contends that the denial of Ang Ladlad’s petition
has the clear and immediate effect of limiting, if not outrightly nullifying the capacity of its members to fully and
equally participate in public life through engagement in the party list elections. Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions mentioned in article 2 and
without unreasonable restrictions:
This argument is puerile. The holding of a public office is not a right but a privilege subject to limitations imposed by
law. x x x47 (a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives;

The OSG fails to recall that petitioner has, in fact, established its qualifications to participate in the party-list system, (b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage
and – as advanced by the OSG itself – the moral objection offered by the COMELEC was not a limitation imposed by and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors;
law. To the extent, therefore, that the petitioner has been precluded, because of COMELEC’s action, from publicly
expressing its views as a political party and participating on an equal basis in the political process with other equally-
(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country.
qualified party-list candidates, we find that there has, indeed, been a transgression of petitioner’s fundamental rights.

As stated by the CHR in its Comment-in-Intervention, the scope of the right to electoral participation is elaborated by
Non-Discrimination and International Law
the Human Rights Committee in its General Comment No. 25 (Participation in Public Affairs and the Right to Vote)
as follows:
In an age that has seen international law evolve geometrically in scope and promise, international human rights law,
in particular, has grown dynamically in its attempt to bring about a more just and humane world order. For individuals
1. Article 25 of the Covenant recognizes and protects the right of every citizen to take part in the conduct of public
and groups struggling with inadequate structural and governmental support, international human rights norms are
affairs, the right to vote and to be elected and the right to have access to public service. Whatever form of
particularly significant, and should be effectively enforced in domestic legal systems so that such norms may become
constitution or government is in force, the Covenant requires States to adopt such legislative and other measures as
actual, rather than ideal, standards of conduct.
may be necessary to ensure that citizens have an effective opportunity to enjoy the rights it protects. Article 25 lies at
the core of democratic government based on the consent of the people and in conformity with the principles of the
Our Decision today is fully in accord with our international obligations to protect and promote human rights. In Covenant.
particular, we explicitly recognize the principle of non-discrimination as it relates to the right to electoral participation,
enunciated in the UDHR and the ICCPR.
xxxx

The principle of non-discrimination is laid out in Article 26 of the ICCPR, as follows:

15. The effective implementation of the right and the opportunity to stand for elective office ensures that persons
entitled to vote have a free choice of candidates. Any restrictions on the right to stand for election, such as minimum
Article 26 age, must be justifiable on objective and reasonable criteria. Persons who are otherwise eligible to stand for election
should not be excluded by unreasonable or discriminatory requirements such as education, residence or descent, or
by reason of political affiliation. No person should suffer discrimination or disadvantage of any kind because of that
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In
person's candidacy. States parties should indicate and explain the legislative provisions which exclude any group or
this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection
category of persons from elective office. 50
against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national
or social origin, property, birth or other status.
We stress, however, that although this Court stands willing to assume the responsibility of giving effect to the
Philippines’ international law obligations, the blanket invocation of international law is not the panacea for all social
In this context, the principle of non-discrimination requires that laws of general application relating to elections be
ills. We refer now to the petitioner’s invocation of the Yogyakarta Principles (the Application of International Human
applied equally to all persons, regardless of sexual orientation. Although sexual orientation is not specifically
Rights Law In Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity),51 which petitioner declares to reflect binding
principles of international law.

At this time, we are not prepared to declare that these Yogyakarta Principles contain norms that are obligatory on the
Philippines. There are declarations and obligations outlined in said Principles which are not reflective of the current
state of international law, and do not find basis in any of the sources of international law enumerated under Article
38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.52 Petitioner has not undertaken any objective and rigorous
analysis of these alleged principles of international law to ascertain their true status.

We also hasten to add that not everything that society – or a certain segment of society – wants or demands is
automatically a human right. This is not an arbitrary human intervention that may be added to or subtracted from at
will. It is unfortunate that much of what passes for human rights today is a much broader context of needs that
identifies many social desires as rights in order to further claims that international law obliges states to sanction
these innovations. This has the effect of diluting real human rights, and is a result of the notion that if "wants" are
couched in "rights" language, then they are no longer controversial.1avvphi1

Using even the most liberal of lenses, these Yogyakarta Principles, consisting of a declaration formulated by various
international law professors, are – at best – de lege ferenda – and do not constitute binding obligations on the
Philippines. Indeed, so much of contemporary international law is characterized by the "soft law" nomenclature, i.e.,
international law is full of principles that promote international cooperation, harmony, and respect for human rights,
most of which amount to no more than well-meaning desires, without the support of either State practice or opinio
juris.53

As a final note, we cannot help but observe that the social issues presented by this case are emotionally charged,
societal attitudes are in flux, even the psychiatric and religious communities are divided in opinion. This Court’s role
is not to impose its own view of acceptable behavior. Rather, it is to apply the Constitution and laws as best as it can,
uninfluenced by public opinion, and confident in the knowledge that our democracy is resilient enough to withstand
vigorous debate.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Commission on Elections dated November
11, 2009 and December 16, 2009 in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) are hereby SET ASIDE. The Commission on Elections is
directed to GRANT petitioner’s application for party-list accreditation.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice