THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 190834. November 26, 2014.]
ARIEL T. LIM, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J : p
This is to resolve the petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal
of the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated on June 30, 2009, and
its Resolution 2 dated January 4, 2010. The CA affirmed the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila (RTC), convicting petitioner of one (1) count of
violation of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Bilang 22 in Criminal Case No. 07-249932.
Records reveal that petitioner issued Bank of Commerce Check Nos.
0013813 and 0013814, dated June 30, 1998 and July 15, 1998, respectively,
payable to CASH, in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00)
for each check. He gave the checks to Mr. Willie Castor (Castor) as his campaign
donation to the latter's candidacy in the elections of 1998. It was Castor who
ordered the delivery of printing materials and used petitioner's checks to pay for
the same. Claiming that the printing materials were delivered too late, Castor
instructed petitioner to issue a "Stop Payment" order for the two checks. Thus, the
checks were dishonored by the bank because of said order and during trial, when
the bank officer was presented on the witness stand, he admitted that said checks
were drawn against insufficient funds (DAIF). Private complainant Magna B.
Badiee sent two demand letters to petitioner, dated July 20, 1998 and July 23,
1998 and, subsequently, private complainant filed a complaint against petitioner
before the Office of the Prosecutor. After the lapse of more than one month from
receipt of the demand letters, and after receiving the subpoena from the Office of
the Prosecutor, petitioner issued a replacement check dated September 8, 1998 in
the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00). Private complainant
Magna B. Badiee was able to encash said replacement check.
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Nevertheless, on March 19, 1999, or six (6) months after petitioner had paid
the amount of the bounced checks, two Informations were filed against him before
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (MeTC), to wit:
CRIMINAL CASE No. 327138-CR
INFORMATION
The undersigned accuses ARIEL LIM of violation of B.P. Blg. 22
committed as follows:
That sometime in the month of April, 1998 in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously make or draw and issue to MAGNA B. BADIEE to apply on
account or for value BANK OF COMMERCE CHECK No. 0013814 dated
July 15, 1998, payable to Cash in the amount of P100,000.00 said accused
knowing fully well that at the time of issue he did not have sufficient funds
in or credit with the drawee bank for payment of such check in full upon its
presentment, which check when presented for payment within ninety (90)
days from the date thereof, was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank
for the reason "PAYMENT STOPPED," but the same would have been
dishonored for insufficient funds had not the accused, without any valid
reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, the said accused, despite receipt of
notice of such dishonor failed to pay said Magna B. Badiee the amount of
the said check or to make arrangement for payment in full of the same
within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 3
CRIMINAL CASE No. 327139-CR
INFORMATION
The undersigned accuses ARIEL LIM of violation of B.P. Blg. 22
committed as follows: HIETAc
That sometime in the month of April, 1998 in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously make or draw and issue to MAGNA B. BADIEE to apply on
account or for value BANK OF COMMERCE CHECK No. 0013813 dated
June 30, 1998 payable to Cash in the amount of P100,000.00 said accused
knowing fully well that at the time of issue he did not have sufficient funds
in or credit with the drawee bank for payment of such check in full upon its
presentment, which check when presented for payment within ninety (90)
days from the date thereof, was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank
for the reason "PAYMENT STOPPED," but the same would have been
dishonored for insufficient funds had not the accused, without any valid
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reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, the said accused, despite receipt of
notice of such dishonor failed to pay said Magna B. Badiee the amount of
the said check or to make arrangement for payment in full of the same
within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 4
On September 12, 2006, the MeTC promulgated its Decision finding
petitioner guilty of two (2) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Petitioner appealed
to the Regional Trial Court of Manila (RTC), and on July 20, 2007, the RTC issued
a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, this court therefore modifies the lower court decision
with respect to criminal case no. 327138 (07-249931), because the lower
court of Manila has no jurisdiction to try and decide cases where the
essential ingredients of the crime charged happened in Quezon City. The
decision of the lower court with respect to criminal case no. 327138
(07-249931) is ordered vacated and set aside for lack of jurisdiction.
The lower court findings that accused is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for Violation of BP 22 with respect to criminal case no.
07-24992 is affirmed and is ordered to pay a fine of P100,000.00 plus costs.
No findings as to civil liability because the court agrees with the lower court
that the check was paid, is affirmed and there is no cogent reason to disturb
the same. In case of failure to pay fine, the accused shall undergo subsidiary
imprisonment of not more than six (6) months.
SO ORDERED. 5
A petition for review was then filed with the Court of Appeals, and on June
30, 2009, the CA promulgated its Decision affirming in toto the RTC judgment.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration thereof was denied per Resolution dated
January 4, 2010.
Thus, the present petition wherein petitioner posits that jurisprudence
dictates the dismissal of the criminal case against him on the ground that he has
fully paid the amount of the dishonored checks even before the Informations
against him were filed in court. Petitioner mainly relies on Griffith v. Court of
Appeals. 6 The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) likewise recommends the
acquittal of petitioner, opining that Griffith 7 is applicable to the present case.
The Court finds the petition meritorious.
In Griffith, the Court acquitted the accused therein due to the fact that two
years before the filing of the Information for violation of B.P. No. 22, the accused
had, in effect, paid the complainant an amount greater than the value of the
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bounced checks. The CA held that the factual circumstances in Griffith are
dissimilar from those in the present case. The Court disagrees with such
conclusion.
The CA found Griffith inapplicable to the present case, because the checks
subject of this case are personal checks, while the check involved in Griffith was a
corporate check and, hence, some confusion or miscommunication could easily
occur between the signatories of the check and the corporate treasurer. Although
the factual circumstances in the present case are not exactly the same as those in
Griffith, it should be noted that the same kind of confusion giving rise to
petitioner's mistake very well existed in the present case. Here, the check was
issued by petitioner merely as a campaign contribution to Castor's candidacy. As
found by the trial court, it was Castor who instructed petitioner to issue a "Stop
Payment" order for the two checks because the campaign materials, for which the
checks were used as payment, were not delivered on time. Petitioner relied on
Castor's word and complied with his instructions, as it was Castor who was
supposed to take delivery of said materials. Verily, it is easy to see how petitioner
made the mistake of readily complying with the instruction to stop payment since
he believed Castor's word that there is no longer any valid reason to pay
complainant as delivery was not made as agreed upon. Nevertheless, two months
after receiving the demand letter from private complainant and just several days
after receiving the subpoena from the Office of the Prosecutor, accused issued a
replacement check which was successfully encashed by private complainant.
The CA also took it against petitioner that he paid the amount of the checks
only after receiving the subpoena from the Office of the Prosecutor, which
supposedly shows that petitioner was motivated to pay not because he wanted to
settle his obligation but because he wanted to avoid prosecution. This reasoning is
tenuous, because in Griffith, the accused therein did not even voluntarily pay the
value of the dishonored checks; rather, the complainant was paid from the
proceeds of the invalid foreclosure of the accused's property. In said case, the
Court did not differentiate as to whether payment was made before or after the
complaint had been filed with the Office of the Prosecutor. It only mattered that
the amount stated in the dishonored check had actually been paid before the
Information against the accused was filed in court. In this case, petitioner even
voluntarily paid value of the bounced checks. The Court, therefore, sees no
justification for differentiating this case from that of Griffith. Records show that
both in Griffith and in this case, petitioner had paid the amount of the dishonored
checks before the filing of the Informations in court. Verily, there is no reason why
the same liberality granted to the accused in Griffith should not likewise be
extended to herein petitioner. The precept enunciated in Griffith is herein
reiterated, to wit: ECTIHa
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While we agree with the private respondent that the gravamen of
violation of B.P. 22 is the issuance of worthless checks that are dishonored
upon their presentment for payment, we should not apply penal laws
mechanically. We must find if the application of the law is consistent with
the purpose of and reason for the law. Ratione cessat lex, et cessat lex.
(When the reason for the law ceases, the law ceases.) It is not the letter
alone but the spirit of the law also that gives it life. This is especially so
in this case where a debtor's criminalization would not serve the ends of
justice but in fact subvert it. The creditor having collected already more
than a sufficient amount to cover the value of the checks for payment of
rentals, via auction sale, we find that holding the debtor's president to answer
for a criminal offense under B.P. 22 two years after said collection is no
longer tenable nor justified by law or equitable considerations.
In sum, considering that the money value of the two checks issued
by petitioner has already been effectively paid two years before the
informations against him were filed, we find merit in this petition. We
hold that petitioner herein could not be validly and justly convicted or
sentenced for violation of B.P. 22. . . . 8 (Emphasis supplied)
In the more recent case of Tan v. Philippine Commercial International
Bank, 9 the foregoing principle articulated in Griffith was the precedent cited to
justify the acquittal of the accused in said case. Therein, the Court enumerated the
elements for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 being "(1) The accused makes, draws or
issues a check to apply to account or for value; (2) The accused knows at the time
of the issuance that he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with the
drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) The
check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or
credit, or it would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer,
without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment." 10 To facilitate
proving the second element, the law created a prima facie presumption of
knowledge of insufficiency of funds or credit, which is established when it is
shown that the drawer of the check was notified of its dishonor and, within five
banking days thereafter, failed to fully pay the amount of the check or make
arrangements for its full payment. If the check, however, is made good or the
drawer pays the value of the check within the five-day period, then the
presumption is rebutted. Evidently, one of the essential elements of the violation is
no longer present and the drawer may no longer be indicted for B.P. Blg. 22. Said
payment within the period prescribed by the law is a complete defense.
Generally, only the full payment of the value of the dishonored check
during the five-day grace period would exculpate the accused from criminal
liability under B.P. Blg. 22 but, as the Court further elaborated in Tan:
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In Griffith v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that were the creditor
had collected more than a sufficient amount to cover the value of the checks
representing rental arrearages, holding the debtor's president to answer for a
criminal offense under B.P. Blg. 22 two years after the said collection is no
longer tenable nor justified by law or equitable considerations. In that
case, the Court ruled that albeit made beyond the grace period but two years
prior to the institution of the criminal case, the payment collected from the
proceeds of the foreclosure and auction sale of the petitioner's impounded
properties, with more than a million pesos to spare, justified the acquittal of
the petitioner.
xxx xxx xxx
In the present case, PCIB already extracted its proverbial pound of
flesh by receiving and keeping in possession the four buses — trust
properties surrendered by petitioner in about mid 1991 and March 1992
pursuant to Section 7 of the Trust Receipts Law, the estimated value of
which was "about P6.6 million." It thus appears that the total amount of the
dishonored checks — P1,785,855.75 —, . . . was more than fully satisfied
prior to the transmittal and receipt of the July 9, 1992 letter of demand.
In keeping with jurisprudence, the Court then considers such payment of the
dishonored checks to have obliterated the criminal liability of petitioner.
It is consistent rule that penal statutes are construed strictly against
the State and liberally in favor of the accused. And since penal laws should
not be applied mechanically, the Court must determine whether the
application of the penal law is consistent with the purpose and reason of the
law. . . . 11 (Underscoring supplied)
Thus, although payment of the value of the bounced check, if made beyond
the 5-day period provided for in B.P. Blg. 22, would normally not extinguish
criminal liability, the aforementioned cases show that the Court acknowledges the
existence of extraordinary cases where, even if all the elements of the crime or
offense are present, the conviction of the accused would prove to be abhorrent to
society's sense of justice. Just like in Griffith and in Tan, 12 petitioner should not
be penalized although all the elements of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 are proven to be
present. The fact that the issuer of the check had already paid the value of the
dishonored check after having received the subpoena from the Office of the
Prosecutor should have forestalled the filing of the Information in court. The spirit
of the law which, for B.P. Blg. 22, is the protection of the credibility and stability
of the banking system, would not be served by penalizing people who have
evidently made amends for their mistakes and made restitution for damages even
before charges have been filed against them. In effect, the payment of the checks
before the filing of the informations has already attained the purpose of the law.
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It should be emphasized as well that payment of the value of the bounced
check after the information has been filed in court would no longer have the
effect of exonerating the accused from possible conviction for violation of B.P.
Blg. 22. Since from the commencement of the criminal proceedings in court, there
is no circumstance whatsoever to show that the accused had every intention to
mitigate or totally alleviate the ill effects of his issuance of the unfunded check,
then there is no equitable and compelling reason to preclude his prosecution. In
such a case, the letter of the law should be applied to its full extent. EcAISC
Furthermore, to avoid any confusion, the Court's ruling in this case should
be well differentiated from cases where the accused is charged with estafa under
Article 315, par. 2 (d) of the Revised Penal Code, where the fraud is perpetuated
by postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the
offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not
sufficient to cover the amount of the check. In said case of estafa, damage and
deceit are the essential elements of the offense, and the check is merely the
accused's tool in committing fraud. In such a case, paying the value of the
dishonored check will not free the accused from criminal liability. It will merely
satisfy the civil liability of the crime but not the criminal liability.
In fine, the Court holds that herein petitioner must be exonerated from the
imposition of penalties for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 as he had already paid the
amount of the dishonored checks six (6) months before the filing of Informations
with the court. Such a course of action is more in keeping with justice and equity.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated June 30,
2009, in CA-G.R. CR No. 31725, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Petitioner Ariel T. Lim is ACQUITTED in Criminal Case No. 07-249932.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., Villarama, Jr., Reyes and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Penned by Associate Justice Pampio A. Abarintos, with Associate Justices
Amelita G. Tolentino and Sixto C. Marella, Jr., concurring.
2. Id.
3. CA rollo, p. 40.
4. Id. at 39.
5. Rollo, pp. 40-41.
6. 428 Phil. 878 (2002).
7. Supra.
8. Griffith v. Court of Appeals, supra note 6, at 892.
9. 575 Phil. 485 (2008).
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10. Id. at 494.
11. Id. at 496-497. (Underscoring ours)
12. Supra.
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