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Evaluating Effective Governance Systems

This document discusses effective forms of government and what makes a government successful. It examines different forms of governance throughout history from ancient civilizations to modern times. The author argues that "good" governance is effective, efficient, sustainable, and responsive to citizen needs, and that democracy is not necessary for good governance. The purpose is to critically assess what constitutes good governance, why it matters, and whether democracy is required. The literature review discusses papers on various forms of governments, including monarchies, legalism, and democracy, and considers their successes and failures.

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Elliot Lazarus
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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
138 views57 pages

Evaluating Effective Governance Systems

This document discusses effective forms of government and what makes a government successful. It examines different forms of governance throughout history from ancient civilizations to modern times. The author argues that "good" governance is effective, efficient, sustainable, and responsive to citizen needs, and that democracy is not necessary for good governance. The purpose is to critically assess what constitutes good governance, why it matters, and whether democracy is required. The literature review discusses papers on various forms of governments, including monarchies, legalism, and democracy, and considers their successes and failures.

Uploaded by

Elliot Lazarus
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd

Effective Forms of Government: What makes a government successful or not?

Vikraant V. Singh

IR 550: Pro-Seminar

Prof. Jonathon Whooley

September 1st, 2017


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Abstract

For as long as there have been ‘Governments’, there have been questions of “which

governments is the best?” or “which form of governance is ideal?” Yet, a fundamental issue, at

least in our current time, is what, exactly, does ‘good’ or ‘bad’ governance look and behaves

like. Thus, it becomes ever more imperative that we not only develop a system of measuring

governance, but also ensure that sure a system is not predispositioned to favor one system over

another, thus presenting an unbiased or definitive result as can be.

In this paper, we explore differing forms of governance over different time periods, such

as Classical Antiquity (Greek and Romans), Qin Dynasty to Song dynasty (China), Nara to

Tokugawa Period (Japan), Persian Empires (Iran), and so forth up to the present time. Many

political theorists would rather right off the political thoughts of our ancestors as backwards or

‘outdated’ without further examination, yet it is these same ancestors philosophical and political

works that have shaped our modern worlds and still have more to offer us. It seems incorrect to

disregard our ancestors’ political ideas and historical records because they are an ample source of

information for how things can go horribly wrong, how to avoid such things, and why certain

political systems developed the way they did.

Most importantly, the purpose of this paper is to examine and critically assess what good

governance is, why it matters, and if democracy is needed for good governance, as most Western

theorists persist? Thus, we argue that ‘good’ governance is one that is effective, efficient,

sustainable, and responsive to its peoples’ needs and that democracy is not needed for ‘good’

governance, regardless of what most Western theologians insist.

Key terms:
 Republic: of Latin origin, made of two words ‘res’, meaning “a thing,” and ‘publica’,
meaning “the public,” that refers to ‘the public thing (i.e. law)’. It is considered as the
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modern, standard form of government, which is ruled by the citizen’s representatives,


chosen by them through voting or other means. The government leaders can exercise
their powers as per the rule of law.
 Democracy: a combination of two Greek words ‘demos’, meaning “people,” and
‘kratein’, meaning “to rule.” In short, it means ‘the rule of the people’. It is a government
which is ruled by the citizens of a country, also known as the system of the masses.
Majority rule is the essence of this system.
 Legalism: strict adherence, or the principle of strict adherence, to law or prescription,
especially to the letter rather than the spirit.
o (initial capital letter) (in Chinese philosophy) the principles and practices of a
school of political theorists advocating strict legal control over all activities, a
system of rewards and punishments uniform for all classes, and an absolute
monarchy.
 Bureaucracy: a system of government in which most of the important decisions are made
by state officials rather than by elected representatives.
 Political Party: a group of persons organized to acquire and exercise political power.
 Democratic Peace Theory: the proposition that democracies are more peaceful in their
foreign relations.
 Authoritarian: a system of government that is centralized and dictatorial and requires
complete subservience to the state.
 “Mixed government”: A form of rule that combines elements of monarchic, aristocratic,
oligarchic, and democratic government.
 Monarchy: a state or nation in which the supreme power is actually or nominally lodged
in a monarch.
 Theocracy: a form of government in which God or a deity is recognized as the supreme
civil ruler, the God's or deity's laws being interpreted by the ecclesiastical authorities.
 Communism: a theory or system of social organization based on the holding of all
property in common, actual ownership being ascribed to the community as a whole or to
the state.
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 Technocracy: a theory and movement, prominent about 1932, advocating control of


industrial resources, reform of financial institutions, and reorganization of the social
system, based on the findings of technologists and engineers.

Literature Review

The issues of effective forms of Governance have been part of political debate for

centuries. For this matter, the subject matter of Comparative Politics was better suited for the

issue(s) at hand. The central issue of what ‘good’ governance is depends on if it is tied to a

certain form of government or not, does it require political parties or not, and the roles of

governments themselves.

In “Seeing like a state,” Scott argues about the 20th century Austrian view that central

planning in social-engineering is doomed to fail and the Austrian idea of learning from the locals

instead of having disassociated bureaucrats is better.1 Scott also talks about the battle between

states and taming its peoples and that centralization is ineffective when it comes to local issues,

thus devolving power to the local level is more preferred. He seems to take on a strong,

Eurocentric, modernist perspective of ‘civilization’ being the creation of European men and

disregards successful, ancient civilizations (Romans included) that were successful in statecraft

and in awareness of the economy and borders of their empires (i.e. taxation of people and

merchants, regulation of currency, units of measurement, travel within the empire, and surveying

the territory as well as massive engineering projects and longevity of the empires). Scott’s views

on decentralization point to the split between Unitary and Federal forms of government in the

world today, yet the prevalent of the two is Unitary as well as being more successful, which

makes Scott’s views less convincing, but still worth considering.2


1
Scott, James C. “Seeing like a state: How certain schemes to improve the human condition have failed.” New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press,
1998.
2
Fukuyama, Francis, and James C. Scott. "Seeing like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed." Foreign
Affairs 77, no. 4 (1998): 121. Accessed September 5, 2017. doi:10.2307/20048980.
Singh 5

Many of the papers describe the many forms of governments that have existed and do

exist. They explore the notions of why Monarchies have been so enduring and why some

survived while others were overthrown3, how Legalism emerged and how it functions and related

to modern notions of law and governance45, the concepts of democracy and how ‘democratic’

nations are similar in some aspects yet differ in others as well as the ideas of ‘democracy’

itself678910, and pondering on the other forms of governance and if these other forms are

successful or not across various fields of measurement for ‘good’ and/or ‘bad’ governance.11121314

Exploring how ancient governments functioned and were able to survive for long periods of time

is also worth looking into, without just criticizing them for being outdated and inefficient,

3
Tridimas, George. "On the Overthrow Or Endurance of Kings." Constitutional Political Economy 27, no. 1 (03, 2016): 41-65.
doi:[Link] [Link]
accountid=13802.
4
Schneider, David K. "China's New Legalism." The National Interest no. 143 (May, 2016): 19-25. [Link]
[Link]/docview/1792386756?accountid=13802.
5
Lu, Mingjun. "Implications of Han Fei's Philosophy for China's Legal and Institutional Reforms." Journal Of Chinese Political Science 21, no. 3
(September 2016): 339-356. Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed October 1, 2017).
6
Held, David. "The transformation of political community: rethinking democracy in the context of globalization." Democracy’s edges (1999).
7
Levitsky, Steven and Maxwell A. Cameron. "Democracy without Parties? Political Parties and Regime Change in Fujimori's Peru." Latin
American Politics and Society 45, no. 3 (Fall, 2003): 1-33. [Link]
8
GEIS, ANNA and WOLFGANG WAGNER. "How Far is it from Konigsberg to Kandahar? Democratic Peace and Democratic Violence in
International Relations." Review of International Studies 37, no. 4 (10, 2011): 1555-1577.
doi:[Link] [Link]
accountid=13802.
9
Donald K. Emmerson. "Minding the Gap Between Democracy and Governance." Journal of Democracy 23, no. 2 (2012): 62-73.
[Link] (accessed September 27, 2017).
10
Hidalgo, Oliver. "Conceptual History and Politics: Is the Concept of Democracy Essentially Contested?" Contributions to the History of
Concepts 4, no. 2 (2008): 176-201. [Link]
11
De Vries, Michiel. "The Challenge of Good Governance." The Innovation Journal18, no. 1 (0, 2013). [Link]
[Link]/docview/1417520454?accountid=13802.
12
Bovaird, Tony and Elke Loffler. "Evaluating the Quality of Public Governance: Indicators, Models and Methodologies." International Review of
Administrative Sciences 69, no. 3 (09, 2003): 313-328. [Link]
13
Postolache, Ana. "The Power of a Single Voice: The EU's Contribution to Global Governance Architecture." Romanian Journal of European
Affairs 12, no. 3 (09, 2012): 5-18. [Link]
14
Weiss, Thomas G. “Governance, good governance and global governance: Conceptual and actual challenges.” Third World Quarterly 21, no. 5
(2000): 795-814. DOI: 10.1080/713701075.
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especially since much of modern scholarship owes much to the ideas of our

ancestors.1516171819202122 If we talk about Governance and differing forms of government, then we

must also discuss how they are governed, such as the structure of Bureaucracy, both recent2324

and ancient.252627282930 We also explore how Chinese forms of governance3132 and political

15
Argyriades, Demetrius. "ROME AND BYZANTIUM: AN ADMINISTRATIVE OVERVIEW." Public Administration Quarterly 26, no. 3 (Fall, 2002):
373-392. [Link]
16
Claire Lazar, Nomi. "Why Rome Didn't Bark in the Night: Some Thoughts on Crisis Government and Constitutional Flexibility." Polity 45, no. 3
(07, 2013): 422-444. doi:[Link] [Link]
[Link]/docview/1433070014?accountid=13802.
17
DiCicco, Joel M. "THE DEVELOPMENT OF LEADERS IN ANCIENT CHINA, ROME, AND PERSIA." Public Administration Quarterly 27, no. 1 (Spring,
2003): 6-40. [Link]
18
Farazmand, Ali. "ADMINISTRATIVE LEGACIES OF THE PERSIAN WORLD-STATE EMPIRE: IMPLICATIONS FOR MODERN PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION, Part 1." Public Administration Quarterly 26, no. 3 (Fall, 2002): 280-316. [Link]
[Link]/docview/226978624?accountid=13802.
19
Song, Jaeyoon. "Redefining Good Government Shifting Paradigms in Song Dynasty (960-1279) Discourse on "Fengjian"." T'Oung Pao 97, no. 4-
5 (0, 2011): 301-343. doi:[Link] [Link]
[Link]/docview/1037872793?accountid=13802.
20
Dam, Raymond Van. "Peter Fibiger Bang, The Roman Bazaar: A Comparative Study of Trade and Markets in a Tributary Empire. Cambridge
Classical Studies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, pp. xvi 358." Comparative Studies in Society and History 52, no. 02 (2010):
486. doi:10.1017/s0010417510000265.
21
Richard L. A. Sterba. "Clandestine Management in the Imperial Chinese Bureaucracy." The Academy of Management Review 3, no. 1 (1978):
69-78. [Link]
22
Kalyvas, Andreas. "The Tyranny of Dictatorship: When the Greek Tyrant Met the Roman Dictator." Political Theory 35, no. 4 (2007): 412-42.
[Link]
23
Riggs, Fred W. "Modernity and Bureaucracy." Public Administration Review 57, no. 4 (Jul, 1997): 347-353. [Link]
[Link]/docview/197167538?accountid=13802.
24
ALKADRY, MOHAMAD G. "BUREAUCRACY: WEBER'S OR HAMMURABI'S? IDEAL OR ANCIENT?" Public Administration Quarterly 26, no. 3/4
(2002): 317-45. [Link]
25
Handelman, Don. "Cultural Taxonomy and Bureaucracy in Ancient China: The Book of Lord Shang." International Journal of Politics, Culture,
and Society 9, no. 2 (1995): 263-93. [Link]
26
James T. C. Liu. "Eleventh-Century Chinese Bureaucrats: Some Historical Classification and Behavioral Types." Administrative Science
Quarterly 4, no. 2 (1959): 207-26. doi:10.2307/2390679.
27
Song, Jaeyoon. "Redefining Good Government Shifting Paradigms in Song Dynasty (960-1279) Discourse on "Fengjian"." T'Oung Pao 97, no. 4-
5 (0, 2011): 301-343. doi:[Link] [Link]
[Link]/docview/1037872793?accountid=13802.
28
Kiser, Edgar and Yong Cai. "War and Bureaucratization in Qin China: Exploring an Anomalous Case." American Sociological Review 68, no. 4
(08, 2003): 511-539. [Link]
29
Paramore, Kiri. "Confucian Ritual and Sacred Kingship: Why the Emperors Did not Rule Japan." Comparative Studies in Society and History 58,
no. 03 (2016): 694-716. doi:10.1017/s0010417516000323.
30
Kim, Sungmoon. "Confucian Constitutionalism: Mencius and Xunzi on Virtue, Ritual, and Royal Transmission." The Review of Politics 73, no. 3
(2011): 371-99. [Link]
31
Tuo, Cai. "Global Governance and State Governance: Two Strategic Considerations in Contemporary China." Social Sciences in China 37, no. 4
(2016): 138-51. doi:10.1080/02529203.2016.1241499.
32
Xueliana, Liu, and Yao Lu. "The Implications of State Governance for Effective Global Governance." Social Sciences in China 37, no. 4 (2016):
175-85. doi:10.1080/02529203.2016.1241504.
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thought3334353637 differ, or not, from those in the ‘Western’ world383940414243 and even among

neighboring ‘Democratic’ Nations.44454647484950 Another issue presents itself, especially in the

context of modern governance, which is the role of Political Parties and if they are required for

‘good’ or ‘effective’ governance or not.5152535455 We will digest the literature by first splitting

them into smaller, more manageable sections. These sections will be: Governance, Morality

33
Minzner, Carl. "A Confucian Constitutional Order: How Chinas Ancient Past Can Shape Its Political Future. Jiang Qing Translated by Edmund
Ryden; Edited by Daniel Bell and Ruiping Fan. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2013. vi 256 pp. $39.50; £27.95. ISBN 978-0-
691-15460-2." The China Quarterly 215 (2013): 767-69. doi:10.1017/s0305741013000829.
34
Tong, Yanqi. "Morality, Benevolence, and Responsibility: Regime Legitimacy in China from Past to the Present." Journal of Chinese Political
Science 16, no. 2 (2011): 141-59. doi:10.1007/s11366-011-9141-7.
35
Zhang, Yongjin. "System, empire and state in Chinese international relations." Review of International Studies 27, no. 05 (2001).
doi:10.1017/s0260210501008026.
36
Yu, Keping. "An Essay on Officialism (Guanben Zhuyi): A Political Analysis of Chinese Traditional Society." Journal of Chinese Political Science
19, no. 3 (09, 2014): 235-247. doi:[Link] [Link]
[Link]/docview/1562606682?accountid=13802.
37
Yao, Yusheng and Kerry Brown. "Ballot Box in China: Grassroots Democracy in the Final Major One-Party State." The China Quarterly 207, (09,
2011): 727-729. doi:[Link] [Link]
[Link]/docview/893574014?accountid=13802.
38
Brinkerhoff, Derick W., and Ronald W. Johnson. "Decentralized local governance in fragile states: learning from Iraq." International Review of
Administrative Sciences 75, no. 4 (2009): 585-607. doi:10.1177/0020852309349424.
39
McGowan, William N. "Democracy vs. the Republic." The Clearing House 28, no. 6 (1954): 352-53. [Link]
40
Deudney, Daniel. "Publius before Kant: Federal-Republican Security and Democratic Peace." European Journal of International Relations 10,
no. 3 (09, 2004): 315. [Link]
41
Cohen, Eliot A. "History and the Hyperpower." Foreign Affairs 83, no. 4 (07, 2004): 49-63. [Link]
[Link]/docview/60163982?accountid=13802.
42
Thornhill, Chris. "Towards a Historical Sociology of Constitutional Legitimacy." Theory and Society 37, no. 2 (2008): 161-97.
[Link]
43
Dusza, Karl. "Max Weber's Conception of the State." International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 3, no. 1 (1989): 71-105.
[Link]
44
Chao, Linda, Ramon H. Myers, and James A. Robinson. "Promoting Effective Democracy, Chinese Style: Taiwan's National Development
Conference." Asian Survey 37, no. 7 (1997): 669-82. doi:10.2307/2645515.
45
Kang, Jung In. "The Rule of Law and the Rule of Virtue: On the Necessity for their Mutual Integration." Korea Journal 43, no. 1 (2003): 233-
260. [Link]
46
Kim, Pan Suk. "BUILDING TRUST BY IMPROVING GOVERNANCE: SEARCHING FOR A FEASIBLE WAY FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES." Public
Administration Quarterly 34, no. 3 (Fall, 2010): 271-299. [Link]
47
McNish, Ian. "Democracy without Competition in Japan: Opposition Failure in a One-Party Dominant State." The Journal of Social, Political,
and Economic Studies 31, no. 2 (Summer, 2006): 250-251. [Link]
48
Rosenbluth, Frances Mccall. "Japan in 2010." Asian Survey 51, no. 1 (Jan, 2011): 41-53.
doi:[Link] [Link]
accountid=13802.
49
Kuo, Cheng-tian. "State-Religion Relations in Taiwan: From Statism and Separatism to Checks and Balances*." Issues and Studies 49, no. 1 (03,
2013): 1-38. [Link]
50
Schubert, Gunter. "Taiwan's Political Parties and National Identity: The Rise of an Overarching Consensus." Asian Survey 44, no. 4 (Jul, 2004):
534-554. [Link]
51
Franklin, James C. "Political Party Opposition to Noncompetitive Regimes: A Cross-National Analysis." Political Research Quarterly 55, no. 3
(2002): 521-46. doi:10.2307/3088029.
52
CARAMANI, DANIELE. "Will Vs. Reason: The Populist and Technocratic Forms of Political Representation and their Critique to Party
Government." The American Political Science Review 111, no. 1 (02, 2017): 54-67.
53
Rizova, Tatiana Petrova. "The Party is Dead, Long Live the Party! Successor Party Adaptation to Democracy." Order No. 3346992, University of
California, Los Angeles, 2008. [Link]
54
Sartori, Giovanni. "The party‐effects of electoral systems." Israel Affairs 6, no. 2 (1999): 13-28. doi:10.1080/13537129908719557.
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versus Legalism, Bureaucracy, Democracy versus Republic, Governmental ideology and form,

State and Legitimacy, Role of Political Parties, and Discourses on why it all matters as well as

some Afterthoughts.

- Governance

The issue of what, exactly, ‘good’ and ‘bad’ governance means are explored by Bovaird

and Löffler in their work, “Evaluating the quality of public governance: indicators, models and

methodologies,” whereas the others cover the topic of how the UN takes on the matter of good

governance, and the concepts of governance from Ancient and Modern perspectives (both

‘Western’ and ‘non-western’).

From the various works and/or sources on what governance is perceived as, we see that

the subject of ‘Governance’ does not correlate with any set ‘form’ of government, ideologically

or structurally. “Good” governance is described as one that is responsive to the needs of the

governed, not the wants of the populace, how effective and efficient a government is in

managing the collective needs of its people, while also considering the needs of its elite, and

sustainability must also be considered. Here, ‘Responsive’ is described as the ability of a

government to address its people’s needs and concerns when issues arise, such as the issue of

poverty or wealth inequality. ‘Effective’ is described as the ability of a government to provide

the most optimal solution to an issue, such as updating public transportation systems to address

transport issues such as traffic or outdated trains. ‘Efficient’ is described as a governments ability

to be able to mobilize resource and manpower needed to address issues at hand, such as

removing policy barriers for disaster relief or ensuring certain policies are clear and concise.

‘Sustainable’ here refers to the ability of a nation to be able to provide for its own needs before

exporting or importing to/from others.


55
Galasso, Vincenzo. "The Role of Political Partisanship during Economic Crises." Public Choice 158, no. 1-2 (01, 2014): 143-165.
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Bureaucracy also plays a part in the survival and effectiveness of a government in being

responsive and efficient. A certain degree of local accountability is also needed, as seen from

both recent and ancient examples of government survivability and even ‘legitimacy’. We can

also see that the concepts of Legalism, a law based society, would face issues if a certain degree

of morality and ‘ethical’ behavior were not present. In the ancient Chinese concepts of

“Legalism,” we see that, while all-encompassing laws seem to have been revolutionary concepts

for its time, Legalist ideas were ineffective if it did not include a proper sense of ethics and

morality that distinguishes and teaches ‘right’ from ‘wrong’ to those that are governed. After all,

if your populace is unaware of the distinction between ‘good’ or ‘bad’ behavior, how would they

seek to avoid misconduct if all they can conceive is that certain actions are just “against the

law?”

Thus, in ancient governments as well as modern ones, we see the role of governments

shifting to supply the governed with concepts of morality through religious means, such as

ancient China’s shift to Confucian philosophy of governance and Theological governments that

dictate morality based on their religious values of moral behavior in relation to society.

So, what does all of this mean? Well, the concept of ‘good’ governance is associated with

how effectively and efficiently a government is able to respond to the needs of its people and

move to provide those needs. ‘Bad’ governance is generally tied to a government’s ineptitude in

being able to effectively and efficiently meet the needs of its people, especially in a timely

manner.

- Ethics/Morality versus Legalism

Modern governments combine the concepts of morality, both religious and non-religious,

with legalism to form a foundation for efficient governance and a ‘respect’ for the “Law.” We
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must also take into consideration the modern drive for effective development of a nation and

how the government is able to come into line with developments in the economy of the nation

and the evolving needs of its people, especially its businesspeople, the merchants of the modern

world.

For this, we examine how ancient governments were effective or ineffective in dictating

their markets, or if governments let the markets dictate themselves to a certain degree. Modern

‘democratic’ nations infer that noninterference in the economy is a key aspect for development,

yet that is not the case. What is meant by this is that governance plays a key aspect in dictating

the development of the economy, whether proponents of a free market agree with it or not.

Governments dictate the issuance of currency, the rules of their market economy, taxation for

government operation fees and programs, and the amount of foreign influences in the local

markets through trade agreements and market transparency.

Observing both modern and ancient perspectives of market governance, we realize that a

certain degree of government oversight is needed to allow progress to flourish. In ancient China

and Rome, we see that the local markets were flourishing and robust, mostly due to government

policies on standardized currency, reasonable taxation, protection for the populace, and

infrastructure projects that provided greater connectivity and mobility across the empires. Yet,

they also failed in aspects of overindulgence, growing corruption, and government debts

associated with the aforementioned things as well as military expenditures and wealth inequality

comparable to modern levels in considerable aspects.

Modern governments have to tackle these same issues while trying to remedy the issues

through reforms and regulations. What is meant by all of this is that laws cannot be unreasonable

for punishing misconduct, but the people must also be instill with a degree of morality and ethic
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to be able comprehend why certain actions are ‘good’ or ‘bad’ and if the laws of the nation are in

line with this distilled moral and ethical standard. This, in turn, also allows the people to be able

to assess if the form of governance they have, compared to others, is ‘good’ or ‘bad’, based on

their moral and ethical standards, the standards of those being governed by that government, and

the implementation of laws in relation to these standards.

- Bureaucracy

Bureaucracy has been key aspect of governance since ancient times and even more so in

todays, modern government structures. While it is true that governmental ideologies and forms

differ nation to nation, the structures of Bureaucracy remains the same, in practicality.

Bureaucracies cropped up to meet the needs of the governed, as well as devolving a certain

degree of power from the sovereign to the political and economic elites. Bureaucracies may also

serve to provide ‘formal’ and/or ‘political’ status to aristocrats, oligarchs, nobility, or local

landed elites. It’s also evident that the ideology of the society being governed influences the

policies and practices of those governing. By this, what is meant is that Religion, Economics,

and Culture play intrinsic roles in shaping Bureaucracy and, thus, governance itself.

The size of a nations Bureaucracy also becomes a factor of how effective it is. Large

Bureaucracies tend to be less effective than those smaller in size. For example, throughout

China’s extensive governmental history, the size of its Bureaucracy had decreased in size,

compared to population growth. This, arguably, made the Bureaucracy more responsive and

efficient, compared to those that were more sizable, due to greater fractioning, higher instances

of corruption, and less accountability. Thus, it becomes imperative to analyze how different

Bureaucracies function within different or similar forms of governance structures, due to their
Singh 12

impact on assessing if a certain Bureaucratic form contributes to ‘good’ or ‘bad’ governance

practices.

- Democracy versus Republic

‘Western’ theorists claim that ‘Democracies’ are more efficient, economically sound, and

substantially favored by the populace due to higher degrees of ‘freedoms’ offered and higher

economic and political mobility. Yet, the existence of a few, successful alternatives to

‘Democratic’ nations throws this ideology into question, and rightly so. Just because one form of

governance is popular today, does not negate the effectiveness and/or efficiency of possible

alternatives.

For example, we need to consider the existence of Monarchies till today, the existence of

Theological Republic (such as that of Iran and the Vatican), as well as Mixed governments and

single party (dominated) nations. Even among the ‘democratic’ nations, there are significant

differences in governance styles and preferences. Take into account the fact that Japan, despite

being a ‘democratic’ nation, is quite similar to China, in terms of governance. What is meant by

this is the fact that both are very Unitary (centralized) in governance and the fact that one

political party has played a significant role in running both nations (the Communist Party of

China and the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan, respectively).

This brings us to another significant subject of modern governance, what is the

significance of Political Parties in governance and are they needed? But, before we venture into

party politics, we should first discuss what ‘democracy’ really is and why political parties matter,

not only in relation to ‘democracies’ but also in modern governance, predominantly due to their

presence in nearly all governments in existence today. When theorists, politicians, and the

average person talks about ‘democracy’ today, what they are effectively trying to convey are the
Singh 13

ideas of a “Democratic Republic.” So, what is a “Democratic Republic?” It is a form of

governance that combines the core, constitutionality of a “Republic,” which enshrines the ‘laws

of the land’ and dictates certain, inalienable rights of citizens, and the “Democratic” concept of

‘majority rule’ by virtue of ‘voting’ for representatives and laws.

- Governmental Ideology and Forms

Some of the sources also discuss the matter of the various forms and ideologies of

government that have existed and still exist today. While it seems like that ‘democratic’

governments are prevalent today, other ideological forms of government still exist and

differences even among these ‘democratic’ governments. We are able to see from Tridimas’

paper, “On the Overthrow or Endurance of Kings,” how the system of Monarchy has survived

the test of time in various nations, even among ‘Democratic’ Nations, yet collapsed in all other

instances without a coherent correlation between various downfalls. Tridimas goes on to explain

that the failures of Monarchies can be attributed to two reasons. First, the failure to act as a

symbol of national unity and maintain the territorial integrity of the State and the second reason

is attributed to the failure of Autocrats (Monarchies and Dictators alike) to concede, or devolve,

political power/sovereignty to other, interested parties. He also mentions that those Monarchs

that did devolve power and maintain a symbol of unity were able to survive till the modern day,

giving rise to modern constitutional monarchies within ‘democratic’ nations, survival of various

forms of Monarchy, and a new category of mixed government, as seen in modern Bhutan.

We must also take into account sources that cover how Ancient Rome and China

developed the Bureaucratic foundations of the Eastern and Western models of governance.

Rome, for example, went from a Republic to a sort of mixed government where indefinite

powers were inferred by the Roman Senate to the Roman dictators (Emperors) within
Singh 14

Republican means, initially. Even if the Emperor had vast amounts of Power, his rule depended

on the Roman Senate’s approval for him, as well as the role of the Imperial army, as evident with

the death of Caesar by Senators and the execution, or ‘overthrow’, of Imperials by the Imperial

Army. The Emperors needed to work in conjunction with the Senate and other various

aristocratic Bureaucrats and generals in order to secure their rule as well as govern their vast

empire. The Republican ideas of the Romans were the foundation of Western political thought,

with additions of Greek ‘Democracy’.

In Imperial China, we see the emergence of various political thoughts, as well as the

emergence of a vibrant Bureaucracy. We also saw the rise of Legalism, Theocratic-leaning

Empires, and especially Meritocracies. When the first major Chinese empire was created by the

first Qin Emperor, he implemented the concepts of Legalism, which is a law based society where

the Laws applied to everyone in society, except the sovereign that is. Yet, due to people lacking a

basis for morality in discerning why something was against the law, legalism quickly fell out of

favor after the collapse of the Qin and was replaced by Confucian philosophies of a “benevolent”

ruler, where the Emperor and State were characterized as being the ‘parent’ that protects its

‘children’, or the people in this case.

The various sources on Ancient Chinese governance and Bureaucracy also bring up the

emergence of a Meritocracy based society, where everyone was open to political mobility, if

monetary situations permitted. This relevant political openness provided to the whole populace,

even if unattainable to much of the economically worse off populace, a notion of representation,

political competency, and a degree of accountability for both the governors and governed.

Greater attention is paid to Song Dynasty China, where Meritocratic Bureaucracy was at its peak

and the power of the sovereign had devolved from the Emperor to a figure similar to a modern
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“Prime Minister.” The different styles of governance between the ancient Romans and Chinese

might be one of many factors that try to explain the rift between the Eastern and Western forms

of Governance.

Another form of government, in fact the most prominent today, is ‘Democracy’, which

refers to various Democratic Republics. Within ‘Democratic’ nations, we can observe innate

differences in governance structure, such as Parliamentarian (including Constitutional

Monarchies), Presidential (including Semi-Presidential), Single Political movement dominated

(also referred to as ‘Single’ party States), and certain mixed forms of governance. The reason

single political movement dominated governance is in the list, is due to the dominance of a

single political party within certain ‘democratic’ nations, such as the Liberal Democratic Party

(or LDP) of Japan or the Kuomintang (KMT) of the Republic of China, Taiwan (1949-1993).

Both were still considered ‘democratic’ nations, even though both nations were ruled by a single

political entity for a considerably long period of time (the LDP still rules till this day).

Thus, we can see that the structures of ‘democratic’ nations vary considerably from

nation to nation, yet other, single political movement based, nations are not counted as being

‘democratic’, due to their adherence to differing political ideologies (even if in name only), such

as the People’s Republic of China (or Mainland China). Back to the subject of ‘democracies’, we

see how the various authors prescribe ‘democratic’ nations as being Democratic Republics,

where certain rights of the people are inalienable and the populace plays an active role in

‘voting’ for laws directly, or ‘voting’ for representatives to make decisions for the populace in

lawmaking, thus providing a sense of accountability to the people, as discussed before. This form

of government is a bottom-up form of governance, where power is derived from the people,

compared to top-down governance, where power flows from the government to the lower levels
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of society. Yet, democratic nations, predominantly, have a top-down (centralized) concept of

governance, where the central government reigns supreme (Unitary), as compared to bottom-up

governance, where power is devolved from the central government to local governments

(Federal).

Then there are the ‘non-democratic’, single political movement states, which derive

power from one political party that runs the day to day affairs of the state. Another form of

governance is Theocratic Republics, where the nation and its constitution revolve around a

certain religion or religious ideals, such as the various Islamic Republics and the Vatican (Holy

Sea). One could even say that India should be considered more of a ‘Theocratic’ Republic, rather

than a ‘democratic’ one, due to its overaccommodation of certain religious beliefs where, instead

of allowing for freedom of choice for things like consuming certain foods or beverages, you are

not presented a choice at all since they are unilaterally banned for consumption under religious

pretexts. Yet, since the majority rules through ‘voting’, it is considered a ‘democracy’ in

practice, while other nations, such as Russia, are considered ‘democratic’ in name only.

What does this all mean? Well, we see how various options of governmental ideology

and their forms have existed, and even exist till today. This means that we must carefully

consider why such ideologies and forms exist and how they have been effective in pursuing

‘good’ or ‘bad’ governance and if this correlates with some of their survival till this day. Can

‘good’ governance explain why the people of a nation are contempt with the form and ideology

of government they have currently and if ‘bad’ governance exists, then how would the people of

that nation remedy it or would they seek to pursue a different form and ideology of governance.

- State and Legitimacy


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Moving to the concept of State and Legitimacy, we examine how certain nations are

formalized as ‘recognized’ States, while others have little to no formal recognition by a vast

majority of prominent nations, such as The Republic of China, Taiwan (also referred to as just

Taiwan or ROC). This notion of legitimacy is derived from the modern recognition by other

States of a nation as being their equal in the international political field. Whereas, the Ancient

Chinese derived a good deal of power from certain religious, or spiritual, aspects, especially the

notion of the “Mandate of Heaven,” where the mandate signified official recognition for a

dynasty’s right to rule. Though, the mandate was often used ex post facto, basically inferring

legitimacy after a dynasty is declared and set up. It was also used to infer why certain rulers were

deposed and another familys’ rise to power.

In Ancient Rome, power was derived from the Roman people and inferred to the Senate,

which later inferred a significant portion of it to the later Emperors. Another, significant Roman

invention was the notion of ‘citizenship’ and the need to be a ‘citizen’, with all the ‘rights’ it

inferred. This notion of ‘citizenship’ carried over to European states and ultimately to every

state. This is important since ‘democratic’ nations today claim power through its citizenry.

Similar to the Romans, these nations have laws on who can or cannot be ‘citizens’ and under

what conditions is ‘citizenship’ inferred to the people, which is either through blood or birth

right.

Knowing this, does government legitimacy explain why ‘good’ or ‘bad’ governance

exists within the nation, or has it contributed to ‘good’ or ‘bad’ governance in any shape or

form? By analyzing the legitimacy of governments, we seek to explain how certain governments

have maintained their prominence till today, or if legitimacy has impacted government decisions

at all, such as the case of Mainland China, Taiwan, and various other recognized and
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unrecognized forms and ideologies of governance. Essentially, what is the relative impact of

‘Statehood’ and legitimacy of matters of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ governance practices.

- Role of Political Parties

Political Parties within all modern nations make up an integral part of a nations’ political

and Bureaucratic culture. Thus, we must also examine the role of political parties in governments

worldwide and if they are needed or not for proper and/or efficient governance. In their paper,

“Democracy without Parties?,” Levitsky and Cameron discuss the situation in Peru and its

opposition to Political Parties and describe Political Parties as being “central pillars” for

‘democracy’. Their entire article focuses on persuading the reader into believing that Political

Parties are essential for ‘democratic’ nations to be able to function properly by uniting people

with common ideals in opposing a single person or group of people from taking too much power

in a system without ‘party opposition’. In his work, “Political Parties and Perceptual

Agreement,” Dahlberg talks about Political Parties being essential to democracy as well and

promoting his ‘Responsible Party Model’, as well as ‘Perceptual Agreement’ between the party

and the people (i.e. voters) about the essential preferences and policy outcomes of a political

party and their relation to what the peoples preferences are.

We can also observe from the data provided from the EU that Political Partisanship

during times of crisis are key factors from market reform, regardless of whether it’s election

season or not. Caramani talks about the ‘Political Party Model’ of ‘democracy’ as well. Yet, in

his work, he discusses two unique discourses based on the notions of Technocracy, which he

describes as the rule of the competent/experts or showing responsibility in governance, and

Populism, which is described as the peoples’ want for political parties to be more responsive to
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the people. He concludes that Political parties must mediate between the two perspectives to

great a more efficient ‘democracy’.

In Schuberts’ article on Taiwan’s’ political landscape, we see how one political party has

been responsible for the division in the nation as well as opposition against Mainland China, in

terms of sovereignty and the issue of identity. In this case, it’s a battle between two political

parties, Taiwans’ Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) against Mainland Chinas’ Communist

Party of China (CPC). It becomes more apparent when the author voices his views as siding with

those of the DPP in claiming that they should not say Taiwan is part of “One China” and should

go strongly in claiming ‘independence’, which makes the article more muddled in that in his

debate of the “pan-green”(independence) and “pan-blue” (reunification) camps was already pro-

independence from the beginning, thus his message seems more likely to focus of attempting to

persuade the CPC to recognize Taiwan as being ‘independent’ and scaling down talks of

confrontation, if it wants the moderates in Taiwan to be more “Pan-Chinese.” While, in Japan,

we observe how, despite being a ‘democratic’ nation, Japans’ LDP has ruled the nation for much,

or almost all, of its post-WW2 history. Yet, Japanese people and Japan’s allies do not see much

of a problem with this aspect, since the LDP is ‘Western’ friendly and competent in governance,

to a point.

Analyzing the role of Political parties within differing forms and ideologies of

governance help to explain if ‘good’ or ‘bad’ governance can be impacted by factors unrelated to

said governance forms and ideologies. Meaning, are Political parties positively or negatively

impacting the image of a certain form and ideology of governance in the international stage and

why? In terms of modern nation building, it is apparent that Political parties do matter in the
Singh 20

perception of ‘good’ or ‘bad’ aspects of governance, especially in the case of most governments

today.

- Discourses and Afterthoughts

By looking at the governance structures of ancient and recent governments, we can see

that concepts of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ governance differ quite a bit, depending on whom you ask.

But, on a fundamental level, all agree that a certain degree of morality or ethnics is needed to

discern what ‘good’ and ‘bad’ means, as well as their relations to promoting proper laws,

especially since certain laws may seem ‘unfair’ to one ideological group, but may be ‘fair’ for

another, based on differing measurements of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ on philosophical levels (i.e. what

may see ethical and ‘good’ based on theological morality, may differ from what is ethical and

‘good’ from a ‘non-theological’, Liberal ideology). Another level of divergence in governance

practices lies in the ideology of governance that the people of a nation follow. The people living

in the Islamic Republic of Iran, People’s Republic of China, and the United States of America

will differ in their views of what a government may, or may not, do, its role in the market, and

the laws of the land. This could be explained by differences in culture, religion, and/or social

norms and beliefs.

Is there, considering the differences, an ‘ideal’ form of government based on the

Ideological and Bureaucratic structure of governments in different nations? If so, what would it

look like and how would its internal, Bureaucratic functions look like? Proponents for

‘democracy’ state that ‘democracy’, itself, is this aforementioned governing structure and can be

tweaked little by little to meet local needs. Yet, proponents of other forms of government suggest

that ‘democracy’ cannot properly handle questions of economic prosperity versus ecological

impact and monetary inequality among the populace. Then there is the issue of the roles of
Singh 21

political parties also arises, especially when you consider that almost every modern nation has

political parties, and the need to assess on if they are essential for proper, effective governance or

do they pose a challenge to governance, based on certain intrinsic issues (i.e. Partisanship,

government shutdowns, or even party survival).

Overall, we see that the topics concerning governance and government structure

differ on varying degrees, even among nations with similar ideologies, and certain nations

dynamic progress break the mold of ‘democratic’ governance proponents and their push for a

modern, citizen driven society. But, concepts such as populism, opposition to immigration, and

economic inequality are not discussed when talking about the ‘promotion’ of the idea of

‘democracy’ to ‘non-democratic’ societies and people. Thus, we have concluded that ‘good’ and

‘bad’ governance does not, necessarily, correlate to the effectiveness of one form and ideology of

governance over another. There are various factors that need to be considered before we can

claim with certainty that a certain form and ideology of governance ‘preferable’ compared to

another.

Research Design

So, again, what does this mean and why is it relevant to my topic? Well, the notions of

‘good’ and ‘bad’ governance have been pondered for as long as there have been governments.

All governments, at some point, have pondered on how they can govern their people best, though

mostly to avoid being overthrown and/or killed. But, is governance best when tied to an

ideology, as “Democratic Peace Theory” proponents insist, or does ‘good’ governance only

depend on the effectiveness and efficiency of the governing body, itself? Thus, we arrive at the

proposition of pondering how nations with differing ideologies and forms have governed their

nation and why certain nations have been successful, despite being ‘Non-Democratic’ in terms of
Singh 22

“Western” standards. Essentially, we want to ascertain if there is a, possibly, definitive form or

ideology of governance that is ‘good’ for a Nation or can a government be ‘good’ regardless of

which ideology or form of governance it chooses to follow?

We argue that ‘good’ governance is one that is effective, efficient, sustainable, and

responsive to its peoples’ needs and that democracy is not needed for ‘good’ governance,

regardless of what most Western theologians insist. We believe that ‘good’ governance is only

relative to how a Nations government is able to plan and follow through on policies, laws, and/or

projects and if they were effectively and efficiently implemented with positive results, as well as

a governments ability to address the needs of its people. Aside from the definitions and key

words mentioned in the Abstract, we will also include several other key terms that have been

discussed thus far.

When talking about the “ideology of governance,” what is meant by this is the ideology a

Nation may choose to adhere to, such as “Democracy,” “Communism,” “Authoritarianism,” or

“Theocracy.” And when talking about a “form of Governance,” what is meant is the way in

which a government is structured, such as being a “single” or “Multi” Party system, is it

Parliamentary or Presidential, and is it a Centralized or Decentralized government. A

“Centralized” government is one where absolute power rests with the National government,

whereas a “Decentralized” government has degrees of ‘devolved’, or splintered, power where a

certain degree of power is held by the local levels of government and other aspects with the

National government. Absolute power means that the entity has final, or the only, say in all

matters and the laws, policies, and regulations issued by this entity.

We will measure ‘good’ governance by examining how Responsive a government is in

addressing the needs and issues of its people, how Efficiently it is able to push forward policies,
Singh 23

how effective it is in implementing those policies, and measuring the outcomes of such policies

based on public support and need for these policies. We also need to consider how governance

can impact the sustainability of the community and nation itself. We will examine the perception

and opinions of a nation’s citizens on whether they are content or not with their current

government and whether certain key aspects weigh in on this perception, such as economic

and/or security/safety needs. We will also measure how Political Parties have contributed or

hindered government effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, and responsiveness by examining

how various Political Parties have interacted with their respective governments.

It is imperative to take into consideration how Political Parties operate in different forms

of governance and if their involvement is truly required for certain government structures or if

they serve their self-interests. Measurements will be based on the perceived effectiveness,

efficiency, and responsiveness of Political Parties to changes in policy, natural/manmade

disasters, and overall involvement in the political bureaucracy. Most important of all, we will

measure the ability of a government to provide stability, security, economic prosperity, or pursuit

thereof, and a mix of culture, modernity, and ethics/morality. Culture here refers to ethno-

national culture of a group of people within a nation (-state). Modernity refers to technological

advancement of society.

- Case Studies explained

The first case study we will focus on will be the nation-state of China and its governance

practices and structures. We will examine how Chinese governance structure has been influenced

by its own ancient structures and forms of government and influences from Western forms of

governance in the modern era, especially its most current form of governance in the year 2017.

The justification for focusing on China is to compare, contrast, and elaborate on aspects of
Singh 24

‘Eastern’ and ‘Western’ styles of governances, as well as recent and ancient ones, and how they

influence the current geopolitical structure of nations, in relation to what ‘good’ governance

means. By this, what is meant is that due to the modern Chinese states nonconformity to

“democratic” principles, it is imperative to examine how and why it is prosperous even though

Western theologians insist it will, eventually, collapse and succumb to ‘bad’ governance for

being “undemocratic,” thus presenting a biased outlook on the issue from the beginning. We

need to examine how Chinas’ own, unique political system developed, was fostered throughout

the years, and how they apply to today’s political landscape. It’s also imperative to see how

sustainability impacts the wellbeing of a nation and its ability to be able to provide for itself,

first, before focusing on exporting or importing from others.

By examining the evolution of Chinese political thought, we could provide information

on how an alternative to the current, Western governance structure can be possible while also

disproving the notion that ‘democracy’ is required for ‘good’ governance to exist. We will

examine the political ideologies of Legalism, Confucian notions of ethical/moral governance,

cultural/religious influences on state affairs and structure, Bureaucratic styles, and China’s

modern governing structure. We will also compare and contrast the influences of ancient

governance styles and why some of them have endured over the ages, while others have died out,

or evolved, to meet modern needs.

Our next case study will focus on the nation-state of Japan and its unique take on

governance. We will examine both current and ancient forms of Japanese governance to explain

how and why Japan developed the way is has and how its governance structure is unique among

other ‘democratic’ nations. We want to determine how these various factors play into the modern

Japanese state being as prosperous as it currently is. We will assess the influences of ancient
Singh 25

governance structures and their impact on the modern Japanese mode of governance, if any,

compared to the influences of modern, ‘democratic’ governance structures that prevail today.

Examining Japanese governance will provide us an example of what a ‘democratic’ state

looks like, especially in the region of East Asia. While proponents may state that Japan may not

be a ‘good’ example as a ‘democratic’ state at some point, it is still considered a ‘democratic’

state nonetheless. We will also examine how Japanese governance and Chinese governance

compare to each other and the differences between ‘democratic’ and ‘non-democratic’ nations

when it comes to the issue of ‘good’ governance. We will measure Japan’s governance in terms

of how effectively the government is able to manage itself, the economy and its people, how

efficiently it’s able to implement policies, and how responsive it is to its people’s needs (such as

disaster relief).

Furthermore, I will evaluate the differences, if any, between the varying governance

styles and forms and ascertain whether some variables are mandatory, or not, and go on to

discuss what an ideal and/or practical form of governance would/should look like. More

precisely, we want to examine how and why the governments of PR China and Japan ended up

the way they are and why they have been as successful as they are.

Case Study Analysis

- China

China is unique in that it has a long running historical record of its empires, its rich

cultural traditions which also influenced almost all its neighbors, a vibrant history of the arts,

and, most importantly, of its governance structures, and their successes or failures, that we can

draw upon today. This same depth of historical knowledge on governance is essential in

understanding why certain forms of governance worked well, while others faltered and fell out of
Singh 26

favor. It’s also imperative to consider the groundwork that our ancestors have laid out for us to

learn from, assess them critically, and improve them to meet our needs today. For these reasons,

we have decided to focus on Chinese forms of governance, as they have much to teach us,

especially considering the amount of knowledge held in their historical records. We will start by

examining the different political thoughts that originated and evolved in ancient Chinese

dynasties as well as comparing them to other ancient civilizations governance structures as

groundwork for evaluating governance.

Starting with the Qin Dynasty, we see that the Qin emperor and his dynasty are known in

Chinese historical records of being tyrannical, yet brilliant rulers. The theory of Legalism

dictates that all are equal before the law, all except the ruler that is. Ironically, this is that same

system we implement in modern, law-based societies, though the modern form is much more

evolved and has additional political influences. The ancient Chinese form of Legalism came

about to show the people of the Qin dynasty that their rulers were wise and fair. Yet, a

fundamental, philosophical retort to Legalism emerged.5657 Laws don’t care for morality or

ethics, so how will people know what is ‘right’ and ‘wrong’, on a moral/ethical level, if all they

are told is that something is just “against the law?” This notion was put forward by practitioners

of Confucian thought, who felt that Laws lacked sufficient moral/ethical grounding to be able to

teach people why something is ‘wrong’ or ‘immoral’ and why they shouldn’t do it, instead of

just stating that it is against the law to do it. Confucian, as well as other spiritual practitioners,

felt that laws weren’t enough to govern; a substantial deal of morals/ethics was also needed.

Legalism, it turns out, fell out of favor the same time the Qin dynasty collapsed, but its

core philosophy of legal codes and laws proved vital for the state to not implement.58 Confucian

56
Schneider, "China's New Legalism." 20.
57
Lu, "Implications of Han Fei's Philosophy for China's Legal and Institutional Reforms." (September 2016): 340.
58
Ibid., (September 2016): 340.
Singh 27

treaties of governance won out and the relation between ruler and subject became that of “parent

and Child.” The Qin dynasty lasted, roughly, thirteen to fourteen years before it collapsed due to

a peasant uprising against oppressive rule. Thus, we can assume that the Qin government had

practiced ‘bad’ governance, due to the very brief amount of time it had lasted. Yet, the concept

of legalism was not entirely to blame here.59 The uprisings and discontent with this system stem

with the extreme authoritarian rule of the Emperor and his court, the mismanagement of

resources and disregard for the peoples needs, and topped with the fact that the Emperor had

suddenly died and his son was now scrambling to consolidate power (though he ultimately

failed). Due to mismanagement, a form of governance that is popular today, Legalism (as is the

rule of Law), became associated with an unfavorable government and Emperor, which lead to the

rise of Confucian-Legalism.

Moving on, we see the later dynasties gravitated more so along the teachings of

Confucian treaties of governance. The later dynasties also lasted centuries longer than the Qin

Dynasty had. One would think that such a long time of governance would mean our ancestors

must have figured out some secrets to good governance. Confucian treaties on governance

focused on hierarchy and ethics rather than just plain laws. These dynasties also established rigid

imperial examinations to recruit people for the Imperial bureaucracy.60 There was, also, no such

restrictions on who could partake in these civil service, or Imperial, examinations, which meant

that, at least in theory, anyone could take the examinations and become part of the bureaucratic

elite (also known as the Literati). This form of governance emerged more so during the reign of

the Han dynasty, the iconic dynasty that the Han Chinese are named after. The Han dynasty also

lived alongside the Roman Empire as well. Thus, we will also assess the Roman Empire and

59
Ye, Lang, Zhenggang Fei, and Tianyou Wang, eds. China: five thousand years of history and civilization. Kowloon, Hong Kong: City University of
Hong Kong Press, 2008.
60
Sterba. "Clandestine Management in the Imperial Chinese Bureaucracy." 69-78.
Singh 28

compare and contrast these two systems of governance, since both empires laid the foundations

for later empires and nations in profound ways.

When comparing these two civilizations, we see that the Roman Empire and Han dynasty

had some similar aspects to them, yet they were also quite different, predominantly due to the

differing needs of the people of their respective empires (mostly the ruling/upper class).61 Both

had established vibrant bureaucratic institutions to govern their vast territories (though differing

in their innate structure), both had established unparalleled civilizations in their respective

regions, and both had setup very unique systems of governance, economy, and hierarchy. These

were all important factors that were necessary for both civilizations to thrive, meet the needs of

their people, and expand to the sizes that they did. What interests us is the history of governance

practiced by both Empires and how they relate and/or differ and if they were effective, efficient,

responsive, and sustainable. For this end, we will start by examining the fundamentals behind

their governance ideologies, first. Then, we will more thoroughly examine the implications these

would have on the efficiency, effectiveness, responsiveness, and sustainability.

For starters, both, Rome and Han China, had thriving bureaucracies, vast empires,

thriving economies, and powerful regional militaries. While Han Chinese bureaucracy drew

upon people who had passed rigorous imperial, or Civil service, examinations dealing with

various subjects, Roman bureaucracies drew on ‘Senators’ and other officials that were mostly

comprised of the ruling elite in Roman and local society, with the added advantage of “public

slaves” that would assist local Magistrates to carry out their duties. 62

61
Argyriades, Demetrius. "ROME AND BYZANTIUM: AN ADMINISTRATIVE OVERVIEW." Public Administration Quarterly 26, no. 3 (Fall, 2002):
373-392.
62
Aldrete, Gregory S. "Han and Roman Empires Compared: Government." [Link]: History of the Ancient World: A Global Perspective:
Gregory S. Aldrete, The Great Courses. December 16, 2011. Accessed December 02, 2017. [Link]
Global-Perspective/dp/B00P6I5GBO.
Singh 29

Han Chinese Bureaucrats were staffed and paid by the State, whereas most Roman Civil

Servants comprised of a few dozen administrators and mostly unpaid workers, such as friends,

acquaintances and publicly held slaves as well as other, non-appointed, ‘assistants’, as stated by

Aldrete. Rome was also unique in that it had utilized the idea of “Citizenship” and used it to

promote the idea that being a ‘citizen’ of the Roman civilization is the highest honor, or status,

one could achieve, something to be highly sought after on their side of the world. The idea of

citizenship was how the Romans were able to provide their people with something to strive for,

so as to deter opposition to the ruling class. Han China achieved this same outcome by way of

the imperial examination, which allowed for anyone to be able to climb up the ranks of the

imperial court. Both systems kept the populace, at least those with a say, happy enough to live

with the system. Stability over a long span of time would also hint at the government being

responsive to the peoples’ needs, at least for those that mattered.

Han China, similar to other Chinese dynasties, had a centralized government structure,

yet the local magistrates could be selective on certain matters of governance that the Emperor,

Imperial Court, and higher ranking officials were not made aware of or matters of ‘corruption’ in

this case. Chinese Bureaucrats had to pay special attention to the needs of the local landed elite,

as highlighted in the Chinese novel, The story of the Stone or Red Chamber.63 Yet, supreme

power still presided with the Emperor and his Court. This changed in later Empires, such as the

Song, where an official similar to a “Prime Minister” held a considerable amount of power in the

imperial court and bureaucracy, at times more so than the Emperor. Yet, the notions of local

officials dealing with local problems on their own knowledge and authority would imply a

certain degree of responsiveness, effectiveness, and/or efficiency of the system, even though all

63
Cao, Xueqin. The story of the stone: also known as the Dream of the Red Chamber. Translated by David Hawkes. Edited by Betty Radice. Vol.
1. 5 vols. The Golden Days. London: Penguin Books, 1974.
Singh 30

officials assigned to each region were not from that region, so as to discourage partisanship or

gross abuse of powers.

In the Han and Roman Empires Compared: Governments, Aldrete talks about how the

actual governance of the two empires differed in terms of the centrality of power. Aldrete

mentions an instance where a Roman Provincial governor of Asia Minor, Pliny the Younger,

repeatedly asks Emperor Trajan for his advice on how to do various things in his province, to

which Trajan replies “Just let me know what you decide.” In Han China, Aldrete notes that

governance was more centralized, where the authority of the Emperor and his court superseded

local officials. Another key aspect noted by Aldrete is that even though both empires possessed

some bad Emperors, the state bureaucracy allowed for the nation to continue to run smoothly, at

least where the Emperor was not concerned. Thus, bureaucracy establishes itself as a key factor

for the maintenance and continuation of good governance practices. This, in short, allows for the

empires to remain stable and somewhat efficient and effective.

Comparing both to the Persian Empire, as Ali Farazmand has done, is also necessary,

especially when considering non-western theories of governance.64 Though, we will note that

Ali’s section on Ancient Iranian rulers is idealistic and not as critical as we would like it to be.

But, Ali does note some key aspects of Iranian, more precisely Median, governance which show

certain similarities to that of the Roman Empire, but to a different degree. He describes the

Median’s as having a bureaucratic class that came from among the nobility and priests, as well as

“common men.” The reference to “common men” implies a small degree of political mobility,

though not that much. This would imply that the ideas of bureaucracy was naturally formed in

more than one civilization for the purpose of governing the people more effectively.

64
DiCicco, Joel M. "THE DEVELOPMENT OF LEADERS IN ANCIENT CHINA, ROME, AND PERSIA." Public Administration Quarterly 27, no. 1 (Spring,
2003): 6-40. [Link]
Singh 31

Though, Ali does describe the Persians, under Cyrus the Great, as having a “democratic”

government, when what is really meant is a more “liberal” or “progressive” government, in terms

of Cyrus’ ideas of incorporating the ideas of non-Persians. This also goes back to a crucial

question, what is democracy and why is it so important to be one (in the western world

especially)? For that, we had to examine the traditions of the Greeks and Romans and the

influence of their rule on later European kingdoms and nations. The concepts of ‘Democracy’

and ‘Republic’ originate with the Greeks and Romans, respectively. Yet, both concepts were

quite different from the concepts of a “Democratic Republic” many Nations currently use.

In his paper, Kalyvas describes the inter-relation between the Roman institution of

‘Dictatorship’ (the Emperors), with that of the Greek ‘Tyrant’.65 He goes on to talk about how

the Greeks viewed ‘Tyrants’ as corrupted kings who used their power in an unjust manner. It

goes further to state that Dionysius and Appian equated the Greek ‘Tyrant’ with the Roman

institution of ‘Dictatorship’, which was a form of “emergency executive” power that elected

Consuls of the Roman Republic could use, but was later made permanent in the Imperial Era in

the form of the emperors. This implies that Western concepts of Emperors, or kings, were

thought to be within constitutional restraints, thus ensuring responsiveness, or responsibility, to

the people being governed.

This concept runs counter to Chinese forms of Confucian-Legalist Constitutional thought,

where debates about laws were not openly carried out, but were discussed, more so, along the

lines of the functions of the state bureaucracy, in terms of the amoral nature of Legalism being

unfolded by usage of Confucian virtues and rituals.66 This presents an exceptionally different

concept of constitutionalism that runs in contrast to Western concepts of constitutional thought,


65
Kalyvas, Andreas. "The Tyranny of Dictatorship: When the Greek Tyrant Met the Roman Dictator." Political Theory 35, no. 4 (2007): 412-42.
[Link]
66
Kim, Sungmoon. "Confucian Constitutionalism: Mencius and Xunzi on Virtue, Ritual, and Royal Transmission." The Review of Politics 73, no. 3
(2011): 371-99. [Link]
Singh 32

as further explained by Kim. Confucian-Legalism adopted the concept of law from the Legalists,

but focused on Confucian ideas of morality and ethics to determine the functionality of such laws

as well as that of the government and Emperor themselves. This intellectual debate would help

Chinese bureaucracy become effective and efficient in the long run.

Yet, this form of government has lasted for centuries, compared to that of Western

governance structures, where Greek Democracy and the Roman Republic died out and were

replaced with monarchies, with the concepts re-emerging later on. This, alone, warrants further

examination of this particular system of governance, how it evolved, and why it succeeded where

others had failed. Thus, we will start by examining how this Imperial system functioned, its

efficiency, effectiveness, responsiveness, and sustainability.

In terms of efficiency, the bureaucracy of the Imperial system was, at times, efficient,

while also lacking efficiency in many other cases, mostly due to technological and social

constraints. For example, the Bureaucracy had a suitable amount of administrators compared to

the population size, as noted by Aldrete. This would make local administration much more

efficient and responsive to the peoples needs, but it may not hinder corruption. Yet, the Chinese

Imperial system thrived for centuries where others failed. Under this unique system, China was

able to become self-sustainable, thus being able to thrive. Even without a Democratic and/or

Republican form of government, the Chinese Imperial system managed to create a robust

Bureaucracy on par with most modern bureaucracies. These bureaucracies were effective in

carrying out Imperial laws and regulating society in day to day matters.

In terms of sustainability and economic stability, we can see in Wan’s paper, the in-depth

discourses in Han dynasty China over State expansion, state monopolies over salt and iron, and
Singh 33

discourses between scholars based on moral principles versus material calculations.67 The

debates in the Discourses highlight the fundamental workings of the Imperial system in China,

where you have this intrinsic debate between the Literati, proponents of Confucianism, and State

Officials, proponents of Legalism. We can also see how the political debate between the

theology of Confucian thought and Realists policies of Legalist thought helped to create a more

cohesive Imperial system. The following line presents an informative outlook on how the

Political economy of the Chinese Imperial state was formed: “As a case in point, “the conscious

combination of Confucianism and Legalism in theory and practice allowed a wide range of

variation and vibration between idealism and realism” as well “militarism and pacifism,

laissez-faire and state control.”” This is important since it paints a picture of a philosophical

battle between state control of the economy at large, versus a more laissez-faire (or ‘free’)

economy where the people dictate the quality, quantity, and pricing of materials.

In the section of Economics of Empire, it seems that both sides agreed on the State

control and endorsement of Agriculture as the lifeline of the Nation. Yet, it seems agriculture

was more favored than commerce, especially the Merchant class, to the point that Agricultural

taxes were lowered, while taxation of Merchants were increased. Thus, we see a very crucial

insight of how the Imperial system was carried out on economic levels, with two differing sides

debating on the prospects of economic growth and progress versus morality and ethic or how the

Emperor should not be seen as greedy or concerned with economic affairs. Yet, the Imperial

system found balance in both aspects and through favorable conditions between agriculture and

commerce; the empires were able to stay stable and sustainable enough to last for millennia.

67
Wan, Ming. "Discourses on Salt and Iron: A First Century B.C. Chinese Debate over the Political Economy of Empire." Journal of Chinese
Political Science 17, no. 2 (2012): 143.
Singh 34

Later Chinese dynasties would also take up similar aspects of the Han Dynasty, using it

as a ‘standard bearer’ or the ideal state. However, with the arrival of Buddhism, its discourses

with Confucian and Daoist ideology, we saw the Tang dynasty lean more towards Theology, yet

maintain some of its core Legalist principles. Yet, the Tang also witnessed a “Golden age” of

Chinese culture and literature, as well as subtle changes, or challenges, to the Confucian and

Daoist ideologies and hierarchies. This was later countered during the Song dynasty, when

Confucian and legalist thought made a more profound comeback, the Emperors power

diminishing a bit, and the power of the Scholarly officials rising to new heights.

Now, comparing these theories to modern times, we see that Chinese systems of

governance have not differed too much with its former Imperial system, so much so that many

regard the current system as a ‘New dynasty’ where, now, the CCP is the sovereign. This is

largely due to the fact that the Communist Party operates on a robust bureaucratic system, much

like all former Chinese dynasties. This can also be said of the Republic of China in Taiwan,

where they have gone above-and-beyond with their bureaucracy to the point that they have 5

main branches of government. Thus, it could be said that it is bureaucracy that defines

governance, not so much the ideology of the government itself. Even on ideological levels, many

democracies differ in their governing structures, such as stated by Emmerson68 and his

compatriots Held and Hidalgo, that Democracies are not similar to one another.

Thus, it does not matter which ideology is followed, so long as the governance structure

is stable, efficient and effective in this regard. In the case of modern china, we see that the PRC

has displayed continued stability and efficiency in governance, which correlates to economic

prosperity as well. Though, some minor conflicts on the local, provincial levels do present

68
Donald K. Emmerson. "Minding the Gap Between Democracy and Governance." Journal of Democracy 23, no. 2 (2012): 62-73.
[Link] (accessed September 27, 2017).
Singh 35

themselves, yet the central government still remains in control. This centralization and stability

means that the PRC is fairly efficient and effective in running the Chinese nation. On the other

hand, across the straits, we see how the ROC in Taiwan has struggled to keep up with proper

economic reforms (a factor that also is present in neighboring Japan and the Republic of Korea,

as well). By this, what is meant is the fact that the ROC in Taiwan has failed to reform its own

labor laws to meet modern demands, to the point that the local markets do not offer many

benefits to the residents there. Young, new graduates end up in Mainland China, seeking higher

pay for similar work they would have done in the ROC (Taiwan).6970

Now that the contexts of political history are somewhat explained, we will move to the

main questions of how this relates to our main argument for effectiveness, efficiency,

sustainability, and responsiveness. In regards to the current system in the PRC, it can be simply

said that it works. The government has improved the bureaucratic system it inherited from

former dynasties, ensuring stability, and thus providing effectiveness and efficiency, such as its

top down (centralized) governance has made policy implementation much more efficient, though

it is important to note that the central government does struggle with keeping provincial and

local governments in line with central government mandates. Yet, overall, these local hurdles are

not large enough to hinder the central government to implement its reforms and economic plans,

such as its high-speed rail building, moves to reduce pollution, and drives to alleviate the

housing markets in coastal cities by improving conditions in central Chinese cities.717273

69
Sui, Cindy. "Why China is land of opportunity for young Taiwanese." BBC News. June 26, 2014. Accessed December 15, 2017.
[Link]
70
Chao, Linda, Ramon H. Myers, and James A. Robinson. "Promoting Effective Democracy, Chinese Style: Taiwan's National Development
Conference." Asian Survey 37, no. 7 (1997): 669-82. doi:10.2307/2645515.
71
Poon, Linda. "A Chinese Train Wedges Itself Into Hong Kong's Political Future." CityLab. December 20, 2017. Accessed December 21, 2017.
[Link]
72
Xin, Zhou. "Central Chinese city to build apartments for youth." Central Chinese city to build apartments for youth - Xinhua | [Link].
December 21, 2017. Accessed December 21, 2017. [Link]
73
Weaver, John Fitzgerald. "China is building solar roadways – ‘transparent concrete’ atop solar cells that charge driving cars." Electrek.
December 21, 2017. Accessed December 21, 2017. [Link]
charge-cars/.
Singh 36

Much of the improvements in the PRC have taken place in response to complaints by

citizens, thus, it could be said that the government is responsive to its peoples needs. Though, on

the sustainability side, we run into some problems that may comeback to hurt the government, if

not addressed in time. One such problem is the nations growing demand for imported

agricultural products, which would lead it on a path to foreign reliance for agricultural products

and deteriorate food security as well as self-sustainability.74 Yet, China’s trade surpluses in other

sectors, currently, are high enough to mitigate the need for imports. But, the concern for food

security is a reliance on foreign imports of agricultural products leaves the nation vulnerable to

changes or concerns over those products, such as diseases, famines, and/or price changes. This

lack of sustainability also extends to the energy sector and overwhelming imports of petroleum

products, which are currently being tackled in the form of a shift to locally-produced renewable

energy sources.

This degradation of sustainability is not a bad thing for the near future, but it can be a

major issue in the decades to come, as debt may rise in response to growing import demands. To

negate this, the nation should invest in education, research, and technology for farming and

energy needs, one of which is currently being met.

Another major issue is whether party politics has helped or hindered good governance

and if it is needed. In relation to this subject matter, we see from the works of Levitsky &

Cameron, Valasso, Dahlburg, Franklin, Sartori, Schubert, Rizova, and their compatriots, that this

issue regarding the role of political parties in the modern political landscape is wide ranging.

Many view political parties as being essential to the political system, some stating it is integral

for ‘democracy’ as a whole, and others say that political parties are not needed. Political parties

74
"China Agricultural Overview." USDA ERS - China. Accessed December 21, 2017.
[Link]
Singh 37

do, in fact, make mobilization of the public behind common issues more effective, but parties

can also bog down the political system in needless bureaucratic hurdles due to staunch

opposition to one another, strictly based on party politics (or the rivalry between parties

themselves).

In the case of the PRC (mainland China), we see that one political party controls the

majority of the decision making. But, one party rule comes with its own issues as well, such as

the party being concerned for its own survival more so than the good of the nation. This

unreasonable fear of the party can lead to stark shifts in policies to keep the party in power, but

this can also lead to better responsiveness to the peoples needs as well. Thus, this concern for

survival of the party can also serve to make the party more responsive to the peoples needs, or it

can move to restrict opposition to its position of power, or possibly both f those options.

However, looking back at Chinese history, as well as the political histories of other

empires before the invention of political parties, we see that the bureaucratic system would

naturally create informal groupings similar to political parties, such as the Imperial and

Senatorial factions in the Roman Empire or, more relevant to China, the Scholars (favoring

Confucian morals, also known as the Literati) and the Officials (favoring Legalist and

mercantilist ideas, also known as the Worthies). But, the difference between the two is that one

had formal party groupings, while the other had informal, temporary groupings. The party

system also infuses onto its members and constituents a sense of unity that goes beyond just

national unity. This aspect of party politics is what is not preferred when considering government

efficiency and effectiveness. Governments can still have factions within them based on

ideological similarities, but party politics takes this simple notion to a higher level of power

concentration and party loyalty before the good of the nation.


Singh 38

Thus, China has the efficiency and effectiveness, as well as the right amount of

responsiveness, even if they may be motivated for party survivability, to ensure that good

governance prevails. However, it has recently started to fall into the sustainability trap that most

developed nations eventually suffer from, leading to growing deficits and debt, which become

detrimental to economic growth and inequality. To counter such lack of sustainability, the

natural response would be to boost local markets in the central regions, which would drive a

more balanced development plan in the nation, as well as alleviate the coastal city markets and

boost sustainability in the long term.

- Japan

Japan is another nation with a long running history, rich in culture and tradition that many

have come to enjoy today. Yet, what we are interested in is the theoretical works and practices

involved in governance when it comes to Japan, with some reference to cultural impact (culture

is hard to measure and define so it may complicate things later on). Early Japanese governments

and political structures were known to have been heavily influenced by various Chinese

civilizations, before looking inward and promoting indigenous forms of governance and culture.

Japan and China have, at times, been enemies, mutual admirers of the other, friends, and rivals.

This unique relationship has been crucial in defining how Japan has evolved into what it is today.

For Japan, we will start by examining how its ancient relations and political culture was

influenced by Chinese thought and culture, as well as its own, unique evolution and adaptations

in political thought and culture. We will also compare ancient Japanese forms of governance

with other ancient civilizations political thoughts, as well. Then, we will address the main
Singh 39

question of how effective, efficient, responsive, and sustainable the Japanese forms of

governance were and/or are compared to others.

The first instances of Japanese governance were predominantly recorded by Chinese

historians, largely based on knowledge gained from Japanese missions to various Chinese

governments. The first notable mentions of contacts between Japanese and Chinese civilizations

mentions an ancient Wa (Wo in Chinese) kingdom ruled by a female Empress.75 That aside, the

most notable period of interaction between the two sides started around the time of the Sui-Tang

dynasty eras. It was during this period that Japanese missions escalated in size and prominence,

in a mission to gain Chinese knowledge, most notably knowledge in Buddhism, governance, and

engineering. This had profound effects on Japanese society for centuries to come. For our paper,

the aspect we will focus on is the knowledge of governance that was gained from these

interactions. Similar to how various lesser kingdoms and empires sought to mimic the Romans,

we see that the Japanese were attracted to the Chinese dynasties in a similar fashion, especially

during the “golden age” of Chinese civilization.

The Japanese Kentoshi missions to Tang dynasty China are well recorded and in large

numbers. These missions revolved around 3 aspects of relations: trade, knowledge, and politics.

These missions are equally important to us since they provide us with an all-encompassing view

of two nations longstanding relations with each other, as well as the influence between a major

power and rising power (in regional terms). The most notable influences were adaptations of

Chinese imperial hierarchy and policies in Japanese ones, such as setting up a Chinese based

Bureaucracy under the Japanese Emperor and implementing land reforms based on their Chinese

75
LI, PO-JU. "SINO-JAPANESE POLITICAL RELATIONS BEFORE THE FIFTH CENTURY A.D." Order No. 1323940, The University of Arizona, 1984.
[Link]
Singh 40

counterparts. Japanese missions to Tang dynasty China were crucial to the Japanese state for its

own political development.

In the case of Japan, the ideas of Confucian constitutionalism were initially transmitted

from the Korean peninsula, then through China itself. Yet, according to Paramore,76 Japanese

forms of Confucianism differed substantially from its mainland counterparts in China and the

Korean peninsula. The Japanese took in Confucian knowledge and teachers as more of a show of

status, rather than implementing it as the Chinese did, such as the use of Confucian rituals as a

means of legitimizing the Imperial lineages rule. Instead, the Japanese integrated Confucian

rituals with Kami (Japanese for ‘god(s)’) worship and the structural difference in postulating

their Emperor as being directly linked to the Heavenly realm, whereas the Chinese Confucian

system provided a more ad-hoc association with the Heavenly realm by pushing it further into a

mythical past which is then connected to the Imperial ancestors and then the current Imperial

lineage. In short, the Japanese Emperors were viewed as being Divine, themselves, by linking

themselves with Japanese Shinto gods, whereas Chinese Emperors could claim an ancestral

lineage decent linked with the Heavens, thus making the Chinese system more flexible to

dynastic change than the Japanese system, in Paramore’s words.

This structural difference set the Japanese and Chinese Imperial systems apart, though the

Chinese system lasted far longer than the Japanese one, which was later removed in favor of a

more ‘local’ form of governance. This local form was, more or less, influenced by the Japanese

form of Confucian thought, where the Emperor could not be easily replaced, so other political

roles had to be invented to validate or exercise political power “in the name of the Emperor” yet

in the voice of the political ruler, most commonly a Shogun. However, despite having culturally

76
Paramore, Kiri. "Confucian Ritual and Sacred Kingship: Why the Emperors Did not Rule Japan." Comparative Studies in Society and History 58,
no. 03 (2016): 694-716. doi:10.1017/s0010417516000323.
Singh 41

Japanese aspects to this system, the concept of a Shogun or Kanpaku is similar to the role of a 宰

相 (Zǎixiàng), or Grand Chancellor/Prime Minister, which was the highest position in the

Chinese Imperial government, outside the Imperial family. The post of the highest official in the

Chinese system usually had different names and roles, though it is also wise to note that two

other posts were also among the most powerful, with varying degrees of importance.

This same system of ranking also existed within the Tokugawa Shogunate system of the

Edo or Pre-modern (近世) Era of Japanese history.7778 Under this Japanese system, however, the

highest ranking government official, the Shogun, had far more power than their Chinese

counterpart in most cases. Thus, one could, theoretically, state that the current Japanese system

of governance, where the Imperial family still exists as heads of State but the Prime Ministers

and officials rule, is no different than that of the Shogunate era. Thus, there is a sense of political

stability and continuity due to this similarity in governance structure.

In the case of Japan, military affairs as well as a rich cultural tradition played a

significant role in shaping its unique form of governance. In Ikegami’s paper, we see the relation

between the traditional, honor-oriented societies of Samurai clashing with that of the

restructured, elitist Shogunate. It’s also worth noting that this sense of honor and strong culture

still persists in modern Japanese politics today, especially within the ruling Liberal Democratic

Party of Japan, or the LDP for short. Despite their name, the LDP is actually very conservative in

terms of social hierarchy, military tradition, culture, immigration, and economy. There, really, is

nothing ‘Liberal’ about it, in any sense of the word from a Western connotation.

Japanese governance has followed similar trends as that of China. The only difference

was during the Imperial era, where Shinto was also used by the ruling military elite to galvanize
77
Ikegami, Eiko. "Shame and the Samurai: Institutions, Trusthworthiness, and Autonomy in the Elite Honor Culture." Social Research 70, no. 4
(Winter, 2003): 1351-1378. [Link]
78
McNelly, Theodore. "Tokugawa Political Writings." Perspectives on Political Science28, no. 3 (Summer, 1999): 177. [Link]
[Link]/docview/194694126?accountid=13802.
Singh 42

the people behind Nationalist agendas, showing a leaning towards theology. Though, this

theological shift could best be described as an emphasis on local traditions and casing out foreign

influences. Something similar happened during the Heian period, where the Japanese court

shifted away from China and focused more on local culture after the collapse of the Tang

Dynasty. Yet, Japanese modes of governance have, largely, stuck to a similar form of

governance, even though certain aspects have changed. For starters, the Japanese government is

still heavily centralized, with power resting in Tokyo. This has been the norm since the

Shogunate established ancient Edo-do, modern Tokyo.

Now, due to this continuation of a similar governance structure, with some

modernization, we can see why the Japanese political system works out for Japan, while possibly

failing in other nations. Now, this could also be said of the opposite, meaning that a foreign

system of governance may not mix well with the overall political and/or social culture of Japan,

as was also seen in the case of China (both the PRC and ROC, on the mainland and in Taiwan, in

this case). Despite having been the single most powerful political party in Japan, the people of

Japan support the LDP to govern and represent them. However, much like in China, the issue of

political party control and party survivability is also an issue in Japan, where the LDP fears for

its continued survival and support by the people. Yet, due to weak opposition parties, the LDP

has managed to retain control of the political system, despite party politics and corruption issues,

aside from other issues.

This continued political similarity has contributed significantly to Japan’s political and

economic stability as well, making the system effective in terms of its continued stability.

Efficiency, on the other hand, is displayed on the level of government centralization and the fact

that one political party, in this case the LDP, is in control of the political and economic system in
Singh 43

Japan. Thus, we can see that the government of Japan, while not conforming to the structures of

other ‘democratic’ nations, has maintained efficiency and effectiveness through its centralized

control of the nation, with the exception of corruption and crime.

In terms of sustainability, Japan seems worse off than China in this aspect, thus its higher

reliance on technology, innovation, and exports of high-end goods, such as cars, computers, and

videogame products, aside from the fact that its culture has also been monetized for export as

well. According to the USDA’s country profile on Japan, it shows that Japan imports roughly 60

percent of its agricultural products.79 Japan also charges a high tariff for imported products that

are also locally grown and protected by the government, yet the people still import them due to

high demands and lower domestic agricultural yields. This is also excluding other crucial energy

products and raw materials which are also imported in large quantities, contributing to Japans

massive trade deficit and debt.80 Thus, Japanese governance of the economy would not be

considered sustainable due to the overdependence on foreign imports. But, it seems that Japan

has sought to balance it books with more exports than imports, recently, which is a step in the

right direction.81

However, Japan is still not fully sustainable, thus it does not, partially, met the

requirements for one of the key aspects of good governance listed before. In terms of

responsiveness, Japan has received mixed receptions. The government has solved issues of

income inequality compared to most other developed, ‘democratic’ nations, but it has failed in

areas such as labor and housing reforms, evenly distributing development, and agricultural

reforms, as well as becoming energy self-sufficient (which it is currently attempting to tackle).

79
"Japan Trade." USDA ERS - Trade. Accessed December 21, 2017. [Link]
regions/japan/trade.
80
"Japan- Economy and Trade Fact Sheet." Economy and Trade: Japan: Fact Sheet. Accessed December 21, 2017.
[Link]
81
"Japan-OEC country profile." OEC - Japan (JPN) Exports, Imports, and Trade Partners. Accessed December 22, 2017.
[Link]
Singh 44

Aside from these, the Japanese governance structure has already proven itself to be efficient and

effective for the needs of the Japanese people, which are more important to appeal to than the

international community. Thus, we should say that, regardless of the political ideology, Japanese

governance has managed to practice good governance in aspects of political efficiency and

effectiveness, for the Japanese people at least, but lagged in areas of sustainability and

responsiveness in terms of economic reforms, which have contributed significantly to the nations

debt and deficit, as well as underproductive labor market.

Conclusion

Theories of governance are not always one-in-the same. We can see from our examples

of Chinese and Japanese forms of governance that ideas and structures of governance differ in

considerable amounts, yet they can also be the most effective form of governance for that nations

people and their needs. People want a government that is effective, efficient, responsive, and

provides a sustainable market and production. However, the requirements for such a government

differ depending on the needs and culture of that particular nation or region.

In the case of China, we saw how the imbedded political culture, stretching back

millennia in Chinese history, played a role in shaping its modern political culture to a certain

degree. Understanding that history helps explain why certain things ended up the way they did.

For example, after every successful dynasty, there would always be a transitional period of chaos

and disunity. Thus, one could imply that the Republican era, after the fall of the Qing dynasty,

was a “transitional period” before the Communist Party started its current Chinese dynasty.

Thus, within this context, the CCP is continuing Chinese governance in a symbolic way, while

its governance structure, which focuses much more heavily on bureaucracy, is a more concrete

continuance of previous Chinese, political culture.


Singh 45

Regardless of current political stability, there were still some concerns in terms of

political party survivability. What is meant by this is how the CCP reacts to criticism of its rule

by doubling down on control. But, this alone is not enough to hinder responsiveness to the

peoples needs. Another factor would be corruption and special interest groups within the party

that use political influence to fill their own pockets, such as the extremely wealthy who

benefitted from their close connections with party members. On the plus side, these businesses

have contributed a significant amount to the local economy, as well as expanding China’s soft

and hard power in terms of economic influences. Thus, a general evaluation of events would

suggest that the party has become a bit disconnected from the people’s needs, on a more

fundamental level, yet still operates in the interests of the nation, itself.

In the case of Japan, we can see that a proper understanding of its own political history is

needed to understand why the current Japanese political structure is the way it is. For that, we

needed to realize the influences of Chinese governance styles and how the Japanese adapted

them to their own, unique, governance structure. The result was a structure that equated the

Japanese emperor as being god on earth, which made it difficult for other political leaders to just

replace him. Thus, the Japanese administration adapted to it by creating the Shogun institution,

which is equivalent to today’s Prime Minister position. This system also stayed in place before,

during, and after WWII, despite Japan’s ‘ideological shift’ to a ‘democratic’ government,

continuing the same governance style it had used previously for centuries before, much like in

China.

Japan also had similar concerns as those in china, in terms of political party stability and

survival concerns, yet the Japanese willingly gave the Japanese LDP control due to other

political parties lacking proper governance experience to match the LDP. However, a very
Singh 46

concerning sector of Japanese society, which could hinder efficiency, in terms of the economy,

would be its poor sustainability, in terms of high import reliance, and lack of responsiveness, in

terms of its failure to engage in labor reforms to tackle the nations unreasonably high ‘overtime’

working hours. Tackling the issue of its ‘overtime’ culture would also boost productivity as

workers would be less tired, the freed up hours would contribute to more workers hired, and a

possible rise in birth rates may also be a result of less harsh working conditions.

Overall, we can see that in terms of efficiency, effectiveness, responsiveness, and

sustainability, China performed better on certain fields than Japan, especially in terms of

responsiveness and sustainability due to economic concerns. Yet, on other aspects, such as

relative stability and government efficiency, both performed pretty well, for their people at least.
Singh 47

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