24. MILO VS.

SALANGA alleged in the information or which do not appear on the face of the
information because said motion is a hypothetical admission of the facts
VOL. 152, JULY 20, 1987 113 alleged in the information; Exception.—Next, private respondent Tuvera,
Milo vs. Salanga Sr. contends that the motion to quash was validly granted as the facts and
No. L-37007. July 20, 1987.* evidence on record show that there was no crime of Arbitrary Detention;
RAMON S. MILO, in his capacity as Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan, that he only sought the aid and assistance of the Manaoag Police Force;
and ARMANDO VALDEZ, petitioners, vs. ANGELITO C. SALANGA, in his and that he only accompanied petitioner Valdez to town for the latter's
capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan (Branch IV), personal safety. Suffice it to say that the above allegations can only be
and JUAN TUVERA, SR., respondents. raised as a defense at the trial as they traverse what is alleged in the
Criminal Law; Evidence; Arbitrary Detention; Concept of and Information. We have repeatedly held that Courts, in resolving a motion to
elements of the crime of arbitrary detention.—Arbitrary Detention is quash, cannot consider facts contrary to those alleged in the information or
committed by a public officer who, without legal grounds, detains a person. which do not appear on the face of the information. This is because a
The elements of this crime are the following: 1. That the offender is a motion to quash is a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the
public officer or employee. 2. That he detains a person. 3. That the information. Matters of defense cannot be proved during the hearing of
detention is without legal grounds. such a motion, except where the Rules expressly permit, such as extinction
Same; Same; Same; Public officers liable for arbitrary detention must of criminal liability, prescription, and former
be vested with authority to detain or order the detention of persons 115
accused of a crime.—The public officers liable for Arbitrary Detention must VOL. 152, JULY 20, 1987 115
be vested with authority to detain or order the detention of persons Milo vs. Salanga
accused of a crime. Such public officers are the policemen and other jeopardy. In the case of U.S. vs. Perez, this Court held that a motion
agents of the law, the judges or mayors. to quash on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense
Same; Same; Same; Barangay captains recognized as persons in cannot allege new facts not only different but diametrically opposed to
_________________ those alleged in the complaint. This rule admits of only one exception and
that is when such facts are admitted by the prosecution.
*
 FIRST DIVISION. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; An order granting a motion to
114 quash is a final order, not merely interlocutory, and is immediately
114 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED appealable; Double jeopardy cannot be claimed by the accused as the
Milo vs. Salanga dismissal of the case was secured not only with his consent but at his
authority.—Long before Presidential Decree 299 was signed into law, instance.—Respondent's contention holds no water. An order granting a
barrio lieutenants, (who were later named barrio captains and now motion to quash, unlike one of denial, is a final order. It is not merely
barangay captains) were recognized as persons in authority. In various interlocutory and is therefore immediately appealable. The accused cannot
cases, this Court deemed them as persons in authority, and convicted claim double jeopardy as the dismissal was secured not only with his
them of Arbitrary Detention. consent but at his instance.
Same; Same; Same; Same; One need not be a police officer to be PETITION for certiorari to review the order of the Court of First Instance of
chargeable with arbitrary detention; A barrio captain having the same duty Pangasinan, Br. IV.
as the mayor of maintaining peace and order, he can be liable for arbitrary
detention; Case at bar.—One need not be a police officer to be chargeable The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
with Arbitrary Detention. It is accepted that other public officers like judges GANCAYCO, J.:
and mayors, who act with abuse of their functions, may be guilty of this
crime. A perusal of the powers and function vested in mayors would show This is a petition for review on certiorari of an order of the Court of First
that they are similar to those of a barrio captain except that in the case of Instance of Pangasinan, Third Judicial District, in Criminal Case No. D-529
the latter, his territorial jurisdiction is smaller. Having the same duty of entitled 'The People of the Philippines versus Juan Tuvera, Sr., et al.,"
maintaining peace and order, both must be and are given the authority to granting the motion to quash the information filed by accused Juan Tuvera,
detain or order detention. Noteworthy is the fact that even private Sr., herein respondent. The issue is whether a barrio captain can be
respondent Tuvera himself admitted that with the aid of his rural police, he charged of arbitrary detention.
as a barrio captain, could have led the arrest of petitioner Valdez. From the The facts are as follows:
foregoing. there is no doubt that a barrio captain, like private respondent On October 12, 1972, an information for Arbitrary Detention was filed
Tuvera, Sr., can be held liable for Arbitrary Detention. against Juan Tuvera, Sr., Tomas Mendoza and Rodolfo Mangsat, in the
Same; Same; Same; Criminal Procedure; Motion to quash; Courts in Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, which reads as follows:
resolving a motion to quash cannot consider facts contrary to those
Page 1 of 4
"The undersigned Assistant Provincial Fiscal accuses Juan Tuvera, Sr., The ground relied upon by private respondent Tuvera for his motion to
Tomas Mendoza and Rodolfo Mangsat alias Rudy, all of Manaoag, quash the information which was sustained by respondent Judge, is that
Pangasinan, of the crime of ARBITRARY DETENTION, committed as follows: the facts charged do not constitute an offense, 3 that is, that the facts
That on or about the 21st day of April, 1973, at around 10:00 alleged in the information do not constitute the elements of Arbitrary
116 Detention.
116 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED The Information charges Tuvera, a barrio captain, to have conspired
Milo vs. Salanga with Cpl. Mendoza and Pat. Mangsat, who are members of the police force
o'clock in the evening, in barrio Baguinay, Manaoag, Pangasinan, of Manaoag, Pangasinan in detaining petitioner Valdez for about eleven
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Juan (11) hours in the municipal jail without legal ground. No doubt the last two
Tuvera, Sr., a barrio captain, with the aid of some other private persons, elements of the crime are present.
namely Juan Tuvera, Jr., Bertillo Bataoil and one Dianong, maltreated one The only question is whether or not Tuvera, Sr., a barrio cap-
Armando Valdez by hitting with butts of their guns and fists blows and _______________
immediately thereafter, without legal grounds, with deliberate intent to
2
deprive said Armando Valdez of his constitutional liberty, accused Barrio  Supra; U.S. vs. Braganza, et al., 10 Phil. 79; Reyes, The Revised Penal
captain Juan Tuvera, Sr., Cpl. Tomas Mendoza and Pat. Rodolfo Mangsat, Code, Book Two, 1981 Ed., p. 39.
3
members of the police force of Mangsat, Pangasinan, conspiring,  Under Rule 117, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court, the following are the
confederating and helping one another, did, then and there, willfully, grounds on which an accused may move to quash a complaint or
unlawfully and feloniously, lodge and lock said Armando Valdez inside the information on any of the following grounds.
municipal jail of Manaoag, Pangasinan for about eleven (11) hours. (Italics 1. (a)That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
supplied.) 2. (b)That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the
CONTRARY TO ARTICLE 124 of the R.P.C. offense charged or the person of the accused;
Dagupan City, October 12, 1972. 3. (c)That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do
so;
(SGD.) VICENTE C. CALDONA  4. (d)That it does not conform substantially in the prescribed form;
Assistant Provincial Fiscal" 5. (e)That more than one offense is charged except in those cases in
All the accused, including respondent Juan Tuvera, Sr., were arraigned and which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various
pleaded not guilty. offenses;
On April 4, 1973, Tuvera filed a motion to quash the information on the 6. (f)That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense and that the 7. (g)That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a
proof s adduced at the investigation are not sufficient to support the filing legal excuse or justification; and
of the information. Petitioner Assistant Provincial Fiscal Ramon S. Milo filed 8. (h)That the accused has been previously convicted or in jeopardy
an opposition thereto. of being convicted, or acquitted of the offense charged.
Finding that respondent Juan Tuvera, Sr. was not a public officer who
can be charged with Arbitrary Detention, respondent Judge Angelito C. Respondent Tuvera set forth another ground in his motion to quash
Salanga granted the motion to quash in an order dated April 25, 1973. which is not included in the above enumeration and will therefore not be
Hence, this petition. discussed in this decision.
Arbitrary Detention is committed by a public officer who, without legal 118
grounds, detains a person.1 The elements of this crime are the following: 118 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
1. 1.That the offender is a public officer or employee. Milo vs. Salanga
2. 2.That he detains a person. tain, is a public officer who can be liable for the crime of Arbitrary
Detention.
_________________ The public officers liable for Arbitrary Detention must be vested with
authority to detain or order the detention of persons accused of a crime.
1
 Art. 124, Revised Penal Code. Such public officers are the policemen and other agents of the law, the
117 judges or mayors.4
VOL. 152, JULY 20, 1987 117 Respondent Judge Salanga did not consider private respondent Tuvera
Milo vs. Salanga as such public officer when the former made this finding in the questioned
order:
1. 3.That the detention is without legal grounds.2 "Apparently, if Armando Valdez was ever jailed and detained more than six
(6) hours, Juan Tuvera, Sr., has nothing to do with the same because he is
Page 2 of 4
not in any way connected with the Police Force of Manaoag, Pangasinan. Under Republic Act No. 3590, otherwise known as The Revised Barrio
Granting that it was Tuvera, Sr., who ordered Valdez arrested, it was not Charter, the powers and duties of a barrio captain include the following: to
he who detained and jailed him because he has no such authority vested in look after the maintenance of public order in the barrio and to assist the
him as a mere Barrio Captain of Barrio Baguinay, Manaoag, Pangasinan." 5 municipal mayor and the municipal councilor in charge of the district in the
In line with the above finding of respondent Judge Salanga, private performance of their duties in such barrio; 17 to look after the general
respondent Tuvera asserts that the motion to quash was properly welfare of the barrio; 18 to enforce all laws and ordinances which are
sustained for the following reasons: (1) That he did not have the authority operative within the barrio;19 and to
to make arrest, nor jail and detain petitioner Valdez as a mere barrio _______________
captain;6 (2) That he is neither a peace officer nor a policeman, 7 (3) That he
was not a public official; 8 (4) That he had nothing to do with the detention 12
 Page 19, Rollo.
of petitioner Valdez;9 (5) That he is not connected directly or indirectly in 13
 10 Phil. 79.
the administration of the Manaoag Police Force;10 (6) That barrio captains 14
 See Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, 1976 Ed., Vol. 2, p. 822.
on April 21, 1972 were not yet considered as persons in authority and that 15
 15 Phil. 120.
it was only upon the promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 299 that 16
 See Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, 1976 Ed. Vol. 2, pp. 822-823.
Barrio Captain and Heads of Barangays were decreed among those who 17
 Sec. 14c, R.A. 3590.
are persons in authority;11 and that the proper charge was 18
 Sec. 14, R.A. 3590.
________________ 19
 Sec. 14a, R.A. 3590.
120
4
 Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Book II, 1981 ed., p. 39. 120 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
5
 Page 23, Rollo. Milo vs. Salanga
6
 Page 46, Rollo. organize and lead an emergency group whenever the same may be
7
 Page 46, Rollo. necessary f or the maintenance of peace and order within the barrio. 20
8
 Page 49, Rollo. In his treatise on Barrio Government Law and Administration, Professor
9
 Page 43, Rollo. Jose M. Aruego has this to say about the above-mentioned powers and
10
 Pages 43-44, Rollo. duties of a Barrio Captain, to wit:
11
 Page 43, Rollo. "Upon the barrio captain depends in the main the maintenance of
119 public order in the barrio. For public disorder therein, inevitably people
VOL. 152, JULY 20, 1987 119 blame him.
Milo vs. Salanga "In the event that there be a disturbing act to said public order or a
Illegal Detention and Not Arbitrary Detention. 12 threat to disturb public order, what can the barrio captain do?
We disagree. Understandably, he first resorts to peaceful measures. He may take
Long before Presidential Decree 299 was signed into law, barrio preventive measures like placing the offenders under surveillance and
lieutenants (who were later named barrio captains and now barangay persuading them, where possible, to behave well, but when necessary, he
captains) were recognized as persons in authority. In various cases, this may subject them to the full force of law.
Court deemed them as persons in authority, and convicted them of "He is a peace officer in the barrio considered under the law as a
Arbitrary Detention. person in authority. As such, he may make arrest and detain persons
In U.S. vs. Braganza,13 Martin Salibio, a barrio lieutenant, and Hilario within legal limits. "21 (Italics supplied.)
Braganza, a municipal councilor, arrested Father Feliciano Gomez while he One need not be a police officer to be chargeable with Arbitrary
was in his church. They made him pass through the door of the vestry and Detention. It is accepted that other public officers like judges and mayors,
afterwards took him to the municipal building. There, they told him that he who act with abuse of their functions, may be guilty of this crime. 22 A
was under arrest. The priest had not committed any crime. The two public perusal of the powers and function vested in mayors would show that they
officials were convicted of Arbitrary Detention. 14 are similar to those of a barrio captain 23 except that in the case of the
In U.S. vs. Gellada,15 Geronimo Gellada, a barrio lieutenant, with the latter, his territorial jurisdiction is smaller. Having the same duty of
help of Filoteo Soliman, bound and tied his houseboy Sixto Gentugas with a maintaining peace and order, both must be and are given the authority to
rope at around 6:00 p.m. and delivered him to the justice of the peace. detain or order detention. Noteworthy is the fact that even private
Sixto was detained during the whole night and until 9:00 a.m. of the next respondent Tuvera himself admitted that with the aid of his rural police, he
day when he was ordered released by the justice of the peace because he as a barrio captain, could have led the arrest of petitioner Valdez. 24
had not committed any crime, Gellada was convicted of Arbitrary _______________
Detention.16
20
 Sec. 14f, R.A. 3590.
Page 3 of 4
 21
 1968 Ed., p. 71. Respondent's contention holds no water. An order granting a motion to
22
 Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Book Two, 1981 ed., p. 40; Aquino, quash, unlike one of denial, is a final order. It is not merely interlocutory
The Revised Penal Code, 1976 ed., Vol. 2, p. 821. and is therefore immediately appealable. The accused cannot claim double
23
 Sections 88 and 171 of the Local Government Code. jeopardy as the dismissal was secured not only with his consent but at his
24
 Page 46, Rollo. instance.33
121 WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for certiorari is
VOL. 152, JULY 20, 1987 121 GRANTED. The questioned Order of April 25, 1973 in Criminal Case No. D-
Milo vs. Salanga 529 is hereby set aside. Let this case be remanded to the appropriate trial
From the foregoing, there is no doubt that a barrio captain, like private court for further proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs.
respondent Tuvera, Sr., can be held liable for Arbitrary Detention. SO ORDERED.
Next, private respondent Tuvera, Sr. contends that the motion to quash      Teehankee (C.J.), Narvasa, Cruz and Paras, JJ.,concur.
was validly granted as the facts and evidence on record show that there Petition granted. Case remanded to trial court for further proceedings.
was no crime of Arbitrary Detention; 25 that he only sought the aid and Notes.—There is no criminal delay in the delivery of the accused to the
assistance of the Manaoag Police Force; 26 and that he only accompanied court, where the two days following his arrest, were holidays. (Medina vs.
petitioner Valdez to town for the latter's personal safety.27 Orosco, 18 SCRA 1169.)
Suf f ice it to say that the above allegations can only be raised as a A public officer or employee who detains a person without legal
defense at the trial as they traverse what is alleged in the Information. We grounds is guilty of arbitrary detention, but the person so detained will not
have repeatedly held that Courts, in resolving a motion to quash, cannot be released if afterwards he is detained under a valid information. (Medina
consider facts contrary to those alleged in the information or which do not vs. Orosco,18 SCRA 1169.)
appear on the face of the information. This is because a motion to quash is ——o0o——
a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the information. 28 Matters
of defense cannot be proved during the hearing of such a motion, except _____________
where the Rules expressly permit, such as extinction of criminal liability,
prescription, and former jeopardy.29 In the case of U.S. vs. Perez,30 this 33
 Section 8, Rule 117, Rules of Court; now Section 7, Rule 117, 1985
Court held that a motion to quash on the ground that the facts charged do Rules on Criminal Procedure; Andres vs. Cacdac Jr., 113 SCRA 216.
not constitute an offense cannot allege new facts not only different but 123
diametrically opposed to those alleged in the complaint. This rule admits of © Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
only one exception and that is when such facts are admitted by the
prosecution.31
Lastly, private respondent claims that by the lower court's granting of
the motion to quash jeopardy has already attached in his favor 32 on the
ground that here, the case was dismissed
_______________

25
 Page 51, Rollo.
26
 Page 46, Rollo.
27
 Ibid.
28
 People vs. Lim Hoa, 103 Phil. 1169; See also Regalado, Remedial Law
Compensation, 1085 ed., Vol. 2, p. 684.
29
 Sections 2 and 3, Rule 117, Rules of Court; supra, 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure; Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1980 ed., Vol.
4, p. 236.
30
 1 Phil. 203.
31
 People vs. Navarro, 75 Phil. 516.
32
 Page 52, Rollo.
122
122 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Milo vs. Salanga
or otherwise terminated without his express consent.

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