SUN INSURANCE OFFICE, LTD.

, petitioner, In light of these definitions, the Court is convinced that the

vs. incident that resulted in Lim's death was indeed an accident.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and NERISSA LIM, respondents. The petitioner, invoking the case of De la Cruz v. Capital
Insurance, 6 says that "there is no accident when a deliberate
The petitioner issued Personal Accident Policy No. 05687 to act is performed unless some additional, unexpected,
Felix Lim, Jr. with a face value of P200,000.00. Two months later, independent and unforeseen happening occurs which
he was dead with a bullet wound in his head. As beneficiary, his produces or brings about their injury or death." There was such
wife Nerissa Lim sought payment on the policy but her claim a happening. This was the firing of the gun, which was the
was rejected. The petitioner agreed that there was no suicide. It additional unexpected and independent and unforeseen
argued, however that there was no accident either. occurrence that led to the insured person's death.

Pilar Nalagon, Lim's secretary, was the only eyewitness to his The petitioner also cites one of the four exceptions provided
death. It happened on October 6, 1982, at about 10 o'clock in for in the insurance contract and contends that the private
the evening, after his mother's birthday party. According to petitioner's claim is barred by such provision. It is there stated:
Nalagon, Lim was in a happy mood (but not drunk) and was
playing with his handgun, from which he had previously Exceptions —
removed the magazine. As she watched television, he stood in
front of her and pointed the gun at her. She pushed it aside The company shall not be liable in respect of
and said it might he loaded. He assured her it was not and then
pointed it to his temple. The next moment there was an 1. Bodily injury
explosion and Lim slumped to the floor. He was dead before he
fell. 1 xxx xxx xxx

The widow sued the petitioner in the Regional Trial Court of b. consequent upon
Zamboanga City and was sustained. 2 The petitioner was
sentenced to pay her P200,000.00, representing the face value i) The insured person attempting to commit suicide or willfully
of the policy, with interest at the legal rate; P10,000.00 as moral exposing himself to needless peril except in an attempt to save
damages; P5,000.00 as exemplary damages; P5,000.00 as actual human life.
and compensatory damages; and P5,000.00 as attorney's fees,
plus the costs of the suit. This decision was affirmed on appeal, To repeat, the parties agree that Lim did not commit suicide.
and the motion for reconsideration was denied. 3 The Nevertheless, the petitioner contends that the insured willfully
petitioner then came to this Court to fault the Court of Appeals exposed himself to needless peril and thus removed himself
for approving the payment of the claim and the award of from the coverage of the insurance policy.
damages.
It should be noted at the outset that suicide and willful
The term "accident" has been defined as follows: exposure to needless peril are in pari materia because they
both signify a disregard for one's life. The only difference is in
The words "accident" and "accidental" have never acquired any degree, as suicide imports a positive act of ending such life
technical signification in law, and when used in an insurance whereas the second act indicates a reckless risking of it that is
contract are to be construed and considered according to the almost suicidal in intent. To illustrate, a person who walks a
ordinary understanding and common usage and speech of tightrope one thousand meters above the ground and without
people generally. In-substance, the courts are practically any safety device may not actually be intending to commit
agreed that the words "accident" and "accidental" mean that suicide, but his act is nonetheless suicidal. He would thus be
which happens by chance or fortuitously, without intention or considered as "willfully exposing himself to needless peril"
design, and which is unexpected, unusual, and unforeseen. The within the meaning of the exception in question.
definition that has usually been adopted by the courts is that
an accident is an event that takes place without one's foresight The petitioner maintains that by the mere act of pointing the
or expectation — an event that proceeds from an unknown gun to hip temple, Lim had willfully exposed himself to
cause, or is an unusual effect of a known case, and therefore needless peril and so came under the exception. The theory is
not expected. 4 that a gun is per se dangerous and should therefore be
handled cautiously in every case.
An accident is an event which happens without any human
agency or, if happening through human agency, an event That posture is arguable. But what is not is that, as the
which, under the circumstances, is unusual to and not expected secretary testified, Lim had removed the magazine from the
by the person to whom it happens. It has also been defined as gun and believed it was no longer dangerous. He expressly
an injury which happens by reason of some violence or casualty assured her that the gun was not loaded. It is submitted that
to the injured without his design, consent, or voluntary co- Lim did not willfully expose himself to needless peril when he
operation. 5 pointed the gun to his temple because the fact is that he
thought it was not unsafe to do so. The act was precisely
intended to assure Nalagon that the gun was indeed harmless.
 damages. The law could not have meant to impose a penalty
The contrary view is expressed by the petitioner thus: on the right to litigate; such right is so precious that moral
damages may not be charged on those who may exercise it
Accident insurance policies were never intended to reward the erroneously. For these the law taxes costs. 7
insured for his tendency to show off or for his miscalculations.
They were intended to provide for contingencies. Hence, when The fact that the results of the trial were adverse to Barreto did
I miscalculate and jump from the Quezon Bridge into the Pasig not alone make his act in bringing the action wrongful because
River in the belief that I can overcome the current, I have in most cases one party will lose; we would be imposing an
wilfully exposed myself to peril and must accept the unjust condition or limitation on the right to litigate. We hold
consequences of my act. If I drown I cannot go to the insurance that the award of moral damages in the case at bar is not
company to ask them to compensate me for my failure to swim justified by the facts had circumstances as well as the law.
as well as I thought I could. The insured in the case at bar
deliberately put the gun to his head and pulled the trigger. He If a party wins, he cannot, as a rule, recover attorney's fees and
wilfully exposed himself to peril. litigation expenses, since it is not the fact of winning alone that
entitles him to recover such damages of the exceptional
The Court certainly agrees that a drowned man cannot go to circumstances enumerated in Art. 2208. Otherwise, every time a
the insurance company to ask for compensation. That might defendant wins, automatically the plaintiff must pay attorney's
frighten the insurance people to death. We also agree that fees thereby putting a premium on the right to litigate which
under the circumstances narrated, his beneficiary would not be should not be so. For those expenses, the law deems the award
able to collect on the insurance policy for it is clear that when of costs as sufficient. 8
he braved the currents below, he deliberately exposed himself
to a known peril. WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED in so far as it holds the petitioner liable to the
The private respondent maintains that Lim did not. That is private respondent in the sum of P200,000.00 representing the
where she says the analogy fails. The petitioner's hypothetical face value of the insurance contract, with interest at the legal
swimmer knew when he dived off the Quezon Bridge that the rate from the date of the filing of the complaint until the full
currents below were dangerous. By contrast, Lim did not know amount is paid, but MODIFIED with the deletion of all awards
that the gun he put to his head was loaded. for damages, including attorney's fees, except the costs of the
suit.
Lim was unquestionably negligent and that negligence cost
him his own life. But it should not prevent his widow from
recovering from the insurance policy he obtained precisely
against accident. There is nothing in the policy that relieves the SIMON DE LA CRUZ, plaintiff and appellee,
insurer of the responsibility to pay the indemnity agreed upon vs.
if the insured is shown to have contributed to his own accident. THE CAPITAL INSURANCE and SURETY CO., INC., defendant and
appellant.
Indeed, most accidents are caused by negligence. There are
only four exceptions expressly made in the contract to relieve
This is an appeal by the Capital Insurance & Surety Company,
the insurer from liability, and none of these exceptions is
Inc., from the decision of the Court of First Instance of
applicable in the case at bar. **
Pangasinan (in Civ Case No. U-265), ordering it to indemnify
therein plaintiff Simon de la Cruz for the death of the latter's
It bears noting that insurance contracts are as a rule supposed
son, to pay the burial expenses, and attorney's fees.
to be interpreted liberally in favor of the assured. There is no
reason to deviate from this rule, especially in view of the
Eduardo de la Cruz, employed as a mucker in the Itogon-Suyoc
circumstances of this case as above analyzed.
Mines, Inc. in Baguio, was the holder of an accident insurance
policy (No. ITO-BFE-170) underwritten by the Capital Insurance
On the second assigned error, however, the Court must rule in
& Surety Co., Inc., for the period beginning November 13, 1956
favor of the petitioner. The basic issue raised in this case is, as
to November 12, 1957. On January 1, 1957, in connection with
the petitioner correctly observed, one of first impression. It is
the celebration of the New Year, the Itogon-Suyoc Mines, Inc.
evident that the petitioner was acting in good faith then it
sponsored a boxing contest for general entertainment wherein
resisted the private respondent's claim on the ground that the
the insured Eduardo de la Cruz, a non-professional boxer
death of the insured was covered by the exception. The issue
participated. In the course of his bout with another person,
was indeed debatable and was clearly not raised only for the
likewise a non-professional, of the same height, weight, and
purpose of evading a legitimate obligation. We hold therefore
size, Eduardo slipped and was hit by his opponent on the left
that the award of moral and exemplary damages and of
part of the back of the head, causing Eduardo to fall, with his
attorney's fees is unjust and so must be disapproved.
head hitting the rope of the ring. He was brought to the
Baguio General Hospital the following day. The cause of death
In order that a person may be made liable to the payment of
was reported as hemorrhage, intracranial, left.
moral damages, the law requires that his act be wrongful. The
adverse result of an action does not per se make the act
wrongful and subject the act or to the payment of moral
Simon de la Cruz, the father of the insured and who was named insured's voluntary act, or if something unforeseen occurs in
beneficiary under the policy, thereupon filed a claim with the the doing of the act which produces the injury, the resulting
insurance company for payment of the indemnity under the death is within the protection of policies insuring against death
insurance policy. As the claim was denied, De la Cruz instituted or injury from accident.
the action in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan for
specific performance. Defendant insurer set up the defense In the present case, while the participation of the insured in the
that the death of the insured, caused by his participation in a boxing contest is voluntary, the injury was sustained when he
boxing contest, was not accidental and, therefore, not covered slid, giving occasion to the infliction by his opponent of the
by insurance. After due hearing the court rendered the decision blow that threw him to the ropes of the ring. Without this
in favor of the plaintiff which is the subject of the present unfortunate incident, that is, the unintentional slipping of the
appeal. deceased, perhaps he could not have received that blow in the
head and would not have died. The fact that boxing is attended
It is not disputed that during the ring fight with another non- with some risks of external injuries does not make any injuries
professional boxer, Eduardo slipped, which was unintentional. received in the course of the game not accidental. In boxing as
At this opportunity, his opponent landed on Eduardo's head a in other equally physically rigorous sports, such as basketball or
blow, which sent the latter to the ropes. That must have caused baseball, death is not ordinarily anticipated to result. If,
the cranial injury that led to his death. Eduardo was insured therefore, it ever does, the injury or death can only be
"against death or disability caused by accidental means". accidental or produced by some unforeseen happening or
Appellant insurer now contends that while the death of the event as what occurred in this case.
insured was due to head injury, said injury was sustained
because of his voluntary participation in the contest. It is Furthermore, the policy involved herein specifically excluded
claimed that the participation in the boxing contest was the from its coverage —
"means" that produced the injury which, in turn, caused the
death of the insured. And, since his inclusion in the boxing card (e) Death or disablement consequent upon the Insured
was voluntary on the part of the insured, he cannot be engaging in football, hunting, pigsticking, steeplechasing,
considered to have met his death by "accidental means". polo-playing, racing of any kind, mountaineering, or
motorcycling.
The terms "accident" and "accidental", as used in insurance
contracts, have not acquired any technical meaning, and are Death or disablement resulting from engagement in boxing
construed by the courts in their ordinary and common contests was not declared outside of the protection of the
acceptation. Thus, the terms have been taken to mean that insurance contract. Failure of the defendant insurance company
which happen by chance or fortuitously, without intention and to include death resulting from a boxing match or other sports
design, and which is unexpected, unusual, and unforeseen. An among the prohibitive risks leads inevitably to the conclusion
accident is an event that takes place without one's foresight or that it did not intend to limit or exempt itself from liability for
expectation — an event that proceeds from an unknown cause, such death.5
or is an unusual effect of a known cause and, therefore, not
expected.1 Wherefore, in view of the foregoing considerations, the
decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against
Appellant however, would like to make a distinction between appellant. so ordered.
"accident or accidental" and "accidental means", which is the
term used in the insurance policy involved here. It is argued
that to be considered within the protection of the policy, what
is required to be accidental is the means that caused or FINMAN GENERAL ASSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner,
brought the death and not the death itself. It may be vs.
mentioned in this connection, that the tendency of court THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and JULIA SURPOSA,
respondents.
decisions in the United States in recent years is to eliminate the
fine distinction between the terms "accidental" and "accidental
This is a petition for certiorari with a prayer for the issuance of
means" and to consider them as legally synonymous.2 But,
a restraining order and preliminary mandatory injunction to
even if we take appellant's theory, the death of the insured in
annul and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals dated
the case at bar would still be entitled to indemnification under
July 11, 1991, 1 affirming the decision dated March 20, 1990 of
the policy. The generally accepted rule is that, death or injury
the Insurance Commission 2 in ordering petitioner Finman
does not result from accident or accidental means within the
General Assurance Corporation to pay private respondent Julia
terms of an
Surposa the proceeds of the personal accident Insurance policy
accident-policy if it is the natural result of the insured's
with interest.
voluntary act, unaccompanied by anything unforeseen except
the death or injury.3 There is no accident when a deliberate act
It appears on record that on October 22, 1986, deceased, Carlie
is performed unless some additional, unexpected, independent,
Surposa was insured with petitioner Finman General Assurance
and unforeseen happening occurs which produces or brings
Corporation under Finman General Teachers Protection Plan
about the result of injury or death.4 In other words, where the
Master Policy No. 2005 and Individual Policy No. 08924 with his
death or injury is not the natural or probable result of the
parents, spouses Julia and Carlos Surposa, and brothers . . . The generally accepted rule is that, death or injury does not
Christopher, Charles, Chester and Clifton, all surnamed, result from accident or accidental means within the terms of an
Surposa, as beneficiaries. 3 accident-policy if it is the natural result of the insured's
voluntary act, unaccompanied by anything unforeseen except
While said insurance policy was in full force and effect, the the death or injury. There is no accident when a deliberate act
insured, Carlie Surposa, died on October 18, 1988 as a result of is performed unless some additional, unexpected, independent,
a stab wound inflicted by one of the three (3) unidentified men and unforeseen happening occurs which produces or brings
without provocation and warning on the part of the former as about the result of injury or death. In other words, where the
he and his cousin, Winston Surposa, were waiting for a ride on death or injury is not the natural or probable result of the
their way home along Rizal-Locsin Streets, Bacolod City after insured's voluntary act, or if something unforeseen occurs in
attending the celebration of the "Maskarra Annual Festival." the doing of the act which produces the injury, the resulting
death is within the protection of the policies insuring against
Thereafter, private respondent and the other beneficiaries of death or injury from accident. 5
said insurance policy filed a written notice of claim with the
petitioner insurance company which denied said claim As correctly pointed out by the respondent appellate court in
contending that murder and assault are not within the scope of its decision:
the coverage of the insurance policy.
In the case at bar, it cannot be pretended that Carlie Surposa
On February 24, 1989, private respondent filed a complaint died in the course of an assault or murder as a result of his
with the Insurance Commission which subsequently rendered a voluntary act considering the very nature of these crimes. In
decision, the pertinent portion of which reads: the first place, the insured and his companion were on their
way home from attending a festival. They were confronted by
In the light of the foregoing. we find respondent liable to pay unidentified persons. The record is barren of any circumstance
complainant the sum of P15,000.00 representing the proceeds showing how the stab wound was inflicted. Nor can it be
of the policy with interest. As no evidence was submitted to pretended that the malefactor aimed at the insured precisely
prove the claim for mortuary aid in the sum of P1,000.00, the because the killer wanted to take his life. In any event, while the
same cannot be entertained. act may not exempt the unknown perpetrator from criminal
liability, the fact remains that the happening was a pure
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering accident on the part of the victim. The insured died from an
respondent to pay complainant the sum of P15,000.00 with event that took place without his foresight or expectation, an
legal interest from the date of the filing of the complaint until event that proceeded from an unusual effect of a known cause
fully satisfied. With costs. 4 and, therefore, not expected. Neither can it be said that where
was a capricious desire on the part of the accused to expose
On July 11, 1991, the appellate court affirmed said decision. his life to danger considering that he was just going home after
attending a festival. 6
Hence, petitioner filed this petition alleging grove abuse of
discretion on the part of the appellate court in applying the Furthermore, the personal accident insurance policy involved
principle of "expresso unius exclusio alterius" in a personal herein specifically enumerated only ten (10) circumstances
accident insurance policy since death resulting from murder wherein no liability attaches to petitioner insurance company
and/or assault are impliedly excluded in said insurance policy for any injury, disability or loss suffered by the insured as a
considering that the cause of death of the insured was not result of any of the stimulated causes. The principle of "
accidental but rather a deliberate and intentional act of the expresso unius exclusio alterius" — the mention of one thing
assailant in killing the former as indicated by the location of the implies the exclusion of another thing — is therefore applicable
lone stab wound on the insured. Therefore, said death was in the instant case since murder and assault, not having been
committed with deliberate intent which, by the very nature of a expressly included in the enumeration of the circumstances
personal accident insurance policy, cannot be indemnified. that would negate liability in said insurance policy cannot be
considered by implication to discharge the petitioner insurance
We do not agree. company from liability for, any injury, disability or loss suffered
by the insured. Thus, the failure of the petitioner insurance
The terms "accident" and "accidental" as used in insurance company to include death resulting from murder or assault
contracts have not acquired any technical meaning, and are among the prohibited risks leads inevitably to the conclusion
construed by the courts in their ordinary and common that it did not intend to limit or exempt itself from liability for
acceptation. Thus, the terms have been taken to mean that such death.
which happen by chance or fortuitously, without intention and
design, and which is unexpected, unusual, and unforeseen. An Article 1377 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides that:
accident is an event that takes place without one's foresight or
expectation — an event that proceeds from an unknown cause, The interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in a
or is an unusual effect of a known cause and, therefore, not contract shall not favor the party who caused the obscurity.
expected.
Moreover,
it is well settled that contracts of insurance are to be construed Upon a perusal of the authorities cited by the parties, this
liberally in favor of the insured and strictly against the insurer. Court is fully convinced that there is a fundamental distinction
Thus ambiguity in the words of an insurance contract should between life insurance, and accident insurance, and the
be interpreted in favor of its beneficiary. 7 insurance policy issued to Luis G. Morales, husband of herein
defendant, was undoubtedly an accident insurance, as
WHEREFORE, finding no irreversible error in the decision of the distinguished from a life insurance. As conceded by the facts
respondent Court of Appeals, the petition for certiorari with appearing in the pleadings, the personal accident policy, part
restraining order and preliminary injunction is hereby DENIED of the proceeds of which is under garnishment, was for
for lack of merit. P50,000.00 and yet the annual premium was for P15.00. If it
were an ordinary life insurance policy, taking into account that
the insured, Luis G. Morales, was 38 years of age and the
amount of the policy was for P50,000.00 the annual premium
FRANCISCA GALLARDO, plaintiff-appellee, would have been around P1,206.00. Besides, the period for the
vs. policy was stipulated for one year, and considerations as to
HERMENEGILDA S. MORALES, defendant-appellant. age, health, occupation and other personal circumstances were
not taken into account in an accident insurance policy. Even the
The issue before us is whether a personal accident insurance certification issued by the insurance commissioner on August
which "insures for injuries and/or death as a result of murder or 23, 1956, marked as Annex "1" of the opposition, shows that
assault or attempt thereat" is a life insurance, within the the Capital Insurance and Surety Company Inc. is a non-life
purview of Rule 39, section 12, subdivision (k) of the Rules of insurance company and that the only authority granted to it to
Court, exempting from execution. transact business covers fire, marine, surety, fidelity, accident,
motor car, and miscellaneous insurance, except life insurance.
All moneys, benefits, privileges, or annuities accruing or in any From this circumstance alone, not to mention many others,
manner growing out of any life insurance, if the annual there are abundant indications that there exists a fundamental
premiums paid do not exceed five hundred pesos, and if they distinction between life insurance and accident insurance. As
exceed that sum a like exemption shall exist which shall bear counsel for oppositor has clearly pointed out, an accident
the same proportion to the moneys, benefits, privileges, and policy merely insures the person from injury and or death
annuities so accruing or growing out of such insurance that resulting from murder, assault, or an attempt thereat, while in
said five hundred pesos bears to the whole annual premiums life insurance policy, what is insured is the life of the subject for
paid. a definite number of years. From the authorities quoted by the
oppositor, this Court is fully convinced that an accident policy
In accordance with a compromise agreement between the is fundamentally different from a life insurance policy,
parties in the above-entitled case, a decision was rendered especially if this Court takes into account that accident
therein by the Court of First Instance of Manila, on February 3, insurance is an indemnity or casualty contract, while life
1956, sentencing defendant Hermenegilda S. Morales to pay to insurance is an investment contract.
plaintiff Francisca Gallardo the sum of Seven Thousand Pesos
(P7,000.00). In due course, the corresponding writ of execution It is not disputed that a life insurance is, generally speaking,
was issued and delivered to the Sheriff of Manila, who, on distinct and different from an accident insurance. However,
August 8, 1956, garnished and levied execution on the sum of when one of the risks insured in the latter is the death of the
P7,000.00, out of the P30,000.00 a due from the Capital insured by accident, then there are authorities to the effect that
Insurance & Surety Co., Inc., to said defendant, as beneficiary such accident insurance may, also, be regarded as a life
under a personal accident policy issued by said company to insurance.
defendant's husband, Luis Morales, who died, on August 26,
1950, by assassination. Invoking the above-quoted provision of "Life insurance" is a contract whereby one party insures a
the Rules of Court, defendant asked the sheriff to quash and lift person against loss by the death of another.
said garnishment or levy on execution. Upon denial of this
request by the sheriff, defendant filed a motion praying that An insurance on life is a contract by which the insurer, for a
the aforementioned sum of P7,000.00 be declared exempt from stipulated sum, engages to pay a certain amount of money if
execution under said provision of the Rules of Court, and that another dies within the time limited by the policy.
the Sheriff of Manila be ordered to quash or lift said
garnishment or levy on execution. This motion was denied by Life insurance includes in which the payment of the insurance
an order dated October 18, 1956. Hence, the present appeal by money is contingent upon the loss of life.
the defendant, who maintains that the policy in question is a
life insurance policy, within the purview of the aforementioned A contract for life insurance is really a contract for insurance for
exemption, for it insured her husband ". . . for injuries and/or one year in consideration of an advanced premium, with the
death as a result of murder or assault or attempt thereat." right of assured to continue it from year to year upon payment
of a premium as stipulated. Mutual Life Ins. Co. 100 Pa 172,
In its order denying the claim for exemption set up by the 180.
defendant, the lower court expressed itself as follows:
In its broader sense, "life insurance" includes accident accidental causes, or to the willful and criminal act of another,
insurance, since life is insured under either contract. which, as such, is not strictly accidental in nature. Indeed, it has
been held that statutes of this nature seek to enable the head
Under statute providing that 'any life insurance' on life of of the family to secure his widow and children from becoming
husband shall insure to benefit of widow and children exempt a burden upon the community and, accordingly, should merit a
from husband's debt, proceeds of policy insuring against death liberal interpretation.
by accident insured to widow's benefit free from husband's
debts. The object of this statue was to enable a husband, when death
deprived wife and children of his support, to secure them from
Insurance policy, providing for payment in case of accidental want and to prevent them from becoming a charge upon the
death, is "life insurance policy" to such extent within state public. Necessities of the wife and children and the public
statue prescribing in-contestable period for policies. interest are none the less if the death of the husband be
brought about by accident rather than by disease. The intent of
"Life insurance" includes all policies of insurance in which the legislature in the enactment of this statute would not be
payment of insurance money is contingent upon loss of life. . . . advanced by the construction of the law upon which the
petitioners insist.
Insurance policy including a death benefit and a health or
accident disability benefit constituted a "life insurance policy" Under statutes providing to that effect, the proceeds of life
within meaning of laws 1926, c. 118, S. 134, imposing privilege insurance are exempt from the claims of creditors, a limitation
tax on insurance companies with different rates as between life being sometimes imposed as to amount, see infra Sec. 40, or as
insurance companies and other companies, in view of to the beneficiaries entitled to the exemption, see infra
provisions of Code 1906, ss 2576, 2598 (Hemingway's Code subdivision of this section. Statutes exempting life insurance
1927, ss 5830, 5856), and Law 1924, c. 191, s I (Hemingway's are regarded as exemption laws, and not as part of the
Code 1927, s 5995); it being immaterial that in some policy insurance from law of the state, nor as designed simply to
forms the health and disability feature was more valuable asent protect insurer from harassing litigation. Such statutes should
a showing that death provision was inserted to avoid the be construed liberally and in the light of, and to give effect to,
higher tax. their purpose of enabling an individual to provide a fund after
his death for his family which will be free from the claims of
When the application was made, Harris W. Rimmer carried life creditors. The exemption privilege is created not by contract
insurance with the Equitable Life Assurance Society, for but by legislative grant, and grounds for the exemption of the
$10,000, payable upon proof of death, with a provision that proceeds of insurance policies must be found in the statutes.
upon death by accident the amount of insurance payable
would be increased to $20,000. The plaintiff insisted that this By weight of authority, exemption statutes or rules should be
was life insurance, a disclosure of which was not called for in liberally construed with a view to giving effect to their
question 10, while the defendant insisted it was accident beneficent and humane purpose. To this end, every reasonable
insurance that should have been disclosed and further insisted doubt as to whether a given property is or is not exempt
that, it being a fact material to the risk the failure to disclose should be resolved in favor of exemption.
the policy in the Equitable Life Assurance Society rendered the
policy issued to the applicant void. . . . Wherefore, the order appealed from is reversed, and the
garnishment in dispute hereby set aside and quashed, with the
The court might have gone further and held that the failure of costs of this instance against plaintiff Francisca Gallardo. It is so
the applicant to characterize the insurance in the Equitable Life ordered.
Assurance Society as accident insurance did not constitute a
false answer to the inquiry of what accident or health insurance
he was carrying. The policy in the Equitable Life Assurance
Society covered loss of life from natural as well as external and LUZ PINEDA, MARILOU MONTENEGRO, VIRGINIA ALARCON, DINA
accidental causes, and was life insurance. The mere addition of LORENA AYO, CELIA CALUMBAG and LUCIA LONTOK, petitioners,
the double indemnity clause providing for increased insurance vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE
upon proof of death by accident did not divest the policy of its
COMPANY, LIMITED, respondents.
character of insurance on life, or make the contract other than
life insurance, for insurance on life includes all policies of
This is an appeal by certiorari to review and set aside the
insurance in which the payment of the insurance money is
Decision of the public respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
contingent upon the loss of life.
SP No. 229501 and its Resolution denying the petitioners'
motion for reconsideration.2 The challenged decision modified
For this reason, and because the above-quoted provision of the
the decision of the Insurance Commission in IC Case
Rules of Court makes reference to "any life insurance," we are
No. RD-058. 3
inclined to believe that the exemption there established applies
to ordinary life insurance contracts, as well as to those which,
The petitioners were the complainants in IC Case No. RD-058,
although intended primarily to indemnify for risks arising from
an administrative complaint against private respondent Insular
accident, likewise, insure against loss of life due, either to
Life Assurance Company, Ltd. (hereinafter Insular Life), which
was filed with the Insurance Commission on 20 September Second: The testimony of the complainants' rebuttal witness,
1989. 4 They prayed therein that after due proceedings, Insular Mrs. Trinidad Alarcon, who declared in no uncertain terms that
Life "be ordered to pay the claimants their insurance claims" neither she nor her husband, executed a special power of
and that "proper sanctions/penalties be imposed on" it "for its attorney in favor of Captain Rosendo Nuval, authorizing him to
deliberate, feckless violation of its contractual obligations to claim, receive, receipt and take delivery of any insurance
the complainants, and of the Insurance Code." 5 Insular Life's proceeds from Insular Life arising out of the death of their
motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that "the insured/seaman son, is not convincingly refuted.
claims of complainants are all respectively beyond the
jurisdiction of the Insurance Commission as provided in Section Third: Respondent Insular Life did not observe Section 180 of
416 of the Insurance Code,"6 having been denied in the Order the Insurance Code, when it issued or released two checks in
of 14 November 1989, 7 it filed its answer on 5 December the amount of P150,000.00 for the three minor children
1989. 8 Thereafter, hearings were conducted on various dates. (P50,000.00 each) of complainant, Dina Ayo and another check
of P40,000.00 for minor beneficiary Marissa Lontok, daughter
On 20 June 1990, the Commission rendered its decision9 in of another complainant Lucia Lontok, there being no showing
favor of the complainants, the dispositive portion of which of any court authorization presented or the requisite bond
reads as follows: posted.

WHEREFORE, this Commission merely orders the respondent Section 180 is quotes [sic] partly as follows:
company to:
. . . In the absence of a judicial guardian, the father, or in the
a) Pay a fine of FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P500.00) a day from the latter's absence or incapacity, the mother of any minor, who is
receipt of a copy of this Decision until actual payment thereof; an insured or a beneficiary under a contract of life, health or
accident insurance, may exercise, in behalf of said minor, any
b) Pay and settle the claims of DINA AYO and LUCIA LONTOK, right, under the policy, without necessity of court authority or
for P50,000.00 and P40,000.00, respectively; the giving of a bond where the interest of the minor in the
particular act involved does not exceed twenty thousand
c) Notify henceforth it should notify individual beneficiaries pesos . . . . 11
designated under any Group Policy, in the event of the death
of insured(s), where the corresponding claims are filed by the Insular Life appealed the decision to the public respondent
Policyholder; which docketed the case as CA-G.R. SP No. 22950. The appeal
urged the appellate court to reverse the decision because the
d) Show cause within ten days why its other responsible Insurance Commission (a) had no jurisdiction over the case
officers who have handled this case should not be subjected to considering that the claims exceeded P100,000.00,
disciplinary and other administrative sanctions for deliberately (b) erred in holding that the powers of attorney relied upon by
releasing to Capt. Nuval the check intended for spouses Insular Life were insufficient to convey absolute authority to
ALARCON, in the absence of any Special Power of Attorney for Capt. Nuval to demand, receive and take delivery of the
that matter, and for negligence with respect to the release of insurance proceeds pertaining to the petitioners, (c) erred in
the other five checks. not giving credit to the version of Insular Life that the power of
attorney supposed to have been executed in favor of the
SO ORDERED. 10 Alarcons was missing, and
(d) erred in holding that Insular Life was liable for violating
In holding for the petitioners, the Insurance Commission made Section 180 of the Insurance Code for having released to the
the following findings and conclusions: surviving mothers the insurance proceeds pertaining to the
beneficiaries who were still minors despite the failure of the
After taking into consideration the evidences [sic], testimonial former to obtain a court authorization or to post a bond.
and documentary for the complainants and the respondent,
the Commission finds that; First: The respondent erred in On 10 October 1991, the public respondent rendered a
appreciating that the powers of attorney executed by five (5) of decision, 12 the decretal portion of which reads:
the several beneficiaries convey absolute authority to Capt.
Nuval, to demand, receive, receipt and take delivery of WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is modified by
insurance proceeds from respondent Insular Life. A cursory eliminating therefrom the award to Dina Ayo and Lucia Lontok
reading of the questioned powers of authority would disclosed in the amounts of P50,000.00 and P40,000.00, respectively. 13
[sic] that they do not contain in unequivocal and clear terms
authority to Capt. Nuval to obtain, receive, receipt from It found the following facts to have been duly established:
respondent company insurance proceeds arising from the
death of the seaman-insured. On the contrary, the said powers It appears that on 23 September 1983, Prime Marine Services,
of attorney are couched in terms which could easily arouse Inc. (PMSI, for brevity), a crewing/manning outfit, procured
suspicion of an ordinary Group PoIicy
man. . . .
No. G-004694 from respondent-appellant Insular Life prayed for." 15 It also rejected Insular Life's claim that the
Assurance Co., Ltd. to provide life insurance coverage to its Alarcons had submitted a special power of attorney which they
sea-based employees enrolled under the plan. On 17 February (Insular Life) later misplaced.
1986, during the effectivity of the policy, six covered employees
of the PMSI perished at sea when their vessel, M/V Nemos, a On the other hand, the public respondent ruled that the
Greek cargo vessel, sunk somewhere in El Jadida, Morocco. powers of attorney, Exhibits "1" to "5," relied upon by Insular
They were survived by complainants-appellees, the Life were sufficient to authorize Capt. Nuval to receive the
beneficiaries under the policy. proceeds of the insurance pertaining to the beneficiaries. It
stated:
Following the tragic demise of their loved ones, complainants-
appellees sought to claim death benefits due them and, for this When the officers of respondent-appellant read these written
purpose, they approached the President and General Manager powers, they must have assumed Capt. Nuval indeed had
of PMSI, Capt. Roberto Nuval. The latter evinced willingness to authority to collect the insurance proceeds in behalf of the
assist complainants-appellees to recover Overseas Workers beneficiaries who duly affixed their signatures therein. The
Welfare Administration (OWWA) benefits from the POEA and written power is specific enough to define the authority of the
to work for the increase of their PANDIMAN and other benefits agent to collect any sum of money pertaining to the sinking of
arising from the deaths of their husbands/sons. They were thus the fatal vessel. Respondent-appellant interpreted this power
made to execute, with the exception of the spouses Alarcon, to include the collection of insurance proceeds in behalf of the
special powers of attorney authorizing Capt. Nuval to, among beneficiaries concerned. We believe this is a reasonable
others, "follow up, ask, demand, collect and receive" for their interpretation even by an officer of respondent-appellant
benefit indemnities of sums of money due them relative to the unschooled in the law. Had respondent appellant, consulted its
sinking of M/V Nemos. By virtue of these written powers of legal department it would not have received a contrary view.
attorney, complainants-appellees were able to receive their There is nothing in the law which mandates a specific or special
respective death benefits. Unknown to them, however, the power of attorney to be executed to collect insurance
PMSI, in its capacity as employer and policyholder of the life proceeds. Such authority is not included in the enumeration of
insurance of its deceased workers, filed with respondent- Art. 1878 of the New Civil Code. Neither do we perceive
appellant formal claims for and in behalf of the beneficiaries, collection of insurance claims as an act of strict dominion as to
through its President, Capt. Nuval. Among the documents require a special power of attorney. Moreover, respondent-
submitted by the latter for the processing of the claims were appellant had no reason to doubt Capt. Nuval. Not only was he
five special powers of attorney executed by complainants- armed with a seemingly genuine authorization, he also
appellees. On the basis of these and other documents duly appeared to be the proper person to deal with respondent-
submitted, respondent-appellant drew against its account with appellant being the President and General Manager of the
the Bank of the Philippine Islands on 27 May 1986 six (6) PMSI, the policyholder with whom respondent-appellant
checks, four for P200,00.00 each, one for P50,000.00 and always dealt. The fact that there was a verbal agreement
another for P40,00.00, payable to the order of complainants- between complainants-appellees and Capt. Nuval limiting the
appellees. These checks were released to the treasurer of PMSI authority of the latter to claiming specified death benefits
upon instructions of cannot prejudice the insurance company which relied on the
Capt. Nuval over the phone to Mr. Mariano Urbano, Assistant terms of the powers of attorney which on their face do not
Department Manager for Group Administration Department of disclose such limitation. Under the circumstances, it appearing
respondent-appellant. Capt. Nuval, upon receipt of these that complainants-appellees have failed to point to a positive
checks from the treasurer, who happened to be his son-in-law, provision of law or stipulation in the policy requiring a specific
endorsed and deposited them in his account with the power of attorney to be presented, respondents-appellant's
Commercial Bank of Manila, now Boston Bank. reliance on the written powers was in order and it cannot be
penalized for such an act. 16
On 3 July 1989, after complainants-appellees learned that they
were entitled, as beneficiaries, to life insurance benefits under a Insofar as the minor children of Dina Ayo and Lucia Lontok
group policy with respondent-appellant, they sought to were concerned, it ruled that the requirement in Section 180 of
recover these benefits from Insular Life but the latter denied the Insurance Code which provides in part that:
their claim on the ground that the liability to complainants-
appellees was already extinguished upon delivery to and In the absence of a judicial guardian, the father, or in the
receipt by PMSI of the six (6) checks issued in their names.14 latter's absence or incapacity, the mother, of any minor, who is
an insured or a beneficiary under a contract of life, health or
On the basis thereof, the public respondent held that the accident insurance, may exercise, in behalf of said minor, any
Insurance Commission had jurisdiction over the case on the right under the policy, without necessity of court authority or
ground that although some of the claims exceed P100,000.00, the giving of a bond, where the interest of the minor in the
the petitioners had asked for administrative sanctions against particular act involved does not exceed twenty thousand pesos.
Insular Life which are within the Commission's jurisdiction to Such a right, may include, but shall not be limited to, obtaining
grant; hence, "there was merely a misjoinder of causes of a policy loan, surrendering the policy, receiving the proceeds of
action . . . and, like misjoinder of parties, it is not a ground for the policy, and giving the minor's consent to any transaction
the dismissal of the action as it does not affect the other reliefs on the policy.
 Certainly, it would be highly imprudent to read into the special
has been amended by the Family Code 17 which grants the powers of attorney in question the power to collect and receive
father and mother joint legal guardianship over the property of the insurance proceeds due the petitioners from Group Policy
their unemancipated common child without the necessity of a No. G-004694. Insular Life knew that a power of attorney in
court appointment; however, when the market value of the favor of Capt. Nuval for the collection and receipt of such
property or the annual income of the child exceeds P50,000.00, proceeds was a deviation from its practice with respect to
the parent concerned shall be required to put up a bond in group policies. Such practice was testified to by Mr. Marciano
such amount as the court may determine. Urbano, Insular Life's Assistant Manager of the Group
Administrative Department, thus:
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari which we gave due
course after the private respondent had filed the required ATTY. CAGUIOA:
comment thereon and the petitioners their reply to the
comment. Can you explain to us why in this case, the claim was filed by a
certain Capt. Noval [sic]?
We rule for the petitioners.
WITNESS:
We have carefully examined the specific powers of attorney,
Exhibits "1" to "5," which were executed by petitioners Luz a The practice of our company in claim pertaining to group
Pineda, Lucia B. Lontok, Dina Ayo, Celia Calumag, and Marilyn insurance, the policyholder is the one who files the claim for
Montenegro, respectively, on 14 May 198618 and uniformly the beneficiaries of the deceased. At that time, Capt. Noval [sic]
granted to Capt. Rosendo Nuval the following powers: is the President and General Manager of Prime Marine.

To follow-up, ask, demand, collect and receipt for my benefit q What is the reason why policyholders are the ones who file
indemnities or sum of money due me relative to the sinking of the claim and not the designated beneficiaries of the
M.V. NEMOS in the vicinity of El Jadida, Casablanca, Morocco employees of the policyholders?
on the evening of February 17, 1986; and
a Yes because group insurance is normally taken by the
To sign receipts, documents, pertinent waivers of indemnities employer as an employee-benefit program and as such, the
or other writings of whatsoever nature with any and all third benefit should be awarded by the policyholder to make it
persons, concerns and entities, upon terms and conditions appear that the benefit really is given by the employer. 20
acceptable to my said attorney.
On cross-examination, Urbano further elaborated that even
We agree with the Insurance Commission that the special payments, among other things, are coursed through the
powers of attorney "do not contain in unequivocal and clear policyholder:
terms authority to Capt. Nuval to obtain, receive, receipt from
respondent company insurance proceeds arising from the q What is the corporate concept of group insurance insofar as
death of the seaman-insured. On the contrary, the said powers Insular Life is concerned?
of attorney are couched in terms which could easily arouse
suspicion of an ordinary man." 19 The holding of the public WITNESS:
respondent to the contrary is principally premised on its
opinion that: a Group insurance is a contract where a group of individuals
are covered under one master contract. The individual
[t]here is nothing in the law which mandates a specific or underwriting characteristics of each individual is not considered
special power of attorney to be executed to collect insurance in the determination of whether the individual is insurable or
proceeds. Such authority is not included in the enumeration of not. The contract is between the policyholder and the
art. 1878 of the New Civil Code. Neither do we perceive insurance company. In our case, it is Prime Marine and Insular
collection of insurance claims as an act of strict dominion as to Life. We do not have contractual obligations with the individual
require a special power of attorney. employees; it is between Prime Marine and Insular Life.

If this be so, then they could not have been meant to be a q And so it is part of that concept that all inquiries, follow-up,
general power of attorney since Exhibits "1" to "5" are special payment of claims, premium billings, etc. should always be
powers of attorney. The execution by the principals of special coursed thru the policyholder?
powers of attorney, which clearly appeared to be in prepared
forms and only had to be filled up with their names, residences, a Yes that is our practice.
dates of execution, dates of acknowledgment and others,
excludes any intent to grant a general power of attorney or to q And when you say claim payments should always be coursed
constitute a universal agency. Being special powers of attorney, thru the policyholder, do you require a power of attorney to be
they must be strictly construed. presented by the policyholder or not?

a Not necessarily.
 Assurance Society. 22 Group insurance is essentially a single
q In other words, under a group insurance policy like the one in insurance contract that provides coverage for many individuals.
this case, Insular Life could pay the claims to the policyholder In its original and most common form, group insurance
himself even without the presentation of any power of attorney provides life or health insurance coverage for the employees of
from the designated beneficiaries? one employer.

xxx xxx xxx The coverage terms for group insurance are usually stated in a
master agreement or policy that is issued by the insurer to a
WITNESS: representative of the group or to an administrator of the
insurance program, such as an employer. 23 The employer acts
a No. Sir. as a functionary in the collection and payment of premiums
and in performing related duties. Likewise falling within the
ATTY. AMPIL: ambit of administration of a group policy is the disbursement
of insurance payments by the employer to the employees. 24
q Why? Is this case, the present case different from the cases Most policies, such as the one in this case, require an employee
which you answered that no power of attorney is necessary in to pay a portion of the premium, which the employer deducts
claims payments? from wages while the remainder is paid by the employer. This
is known as a contributory plan as compared to a non-
WITNESS: contributory plan where the premiums are solely paid by the
employer.
a We did not pay Prime Marine; we paid the beneficiaries.
Although the employer may be the titular or named insured,
q Will you now tell the Honorable Commission why you did not the insurance is actually related to the life and health of the
pay Prime Marine and instead paid the beneficiaries, the employee. Indeed, the employee is in the position of a real
designated beneficiaries? party to the master policy, and even in a non-contributory plan,
the payment by the employer of the entire premium is a part of
xxx xxx xxx the total compensation paid for the services of the employee.
25 Put differently, the labor of the employees is the true source
ATTY. AMPIL: of the benefits, which are a form of additional compensation to
them.
I will rephrase the question.
It has been stated that every problem concerning group
q Will you tell the Commission what circumstances led you to insurance presented to a court should be approached with the
pay the designated beneficiaries, the complainants in this case, purpose of giving to it every legitimate opportunity of
instead of the policyholder when as you answered a while ago, becoming a social agency of real consequence considering that
it is your practice in group insurance that claims payments, etc., the primary aim is to provide the employer with a means of
are coursed thru the policyholder? procuring insurance protection for his employees and their
families at the lowest possible cost, and in so doing, the
WITNESS: employer creates goodwill with his employees, enables the
employees to carry a larger amount of insurance than they
a It is coursed but, it is not paid to the policyholder. could otherwise, and helps to attract and hold a permanent
class of employees. 26
q And so in this case, you gave the checks to the policyholder
only coursing them thru said policyholder? In Elfstrom vs. New York Life Insurance Company, 27 the
California Supreme Court explicitly ruled that in group
a That is right, Sir. insurance policies, the employer is the agent of the insurer.
Thus:
q Not directly to the designated beneficiaries?
We are convinced that the employer is the agent of the insurer
a Yes, Sir. 21 in performing the duties of administering group insurance
policies. It cannot be said that the employer acts entirely for its
This practice is usual in the group insurance business and is own benefit or for the benefit of its employees in undertaking
consistent with the jurisprudence thereon in the State of administrative functions. While a reduced premium may result
California — from whose laws our Insurance Code has been if the employer relieves the insurer of these tasks, and this, of
mainly patterned — which holds that the employer- course, is advantageous to both the employer and the
policyholder is the agent of the insurer. employees, the insurer also enjoys significant advantages from
the arrangement. The reduction in the premium which results
Group insurance is a comparatively new form of insurance. In from employer-administration permits the insurer to realize a
the United States, the first modern group insurance policies larger volume of sales, and at the same time the insurer's own
appear to have been issued in 1911 by the Equitable Life administrative costs are markedly reduced.
 exercise is of such an unusual or improbable character, as
xxx xxx xxx would suffice to put an ordinarily prudent man upon his guard,
the party dealing with him may not shut his eyes to the real
The most persuasive rationale for adopting the view that the state of the case, but should either refuse to deal with the
employer acts as the agent of the insurer, however, is that the agent at all, or should ascertain from the principal the true
employee has no knowledge of or control over the employer's condition of affairs. (emphasis supplied)
actions in handling the policy or its administration. An agency
relationship is based upon consent by one person that another Even granting for the sake of argument that the special powers
shall act in his behalf and be subject to his control. It is clear of attorney were in due form, Insular Life was grossly negligent
from the evidence regarding procedural techniques here that in delivering the checks, drawn in favor of the petitioners, to a
the insurer-employer relationship meets this agency test with party who is not the agent mentioned in the special power of
regard to the administration of the policy, whereas that attorney.
between the employer and its employees fails to reflect true
agency. The insurer directs the performance of the employer's Nor can we agree with the opinion of the public respondent
administrative acts, and if these duties are not undertaken that since the shares of the minors in the insurance proceeds
properly the insurer is in a position to exercise more are less than P50,000.00, then under Article 225 of the Family
constricted control over the employer's conduct. Code their mothers could receive such shares without need of
either court appointments as guardian or the posting of a
In Neider vs. Continental Assurance Company, 28 which was bond. It is of the view that said Article had repealed the third
cited in Elfstrom, it was held that: paragraph of Section 180 of the Insurance Code. 34 The
pertinent portion of Article 225 of the Family Code reads as
[t]he employer owes to the employee the duty of good faith follows:
and due care in attending to the policy, and that the employer
should make clear to the employee anything required of him to Art. 225. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise legal
keep the policy in effect, and the time that the obligations are guardianship over the property of their unemancipated
due. In its position as administrator of the policy, we feel also common child without the necessity of a court appointment. In
that the employer should be considered as the agent of the case of disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail, unless
insurer, and any omission of duty to the employee in its there is judicial order to the contrary.
administration should be attributable to the insurer.
Where the market value of the property or the annual income
The ruling in Elfstrom was subsequently reiterated in the cases of the child exceeds P50,000, the parent concerned shall be
of Bass vs. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. 29 and required to furnish a bond in such amount as the court may
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. vs. State Board of determine, but not less than ten per centum (10%) of the value
Equalization.30 of the property or annual income, to guarantee the
performance of the obligations prescribed for general
In the light of the above disquisitions and after an examination guardians.
of the facts of this case, we hold that PMSI, through its
President and General Manager, Capt. Nuval, acted as the It is clear from the said Article that regardless of the value of
agent of Insular Life. The latter is thus bound by the the unemancipated common child's property, the father and
misconduct of its agent. mother ipso jure become the legal guardian of the child's
property. However, if the market value of the property or the
Insular Life, however, likewise recognized Capt. Nuval as the annual income of the child exceeds P50,000.00, a bond has to
attorney-in-fact of the petitioners. Unfortunately, through its be posted by the parents concerned to guarantee the
official, Mr. Urbano, it acted imprudently and negligently in the performance of the obligations of a general guardian.
premises by relying without question on the special power of
attorney. In Strong vs. Repide, 31 this Court ruled that it is It must, however, be noted that the second paragraph of
among the established principles in the civil law of Europe as Article 225 of the Family Code speaks of the "market value of
well as the common law of American that third persons deal the property or the annual income of the child," which means,
with agents at their peril and are bound to inquire as to the therefore, the aggregate of the child's property or annual
extent of the power of the agent with whom they contract. And income; if this exceeds P50,000.00, a bond is required. There is
in Harry E. Keller Electric Co. vs. Rodriguez, 32 this Court, no evidence that the share of each of the minors in the
quoting Mechem on Agency, 33 stated that: proceeds of the group policy in question is the minor's only
property. Without such evidence, it would not be safe to
The person dealing with an agent must also act with ordinary conclude that, indeed, that is his only property.
prudence and reasonable diligence. Obviously, if he knows or
has good reason to believe that the agent is exceeding his WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision of
authority, he cannot claim protection. So if the suggestions of 10 October 1991 and the Resolution of 19 May 1992 of the
probable limitations be of such a clear and reasonable quality, public respondent in CA-G.R. SP No. 22950 are SET ASIDE and
or if the character assumed by the agent is of such a suspicious the Decision of the Insurance Commission in IC Case No. RD-
or unreasonable nature, or if the authority which he seeks to 058 is REINSTATED.