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58 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Biagtan vs. The Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd.

No. L-25579. March 29, 1972.

EMILIA T. BIAGTAN, JUAN T. BIAGTAN, JR., MIGUEL

T. BIAGTAN, GIL T. BIAGTAN and GRACIA T.
BIAGTAN, plaintiffs-appellees, vs. THE INSULAR LIFE
ASSURANCE COMPANY,LTD., defendant-appellant.

Insurance Law; Exception under double indemnity insurance

clause.—Under an “Accidental Death Benefit Clause” providing
for an additional sum of P5,000.00 if “the death of the Insured
resulted directly from bodily injury effected solely through
external and violent means sustained in an accident and
independently of all other causes” but expressly excepting
therefrom a case where death resulted from an injury
“intentionally inflicted by a third party”, the insured who died
under the following circumstances is not entitled to the said
additional sum, to wit: That on the night... while the said life
policy and supplementary contract were in full force and effect the

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Biagtan vs. The Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd.

house of the insured . . . was robbed by a band of robbers who-

were charged in and convicted by the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan for robbery with homicide; that in committing the
robbery, the robbers, on reaching the staircase landing of the
second floor, rushed towards the doors of the second floor room,
where they suddenly met a person near the door of one of the
rooms who turned out to be the insured . . . who received thrusts
from their sharp-pointed instruments, causing wounds on the
body . . . resulting in his death...”

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APPEAL from a decision of the Court of First Instance of

Pangasinan. Domingo, J.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

          Tanopo, Millora, Serafica & Sañez for plaintiffs-
appellees.
     Araneta, Mendoza & Papa for defendant-appellant.

MAKALINTAL, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First

Instance of Pangasinan in its Civil Case No. D-1700. The
facts are stipulated. Juan S. Biagtan was insured with
defendant Insular life Assurance Company under Policy
No. 398075 for the sum of P5,000.00 and, under a
supplementary contract denominated “Accidental Death
Benefit Clause, for an additional sum of P5,000.00 if “the
death of the Insured resulted directly from bodily injury
effected solely through external and violent means
sustained in an accident x x x and independently of all
other causes.” The clause, however, expressly provided that
it would not apply where death resulted from an injury
“intentionally inflicted by a third party.”
On the night of May 20, 1964 or during the first hours of
the following day a band of robbers entered the house of the
insured Juan S. Biagtan. What happened then is related in
the decision of the trial court as follows:

“x x x; that on the night of May 20, 1964 or the first hours of May
21 1964, while the said life policy and supplementary contract
were in full force and effect, the house of insured Juan S. Biagtan
was robbed by a band of robbers who were

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Biagtan vs. The Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd.

charged in and convicted by the Court of First Instance of

Pangasinan for robbery with homicide; that in committing the
robbery, the robbers, on reaching the staircase landing of the
second floor, rushed towards the doors of the second floor room,
where they suddenly met a person near the door of one of the
rooms who turned out to be the insured Juan S. Biagtan who
received thrusts from their sharp-pointed instruments, causing
wounds on the body of said Juan S. Biagtan resulting in his death
at about 7 a.m. on the same day, May 21, 1964;”

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Plaintiffs, as beneficiaries of the insured, filed a claim

under the policy. The insurance company paid the basic
amount of P5,000.00 but refused to pay the additional sum
of P5,000.00 under the accidental death benefit clause, on
the ground that the insured’s death resulted from injuries
intentionally inflicted by third parties and therefore was
not covered. Plaintiffs filed suit to recover, and after due
hearing the court a quo rendered judgment in their favor.
Hence the present appeal by the insurer.
The only issue here is whether under the facts are
stipulated and found by the trial court the wounds received
by the insured at the hands of the robbers—nine in all, five
of them mortal and four non-mortal—were inflicted
intentionally. The court, in ruling negatively on the issue,
stated that since the parties presented no evidence and
submitted the case upon stipulation, there was no “proof
that the act of receiving thrust (sic) from the sharp-pointed
instrument of the robbers was intended to inflict injuries
upon the person of the insured or any other person or
merely to scare away any person so as to ward off any
resistance or obstacle that might be offered in the pursuit
of their main objective which was robbery.”
The trial court committed a plain error in drawing the
conclusion it did from the admitted facts. Nine wounds
were inflicted upon the deceased, all by means of thrusts
with sharp-pointed instruments wielded by the robbers.
This is a physical fact as to which there is no dispute. So is
the fact that five of those wounds caused the death of the
insured. Whether the robbers had the intent to kill or
merely to scare the victim or to ward off any defense he
might offer, it cannot be denied that the act itself of in-

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Biagtan vs. The Insular Lift Assurance Company, Ltd.

flicting the injuries was intentional. It should be noted that

the exception in the accidental benefit clause invoked by
the appellant does not speak of the purpose—whether
homicidal or not—of a third party in causing the injuries,
but only of the fact that such injuries have been
“intentionally” inflicted—this obviously to distinguish them
from injuries which, although received at the hands of a
third party, are purely accidental. This construction is the
basic idea expressed in the coverage of the clause itself,
namely, that “the death of the insured resulted directly
from bodily injury effected solely through external and
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violent means sustained in an accident . . . and

independently of all other causes.” A gun which discharges
while being cleaned and kills a bystander; a hunter who
shoots at his prey and hits a person instead; an athlete in a
competitive game involving physical effort who collides
with an opponent and fatally injures him as a result: these
are instances where the infliction of the injury is
unintentional and therefore would be within the coverage
of an accidental death benefit clause such as that in
question in this case. But where a gang of robbers enter a
house and coming face to face with the owner, even if
unexpectedly, stab him repeatedly, it is contrary to all
reason and logic to say that his injuries are not
intentionally inflicted, regardless of whether they prove
fatal or not. As it was, in the present case they did prove
fatal, and the robbers have been accused and convicted of
the crime of robbery with homicide.
The case of Calanoc vs. Court of Appeals, 98 Phil. 79, is
relied upon by the trial court in support of its decision. The
facts in that case, however, are different from those
obtaining here. The insured there was a watchman in a
certain company, who happened to be invited by a
policeman to come along as the latter was on his way to
investigate a reported robbery going on in a private house.
As the two of them, together with the owner of the house,
approached and stood in front of the main gate, a shot was
fired and it turned out afterwards that the watchman was
hit in the abdomen, the wound causing his death. Under
those circumstances this Court held that it could not be

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Biagtan vs. The Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd.

said that the killing was intentional for there was the
possibility that the malefactor had fired the shot to scare
the people around for his own protection and not
necessarily to kill or hit the victim. A similar possibility is
clearly ruled out by the facts in the case now before Us. For
while a single shot fired from a distance, and by a person
who was not even seen aiming at the victim, could indeed
have been fired without intent to kill or injure, nine
wounds inflicted with bladed weapons at close range
cannot conceivably be considered as innocent insofar as
such intent is concerned. The manner of execution of the
crime permits no other conclusion.

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Court decisions in the American jurisdiction, where

similar provisions in accidental death benefit clauses in
insurance policies have been construed, may shed light on
the issue before Us. Thus, it has been held that
“intentional” as used in an accident policy excepting
intentional injuries inflicted by the insured or any other
person, etc., implies the exercise
1
of the reasoning faculties,
consciousness, and volition. Where a provision of the policy
excludes intentional injury, it is the intention
2
of the person
inflicting the injury that is controlling. If the injuries
suffered by the insured clearly resulted from the
intentional act of a third
3
person the insurer is relieved from
liability as stipulated.
In the case of Hutchcraft’s Ex’r. v. Travelers’ Ins. Co., 87
Ky. 300, 8 S.W. 570, 12 Am. St. Rep. 484, the insured was
waylaid and assassinated for the purpose of robbery. Two
(2) defenses were interposed to the action to recover
indemnity, namely: (1) that the insured having been killed
by intentional means, his death was not accidental, and (2)
that the proviso in the policy expressly exempted the
insurer from liability in case the insured died from injuries

_______________

1 Berger v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins, Co., 88 F. 241, 242.

2 Traveler’s Protective Ass’n. of America vs. Fawcett, 104 N.E. 991, 50
Ind. App. 111.
3 Continental Cas. Co. v. Klinge. 82 Ind. App. 277, 144 N.E. 246;
Washington v. Union C. & Sur. Co., 115 Mo. App. 627, 91 S.C. 988;
National L & Acci. Co. v. De Lopez (Tex. Civ. App.), 207 S.W. 160.

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Biagtan vs. The Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd.

intentionally inflicted by another person. In rendering

judgment for the insurance company the Court held that
while the assassination of the insured was as to him an
unforeseen event and therefore accidental, “the clause of
the proviso that excludes the (insurer’s) liability, in case
death or injury is intentionally inflicted by any other
person, applies to this case.”
In Butero v. Travelers’ Acc. Ins. Co., 96 Wis. 536, 65 Am.
St. Rep. 61, 71 S.W. 811, the insured was shot three times
by a person unknown late on a dark and stormy night,
while working in the coal shed of a railroad company. The
policy did not cover death resulting from “intentional
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injuries inflicted by the insured or any other person.” The

inquiry was as to the question whether the shooting that
caused the insured’s death was accidental or intentional;
and the Court found that under the facts, showing that the
murderer knew his victim and that he fired with intent to
kill, there could be no recovery under the policy which
excepted death from intentional injuries inflicted by any
person.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed
and the complaint dismissed, without pronouncement as to
costs.

          Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando and Villamor, JJ.,

concur.
     Concepcion, C.J. and Reyes, J.B.L., J., concur in the
dissent of Justice Teehankee.
     Teehankee, J., dissents in a separate opinion.
     Barredo, J., concurs in separate opinion.
     Makasiar, J., reserves his vote.

BARREDO, J.: Concurring —

During the deliberations in this case, I entertained some

doubts as to the correctness and validity of the view upheld
in the main opinion penned by Justice Makalintal. Further
reflection has convinced me, however, that there are good
reasons to support it.

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Biagtan vs. The Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd.

At first blush, one would feel that every death not suicidal
should be considered accidental, for the purposes of an
accident insurance policy or a life insurance policy with a
double-indemnity clause in case death results from
accident. Indeed, it is quite logical to think that any event
whether caused by fault, negligence, intent of a third party
or any unavoidable circumstance, normally unforeseen by
the insured and free from any possible connivance on his
part, is an accident in the generally accepted sense of the
term. And if I were convinced that in including in the policy
the provision in question, both the insurer and the insured
had in mind to exclude thereby from the coverage of the
policy only suicide whether unhelped or helped somehow by
a third party, I would disregard the American decisions
cited and quoted in the main opinion as not even

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persuasive authorities. But examining the unequivocal

language of the provision in controversy and considering
that the insured accepted the policy without asking that it
be made clear that the phrase “injury intentionally inflicted
by a third party” should be understood to refer only to
injuries inflicted by a third party without any wilful
intervention on his part (of the insured) or, in other words,
without any connivance with him (the insured) in order to
augment the proceeds of the policy for his beneficiaries, I
am inclined to agree that death caused by criminal assault
is not covered by the policies of the kind here in question,
specially if the assault, as a matter of fact, could have been
more or less anticipated, as when the insured happens to
have violent enemies or is found in circumstances that
would make his life fair game of third parties.
As to the rest, I have no doubt that the killing of the
insured in this case is as intentional as any intentional act
can be, hence this concurrence.

SEPARATE OPINION

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:

The sole issue at bar is the correctness in law of the lower

court’s appealed decision adjudging defendant insurance
company liable, under its supplementary contract de-
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Biagtan vs. The Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd.

nominated “Accidental Death Benefit Clause” with the

deceased insured, to plaintiffs-beneficiaries (excluding
plaintiff Emilia T. Biagtan) in an additional amount of
P5,000.00 (with corresponding legal interest) and ruling
that defendant company had failed to present any evidence
to substantiate its defense that the insured’s death came
within the stipulated exceptions.
Defendant’s accidental death benefit clause expressly
provides:

“ACCIDENTAL DEATH BENEFIT, (hereinafter called the

benefit). Upon receipt and approval of due proof that the death of
the Insured resulted directly from bodily injury effected solely
through external and violent means sustained in an accident,
within ninety days after the date of sustaining such injury, and

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independently of all other causes, this Company shall pay, in

addition to the sum insured specified on the first page of this
Policy, a further sum equal to said sum insured payable at the
same time and in the same manner as said sum insured,
provided, that such death occurred during the continuance of this
Clause and
1
of this Policy and before the sixtieth birthday of the
Insured.”

A long list of exceptions and an Automatic Discontinuance

clause immediately follow thereafter, thus:

“EXCEPTIONS. The Benefit shall not apply if the Insured’s death

shall result, either directly or indirectly, from any one of the
following causes:

(1) Self-destruction or self-inflicted injuries, whether the

Insured be sane or insane;
(2) Bodily or mental infirmity or disease of any kind;
(3) Poisoning or infection, other than infection occurring
simultaneously with and in consequence of a cut or wound
sustained in an accident;
(4) Injuries of which there is no visible contusions or wound
on the exterior of the body, drowning and internal injuries
revealed by autopsy excepted:
(5) Any injuries received (a) while on police duty in any
military, naval or police organization; (b) in any not, civil
commotion, insurrection or war or any act incident

_______________

1 Rec. on Appeal, pp. 7-8, italics furnished.

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Biagtan vs. The Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd.

thereto; (c) while travelling as a passenger or otherwise in

any form of submarine transportation, or while engaging
in submarine operations; (d) in any violation of the law by
the Insured or assault provoked by the Insured; (e) that
has been inflicted intentionally by a third party, either
with or without provocation on the part of the Insured,
and whether or not the attack or the defense by the third
party was caused by a violation of the law by the Insured;
(6) Operating or riding in or descending from any kind of
aircraft if the Insured is a pilot, officer or member of the
crew of the aircraft or is giving or receiving any kind of

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training or Instruction or has any duties aboard the

aircraft or requiring descent therefrom; and
(7) Atomic energy explosion of any nature whatsoever.“The
Company, before making any payment under this Clause,
shall have the right and opportunity to examine the body
and make an autopsy thereof.

“AUTOMATIC DISCONTINUANCE. This Benefit shall

automatically terminate and the additional premium therefor
shall cease to be payable when and if:

(1) This Policy is surrendered for cash, paid-up insurance or

extended term insurance; or
(2) The benefit under the Total and Permanent Disability
Waiver of Premium Certificate is granted to the insured;
or
(3) The Insured engages in military, naval or aeronautic
service in time of war; or
(4) The policy anniversary immediately2 preceding the sixtieth
birthday of the Insured is reached.”

It is undisputed that, as recited in the lower court’s

decision, the insured met his death, as follows: “that on the
night of May 20, 1964 or the first hours of May 21, 1964,
while the said life policy and supplementary contract were
in full force and effect, the house of insured Juan S Biagtan
was robbed by a band of robbers who were charged in and
convicted by the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan for
robbery with homicide; that in committing the

______________

2 Idem, pp. 8-10, italics furnished.

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Biagtan vs. The Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd.

robbery, the robbers, on reaching the staircase landing of

the second floor, rushed towards the doors of the second
floor room, where they suddenly met a person near the door
of one of the rooms who turned out to be the insured Juan
S. Biagtan who received thrusts from their sharp-pointed
instruments, causing wounds on the body of said Juan S.
Biagtan resulting in3 his death at about 7 a.m. on the same
day, May 21, 1964.’’

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Defendant company, while admitting the above-recited

circumstances under which the insured met his death,
disclaimed liability under its accidental death benefit
clause under paragraph 5 of its stipulated “Exceptions” on
its theory that the insured’s death resulted from injuries
“intentionally inflicted by a third party,” i.e. the robbers
who broke into the insured’s house and inflicted fatal
injuries on him.
The case was submitted for decision upon the parties’
stipulation of facts that (1) insurance companies such as
the Lincoln National Life Insurance Co. and Sun Life
Assurance Co. of Canada with which the deceased insured
Juan S. Biagtan was also insured for much larger sums
under similar contracts with accidental death benefit
provisions have promptly paid the benefits thereunder to
plaintiffs-beneficiaries; (2) the robbers who caused the
insured’s death were charged in and convicted by the Court
of First Instance of Pangasinan for the crime of robbery
with homicide; and (3) the injuries inflicted on the insured
by the robbers
4
consisted of five mortal and four non-mortal
wounds.
The lower court thereafter rendered judgment against
defendant, as follows:

“There is no doubt that the insured, Juan S. Biagtan, met his

death as a result of the wounds inflicted upon him by the
malefactors on the early morning of May 21, 1964 by means of
thrusts from sharp-pointed instruments delivered upon his
person, and there is likewise no question that the thrusts were

______________

3 Idem, pp. 46-47.

4 Idem, pp. 37-38.

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made on the occasion of the robbery. However, it is defendants’

position that the killing of the insured was intentionally done by
the malefactors, who were charged with and convicted of the
crime of robbery with homicide by the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan.
“It must be noted here that no evidence whatsoever was
presented by the parties who submitted the case for resolution
upon the stipulation of facts presented by them. Thus, the court
does not have before it proof that the act of receiving thrust(s)
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from the sharp-pointed instrument of the robbers was intended to

inflict injuries upon the person of the insured or any other person
or merely to scare away any person so as to ward off any resistance
or obstacle that might be offered in the pursuit of their main
objective which was robbery. It was held that where a provision of
the policy excludes intentional injury, it is the intention of the
person inflicting the injury that is controlling xxx and to come
within the exception, the act which causes the injury must be
wholly intentional, not merely partly.
“The case at bar has some similarity with the case of Virginia
Calanoc vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-8151, promulgated
December 16, 1965, where the Supreme Court ruled that ‘the shot
(which killed the insured) was merely to scare away the people
around for his own protection and not necessarily to kill or hit the
victim.’
“In the Calanoc case, one Melencio Basilio, a watchman of a
certain company, took out life insurance from the Philippine
American Life Insurance Company in the amount of P2,000.00 to
which was attached a supplementary contract covering death by
accident. Calanoc died of gunshot wounds on the occasion of a
robbery committed in the house of a certain Atty. Ojeda in
Manila. The insured’s widow was paid P2,000.00, the face value of
the policy, but when she demanded payment of the additional
sum of P2,000.00 representing the value of the supplemental
policy, the company refused alleging, as main defense, that the
deceased died because he was murdered by a person who took
part in the commission of the robbery and while making an arrest
as an officer of the law which contingencies were (as in this case)
expressly excluded in the contract and have the effect of
exempting the company from liability.
“The facts in the Calanoc case insofar as pertinent to this case
are, as found by the Court of Appeals in its decision which
findings of fact were adopted by the Supreme Court, as follows:

‘x x x that on the way to the Ojeda residence (which was then being
robbed by armed men), the policeman and Atty. Ojeda passed by Basilio
(the insured) and somehow

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Biagtan vs. The Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd.

or other invited the latter to come along; that as the three approached the
Ojeda residence and stood in front of the main gate which was covered by
galvanized iron, the fence itself being partly concrete and partly adobe
stone, a shot was fired; x x x that it turned out afterwards that the

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special watchman Melencio Basilio was hit in the abdomen, the wound
causing his instantaneous death x x x.’

“The Court of Appeals arrived at the conclusion that the death

of Basilio, although unexpected, was not caused by an accident,
being a voluntary and intentional act on the part of the one who
robbed, or one of those who robbed, the house of Atty. Ojeda.
“In reversing this conclusion of the Court of Appeals, the
Supreme Court said in part:

‘x x x Nor can it be said that the killing was intentional for there is the
possibility that the malefactors had fired the shot merely to scare away
the people around for his own protection and not necessarily to kill or hit
the victim. In any event, while the act may not exempt the triggerman
from liability for the damage done, the fact remains that the happening
was a pure accident on the part of the victim.’

“With this ruling of the Supreme Court, and the utter absence of
evidence in this case as to the real intention of the malefactors in
making a thrust with their sharp-pointed instrument on any
person, the victim in particular, the case falls squarely within the
ruling in the Calanoc vs. Court of Appeals case.
“It is the considered view of this Court that the insured died
because of an accident which happened on the occasion of the
robbery being committed in his house. His death was not sought
(at least no evidence was presented to show it was), mid therefore
was fortuitous. ‘Accident’ was defined as that which happens by
chance or fortuitously, without intention or design, and which is
unexpected, unusual and unforeseen, or that which takes place
without one’s foresight or expectation—an event that proceeds
from an unknown cause, or is an unusual effect of a known cause,
and therefore not expected (29 Am. Jur. 706).”
“There is no question that the defense set up by the defendant
company is one of those included among the risks excluded in the
supplementary contract. However, there is no evidence here that
the thrusts with sharp-pointed instrument (which led to the death
of the insured) was ‘intentional; (sic) so as to exempt the company
from liability. It could safely be assumed

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that it was purely accidental considering that the principal motive

of the culprits was robbery, the thrusts being merely intended to
scare away persons who might offer resistance or might obstruct
5
them from pursuing their main objective which was robbery.”

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It is respectfully submitted that the lower court committed

no error in law in holding defendant insurance company
liable to plaintiffs-beneficiaries under its accidental death
benefit clause, by virtue of the following considerations:
1. The case of 6Calanoc cited by the lower court is indeed
controlling here. This Court, there construing a similar
clause, squarely ruled that fatal injuries inflicted upon an
insured by a malefactor(s) during the latter’s commission of
a crime are deemed accidental and within the coverage of
such accidental death benefit clauses and the burden of
proving that the killing was intentional so as to have it fall
within the stipulated exception of having resulted from
injuries “intentionally inflicted by a third party” must be
discharged by the insurance company. This Court there
clearly held that in such cases where the killing does not
amount to murder, it must be held to be a “pure accident”
on the part of the victim, compensable with double-
indemnity, even though the malefactor is criminally liable
for his act. This Court rejected the insurance-company’s
contrary claim, thus:

“Much less can it be pretended that Basilio died in the course of

an assault or murder considering the very nature of these crimes.
In the first place, there is no proof that the death of Basilio is the
result of either crime for the record is barren of any circumstance
showing how the fatal shot was fired. Perhaps this may be
clarified in the criminal case now pending in court as regards the
incident but before that is done anything that might be said on
the point would be a mere conjecture. Nor can it be said that the
killing was intentional for there is the possibility that the
malefactor had fired the shot merely to scare away the people
around for his own protection and not necessarily to kill or hit the
victim. In any event, while the act may not exempt the triggerman
from liability for the damage done, the fact re-

_______________

5 Idem, pp. 49-54, italics furnished.

6 98 Phil. 79.

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VOL. 44, MARCH 29, 1972 71

Biagtan vs. The Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd.

mains that the happening was a pure accident on the part of the
victim. The victim could have been either the policeman or Atty.
Ojeda for it cannot be pretended that the malefactor aimed
7
at the
deceased precisely because he wanted to take his life.”
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2. Defendant company patently failed to discharge its

burden of proving that the fatal injuries were inflicted upon
the deceased intentionally, i.e. deliberately. The lower court
correctly held that since the case was submitted upon the
parties’ stipulation of facts which did not cover the
malefactors’ intent at all, there was an “utter absence of
evidence in this case as to the real intention of the
malefactors in making a thrust with their sharp-point-ed
instrument(s) on any person, the 8
victim in particular.”
From the undisputed facts, supra, the robbers had “rushed
towards the doors of the second floor room, where they
suddenly met a person . . . who turned out to be the insured
Juan S. Biagtan who received thrusts from their sharp-
pointed instruments.” The thrusts were indeed properly
termed “purely accidental” since they seemed to be a reflex
action on the robbers’ part upon their being surprised by
the deceased. To argue, as defendant does, that the robbers’
intent to kill must necessarily be deduced from the four
mortal wounds inflicted upon the deceased is to beg the
question. Defendant must suffer the consequence of its
failure to discharge its burden of proving by competent
evidence, e.g. the robbers’ or eye-witnesses’ testimony, that
the fatal injuries were intentionally inflicted upon the
insured so as to exempt itself from liability.
3. Furthermore, plaintiffs-appellees properly assert in
their brief that the sole error assigned by defendant
company, to wit, that the fatal injuries were not accidental
as held by the lower court but should be held to have been
intentionally inflicted, raises a question of fact—which
defendant is now barred from raising, since it expressly
limited its appeal to this9 Court purely “on questions of law”,
per its notice of appeal. Defendant is therefore confined to
“raising only questions of law” and “no other questions”

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7 Idem, at page 83, italics furnished.

8 At page 3.
9 Rec. on Appeal, p. 56.

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Biagtan vs. The Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd.

10
under Rule 42, section 2 of the Rules of Court and is
deemed to have conceded the findings of fact of the trial
court, since he thereby waived all questions of facts.”
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4. It has long been an established rule of construction of

so-called contracts of adhesion such as insurance contracts,
where the insured is handed a printed insurance policy
whose fine-print language has long been selected with
great care and deliberation by specialists and legal advisers
employed by and acting exclusively in the interest of the
insurance company, that the terms and phraseology of the
policy, particularly of any exception clauses, must be
clearly expressed so as to be easily understood by the
insured and any “ambiguous, equivocal or uncertain terms”
are to be “construed strictly and most strongly against the
insurer and liberally in favor of the insured so as to effect
the dominant purpose of indemnity or payment to the
insured, especially where a forfeiture is involved.”
The Court so expressly held in Calanoc that:

“x x x While as a general rule ‘the parties may limit the coverage

of the policy to certain particular accidents and risks or causes of
loss, and may expressly except other risks or causes of loss
therefrom’ (45 C.J.S. 781-782), however, it is to be desired that
the terms and phraseology of the exception clause be clearly
expressed so as to be within the easy grasp and understanding of
the insured, for if the terms are doubtful or obscure the same
must of necessity be interpreted or resolved against the one who
has caused the obscurity. (Article 1377, new Civil Code) And so it
has been generally held that the ‘terms in an insurance policy,
which are ambiguous, equivocal, or uncertain xxx are to be
construed strictly and most strongly against the insurer, and
liberally in favor of the insured so as to effect the dominant
purpose of indemnity or payment to the insured, especially where a
forfeiture if involved’ (29 AM. Jur., 181), and the reason for this
rule is that the ‘insured usually has no voice in the selection or
arrangement of the words employed and that the language of the
contract is selected with great care and deli-

_______________

10 “SEC 2. Appeal on pure question of law.—Where the appellant states in his

notice of appeal or record on appeal that he will raise only questions of law, no
other questions shall be allowed, and the evidence need not be elevated.” (Rule 42)
11 See 2 Moran’s Comments on Rules of Court, 1970 Ed pp. 456-457 and cases
cited therein.

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Biagtan vs. The Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd.

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beration by experts and legal advisers employed by, and acting

exclusively in the interest of, the insurance company.’ (44 CJ.S., p.
1174)
“ ‘Insurance is, in its nature, complex and difficult for the lay
man to understand. Policies are prepared by experts who know
and can anticipate the bearing and possible complications of every
contingency. So long as insurance companies insist upon the use of
ambiguous, intricate and technical provisions, which conceal
rather than frankly disclose, their own intentions, the courts must,
in fairness to those who purchase insurance construe every
ambiguity in favor of the insured.’ (Algoe vs. Pacific Mut. L. Ins.
Co., 91 Wash. 324, LRA 1917A, 1237.)
“ ‘An insurer should not be allowed, by the use of obscure
phrases and exceptions, to defeat the very purpose for which the
policy was procured.’
12
(Moore vs. Aetna Life Insurance Co., LRA
1915D, 164).”

The Court has but13 recently reiterated this doctrine in

Landicho vs. GSIS and again applied the provisions of
Article 1377 of our Civil Code that “The interpretation of
obscure words or stipulations in a contract shall not favor
the party who caused the obscurity.”
5. The accidental death benefit clause assuring the
insured’s beneficiaries of double indemnity, upon payment
of an extra premium, in the event that the insured meets
violent accidental death is contractually stipulated as
follows in the policy: “that the death of the insured resulted
directly from bodily injury effected solely through external
and violent means sustained in an accident,” supra. The
policy then lists numerous exceptions, which may be
classified as follows:
—Injuries effected through non-external means which
are excepted: self-destruction, bodily or mental infirmity or
disease, poisoning or infection, injuries with no visible
contusions or exterior wounds (exceptions 1 to 4 of policy
clause);
—Injuries caused by some act of the insured which is

_______________

12 Italics furnished.
13 L-28866, prom. March 17, 1972, per Concepcion, C.J., and cases cited
therein.

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74 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Biagtan vs. The Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd.

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proscribed by the policy, and are therefore similarly

excepted: injuries received while on police duty, while
travelling in any form of submarine transportation, or in
any violation of law by the insured or assault provoked by
the insured, or in any aircraft if the insured is a pilot or
crew member; [exceptions 5 (a), (c) and (d), and 6 of the
policy clause]; and
—Accidents expressly excluded: where death resulted in
any riot, civil commotion, insurrection or war or atomic
energy explosion. (Exceptions 5[b] and 7 of policy clause).
The only exception which is not susceptible of
classification is that provided in paragraph 5(e), the very
exception herein involved, which would also except injuries
“in-flicted intentionally by a third party, either with or
without provocation on the part of the insured, and whether
or not the attack or the defense by the third party was
caused by a violation of the law by the insured.”
This ambiguous clause conflicts with all the other four
exceptions in the same paragraph 5 particularly that
immediately preceding it in item (d) which excepts injuries
received where the insured has violated the law or
provoked the injury, while this clause, construed as the
insurance company now claims, would seemingly except
also all other injuries, intentionally inflicted by a third
party, regardless of any violation of law or provocation by
the insured, and defeat the very purpose of the policy of
giving the insured double indemnity in case of accidental
death by “external and violent means”—in the very
language of the policy.’
It is obvious from the very classification of the
exceptions and applying the rule of noscitus a sociis, that
the double-indemnity policy covers the insured against
accidental death, whether caused by fault, negligence or
intent of a third party which is unforeseen and unexpected
by the insured. All the associated words and concepts in
the policy plainly exclude the accidental death from the
coverage of the policy only where the injuries are self-
inflicted or
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VOL. 44, MARCH 29, 1972 75

People vs. Imperio

attended by some proscribed act of the insured or are

incurred in same expressly excluded calamity such as riot,
war or atomic explosion.

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Finally, the untenability of herein defendant insurer’s

claim that the insured’s death fell within the exception is
further heightened by the stipulated fact that two other
insurance companies which likewise covered the insured
for much, larger sums under similar accidental death
benefit clauses promptly paid the benefits thereof to
plaintiffs-beneficiaries.
I vote accordingly for the affirmance in toto of the
appealed decision, with costs against defendant-appellant.
Decision reversed.

Notes.—See Kanapi v. Insular Assur. Co., Ltd., 50 O.G.

1045 for additional reference.

_______________

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