Martinez v.
Tan, 12 Phil 731
FACTS: There was received in evidence at the trial what is called Rosalia Martinez and Angel Tan were
married before a justice of the peace in Leyte. They executed an expediente de matrimonio civil. It is
written in Spanish and consists, first, of a petition directed to the justice of the peace, dated on the 25th of
September, 1907, signed both by Martinez and Tan, in which they state that they have mutually agreed to
enter into a contract of marriage before the justice of the peace, and ask that the justice solemnize the
marriage. Marriage was solemnized with two witnesses. The couple did not live together and when
Martinez went home to Ormoc, her relatives convinced her to file charges claiming that the marriage was
not valid since she signed the document in her own home thinking that it was a paper authorizing Tan to
ask the consent of her parents to the marriage.
ISSUE: WON the marriage is valid.
HELD: Yes. They were married since there was an expression of mutual consent and both of them
appeared before the justice of the peace. They both understood Spanish thus they knew the contents of
the document they were signing.
ROSALIA MARTINEZ, vs ANGEL TAN
G.R. No. L-4904 February 5, 1909
Facts:
The parties went to the office of the justice of the peace purportedly to sign a petition written in
Spanish in which they stated that they have mutually agreed to enter into a contract of marriage
before the justice and asked the him to solemnize the marriage. The justice of the peace said
nothing until after the document was signed. Then, addressing himself to the parties, he said,
"You are married." Then a document was signed by the parties, the justice of the peace and the
above-named witnesses ratifying under oath the contents of the petition and that the parties were
actually present in the office of the justice of the peace and witnesses have been produced.
Then a certificate of marriage signed by the justice of the peace and the witnesses Zacarias
Esmero and Pacita Ballori, dated the 25th day of September, 1907, in which it is stated that the
plaintiff and the defendant were legally married by the justice of the peace in the presence of the
witnesses on that day was issued.
ISSue:
WON a valid marriage exists.
Ruling:
General orders, No. 68, section 6, is as follows:
No particular form from the ceremony of marriage is required, but the parties must
declare in the presence of the person solemnizing the marriage, that they take each other
as husband and wife.
It was proven that both the plaintiff and the defendant were able to read and write the Spanish
language, and that they knew the contents of the document which they signed. Thus, under the
circumstances, that what took place before the justice of the peace on this occasion amounted to
a legal marriage.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 4904. February 5, 1909. ]
ROSALIA MARTINEZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ANGEL TAN, Defendant-Appellee.
Domingo Franco, for Appellant.
Doroteo Karagdag, for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE; MARRIAGE BY JUSTICE OF THE PEACE. — A man and
woman appeared before a justice of the peace and there signed a statement setting forth that they
had agreed to marry each other and asked the justice to solemnize the marriage. Another
document was then signed by them, by the justice and by two witnesses, stating that the man and
woman appeared before the justice and ratified all that was contained in the preceding instrument
and insisted upon the marriage. After the signing of these documents the justice announced to the
man and woman that they were married: Held, That, under the circumstances in this case, there
was a sufficient compliance with section 6 of General Orders, No. 68, to constitute a valid
marriage.
2. PLEADING AND PRACTICE; ANSWER; AMENDMENT DURING TRIAL. — Held, That
the court did not err in allowing the defendant to amend his answer during the progress of the
trial.
DECISION
WILLARD, J. :
The only question in this case is whether or not the plaintiff and the defendant were
married on the 25th day of September, 1907, before the justice of the peace, Jose
Ballori, in the town of Palompon in the Province of Leyte.
There was received in evidence at the trial what is called an expediente de matrimonio
civil. It is written in Spanish and consists, first, of a petition directed to the justice of
the peace, dated on the 25th of September, 1907, signed by the plaintiff and the
defendant, in which they state that they have mutually agreed to enter into a contract
of marriage before the justice of the peace, and ask that the justice solemnize the
marriage. Following this is a document dated on the same day, signed by the justice of
the peace, by the plaintiff, by the defendant, and by Zacarias Esmero and Pacita Ballori.
It states the presentation of the petition above mentioned; that the persons who signed
it were actually present in the office of the justice on the day named; that they ratified
under oath the contents of the petition, and that they insisted in that they had there
asked for. It also stated that being required to produce witnesses of the marriage, they
presented Zacarias Esmero as a witness for the husband and Pacita Ballori as a witness
for the wife. Following this is a certificate of marriage signed by the justice of the peace
and the witnesses Zacarias Esmero and Pacita Ballori, dated the 25th day of
September, 1907, in which it is stated that the plaintiff and the defendant were legally
married by the justice of the peace in the presence of the witnesses on that day.
The court below decided the case in favor of the defendant, holding that the parties
were legally married on the day named. The evidence in support of that decision is:
First. The document itself, which the plaintiff admits that she signed. Second. The
evidence of the defendant, who testifies that he and the plaintiff appeared before the
justice of the peace at the time named, together with the witnesses Zacarias Esmero
and Pacita Ballori, and that they all signed the document above mentioned. Third. The
evidence of Zacarias Esmero, one of the above-named witnesses, who testifies that the
plaintiff, the defendant, and Pacita Ballori appeared before the justice at the time
named and did sign the document referred to. Fourth. The evidence of Pacita Ballori,
who testified to the same effect. Fifth. The evidence of Jose Santiago, the bailiff of the
court of the justice of the peace, who testified that the plaintiff, the defendant, the two
witnesses above-named, and the justice of the peace were all present in the office of
the justice of the peace at the time mentioned.
The only direct evidence in favor of the plaintiff is her own testimony that she never
appeared before the justice of the peace and never was married to the defendant. She
admits that she signed the document in question, but says that she signed it in her own
home, without reading it, and at the request of the defendant, who told her that it was
a paper authorizing him to ask the consent of her parents to the marriage.
There is some indirect evidence which the plaintiff claims supports her case, but which
we think, when properly considered, is not entitled to much weight. The plaintiff at the
time was visiting, in the town of Palompon, her married brother and was there for
about two weeks. The wife of her brother, Rosario Bayot, testified that the plaintiff
never left the house except in her company. But she admitted on cross-examination
that she herself went to school every morning and that on one occasion the plaintiff had
gone to church unaccompanied. The testimony of this witness loses its force when the
testimony of Pacita Ballori is considered. She says that at the request of the defendant
on the day named, about 5 o’clock in the afternoon, she went to the store of a Chinese
named Veles; that there she met the plaintiff and her mother; that she asked the
mother of the plaintiff to allow the plaintiff to accompany her, the witness, to her own
house for the purpose of examining some dress patterns; that the mother gave her
consent and the two girls left the store, but instead of going to the house of the witness
they went directly to the office of the justice of the peace where the ceremony took
place; that after the ceremony had taken place, one came advising them that the
mother was approaching, and that they thereupon hurriedly left the office of the justice
and went to the house of Pacita Ballori, where the mother later found them.
The other testimony of the plaintiff relating to certain statements made by the justice of
the peace, who died after the ceremony was performed and before the trial, and certain
statements made by Pacita Ballori, is not sufficient to overcome the positive testimony
of the witnesses for the defendant.
The testimony of Pacita Ballori is severely criticized by counsel for the appellant in his
brief. It appears that during her first examination she was seized with an hysterical
attack and practically collapsed at the trial. Her examination was adjourned to a future
day and was completed in her house where she was sick in bed. It is claimed by
counsel that her collapse was due to the fact that she recognized that she testified
falsely in stating that the office of the justice of the peace was at the time in the
municipal building, when, in fact, it was in a private house. We do not think that the
record justifies the claim of the Appellant. The statement as to the location of the office
of the justice of the peace was afterwards corrected by the witness and we are satisfied
that she told the facts substantially as they occurred.
There is, moreover, in the case written evidence which satisfies us that the plaintiff was
not telling the truth when she said she did not appear before the justice of the peace.
This evidence consists of eight letters, which the defendant claims were all written by
the plaintiff. The plaintiff admits that she wrote letters numbered 2 and 9. The
authenticity of the others was proven. No. 9 is as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"ANGEL: Up to this time I did not see my father; but I know that he is very angry and if
he be informed that we have been married civilly, I am sure that he will turn me out of
the house.
"Do what you may deem convenient, as I don’t know what to do.
"Should I be able to go tomorrow to Merida, I shall do so, because I can not remain
here.
"Yours, ROSAL"
Letter No. 6, which bears no date, but which undoubtedly was written on the morning
of the 25th of September, is as follows: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Sr. D. ANGEL TAN.
"ANGEL: It is impossible for me to go to the house of Veles this morning because my
sister-in-law w ill not let me go there; if it suits you, I believe that this afternoon, about
5 or 6 o’clock, is the best hour.
"Arrange everything, as I shall go there only for the purpose of signing, and have Pacita
wait for me at the Chinese store, because I don’t like to go without Pacita.
"The house must be one belonging to prudent people, and no one should know anything
about it.
"Yours, ROSAL." cralaw virtua1aw library
It will be noticed that this corroborates completely the testimony of Pacita Ballori as to
her meeting the plaintiff in the afternoon at the store of the Chinese, Veles. Letter No. 7
is also undated, but was evidently written after the marriage before the justice of the
peace. It is as follows: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Sr. D. ANGEL TAN.
"ANGEL: If you want to speak to my mother, who is also yours, come here by and by,
at about 9 or 10, when you see that the tide is high because my brother will have to go
to the boat for the purpose of loading lumber.
"Don’t tell her that we have been civilly married, but tell her at first that you are willing
to celebrate the marriage at this time, because I don’t like her to know to-day that we
have been at the court-house, inasmuch as she told me this morning that she heard
that we would go to the court, and that we must not cause her to be ashamed, and that
if I insist on being married I must do it right.
"Tell her also that you have asked me to marry you.
"I send you herewith the letter of your brother, in order that you may do what he
wishes.
"Yours, ROSAL." cralaw virtua1aw library
Letter No. 8 was also evidently written after the marriage and is in part as follows: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Sr. D. ANGEL TAN.
"ANGEL: I believe it is better for you to go to Ormoc on Sunday on the steamer Rosa,
for the purpose of asking my father’s permission for our marriage, and in case he fails
to give it, then we shall do what we deem proper, and, if he does not wish us to marry
without his permission, you must request his consent.
"Tell me who said that my sister-in-law knows that we are civilly married; my brother’s
ill treatment is a matter of no importance, as every thing may be carried out, with
patience."cralaw virtua1aw library
It was proven at the trial that the defendant did go to Ormoc on the steamer Rosa as
indicated in this letter, and that the plaintiff was on the same boat. The plaintiff
testified, however, that she had no communication with the defendant during the
voyage. The plaintiff and the defendant never lived together as husband and wife, and
upon her arrival in Ormoc, after consulting with her family, she went to Cebu and
commenced this action, which was brought for the purpose of procuring the cancellation
of the certificate of marriage and for damages. The evidence strongly preponderates in
favor of the decision of the court below to the effect that the plaintiff appeared before
the justice of the peace at the time named.
It is claimed by the plaintiff that what took place before the justice of the peace, even
admitting all that the witnesses for the defendant testified to, did not constitute a legal
marriage. General Orders, No. 68, section 6, is as follows: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"No particular form for the ceremony of marriage is required, but the parties must
declare, in the presence of the person solemnizing the marriage, that they take each
other as husband and wife." cralaw virtua1aw library
Zacarias Esmero, one of the witnesses, testified that upon the occasion in question the
justice of the peace said nothing until after the document was signed and then
addressing himself to the plaintiff and the defendant said, "You are married." The
petition signed by the plaintiff and defendant contained a positive statement that they
had mutually agreed to be married and they asked the justice of the peace to solemnize
the marriage. The document signed by the plaintiff, the defendant, and the justice of
the peace, stated that they ratified under oath, before the justice, the contents of the
petition and that witnesses of the marriage were produced. A marriage took place as
shown by the certificate of the justice of the peace, signed by both contracting parties,
which certificate gives rise to the presumption that the officer authorized the marriage
in due form, the parties before the justice of the peace declaring that they took each
other as husband and wife, unless the contrary is proved, such presumption being
corroborated in this case by the admission of the woman to the effect that she had
contracted the marriage certified to in the document signed by her, which admission
can only mean that the parties mutually agreed to unite in marriage when they
appeared and signed the said document which so states before the justice of the peace
who authorized the same. It was proven that both the plaintiff and the defendant were
able to read and write the Spanish language, and that they knew the contents of the
document which they signed; and under the circumstances in this particular case we
are satisfied, and so hold, that what took place before the justice of the peace on this
occasion amounted to a legal marriage.
The defendant’s original answer was a general denial of the allegations contained in the
complaint. Among these allegations was a statement that the parties had agreed to be
married on condition that the defendant obtain previously the consent of the plaintiff’s
parents. The defendant was afterwards allowed to amend his answer so that it was a
denial of all the allegations of the complaint except that relating to the condition in
regard to the consent of the parents. The plaintiff objected to the allowance of this
amendment. After the trial had commenced the defendant was again allowed to amend
his answer so that it should be an admission of paragraphs 2 and 3 of the complaint,
except that part which related to the consent of the parents. It will be seen that this
second amendment destroyed completely the first amendment and the defendant’s
lawyer stated that what he had alleged in his second amendment was what he intended
to allege in his first amendment, but by reason of the haste with which the first
amendment was drawn he had unintentionally made it exactly the opposite of what he
had intended to state. After argument the court allowed the second amendment. We
are satisfied that in this allowance there was no abuse of discretion and we do not see
how the plaintiff was in any way prejudiced. She proceeded with the trial of the case
without asking for a continuance.
The judgment of the court below acquitting the defendant of the complaint is affirmed,
with the costs of this instance against the Appellant.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, Johnson and Carson, JJ., concur.