Electronic Voting Machine

1
Naveen Rathee, 2Vikas Maheshwari, 3 Anuradha Kumari,

Department Of Electronics and Communication Engineering

Bharat Institute of Engineering and Technology, Hyderabad
1
drnaveenrathee@[Link],2maheshwarivikas1982@[Link],
3
anuradhak0016@[Link]

,
Abstract. This paper proposes a complete overview of the voting machine,
comparison and issues among the conventional system and EVM’s. Voting
in election forms the fundamental right of democracy which creates a
bridge between the governments and governed. In current schenerio,
because of successive advancement in voting methods with technology from
ballot paper to EVM’s and other methods to reduce, expense and time, also
to increase security and trust of the voter. Most of the voting system proven
correct but has many concern and security issues like invalid votes,
malicious attack etc. This paper proposes an improved voting system based
on technology to ensure more reliability and security for user identification
of a person, like by introducing biometric or aadhaar link with EVM’s.

Keywords: EVM (Electronic Voting Machine), voting machine invalid

votes, malicious attack.

1 Introduction
Election through voting is a major pillar of democracy. In a representative
democracy, voting is the method by which the electorate appoints their
representatives in the government of any country or states. Electronic Voting
(E-Voting) stands for the voting method was electronic element is used in any
phase of the votings steps the recording, the casting and/or the counting of
votes in the election. Introducing e-voting is probably the most difficult
upgrade as this technology touches the core of the entire electoral process, the
casting and counting of the votes. If not carefully planned and designed, e-
voting can undermine the confidence in the whole electoral process.
Consequently, e-voting usually triggers more criticism and opposition and is
more disputed than any other information technology application in elections.
International IDEA Policy Paper confirmed that e-voting systems that are
implemented in controlled environments (a) and e-voting systems that are
(partially) implemented in uncontrolled environments. E-voting systems
implemented in a controlled environment are systems such as DRE (Direct
electronic recording) voting machines that record the vote without that vote
being transmitted over the Internet or another network. The interface of a DRE
machine can be a touch screen or a scanner that scans the ballot paper where
the voter marked the vote. The vote is then registered and stored in the voting
 machine. Then there is the voting over the Internet that uses a PC with an
Internet-connection to cast the vote and send it to be stored in another remote
computer. Personal Digital Assistants (PDA’s), telephones or mobile phones
can also be used to cast a vote electronically. The fact that the casting of the
vote is not done inside a controllable area of a polling place and that the vote
has to be transmitted in some way to the polling or counting place, poses
additional challenges. E-voting systems that are partially implemented in
controlled environments like Indian EVMs or electronic voting machines are a
good example of e-voting machine implementation. These EVMs provide the
voter with a button for each choice which is connected by a cable to an
electronic ballot box. An EVM consists of two units i.e. control unit and
balloting unit-and these two are connected by a five-meter cable. When a voter
presses a button against the candidate, he/she wishes to vote for, the machine
locks itself. This EVM can be opened only with a new ballot number. This
way, EVMs ensure that a person will be provided to vote only once these
machines don't require electricity and run on batteries. Moreover, it has no
internet connection which makes it tamper-free.

2. Existing Systems

a) Paper-based Electronic Voting System

Paper-based voting systems originated as a system where votes are cast and
counted by hand, using paper ballots. It is also called as "document ballot
voting system" each candidate was allotted a separate ballot box pasted with
the symbol of the candidate. The candidate’s name and symbol were not
printed on the ballot paper and voters had to drop a pre-printed ballot paper in
the ballot box of the candidate of their choice. The use of ballot papers was
time-consuming, prone to malpractices like booth-capturing and ballot-box
stuffing. Large number of invalid votes due to wrong/incorrect marking,
subjects to prolonged counting drills. Because of the above scenario ,chances
of conflict will be more thereby delaying result besides being an ecologically
straining and non-environment friendly method.

Fig 1. Paper-based Electronic Voting System

b) Punch-card Voting Systems

 With punch-card voting systems, the ballot is a card or cards and the voters
punch holes in it with a supplied punch device next to their candidate or
choice. After punching the hole, the voter may place the ballot in a ballot box,
or the voter may feed the ballot into an electronic vote tabulating device at the
voting place. Two common types of punch-card voting systems are the
"Votomatic" and the "Data vote" system. The list of candidates or ballot issue
choices and directions for punching the corresponding holes are printed in a
separate booklet. With the Datavote card, the name of the candidate or
description of the choice is printed on the ballot next to the location of the hole
to be punched.

Fig 2. Punch-card Voting Systems

c) Direct-Recording Electronic (DRE) Voting Machines

Voting can be done on Election Day or it can be used as an advance voting
device in polling stations. The DRE machines have a touch screen displaying
the ballot. After the election or referendum, the DRE machine produces a
tabulation of the voting data stored in a removable memory component and/or
as a printed copy. The system may also allow for the transmission of
individual ballots or vote totals to a central location. The result can then be
consolidated in one central place. DRE voting machines started to be
massively used in 1996 in Brazil. Vision-impaired voters benefit from DRE
machines because they can cast their vote without help from another person. In
the Netherlands, where the company NEDAP provided its own DRE machines
since 1989. In 2009, the German Constitutional Court found that the DRE-type
voting machines used in parliamentary elections in Germany were
unconstitutional since they did not allow citizens to examine the determination
of the result.
Fig 3. Direct-Recording Electronic (DRE) Voting Machines

d) Public Network Direct-Recording Electronic Voting System (PNDRE)

This is an improvement on the DRE voting system. The difference is that cast
ballots are transmitted electronically over a public network to a central
server/collation centre. Where the voting terminal and the tallying server sit at
remote locations to each other. In this system, a medium of transmitting the
ballots from the voting terminal to the tallying server becomes needful. The
public network serves the purposes of transmitting the electronic ballots from
the voting terminal to the server, normal client/server and also, server/server
communications. Most of the current public network design implementations
are a VSAT connection with Modem provided by an Internet Service Provider
(ISP) except for non-supervised electronic voting where voters could cast their
votes from any computer with an internet connection

e)India’s EVM
Electronic Voting Machines ("EVM") are being used in Indian General and
State Elections to implement electronic voting in part from 1999 elections by
Election Commission of India in association with Bharat Electronics Limited
(BHEL) and Electronics Corporation of India Limited (ECIL). An EVM
consists of two units: balloting unit and control unit . This two different units
are connected together by a five-meter long cable. Voting is aided using
Balloting unit by the voter through labelled buttons . The control unit acts like
heart of Indian EVM , all the function like controlling of ballot units, voting
counts storage and display of the results on 7 segment LED displays are
performed by control unit . It can not be alter or reprogram even by the
manufacturer . Electronics Corporation of India Limited and Bharat
Electronics Limited alliance designed 6 volt alkaline battery to power EVM
and no other externa power supply is needed . This cost effective EVMs are
designe is throughout the country in several parts of India with no interference
. An EVM can display maximum of 64 candidates name in 4 different ballot
units connected in parallel and each single unit can display upto 16 candidates
name on ballot unit and can store 3864 votes in a single EVM unit. It is
highly imposible to vote more than once either to same candidate or different
candidate by pressing the vote button of EVM repeatedly because the moment
a particular button is pressed on the balloting unit, the vote is filed for that
particular candidate and evm gets close. Even if someone tries to vote again
EVM wont work .This increases sceurty of [Link] advancement was
introduced in voting machine by introducing Voter Verifiable Paper

Fig 4. India’s EVM

Audit Trail (VVPAT).It is a feature of the electronic voting machine when

VVPAT machine’s button is pressed against the chosen candidate, a printed.
VVPAT slip is displayed for 7 seconds before it's automatically cut and
delivered to a sealed ballot compartment. This second line of verification
process was announce to make sure that the vote casted by a voter goes to the
correct candidate . So that voter can rely on EVM.

f) Diebold AccuVote-TS voting machine

The AccuVote-TS and TSX are touch screen direct recording electronic voting
machines that record votes on internal flash memory. Both systems offer a
summary page once the voter has sequenced through the entire ballot,which
gives the voter a second chance to check their voting status and to cast vote in
any caseif they missed. The votes are then recorded to internal electronic
memory. The AccuVote TS/TSX is configured for each election by inserting a
memory card into a slot behind a locked door on the side of the voting
machine. Back end process of election are pre election work, the file system on
the memory card stores the election definition, sound files, translations for
other languages, interpreted code that is used to print reports, and other
configuration information. As each ballot is cast, the AccuVote TS/TSX stores
an electronic record of the votes associated with that ballot in the memory card
as files. At the close of polls, the AccuVote TS/TSX counts all of the votes and
prints a summary tape showing the vote tallies. After the election, memory
card from the machineby the poll workers and send it to election headquarters
so that the electronic vote records can be uploaded for tabulation. Internally,
the TSX contains much of the same hardware found in a general-purpose PC.
An application called Ballot Station runs on top of the operating system and
provides the interacting channel between voters and polling agents . Ballot
Station interacts with the voter, accepts and records votes, counts the votes,
and performs all other election-related processing.

Fig 5. Diebold AccuVote-TS voting machine

g) Hart Inter Civic e-Slate

The Hart Inter Civic e-Slate is a direct recording electronic voting machine
where the voter turns a Select Wheel and pushes a button to indicate its
preferences. The system as shown in the Figure which provides vote activation
and vote storage for up to twelve e-Slates. The voter enters the Access Code on
the e-Slate and votes using the select Wheel and Buttons. Once the ballot is
cast, the votes are stored in redundant and physically separate areas of the e-
Slate System, including the e-Slate, JBC and flash memory. The votes are
transmitted via a cable to the JBC, and are stored on the JBC and on a flash
memory card (Mobile Ballot Box or MBB) inside the JBC. Then the MBB is
physically transported to election headquarters for tabulation. The e-Slate
consists of a screen and below it a wheel and 5 buttons. The PREV and NEXT
arrow buttons move the voter backwards and forward through available pages,
respectively. The HELP button provides on-screen assistance or summons a
poll worker to help the voter. The CAST BALLOT button advances the voter
to/through the vote review and acceptance steps and finalizes the voter’s
selection data to cast the voter’s ballot.
 Fig 6. Hart Inter Civic e-Slate

h)VoteHere Platinum
VoteHere Platinum uses a completely software-based touch screen interface.
This system does not offer hardware buttons or any of the benefits that
hardware buttons provideas it is touchscreen [Link] risesthe risks that the
software use to design this voting machine could be tampered or the prograne
is altered. The VoteHere Platinum system always have a race on the screen at a
time. The voteris peovided with “next” and “back” buttons at the top of the
screen for navigate between [Link] voting system requires to increase
security and realiblity.

Fig 7. VoteHere Platinum

i)SureVote
Surevote is a multi-pronged system with Vermont-based startup to provides
extra layers of security to the overall voting systems because it moves through
multiple types of technological [Link] a hybrid mode of a mobile and
physical vote experience where thr users has to prepare their ballots through a
mobile application and complete them at physical polling places using secure
kiosks on a closed network. As it works on a closed system which only goes
in one direction, votes can’t ne hacked or [Link] overall process
introduced in this technology goes in sequence as in Fig 8..This starts by
filling information needed for their particular state at the end of registration
voter has to scans their face with their device to complete and confirm the
process. Before casting a vote, the voter will have to register themselveswith
current location and confirm the date and time fore voting. Then voter can
caste vote for their selected candidates/representative in a closed environment
that they have determined for [Link] after Verification and
Submission to finally submit a vote, the user simply confirms their selections
on the kiosk and their vote is sent to Surevote’s secure servers for collection.

Fig 8. SureVote

j) EVM based on Biometric

Biometric voter registration implicates using biometric technology (capturing
unique physical features of an individual – fingerprinting is the most
commonly used), most of the times in addition to demographics of the voter,
for polling registration and/or authentication. The enrollment infrastructure
allows collecting and maintaining a database of the biometric templates for all
[Link] voting machine A biometric voting machine includes
biometric registration process for enrolment of voters; using electronic voter
identification devices before and on Election Day; issuing of voter
identification documents (i.e. biometric voter cards), among others. The
chronological stages for adopting a biometric voting registration project
usually include assessment; feasibility studies; securing funding; reviewing
legislation; doing pilot projects and mock registration exercises, procurement’
distribution of equipment, installation, and testing; recruitment and training of
staff; voter information; deployment and, post-election audits. Aim of
implementing biometric election technology is achieving de-duplication of the
voting register, thus preventing multiple voter registration and multiple voting;
improving identification of the voter at
 Fig 9. Biometric EVM
the polling booth and reduces the risk of voter fraud. On the other hand, those
who criticise and disapprove the use of biometrics for voter identification
maintain that using biometrics for election purposes raises concerns over
voters' privacy, human dignity and governmental disclosure of personal
information. Some critics go further to claim that biometrics in voting poses a
serious threat to democracy, due to fears of violation of the secrecy of the vote
(or correlation voter-vote).

EXPERIENCE OF EVM

a) Netherlands
Electronic Voting was used in The Netherlands in between 1990-2007. The
voting machines were manufactured by a private Dutch-company called
NEDAP (Nederlandse Apparaten Fabriek NV). In 2006, the government
ordered an independent testing of the voting machines. Two independent
commissions, The Voting Machines Decisionmaking Commission and the
Election Process Advisory Commission (EPAC) were also established on
December 19, 2006 and January 18, 2007, respectively, to review the security
and reliability features of NEDAP machines. The Ministry of Interior and
Kingdom Relations (MOIKR) of The Netherlands lacked adequate technical
knowledge vis-à-vis the NEDAP machines, leading officials to depend on
external actors for the conduct of elections. Technology vendors became part
of the decision making process and the ministry was not in a position to
exercise effective oversight. The Dutch Organization for Applied Scientific
Research certified and tested these machines following “outdated standards”
which were not immune to modern IT and security threats. Moreover, the
certification and testing reports were not made public depriving independent
experts to verify the [Link] legal framework, particularly the necessary
security requirements, was inadequate to deal with the specificities of the
electronic voting process.

b) Germany
In Germany, the e-voting machines manufactured by NEDAP were used in
between 2005 – 2009 before it came under criticismand finally discontinued.
The Federal Constitutional Court of Germany ordered the discontinuation of
the use of NEDAP machines in 2009 because the use of Nedap electronic
voting machines violated the principle of the public nature of elections (Article
38 in conjunction with Article 20.1 and 20.2 of the Basic Law) that requires
that all essential steps in the elections are subject to public examinability
unless other constitutional interests justify an exception. It also observed that it
must be possible for the citizen to check the essential steps in the election
process and decleration of the results reliably and without special expert
knowledg.

c) Ireland
NEDAP machines were used in Ireland in between 2002 – 2004. Introduction
of this machines was questioned following which two independent
commissions were set up. The two Commissions on the Secrecy, Accuracy and
Testing of the Chosen Electronic
Voting System, concluded the NEDAP machines could not be used in
elections inIreland becose of Inadequate technological safeguards Insecure
transfer of data by the use of CDs Absence of a comprehensive independent
end-to-end testing, verification and certification by a single accredited body
Inconsistencies in physical security of machines across constituencies
Absence of a clear policy guideline via-a-vis storage, transport, set-up, use and
disposal of voting equipment; and Absence of comprehensive electronic
register to record the identity, location and movement of the electronic voting
devices.

d) United States of America

In 2000, after the dispute on the voting method in the USA presidential
elections, the voting method was reviewed.. Accordingly, Direct Recording
Electronic (DRE) Systems (like the widely used AccuVote TS developed by
Premier Election Solutions, commonly called Diebold) were introduced. DRE
Systems uses “one of three basic interfaces (pushbutton, touchscreen or dial)”
through which voters record their votes directly into computer memory. The
voter’s choices are stored in DREs via a memory cartridge, diskette or smart
card…Some DREs can be equipped with Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail
(VVPAT) printers. Currently, in the USA, the Direct Recording Machines are
used in 27 states, among which paper audit trails are used in 15 states. The
other voting methods include: Optical Scan Paper Ballot Systems, Ballot
Marking Devices, and the Punch Card Ballot.

e) Brazil
In Brazil, the machines used in elections are called ‘electronic ballot boxes’
which are stand-alone direct electronic recording systems. The voting machine
accomplishes three steps voter identification, secure voting and tallying in a
single process, eliminating fraud based on forged or falsified public
documents. Political parties have access to the voting machine's programs
before the election for auditing. On the eve of an election, the election
authorities in each State select a number of voting machines by lot (all
available voting machines take part in that lot, identified by their serial
 number), and those machines so selected, instead of being used in actual
pooling stations, are retained in the seat of the State's Regional Electoral Court
for a "parallel voting", conducted for audit purposes in the presence of
representatives designated by the political parties. The audit vote takes place
on the same date as the election.

f)Venezuela
In Venezuela, SATIS (Smartmatic Auditable Election Systems) voting
machines are used which were fully implemented across the nation in 2004.
SATIS specializes in technology solutions aimed at governments. It is
organized around producing electronic voting systems, smart cities solutions
including public safety and public transportation and identity management
systems for civil registration, as well as authentication for government
applications.

g) India
Indian EVMs are truly unique compared to the e-voting machines used in other
parts of the world becouse ECI-EVMs are stand-alone non-networked
machines In ECI EVMs data is stored internally and not transferrable by any
device, unlike other countries where voting data recorded in the DRM is
transferred by means of CD, etc. Commission has evolved full end to end
security protocol and administrative safeguards for the use, storage,
transportation and tracking of ECI EVMs, unlike in other countries where
NEDAP machines were used. Every EVM has a unique number attached to it,
which is recorded in the Election Commission’s database through EVM
Tracking Software. This number of the EVM can always be cross-checked
against the [Link] software used in these EVMs is One Time
Programmable (OTP), which can’t be re-written after manufacture. The ECI-
EVMs are always under strict, uniform, high profile administrative and
physical security as per legal framework across the country.

3. Framwork

Though we studied a specific voting technology, raise similar concerns about

malicious code injection attacks and other problems. All EVMs face
fundamental security challenges that are not easily overcome. Let’s discuss
some of these threats.

a)Vote-Stealing Attacks
Attacks that steal votes from one candidate and give them to another is called
Vote-Stealing [Link] attacks can be carried out without leaving any
evidence of fraud in the system’s logs. To avoid detection, a vote-stealing
attack must transfer votes from one candidate to another, leaving the total
number of votes unchanged so that poll workers do not notice any discrepancy
 in the number of votes reported. Attacks that only add votes or only subtract
votes would be detected when poll workers compared the total vote count to
the number of voters who checked in at the front desk.

b) Denial-of-Service Attacks (DoS)

Attack would make voting machines unavailable on Election Day. For
example, malicious code could be programmed to make the machine crash or
malfunction at a pre-programmed time, perhaps only in certain polling places.
In an extreme example, an attack could strike on Election Day, perhaps late in
the day, and completely wipe out the state of the machine by erasing its flash
memory. The only way to restore such a machine to a working state would be
to have a service technician visit, install a special EPROM chip on the
machine’s motherboard, and reboot the machine from that EPROM.

c) Injecting Attack Code

The attacker can install a voting machine virus/ malicious software that
spreads to other machines, allowing him to commit widespread fraud even if
he only has physical access to one machine or memory card.

d) Difficulty of Recovery
If a voting machine has been infected with malicious code, or even if the
infection is suspected, it is necessary to disinfect the machine This is difficult
to do reliably. There is no foolproof way to tell whether an update presented
really has been installed safely. The only assured way to revert the machine to
a safe state is to boot from EPROM. This involves making an EPROM chip
containing an update tool, inserting the EPROM chip into the motherboard,
setting the machine to boot from the chip, and powering it on. On boot, the
EPROM-based updater would overwrite the on-board flash memory, restoring
the machine to a known state. Since this procedure involves the insertion (and
later removal) of a chip, it would probably require a service technician to visit
each machine.

4. NEED FOR FUTURE EVALUATION

i)Adopting and implementing the latest technological advancements in

improving and fine-tuning the election processes and systems.
ii) Making a touchscreen voting machine with the display showing the
photos of the candidates along with their basic bio-data and party details.
iii) A Government-approved card such as Aadhaar card which can be
snipped in the voting machine just like the ATM machines without tracking the
user’s votes can improve the voting authenticity.
iv) EVM should be designed such that it allows any person to vote for
their constituency from any polling booth will greatly boost the total vote
percentage.
 v) By modifying software the same EVM can be used for general as
well as the local election.
vi) voice clip could be includes for the blind people to
vote and provide feedback.
vii) The key feature we may provide that all the EVMs should be
connected to one central control room via satellite link so that result of the
entire election might be displayed within some hour on the same day.

5. Conclusion
This paper discussed about the EVM, its variation and various ways it can be
hacked or tampered. EVM’s has advantages but disadvantages too, many types
of voting machine are designed which are discussed ins case study. Different
countries desined there EVM’and various challenges faced by them that can be
rectified by advancement in technology. Issues related to EVM’s are discussed
and some usefull improvement are also suggested to enhance the operation of
EVM so that in future elections should be smooth, tamper-free, error less and
more secure. For the authenticity of the voting casted by voters, Adhaar Card
linking process will be proved as one of key factor. By doing this any one can
caste his/her vote from any part of the world, voting management of the
election commission will be improved by ceasing fraudulent activities,
corruptions, ensuring security, transparency, fairness, accuracy, trustworthy
and keeping backup.

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