1. Far East Bank vs.
Pacilan
G.R. 157314 July 29, 2005
FACTS:
Pacilan maintains a current account with petitioner bank (now BPI). He issued
several postdated checks, the last one being check no. 2434886 amounting to P680. The
said check was presented to petitioner bank for payment on April 4, 1988 but was
dishonored. It appeared that the account of Pacilan has been closed on the evening of
April 4 on the ground that it was 'improperly handled'.
It appeared that the plaintiff issued four checks from March 30 - April 4, 1988
amounting in total to P7,410, on one hand, his funds in the bank only amounted to
P6,981.43, thus an overdraft of P 428.57 resulted therefrom. Consequently, the last
check was dishonored despite the fact that plaintiff deposited the amount the following
day.
Pacilan wrote a complaint to the bank but after the bank did not reply, he filed
an action for damages against it and the employee (Villadelgado) who closed the
account. The plaintiff alleged that the immediate closure of his account was malicious
and intended to embarrass him.
The lower court ruled in favor of the plaintiff and awarded actual damages
(P100,000) and exemplary damages (P50,000). The bank appealed, but the CA affirmed
the lower court's decision with modifications and held that the closure of the bank of
plaintiff's account despite its rules and regulation allowing a re-clearing of a check
returned for insufficiency of funds, is patently malicious and unjustifiable. Hence, this
appeal.
The petitioner contended that in closing the account, it acted in good faith and in
accordance with the pertinent banking rules and regulations governing the operations
of a regular demand deposit, allowing it to close an account if the depositor frequently
draws checks against insufficient funds or uncollected deposits.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is liable for damages.
RULING:
NO. The award of damages under Art. 19 of the Civil Code is unjustifiable. The
petitioner has the right to close the account of plaintiff based on the rules and
regulations on regular demand deposits. The facts do not show that the petitioner
abused its rights in the exercise of its duties. The evidence negates the existence of bad
faith and malice on the part of the petitioner bank, which are the second and third
elements necessary to prove an abuse of right in violation of Art. 19.
The records also showed that indeed plaintiff has mishandled his account by
issuing checks previously against insufficient funds not just once, but more than a
hundred times.
Moreover, the acceptance by the bank of the deposit the day after the closure of
the account cannot be considered as bad faith nor done with malice but a mere simple
negligence of its personnel.
As a result, whatever damage the plaintiff has suffered (by virtue of the
subsequent dishonor of the other checks he issued) should be borne by him alone as
these was the result of his own act in irregularly handling his account.
2. Manila Prince Hotel vs GSIS,
GR No. 122156, February 3, 1997
FACTS:
Pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippines Government under
Proclamation No. 50 dated December 8, 1986 GSIS decided to sell through public
bidding 30% to 51% of the issued outstanding shares of respondent Manila Prince Hotel.
In a close bidding held on September 18,1995 only two (2) bidders participated:
Petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation a Filipino Corporation, which offered to buy
51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhard, a
Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number
of shares at P44.00 per share. Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning
bidder/strategic partner and the execution of necessary contracts, petitioner in a letter
to GSIS dated September 28,1995 matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered
by Renong Berhard. In the subsequent letter dated October 10, 1995 the petitioner sent
a managers check for P33, 000,000.00 as bid security to match the bid of Renong
Berhard, which respondent GSIS refuse to accept.
On October 17, 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has disregard
the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by
respondent GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner came to Court on
prohibition and mandamus.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is Self-executing
or not.
RULING:
YES. Sec 10, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.
A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of
the 1987 Constitution is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in
itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation,
or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be
enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing
if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the
constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction
of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the
legislature for action.
Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in such a way as not
to make it appear that it is not self-executing but simply for purposes of style. But,
certainly, the legislature is not precluded from enacting further laws to enforce the
constitutional provision so long as the contemplated statute squares with the
Constitution. Minor details may be left to the legislature without impairing the self-
executing nature of constitutional provisions.
Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive
command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or
implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does
not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable.
3. People of the Philippines vs Jesalva,
GR No. 227306, June 19, 2017
FACTS:
On September 16, 2007, at around 1:00 a.m., Ortigosa, his cousin Renato B.
Flores (Flores) and Manny Boy Ditche were drinking in Dupax Street, Old Balara, Quezon
City. Later, they decided to go to a store to buy cigarettes. On their way to the store,
Flores noticed accused-appellant standing in a comer near the store and staring at them.
Then, accused-appellant walked away and disappeared. Later, accused-appellant
reappeared, accompanied by Menieva and Ilaw, and followed Ortigosa and his group to
the store. When accused-appellant and his companions were already in front of
Ortigosa, Menieva uttered, "Ne!, ano ba yan?" and proceeded to stab Ortigosa twice
with an icepick. Menieva stabbed Ortigosa first on the right portion of his chest, then on
his left armpit. As Menieva stabbed Ortigosa, Ilaw pointed a sumpak at Ortigosa while
accused-appellant pointed at Ortigosa' s group and left.
After the stabbing, Ortigosa and his group tried to run back to where they were
drinking. Before they reached the place, Ortigosa fell on the ground. His companions
rushed him to East Avenue Medical Center where he died.
A case was filed before the RTC and the accused-appellant denied any
participation in Ortigosa's stabbing. He claimed that on the night of the incident, he was
waiting for his sister on the corner of Dupax Street. While waiting, he saw and heard
people running and shouting which caused him to leave the place.
The RTC found the accused appellant guilty of murder. The CA affirmed with
modification the trial court's Decision and held that conspiracy was evident from the
coordinated movements of the three accused.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a conspiracy between the accused-appellant and the other
accused.
RULING:
NO. The prosecution failed to prove that accused-appellant conspired with
Menieva and Ilaw in committing the crime of murder.
Conspiracy is said to exist where two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. The essence of
conspiracy is the unity of action and purpose. Its elements, like the physical acts
constituting the crime itself, must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Accused-appellant's act of pointing to the victim and his group is not an overt act
which shows that accused-appellant acted in concert with his co-accused to cause the
death of Ortigosa. It is stressed that mere knowledge, acquiescence or approval of the
act, without the cooperation and the agreement to cooperate, is not enough to
establish conspiracy. Even if the accused were present and agreed to cooperate with the
main perpetrators of the crime, their mere presence does not make them parties to it,
absent any active participation in the furtherance of the common design or purpose.
Likewise, where the only act attributable to the other accused is an apparent readiness
to provide assistance, but with no certainty as to its ripening into an overt act, there is
no conspiracy. In this case, while accused-appellant's presence and act of pointing at the
victim and his group may mean he approved of the crime or that he was ready to assist
his co-accused, absent any other overt act on his part, there is no conspiracy.
