JRSA

SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT NETWORK, INC. V. ANTI-TERRORISM

GR NO. 178552

NATURE OF CASE:

DOCTRINE/PRINCIPLE: (FOR CONSTI)

PETITIONERS:

RESPONDENTS:

FACTS: This case consists of 6 petitions challenging the constitutionality of RA 9372, “An
Act to Secure the State and Protect our People from Terrorism,” aka Human Security Act of
2007. Petitioners claim that RA 9372 is vague and broad, in that terms like “widespread and
extraordinary fear and panic among the populace” and “coerce the government to give in to an
unlawful demand” are nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies with no standard to
measure the prohibited acts.

BACKGROUND:
 6 March 2007: RA NO 9372 (Human Security Act of 2007) was signed into law
 15 July 2007: RA 9372 came into effect
 16 July 2007: Petitioner NGO Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. and
Atty. Santos filed a petitioner for certiorari and prohibition (GR No. 178554)
 17 July 2007: Petitioner organizations joined by concerned citizens and taxpayers filed
same petition of certiorari and prohibition
 6 August 2007: Petitioner organizations filed same petition of certiorari and prohibition
 29 August 2007: Petitioner organization filed same petition of certiorari and
prohibition, replicates same allegations as in GR No. 178581
 All six petitioners are petitioner for certiorari and prohibtion, praying that the Court
declare RA No 9372 otherwise knows as the Human Security Act of 2007 be declared
unconstitutional.

ISSUE:
1. WON petitioners’ resort to certiorari was proper
2. WON RA 9372 regulates speech so as to permit a facial analysis of its validity

FALLO: f

HELD:
Issue #1: WON Petitioners’ resort to certiorari was proper
Certiorari does not lie against respondents who do not exercise judicial or quasi-judicial
functions
 Sec 1, Rule 65 of ROC – “when any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions…actued without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with
GAOD amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction”
 Certiorari may not be issed agains respondents
 Petitioners failed to allege how respondents acted without or in excess of their
respective jurisdictions, or with GAOD amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction

Two requisites or judicial review was not complied with by the petitioners
 Power of judicial review limited by 4 requisites
o Must be actual case of controversy
o Petitioners must possess locus standi
o Question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity
o The issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case
 The first two essential requisites were absent in the present case, hence there is no
reason for the case to proceed

Issue #2: WON RA 9372 regulates speech so as to permit a facial analysis of its validity

The doctrines of void-for-vagueness and overbreadth find no application in the present case since these
doctrines apply only to free speech cases and that RA 9372 regulates conduct, not speech.
• Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan: The overbreadth and the vagueness doctrines have special application only
to free speech cases, and are not appropriate for testing the validity of penal statutes.
• The aforementioned cases rely heavily on Justice Mendoza’s Separate Opinion in the Estrada case: Allegations that a penal
statute is vague and overbroad do not justify a facial review of its validity. A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague
statute and to one, which is overbroad because of possible chilling effect upon protected speech. This rationale does not apply
to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect. Overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special
application only to free speech cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes.
• Since a penal statute may only be assailed for being vague as applied to petitioners, a limited vagueness analysis of the
definition of “terrorism” in RA 9372 is legally impossible absent an actual or imminent charge against them.
• The confusion apparently stems from the interlocking relation of the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines as grounds for a
facial or as-applied challenge against a penal statute (under a claim of violation of due process of law) or a speech regulation
(under a claim of abridgement of the freedom of speech and cognate rights).
• The doctrine of vagueness and the doctrine of overbreadth do not operate on the same plane.
o A statute or acts suffers from the defect of vagueness when:
 It lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ
as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in 2 ways:
1.) violates due process for failure to accord fair notice of conduct to avoid and
2.) leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle.
o The overbreadth doctrine decrees that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state
regulations may not be achieved by means, which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected
freedoms.

Notes:
DOCTRINE: AS APPLIED CHALLENGE
A “facial” challenge is likewise different from an “as applied” challenge.
• “As applied” challenge considers only extant (existing) facts affecting real litigants.
• “Facial” challenge is an examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only on the basis of its actual
operation to the parties, but also on the assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others not before the court
to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or activities. Under no case may ordinary penal statutes be subjected to a
facial challenge. If facial challenge to a penal statute is permitted, the prosecution of crimes may be hampered. No prosecution
would be possible.
• Justice Mendoza accurately phrased the subtitle in his concurring opinion that the vagueness and
overbreadth doctrines, as grounds for a facial challenge, are not applicable to penal laws. A litigant cannot
thus successfully mount a facial challenge against a criminal statute on either vagueness or overbreadth
grounds.
• The rule established in our jurisdiction is, only statutes on free speech, religious freedom, and other fundamental rights may
be facially challenged. Under no case may ordinary penal statutes be subjected to a facial challenge. If a facial challenge
to a penal statute is permitted, the prosecution of crimes may be hampered. No prosecution would be possible. A facial
challenge against a penal statute is, at best amorphous and speculative. It would, essentially, force the court to consider third
parties who are not before it. As I have said in my opposition to the allowance of a facial challenge to attack penal statutes,
such a test will impair the State’s ability to deal with crime. If warranted, there would be nothing that can hinder an accused
from defeating the State’s power to prosecute on a mere showing that, as applied to third parties, the penal statute is vague or
overbroad, notwithstanding that the law is clear as applied to him.
• It is settled, on the other hand, that the application of the overbreadth doctrine is limited to a facial kind of
challenge and, owing to the given rationale of a facial challenge, applicable only to free speech cases.
• The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks an exception to some of the usual
rules of constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to him or
her; if the litigant prevails, the courts carve away the unconstitutional aspects of the law by invalidating its improper
applications on a case to case basis. Moreover, challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the rights of third parties and can
only assert their own interests. In overbreadth analysis, those rules give way; challenges are permitted to raise the rights of
third parties; and the court invalidates the entire statute "on its face," not merely "as applied for" so that the overbroad law
becomes unenforceable until a properly authorized court construes it more narrowly. The factor that motivates courts to depart
from the normal adjudicatory rules is the concern with the "chilling;" deterrent effect of the overbroad statute on third parties
not courageous enough to bring suit. The Court assumes that an overbroad law’s "very existence may cause others not before
the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression." An overbreadth ruling is designed to remove that
deterrent effect on the speech of those third parties.
• Since a penal statute may only be assailed for being vague as applied to petitioners, a limited
vagueness analysis of the definition of “terrorism” in RA 9372 is legally impermissible absent anactual or imminent
charge against them.