COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON GENERAL FARM COMMODITIES
AND RISK MANAGEMENT
IMPLEMENTATION OF TITLE VII OF THE DODD-FRANK
WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT
ORAL STATEMENT OF JOHN M. DAMGARD, PRESIDENT
FUTURES INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION
FEBRUARY 15, 2011
Chairman Conaway, Ranking Member Boswell, members of the
Subcommittee, I am John Damgard, president of the Futures
Industry Association. On behalf of FIA, I want to thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today.
Since many members of the Subcommittee are new, I would like to
take a minute to explain who we are. FIA is a principal spokesman
for the commodity futures and options industry. FIA’s regular
membership is comprised of approximately 30 of the largest futures
commission merchants or FCMs in the United States. Among
FIA’s associate members are representatives from virtually all other
segments of the futures industry, both national and international.
FIA estimates that its members effect more than eighty percent of
all customer transactions executed on U.S. contract markets.
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As the principal clearing members of the U.S. derivatives clearing
organizations, our member firms play a critical role in the reduction
of systemic risk in our financial system. Our member firms commit
a substantial amount of our own capital to guarantee the futures and
options transactions that our customers submit for clearing. We
take justifiable pride that the U.S. futures markets operated
extremely well throughout the financial crisis. No FCM failed and
no customer lost money as a result of a failure of the futures
regulatory system.
Today I would like to highlight four major concerns about the
Dodd-Frank rulemaking process. First, some of the proposed rules
have gone well beyond the intent of Congress. Given the intense
pressure that we all face in bringing down the level of government
spending, it would make more sense to focus on the regulatory
requirements that are mandated by Congress, and set aside other
regulatory initiatives for a future date.
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Second, the rules have been published for comment in an order and
at a pace that makes meaningful analysis and comment difficult, if
not impossible. We encourage both Congress and the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission to take the time necessary to fully
analyze all the costs and benefits of the proposed rules and allow
sufficient time for implementation.
Third, the costs of complying with Dodd-Frank will discourage
participation in the markets and force certain firms out of the
business. You have already heard similar concerns from many
groups that represent the end-users of derivatives; I would only add
that the potential costs could lead to a loss of competition among
clearing firms and liquidity providers.
Fourth, I encourage Congress to consider the international
dimensions of the rulemaking process. In particular, FIA believes
that the Commission should use its exemptive authority to avoid
duplicative and perhaps conflicting regulatory requirements for
activities that take place outside the United States.
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Let me now turn to the rulemaking process. Our member firms
believe that the CFTC should implement the reforms envisioned by
the Dodd-Frank Act in a deliberate and measured way. We
recognize that the Commodity Futures Trading Commission and its
staff are working night and day to comply with the very tight
timeframes set out in the Dodd-Frank Act. We also appreciate that
the Commission has repeatedly invited affected parties to provide
input into the rulemaking process. And we have responded. As of
today, we have filed comment letters on 17 proposed rulemakings,
we have participated in three CFTC roundtables and we have met
with CFTC staff on many occasions to discuss matters of particular
concern.
I regret to say, however, that providing meaningful analysis and
comment is extraordinarily difficult due to the tremendous number
of rules that have been proposed in such a short period of time. To
give you one example, the Commission has proposed a myriad of
rules that taken together would completely overhaul the
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recordkeeping and reporting requirements for clearing firms,
exchanges and clearing organizations. These proposals include: (i)
the advance notice of proposed rulemaking regarding the protection
of cleared swaps customers before and after commodity broker
bankruptcies; (ii) core principles and other requirements for
designated contract markets; (iii) risk management requirements for
derivatives clearing organizations; (iv) information management
requirements for derivatives clearing organizations; (v) position
limits for derivatives; (vi) core principles and other requirements for
swap execution facilities; and (vii) swap data recordkeeping and
reporting requirements. These rulemakings cannot be considered in
isolation. All of the pending recordkeeping and reporting
requirements must be evaluated collectively, not individually.
Otherwise it is impossible to determine whether the pending rules
are complementary or conflicting. Nor is it possible to calculate the
financial and operational burdens these proposals will impose on the
industry and its customers.
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FIA also believes that some of the Commission’s proposed rules go
well beyond Congressional intent. One example is the rulemaking
on governance and ownership of clearing organizations, contract
markets and swap execution facilities. Although the House version
of the financial reform legislation contained provisions that set
specific ownership limits for these entities, those provisions were
removed when the legislation reached the conference committee,
and the Dodd-Frank Act in its final form simply authorizes the
Commission to adopt rules with respect to ownership and
governance. Furthermore, the Act states that any such rules should
be adopted only after the Commission first determines that such
rules are necessary or appropriate to improve the governance,
mitigate systemic risk, promote competition, or mitigate conflicts of
interest. Although the Commission has not made the required
determination, the Commission nonetheless has proposed specific
rules on governance and ownership that effectively would
implement the very provisions that were removed in conference.
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Let me now turn to the third of our major concerns. The
Commission has acknowledged that its proposed rules will increase
the costs of effecting transactions in swaps, but it has stated that the
benefits outweigh any additional costs that may be imposed on
customers. We believe the Commission may well have
underestimated these additional costs. For example, in the proposed
OCR rule, the CFTC estimated the cost of compliance of the
reporting entity and did not estimate the cost to the FCM where
most of the data would originate. FIA estimates that the median
firm would face total costs of $18.8 million per firm to implement
and maintain the data.
Moreover, the additional costs will not be imposed solely on swap
market participants. They are certain to affect participants in the
exchange-traded markets as well. FCMs will have little choice but
to pass these costs on to their customers. Furthermore, the potential
increase in costs could have the counterproductive effect of
reducing competition by causing existing FCMs to withdraw from
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registration and discouraging other firms from entering the FCM
business.
This past year, we formed a new division of the FIA comprised of
firms that trade their own capital and provide an increasingly
important source of liquidity in a wide variety of exchange-traded
markets. Some members of the FIA PTG may choose to provide
liquidity to the cleared swaps markets that are expected to emerge
after Dodd-Frank takes effect. Their willingness and ability to do so
will depend, however, on a number of factors, not the least of which
will be the costs of complying with the requirements of Dodd-
Frank.
It has been suggested that the Commission should move forward
with adopting final rules within the Dodd-Frank Act timeframes, but
set effective dates that will afford participants sufficient time to
come into compliance. Although this is certainly one alternative,
we believe the better choice is to delay adopting final rules until all
affected participants have a reasonable opportunity to fully analyze
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and understand the scope of the complex and far-reaching
regulatory regime that the Commission has proposed.
It should be noted that the rulemaking process that we are
discussing today does not take place in a vacuum. The European
Union is developing a comprehensive regulatory regime for swaps,
including clearing through EU clearing organizations. Chairman
Gensler has taken great pains to consult with his European
colleagues on the rulemaking process. Nevertheless, there is no
escaping the fact that the process on this side of the Atlantic is
proceeding more rapidly than on that side of the Atlantic. That is all
the more reason to proceed carefully as we move ahead on these
rulemaking and avoid locking ourselves into conflicting regulations.
Furthermore, it is our view that the Commission should be
encouraged to use its exemptive authority to assure that market
participants and transactions taking place outside the U.S. are not
subject to duplicative or conflicting regulatory requirements.
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In closing, I want to note that we were pleased that Chairman
Gensler has indicated that he intends to rely more heavily on the
National Futures Association. Self-regulation has worked
extremely well in the futures markets, and we see no reason why the
success of these programs cannot be transferred to the swaps
markets. Importantly, NFA is funded entirely by futures market
participants, thereby relieving additional strain on the federal
budget.
We urge the Subcommittee to take whatever action it deems
appropriate to encourage the Commission to shift regulatory
obligations to NFA and, through NFA, to the other industry self-
regulatory organizations. As discussed above, for example, the
Commission could delegate to NFA the responsibility to adopt rules
for chief compliance officers.
Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today. I
would be happy to answer any questions you may have.
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