Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-23307 June 30, 1967
DAMASO P. PEREZ and REPUBLIC BANK, ETC., ET AL., petitioners-appellants,
vs.
MONETARY BOARD, THE SUPERINTENDENT OF BANKS,
CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, respondents-
appellees.
AURORA R. RECTO, MIGUEL CANIZARES, LEON ANCHETA, PABLO ROMAN,
VICTORIA B. ROMAN and NORBERTO J. QUISUMBING, intervenors-appellees.
C. D. Baizas and Associates and Halili, Bolinao and Associates for petitioners-appellants.
Natalio M. Balboa, F. E. Evangelista and Severo Malvar for respondent-appellee Central
Bank.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz and Solicitor C. S. Gaddi for respondent-
appellee Secretary of Justice.
N. J. Quisumbing and E. Quisumbing-Fernando for intervenors-appellees.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
Petitioner-appellant Damaso P. Perez, for himself and in a derivative capacity on behalf of
the Republic Bank, instituted mandamus proceedings in the Court of First Instance of
Manila on June 23, 1962, against the Monetary Board, the Superintendent of Banks, the
Central Bank and the Secretary of Justice. His object was to compel these respondents to
prosecute, among others, Pablo Roman and several other Republic Bank officials for
violations of the General Banking Act (specifically secs. 76-78 and 83 thereof) and the
Central Bank Act, and for falsification of public or commercial documents in connection with
certain alleged anomalous loans amounting to P1,303,400.00 authorized by Roman and the
other bank officials.
Respondents assailed, in their respective answers, the propriety of mandamus. The
Secretary of Justice claimed that it was not their specific duty to prosecute the persons
denounced by Perez. The Central Bank and its respondent officials, on the other hand,
averred that they had already done their duty under the law by referring to the special
prosecutors of the Department of Justice for criminal investigation and prosecution those
cases involving the alleged anomalous loans.1
On July 10, 1962, respondents moved for the dismissal of the petition for lack of cause of
action. Petitioners opposed. The lower court denied the motion.
Subsequently, herein intervenors-appellees, as the incumbent directors of the Board of the
Republic Bank, filed motion to intervene in the proceedings. Petitioners opposed the motion
but the lower court approved the same.
On January 20, 1964, the Monetary Board of the Central Bank passed Resolution No. 81
granting the request of Republic Bank for credit accommodations to cover the unusual
withdrawal of deposits by its depositors in view of the fact that said Bank was under
investigation then by the authorities. The grant, however, was conditioned upon the
execution by the management and controlling stockholders of the Republic Bank of a voting
trust agreement in favor of a Board of Trustees to be chosen by the latter with the approval
of the Central Bank.
Pursuant to this resolution, Pablo Roman and his family, is the controlling stockholders of
Republic Bank, executed a voting trust agreement in favor of a board of trustees composed
of former Chief Justice Ricardo Paras, Hon. Miguel Cuaderno and Mr. Felix de la Costa.
Subsequently, or on March 13, 1964, this agreement was superseded by another one with
the Philippine National Bank as the trustee. 2
In view of these developments, the intervenors-appellees filed a motion to dismiss before
the lower court claiming that the ouster of Pablo Roman and his family from the
management of the Republic Bank effected by the voting trust agreement rendered
the mandamus case moot and academic. Respondents-appellees also filed motion to
dismiss in which they again raised the impropriety of mandamus. Acting upon the two
motions and the oppositions thereto filed by petitioners, the lower court granted the motions
and dismissed the case. Hence, this appeal.
Appellants, contending that the ouster of Pablo Roman from Republic Bank's management
and control has not altered or rendered moot the issues in the case, argue that the remedy
of mandamus lies3 to compel respondents to prosecute the aforementioned Pablo Roman
and company. Addressing Ourselves directly to this issue raised on the propriety of the
petition for mandamus, We rule that petitioners cannot seek by mandamus to compel
respondents to prosecute criminally those alleged violators of the banking laws. Although
the Central Bank and its respondent officials may have the duty under the Central Bank Act
and the General Banking Act to cause the prosecution of those alleged violators, yet We
find nothing in said laws that imposes a clear, specific duty on the former to do the actual
prosecution of the latter. The Central Bank is a government corporation created principally
to administer the monetary and banking system of the Republic, 4 not a prosecution
agency5 like the fiscal's office. Being an artificial person, The Central Bank is limited to its
statutory powers and the nearest power to which prosecution of violators of banking laws
may be attributed is its power to sue and be sued. 6 But this corporate power of litigation
evidently refers to civil cases only.
1äwphï1.ñët
The Central Bank and its respondent officials have already done all they could, within the
confines of their powers, to cause the prosecution of those persons denounced by Perez.
Annexes 5 to 7-C CBP of respondents' answer and even petitioners' opposition to the first
motion to dismiss7 show that the cases of the alleged anomalous loans had already been
referred by the Central Bank to the special prosecutors of the Department of Justice for
criminal investigation and prosecution. For respondents to do the actual prosecuting
themselves, as petitioners would have it, would be tantamount to an ultra vires act already.
As for the Secretary of Justice, while he may have the power to prosecute — through the
office of the Solicitor General — criminal cases, yet it is settled rule that mandamus will not
lie to compel a prosecuting officer to prosecute a criminal case in court. 8
Moreover, it does not appear from the law that only the Central Bank or its respondent
officials can cause the prosecution of alleged violations of banking laws. Said violations
constitute a public offense, the prosecution of which is a matter of public interest and hence,
anyone — even private individuals — can denounce such violations before the prosecuting
authorities. Since Perez himself could cause the filing of criminal complaints against those
allegedly involved in the anomalous loans, if any, then he has a plain, adequate and speedy
remedy in the ordinary course of law, which makes mandamus against respondents
improper.
But petitioners-appellants would insist that the impropriety of mandamus could no longer be
raised before the lower court for the second time since it had already been invoked in
previous motion to dismiss which was denied. This is untenable. The lower court was not
estopped from changing its opinion while it was under its jurisdiction to do so and on the
same ground of lack of cause of action raised before, because the former order was purely
interlocutory and thus remained constantly subject to alteration, modification or reversal by
it before the rendition of final judgment on its merits. 9
Wherefore, the order of dismissal appealed from is, as it is hereby, affirmed. Costs against
petitioner-appellant Perez. So ordered. 1äwphï1.ñët
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro JJ.,
concur.
Footnotes
1
See Annexes 5, 7 and 7-A CBP of respondents' answer.
2
See Annex "A" of petitioners-appellants' brief.
3
I.e., that in their petition, pars. 6-10 and 12 specially, a cause of action
for mandamus is stated.
4
Sec. 2, Republic Act 265.
5
See: People vs. Tan, L-9275, June 30, 1960.
6
Sec. 4, Republic Act 265.
7
See Records, p. 40.
Gonzales vs, Court of First Instance, 63 Phil. 846; Dimaunahan vs. Hon. Aranas, 74
8
Phil. 455; People vs. Natoza, L-8917, Dec. 24, 1956.
