Hizon Notes - Political Law Review (Sandoval)
Hizon Notes - Political Law Review (Sandoval)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TOPIC PAGE
RECENT JURISPRUDENCE
Three-Term Limit Rule: Aldovino v. COMELEC 2
Summary of other relevant jurisprudence on the Three-Term 4
Limit Rule
Disbursement Acceleration Fund case: Araullo v. Aquino 7
Main Decision
Separate Decision of Justice Brion 16
Cybercrime Prevention Act case: Disini v. Secretary of Justice 18
Constitutional Provisions
Unconstitutional Provisions 25
Party-List System case 29
Previous Relevant Jurisdiction
Atong Paglaum v. COMELEC 33
Political Law Revalida Questions 36
LECTURE NOTES 65
Asilo’s 2004-2007 term was not interrupted by the Sandiganbayan-imposed preventive suspension in 2005, as preventive
suspension does not interrupt an elective official’s term. Thus, the COMELEC refused to apply the legal command of Section 8, Article
X of the Constitution when it granted due course to Asilo’s certificate of candidacy for a prohibited fourth term.
Wilfredo F. Asilo (Asilo) was elected councilor of Lucena City for three consecutive terms: for the 1998-2001, 2001-2004,
and 2004-2007 terms, respectively. In September 2005 or during his 2004-2007 term of office, the Sandiganbayan preventively
suspended him for 90 days in relation with a criminal case he then faced. This Court, however, subsequently lifted the
Sandiganbayan’s suspension order; hence, he resumed performing the functions of his office and finished his term.
In the 2007 election, Asilo filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position. The petitioners Simon B. Aldovino, Jr.,
Danilo B. Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong (the petitioners) sought to deny due course to Asilo’s certificate of candidacy or to cancel
it on the ground that he had been elected and had served for three terms; his candidacy for a fourth term therefore violated the
three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of RA 7160.
The COMELEC’s Second Division ruled against Aldovino, et al. It reasoned out that the three-term limit rule did not apply, as
Asilo failed to render complete service for the 2004-2007 term because of the suspension the Sandiganbayan had ordered. The
COMELEC en banc refused to reconsider the Second Division’s ruling.
ISSUES:
1. Whether preventive suspension of an elected local official is an interruption of the three-term limit rule; and
2. Whether preventive suspension is considered involuntary renunciation as contemplated in Section 43(b) of RA 7160
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law,
shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office
for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he
was elected.
Section 43 (b) of RA 7160 practically repeats the constitutional provision, and any difference in wording does not assume
any significance in this case. As worded, the constitutional provision fixes the term of a local elective office and limits an elective
official’s stay in office to no more than three consecutive terms. This is the first branch of the rule embodied in Section 8, Article X.
Significantly, this provision refers to a “term” as a period of time – three years – during which an official has title to office
and can serve. The word “term” in a legal sense means a fixed and definite period of time which the law describes that an officer
may hold an office. According to Mechem, the term of office is the period during which an office may be held. Upon expiration of
the officer’s term, unless he is authorized by law to holdover, his rights, duties and authority as a public officer must ipso
facto cease. In the law of public officers, the most and natural frequent method by which a public officer ceases to be such is by the
expiration of the terms for which he was elected or appointed.
The term means the time during which the officer may claim to hold office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the
several incumbents shall succeed one another. The “limitation” under this first branch of the provision is expressed in the negative –
“no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.” This formulation – no more than three consecutive terms – is a
clear command suggesting the existence of an inflexible rule. While it gives no exact indication of what to “serve. . . three
consecutive terms” exactly connotes, the meaning is clear – reference is to the term, not to the service that a public official may
render. In other words, the limitation refers to the term. The second branch relates to the provision’s express initiative to prevent
any circumvention of the limitation through voluntary severance of ties with the public office; it expressly states that voluntary
A notable feature of the second branch is that it does not textually state that voluntary renunciation is the only actual
interruption of service that does not affect “continuity of service for a full term” for purposes of the three-term limit rule. It is a pure
declaratory statement of what does not serve as an interruption of service for a full term, but the phrase “voluntary renunciation,”
by itself, is not without significance in determining constitutional intent.
The word “renunciation” carries the dictionary meaning of abandonment. To renounce is to give up, abandon, decline, or
resign. It is an act that emanates from its author, as contrasted to an act that operates from the outside. Read with the definition of
a “term” in mind, renunciation, as mentioned under the second branch of the constitutional provision, cannot but mean an act that
results in cutting short the term, i.e., the loss of title to office. The descriptive word “voluntary” linked together with “renunciation”
signifies an act of surrender based on the surenderee’s own freely exercised will; in other words, a loss of title to office by conscious
choice. In the context of the three-term limit rule, such loss of title is not considered an interruption because it is presumed to
be purposely sought to avoid the application of the term limitation.
The framers’ intent apparently was to close all gaps that an elective official may seize to defeat the three-term limit rule, in
the way that voluntary renunciation has been rendered unavailable as a mode of defeating the three-term limit rule.
From all the above, we conclude that the “interruption” of a term exempting an elective official from the three-term
limit rule is one that involves no less than the involuntary loss of title to office. The elective official must have involuntarily left
his office for a length of time, however short, for an effective interruption to occur. This has to be the case if the thrust of Section
8, Article X and its strict intent are to be faithfully served, i.e., to limit an elective official’s continuous stay in office to no more
than three consecutive terms, using “voluntary renunciation” as an example and standard of what does not constitute an
interruption.
Thus, based on this standard, loss of office by operation of law, being involuntary, is an effective interruption of service
within a term, as we held in Montebon. On the other hand, temporary inability or disqualification to exercise the functions of an
elective post, even if involuntary, should not be considered an effective interruption of a term because it does not involve the loss of
title to office or at least an effective break from holding office; the office holder, while retaining title, is simply barred from
exercising the functions of his office for a reason provided by law.
An interruption occurs when the term is broken because the office holder lost the right to hold on to his office, and cannot
be equated with the failure to render service. The latter occurs during an office holder’s term when he retains title to the office but
cannot exercise his functions for reasons established by law. Of course, the term “failure to serve” cannot be used once the right to
office is lost; without the right to hold office or to serve, then no service can be rendered so that none is really lost.
To put it differently although at the risk of repetition, Section 8, Article X – both by structure and substance – fixes an elective
official’s term of office and limits his stay in office to three consecutive terms as an inflexible rule that is stressed, no less, by citing
voluntary renunciation as an example of a circumvention. The provision should be read in the context of interruption of term, not in
the context of interrupting the full continuity of the exercise of the powers of the elective position. The “voluntary renunciation” it
speaks of refers only to the elective official’s voluntary relinquishment of office and loss of title to this office. It does not speak of
the temporary “cessation of the exercise of power or authority” that may occur for various reasons, with preventive suspension
being only one of them.
Rivera v. COMELEC The Court in Rivera rejected the theory that the official who
finally lost the election contest was merely a “caretaker of the
office” or a mere “de facto officer.” The Court obeserved that
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution is violated and its
purpose defeated when an official fully served in the same
position for three consecutive terms. Whether as “caretaker”
or “de facto” officer, he exercised the powers and enjoyed the
perquisites of the office that enabled him “to stay on
indefinitely.”
Latasa v. whether a municipal During the third term, the municipality was converted into a
Commission on mayor who had fully served city; the cityhood charter provided that the elective officials of
Elections for three consecutive terms the municipality shall, in a holdover capacity, continue to
could run as city mayor in exercise their powers and functions until elections were held
light of the intervening for the new city officials. The Court ruled that the conversion
conversion of the of the municipality into a city did not convert the office of the
municipality into a city municipal mayor into a local government post different from
the office of the city mayor – the territorial jurisdiction of the
city was the same as that of the municipality; the inhabitants
were the same group of voters who elected the municipal
mayor for 3 consecutive terms; and they were the same
inhabitants over whom the municipal mayor held power and
Preventive suspension is imposed under the Local Government Code “when the evidence of guilt is strong and given the
gravity of the offense, there is a possibility that the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a
threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence.”
1. Under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, it is imposed after a valid information (that requires a finding of
probable cause) has been filed in court,
2. While under the Ombudsman Act, it is imposed when, in the judgment of the Ombudsman, the evidence of guilt is
strong; and (a) the charge involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty;
or (b) the charges would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent’s continued stay in office may
prejudice the case filed against him.
Notably in all cases of preventive suspension, the suspended official is barred from performing the functions of his office
and does not receive salary in the meanwhile, but does not vacate and lose title to his office; loss of office is a consequence that
only results upon an eventual finding of guilt or liability. Protection of the service goes only as far as a temporary prohibition on
the exercise of the functions of the official’s office; the official is reinstated to the exercise of his position as soon as the preventive
suspension is lifted. Thus, while a temporary incapacity in the exercise of power results, no position is vacated when a public official
is preventively suspended. This was what exactly happened to Asilo.
Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term limit rule demands that preventive suspension should not be considered an
interruption that allows an elective official’s stay in office beyond three terms. A preventive suspension cannot simply be a term
interruption because the suspended official continues to stay in office although he is barred from exercising the functions and
prerogatives of the office within the suspension period. The best indicator of the suspended official’s continuity in office is
the absence of a permanent replacement and the lack of the authority to appoint one since no vacancy exists.
A serious extended illness, inability through force majeure, or the enforcement of a suspension as a penalty, to cite some
involuntary examples, may prevent an office holder from exercising the functions of his office for a time without forfeiting title to
office. Preventive suspension is no different because it disrupts actual delivery of service for a time within a term. Adopting such
Facultad de Derecho Civil 6
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
NOTES ON POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
Kenneth and King C. Hizon _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
interruption ofactual service as the standard to determine effective interruption of term under the three-term rule raises at least
the possibility of confusion in implementing this rule, given the many modes and occasions when actual service may be interrupted
in the course of serving a term of office. The standard may reduce the enforcement of the three-term limit rule to a case-to-case
and possibly see-sawing determination of what an effective interruption is.
MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO, CHAIRPERSON, BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN, et al., v. BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, PRESIDENT OF
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al.
G.R. No. 209287, 1 July 2014, EN BANC (Bersamin, J.)
In a Memorandum dated October 12, 2011, Secretary Florencio Abad of the DBM secured a formal confirmation of the President’s approval of the
DAP for a total of P72.11 billion. This was followed by subsequent Memoranda requesting for the omnibus authority: 1. to consolidate
savings/unutilized balances in fiscal year (FY) 2011 corresponding to completed or discontinued projects and their realignment; 2. to consolidate
savings/unutilized balances in FY 2012 corresponding to unfilled positions and completed or discontinued projects; and 3. for the withdrawal and
pooling of the available and unobligated balances, for both continuing and current allotments, of national government agencies as of June 30,
2012.
After the approval of the requests, DBM subsequently issued National Budget Circular (NBC) No. 541 authorizing Sec. Abad. to withdraw the
unobligated allotments of agencies that had low level of obligations as of June 30, 2012. The DAP funds were sourced from: 1. “savings” generated
by the government, as well as 2. the Unprogrammed Fund.
In September 2013, Sen. Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada delivered a privilege speech in the Senate to reveal that some Senators, including himself, had
been allotted an additional P50 Million each as “incentive” for voting in favor of the impeachment of Chief Justice Renato C. Corona.
DBM’s Explanation
1. Sec. Abad issued a public statement explaining that the funds released to the Senators had been part of the DAP, a program designed by
the DBM to ramp up spending to accelerate economic expansion.
2. He clarified that the funds had been released to the Senators based on their letters of request for funding; and that it was not the first
time that releases from the DAP had been made because the DAP had already been instituted in 2011 to ramp up spending after sluggish
disbursements had caused the growth of the gross domestic product (GDP) to slow down.
3. Abad explained that the funds under the DAP were usually taken from:
a. unreleased appropriations under Personnel Services;
b. unprogrammed funds;
c. carry-over appropriations unreleased from the previous year; and
d. budgets for slow-moving items or projects that had been realigned to support faster-disbursing projects.
4. The DBM claimed that the DAP releases had been sourced from savings generated by the Government, and from unprogrammed funds;
and that the savings had been derived from
a. the pooling of unreleased appropriations, like unreleased Personnel Services appropriations that would lapse at the end of the year,
unreleased appropriations of slow-moving projects and discontinued projects per zero-based budgeting findings; and
b. the withdrawal of unobligated allotments also for slow-moving programs and projects that had been earlier released to the agencies
of the National Government.
1. Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, which granted to the President the authority to augment an item for his office in the
general appropriations law;
2. Section 49 (Authority to Use Savings for Certain Purposes) and Section 38 (Suspension of Expenditure Appropriations), Chapter 5, Book VI
of Executive Order (EO) No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987); and
3. the General Appropriations Acts (GAAs) of 2011, 2012 and 2013, particularly their provisions on the (a) use of savings; (b) meanings of
savings and augmentation; and (c) priority in the use of savings.
ISSUES:
a. They treat the unreleased appropriations and unobligated allotments withdrawn from government agencies as “savings” as the term is
used in Sec. 25(5), in relation to the provisions of the GAAs of 2011, 2012 and 2013;
b. They authorize the disbursement of funds for projects or programs not provided in the GAAs for the Executive Department; and
c. They “augment” discretionary lump sum appropriations in the GAAs.
3. Whether or not the DAP violates: (1) the Equal Protection Clause, (2) the system of checks and balances, and (3) the principle of public
accountability enshrined in the 1987 Constitution considering that it authorizes the release of funds upon the request of legislators.
4. Whether or not factual and legal justification exists to issue a temporary restraining order to restrain the implementation of the DAP, NBC
No. 541, and all other executive issuances allegedly implementing the DAP.
HELD:
Each phase is distinctly separate from the others but they overlap in the implementation of the budget during the budget year.
A. Budget Preparation
1. The budget preparation phase is commenced through the issuance of a Budget Call by the DBM. The Budget Call contains budget
parameters earlier set by the Development Budget Coordination Committee (DBCC) as well as policy guidelines and procedures to aid
government agencies in the preparation and submission of their budget proposals.
2. The Budget Call is of two kinds, namely: (1) a National Budget Call, which is addressed to all agencies, including state universities and
colleges; and (2) a Corporate Budget Call, which is addressed to all government-owned and -controlled corporations (GOCCs) and
government financial institutions (GFIs).
3. Following the issuance of the Budget Call, the various departments and agencies submit their respective Agency Budget Proposals to the
DBM.
4. DBM bureaus thereafter review the Agency Budget Proposals and come up with recommendations for the Executive Review Board,
comprised by the DBM Secretary and the DBM’s senior officials.
5. The DBM next consolidates the recommended agency budgets into the National Expenditure Program (NEP) and a Budget of
Expenditures and Sources of Financing (BESF). The NEP provides the details of spending for each department and agency by program,
activity or project (PAP), and is submitted in the form of a proposed GAA.
6. The NEP and BESF are thereafter presented by the DBM and the DBCC to the President and the Cabinet for further refinements or re-
prioritization. Once the NEP and the BESF are approved by the President and the Cabinet, the DBM prepares the budget documents for
submission to Congress.
7. The budget documents consist of: (1) the President’s Budget Message, through which the President explains the policy framework and
budget priorities; (2) the BESF, mandated by Section 22, Article VII of the Constitution, which contains the macroeconomic assumptions,
public sector context, breakdown of the expenditures and funding sources for the fiscal year and the two previous years; and (3) the NEP
8. Public or government expenditures are generally classified into two categories, specifically: (1) capital expenditures or outlays; and
(2) current operating expenditures. Capital expenditures are the expenses whose usefulness lasts for more than one year, and which
add to the assets of the Government, including investments in the capital of government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries. Current operating expenditures are the purchases of goods and services in current consumption the benefit of which does
not extend beyond the fiscal year. The two components of current expenditures are those for personal services(PS), and those
for maintenance and other operating expenses (MOOE).
1. The Budget Legislation Phase covers the period commencing from the time Congress receives the President’s Budget, which is inclusive
of the NEP and the BESF, up to the President’s approval of the GAA. This phase is also known as the Budget Authorization Phase, and
involves the significant participation of the Legislative through its deliberations.
2. Initially, the President’s Budget is assigned to the House of Representatives’ Appropriations Committee on First Reading.
The Appropriations Committee and its various Sub-Committees schedule and conduct budget hearings to examine the PAPs of the
departments and agencies. Thereafter, the House of Representatives drafts the General Appropriations Bill (GAB).
Facultad de Derecho Civil 8
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
NOTES ON POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
Kenneth and King C. Hizon _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
3. The GAB is sponsored, presented and defended by the House of Representatives’ Appropriations Committeeand Sub-Committees in
plenary session. As with other laws, the GAB is approved on Third Reading before the House of Representatives’ version is transmitted to
the Senate.
After transmission, the Senate conducts its own committee hearings on the GAB. To expedite proceedings, the Senate may conduct its
committee hearings simultaneously with the House of Representatives’ deliberations. The Senate’s Finance Committee and its Sub-
Committees may submit the proposed amendments to the GAB to the plenary of the Senate only after the House of Representatives has
formally transmitted its version to the Senate. The Senate version of the GAB is likewise approved on Third Reading
4. The House of Representatives and the Senate then constitute a panel each to sit in the Bicameral Conference Committee for the purpose
of discussing and harmonizing the conflicting provisions of their versions of the GAB.
5. The “harmonized” version of the GAB is next presented to the President for approval.
6. If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed to pass the GAB for the ensuing fiscal year, the GAA for the preceding fiscal
year shall be deemed re-enacted and shall remain in force and effect until the GAB is passed by the Congress.
C. Budget Execution
1. With the GAA now in full force and effect, the next step is the implementation of the budget. The Budget Execution Phase is primarily the
function of the DBM, which is tasked to perform the following procedures, namely: (1) to issue the programs and guidelines for the
release of funds; (2) to prepare an Allotment and Cash Release Program; (3) to release allotments; and (4) to issue disbursement
authorities.
2. The implementation of the GAA is directed by the guidelines issued by the DBM. T
3. The DBM prepares an Allotment Release Program (ARP) and a Cash Release Program (CRP). TheARP sets a limit for allotments issued in
general and to a specific agency. The CRP fixes the monthly, quarterly and annual disbursement levels.
4. Allotments, which authorize an agency to enter into obligations, are issued by the DBM. Allotments are lesser in scope
than appropriations, in that the latter embrace the general legislative authority to spend. Allotments may be released in two forms –
through a comprehensive Agency Budget Matrix (ABM), or, individually, by SARO.
5. Armed with either the ABM or the SARO, agencies become authorized to incur obligations on behalf of the Government in order to
implement their PAPs.
6. In order to settle the obligations incurred by the agencies, the DBM issues a disbursement authority so that cash may be allocated in
payment of the obligations.
7. Actual disbursement or spending of government funds terminates the Budget Execution Phase and is usually accomplished through
the Modified Disbursement Scheme under wehich disbursements chargeable against the National Treasury are coursed through the
government servicing banks.
D. Accountability
1. Accountability is a significant phase of the budget cycle because it ensures that the government funds have been effectively and
efficiently utilized to achieve the State’s socio-economic goals. It also allows the DBM to assess the performance of agencies during the
fiscal year for the purpose of implementing reforms and establishing new policies.
2. An agency’s accountability may be examined and evaluated through (1) performance targets and outcomes; (2)budget accountability
reports; (3) review of agency performance; and (4) audit conducted by the Commission on Audit (COA).
II. DAP
1. When he assumed office in the middle of 2010, President Aquino made efficiency and transparency in government spending a significant
focus of his Administration. Yet, although such focus resulted in an improved fiscal deficit of 0.5% in the gross domestic product (GDP)
from January to July of 2011, it also unfortunately decelerated government project implementation and payment schedules.
2. The economic situation prevailing in the middle of 2011 thus paved the way for the development and implementation of the DAP as a
stimulus package intended to fast-track public spending and to push economic growth by investing on high-impact budgetary PAPs to be
funded from the “savings” generated during the year as well as from unprogrammed funds.
3. The Administration would thereby accelerate government spending by: (1) streamlining the implementation process through the
clustering of infrastructure projects of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) and the Department of Education (DepEd),
and (2) frontloading PPP-related projects due for implementation in the following year.
4. The March 2012 report of the World Bank,revealed that the DAP was partially successful. The disbursements under the DAP contributed
[110]
1.3 percentage points to GDP growth by the fourth quarter of 2011. The continued implementation of the DAP strengthened growth
by 11.8% year on year while infrastructure spending rebounded from a 29% contraction to a 34% growth as of September 2013
b. DAP was not an appropriation measure; hence, no appropriation law was required to adopt or to implement it
1. The DAP was a government policy or strategy designed to stimulate the economy through accelerated spending. In the context of the
DAP’s adoption and implementation being a function pertaining to the Executive as the main actor during the Budget Execution
Stage under its constitutional mandate to faithfully execute the laws, including the GAAs, Congress did not need to legislate to adopt or
to implement the DAP.
Facultad de Derecho Civil 9
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
NOTES ON POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
Kenneth and King C. Hizon _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
2. Congress could appropriate but would have nothing more to do during the Budget Execution Stage. Indeed, appropriation was the act by
which Congress “designates a particular fund, or sets apart a specified portion of the public revenue or of the money in the public
treasury, to be applied to some general object of governmental expenditure, or to some individual purchase or expense.”In a strict sense,
appropriation has been defined ‘as nothing more than the legislative authorization prescribed by the Constitution that money may be
paid out of the Treasury,’ while appropriation made by law refers to ‘the act of the legislature setting apart or assigning to a particular
[
use a certain sum to be used in the payment of debt or dues from the State to its creditors.’”
3. On the other hand, the President, in keeping with his duty to faithfully execute the laws, had sufficient discretion during the execution of
the budget to adapt the budget to changes in the country’s economic situation. He could adopt a plan like the DAP for the purpose. He
could pool the savings and identify the PAPs to be funded under the DAP. The pooling of savings pursuant to the DAP, and the
identification of the PAPs to be funded under the DAP did not involve appropriation in the strict sense because the money had been
already set apart from the public treasury by Congress through the GAAs. In such actions, the Executive did not usurp the power vested in
Congress under Section 29(1), Article VI of the Constitution.
i. Although executive discretion and flexibility are necessary in the execution of the budget, any transfer of appropriated funds should
conform to Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution
1. Congress cannot anticipate all issues and needs that may come into play once the budget reaches its execution stage. Executive
discretion is necessary at that stage to achieve a sound fiscal administration and assure effective budget implementation. The heads of
offices, particularly the President, require flexibility in their operations under performance budgeting to enable them to make whatever
adjustments are needed to meet established work goals under changing conditions. In particular, the power to transfer funds can give
the President the flexibility to meet unforeseen events that may otherwise impede the efficient implementation of the PAPs set by
Congress in the GAA.
2. Congress has traditionally allowed much flexibility to the President in allocating funds pursuant to the GAAs, particularly when the funds
are grouped to form lump sum accounts. This flexibility comes in the form of policies that the Executive may adopt during the budget
execution phase. The DAP – as a strategy to improve the country’s economic position – was one policy that the President decided to carry
out in order to fulfill his mandate under the GAAs.
3. In contrast, by allowing to the heads of offices some power to transfer funds within their respective offices, the Constitution itself
ensures the fiscal autonomy of their offices, and at the same time maintains the separation of powers among the three main branches of
the Government.
4. In the case of the President, the power to transfer funds from one item to another within the Executive has not been the mere offshoot
of established usage, but has emanated from law itself. It has existed since the time of the American Governors-General Act No. 1902 (An
Act authorizing the Governor-General to direct any unexpended balances of appropriations be returned to the general fund of the Insular
Treasury and to transfer from the general fund moneys which have been returned thereto), passed on May 18, 1909 by the First Philippine
Legislature, was the first enabling law that granted statutory authority to the President to transfer funds. The authority was without any
limitation, for the Act explicitly empowered the Governor-General to transfer any unexpended balance of appropriations for any bureau
or office to another, and to spend such balance as if it had originally been appropriated for that bureau or office.
5. In Demetria v. Alba, however, the Court struck down the first paragraph of Section 44 for contravening Section 16(5) of the 1973
Constitution, ruling: Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. No. 1177 unduly over-extends the privilege granted under said Section 16. It
empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive Department
to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its
enactment, without regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item from which the same are
to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made. It does not
only completely disregard the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but
likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and void.
6. It is significant that Demetria was promulgated 25 days after the ratification by the people of the 1987 Constitution, whose Section 25(5)
of Article VI is identical to Section 16(5), Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, to wit:
Section 25. x x x
5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of
the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be
authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their
respective appropriations.
xxxx
7. Evidently, the Constitutional Commission included Section 25(5), supra, to keep a tight rein on the exercise of the power to transfer funds
appropriated by Congress by the President and the other high officials of the Government named therein. In the funding of current
activities, projects, and programs, the general rule should still be that the budgetary amount contained in the appropriations bill is the
extent Congress will determine as sufficient for the budgetary allocation for the proponent agency. The only exception is found in
Section 25 (5), Article VI of the Constitution, by which the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions are authorized to transfer
Facultad de Derecho Civil 10
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
NOTES ON POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
Kenneth and King C. Hizon _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
appropriations to augment any item in the GAA for their respective offices from the savings in other items of their respective
appropriations.
8. When the statute itself enumerates the exceptions to the application of the general rule, the exceptions are strictly but reasonably
construed. The exceptions extend only as far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general
provision rather than the exceptions. Where the general rule is established by a statute with exceptions, none but the enacting authority
can curtail the former. Not even the courts may add to the latter by implication, and it is a rule that an express exception excludes all
others, although it is always proper in determining the applicability of the rule to inquire whether, in a particular case, it accords with
reason and justice.
ii. Requisites for the valid transfer of appropriated funds under Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution
The transfer of appropriated funds, to be valid under Section 25(5), supra, must be made upon a concurrence of the following requisites, namely:
a. There is a law authorizing the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, and the heads of the Constitutional Commissions to transfer funds within their respective offices;
b. The funds to be transferred are savings generated from the appropriations for their respective offices; and
c. The purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices.
1. First Requisite –GAAs of 2011 and 2012 lacked valid provisions to authorize transfers of funds under the DAP; hence, transfers under
the DAP were unconstitutional
Section 25(5), supra, not being a self-executing provision of the Constitution, must have an implementing law for it to be operative. That law,
generally, is the GAA of a given fiscal year. To comply with the first requisite, the GAAs should expressly authorize the transfer of funds.
Did the GAAs expressly authorize the transfer of funds? In the 2011 GAA, the provision that gave the President and the other high officials the
authority to transfer funds was Section 59, as follows:
Section 59. Use of Savings. The President of the Philippines, the Senate President, the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the Heads of Constitutional Commissions enjoying fiscal autonomy, and the
Ombudsman are hereby authorized to augment any item in this Act from savings in other items of their respective
appropriations.
In the 2012 GAA, the empowering provision was Section 53, to wit:
Section 53. Use of Savings. The President of the Philippines, the Senate President, the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the Heads of Constitutional Commissions enjoying fiscal autonomy, and the
Ombudsman are hereby authorized to augment any item in this Act from savings in other items of their respective
appropriations.
In fact, the foregoing provisions of the 2011 and 2012 GAAs were cited by the DBM as justification for the use of savings under the DAP. The
aforequoted provisions of the GAAs of 2011 and 2012 were textually unfaithful to the Constitution for not carrying the phrase “for their
respective offices” contained in Section 25(5), supra. The impact of the phrase “for their respective offices” was to authorize only transfers of
funds within their offices (i.e., in the case of the President, the transfer was to an item of appropriation within the Executive). The provisions
carried a different phrase (“to augment any item in this Act”), and the effect was that the 2011 and 2012 GAAs thereby literally allowed the
transfer of funds from savings to augment any item in the GAAs even if the item belonged to an office outside the Executive. To that extent did
the 2011 and 2012 GAAs contravene the Constitution.
Apparently realizing the problem, Congress inserted the omitted phrase in the counterpart provision in the 2013 GAA, to wit:
Section 52. Use of Savings. The President of the Philippines, the Senate President, the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the Heads of Constitutional Commissions enjoying fiscal autonomy, and the
Ombudsman are hereby authorized to use savings in their respective appropriations to augment actual deficiencies incurred for
the current year in any item of their respective appropriations.
Even had a valid law authorizing the transfer of funds pursuant to Section 25(5), supra, existed, there still remained two other requisites to be met,
namely: that the source of funds to be transferred were savings from appropriations within the respective offices; and that the transfer must be for
the purpose of augmenting an item of appropriation within the respective offices.
The foregoing principles caution us to construe savings strictly against expanding the scope of the power to augment. It is then indubitable that the
power to augment was to be used only when the purpose for which the funds had been allocated were already satisfied, or the need for such
funds had ceased to exist, for only then could savings be properly realized. This interpretation prevents the Executive from unduly transgressing
Congress’ power of the purse.
The definition of “savings” in the GAAs, particularly for 2011, 2012 and 2013, reflected this interpretation and made it operational, viz:
Savings refer to portions or balances of any programmed appropriation in this Act free from any obligation or encumbrance
which are: (i) still available after the completion or final discontinuance or abandonment of the work, activity or purpose for
which the appropriation is authorized; (ii) from appropriations balances arising from unpaid compensation and related costs
pertaining to vacant positions and leaves of absence without pay; and (iii) from appropriations balances realized from the
implementation of measures resulting in improved systems and efficiencies and thus enabled agencies to meet and deliver
the required or planned targets, programs and services approved in this Act at a lesser cost.
The three instances listed in the GAAs’ aforequoted definition were a sure indication that savings could be generated only upon the purpose of the
appropriation being fulfilled, or upon the need for the appropriation being no longer existent.
The phrase “free from any obligation or encumbrance” in the definition of savings in the GAAs conveyed the notion that the appropriation was at
that stage when the appropriation was already obligated and the appropriation was already released. This interpretation was reinforced by the
enumeration of the three instances for savings to arise, which showed that the appropriation referred to had reached the agency level. It could not
be otherwise, considering that only when the appropriation had reached the agency level could it be determined whether (a) the PAP for which the
appropriation had been authorized was completed, finally discontinued, or abandoned; or (b) there were vacant positions and leaves of absence
without pay; or (c) the required or planned targets, programs and services were realized at a lesser cost because of the implementation of
measures resulting in improved systems and efficiencies.
The DBM declares that part of the savings brought under the DAP came from “pooling of unreleased appropriations such as unreleased Personnel
Services appropriations which will lapse at the end of the year, unreleased appropriations of slow moving projects and discontinued projects per
Zero-Based Budgeting findings.”The declaration of the DBM by itself does not state the clear legal basis for the treatment of unreleased or
unalloted appropriations as savings. The fact alone that the appropriations are unreleased or unalloted is a mere description of the status of the
items as unalloted or unreleased. They have not yet ripened into categories of items from which savings can be generated. xxx
For us to consider unreleased appropriations as savings, unless these met the statutory definition of savings, would seriously undercut the
congressional power of the purse, because such appropriations had not even reached and been used by the agency concerned vis-à-vis the PAPs
for which Congress had allocated them.
The DBM’s Memorandum for the President dated June 25, 2012 (which became the basis of NBC No. 541) stated:
On the Authority to Withdraw Unobligated allotments
xxxx
9.0 It may be emphasized that the allotments to be withdrawn will be based on the list of slow moving
projects to be identified by the agencies and their catch up plans to be evaluated by the DBM.
It is apparent from the foregoing text that the withdrawal of unobligated allotments would be based on whether the allotments pertained to slow-
moving projects, or not. However, NBC No. 541 did not set in clear terms the criteria for the withdrawal of unobligated allotments. NBC No. 541
[151]
targeted the “withdrawal of unobligated allotments of agencies with low levels of obligations” “to fund priority and/or fast-moving
programs/projects.” But the fact that the withdrawn allotments could be “*r+eissued for the original programs and projects of the agencies/OUs
concerned, from which the allotments were withdrawn” supported the conclusion that the PAPs had not yet been finally discontinued or
abandoned. Thus, the purpose for which the withdrawn funds had been appropriated was not yet fulfilled, or did not yet cease to exist,
rendering the declaration of the funds as savings impossible.
Worse, NBC No. 541 immediately considered for withdrawal all released allotments in 2011 charged against the 2011 GAA that had remained
unobligated. Such withdrawals pursuant to NBC No. 541, the circular that affected the unobligated allotments for continuing and current
Section 65. Availability of Appropriations. — Appropriations for MOOE and capital outlays authorized in this Act shall be
available for release and obligation for the purpose specified, and under the same special provisions applicable thereto, for a
period extending to one fiscal year after the end of the year in which such items were appropriated: PROVIDED, That
appropriations for MOOE and capital outlays under R.A. No. 9970 shall be made available up to the end of FY 2011: PROVIDED,
FURTHER, That a report on these releases and obligations shall be submitted to the Senate Committee on Finance and the
House Committee on Appropriations.
Section 63. Availability of Appropriations. — Appropriations for MOOE and capital outlays authorized in this Act shall be
available for release and obligation for the purpose specified, and under the same special provisions applicable thereto, for a
period extending to one fiscal year after the end of the year in which such items were appropriated: PROVIDED, That a report
on these releases and obligations shall be submitted to the Senate Committee on Finance and the House Committee on
Appropriations, either in printed form or by way of electronic document.
Thus, another alleged area of constitutional infirmity was that the DAP and its relevant issuances shortened the period of availability of the
appropriations for MOOE and capital outlays. Congress provided a one-year period of availability of the funds for all allotment classes in the 2013
GAA (R.A. No. 10352). Yet, in his memorandum for the President dated May 20, 2013, Sec. Abad sought omnibus authority to consolidate savings
and unutilized balances to fund the DAP on a quarterly basis. The validity period of the affected appropriations, already given the brief lifespan of
one year, was further shortened to only a quarter of a year under the DBM’s memorandum dated May 20, 2013.
The petitioners accuse the respondents of forcing the generation of savings in order to have a larger fund available for discretionary spending. The
respondents belie the accusation, insisting that the unobligated allotments were being withdrawn upon the instance of the implementing agencies.
Contrary to the respondents’ insistence, the withdrawals were upon the initiative of the DBM itself.
The withdrawal and transfer of unobligated allotments and the pooling of unreleased appropriations were invalid for being bereft of legal support.
Nonetheless, such withdrawal of unobligated allotments and the retention of appropriated funds cannot be considered as impoundment.
According to Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez: “Impoundment refers to a refusal by the President, for whatever reason, to spend
funds made available by Congress. It is the failure to spend or obligate budget authority of any type.” Impoundment under the GAA is
understood to mean the retention or deduction of appropriations. The 2011 GAA authorized impoundment only in case of unmanageable National
Government budget deficit. The withdrawal of unobligated allotments under the DAP should not be regarded as impoundment because it entailed
only the transfer of funds, not the retention or deduction of appropriations.
The respondents rely on Section 38, Chapter 5, Book VI of the Administrative Code of 1987 to justify the withdrawal of unobligated allotments. But
the provision authorized only the suspension or stoppage of further expenditures, not the withdrawal of unobligated allotments, to wit:
Section 38. Suspension of Expenditure of Appropriations. - Except as otherwise provided in the General Appropriations Act and
whenever in his judgment the public interest so requires, the President, upon notice to the head of office concerned, is
authorized to suspend or otherwise stop further expenditure of funds allotted for any agency, or any other expenditure
authorized in the General Appropriations Act, except for personal services appropriations used for permanent officials and
employees.
Moreover, the DBM did not suspend or stop further expenditures in accordance with Section 38, supra, but instead transferred the funds to other
PAPs. It is relevant to remind at this juncture that the balances of appropriations that remained unexpended at the end of the fiscal year were to be
reverted to the General Fund. This was the mandate of Section 28, Chapter IV, Book VI of the Administrative Code, to wit:
Section 28. Reversion of Unexpended Balances of Appropriations, Continuing Appropriations. - Unexpended balances of
appropriations authorized in the General Appropriation Act shall revert to the unappropriated surplus of the General Fund at
the end of the fiscal year and shall not thereafter be available for expenditure except by subsequent legislative enactment:
Provided, that appropriations for capital outlays shall remain valid until fully spent or reverted: provided, further, that
continuing appropriations for current operating expenditures may be specifically recommended and approved as such in
support of projects whose effective implementation calls for multi-year expenditure commitments: provided, finally, that the
President may authorize the use of savings realized by an agency during given year to meet non-recurring expenditures in a
subsequent year.
The balances of continuing appropriations shall be reviewed as part of the annual budget preparation process and the
preparation process and the President may approve upon recommendation of the Secretary, the reversion of funds no longer
needed in connection with the activities funded by said continuing appropriations.
The GAAs for 2011, 2012 and 2013 set as a condition for augmentation that the appropriation for the PAP item to be augmented must be deficient,
to wit: x x x Augmentation implies the existence in this Act of a program, activity, or project with an appropriation, which upon implementation, or
subsequent evaluation of needed resources, is determined to be deficient. In no case shall a non-existent program, activity, or project, be funded
by augmentation from savings or by the use of appropriations otherwise authorized in this Act.
In other words, an appropriation for any PAP must first be determined to be deficient before it could be augmented from savings. Note is taken
of the fact that the 2013 GAA already made this quite clear.
5. Third Requisite – Cross-border augmentations from savings were prohibited by the Constitution
By providing that the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court,
and the Heads of the Constitutional Commissions may be authorized to augment any item in the GAA “for their respective offices,” Section
25(5), supra, has delineated borders between their offices, such that funds appropriated for one office are prohibited from crossing over to another
office even in the guise of augmentation of a deficient item or items. Thus, we call such transfers of funds cross-border transfers or cross-border
augmentations.
To be sure, the phrase “respective offices” used in Section 25(5), supra, refers to the entire Executive, with respect to the President; the Senate,
with respect to the Senate President; the House of Representatives, with respect to the Speaker; the Judiciary, with respect to the Chief Justice; the
Constitutional Commissions, with respect to their respective Chairpersons.
Regardless of the variant characterizations of the cross-border transfers of funds, the plain text of Section 25(5),supra, disallowing cross-border
transfers was disobeyed. Cross-border transfers, whether as augmentation, or as aid, were prohibited under Section 25(5), supra.
d. Sourcing the DAP from unprogrammed funds despite the original revenue targetsnot having been exceeded was invalid
The BESFs for 2011, 2012 and 2013 uniformly defined “unprogrammed appropriations” as appropriations that provided standby authority to incur
additional agency obligations for priority PAPs when revenue collections exceeded targets, and when additional foreign funds are generated.
Contrary to the DBM’s averment that there were three instances when unprogrammed funds could be released, the BESFs envisioned only two
instances. The third mentioned by the DBM – the collection of new revenues from sources not originally considered in the BESFs – was not
included. This meant that the collection of additional revenues from new sources did not warrant the release of the unprogrammed funds.
Hence, even if the revenues not considered in the BESFs were collected or generated, the basic condition that the revenue collections should
exceed the revenue targets must still be complied with in order to justify the release of the unprogrammed funds.
The revenue targets stated in the BESF were intended to address the funding requirements of the proposed programmed appropriations. In
contrast, the unprogrammed funds, as standby appropriations, were to be released only when there were revenues in excess of what the
programmed appropriations required. As such, the revenue targets should be considered as a whole, not individually; otherwise, we would be
dealing with artificial revenue surpluses. The requirement that revenue collections must exceed revenue target should be understood to mean
that the revenue collections must exceed the total of the revenue targets stated in the BESF. Moreover, to release the unprogrammed funds
simply because there was an excess revenue as to one source of revenue would be an unsound fiscal management measure because it would
disregard the budget plan and foster budget deficits, in contravention of the Government’s surplus budget policy.
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or
practice to the contrary.
When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.
Orthodox View
The decision now on appeal reflects the orthodox view that an unconstitutional act, for that matter an executive order or a municipal ordinance
likewise suffering from that infirmity, cannot be the source of any legal rights or duties.
The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination [of unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may have consequences which
cannot justly be ignored. The doctrine of operative fact recognizes the existence of the law or executive act prior to the determination of its
unconstitutionality as an operative fact that produced consequences that cannot always be erased, ignored or disregarded. In short, it nullifies
the void law or executive act but sustains its effects. It provides an exception to the general rule that a void or unconstitutional law produces no
effect. But its use must be subjected to great scrutiny and circumspection, and it cannot be invoked to validate an unconstitutional law or executive
act, but is resorted to only as a matter of equity and fair play. It applies only to cases where extraordinary circumstances exist, and only when the
extraordinary circumstances have met the stringent conditions that will permit its application.
NOTE: The SC finds the doctrine of operative fact applicable to the adoption and implementation of the DAP. Its application to the DAP proceeds
from equity and fair play. The consequences resulting from the DAP and its related issuances could not be ignored or could no longer be undone.
To be clear, the doctrine of operative fact extends to a void or unconstitutional executive act. The term executive act is broad enough to include
any and all acts of the Executive, including those that are quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial in nature. The operative fact doctrine is not
confined to statutes and rules and regulations issued by the executive department that are accorded the same status as that of a statute or
those which are quasi-legislative in nature.
Even assuming that De Agbayani initially applied the operative fact doctrine only to executive issuances like orders and rules and regulations,
said principle can nonetheless be applied, by analogy, to decisions made by the President or the agencies under the executive department. This
doctrine, in the interest of justice and equity, can be applied liberally and in a broad sense to encompass said decisions of the executive branch.
In keeping with the demands of equity, the Court can apply the operative fact doctrine to acts and consequences that resulted from the reliance
not only on a law or executive act which is quasi-legislative in nature but also on decisions or orders of the executive branch which were later
nullified. This Court is not unmindful that such acts and consequences must be recognized in the higher interest of justice, equity and fairness.
Significantly, a decision made by the President or the administrative agencies has to be complied with because it has the force and effect of law,
springing from the powers of the President under the Constitution and existing laws. Prior to the nullification or recall of said decision, it may
have produced acts and consequences in conformity to and in reliance of said decision, which must be respected. It is on this score that the
operative fact doctrine should be applied to acts and consequences that resulted from the implementation of the PARC Resolution approving
the SDP of HLI.
It is clear from the foregoing that the adoption and the implementation of the DAP and its related issuances were executive acts. The DAP itself, as
a policy, transcended a merely administrative practice especially after the Executive, through the DBM, implemented it by issuing various
memoranda and circulars. The pooling of savings pursuant to the DAP from the allotments made available to the different agencies and
departments was consistently applied throughout the entire Executive. With the Executive, through the DBM, being in charge of the third phase of
the budget cycle – the budget execution phase, the President could legitimately adopt a policy like the DAP by virtue of his primary responsibility as
the Chief Executive of directing the national economy towards growth and development. This is simply because savings could and should be
determined only during the budget execution phase.
To declare the implementation of the DAP unconstitutional without recognizing that its prior implementation constituted an operative fact that
produced consequences in the real as well as juristic worlds of the Government and the Nation is to be impractical and unfair. Unless the doctrine
is held to apply, the Executive as the disburser and the offices under it and elsewhere as the recipients could be required to undo everything that
they had implemented in good faith under the DAP. That scenario would be enormously burdensome for the Government. Equity alleviates such
burden
Nonetheless, as Justice Brion has pointed out during the deliberations, the doctrine of operative fact does not always apply, and is not always
the consequence of every declaration of constitutional invalidity. It can be invoked only in situations where the nullification of the effects of
what used to be a valid law would result in inequity and injustice; but where no such result would ensue, the general rule that an
unconstitutional law is totally ineffective should apply.
In that context, as Justice Brion has clarified, the doctrine of operative fact can apply only to the PAPs that can no longer be undone, and whose
beneficiaries relied in good faith on the validity of the DAP, but cannot apply to the authors, proponents and implementors of the DAP, unless
there are concrete findings of good faith in their favor by the proper tribunals determining their criminal, civil, administrative and other
liabilities.
SEPARATE OPINION:
MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO, CHAIRPERSON, BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN, et al., v. BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, PRESIDENT OF
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al.
G.R. No. 209287, 1 July 2014, (Brion, J.)
I. DAP violates the principles of separation of powers and checks and balances
DAP violates the principles of separation of powers and checks and balances on two (2) counts:
1. by pooling funds that cannot at all be classified as savings;
2. by using these funds to finance projects outside the Executive or for projects with no appropriation cover. The details behind these
transgressions and their constitutional status are further discussed below.
These violations – in direct violation of the “no transfer” proviso of Section 25(5) of Article VI of the Constitution – had the effect of allowing the
Executive to encroach on the domain of Congress in the budgetary process. By facilitating the use of funds not classified as savings to finance
items other than for which they have been appropriated, the DAP in effect allowed the President to circumvent the constitutional budgetary
process and to veto items of the GAA without subjecting them to the 2/3 overriding veto that Congress is empowered to exercise.
Additionally, this practice allows the creation of a budget within a budget: the use of funds not otherwise classifiable as savings disregards the
items for which these funds had been appropriated, and allows their use for items for which they had not been appropriated.
Worse, funds provided to finance appropriations in the Executive Department had been used for projects in the Legislature and other
constitutional bodies. In short, the violation allowed the constitutionally-prohibited transfer of funds across constitutional boundaries.
Through these violations of the express terms of Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, the DAP directly contravened the principles of
separation of powers and checks and balances that the Constitution built into the budgetary process.
Given the jurisprudential meaning of the operative fact doctrine, a first consideration to be made under the circumstances of this case is the
application of the doctrine:
1. to the programs, works and projects the DAP funded in relying on its validity;
2. to the officials who undertook the programs, works and projects; and
3. to the public officials responsible for the establishment and implementation of the DAP.
With respect to the programs, works and projects, the DAP-funded programs, works and projects can no longer be undone; practicality and equity
demand that they be left alone as they were undertaken relying on the validity of the DAP funds at the time these programs, works and projects
were undertaken.
2. The officials who merely received or utilized the budgetary funds cannot be held liable
The persons and officials, on the other hand, who merely received or utilized the budgetary funds in the regular course and without knowledge of
the DAP’s invalidity, would suffer prejudice if the invalidity of the DAP would affect them. Thus, they should not incur any liability for utilizing DAP
funds, unless they committed criminal acts in the course of their actions other than the use of the funds in good faith.
The doctrine, on the other hand, cannot simply and generally be extended to the officials who never relied on the DAP’s validity and who are
merely linked to the DAP because they were its authors and implementors. A case in point is the case of the DBM Secretary who formulated and
sought the approval of NBC No. 541 and who, as author, cannot be said to have relied on it in the course of its operation. Since he did not rely on
the DAP, no occasion exists to apply the operative fact doctrine to him and there is no reason to consider his “good or bad faith” under this
doctrine.
If these parties, for their own reasons, would claim the benefit of the doctrine, then the burden is on them to prove that they fall under the
coverage of the doctrine. As claimants seeking protection, they must actively show their good faith reliance; good faith cannot rise on its own
and self-levitate from a law or measure that has fallen due to its unconstitutionality. Upon failure to discharge the burden, then the general rule
should apply – the DAP is a void measure which is deemed never to have existed at all.
It is a basic rule under the law on public officers that public accountability potentially imposes a three-fold liability – criminal, civil and
administrative – against a public officer. A ruling of this kind can only come from a tribunal with direct or original jurisdiction over the issue of
INTRODUCTION
I. Antecedent Facts
On September 12, 2012, the “Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012” recorded as Republic Act 10175 was approved. Among the cybercrime
offenses are:
1. Cyber-squatting
2. Cybersex
3. Child pornography
4. Identity theft
5. Illegal access to data
6. libel
Disini, et al .filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to nullify Sections 4(c)(4),
6, 7, 12 and 19 of RA 10175 for violating the fundamental rights protected under the Constitution. On October 9, 2012, the Court issued a
temporary restraining order against the implementation of RA 10175 for 120 days. On February 2012, the Court extended the TRO until further
order from the Court.
Noteworthily, on May 24, 2013, the Department of Justice announced that the provision of RA 10175 on “contentious on-line libel” has
been dropped together with those provisions that are punishable already under the Revised Penal Code, i.e., child pornography and cyber-
squatting.
II. RA 10175
a. Catch-all Clause
RA 10175 has 31 provisions divided into 8 chapters. RA 10175 also provides for a “catch-all” clause, wherein all offenses likewise
punishable under the Act when committed using a computer, with corresponding stricter penalties.
b. Universal Jurisdiction
RA 10175 also provides for a “universal jurisdiction”, i.e., its provisions apply to all Filipino nationals regardless of the place of
commission. Jurisdiction also lies when a punishable act is either committed within the Philippines, whether the erring device is wholly or partly
situated in the Philippines, or whether damage was done to any natural or juridical person who at the time of commission was within the
Philippines. Regional Trial Courts shall have jurisdiction over cases involving violations of the Act.
c. Takedown Clause
A takedown clause is included in the Act, empowering the Department of Justice to restrict and/or demand the removal of content found
to be contrary to the provisions of the Act, without the need for a court order. This provision, originally not included in earlier iterations of the Act
as it was being deliberated through Congress, was inserted during Senate deliberations. Complementary to the takedown clause is a clause
mandating the retention of data on computer servers for six months after the date of transaction, which may be extended for another six months
should law enforcement authorities request it.
The Act also mandates the National Bureau of Investigation and the Philippine National Police to organize a cybercrime unit, staffed by
special investigators whose responsibility will be to exclusively handle cases pertaining to violations of the Act, under the supervision of the
Department of Justice. The unit is empowered to, among others, collect real-time traffic data from Internet service providers with due cause,
e. Cybercrime courts
It also mandates the establishment of special "cybercrime courts" which will handle cases involving cybercrime offenses (offenses
enumerated in Section 4(a) of the Act).
The cybercrime law aims to regulate access to and use of the cyberspace. Using his laptop or computer, a person can connect to the
internet, a system that links him to other computers and enable him, among other things, to:
1. Access virtual libraries and encyclopedias for all kinds of information that he needs for research, study, amusement, upliftment, or pure
curiosity;
2. Post billboard-like notices or messages, including pictures and videos, for the general public or for special audiences like associates,
classmates, or friends and read postings from them;
3. Advertise and promote goods or services and make purchase and payments;
4. Inquire and do business with institutional entities like government agencies, banks, stock exchanges, trade houses, credit card
companies, public utilities, hospitals, and schools; and
5. Communicate in writing or by voice with any person through his e-mail address or telephone.
Because linking with the internet opens up a user to communications from others, the ill-motivated can use the cyberspace for
committing theft by hacking into or surreptitiously accessing his bank account or credit card or defrauding him through false representations. The
wicked can use the cyberspace, too, for illicit trafficking in sex or for exposing to pornography guileless children who have access to the internet.
For this reason, the government has a legitimate right to regulate the use of cyberspace and contain and punish wrongdoings.
Annabelle Rama and Eddie Gutierrez filed 2 criminal informations for libel against Cristinelli S. Fermin, et al. A libel is defined as a public
and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary; or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to
cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead. In determining whether a
statement is defamatory, the words used are to be construed in their entirety and should be taken in their plain and ordinary meaning as they
would naturally be understood by persons reading them, unless it appears that they were used and understood in another sense.
With respect to the penalty to be imposed for this conviction, we note that on January 25, 2008, the Court issued Administrative Circular
No. 08-2008, entitled Guidelines in the Observance of a Rule of Preference in the Imposition of Penalties in Libel Cases. The Circular expresses a
preference for the imposition of a fine rather than imprisonment, given the circumstances attendant in the cases. However, the Circular likewise
allows the court, in the exercise of sound discretion, the option to impose imprisonment as penalty, whenever the imposition of a fine alone would
depreciate the seriousness of the offense, work violence on the social order, or otherwise be contrary to the imperatives of justice.
ISSUES:
Disini, et al., challenges the constitutionality of the following provisions of the cybercrime law that regard certain acts as crimes and
impose penalties for their commission as well as provisions that would enable the government to track down and penalize violators. These
provisions are:
SEC. 4. Cybercrime Offenses. — The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under this Act:
(a) Offenses against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data and systems:
(1) Illegal Access. – The access to the whole or any part of a computer system without right.
STRICT SCRUTINY STANDARD- a legislative classification that impermissibly interferes with the exercise of fundamental right or operates to the
peculiar class disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed unconstitutional. The burden is on the government to prove that the classification is
necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that it is the least restrictive means to protect such interest. Later, the strict scrutiny standard
was used to assess the validity of laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender, or race as well as other fundamental rights, as expansion from
its earlier applications to equal protection.
Ruling: The Court finds nothing in Section 4(a)(1) that calls for the application of the strict scrutiny standard since no fundamental freedom, like
speech, is involved in punishing what is essentially a condemnable act – accessing the computer system of another without right. It is a
universally condemned conduct.
This will NOT violate the work of professional hackers, professionals who employ tools and techniques used by criminal hackers but would neither
damage the target systems nor steal information. Besides, a client’s engagement of an ethical hacker requires an agreement between them as to
the extent of the search, the methods to be used, and the systems to be tested. This is referred to as the “get out of jail free card.” Since the
ethical hacker does his job with prior permission from the client, such permission would insulate him from the coverage of Section 4(a)(1)
SEC. 4. Cybercrime Offenses. — The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under this Act:
(a) Offenses against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data and systems:
(3) Data Interference. — The intentional or reckless alteration, damaging, deletion or deterioration of computer data, electronic document, or
electronic data message, without right, including the introduction or transmission of viruses.
Contention: It is contended that this provision is overbreadth, while it seeks to discourage data interference, it intrudes into the area of protected
speech and expression, creating a chilling and deterrent effect on these guaranteed freedoms.
OVERBREADTH DOCTRINE- a proper governmental purpose, constitutionally subject to state regulation, may not be achieved by means that
unnecessarily sweep its subject broadly, thereby invading the area of protected freedoms.
Ruling: Section 4(a)(3) does not encroach on these freedoms at all. It simply punishes what essentially is a form of vandalism, the act of willfully
destroying without right the things that belong to others, in this case their computer data, electronic document, or electronic data message. Such
act has no connection to guaranteed freedoms. There is no freedom to destroy other people’s computer systems and private documents
As for the alleged chilling effect of the provision, all penal laws, like the cybercrime law, have of course an inherent chilling effect, an in terrorem
effect or the fear of possible prosecution that hangs on the heads of citizens who are minded to step beyond the boundaries of what is proper.
But to prevent the State from legislating criminal laws because they instill such kind of fear is to render the state powerless in addressing and
penalizing socially harmful conduct. Here, the chilling effect that results in paralysis is an illusion since Section 4(a)(3) clearly describes the evil
that it seeks to punish and creates no tendency to intimidate the free exercise of one’s constitutional rights.
SEC. 4. Cybercrime Offenses. — The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under this Act:
(a) Offenses against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data and systems:
(6) Cyber-squatting. – The acquisition of a domain name over the internet in bad faith to profit, mislead, destroy reputation, and deprive others
from registering the same, if such a domain name is:
(ii) Identical or in any way similar with the name of a person other than the registrant, in case of a personal name; and
Contention: The contention that this provision violates the equal protection clause such that it will cause a user using his real name to suffer the
same fate as those who use aliases or take the name of another in satire, parody, or any other literary device is untenable. Allegedly, supposing
there exists a well known billionaire-philanthropist named “Julio Gandolfo,” the law would punish for cyber-squatting both the person who
registers such name because he claims it to be his pseudo-name and another who registers the name because it happens to be his real name.
Petitioners claim that, considering the substantial distinction between the two, the law should recognize the difference. This is not true.
Ruling: There is no real difference whether he uses “Julio Gandolfo” which happens to be his real name or use it as a pseudo-name for it is the evil
purpose for which he uses the name that the law condemns. The law is reasonable in penalizing him for acquiring the domain name in bad faith to
profit, mislead, destroy reputation, or deprive others who are not ill-motivated of the rightful opportunity of registering the same.
SEC. 4. Cybercrime Offenses. — The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under this Act:
(3) Computer-related Identity Theft. – The intentional acquisition, use, misuse, transfer, possession, alteration or deletion of identifying
information belonging to another, whether natural or juridical, without right: Provided, That if no damage has yet been caused, the penalty
imposable shall be one (1) degree lower.
Contention: The contention that this provision violates the constitutional rights to due process and to privacy and correspondence and freedom of
the press has no basis.
ZONES OF PRIVACY: Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. Within these zones, any form of intrusion is impermissible unless
excused by law and in accordance with customary legal process. The meticulous regard we accord to these zones arises not only from our
conviction that the right to privacy is a “constitutional right” and “the right most valued by civilized men,” but also from our adherence to the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights which mandates that, “no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy” and “everyone
has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.”
In assessing the challenge that the State has impermissibly intruded into these zones of privacy, a court must determine whether a person has
exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy and, if so, whether that expectation has been violated by unreasonable government intrusion. The
usual identifying information regarding a person includes his name, his citizenship, his residence address, his contact number, his place and date of
birth, the name of his spouse if any, his occupation, and similar data.
Ruling:
a. Petitioners fail to show how government effort to curb computer-related identity theft violates the right to privacy and correspondence
as well as the right to due process of law. The charge of invalidity of this section based on the overbreadth doctrine will not hold water
since the specific conducts proscribed do not intrude into guaranteed freedoms like speech. Clearly, what this section regulates are
specific actions: the acquisition, use, misuse or deletion of personal identifying data of another. There is no fundamental right to acquire
another’s personal data.
b. On the alleged violation of the freedom of the press since journalists would be hindered from accessing the unrestricted user account of a
person in the news to secure information about him that could be published. But this is not the essence of identity theft that the law
seeks to prohibit and punish. Evidently, the theft of identity information must be intended for an illegitimate purpose.
c. INTENT TO GAIN- an internal act which can be established through the overt acts of the offender, and it may be presumed from the
furtive taking of useful property pertaining to another, unless special circumstances reveal a different intent on the part of the
perpetrator.
d. The press, whether in quest of news reporting or social investigation, has nothing to fear since a special circumstance is present to negate
intent to gain which is required by this Section.
(1) Cybersex. — The willful engagement, maintenance, control, or operation, directly or indirectly, of any lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or
sexual activity, with the aid of a computer system, for favor or consideration.
Contention: Allegedly, this provision violates the freedom of expression. They express fear that private communications of sexual character
between husband and wife or consenting adults, which are not regarded as crimes under the penal code, would now be regarded as crimes when
done “for favor” in cyberspace.
Ruling:
a. The deliberations of the Bicameral Conference Committee show a lack of intent to penalize a “private showing x x x between and among
two private persons x x x although that may be a form of obscenity to some.”
b. The understanding of those who drew up the cybercrime law is that the element of “engaging in a business” is necessary to constitute
the illegal cybersex.. The Act actually seeks to punish cyber prostitution, white slave trade, and pornography for favor and consideration.
This includes interactive prostitution and pornography, i.e., by webcam.
c. Exercise of Police Power: The State can regulate materials that serve no other purpose than satisfy the market for violence, lust, or
pornography. Engaging in sexual acts privately through internet connection, perceived by some as a right, has to be balanced with the
mandate of the State to eradicate white slavery and the exploitation of women.
SEC. 4. Cybercrime Offenses. — The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under this Act:
(2) Child Pornography. — The unlawful or prohibited acts defined and punishable by Republic Act No. 9775 or the Anti-Child Pornography Act of
2009, committed through a computer system: Provided, That the penalty to be imposed shall be (1) one degree higher than that provided for in
Republic Act No. 9775.
Contention: Petitioners allege that the provision of Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009 (ACPA) making it unlawful for any person to “produce,
direct, manufacture or create any form of child pornography” clearly relates to the prosecution of persons who aid and abet the core offenses that
ACPA seeks to punish. They are wary that a person who merely doodles on paper and imagines a sexual abuse of a 16-year-old is not criminally
liable for producing child pornography but one who formulates the idea on his laptop would be. This has no basis.
Ruling:
a. ACPA’s definition of child pornography already embraces the use of “electronic, mechanical, digital, optical, magnetic or any other
means.” Nobody questioned this.
b. The law makes the penalty higher by one degree when the crime is committed in cyberspace. But no one can complain since the intensity
or duration of penalty is a legislative prerogative and there is rational basis for such higher penalty.
c. The potential for uncontrolled proliferation of a particular piece of child pornography when uploaded in the cyberspace is incalculable.
SEC. 4. Cybercrime Offenses. — The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under this Act:
(4) Libel. — The unlawful or prohibited acts of libel as defined in Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, committed through a
computer system or any other similar means which may be devised in the future.
Contentions:
a. Petitioners allege that the libel provision of the RPC and in the cybercrime law carry with them the requirement of “presumed malice”
even when the latest jurisprudence already replaces it with the higher standard of “actual malice” as a basis for conviction. They argue
that inferring “presumed malice” from the accused’s defamatory statement by virtue of Article 354 of the penal code infringes on his
constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression. They further contend that contend that the laws on libel should be stricken down as
unconstitutional for otherwise good jurisprudence requiring “actual malice” could easily be overturned as the Court has done in Fermin v.
People.
b. Elements of libel:
c. ACTUAL MALICE OR MALICE IN FACT- There is “actual malice” or malice in fact41 when the offender makes the defamatory statement
with the knowledge that it is false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.42 The reckless disregard standard used here
requires a high degree of awareness of probable falsity. There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the accused in
fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the statement he published. Gross or even extreme negligence is not sufficient to
establish actual malice.
d. The Court cannot accept the proposition that its ruling in Fermin disregarded the higher standard of actual malice or malice in fact when
it found Cristinelli Fermin guilty of committing libel against complainants who were public figures. Actually, the Court found the presence
of malice in fact in that case. From her testimony, she had motive to make defamatory statements.
e. When the offender is a private individual: where the offended party is a private individual, the prosecution need not prove the presence
of malice. The law explicitly presumes its existence (malice in law) from the defamatory character of the assailed statement. For his
defense, the accused must show that he has a justifiable reason for the defamatory statement even if it was in fact true.
f. No violation of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR):
1. General Comment 34 of the U.N. Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) does not say that the truth of defamatory statement should
constitute an all-encompassing defense. Under Art. 361 which recognizes the truth as a defense, it is subject to the condition that
the accused has been prompted in making the statement by good motives and for justifiable ends.
2. The UNHRC did not enjoin the Philippines to decriminalize libel. It simply suggested that defamation laws be crafted with care to
ensure that they do not stifle freedom of expression. Free speech is not absolute. It is subject to restrictions as may be provided by
law.
g. Cyberlibel is actually not a new crime since Article 353, in relation to Article 355 of the penal code, already punishes it. In effect, Section
4(c)(4) above merely affirms that online defamation constitutes “similar means” for committing libel.
SEC. 6. All crimes defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and special laws, if committed by, through and with the use of
information and communications technologies shall be covered by the relevant provisions of this Act: Provided, That the penalty to be imposed
shall be one (1) degree higher than that provided for by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and special laws, as the case may be.
Ruling: Section 6 merely makes commission of existing crimes through the internet a qualifying circumstance. As the Solicitor General points out,
there exists a substantial distinction between crimes committed through the use of information and communications technology and similar crimes
committed using other means. In using the technology in question, the offender often evades identification and is able to reach far more victims or
cause greater harm. The distinction, therefore, creates a basis for higher penalties for cybercrimes
L. Section 8 on Penalties;
SEC. 8. Penalties. — Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Sections 4(a) and 4(b) of this Act shall be punished with
imprisonment of prision mayor or a fine of at least Two hundred thousand pesos (PhP200,000.00) up to a maximum amount commensurate to the
damage incurred or both.
Any person found guilty of the punishable act under Section 4(a)(5) shall be punished with imprisonment of prision mayor or a fine of not more
than Five hundred thousand pesos (PhP500,000.00) or both.
If punishable acts in Section 4(a) are committed against critical infrastructure, the penalty of reclusion temporal or a fine of at least Five hundred
thousand pesos (PhP500,000.00) up to maximum amount commensurate to the damage incurred or both, shall be imposed.
Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section 4(c)(1) of this Act shall be punished with imprisonment of prision
mayor or a fine of at least Two hundred thousand pesos (PhP200,000.00) but not exceeding One million pesos (PhP1,000,000.00) or both.
Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section 4(c)(2) of this Act shall be punished with the penalties as enumerated
in Republic Act No. 9775 or the “Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009″: Provided, That the penalty to be imposed shall be one (1) degree higher than
that provided for in Republic Act No. 9775, if committed through a computer system.
Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section 4(c)(3) shall be punished with imprisonment of arresto mayor or a fine
of at least Fifty thousand pesos (PhP50,000.00) but not exceeding Two hundred fifty thousand pesos (PhP250,000.00) or both.
Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section 5 shall be punished with imprisonment one (1) degree lower than that
of the prescribed penalty for the offense or a fine of at least One hundred thousand pesos (PhP100,000.00) but not exceeding Five hundred
thousand pesos (PhP500,000.00) or both.
SEC. 13. Preservation of Computer Data. — The integrity of traffic data and subscriber information relating to communication services provided by
a service provider shall be preserved for a minimum period of six (6) months from the date of the transaction. Content data shall be similarly
preserved for six (6) months from the date of receipt of the order from law enforcement authorities requiring its preservation.
Law enforcement authorities may order a one-time extension for another six (6) months: Provided, That once computer data preserved,
transmitted or stored by a service provider is used as evidence in a case, the mere furnishing to such service provider of the transmittal document
to the Office of the Prosecutor shall be deemed a notification to preserve the computer data until the termination of the case.
The service provider ordered to preserve computer data shall keep confidential the order and its compliance.
Ruling: By virtue of Section 13, however, the law now requires service providers to keep traffic data and subscriber information relating to
communication services for at least six months from the date of the transaction and those relating to content data for at least six months from
receipt of the order for their preservation. Actually, the user ought to have kept a copy of that data when it crossed his computer if he was so
minded. The service provider has never assumed responsibility for their loss or deletion while in its keep.
However, the data that service providers preserve on orders of law enforcement authorities are not made inaccessible to users by reason of the
issuance of such orders. The process of preserving data will not unduly hamper the normal transmission or use of the same.
SEC. 14. Disclosure of Computer Data. — Law enforcement authorities, upon securing a court warrant, shall issue an order requiring any person or
service provider to disclose or submit subscriber’s information, traffic data or relevant data in his/its possession or control within seventy-two (72)
hours from receipt of the order in relation to a valid complaint officially docketed and assigned for investigation and the disclosure is necessary and
relevant for the purpose of investigation.
Ruling: None. It is well-settled that the power to issue subpoenas is not exclusively a judicial function. Executive agencies have the power to issue
subpoena as an adjunct of their investigatory powers. The prescribed procedure for disclosure would not constitute an unlawful search or seizure
nor would it violate the privacy of communications and correspondence. Disclosure can be made only after judicial intervention.
SEC. 15. Search, Seizure and Examination of Computer Data. — Where a search and seizure warrant is properly issued, the law enforcement
authorities shall likewise have the following powers and duties.
Within the time period specified in the warrant, to conduct interception, as defined in this Act, and:
(d) To conduct forensic analysis or examination of the computer data storage medium; and
(e) To render inaccessible or remove those computer data in the accessed computer or computer and communications network.
Pursuant thereof, the law enforcement authorities may order any person who has knowledge about the functioning of the computer system and
the measures to protect and preserve the computer data therein to provide, as is reasonable, the necessary information, to enable the undertaking
of the search, seizure and examination.
Contention: Whether or not the provision violates the right against illegal search and seizures?
Ruling: None. Section 15 merely enumerates the duties of law enforcement authorities that would ensure the proper collection, preservation, and
use of computer system or data that have been seized by virtue of a court warrant. The exercise of these duties do not pose any threat on the
rights of the person from whom they were taken. Section 15 does not appear to supersede existing search and seizure rules but merely
supplements them.
SEC. 17. Destruction of Computer Data. — Upon expiration of the periods as provided in Sections 13 and 15, service providers and law enforcement
authorities, as the case may be, shall immediately and completely destroy the computer data subject of a preservation and examination.
Contention: Whether or not the provision violates the right of a person against deprivation of property without due process of law?
Ruling: No. It is unclear that the user has a demandable right to require the service provider to have that copy of the data saved indefinitely for him
in its storage system. If he wanted them preserved, he should have saved them in his computer when he generated the data or received it. He
could also request the service provider for a copy before it is deleted.
SEC. 20. Noncompliance. — Failure to comply with the provisions of Chapter IV hereof specifically the orders from law enforcement authorities
shall be punished as a violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829 with imprisonment of prision correctional in its maximum period or a fine of
One hundred thousand pesos (Php100,000.00) or both, for each and every noncompliance with an order issued by law enforcement authorities.
Ruling: Thus, the act of non-compliance, for it to be punishable, must still be done “knowingly or willfully.” There must still be a judicial
determination of guilt, during which, as the Solicitor General assumes, defense and justifications for non-compliance may be raised. Thus, Section
20 is valid insofar as it applies to the provisions of Chapter IV which are not struck down by the Court.
T. Section 24 on Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC); and Section 26(a) on CICC’s Powers and Functions
SEC. 24. Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center. — There is hereby created, within thirty (30) days from the effectivity of this Act, an
inter-agency body to be known as the Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC), under the administrative supervision of the Office
of the President, for policy coordination among concerned agencies and for the formulation and enforcement of the national cybersecurity plan.
SEC. 26. Powers and Functions. — The CICC shall have the following powers and functions:
(a) To formulate a national cybersecurity plan and extend immediate assistance for the suppression of real-time commission of cybercrime
offenses through a computer emergency response team (CERT);
(b) To coordinate the preparation of appropriate and effective measures to prevent and suppress cybercrime activities as provided for in this
Act;
(c) To monitor cybercrime cases being bandied by participating law enforcement and prosecution agencies;
(d) To facilitate international cooperation on intelligence, investigations, training and capacity building related to cybercrime prevention,
suppression and prosecution;
(e) To coordinate the support and participation of the business sector, local government units and nongovernment organizations in cybercrime
prevention programs and other
related projects;
(f) To recommend the enactment of appropriate laws, issuances, measures and policies;
(g) To call upon any government agency to render assistance in the accomplishment of the CICC’s mandated tasks and functions; and
In order to determine whether there is undue delegation of legislative power, the Court has adopted two tests: the completeness test and the
sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when
it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. The second test mandates adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to
determine the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.
Here, the cybercrime law is complete in itself when it directed the CICC to formulate and implement a national cyber security plan. Also, contrary
to the position of the petitioners, the law gave sufficient standards for the CICC to follow when it provided a definition of cyber security.
Cybersecurity refers to the collection of tools, policies, risk management approaches, actions, training, best practices, assurance and technologies
that can be used to protect cyber environment and organization and user’s assets. This definition serves as the parameters within which CICC
should work in formulating the cybersecurity plan.
SEC. 4. Cybercrime Offenses. — The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under this Act:
(3) Unsolicited Commercial Communications. — The transmission of commercial electronic communication with the use of computer system which
seek to advertise, sell, or offer for sale products and services are prohibited unless:
(ii) The primary intent of the communication is for service and/or administrative announcements from the sender to its existing users, subscribers
or customers; or
(aa) The commercial electronic communication contains a simple, valid, and reliable way for the recipient to reject. receipt of further commercial
electronic messages (opt-out) from the same source;
(bb) The commercial electronic communication does not purposely disguise the source of the electronic message; and
(cc) The commercial electronic communication does not purposely include misleading information in any part of the message in order to induce the
recipients to read the message.
The above penalizes the transmission of unsolicited commercial communications, also known as “spam.” The term “spam” surfaced in
early internet chat rooms and interactive fantasy games. One who repeats the same sentence or comment was said to be making a “spam.”
Contention: The OSG points out that spams are nuisance. Transmitting spams amounts to trespass to one’s privacy since the person sending out
spams enters the recipient’s domain without prior permission. The OSG contends that commercial speech enjoys less protection in law.
a. the government presents no basis for holding that unsolicited electronic ads reduce the “efficiency of computers.”
b. people, before the arrival of the age of computers, have already been receiving such unsolicited ads by mail. These have never been
outlawed as nuisance since people might have interest in such ads. What matters is that the recipient has the option of not opening or
reading these mail ads. That is true with spams. Their recipients always have the option to delete or not to read them.
c. To prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads would deny a person the right to read his emails, even unsolicited commercial ads
addressed to him.
d. Commercial speech is a separate category of speech which is not accorded the same level of protection as that given to other
constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression but is nonetheless entitled to protection.
SEC. 5. Other Offenses. — The following acts shall also constitute an offense:
(a) Aiding or Abetting in the Commission of Cybercrime. – Any person who willfully abets or aids in the commission of any of the offenses
enumerated in this Act shall be held liable.
Facultad de Derecho Civil 25
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
NOTES ON POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
Kenneth & King Hizon (4A)- UST Faculty of Civil Law ___________________________
(b) Attempt in the Commission of Cybercrime. — Any person who willfully attempts to commit any of the offenses enumerated in this Act shall be
held liable.
Contention: According to the petitioners, this provision suffers from overbreadth, creating a chilling and deterrent effect on protected expression.
Illustration: One day, Maria posts on her internet account the statement that a certain married public official has an illicit affair with a movie star.
Linda, one of Maria’s friends who sees this post, comments online, “Yes, this is so true! They are so immoral.” Maria’s original post is then multiplied
by her friends and the latter’s friends, and down the line to friends of friends almost ad infinitum. Nena, who is a stranger to both Maria and Linda,
comes across this blog, finds it interesting and so shares the link to this apparently defamatory blog on her Twitter account. Nena’s “Followers”
then “Retweet” the link to that blog site. Pamela, a Twitter user, stumbles upon a random person’s “Retweet” of Nena’s original tweet and posts
this on her Facebook account. Immediately, Pamela’s Facebook Friends start Liking and making Comments on the assailed posting. A lot of them
even press the Share button, resulting in the further spread of the original posting into tens, hundreds, thousands, and greater postings.
The question is: are online postings such as “Liking” an openly defamatory statement, “Commenting” on it, or “Sharing” it with others, to be
regarded as “aiding or abetting?”
a. In libel in the physical world, if Nestor places on the office bulletin board a small poster that says, “Armand is a thief!,” he could certainly
be charged with libel.
b. If Roger, seeing the poster writes on it, “I like this!,” that could not be libel since he did not author the poster.
c. If Arthur, passing by and noticing the poster, writes on it, “Correct!,” would that be libel? No, for he merely expresses agreement with the
statement on the poster. He still is not its author.
Ruling: A governmental purpose, which seeks to regulate the use of this cyberspace communication technology to protect a person’s reputation
and peace of mind, cannot adopt means that will unnecessarily and broadly sweep, invading the area of protected freedoms. If such means are
adopted, self-inhibition borne of fear of what sinister predicaments await internet users will suppress otherwise robust discussion of public issues.
Penal laws should provide reasonably clear guidelines for law enforcement officials and triers of facts to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement. The terms “aiding or abetting” constitute broad sweep that generates chilling effect on those who express themselves through
cyberspace posts, comments, and other messages.. Hence, Section 5 of the cybercrime law that punishes “aiding or abetting” libel on the
cyberspace is a nullity. When a penal statute encroaches upon the freedom of speech, a facial challenge grounded on the void-for-vagueness
doctrine is acceptable.
GR: “AS APPLIED CHALLENGE”- the petitioner who claims a violation of his constitutional right can raise any constitutional ground – absence of due
process, lack of fair notice, lack of ascertainable standards, overbreadth, or vagueness. Here , one can challenge the constitutionality of a statute
only if he asserts a violation of his own rights. It prohibits one from assailing the constitutionality of the statute based solely on the violation of the
rights of third persons not before the court. This rule is also known as the prohibition against third-party standing.
XPN: “OVERBREADTH DOCTRINE or VAGUENESS OF THE STATUTE DOCTRINE- A petitioner may for instance mount a “facial” challenge to the
constitutionality of a statute even if he claims no violation of his own rights under the assailed statute where it involves free speech on grounds of
overbreadth or vagueness of the statute. The rationale for this exception is to counter the “chilling effect” on protected speech that comes from
statutes violating free speech. A person who does not know whether his speech constitutes a crime under an overbroad or vague law may simply
restrain himself from speaking in order to avoid being charged of a crime. The overbroad or vague law thus chills him into silence.
Cyberspace is an incomparable, pervasive medium of communication. It is inevitable that any government threat of punishment regarding certain
uses of the medium creates a chilling effect on the constitutionally-protected freedom of expression of the great masses that use it. In this case,
the particularly complex web of interaction on social media websites would give law enforcers such latitude that they could arbitrarily or selectively
enforce the law.
Who is to decide when to prosecute persons who boost the visibility of a posting on the internet by liking it? Netizens are not given “fair notice” or
warning as to what is criminal conduct and what is lawful conduct. When a case is filed, how will the court ascertain whether or not one netizen’s
comment aided and abetted a cybercrime while another comment did not? Of course, if the “Comment” does not merely react to the original
posting but creates an altogether new defamatory story against Armand like “He beats his wife and children,” then that should be considered an
original posting published on the internet. Both the penal code and the cybercrime law clearly punish authors of defamatory publications.
SEC. 5 STILL APPLIES TO THE FOLLOWING CASES: But the crime of aiding or abetting the commission of cybercrimes under Section 5 should be
permitted to apply to the following sections for these offenses do not border on the exercise of the freedom of expression:
1. Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access,
2. Section 4(a)(2) on Illegal Interception,
3. Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference,
4. Section 4(a)(4) on System Interference,
5. Section 4(a)(5) on Misuse of Devices,
6. Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting,
7. Section 4(b)(1) on Computer-related Forgery,
8. Section 4(b)(2) on Computer-related Fraud,
9. Section 4(b)(3) on Computer-related Identity Theft, and
10. Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex. None of these offenses borders on the exercise of the freedom of expression.
K. Section 7 on the Prosecution under both the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and R.A. 10175;
SEC. 7. Liability under Other Laws. — A prosecution under this Act shall be without prejudice to any liability for violation of any provision of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, or special laws.
a. There is double jeopardy with regard to line libel. Online libel is different. There should be no question that if the published material on
print, said to be libelous, is again posted online or vice versa, that identical material cannot be the subject of two separate libels. The two
offenses, one a violation of Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code and the other a violation of Section 4(c)(4) of R.A. 10175 involve
essentially the same elements and are in fact one and the same offense. Indeed, the OSG itself claims that online libel under Section
4(c)(4) is not a new crime but is one already punished under Article 353. Section 4(c)(4) merely establishes the computer system as
another means of publication. Charging the offender under both laws would be a blatant violation of the proscription against double
jeopardy.
b. There is double jeopardy with regard the Child pornography provision. The same is true with child pornography committed online.
Section 4(c)(2) merely expands the ACPA’s scope so as to include identical activities in cyberspace. As previously discussed, ACPA’s
definition of child pornography in fact already covers the use of “electronic, mechanical, digital, optical, magnetic or any other means.”
Thus, charging the offender under both Section 4(c)(2) and ACPA would likewise be tantamount to a violation of the constitutional
prohibition against double jeopardy.
SEC. 12. Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data. — Law enforcement authorities, with due cause, shall be authorized to collect or record by technical
or electronic means traffic data in real-time associated with specified communications transmitted by means of a computer system.
Traffic data refer only to the communication’s origin, destination, route, time, date, size, duration, or type of underlying service, but not content,
nor identities.
All other data to be collected or seized or disclosed will require a court warrant.
Service providers are required to cooperate and assist law enforcement authorities in the collection or recording of the above-stated information.
The court warrant required under this section shall only be issued or granted upon written application and the examination under oath or
affirmation of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce and the showing: (1) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that any of the
crimes enumerated hereinabove has been committed, or is being committed, or is about to be committed: (2) that there are reasonable grounds to
believe that evidence that will be obtained is essential to the conviction of any person for, or to the solution of, or to the prevention of, any such
crimes; and (3) that there are no other means readily available for obtaining such evidence
a. Is there a proper governmental purpose that will require disclosure of matters normally considered privilege? Is there rational relation
to the purpose of the law? Is there a compelling State interest behind the law?
Undoubtedly, the State has a compelling interest in enacting the cybercrime law for there is a need to put order to the tremendous activities in
cyberspace for public good. But, not evidence of “yesterday’s traffic data” like the scene of the crime after it has been committed where real-time
data is superfluous for that purpose. In this digital age, the wicked can commit cybercrimes from virtually anywhere: from internet cafés, from
kindred places that provide free internet services, and from unregistered mobile internet connectors. Criminals using cellphones under pre-paid
Transmitting communications is akin to putting a letter in an envelope properly addressed, sealing it closed, and sending it through the postal
service. Those who post letters have no expectations that no one will read the information appearing outside the envelope. However, when
seemingly random bits of traffic data are gathered in bulk, pooled together, and analyzed, they reveal patterns of activities which can then be used
to create profiles of the persons under surveillance. With enough traffic data, analysts may be able to determine a person’s close associations,
religious views, political affiliations, even sexual preferences. Such information is likely beyond what the public may expect to be disclosed, and
clearly falls within matters protected by the right to privacy.
Section 12 empowers law enforcement authorities, “with due cause,” to collect or record by technical or electronic means traffic data in real-time.
The Court cannot draw this meaning since Section 12 does not even bother to relate the collection of data to the probable commission of a
particular crime. It just says, “with due cause,” thus justifying a general gathering of data. It is akin to the use of a general search warrant that the
Constitution prohibits. Due cause is also not descriptive of the purpose for which data collection will be used. Will the law enforcement agencies
use the traffic data to identify the perpetrator of a cyber attack? Or will it be used to build up a case against an identified suspect? Can the data be
used to prevent cybercrimes from happening? The authority that Section 12 gives law enforcement agencies is too sweeping and lacks restraint.
Nothing can prevent law enforcement agencies holding these data in their hands from looking into the identity of their sender or receiver and what
the data contains. This will unnecessarily expose the citizenry to leaked information or, worse, to extortion from certain bad elements in these
agencies.
The grant of the power to track cyberspace communications in real time and determine their sources and destinations must be narrowly drawn to
preclude abuses.
NOTE: The void-for-vagueness doctrine and overbreadth doctrine is not applicable in this case because Section 12 neither regulates nor punishes
any free speech.
SEC. 19. Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data. — When a computer data is prima facie found to be in violation of the provisions of
this Act, the DOJ shall issue an order to restrict or block access to such computer data.
Contention: Whether or not the provision violates the freedom of expression and the right against unreasonable search and seizures of a person?
Ruling:
COMPUTER DATA- may refer to entire programs or lines of code, including malware, as well as files that contain texts, images, audio, or video
recordings. This is also protected from the unreasonable search and seizures. secure in one’s papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable. Further, it states that no search warrant shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge. Here, the Government, in effect, seizes and places the computer data under its control and
disposition without a warrant. The Department of Justice order cannot substitute for judicial search warrant.
The content of the computer data can also constitute speech. In such a case, Section 19 operates as a restriction on the freedom of expression over
cyberspace. Certainly not all forms of speech are protected. Legislature may, within constitutional bounds, declare certain kinds of expression as
To determine the winners in a Philippine-style party-list election, the Constitution and Republic Act (RA) No. 7941 mandate at least four inviolable
parameters. These are:
First, the twenty percent allocation - the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of
the House of Representatives, including those elected under the party list.
Second, the two percent threshold - only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are
“qualified” to have a seat in the House of Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit - each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that
is, one “qualifying” and two additional seats.
Fourth, proportional representation - the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed “in proportion to their total
number of votes.”
Our 1987 Constitution introduced a novel feature into our presidential system of government -- the party-list method of representation—
embodied in Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution. Hence, a voter is given two (2) votes for the House -- one for a district congressman and
another for a party-list representative. Republic Act 7941 was enacted to implement the Constitution and accordingly, the Comelec en banc
promulgated Resolution No. 2847, prescribing the rules and regulations governing the election of party-list representatives through the party-list
system. The first election for party-list representation was held on May 11, 1998. A total of 123 parties, organizations and coalitions participated.
COMELEC proclaimed 14 party-list representatives from 12 parties which obtained at least 2% of the total number of votes cast for the party-list
system. APEC garnered 5.5% of votes, hence, they were entitled to 2 representatives.
People’s Progressive Alliance for Peace and Good Government Towards Alleviation of Poverty and Social Advancement (PAG-ASA) alleged
that he filling up of the twenty percent membership of party-list representatives in the House of Representatives, as provided under the
Constitution, was mandatory. It further claimed that the literal application of the two percent vote requirement and the three-seat limit under RA
7941 would defeat this constitutional provision.
ISSUES:
a. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, mandatory or is it
merely a ceiling? In other words, should the twenty percent allocation for party-list solons be filled up completely and all the time?
b. Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in Section 11 (b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
c. Is the 3-seat limit constitutional?
d. If the answer to Issue 2 is in the affirmative, how should the additional seats of a qualified party be determined?
HELD:
I. The 20% allocation for party-list need not be filled up completely; it is a mere ceiling
Sec. 5 conveys the message that Congress was vested with the broad power to define and prescribe the mechanics of the party-list
system of representation. Through R.A. 7941, the Congress deemed it necessary to require parties, organizations and coalitions participating in the
system to obtain at least two percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system in order to be entitled to a party-list seat. Those garnering
more than this percentage could have "additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes.” Furthermore, no winning party, organization
or coalition can have more than three seats in the House of Representatives. Hence, Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution is not mandatory. It
merely provides a ceiling for party-list seats in Congress.
Consistent with the Constitutional Commission's pronouncements, Congress set the seat-limit to three (3) for each qualified party,
organization or coalition. "Qualified" means having hurdled the two percent vote threshold. Such three-seat limit ensures the entry of various
interest-representations into the legislature; thus, no single group, no matter how large its membership, would dominate the party-list seats, if not
the entire House.
First, the twenty percent allocation - the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership
of the House of Representatives, including those elected under the party list.
Second, the two percent threshold - only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system
are “qualified” to have a seat in the House of Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit - each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats;
that is, one “qualifying” and two additional seats.
Fourth, proportional representation - the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed “in proportion to their total
number of votes.”
1. Rank all the participating parties, organizations and coalitions from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they each
received. Then the ratio for each party is computed by dividing its votes by the total votes cast for all the parties participating in the
system. All parties with at least two percent of the total votes are guaranteed one seat each. Only these parties shall be considered in the
computation of additional seats. The party receiving the highest number of votes shall thenceforth be referred to as the “first” party.
2. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to, in order to be able to compute that for the other parties.
Since the distribution is based on proportional representation, the number of seats to be allotted to the other parties cannot possibly
exceed that to which the first party is entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most number of votes.
For example, the first party received 1,000,000 votes and is determined to be entitled to two additional seats. Another qualified party
which received 500,000 votes cannot be entitled to the same number of seats, since it garnered only fifty percent of the votes won by the
first party. Depending on the proportion of its votes relative to that of the first party whose number of seats has already been
predetermined, the second party should be given less than that to which the first one is entitled.
The other qualified parties will always be allotted less additional seats than the first party for two reasons: (1) the ratio between said
parties and the first party will always be less than 1:1, and (2) the formula does not admit of mathematical rounding off, because there is
no such thing as a fraction of a seat. Verily, an arbitrary rounding off could result in a violation of the twenty percent allocation. An
academic mathematical demonstration of such incipient violation is not necessary because the present set of facts, given the number of
qualified parties and the voting percentages obtained, will definitely not end up in such constitutional contravention.
3. The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other qualified parties are entitled to, based on proportional
representation.
With the onset of the 2001 elections, the Comelec received several Petitions for registration filed by sectoral parties, organizations and
political parties. Ang Bagong Bayani, et al. challenged the Comelec’s Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, which approved the participation of 154
organizations and parties, including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners sought the disqualification of private
respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system was intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream
political parties, the non-marginalized or overrepresented.
ISSUE: Whether or not olitical parties may participate in the party-list elections
HELD: Yes. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of the House of Representatives may “be elected through a party-list
system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.” Indeed, Commissioner Monsod stated that the purpose of the party-
list provision was to open up the system, in order to give a chance to parties that consistently place third or fourth in congressional district
elections to win a seat in Congress.
For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also provides for “a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or
coalitions thereof, x x x.” Section 3 expressly states that a “party” is “either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.” More to
the point, the law defines “political party” as “an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the
general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of
its leaders and members as candidates for public office.”
Furthermore, Section 11 of RA 7941 leaves no doubt as to the participation of political parties in the party-list system. Indubitably, therefore,
political parties – even the major ones -- may participate in the party-list elections.
That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean, however, that any political party -- or any organization or group for
that matter -- may do so. The requisite character of these parties or organizations must be consistent with the purpose of the party-list system, as
laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941.
The foregoing provision mandates a state policy of promoting proportional representation by means of the Filipino-style party-list system, which
will “enable” the election to the House of Representatives of Filipino citizens,
1. who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties; and
3. who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole.
The key words in this policy are “proportional representation,” “marginalized and underrepresented,” and “lack *of+ well-defined constituencies.”
“Proportional representation” here does not refer to the number of people in a particular district, because the party-list election is national in
scope. Neither does it allude to numerical strength in a distressed or oppressed group. Rather, it refers to the representation of the “marginalized
and underrepresented” as exemplified by the enumeration in Section 5 of the law; namely, “labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals.”
However, it is not enough for the candidate to claim representation of the marginalized and underrepresented, because representation is easy to
claim and to feign. The party-list organization or party must factually and truly represent the marginalized and underrepresented constituencies
mentioned in Section 5. Concurrently, the persons nominated by the party-list candidate-organization must be “Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties.”
Finally, “lack of well-defined constituenc*y+” refers to the absence of a traditionally identifiable electoral group, like voters of a congressional
district or territorial unit of government. Rather, it points again to those with disparate interests identified with the “marginalized or
underrepresented.”
BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY (BANAT) PARTY-LIST v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 179271, 21 April 2009, EN BANC (Carpio, J.)
ISSUE: Whether or not the application of the 2% threshold in the distribution of additional seat is constitutional?
HELD: No.
Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution states that the "House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law." The House of Representatives shall be composed of district representatives and party-list
representatives. The Constitution allows the legislature to modify the number of the members of the House of Representatives. We compute the
number of seats available to party-list representatives from the number of legislative districts. On this point, we do not deviate from the first
formula in Veterans, thus:
This formula allows for the corresponding increase in the number of seats available for party-list representatives whenever a legislative district is
created by law. Since the 14th Congress of the Philippines has 220 district representatives, there are 55 seats available to party-list representatives.
Hence:
220 x 0.20 = 55
0.80
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote,22 the following procedure shall be observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the
elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to
one seat each: Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their
total number of votes: Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
Section 12. Procedure in Allocating Seats for Party-List Representatives. — The COMELEC shall tally all the votes for the parties, organizations, or
coalitions on a nationwide basis, rank them according to the number of votes received and allocate party-list representatives proportionately
according to the percentage of votes obtained by each party, organization, or coalition as against the total nationwide votes cast for the party-list
system.
in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as
found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it
mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the number of available party list seats exceeds 50.
The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling
that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast for the 100 participants in the party list elections. A
party that has two percent of the votes cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the first 50 parties all get one
million votes. Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the operation of the two percent threshold, this situation
will repeat itself even if we increase the available party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the
maximum number of parties get two percent of the votes for every party, it is always impossible for the number of occupied party-list seats to
exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is present.
The Court strikes down the two percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of
Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941. The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI
of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of "the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives."
In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the following procedure shall be observed:
b. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be
entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
c. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to
their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.
d. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to
every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as "additional seats" are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List
System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of
fractional seats.
In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our allocation of additional seats to the two-percenters. The percentage
of votes garnered by each party-list candidate is arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by the total number of votes
cast for party-list candidates.
1. The percentage is multiplied by the remaining available seats, which is the difference between the maximum seats reserved under the
Party-List System and the guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The whole integer of the product of the percentage and of the
remaining available seats corresponds to a party’s share in the remaining available seats.
2. Assign one party-list seat to each of the parties next in rank until all available seats are completely distributed. The Court distributed all of
the remaining seats in the second round of seat allocation. Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to determine the number of seats each
qualified party-list candidate is entitled.
ISSUE: Whether or not major political parties may participate in the party-list elections?
HELD: Yes.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers
of the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. In fact, the
members of the Constitutional Commission voted down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral seats, and in the alternative the reservation of the party-
list system to the sectoral groups.
In defining a "party" that participates in party-list elections as either "a political party or a sectoral party," R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that
major political parties will participate in the party-list elections. Excluding the major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the
Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-political engineering and judicially
legislate the exclusion of major political parties from the party-list elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the law.
Much like a swinging pendulum, the decision of the Supreme Court on which parties compose the party list system swings from one side to the
other. Previously, the Supreme Court limited the party list system to representatives of marginalized and underprivileged sectors. In Atong Paglaum
v. COMELEC (G.R. Nos. 203766, et al., April 2, 2013), the latest in the series of party list cases, the pendulum now points to the opposite side.
Atong Paglaum involved 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by 52 party-list groups against COMELEC for
disqualifying them from participating in the May 13, 2013 party-list elections. One of the main reasons for the disqualification was their failure to
represent the marginalized and underrepresented.
(1) Whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying the petitioners from participating in the May 2013 elections; and
(2) Whether the criteria for participating in the party-list system laid down in Ang Bagong Bayani v. COMELEC (ABB) and BANAT v. COMELEC
(BANAT) should be applied by the COMELEC in the coming May 2013 elections.
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3)
sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent
any “marginalized and underrepresented” sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative
district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in partylist elections
only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party,
and is linked to a political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and underrepresented” or lacking in “well-defined political constituencies.” It is
enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are “marginalized and
underrepresented” include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers.
The sectors that lack “well-defined political constituencies” include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized and underrepresented” must belong to the
“marginalized and underrepresented” sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack
“well-defined political constituencies” must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent
the “marginalized and underrepresented,” or that represent those who lack “well-defined political constituencies,” either must belong to their
respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or
organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they
have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
It is clear from the foregoing that a new rule has been set: not all parties in the party-list system have to represent a sector that is marginalized and
underrepresented.
According to the Supreme Court, the framers of the Constitution never intended the party-list system to be reserved for sectoral parties. The latter
were only part of the party-list system not the entirety of it. There were two more groups composing the system — national and regional parties.
This is evident from the phrasing of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, which states that:
The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be
elected from legislative districts…and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional,
and sectoral parties or organizations. (emphasis supplied)
National and regional parties are different from sectoral parties such that the former need not organize along sectoral lines and represent a
particular sector. Hence, it is not necessary for these parties to be representative of the marginalized and underrepresented. In fact, Republic Act
No. 7941, the enabling law of the party-list elections under the Constitution, does not require these parties to fall under this criterion. The Supreme
Court emphasized that the phrase ‘marginalized and underrepresented’ appeared only once in R.A. No. 7941, particularly in the Declaration of
Policy. The section provides:
The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system
of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute
to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of
Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the
legislature, and shall provided the simplest scheme possible.
The oft-quoted phrase neither appeared in the specific implementing provisions of R.A. No. 7941 nor did it require sectors, organizations, or parties
to fall under the criterion as well. In this regard, how then should the broad policy declaration in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941 be harmonized with its
specific implementing provisions, bearing in mind the applicable provisions of the 1987 Constitution on the matter?
The phrase “marginalized and underrepresented” should refer only to the sectors in Section 5 that are, by their nature, economically “marginalized
and underrepresented.” These sectors are: labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans,
overseas workers, and other similar sectors. For these sectors, a majority of the members of the sectoral party must belong to the “marginalized
Facultad de Derecho Civil 34
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
NOTES ON POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
Kenneth & King Hizon (4A)- UST Faculty of Civil Law ___________________________
and underrepresented.” The nominees of the sectoral party either must belong to the sector, or must have a track record of advocacy for the
sector represented…
The recognition that national and regional parties, as well as sectoral parties of professionals, the elderly, women and the youth, need not be
“marginalized and underrepresented” will allow small ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who lack “well-defined political constituencies” a
chance to win seats in the House of Representatives. On the other hand, limiting to the “marginalized and underrepresented” the sectoral parties
for labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors that by
their nature are economically at the margins of society, will give the “marginalized and underrepresented” an opportunity to likewise win seats in
the House of Representatives.
This interpretation will harmonize the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 and will give rise to a multi-party system where those “marginalized and
underrepresented,” both in economic and ideological status, will have the opportunity to send their own members to the House of
Representatives. This interpretation will also make the party-list system honest and transparent, eliminating the need for relatively well-off party-
list representatives to masquerade as “wallowing in poverty, destitution and infirmity,” even as they attend sessions in Congress riding in SUVs.
Based on the Court’s ratiocination, only sectoral parties for labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped,
veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors that by their nature are economically at the margins of society must comply with the criterion of
representing the marginalized and underrepresented. For national, regional, and sectoral parties of professionals, the elderly, women and the
youth, it is sufficient that they consist of “citizens who advocate the same ideology or platform, or the same governance principles and policies,
regardless of their economic status as citizens.”
Consequently, since political parties are essentially national and regional parties, the Supreme Court categorically stated that they may participate
in the party-list elections. The rules for their participation are found under guideline number three.
ABB and BANAT were the prevailing jurisprudence prior to Atong Paglaum.
In ABB, the Supreme Court recognized that even major political parties may join the party list elections. However, the Supreme Court went on
saying that although they may participate, it does not mean that any political party — or group for that matter — may do so. It is essential for these
parties to be consistent with the purpose of the party-list system, as laid down in the Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.
According to the Supreme Court, the purpose of the party-list system is clear: “to give genuine power to the people, not only by giving more law to
those who have less in life, but more so by enabling them to become veritable lawmakers themselves.” Essentially, the goal is to give voice to the
voiceless — to enable Filipino citizens belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented to become members of Congress.
Hence, only parties representing the marginalized and underrepresented may join the party-list elections. The Supreme Court stressed that the
party-list system cannot be exclusive to marginalized and underrepresented because if the rich and overrepresented can participate, it would
desecrate the spirit of the party-list system.
In BANAT where the Supreme Court again had the opportunity to deal with the matter, it categorically declared, by a vote of 8-7, that major
political parties are barred from participating either directly or indirectly from the party-list elections.
Clearly, the doctrine in Atong Paglaum is in stark contrast with the former interpretation of the party-list system. The Supreme Court’s reasoning in
both decisions also sits at opposite sides of the scale. In ABB and BANAT, the Supreme Court concentrated on the spirit and purpose of the party-
list system while in Atong Paglaum, it focused on the letter of the law and the intent of the Constitution’s framers and Congress.
1. Before or after conviction by the MTC; and The appellate court may, motu proprio or on
2. Before conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable motion of any party, review the resolution of
by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. the Regional Trial Court after notice to the
3. The evidence of guilt is not strong. adverse party in either case. (5a)
NOTE: After conviction but pending appeal, the right to appeal is no For Jalosjos, Sec. 5 may not even apply. The penalty imposed upon
longer a matter of right. Sec. 13 finds application only before Jalosjos is reclusion perpetua. Even section 5 will not apply. Hence,
conviction. pending appeal, he can no longer apply for bail. Bail here is not even
a matter of discretion. Since he was convicted of a crime which is
Before conviction, bail is a matter of right only when the imposable penalized by law by imprisonment of more than 6 years, reclusion
penalty is lower than reclusion perpetua. It is a matter of discretion, perpetua, simply means that the evidence of guilt is strong. The 2
when the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua or higher. In such circumstances for the denial of the application for bail are already
a case, it is mandatory for the court to conduct a hearing. The present. Here, bail is not even a matter of discretion.
purpose of the hearing is to determine whether the certainty of guilt
is strong or not. In case of Jalosjos, it is already after conviction. Sec. Under Section 13 of Art. 3, the most important phrase was “before
13 will no longer find application. Most probably, the provision of conviction”. After conviction but pending appeal, Sec.1 3 will not
the Rules of Court will apply: find application anymore. Chances are, Sec. 5 of Rule 114 will come
into play. Under Sec. 4 of Rule 114:
RULE 114, SEC. 5: Bail, when discretionary. —
Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of Section 4. Bail, a matter of right;
an offense not punishable by death, reclusion exception. — All persons in custody shall be
perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to admitted to bail as a matter of right, with
bail is discretionary. The application for bail sufficient sureties, or released on recognize as
may be filed and acted upon by the trial court prescribed by law or this Rule (a) before or after
despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court,
it has not transmitted the original record to the Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in
appellate court. However, if the decision of the Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b)
trial court convicting the accused changed the before conviction by the Regional Trial Court of
nature of the offense from non-bailable to an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
bailable, the application for bail can only be perpetua, or life imprisonment. (4a)
filed with and resolved by the appellate court.
The ratio for Sec 4 is obvious. The jurisdiction of the MTC covers
Should the court grant the application, the crimes not punishable by imprisonment of more than 6 years. There
accused may be allowed to continue on can even be a mere recognizance.
provisional liberty during the pendency of the
appeal under the same bail subject to the INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
consent of the bondsman.
Q: A development in international law is the creation of the
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is International Criminal Court of which we are a signatory. The
imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the treaty which created such was the Rome Statute. Rome Statute is a
accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be treaty. What are the offenses under its jurisdiction?
cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution,
with notice to the accused, of the following or A: The Rome Statute established the International Criminal Court
other similar circumstances: which “shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons
for the most serious crimes of international concern xxx and shall be
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions.” Its
or habitual delinquent, or has committed the jurisdiction covers the crime of:
crime aggravated by the circumstance of 1. genocide,
reiteration; 2. crimes against humanity,
(b) That he has previously escaped from 3. war crimes and
legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated 4. crime of aggression as defined in the Statute (Pimentel, Jr.
the conditions of his bail without valid v. Office of the Executive Secretary, 2005)
justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while Q: What is “genocide”?
under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
A: It is the deliberate destruction or annihilation of a racial, ethnic or
religious group.
Facultad de Derecho Civil 37
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
NOTES ON POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
Kenneth & King Hizon (4A)- UST Faculty of Civil Law ___________________________
commission whose members were not elected by the
Q: What is the “Principle of Complementarity” in the Statute of the people but were appointed by then President Cory Aquino.
International Criminal Court?
2 ways of calling a con-con:
A: The International Criminal Court shall be complementary to the
national criminal jurisdictions. So that, if a court of one state already 1. Congress may directly call by 2/3 votes of its
assumes jurisdiction over a person accused of having committed of members
any of those crimes falling within its jurisdiction, the ICC shall no 2. By the congress instead of directly calling may
longer assume jurisdiction. The ICC shall be complementary to the submit the issue calling the constitutional
national criminal jurisdictions. convention by a vote of majority
XPN: If the purpose of the trial in such state is to protect the c. People's initiative – a petition signed by at least 12% of
accused from criminal liability, or if it is not being conducted registered voters provided that at least 3% of each
independently or impartially, the ICC may still assume jurisdiction. legislative district signed the same (Sec. 2 of article 17).
This is limited to proposing amendment not revisions.
Batch 2:
Section 2. Amendments to this Constitution
REVISIONS AND AMENDMENTS may likewise be directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition of at
Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, least twelve per centum of the total number of
this Constitution may be proposed by: registered voters, of which every legislative
district must be represented by at least three
The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of per centum of the registered voters therein. No
all its Members; or amendment under this section shall be
authorized within five years following the
A constitutional convention. ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than
once every five years thereafter.
Section 2. Amendments to this Constitution
may likewise be directly proposed by the The Congress shall provide for the
people through initiative upon a petition of at implementation of the exercise of this right.
least twelve per centum of the total number of
registered voters, of which every legislative Q: Can revisions be done through initiative?
district must be represented by at least three
per centum of the registered voters therein. No A: No.
amendment under this section shall be
authorized within five years following the THE VOID FOR VAGUENESS DOCTRINE AND OVERBREADTH
ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than DOCTRINE
once every five years thereafter.
Q: A development under the Bill of Rights: “the void for vagueness
The Congress shall provide for the doctrine and overbreadth doctrine”.
implementation of the exercise of this right.
A:
Section 3. The Congress may, by a vote of two-
thirds of all its Members, call a constitutional SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT NETWORK v. ANTI-
convention, or by a majority vote of all its TERRORISM COUNCIL
Members, submit to the electorate the G.R. No. 178552, 5 October 2010, EN BANC (Carpio-Morales, J.)
question of calling such a convention.
HELD:
Q: Under Art 17 of the Constitution, what are the ways of
proposing amendments and revision? The Court stated that “the overbreadth and the vagueness
doctrines have special application only to free-speech cases,” and
A: are “not appropriate for testing the validity of penal statutes.”
a. Constituent assembly: 3/4 votes of all its members where FACIAL CHALLENGE- A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a
the congress will act as a “constituent assembly” to vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible
propose amendments or revisions "chilling effect" upon protected speech. The theory is that "when
b. Constitutional convention: a body separate and distinct statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent
from the congress itself whose members shall be elected construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the
by the people in their legislative districts. The congress statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society
cannot convert itself to a constitutional convention. of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify
Historically, the 1935 Constitution was drafted and allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that
proposed by a constitutional convention. Same with the the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct
1973 Constitution. The 1987 Constitution, it was drafted could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity."
and proposed not by a convention but by a constitutional The possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech
Facultad de Derecho Civil 38
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
NOTES ON POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
Kenneth & King Hizon (4A)- UST Faculty of Civil Law ___________________________
to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected protected
speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to By its nature, the overbreadth
fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes. doctrine has to necessarily apply a
facial type of invalidation in order
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes to plot areas of protected speech,
have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, inevitably almost always under
and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State situations not before the court,
may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful that are impermissibly swept by
conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as the substantially overbroad
in the area of free speech. regulation. Otherwise stated, a
statute cannot be properly
NOTE: Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in striking analyzed for being substantially
them down entirely on the ground that they might be applied to overbroad if the court confines
parties not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally itself only to facts as applied to the
protected. It constitutes a departure from the case and controversy litigants.
requirement of the Constitution and permits decisions to be made
without concrete factual settings and in sterile abstract contexts. Facial Challenge v. As Applied Challenge
For these reasons, "on its face" invalidation of statutes has been FACIAL CHALLENGE AS APPLIED CHALLENGE
described as "manifestly strong medicine," to be employed an examination of the entire law, considers only extant facts
"sparingly and only as a last resort," and is generally disfavored. In pinpointing its flaws and defects, affecting real litigants
determining the constitutionality of a statute, therefore, its not only on the basis of its actual
provisions which are alleged to have been violated in a case must be operation to the parties, but also
examined in the light of the conduct with which the defendant is on the assumption or prediction
charged that its very existence may cause
others not before the court to
The Doctrine of void for vagueness is different from the refrain from constitutionally
overbreadth doctrine protected speech or activities
VOID FOR VAGUENESS OVERBREADTH DOCTRINE NOTE: The allowance of a facial challenge in free speech cases is
A statute or act suffers from Decrees that a governmental justified by the aim to avert the “chilling effect” on protected
the defect of vagueness when purpose to control or prevent speech, the exercise of which should not at all times be abridged.
it lacks comprehensible activities constitutionally subject to
standards that men of state regulations may not be The void for vagueness affects the substantive due process.
common intelligence must achieved by means which sweep
necessarily guess at its unnecessarily broadly and thereby Q: What are the 2 aspects of due process?
meaning and differ as to its invade the area of protected
application. freedoms A:
It is repugnant to the SANDOVAL: It fails to delineate the
Constitution (it is vague) in boundary between those a. Procedural- method or manner by which law is enforced;
two respects: constitutionally permissible and its essence is notice and hearing or opportunity to be
a. it violates due the constitutionally impermissible heard.
process for failure to application of the statute. It will b. Substantive - the law itself is fair, reasonable and just
accord persons, even intrude to those freedoms
especially the affirmatively protected by the Q: In view of the worsening traffic in Manila, the Congress passed a
parties targeted by Constitution like the freedom of law which mandates the apprehension of traffic violators and
it, fair notice of the expression, freedom of religion. providing for the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Is this valid?
conduct to avoid; Take note that the SC said that the
and act must be utterly vague on its A: No, the law is unfair and unjust. The penalty is disproportionate
b. it leaves law face to be declared such, meaning to the offense. The violators are deprived of life, liberty of property
enforcers unbridled it may not be qualified by a: without substantive due process of law.
discretion in a. saving clause, or a
carrying out its b. statutory construction THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT: RULE-MAKING POWER OF THE
provisions and SUPREME COURT
becomes an
arbitrary flexing of Q: What is the basis of the promulgation of the supreme court of
the Government the writ of kalikasan?
muscle.
The overbreadth doctrine assumes A: Rule making power of the Supreme Court under Art. 8, section 5
that individuals will understand (par.5). The same rationale is involved in the promulgation of the
what a statute prohibits and will writ of amparo and writ of habeas data:
accordingly refrain from that
behavior, even though some of it is
Q: May the Iglesia Ni Cristo participate in the party-list election? Ratio: The congress found it necessary to include the 3
seat limit rule to avoid concentration of powers to only 1
A: No. Section 5, paragraph 2 of Article VI: party.
The party-list representatives shall constitute d. The Proportional Representation—the additional seats
twenty per centum of the total number of which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed “in
representatives including those under the party proportion to their total number of votes”. (Veterans
list. For three consecutive terms after the Federation Party vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 136781, October
ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the 6, 2000)
seats allocated to party-list representatives
shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection PDAF: VIOLATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-DELEGATION OF
or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, POWERS
indigenous cultural communities, women,
youth, and such other sectors as may be Q: One of the reasons why the court declared the PDAF as
provided by law, except the religious sector unconstitutional is because it violates the principle of non-
delegation of powers as expressed in the maxim: potestas delegata
Article IX-C, Sec. 2, paragraph C: non delegare potest. What are the instances of 5 permissible
delegation of powers?
Register, after sufficient publication, political
parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in A: PETAL
addition to other requirements, must present
their platform or program of government; and 1. Delegation to the people through plebiscite and
accredit citizens' arms of the Commission on referendum (Sec. 1, Art. 6)
Elections. Religious denominations and sects
shall not be registered. Those which seek to Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested
achieve their goals through violence or in the Congress of the Philippines which shall
unlawful means, or refuse to uphold and consist of a Senate and a House of
adhere to this Constitution, or which are Representatives, except to the extent reserved
supported by any foreign government shall to the people by the provision on initiative and
likewise be refused registration. referendum.
Financial contributions from foreign 2. Emergency powers delegated by the congress (may by
governments and their agencies to political law) to the president (Sec. 23 (2), Art. 6)
parties, organizations, coalitions, or candidates
related to elections, constitute interference in In times of war or other national emergency,
national affairs, and, when accepted, shall be the Congress may, by law, authorize the
an additional ground for the cancellation of President, for a limited period and subject to
their registration with the Commission, in such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise
addition to other penalties that may be powers necessary and proper to carry out a
prescribed by law. declared national policy. Unless sooner
withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such
Q: May a priest be a representative of a party-list group? powers shall cease upon the next adjournment
thereof.
A: Yes.
3. Tariff powers to the president (Sec. 28 (2), Art. 6)
Q: What are the parameters in determining who are the winners in
a party-list poll? The Congress may, by law, authorize the
President to fix within specified limits, and
A: subject to such limitations and restrictions as it
may impose, tariff rates, import and export
a. The Twenty Percent (20%) Allocation—the combined quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other
number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed duties or imposts within the framework of the
twenty percent (20%) of the total membership of the national development program of the
House of Representative, including those elected under Government
the party-list;
b. The Two Percent (2%) Threshold—only those garnering a 4. Delegation to Administrative agencies
minimum of 2% of the total valid votes cast for the party- 5. Delegation to Local government.
list system are qualified to have a seat in the HOR;
c. The Three (3) Seat Limit—each qualified party, regardless Q: What are the 2 kinds of pork barrel?
of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a
A:
Facultad de Derecho Civil 41
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
NOTES ON POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
Kenneth & King Hizon (4A)- UST Faculty of Civil Law ___________________________
1. Presidential pork barrel The Court agrees with petitioners that the phrase "and for such
a. Malampaya funds other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President"
b. Presidential social funds (PSF) under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of
2. Congressional pork barrel legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient
standard to adequately determine the limits of the President‘s
Q: How was the principle of non-delegation of powers violated by authority with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya
the PDAF? Funds may be used. As it reads, the said phrase gives the President
wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he
A: may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate
public funds beyond the purview of the law. That the subject phrase
GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA, et al. v. HON. EXEC. SEC. may be confined only to "energy resource development and
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR. exploitation programs and projects of the government" under the
G.R. No. 208566, 19 November 2013, En Banc (Perlas-Bernabe, J.) principle of ejusdem generis, meaning that the general word or
phrase is to be construed to include – or be restricted to – things
As an adjunct to the separation of powers principle, legislative akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically
power shall be exclusively exercised by the body to which the mentioned, is belied by three (3) reasons: first, the phrase "energy
Constitution has conferred the same. In particular, Section 1, Article resource development and exploitation programs and projects of
VI of the 1987 Constitution states that such power shall be vested in the government" states a singular and general class and hence,
the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a cannot be treated as a statutory reference of specific things from
House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the which the general phrase "for such other purposes" may be limited;
people by the provision on initiative and referendum. Based on this second, the said phrase also exhausts the class it represents, namely
provision, it is clear that only Congress, acting as a bicameral body, energy development programs of the government;250 and, third,
and the people, through the process of initiative and referendum, the Executive department has, in fact, used the Malampaya Funds
may constitutionally wield legislative power and no other. for non-energy related purposes under the subject phrase, thereby
contradicting respondents‘ own position that it is limited only to
In the cases at bar, the Court observes that the 2013 PDAF Article, "energy resource development and exploitation programs and
insofar as it confers post-enactment identification authority to projects of the government." Thus, while Section 8 of PD 910 may
individual legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since have passed the completeness test since the policy of energy
said legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the development is clearly deducible from its text, the phrase "and for
power of appropriation, which – as settled in Philconsa – is lodged in such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President"
Congress. That the power to appropriate must be exercised only under the same provision of law should nonetheless be stricken
through legislation is clear from Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 down as unconstitutional as it lies independently unfettered by any
Constitution which states that: "No money shall be paid out of the sufficient standard of the delegating law. This notwithstanding, it
Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law." To must be underscored that the rest of Section 8, insofar as it allows
understand what constitutes an act of appropriation, the Court, in for the use of the Malampaya Funds "to finance energy resource
Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and Insular Auditor (Bengzon), held development and exploitation programs and projects of the
that the power of appropriation involves (a) the setting apart by law government," remains legally effective and subsisting. Truth be told,
of a certain sum from the public revenue for (b) a specified purpose. the declared unconstitutionality of the aforementioned phrase is but
Essentially, under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are an assurance that the Malampaya Funds would be used – as it
given a personal lump-sum fund from which they are able to dictate should be used – only in accordance with the avowed purpose and
(a) how much from such fund would go to (b) a specific project or intention of PD 910.
beneficiary that they themselves also determine. As these two (2)
acts comprise the exercise of the power of appropriation as FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: CONTENT NEUTRAL AND CONTENT
described in Bengzon, and given that the 2013 PDAF Article BASED REGULATIONS
authorizes individual legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly,
said legislators have been conferred the power to legislate which the Q: One of the rights enshrined under our Constitution is the
Constitution does not, however, allow. Thus, keeping with the Freedom of Expression which includes the Freedom of Assembly.
principle of non-delegability of legislative power, the Court hereby The Congress enacted B.P 880 (The Public Assembly Act of 1985).
declares the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all other forms of In Bayan v. Ermita, the Court upheld the constitutionality of B.P
Congressional Pork Barrel which contain the similar legislative 880. In fact it was merely a content-neutral regulation. Expound on
identification feature as herein discussed, as unconstitutional. this. What are content-based and content-neutral regulation when
we think of freedom of expression, particularly the freedom of
Q: What power of congress is relative to this? assembly.
Q: With regard the Malamapaya Funds, what was violated? CONTENT-BASED RESTRICTIONS- are imposed because of the
content of the speech and are, therefore, subject to the clear-and-
A: Petitioners contend that Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue present danger test. For example, a rule such as that involved in
delegation of legislative power since the phrase "and for such other Sanidad v. COMELEC, prohibiting columnists, commentators, and
purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" gives the announcers from campaigning either for or against an issue in a
President "unbridled discretion to determine for what purpose the plebiscite must have compelling reason to support it, or it will not
funds will be used. pass muster under strict scrutiny. These restrictions are censorial
Facultad de Derecho Civil 42
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
NOTES ON POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
Kenneth & King Hizon (4A)- UST Faculty of Civil Law ___________________________
and therefore they bear a heavy presumption of constitutional expression; and (4) if the incidental restriction on alleged First
invalidity. In addition, they will be tested for possible overbreadth Amendment freedoms (of speech, expression and press) is no
and vagueness. greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. This is so
far the most influential test for distinguishing content-based from
Atty. Sandoval: If it is content-based, you restrict the very content of content-neutral regulations and is said to have “become canonical in
the speech or a particular category of speech. For example, political the review of such laws.” It is noteworthy that the O’ Brien test has
view point speech, if that is restricted, that is content-based been applied by this Court in at least two cases.
restriction. They are presumptively invalid and because of such
presumption, the courts apply strict scrutiny on content-based Under this test, even if a law furthers an important or substantial
restrictions. There are 3 levels of scrutiny: governmental interest, it should be invalidated if such governmental
interest is “not unrelated to the suppression of free expression.”
1. Strict scrutiny Moreover, even if the purpose is unrelated to the suppression of
2. Intermediate scrutiny free speech, the law should nevertheless be invalidated if the
3. Reasonable or lenient scrutiny restriction on freedom of expression is greater than is necessary to
achieve the governmental purpose in question. (Social Weather
CONTENT-NEUTRAL RESTRICTIONS- on the other hand, like Sec. Stations, Inc. v. Comelec, G.R. No. 147571, May 5, 2001, En Banc
11(b) of R.A. No. 6646, which prohibits the sale or donation of print [Mendoza])
space and air time to political candidates during the campaign
period, are not concerned with the content of the speech. These Q: At the height of the “Hello Garci” controversy, the Arroyo
regulations need only a substantial governmental interest to support Administration adopted the so-called “calibrated preemptive
them. A deferential standard of review will suffice to test their response” policy. What is this CPR?
validity. The clear-and-present danger rule is inappropriate as a test
for determining the constitutional validity of laws, like Sec. 11 (b) of A: It simply means the strict enforcement of the no permit, no rally
R.A. No. 6646, which are not concerned with the content of political policy.
ads but only with their incidents. To apply the clear-and-present
danger test to such regulatory measures would be like using a Q: Is this CPR valid? What was the ruling in Bayan v. Ermita?
sledgehammer to drive a nail when a regular hammer is all that is
needed. A:
Bayan v. Executive Secretary Ermita
Atty. Sandoval: These restrictions are imposed regardless of the G.R. No. 169838, April 25, 2006
speech. These usually involve restrictions on the time, place, and
manner of speech. Example of this: B.P 880 or the Public Assembly HELD: The Calibrated Pre-emptive Response (CPR) serves no valid
Act. purpose if it means the something else. Accordingly, what is to be
followed is and should be that mandated by the law itself, namely,
NOTE: B.P 880 is content-neutral. maximum tolerance, which specifically means “the highest degree
of restraint that the military, police and other peace keeping
Q: Are all content-based regulations prohibited? authorities shall observe during a public assembly or in dispersal
of the same. The CPR is superfluous, after all the policy has already
A: No. Content based restrictions are allowed only when there is a been defined by law. It will only confuse the public. However, if CPR
present and substantial evil which the state is mandated to protect is more than maximum tolerance, then such policy is
or suppress. unconstitutional, violative of the freedom of assembly.
It is in content-based restrictions that the court will apply the clear EXTRADITION AND DEPORTATION
and present danger test. It will resolve the problem in freedom of
expression. If it is content-neutral, we do not apply the present Q: What is extradition? What are the fundamental rules?
danger test, but we apply the _____________ (Chavez vs. Secretary
Gonzales) A: It is the surrender of a person by one state to another state
where he is wanted for prosecution or if already convicted, for
NOTE: The test for this difference in the level of justification for the punishment. It is based on:
restriction of speech is that content-based restrictions distort public
debate, have improper motivation, and are usually imposed because a. Treaty, or in its absence
of fear of how people will react to a particular speech. No such b. The local state may grant asylum to the fugitive
reasons underlie content-neutral regulations, like regulation of time, c. If surrender is made, the same is merely a gesture of
place and manner of holding public assemblies under B.P. Blg. 880, comity
the Public Assembly Act of 1985.(Osmena v. COMELEC, 288 SCRA
447, March 31, 1998 [Mendoza]) Q: How is it different from deportation?
Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights to The State have, in accordance with the Chapter of the UN and the
due process and to fundamental fairness. Due principle of International Law:
process does not always call for a prior opportunity
to be heard. A subsequent opportunity is sufficient 1. the sovereign right to exploit their own resources
due to the flight risk involved. Indeed, available pursuant to their own resources pursuant to their own
during the hearings on the petition and the answer resources pursuant to their environmental policies, and
is the full chance to be heard and to enjoy 2. the responsibility to ensure that activities within their
fundamental fairness that is compatible with the jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the
summary nature of extradition. environment of other States or areas beyond the limits of
Gov’t of Hong national jurisdiction.
Kong v. Modern trend in PIL: On human dignity
Olalia, April Q: What is Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration?
19, 2007 The modern trend in public international law is the
(Sandoval- primacy placed on the worth of the individual A: This is one of the 26 principles contained in the Stockholm
Gutierrez) person and the sanctity of human rights. Slowly, Declaration on the Human Environment which was adopted by
the recognition that the individual person may acclamation f 113 states in the United Nations Conference on the
properly be a subject of international law is now Human Environment in 1972. This is a landmark in the development
taking root. The vulnerable doctrine that the of international law on the protection of the environment.
subjects of international law are limited only to
states was dramatically eroded towards the second Q: What does Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration provide?
half of the past century. For one, the Nuremberg
and Tokyo trials after World War II resulted in the A: This declares that States have
unprecedented spectacle of individual defendants
for acts characterized as violations of the laws of 1. The sovereign right to exploit their own resources
war, crimes against peace, and crimes against pursuant to their own environmental policies, and
humanity. 2. The responsibility to ensure that activities within their
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the
The Philippines, along with the other members of environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits
the family of nations, committed to uphold the of national jurisdiction.
fundamental human rights as well as value the
worth and dignity of every person. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: CONTENT NEUTRAL AND CONTENT
BASED REGULATIONS
Right to bail
Q: What is B.P. 880?
If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see
Q: Under Sec. 8 of Article 10, it states: To allow a preventively suspended elective official to run for a fourth
and prohibited term is to close our eyes to this reality and to allow a
Section 8. The term of office of elective local constitutional violation through sophistry by equating the temporary
officials, except barangay officials, which shall inability to discharge the functions of office with the interruption of
be determined by law, shall be three years and term that the constitutional provision contemplates. To be sure,
no such official shall serve for more than three many reasons exist, voluntary or involuntary – some of them
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of personal and some of them by operation of law – that may
the office for any length of time shall not be temporarily prevent an elective office holder from exercising the
considered as an interruption in the continuity functions of his office in the way that preventive suspension does. A
of his service for the full term for which he was serious extended illness, inability through force majeure, or the
elected. enforcement of a suspension as a penalty, to cite some involuntary
examples, may prevent an office holder from exercising the
In Borja vs. COMELEC, what are the 2 conditions for the functions of his office for a time without forfeiting title to office.
disqualification to apply? Preventive suspension is no different because it disrupts actual
delivery of service for a time within a term. Adopting such
A: interruption of actual service as the standard to determine effective
interruption of term under the three-term rule raises at least the
1. possibility of confusion in implementing this rule, given the manyA
n individual has served three consecutive terms in an modes and occasions when actual service may be interrupted in the
elective local office course of serving a term of office. The standard may reduce the
2. enforcement of the three-term limit rule to a case-to-case andh
e must also have been elected to the same position for the possibly see-sawing determination of what an effective interruption
same number of times is.
Q: What are the 2 policies embodied under Sec. 8 of Art. 10? Preventive Suspension and Voluntary Renunciation
Voluntary renunciation, while involving loss of office and the total Q: What are the recognized restrictions as against this law?
incapacity to render service, is disallowed by the Constitution as an
effective interruption of a term. It is therefore not allowed as a A:
mode of circumventing the three-term limit rule.
1. National security matters and intelligence
Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not involve an effective information—this jurisdiction recognizes the common
interruption of a term and should therefore not be a reason to avoid law holding that there is a governmental privilege
the three-term limitation. It can pose as a threat, however, if we against public disclosure with respect to state secrets
shall disregard its nature and consider it an effective interruption of regarding military, diplomatic and other national security
a term. Let it be noted that a preventive suspension is easier to matters;
undertake than voluntary renunciation, as it does not require 2. Trade or industrial secrets—(pursuant to the
relinquishment or loss of office even for the briefest time. It merely Intellectual Property Code, RA 8293 and other related
requires an easily fabricated administrative charge that can be laws and banking transactions—pursuant to the Secrecy of
dismissed soon after a preventive suspension has been imposed. In Bank Deposits Act, RA 1405);
this sense, recognizing preventive suspension as an effective 3. Criminal matters, such as those relating to the
interruption of a term can serve as a circumvention more potent apprehension, the prosecution and the detention of
than the voluntary renunciation that the Constitution expressly criminals, which courts may not inquire into prior to such
disallows as an interruption. arrest, detention and prosecution; and
4. Other confidential information. The Ethical Standards
Q: What if it is a 6-month suspension as a penalty for an offense Act further prohibits public officials and employees from
for which he was found guilty. Will the principle apply? using or divulging “confidential or classified information
to the public.” *Section 7 (c), RA 6713+ Other
A: It is still the same, there is no interruption. Although Aldovino acknowledged limitations to information access include:
involves preventive suspension, the same ruling is also applicable. It a. diplomatic correspondence,
will not make a difference. When he was suspended as a penalty, he b. closed door Cabinet meetings and
did not lose his title as a mayor. Whether it be preventive c. executive sessions of either House of congress,
suspension or suspension as a penalty, he remains to be a mayor d. internal deliberations of the SC. (Chavez vs. PCGG,
until his term ends. Logically, there was no interruption. Interruption 299 SCRA 744)
must involve loss of title. The vice-mayor will have to assume the
office, not as mayor, but as an acting mayor. EXTRADITION AND DEPORTATION
However, if the penalty was removal, then it is an interruption of his Q: What is extradition?
term of office. The vice-mayor now has to assume the office, no
longer as an acting vice-mayor, but as a mayor. Administrative A: See answers on Batch 3.
penalties can either be suspension or removal.
Q: May extradition be effected unilaterally?
Batch 5:
A: No.
THE VOID FOR VAGUENESS DOCTRINE AND OVERBREADTH
DOCTRINE Q: Distinguish extradition and deportation.
Q: What is this void for vagueness doctrine? What is the A: See answers on Batch 3.
overbreadth doctrine? How do they differ in process?
Q: According to Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, the Oct. 17, 2000
A: See answers on Batch 2. decision, an extradition proceeding is a sui generis, a class of itself.
It is not a criminal proceeding which will bring into operation all
RIGHT TO INFORMATION the rights of an accused under the Bill of Rights. How will you
There are other differences between an extradition proceeding and Q: Is an extraditee entitled to bail?
a criminal proceeding.
A: Initially, in Government of USA v. Purganan, the Court applied the
EXTRADITION PROCEEDINGS CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS “no bail rule” in extradition. However, it was re-examined in
As to determination of guilt or innocence Government of Hong Kong v. Olalia. He may now apply for bail as
Does not involve the Involves the determination of long as the 2 conditions in Purganan are satisfied:
determination of the guilt or the guilt or innocence of the
innocence of the extradite; the accused Bail may be applied for and granted as an exception, only upon a
determination will only follow at clear and convincing showing
the requesting state; hence, the 1.
constitutional rights of the hat, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk
accused do not find application or a danger to the community; and
Nature of proceedings 2.
summary in nature involve an adversarial hat there exist special, humanitarian and compelling
proceeding that will require a circumstances] including, as a matter of reciprocity, those
full-blown trial cited by the highest court in the requesting state when it
On the application of the rules on evidence grants provisional liberty in extradition cases therein.
In contradistinction to a criminal The rules on evidence are
proceeding, the rules of strictly followed Q: What is the problem in the Olalia ruling?
evidence in an extradition
proceeding allow admission of A: SANDOVAL: The ruling in Olalia is problematic. The ruling in
evidence under less stringent Olalia is incongruous. In the main proceeding, which is extradition,
standards. the evidence required is a low kind of evidence, mere prima facie
As to quantum of evidence required evidence. In petition for bail in extradition, a mere incident to the
a fugitive may be ordered a criminal case requires proof main action for extradition, higher kind of evidence is required (clear
extradited "upon showing of the beyond reasonable doubt for and convincing evidence).
existence of a prima facie case”; conviction
mere prima facie evidence will PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION
suffice, not even substantial
evidence Q: Under the Civil Service Law, what is the maximum duration of
preventive suspension to be imposed upon the public official?
NOTA BENE:
SANDOVAL: In Gov’t of Hong A: Under P.D. 807:
Kong v. Olalia, the issue is a
petition for bail in extradition. It Section 42. Lifting of Preventive Suspension Pending
is not the extradition itself. The Administrative Investigation. When the administrative case against
quantum of evidence used here the officer of employee under preventive suspension is not finally
was clear and convincing decided by the disciplining authority within the period of ninety
(90) days after the date of suspension of the respondent who is not
Facultad de Derecho Civil 48
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
NOTES ON POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
Kenneth & King Hizon (4A)- UST Faculty of Civil Law ___________________________
a presidential appointee, the respondent shall be automatically Section 24. Preventives Suspension. — The Ombudsman or his
reinstated in the service: Provided, That when the delay in the Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or employee under
disposition of the case is due to the fault, negligence or petition of his authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment the
the respondent, the period of delay shall not be counted in evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge against such officer
computing the period of suspension herein provided. or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct
or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges would
Q: Under the Local Government Code, with respect to appointed warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's
officials of local government, what is the maximum duration of continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.
preventive suspension?
The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is
A: Under the Local Government Code: terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but not more than six
(6) months, without pay, except when the delay in the disposition
Section 85. Preventive Suspension of Appointive Local Officials and of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fault,
Employees. - negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case the period
of such delay shall not be counted in computing the period of
(a) suspension herein provided. T
he local chief executives may preventively suspend for a
period not exceeding sixty (60) days and subordinate Q: What is the maximum period of prevention under the Anti Graft
official or employee under his authority pending and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. 3019)?
investigation if the charge against such official or
employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave A: None is indicated. The law is silent.
misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty, or if
there is reason to believe that the respondent is guilty of Section 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. Any public officer
the charges which would warrant his removal from the against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information
service. under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code
(b) on bribery is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. x
xx Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all
retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is
Q: How about under Sec. 63 of the LGC, what is the maximum acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries
period of preventive suspension for local elected officials? and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in
the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against
A: him.
Section 63. Preventive Suspension. - The Court, following the ruling in Gonzaga v. Sandiganbayan, since
the law is silent, applying the provision of the Civil Service Law, the
(a) Preventive suspension may be imposed: maximum period of preventive suspension is 90 days.
(b) Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the INQUIRIES IN AID OF LEGISLATION
issues are joined, when the evidence of guilt is strong, and given
the gravity of the offense, there is great probability that the Section 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of
continuance in office of the respondent could influence the its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure.
and other evidence: Provided, That, any single preventive The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries
suspension of local elective officials shall not extend beyond sixty shall be respected.
(60) days: Provided, further, That in the event that several
administrative cases are filed against an elective official, he cannot QUESTION HOUR
be preventively suspended for more than ninety (90) days within a
single year on the same ground or grounds existing and known at Section 22. The heads of departments may, upon their own
the time of the first suspension. initiative, with the consent of the President, or upon the request of
either House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear
Q: Under R.A. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act), what is the maximum before and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to
period of preventive suspension? their departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the
President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of
A: Representatives at least three days before their scheduled
appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written
Facultad de Derecho Civil 49
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
NOTES ON POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
Kenneth & King Hizon (4A)- UST Faculty of Civil Law ___________________________
questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the JEAN ARNAULT v. LEON NAZARENO, et al.
security of the State or the public interest so requires and the G.R. No. L-3820, 18 June 1950, EN BANC (Ozaeta, J.)
President so states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted
in executive session. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the
absence of information respecting the conditions which the
NOTE: There are two provisions on legislative hearing, Sections 21 legislation is intended to effect or change; and where the legislative
and 22. Section 21 is about legislative investigations in aid of body does not itself possess the requisite information — which is
legislation. not infrequently true — recourse must be had to others who do
possess it. Experience has shown that mere requests for such
QUESTION HOUR LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATION information are often unavailing, and also that information which is
volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some means of
As to persons who may appear
compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed.
Only a department head Any person
As to who conducts the investigation NOTE: Arnault v. Nazareno was decided under the 1935
Entire body Committees Constitution. Under the 1935 Constitution, there was no provision
As to subject matter similar to Section 21 of Art. 6. Yet, as early as this case, the Supreme
Matters related to the Any matter for the purpose of Court recognized that the power to conduct inquiries in aid of
department only legislation legislation is intrinsic in the grant of the legislative powers.
In Arnault v. Nazareno, the Court said intrinsic in the grant of But there are exceptions:
legislative powers to the Congress to the power to conduct inquiries a. If they entered into a
in aid of legislation for you cannot expect the Congress to enact contract involving real
good laws if it is denied that power. Hence, as held in Senate v. property in the
Ermita, you can compel cabinet members to attend during this kind receiving state and it
of inquiry. does not fall to their
diplomatic mission
Facultad de Derecho Civil 50
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
NOTES ON POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
Kenneth & King Hizon (4A)- UST Faculty of Civil Law ___________________________
b. Questions involving Q: Is a de-facto officer lawfully entitled to the salary of the office
succession where they he is occupying?
are an heir, legatee,
administrator, or A:
executor
c. With respect to the GR: No, when he assumed office knowing that their title is
exercise of their imperfect, he run the risk of not receiving salary; he is not supposed
profession or career in to benefit from his acts. It is against public policy. Otherwise, it will
their receiving state encourage other people to be a de facto officer that will result to
chaos.
Q: What are the classifications of heads of diplomatic missions?
XPNs:
A:
a. If there is no de-jure officer claiming for the same salary;
1. Ambassadors or Nuncios b. If the assumption/act was done in good faith.
2. Envoys, ministers, inter-nuncios who are all accredited by
the Head of States Q: What are the legal effects of the acts of a de facto officer?
3. Charge d'affaires which is really accredited to the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs A: Valid, binding and with full legal effect insofar as they affect the
public. It is intended for the protection of the public and individuals
Q: May a diplomat be appointed as a consul at the same time so he who get involved in the official acts of persons discharging the duties
will have 2 functions in the same state? of a public office. But they are not supposed to benefit from their
own acts (Monroy vs. CA, 20 SCRA 620).
A: Yes.
NOTE: The acts of a de jure officer is valid.
DE FACTO v. DE JURE OFFICERS
General Manager, PPA v. Monsarate
Q: Who are de facto officers? G.R. No. 129616, April 17, 2002
A: One who has reputation of being an officer that he assumes to A rightful incumbent of a public office may recover from a de facto
be, and yet is not an officer in point of law. officer the salary received by the latter during the time of his
wrongful tenure, even though he (the de facto officer) occupied the
Q: Distinguish among de facto, de jure officers and a usurper? office in good faith and under color of title.
In cases where the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is clearly Q: What is the effect in case of non-compliance with the 2
applicable, the court cannot arrogate unto itself the authority to doctrines? For example X, a factory worker, was dismissed from
resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction over which is lodged with an employment. What he did was he went to the RTC and filed an
administrative body of special competence. (Villaflor vs. CA, 280 illegal dismissal case against his employer. What will be the action
SCRA 287) of the RTC?
Q: What is the Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative remedies? A: It will be dismissed because of the lack of jurisdiction. It is the
Labor Arbiter who has primary jurisdiction. Non-observance of such
A: Before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it doctrine will lead to dismissal of the action on the ground of lack of
is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of jurisdiction. Lack of jurisdiction cannot be waived. It is conferred by
administrative processes afforded him. law.
Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be Q: X applied under the Public Land Act. He cultivated the land.
resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every Eventually, the land was awarded to Y. Y made a representation
opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his before the Administrator of Lands. Thus, X went to the regular
jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before courts questioning the issuance by the Administrator of Lands to Y.
the court’s judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation X alleged that he was in the actual possession of the land. He
of court’s jurisdiction is fatal to one’s cause of action. cultivated the land.
NOTE: Sec. 187, LGC—expressly provides that A: The case will be dismissed on the ground of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies must be exhausted first before the administrative remedies. Under the Public Land Act, from the
constitutionality or legality of a tax ordinance may be decision of the Secretary of Lands, you need to elevate that to the
challenged in court. Secretary of Natural Resources. This is an administrative remedy
provided by the law. The case should be dismissed on the ground of
Philippine Coconut Desiccators vs. PhilCoA, lack of cause of action. His cause of action is premature. His action
G.R. No. 110526, 10 February 1998 has not yet ripened. He failed to exhaust the administrative
remedies. And, lack of cause of action is waivable.
Only decisions of administrative agencies made in the exercise
of quasi-judicial powers are subject to the rules of exhaustion of NOTE:
administrative remedies.
GR: Exhaustion of administrative remedies must first be made
In like manner, the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction before resorting to court actions. Failure to exhaust will not affect
applies only where the administrative agency exercises quasi- the jurisdiction of the court but the complainant is deprived of a
judicial or adjudicatory powers. cause of action which is a ground for a motion to dismiss.
NOTE: Thus, where what is assailed is the validity or However, if no motion to dismiss is filed on this ground, there is
constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the deemed to be a waiver.
administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative
function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the XPNs:
same (Smart Communications vs. NTC, G.R. No. 151908, August 12,
2003). 1. If the issue involves a pure question of law—useless to
exhaust. Only the courts can declare with finality what are
Q: Up to what level must he exhaust the administrative remedies? purely legal question.
A: Up to the highest level which could mean the Office of the In Castro vs. Secretary Gloria, G.R. No. 132174, August 20,
President. 2001, the SC said that there is a question of law when the
doubts or differences arise as to what the law is on a
Q: Distinguish between the Doctrines of Primary jurisdiction and certain state of facts. There is question of fact when the
the exhaustion of administrative remedies. doubts or differences arise as to the truth or falsity of
alleged facts.
A:
Facultad de Derecho Civil 52
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
NOTES ON POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
Kenneth & King Hizon (4A)- UST Faculty of Civil Law ___________________________
2. If the law does not provide for an administrative remedy—
just go to the regular courts. In Estuerte vs. CA, 193 SCRA The enforcement of the national budget, as primarily contained in
541, the SC said that in a civil action for damages, the the GAA, is indisputably a function both constitutionally assigned
court’s concern is whether or not damages, personal and properly entrusted to the Executive branch of government. Xxx
to the plaintiff, were caused by the acts of the
defendants; it can proceed independently of the Aside from the area of project identification, legislators have also
administrative action. Accordingly, the doctrine of been accorded post-enactment authority in the areas of fund
exhaustion of administrative remedy does not apply. release and realignment.
3. Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency—ALTER EGO Clearly, these post-enactment measures which govern the areas of
DOCTRINE. In Nazareno vs. CA, 267 SCRA 589, the SC project identification, fund release and fund realignment are not
held that when the Undersecretary of DENR denied the related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow
motion for reconsideration, he was acting on behalf of the legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong
Secretary of DENR; accordingly, administrative remedies to the sphere of budget execution. Indeed, by virtue of the
had been exhausted. foregoing, legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized
to participate in – as Guingona, Jr. puts it – "the various operational
4. Where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction. aspects of budgeting," including "the evaluation of work and
financial plans for individual activities" and the "regulation and
In Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, 255 SCRA 438, the inaction release of funds" in violation of the separation of powers principle.
of the PCGG on the motion filed by the respondent and co- The fundamental rule, as categorically articulated in Abakada,
respondent [it took 7 years before the PCGG filed its cannot be overstated – from the moment the law becomes
motion to dismiss based on failure to exhaust effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its
administrative remedies] gave rise to unreasonable delay. members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of
the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus
5. The administrative action is patently illegal amounting unconstitutional. That the said authority is treated as merely
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. recommendatory in nature does not alter its unconstitutional tenor
since the prohibition, to repeat, covers any role in the
In Cabada vs. Alunan, 260 SCRA 838, the SC said that the implementation or enforcement of the law. Towards this end, the
Commissioner of the NAPOLCOM who denied petitioners’ Court must therefore abandon its ruling in Philconsa which
appeal to the Secretary of DILG acted in a patently illegal sanctioned the conduct of legislator identification on the guise that
manner, because only the Secretary of DILG could act on the same is merely recommendatory and, as such, respondents‘
the appeal and the NAPOLCOM, being a collegial body, reliance on the same falters altogether.
cannot be bound by the act of an individual
Commissioner. Qualifications of a voter
7. When it would amount to a nullification of the claim. Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the
Philippines, not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least
8. When the subject matter is a private land in land case eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in the
proceeding. Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they
propose to vote, for at least six months immediately preceding the
9. When there are circumstances indicating the urgency of election. No literacy, property, or other substantive requirement
judicial intervention. shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage.
10. When due process of law is clearly violated. Jus cogens v. Erga omnes
11. When there is estoppel on the part of the administrative Q: What is jus cogens (“compelling law”) norm?
agency concerned
A: A jus cogens norm is a norm accepted and recognized by the
international community of States as a whole as a norm from which
no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a
TOPICS FROM 4B: subsequent norm of general international law having the same
character.
2 kinds of pork barrel
a. Presidential E.g. the prohibition against the use of force under the UN Charter
b. Congressional (Outlawing of acts of aggression); Outlawing of genocide; Basic
human rights, including protection from slavery and racial
Q: How did PDAF violate the doctrine of separation of powers discrimination; principle of self-determination, crimes against
humanity, prohibition against slavery and slave trade, and piracy
GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA, et al. v. HON. EXEC. SEC. (Magallona, p. 26, 2005).
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.
G.R. No. 208566, 19 November 2013, En Banc (Perlas-Bernabe, J. Q: What is erga omnes (“in relation to everyone”)?
Facultad de Derecho Civil 53
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
NOTES ON POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
Kenneth & King Hizon (4A)- UST Faculty of Civil Law ___________________________
A: It is an obligation of every State towards the international Q: What are the instances of a valid warrantess arrest?
community as a whole. All states have a legal interest in its
compliance, and thus all States are entitled to invoke responsibility A:
for breach of such an obligation.
a. When a person to be arrested has committed, is
Requisites for a valid search warrant and warrant of arrest actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
Q: What are the requisites for a valid warrant? b. When an offense has just been committed and he has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
A: facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
1. It must be based upon probable cause c. When the person to be arrested is an escapee or a
detention prisoner [Arrest while escaping]. (Section 5, Rule
Q: What is probable cause in case of issuance of a warrant of 113, Rules of Criminal Procedure)
arrest?
ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS
A: Such facts and circumstances antecedent to the issuance
of the warrant that in themselves are sufficient to induce a Section 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each
cautious man to rely on them and act in pursuance thereof. It have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all
consists of a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of
cautious man in believing accused to be committing the offense or nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme
to be guilty of the offense. Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six
shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives,
2. The probable cause must be determined by the judge as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties and the
NOTE: The judge shall: parties or organizations registered under the party-list system
represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal
a. Personally evaluate the report and the supporting shall be its Chairman
documents submitted by the public prosecutor regarding
the existence of probable cause and on the basis thereof, Q: What is the composition of the electoral tribunals?
issue a warrant of arrest; or
b. If the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may A: Each electoral tribunal shall be composed of 9 members. 3 from
disregard the prosecutor’s report and require the the SC (to be designated by the CJ) and 6 from the respective House.
submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him
in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable NOTE: The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its
cause. chairman. Members chosen enjoy security of tenure and cannot be
removed by mere change of party affiliation.
3. The determination must be made after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the Q: What is the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunals?
witnesses he may produce.
A: Each electoral tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contests
The examination conducted by the judge takes the form of relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
searching questions. respective members (Sec. 17, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution). This
includes determining the validity or invalidity of a proclamation
4. Identify the person to be arrested declaring a particular candidate as the winner.
Q: What are the requisites for the issuance of a search warrant? ELECTION PROTEST AND QUO WARRANTO
1. There must be probable cause; A: In Samad v. COMELEC, we explained that a petition for quo
2. The presence of probable cause is to be determined by the warranto under the Omnibus Election Code raises in issue the
judge personally; disloyalty or ineligibility of the winning candidate. It is a proceeding
3. The determination by the judge must be made only after to unseat the respondent from office but not necessarily to install
an examination under oath or affirmation of the the petitioner in his place. An election protest is a contest between
complainant and the witnesses he may produce; and the defeated and winning candidates on the ground of frauds or
4. The warrant must specifically describe the place to be irregularities in the casting and counting of the ballots, or in the
searched and the things to be seized which may be preparation of the returns. It raises the question of who actually
anywhere in the Philippines. obtained the plurality of the legal votes and therefore is entitled to
hold the office. (Dumayas, Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 141952-53,
NOTE: The absence of these requisites for a search warrant’s validity April 20, 2001, En Banc [Quisumbing])
will cause its downright nullification.
Facultad de Derecho Civil 54
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
NOTES ON POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
Kenneth & King Hizon (4A)- UST Faculty of Civil Law ___________________________
PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE
See discussion above It is the power of the government to withhold information from
the public, the courts, and the Congress. (Schwartz)
PUBLIC ASSEMBLY ACT
It is also the right of the President and high-level executive branch
See discussion above officers to withhold information from Congress, the courts, and
ultimately the public. (Rozell)
DOCTRINE OF CONDONATION
1. State secret privilege—invoked by Presidents on the
ground that the information is of such nature that its
A:It means that when the people have elected a man to office, it disclosure would subvert crucial military or diplomatic
must be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and objective.
character, and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or 2. Informer’s privilege—privilege of the government not to
misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for the court, by disclose the identity of persons who furnish information in
reason of such faults or misconduct to practically overrule the will of violations of law to officers charged with the enforcement
the people. of the law.
3. Generic privilege—for internal deliberations has been said
Aguinaldo vs. Santos, 212 SCRA 768 to attach to intra-governmental documents reflecting
advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations
A public official cannot be removed for administrative conduct comprising part of a process by which governmental
committed during a prior term, since his re-election to office decisions and policies are formulated.
operates as a condonation of the officer’s previous conduct to the
extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. The foregoing In determining the validity of a claim of privilege, the question that
rule, however, finds no application to criminal cases pending against must be asked is not only whether the requested information falls
petitioner. within one of the traditional privileges, but also whether that
privilege should be honored in a given procedural setting.
Mayor Alvin Garcia vs. Hon. Mojica, et al., G.R. No. 139043,
September 10, 1999 Senate vs. Ermita,
G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006
A re-elected local official may not be held administratively
accountable for misconduct committed during his prior term of Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the
office. The rationale for this holding is that when the electorate put courts, or the public, is recognized only in relation to certain
him back into office, it is presumed that it did so with full knowledge types of information of a sensitive character. While executive
of his life and character, including his past misconduct. If, armed privilege is a constitutional concept, a claim thereof may be valid or
with such knowledge, it still reelects him, such re-election is not depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the context
considered a condonation of his past misdeeds. in which it is made. Noticeably absent is any recognition that
executive officials are exempt from the duty to disclose information
ADMINISTRATIVE JURISDICTION OF OMBUDSMAN by the mere fact of being executive officials. Indeed, the
extraordinary character of the exemptions indicates that the
Q: Who are covered by the administrative disciplinary authority of presumption inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor
the Office of the Ombudsman? of disclosure.
A: All elective and appointive officials of the government and its NERI v. SENATE COMMITTEE
subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including Members of G.R. No. 180643, 4 September 2008
the Cabinet, local governments, government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries are subject to the disciplinary During the hearings, former NEDA head Romulo Neri refused to
authority of the Office of the Ombudsman. answer certain questions involving his conversations with President
Arroyo on the ground they are covered by executive privilege. When
Q: Are there public officials not covered by the disciplinary the Senate cited him in contempt and ordered his arrest, Neri filed a
authority of the Office of the Ombudsman? case against the Senate with the Supreme Court. On March 25,
2008, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of Neri and upheld the claim
A: Yes, excepted from the coverage of the disciplinary authority of of executive privilege.
the Ombudsman are Members of Congress, the Judiciary, and
officials removable only by impeachment. ISSUE: Did the Senate Committees commit grave abuse of discretion
in citing Neri in contempt and ordering his arrest?
BAIL IN EXTRADITION
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court said that the Senate Committees
See discussion above committed grave abuse of discretion in citing Neri in contempt. The
following were the reasons given by the Supreme Court:
INQUIRY IN AID OF LEGISLATION
a. There was a legitimate claim of executive privilege.
See discussion above b. Senate Committees did not comply with the requirement
laid down in Senate v. Ermita that the invitations should
Facultad de Derecho Civil 55
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
NOTES ON POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
Kenneth & King Hizon (4A)- UST Faculty of Civil Law ___________________________
contain the “possible needed statute which prompted the
need for the inquiry” alongwith “usual indication of the Q: The House of Representatives’ House Committee conducted an
subject of inquiry and the questions relative to and in inquiry on the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement
furtherance thereof.” (JPEPA), then being negotiated by the Philippine Government. The
c. A reading of the transcript of the Committees’ proceeding House Committee requested DTI Usec. Aquino to furnish it with a
reveals that only a minority of the member of the Senate copy of the latest draft of the JPEPA. Aquino replied that he shall
d. Blue Ribbon Committee was present during the provide a copy thereof once the negotiations are completed.
deliberations Thus, there is a cloud of doubt as to the
validity of the contempt order A petition was filed with the SC which seeks to obtain a copy of the
e. The Senate Rules of Procedure in aid of legislation were Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiation
not duly published in accordance to Section 21 of Article VI process and all pertinent attachments and annexes thereto.
f. The contempt order is arbitrary and precipitate because Aquino, et al. invoked executive privilege based on the ground that
the Senate did not first rule on the claim of executive the information sought pertains to diplomatic negotiations then in
privilege and instead dismissed Neri’s explanation as progress. On the other hand, Akbayan, et al. for their part invoke
unsatisfactory. This is despite the fact that Neri is not an their right to information on matters of public concern.
unwilling witness. Are matters involving diplomatic negotiations covered by
executive privilege?
Hence, the Senate order citing Neri in contempt and ordering his
arrest was not valid. A. Yes. It is clear that while the final text of the JPEPA may not be
kept perpetually confidential, the offers exchanged by the parties
Senate v. Ermita, G.R. Nos. 169777, 20 April 2006 during the negotiations continue to be privilege even after the JPEPA
is published. Disclosing these offers could impair the ability of the
Q: Who may invoke executive privilege? Philippines to deal not only with Japan but with other foreign
governments in future negotiations (AKBAYAN Citizen’s Action Party
A. It is only the President who has the power to invoke the privilege. v. Aquino, et al., G.R No. 170516, July 16, 2008).
She may of course authorize the Executive Secretary to invoke the
privilege on her behalf, in which case the Executive Secretary must NOTE: Such privilege is only presumptive.
state that the authority is “By order of the President”.
FLAG STATE v. FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE
Q: How is the claim of executive privilege properly invoked?
Q: Distinguish the flag state and the flag of convenience
A: There must be a formal claim of privilege, lodged by the Head of
the department which has control over the matter. A formal and A. Flag state means a ship has the nationality of the flag of the state
proper claim of executive privilege requires “a precise and certain it flies, but there must be a genuine link between the state and the
reason” for preserving their confidentiality (Neri v. Senate, G.R. No. ship. (Article 91 of the Convention on the Law of the Sea)
180643, March 25, 2008).
Flag of convenience refers to a state with which a vessel is registered
Q: Can Congress require the executive to state the reasons for the for various reasons such as low or non-existent taxation or low
claim with particularity? operating costs although the ship has no genuine link with the state.
(Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law, 5th ed., 1998, p.
A. No. Congress must not require the executive to state the reasons 425)
for the claim with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the
information which the privilege is meant to protect (Senate v. FREEDOM OF RELIGION
Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, 20 April 2006).
Section 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise
Q: What are the elements of presidential communications and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
privilege? discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious
test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.
A:
IMPORTANT CLAUSES:
1. The protected communication must relate to a
“quintessential and non-delegable presidential power”. 1. Non-Establishment Clause
2. The communication must be authored or “solicited and 2. Free Exercise Clause
received” by a close advisor of the President or the 3. Religion Test Clause
President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must
be in “operational proximity” with the President. Q: Discuss the Non-Establishment clause.
3. The presidential communications privilege remains a
qualified privilege that may be overcome by a showing of A: The Government cannot establish any official religion. The
adequate need, such that the information sought “likely Government cannot infuse public funds into religion or any religious
contains important evidence” and by the unavailability of activity.
the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating
authority (Neri v. Senate, G.R. No. 180643, March 25,
2008).
Facultad de Derecho Civil 56
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
NOTES ON POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
Kenneth & King Hizon (4A)- UST Faculty of Civil Law ___________________________
XPN: Chaplains inside military camps, orphanages, penal institutions Q: Discuss why the Gerona ruling (justifying the expulsion from
and leprosarium. The reason for this is public policy so that they will public schools of children of Jehovah’s Witnesses who refuse to
not insist anymore of going out of these places. salute the flag and sing the national anthem during flag ceremony
as prescribed by the Flag Salute Law) should be abandoned.
Q: What is the scope of the non-establishment clause?
A: It is somewhat ironic however, that after the Gerona ruling had
A: received legislative cachet by its incorporation in the Administrative
Code of 1987, the present Court believes that the time has come to
a. State cannot set-up church; reexamine it. The idea that one may be compelled to salute the flag,
b. Cannot pass laws which aid one religion, all religions sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge, during a
or prefer one over another; flag ceremony on pain of being dismissed from one’s job or of being
c. Nor influence a person to go to or remain away from expelled from school, is alien to the conscience of the present
church against his will; nor generation of Filipinos who cut their teeth on the Bill of Rights which
d. Force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion guarantees their rights to free speech (The flag salute, singing the
national anthem and reciting the patriotic pledge are all forms of
Q: Discuss the two aspects of freedom of religion. utterances.) and the free exercise of religious profession and
worship. Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled
A: The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold to the highest priority and the amplest protection among human
aspect, viz., freedom to believe and freedom to act on one's belief. rights, for it involves the relationship of man to his Creator.
The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm
of thought. The second is subject to regulation where the belief is We are not persuaded that by exempting the Jehovah’s Witnesses
translated into external acts that affect the public welfare. (Iglesia Ni from saluting the flag, singing the national anthem and reciting the
Cristo v. CA, 259 SCRA 529, July 26, 1996 [Puno]). patriotic pledge, this religious group which admittedly comprises a
“small portion of the school population” will shake up our part of
The constitutional inhibition of legislation on the subject of religion the globe and suddenly produce a nation “untaught and
has a double aspect. On the one hand, it forestalls compulsion by uninculcated in and unimbued with reverence for the flag,
law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of patriotism, love of country and admiration for national heroes.
worship. Freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to such After all, what the petitioners seek only is exemption from the flag
religious organization or form of worship as the individual may ceremony, not exclusion from the public schools where they may
choose cannot be restricted by law. On the other hand, it study the Constitution, the democratic way of life and form of
safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of religion. Thus, government, and learn not only the arts, sciences, Philippine history
the Constitution embraces two concepts, that is, freedom to believe and culture but also receive training for a vocation or profession and
and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, be taught the virtues of “patriotism, respect for human rights,
the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the appreciation for national heroes, the rights and duties of citizenship,
protection of society. The freedom to act must have appropriate and moral and spiritual values (Sec. 3[2], Art. XIV,1987 Constitution)
definitions to preserve the enforcement of that protection. In every as part of the curricula. Expelling or banning the petitioners from
case, the power to regulate must be so exercised, in attaining a Philippine schools will bring about the very situation that this Court
permissible end, as not to unduly infringe on the protected freedom. had feared in Gerona. Forcing a small religious group, through the
iron hand of the law, to participate in a ceremony that violates their
Q: What is an “ecclesiastical affair” to which the State cannot religious beliefs, will hardly be conducive to love of country or
meddle? respect for duly constituted authorities.
A: : An ecclesiastical affair is “one that concerns doctrine, creed, or Q: What are religious tests?
form of worship of the church, or the adoption and enforcement
within a religious association of needful laws and regulations for the A: The constitutional prohibition against religious tests is aimed
government of the membership, and the power of excluding against clandestine attempts on the part of the government to
from such associations those deemed not worthy of prevent a person from exercising his civil or political rights because
membership.” It involves the relationship between the church and of his religious beliefs.
its members and relates to matters of faith, religious doctrines,
worship and governance of the congregation to which the state RECALL
cannot meddle.
Q: What is recall?
Q: Explain the doctrine of “Benevolent Neutrality.”
A: Recall is a mode of removal of a public officer by the people
A: It recognizes that government must pursue its secular goals and before the end of his term of office.
interest but at the same time strive to uphold religious liberty
to the greatest extent possible within flexible constitutional limits. Q: What is the ground for recall? Is this subject to judicial inquiry?
Thus, although the morality contemplated by laws is secular,
benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality A: “There is only one ground for recall of local government officials:
based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state loss of confidence.
interests.
Q: What is “loss of confidence”?
A: The Local Government Code explicitly vests on the punong 1. Culpable violation of the constitution
barangay, upon approval by a majority of all the members of the 2. Treason
sangguniang barangay, the power to appoint or replace the 3. Bribery
barangay treasurer, the barangay secretary, and other appointive 4. Betrayal of public trust
barangay officials. Verily, the power of appointment is to be 5. Graft and corruption
exercised conjointly by the punong barangay and a majority of all 6. Other high crimes
the members of the sangguniang barangay. Without such conjoint
action, neither an appointment nor a replacement can be effectual. PRIVILEGE FROM ARREST
Applying the rule that the power to appoint includes the power to See discussion above
remove x x x the questioned dismissal from office of the barangay
officials by the punong barangay without the concurrence of the FREEDOM OF SPEECH
majority of all the members of the Sangguniang Barangay cannot be
legally justified. To rule otherwise could also create an absurd See discussion above
situation of the Sangguniang Barangay members refusing to give
their approval to the replacements selected by the punong barangay CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION RIGHTS
who has unilaterally terminated the services of the incumbents. It is
likely that the legislature did not intend this absurdity to follow from 1. Right to remain silent;
its enactment of the law. (Ramon Alquizola, Sr. v. Gallardo Ocol, G.R. 2. Right to have a competent and independent counsel
No. 132413, Aug. 27, 1999, 3rd Div. [Vitug]) preferably of his own choice at all stages of the
investigation;
POLITICAL PARTIES THAT ARE DISQUALIFIED
Q: What do you mean by Independent and competent
Q: What groups are disqualified for registration? counsel?
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours NOTE: Supreme Court cannot rule upon the correctness of the
following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance President’s actions but only upon its arbitrariness.
with its rules without need of a call.
While the suspension of the privilege of writ and the proclamation
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed of martial law is subject to judicial review, the actual use by the
by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the President of the armed forces is not. Thus, troop deployments in
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of times of war are subject to the President’s judgment and discretion.
the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision
thereon within thirty days from its filing. RANDOLF DAVID v. GLORIA ARROYO
GR 171396, 3 May 2006
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the
Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or PGMA issued Proclamation 1017 declaring a State of National
legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction Emergency. Randolph David along with others, were arrested
on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are without warrants. Holding of rallies were prohibited. There was
able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the continuing threat to the media and threat to take over public
writ. utilities.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to HELD: The conditions for the exercise of emergency powers were
persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or present but there was no law authorizing the President to exercise
directly connected with invasion. such powers. The petitioners failed to rebut the factual bases of PP
1017; hence its constitutionality must be upheld.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus
arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days, GR: Calling out power is a political question not subject to judicial
otherwise he shall be released. review
Calling out power- The ability of the President to require a military XPN: If it can be shown that the president has gravely abused his
official to secure prior consent before appearing before Congress discretion in exercise of that power
pertains to a wholly different and independent specie of presidential
authority—the commander-in-chief powers of the President. By Q: Why the difference in treatment?
tradition and jurisprudence, the commander-in-chief powers of the
President are not encumbered by the same degree of restriction as A: Calling out power is the lesser and more benign power while the
that which may attach to executive privilege or executive control. power to declare martial law and to suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus are the greater powers which involve direct
Q: What are the Constitutional safeguards on the exercise of the curtailment of civil liberties thereby necessitating safeguards of
power of the President to proclaim martial law? Congress and judicial review of the Court. (IBP v. Zamora)
A: PGMA exercised the calling out power when she issued GO 5 and PP
1017, not the martial law power. The acts taken purportedly to carry
1. There must be actual invasion or rebellion; out the issuances were ultra vires, hence, unconstitutional. The
2. The duration of the proclamation shall not exceed 60 days; exercise of the calling out power does not involve the direct
3. Within 48 hours, the President shall report his action to curtailment and suppression of civil liberties and individual
Congress. If Congress is not in session, it must convene freedoms. However GO 5 and PP1017 are constitutional. Petitioners
within 24 hours; failed to counteract the factual bases therefore as alleged by the
Solgen. (David v. PGMA)
Facultad de Derecho Civil 60
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
NOTES ON POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
Kenneth & King Hizon (4A)- UST Faculty of Civil Law ___________________________
Q: What are the effects of the filing of COCs?
Q: Why not the martial law powers?
A: Candidates holding appointive office or position shall be
A: There was no case of invasion or rebellion. President will be considered ipso facto resigned from his office. (Sec. 66, OEC)
required to submit report to Congress within 48 hours from Candidates holding elective office shall not be considered
proclamation of martial law. (Article VII, section18) resigned from his office. (Sec. 67 of OEC repealed by Section 14 of
RA 9006).
Q: Why not the emergency powers?
COMELEC Resolution No. 3636, promulgated March 1, 2001,
A: The President cannot motu proprio exercise emergency power implementing the Fair Election Act (R.A. No. 9006) provides in
because such power is vested in Congress. (Article VI, section 23) Section 26 thereof: “any elective official, whether national or local,
who has filed a certificate of candidacy for the same or any other
SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF HABEAS CORPUS office shall not be considered resigned from his office.”
Q: What are the grounds for the suspension of the privilege of the Note that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code and the first
writ of habeas corpus? proviso in the third paragraph of Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8436
which modified said Section 67, were expressly repealed and
A: rendered ineffective, respectively, by Section 14 (Repealing Clause)
of The Fair Election Act (R.A. No. 9006).
1. invasion or rebellion,
2. when public safety requires it RA 7438, MIRANDA RIGHTS
Q: How long is the duration of the suspension? Section 2. Rights of Persons Arrested, Detained or Under Custodial
Investigation; Duties of Public Officers. –
A: It shall not to exceed 60 days, following which it shall be lifted
unless extended by Congress (a) Any person arrested detained or under custodial investigation
shall at all times be assisted by counsel.
Q: What are the Four Ways to Lift the Suspension?
(b) Any public officer or employee, or anyone acting under
A: his order or his place, who arrests, detains or investigates any
person for the commission of an offense shall inform the latter, in
1. Lifting by the President himself a language known to and understood by him, of his rights to
2. Revocation by Congress remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel,
3. Nullification by the Supreme Court preferably of his own choice, who shall at all times be allowed to
4. By operation of law after 60 days confer privately with the person arrested, detained or under
custodial investigation. If such person cannot afford the services of
Q: What is the Duty of the President in case of the suspension? his own counsel, he must be provided with a competent and
independent counsel by the investigating officer.lawphi1Ÿ
A: To report action to Congress within 48 hours, personally or in
writing (c) The custodial investigation report shall be reduced to
writing by the investigating officer, provided that before such
NOTE: The Congress may revoke or extend, on request of the report is signed, or thumbmarked if the person arrested or
President, the effectivity of proclamation by a majority vote of all its detained does not know how to read and write, it shall be read and
Members, voting jointly. adequately explained to him by his counsel or by the assisting
counsel provided by the investigating officer in the language or
The suspension applies only to persons judicially charged for dialect known to such arrested or detained person, otherwise, such
rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion. investigation report shall be null and void and of no effect
whatsoever.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged (d) Any extrajudicial confession made by a person arrested,
within three (3) days, otherwise he shall be released. detained or under custodial investigation shall be in writing and
signed by such person in the presence of his counsel or in the
EXCLUSIONARY RULE latter's absence, upon a valid waiver, and in the presence of any of
the parents, elder brothers and sisters, his spouse, the municipal
Section 3. The privacy of communication and correspondence shall mayor, the municipal judge, district school supervisor, or priest or
be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public minister of the gospel as chosen by him; otherwise, such
safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law. extrajudicial confession shall be inadmissible as evidence in any
proceeding.
Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section
shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. (e) Any waiver by a person arrested or detained under the
provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, or under
ELECTION LAW: DEEMED RESIGNED WHEN SUBMITTED COC ONLY custodial investigation, shall be in writing and signed by such
ELECTIVE OFFICERS person in the presence of his counsel; otherwise the waiver shall
be null and void and of no effect.
Facultad de Derecho Civil 61
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
NOTES ON POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
Kenneth & King Hizon (4A)- UST Faculty of Civil Law ___________________________
(f) Any person arrested or detained or under custodial A: Republic Act No. 4200 entitled "An Act to Prohibit and Penalize
investigation shall be allowed visits by or conferences with any Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of the Privacy of
member of his immediate family, or any medical doctor or priest or Communication, and For Other Purposes" expressly makes such tape
religious minister chosen by him or by any member of his recordings inadmissible in evidence. x x x.
immediate family or by his counsel, or by any national non-
governmental organization duly accredited by the Commission on Clearly, respondent trial court and Court of Appeals failed to
Human Rights of by any international non-governmental consider the afore-quoted provisions of the law in admitting in
organization duly accredited by the Office of the President. The evidence the cassette tapes in question. Absent a clear showing
person's "immediate family" shall include his or her spouse, fiancé that both parties to the telephone conversations allowed the
or fiancée, parent or child, brother or sister, grandparent or recording of the same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is
grandchild, uncle or aunt, nephew or niece, and guardian or ward. mandatory under Rep. Act No. 4200.
As used in this Act, "custodial investigation" shall include the Additionally, it should be mentioned that the above-mentioned
practice of issuing an "invitation" to a person who is investigated Republic Act in Section 2 thereof imposes a penalty of imprisonment
in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed, of not less than six (6) months and up to six (6) years for violation of
without prejudice to the liability of the "inviting" officer for any said Act. (Salcedo-Ortanez v. Court of Appeals, 235 SCRA 111, Aug. 4,
violation of law. 1994 [Padilla])
Q: How is the State regarded as a subject of international law? According to the Permanent Court of International Justice, the
forerunner of the International Court of Justice by taking up the
A: The State is regarded as subject of international law or an case of one of its subjects and by reporting to diplomatic action or
international legal person in that it has, in other words, the capacity international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality
to be bearer of rights and duties under international law. asserting its own rights — its right to ensure, in the person of its
subjects, respect for the rules of international law.
The status of the State as subject of law or an international person is
conferred by customary or general international law. It possesses Objects of international law
erga omnes or objective personality not merely by virtue of
recognition on the part of particular states. Q: What is an object of international law?
Q: How is the primacy of states as subjects of international law A: An Object is a person or thing in respect of which rights are held
explained? and obligations assumed by the Subject. Thus, it is not directly
governed by the rules of international law. There is no direct
A: The States are the repositories of legitimated authority over enforcement and accountability. An intermediate agency—the
peoples and territories. It is only in terms of State powers, Subject—is required for the enjoyment of its rights and for the
prerogatives, jurisdictional limits and law-making capabilities that discharge of its obligations.
territorial limits and jurisdiction, responsibility for official actions,
and a host of other questions of co-existence between nations can Q: Distinguish subjects from objects of international law.
be determined.
A:
A: Are international organizations considered as subjects of
international law? SUBJECTS OF INTENATIONAL OBJECTS OF INTENATIONAL
LAW LAW
A: Yes, if their legal personality is established by their constituent Entity that has rights and Person or thing in respect of
instrument or charter. Their status is determined by agreement and responsibilities which rights are held and
not by general or customary international law. Their personality is obligations assumed by the
derivative of the collective will of the states creating it. subject
Has international personality Not directly governed by the
Q: What is the criterion for legal personality to be met? that it can directly assert rights rules of international law
and can be held responsible
A: under the law of nations
1. A permanent association of states, with lawful objects, It can be a proper party in Its rights are received and its
equipped with organs transactions involving the responsibilities imposed
2. A distinction, in terms of legal powers and purposes, application of the law of nations indirectly through the
between the organization and its member states among members of instrumentality of an
3. The existence of legal powers exercisable on the international communities intermediate agency
international plane and not solely within the national
system of one or more states
RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
Q: May individuals assume the status of subjects of international (SEC 2)
law?
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
A: Yes, but on the basis of the agreement by states and in specific houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
context, not in accordance with general or customary international seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
law. inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
HOLY SEE v. ROSARIO (1994) judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
Under both Public International Law and Transnational Law, a describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
person who feels aggrieved by the acts of a foreign sovereign can seized.
ask his own government to espouse his cause through diplomatic
channels. This refers to the personal security of an individual. It protects
persons and not places. Not all searches are prohibited. Only those
which are unreasonable are prohibited by the Constitution.
Facultad de Derecho Civil 63
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
NOTES ON POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
Kenneth & King Hizon (4A)- UST Faculty of Civil Law ___________________________
Lecture Proper:
Doctrine of Condonation
Q: What is the doctrine of condonation? Clear then, the rule is that a public official can not be
removed for administrative misconduct committed during a
A: Doctrine of condonation- the “re-election” of an elected prior term, since his re-election to office operates as a
officer serves as a condonation of any administrative case condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the
(Aguinaldo v. Santos). extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. The
foregoing rule, however, finds no application to criminalcases
-applies only in re-election: same post/position pending against petitioner for acts he may have committed
-applies only to administrative cases, never in criminal case during the failed coup.
where there is no condonation
-section 40 (b) of LGC: disqualified for running in any elective POLI REV
post -Poli and PIL (15%)
A:
Facultad de Derecho Civil 65
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
NOTES ON POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
Kenneth & King Hizon (3A)- UST Faculty of Civil Law ___________________________
the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is
a. Constitution of government solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16,
b. Constitution of Sovereignty Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:
c. Constitution of liberty (2012 Bar Examination)
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the
Bill of rights (liberty) people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the
Method of amendment (government) rhythm and harmony of nature.
Governmental organizational powers (sovereignty)
This right unites with the right to health which is provided for
RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO, TOGETHER in the preceding section of the same article:
WITH 6,327,952 REGISTERED VOTERS v. THE COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to
G.R. No. 174153, October 25, 2006 health of the people and instill health consciousness among
them.
The well-regarded political scientist, Garner, says that a good
constitution should contain at least three (3) sets of While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be
provisions: the constitution of liberty which sets forth the found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies
fundamental rights of the people and imposes certain and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is
limitations on the powers of the government as a means of less important than any of the civil and political rights
securing the enjoyment of these rights; the constitution of enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different
government which deals with the framework of government category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less
and its powers, laying down certain rules for its than self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and
administration and defining the electorate; and, the fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the advancement of
constitution of sovereignty which prescribes the mode or which may even be said to predate all governments and
procedure for amending or revising the constitution.49 It is constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not
plain that the proposed changes will basically affect only the even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to
constitution of government. The constitutions of liberty and exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now
sovereignty remain unaffected. Indeed, the proposed explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because
changes will not change the fundamental nature of our state of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights
as "x x x a democratic and republican state."50 It is self- to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are
evident that a unicameral-parliamentary form of government mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby
will not make our State any less democratic or any less highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon
republican in character. Hence, neither will the use of the the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect
qualitative test resolve the issue of whether the proposed and advance the second, the day would not be too far when
changes are "simple" or "substantial." all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but
also for those to come — generations which stand to inherit
Q: What is the nature of the rights embodied in the Bill of nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.
Rights?
Q: What is the right invoked by the petitioners in this case?
A: The Bill of rights consist of civil and political rights. They
involve the limitation on powers of state/government. A: The right of people to a balance and healthful ecology in
accordance with the rhythm and harmony of nature (Art. 2,
OPOSA v. FACTORAN Sec. 16).
G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993 -state must protect in advance.
-foreign jurisdictions are taking cognizance of this much
In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of celebrated case.
Filipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology which the
petitioners dramatically associate with the twin concepts of Section 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of
"inter-generational responsibility" and "inter-generational the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord
justice." Specifically, it touches on the issue of whether the with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
said petitioners have a cause of action to "prevent the
misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine rainforests Q: Yet the right to a balance and healthful ecology is not in
and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital the Bill of rights (Art. 3). Is it less important?
life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth."
A: No. The reason why it is not in art. 3 is that bill o rights
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right involve civil and political rights. The right to a balance and
— the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for healthful ecology belongs to a different category altogether
2. A provision which is complete in itself- nature and As already stated, however, these provisions are not self-
extent of right and liability imposed-self-executing executing. They do not confer rights which can be enforced in
the courts but only provide guidelines for legislative or
Examples: Some provisions in Bill of rights (freedom of executive action.
religion, freedom of the press, expression, speech, rights of
an accused, due process) OPERATIVE FACT DOCTRINE
Section 16 of Art. 2 (right to a balance ecology)- self- Under the operative fact doctrine, the law is recognized as
executing. An express declaration of the sc. This is more of an unconstitutional but the effects of the unconstitutional law,
exception since in general provisions in art. 2 are not self- prior to its declaration of nullity, may be left undisturbed as a
executing. matter of equity and fair play.
Declaration of Principles Not Self-Executing As a general rule, any act declared by the court to be
WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA v. EDGARDO ANGARA unconstitutional has no legal effect whatsoever – “it confers
G.R. No. 118295. May 2, 1997 no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it
creates no office; It is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative
By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a “declaration as though it had never been passed.”
of principles and state policies.” The counterpart of this
article in the 1935 Constitution is called the “basic political The "operative fact" doctrine realizes that in declaring a law
creed of the nation” by Dean Vicente Sinco. These principles or rule null and void, undue harshness and resulting
in Article II are not intended to be self-executing principles unfairness must be avoided.
ready for enforcement through the courts. They are used by
the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general
of judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment of rule, only applies as a matter of equity and fair play. It
laws. As held in the leading case of Kilosbayan Incorporated nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing
vs. Morato, the principles and state policies enumerated in that the existence of a statute prior to a determination of
Article II and some sections of Article XII are not “self- unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have
executing provisions, the disregard of which can give rise to a consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past
cause of action in the courts. They do not embody judicially cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.
enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for
legislation.” The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of
unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those
KILOSBAYAN, INCORPORATED, et al. v. MANUEL L. who have relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a
MORATO, in his capacity as Chairman of the Philippine criminal case when a declaration of unconstitutionality would
Charity Sweepstakes Office, and the PHILIPPINE GAMING put the accused in double jeopardy or would put in limbo the
MANAGEMENT CORPORATION acts done by a municipality in reliance upon a law creating it.
G.R. No. 118910 November 16, 1995 Operative fact doctrine- applies when a law is declared
unconstitutional. A law declared as unconstitutional:
NOTE: Our constitution is very verbose. Doctrine of effective occupation- discovery alone is not
enough. It only gives inchoate right to the discoverer. There
Philippine Archipelago- The main treaty of Paris (history and must be effective occupation:
legally speaking): only those ceded by Spain to U.S.:
International name: Scarborough shoal: Panatag Shoal:
a. Luzon Spanish maps: Bajo de Masinloc: Masincloc is one of the
b. Visayas province of the province of Zambales: 124 nautical miles from
c. Mindanao Masinloc. Within the 200 mile exclusive economic zone.
However, certain territories like Sulu and Sibuto were Shoal- not an island. Narrow/shallow portion of the sea or of
excluded. As such, another treaty was entered in Washington the river. Usually surfaces during low tide and is submerged
(November 7, 1900). January 1, 1930 Great Britain and during high tide. Not habitable.
U.S.: ceded Turtle and Mangse islands in Palawan and Cebu
islands which used to be British territories. In 1935 The Spratlys Group of Islands
Constitution, the national territory there pertains to the
national archipelago. Q: Do you consider the Spratlys Group of Islands as part of
Philippine Archipelago?
Philippine Archipelago
A. Spratlys Group of Islands is not part of the Philippine
1. Treaty of Paris, December 10, 1898 Cession of the Archipelago because it is too far away from the three main
Philippine Islands by Spain to the United States; islands of the Philippines. It is found, geographically, almost in
2. Treaty between Spain and US at Washington, November the middle of the South China Sea. It is not part of the
7, 1900—inclusion of Cagayan, Sulu and Sibuto; Philippine Archipelago. Historically, when we talk about
3. Treaty between US and GB, January 2, 1930—inclusion of Philippine Archipelago, we refer to those islands and waters
Turtle and Mangsee Islands that were ceded by the Spain to the United States by virtue of
Treaty of Paris in 1898. And that did not include the Spratlys
Main Treaty: Group of Islands yet. Under the treaty, the islands that were
ceded by Spain were identified—the main islands—Luzon,
1. Treaty of Paris Visayas and Mindanao. Clearly, it did not include the Spratlys
Group of Islands.
Ancillary treaties
a. Washington treaty Spratlys Group of Islands was only discovered sometime in
b. Great Britain the 1950’s by a Filipino, Tomas Cloma. The latter waived his
rights over the islands in favor of the Philippine Government.
NOTE: The Spratly’s or Parassel’s islands (Now Kalayaan In effect, the government stepped into the shoes of the
group of islands) are not yet included in 1935. They are not discoverer. By then President Marcos, what he did the
yet recovered: tera nullus (land belonging to no one) moment Tomas Cloma waived his rights over the Spratlys
Group of Islands, is to have the islands immediately occupied
Thomas Cloma from Bohol who calls himself Admiral by Philippine troops. He then issued PD 1596, constituting the
although he is not commissioned. We stepped into his shoes Spratlys Group of Islands as a regular municipality claiming it
when he waived his rights in favor of the Philippine the Municipality of Kalayaan placing it under the Province of
government. Marcos had the islands occupied by the Palawan. And then he had the elections immediately held in
marines. PD 1596 constituting Spratly’s as a municipality of the islands so from that time on until now, we continue to
Kalayaan under the province of Kalayaan. And also he held hold elections there. The Philippine exercises not only
elections there. PD 1596 is the charter of the Spratly’s. Until jurisdiction but also sovereignty over the Spratlys Group of
now, we have troops and officials there. There is also a Islands, yet it is not part of the Philippine Archipelago.
A. Yes. Article I of the Constitution provides: “The national -there are 28 sections under Art. 2 of the constitution.
territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, x x x, and all
other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or Sections 1-6: Principles
jurisdiction, x x x.” The Spratlys Group of islands falls under Sections 7-28: Policies
the second phrase “and all other territories over which the
Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction”. It is part of our Section 28: Policy on transparency-often disregarded
national territory because Philippines exercise sovereignty
(through election of public officials) over Spratlys Group of Section 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican
Islands. State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government
authority emanates from them.
Q: What was the basis of the Philippines’ claim over the
Spratlys? Senate vs. Ermita: In a republican state like government, the
general rule is transparency in view of section 7 of bill of
A. Through discovery of Tomas Cloma and occupation. rights: right of people to information on matters of public
concern, not secrecy policy.
Magallona v. Exec. Sec. Ermita (2010): RA 9522: Baselines
law: compliance with our commitment under the UNCLOS of SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EDUARDO R. ERMITA
1982. From baselines, where we measure territorial sea, G.R. No. 169777 April 20, 2006
contiguous zone and exclusive economic zone.
A transparent government is one of the hallmarks of a truly
Q: Significance of RA 9522 republican state. Even in the early history of republican
thought, however, it has been recognized that the head of
A: When congress enacted RA 9522, this is a notice to the government may keep certain information confidential in
whole world that it is our territory so that foreign countries pursuit of the public interest. Explaining the reason for
cannot claim ignorance over our territories. vesting executive power in only one magistrate, a
distinguished delegate to the U.S. Constitutional Convention
Q: Did it diminished our baselines? said: "Decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch will generally
characterize the proceedings of one man, in a much more
A: No. It is not a mode of acquiring or diminishing our eminent degree than the proceedings of any greater number;
territory. It merely defined our baselines. and in proportion as the number is increased, these qualities
will be diminished."
Thus, with the enactment of RA 9522, other countries like
Malaysia and Indonesia should also define. The possibility of 1. Philippines is a democratic and republican state: a.
overlapping claims over portions of the sea arises. How do sovereignty resides the people and
you resolve? Through the ITCLOS to resolve international b. all government powers, authority emanate from
conflicting claims. them;
2. The constitution prescribes the kind of government:
Panatag shoal: bring to ITCLOS but China wants bilateral democratic and republican. No way to establish
talks. military junta or dictatorship unless you want to do
away with the constitution;
nd
2 sentence of ART 1 3. In international law, the kind of government does
not matter. It is not concerned with that. What it
a. Around concerns is: as long as there is a government.
b. Between
Q: What are the characteristics of public office in a CHR is not a constitutional commission
democratic and republican state?
5. Ombudsman- highest appointive officials of the land
A:
Note: Administrator of the SC are not impeachable
1. Public office is a public trust, it is not a privilege. officers.
Sense of public accountability is very important.
Thus, comingling of funds has no room under our All other officials may be removed by means
concept of public office; provided by law, except by impeachment
2. Public office cannot be inherited. We are not under Thus, this list is exclusive.
monarchy. It is not a hereditable position. Even SK is
corrupted. Anti-political dynasty bill is still pending Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members
despite clear mandate of the constitution; of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional
3. Public office is outside the commerce of man- thus, Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from
it cannot be a subject of a valid contract. Recently, office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable
the term sharing agreement among party-list violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and
became an issue. Such is a contract. Such is not corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All
enforceable in court because the subject matter is other public officers and employees may be removed from
public office; office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.
4. Public office is not a property, thus, it is not Q: Who has the Exclusive power to initiate impeachment?
protected by the due process clause (Art.3, section
1 of Constitution). The abolishment of an office will A: House of Representatives has the exclusive power
not deprive the officer of due process. Congress may
abolish an office in good faith as part of its power to Q: Who shall try?
create an office.
A: Senate. Section 3, par. 6
Abolishment of office vs. removal of the officer
The senate has to take an oath, not as senators but as judges.
Q: What is the distinction between abolition of office and That is why, we address them as senator-judges.
removal of the officer?
The impeachment of corona is not a bill of attainder
A: (administrative act without judicial trial). Such is fallacious.
The impeachment was a judicial trial applying the rules of
Abolition of office Removal of the officer evidence.
the office is abolished the office remains, the
occupant is the one removed Section 3. The House of Representatives shall have the
exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
NOTE: Impeachment- not found in Arts. 6, 7, or 8. But it is
found in art.11, section 2. after all, impeachment is about A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any
public accountability esp. by high government officials since Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen
public office is a public trust. upon a resolution or endorsement by any Member thereof,
which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten
IMPEACHABLE OFFICERS AND GROUNDS session days, and referred to the proper Committee within
three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing,
Q: Who are the impeachable officers under the and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its
Constitution? report to the House within sixty session days from such
No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the A: No. Section 19 of Art. 7: except in cases of impeachment.
same official more than once within a period of one year.
Q: After being impeached, tax evasion?
The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all
cases of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the A: Yes, he can be pardoned by the president on criminal trial
Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the on tax evasion.
President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No ARTICLE II
person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-
thirds of all the Members of the Senate. Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument
of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles
Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further of international law as part of the law of the land and
than removal from office and disqualification to hold any adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom,
office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party cooperation, and amity with all nations.
convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to
prosecution, trial, and punishment, according to law. a. Renunciation of war as instrument of national policy
b. Adopts the/Adherence to the generally accepted
The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to principles of international law
effectively carry out the purpose of this section.
Renunciation of war as instrument of national policy
Q: What are the grounds in case of impeachment?
This is consistent with our membership to the UN. This is one
A: of the fundamental principles behind the establishment of
UN. The world cannot afford another war of such magnitude
1. culpable violation of the Constitution, of the second world war.
2. treason,
3. bribery, Q: Who has the power to declare war?
4. graft and corruption,
5. other high crimes, or A: None. Such power to declare war has been withheld by the
6. betrayal of public trust. constitution since we already renounced war as instrument of
national policy.
Q: What are the grounds under US:
The only power vested by constitution to congress is the sole
1. Treason power to declare the existence of state of war. The kind of
2. Other High crimes war renounced is offensive war. Defensive war is one of our
3. Betrayal of public trust rights under PIL—Right to self-defense.
a. Disqualification to whatever office, appointive or Section 23. The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both
elective Houses in joint session assembled, voting separately, shall
In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress NOTE: This right belongs to minorities within the state only. It
may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period does not belong to all of us.
and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to
exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a Ex: Muslims, Ifugao, Igorot, Mangyans, Tagbanua, Tibolis,
declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by Lumads, Manobos
resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon
the next adjournment thereof. This is a collective right. They are usually called as indigenous
peoples or indigenous cultural community. Remember IPRA:
NOTE: The constitution is specific when it said: separately. Indigenous people rights act.
Right to self-determination A:
1. individual
North Cotabato case: proposed MOA-AD is unconstitutional: Ex: Bill of rights
right to self-determination of peoples: gone beyond mere
treaty or convention, in fact, it is now elevated to a generally 2. collective
accepted principle of international law. As an implication, this Ex: Right to self-determination, right of the people to
is now incorporated to our laws. balanced and healthful ecology
1. Internal- as what the right is usually understood,: NOTE: The right to self-determination has now grown and is
people’s pursuit of his own political, cultural, elevated into a generally accepted principle in international
economic, or social development “within the law.
framework of an existing state”
Q: Who may claim the right to self-determination?
2. External- assertion of unilateral right of secession
can be invoked in extreme cases: A: It refers to the:
a. People under colonial rule
b. People under foreign domination or exploitation a. right of indigenous peoples and
outside colonial context b. indigenous cultural communities
Q: May bangsamoro validly invoke this right to self- and in extreme cases, of people:
determination to secede from the Philippines?
a. under colonial rule
A: The recognized sources of international law establish that Using even the most liberal of lenses, these Yogyakarta
the right to self-determination of a people is normally fulfilled Principles, consisting of a declaration formulated by various
through internal self-determination - a people's pursuit of its international law professors, are – at best – de lege ferenda –
political, economic, social and cultural development within and do not constitute binding obligations on the Philippines.
the framework of an existing state. A right to external self- Indeed, so much of contemporary international law is
determination (which in this case potentially takes the form characterized by the “soft law” nomenclature, i.e.,
of the assertion of a right to unilateral secession) arises in international law is full of principles that promote
only the most extreme of cases and, even then, under international cooperation, harmony, and respect for human
carefully defined circumstances. External self-determination rights, most of which amount to no more than well-meaning
can be defined the establishment of a sovereign and desires, without the support of either State practice or opinio
independent State, the free association or integration with an juris.
independent State or the emergence into any other political
status freely determined by a people constitute modes of Q: Is the Yogyakarta Principles accepted under our
implementing the right of self-determination by that people. jurisdiction?
Indeed, the right to self-determination of the people is now A: We are not prepared to declare that these Yogyakarta
elevated into a generally accepted principle. However, it is Principles contain norms that are obligatory on
only limited to internal right to self-determination. the Philippines. There are declarations and obligations
outlined in said Principles which are not reflective of the
Isagani Cruz v. DENR: proper term is IP. ICC is employed by current state of international law, and do not find basis in any
the constitution, but other than that they are the same. They of the sources of international law enumerated under Article
refer to same minority group in a state. These terms are 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (Ang
always used in their plural form. Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC).
Yogyakarta principles- Ang Ladlat Party list (LGBT) vs. Q: What is the concept ex aequo et bono?
COMELEC
-not yet a generally accepted principle under international A: It is a judgment based on considerations of fairness, not on
law considerations of existing law, that is, to simply decide the
-application of international human rights law in connection case based upon a balancing of the equities. (Brownlie, 2003)
with sexual orientation and gender identity.
Structure of our government
SC: We are not prepared to declare that the Yogyakarta
principles contain norms that are binding and obligatory to 1. Presidential form of government
the Philippines. They are at best de lege ferenda. 2. Democratic and republican kind
3. Adherence to the doctrine Separation of powers
Yogyakarta Principles
a. Legislative: power of the purse/appropriation
Q: What are the Yogyakarta Principles? b. Executive: power of the sword
c. Judiciary: judicial review
A: The Yogyakarta Principles ensure the full enjoyment of all
human rights by all persons regardless of sexual orientation Legislative- there must be a corresponding appropriation
and gender identity. They were put together by a before the government can disburse funds
distinguished group of human rights experts in November
2006 at Yogyakarta, Indonesia and have since been
HISTORY: 1950 Philippines: Huk rebellion held by Luis Taruc: A: It merely promulgates these administrative regulations.
Pres. QUIRINO exercised emergency power via a law enacted Thus, usually called as IRR-implementing rules and
by the congress. Thus, the exercise is valid unlike the case of regulations. They are pieces of subordinate legislation.
PGMA.
In case of conflict between law and the subordinate
Q: What are the requisites for exercise of emergency legislation, the former prevails. The legislative power is
powers? vested to Congress. The source of the power is the law: the
spring cannot rise above its own source.
A:
Rules implementing the LABOR CODE was promulgated by
1. There must be War or national emergency; (DOLE) Sec. Ople by the authority of provision in the code
2. Delegation must be for a limited period only; delegating the promulgation of the rules and regulations. He
3. Subject to limitations prescribed by the Congress; acted in his capacity: quasi-legislative authority not as
and secretary of labor.
4. Must always be pursuant to declared national policy.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE: There is a provision delegating
Essence: Emergency powers cases to an Oversight committee the promulgation of such rules
and regulations.
OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE: The COMELEC was authorized to A: Undue delegation of powers. This is no longer delegation
promulgate the rules and regulations. but an abdication of power in favor of the delegate which
cannot be allowed by the rule—a delegation running riot not
Local governments canalized at all. This will tilt the balance of separation of
powers.
ARTICLE X
LOCAL GOVERNMENT a. Completeness test- the law must be complete in all
GENERAL PROVISIONS essential terms and conditions when it leaves the
legislature so that when it reaches the delegate,
Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the nothing more will be left for the delegate but to
Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities, implement the law.
municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous
regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as -So that the delegate will not fill in the gaps of the law. When
hereinafter provided. the law is not sufficient, the remedy is for congress to amend
its own act. Not even the SC may fill in the gaps of the law
Local governments: referred to as: (judicial legislation).
Section 15: dual nature and function of the local government: STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT
1. body politic- governmental or sovereign functions
2. body corporate-exercises proprietary or private ARTICLE VI
functions THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the
Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate
SEC. 15. Political and Corporate Nature of Local Government and a House of Representatives, except to the extent
Units. - Every local government unit created or recognized reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and
under this Code is a body politic and corporate endowed referendum.
with powers to be exercised by it in conformity with law. As
such, it shall exercise powers as a political subdivision of the NOTE: This is a cross-over provision.
national government and as a corporate entity representing
the inhabitants of its territory. Section 32. The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide
for a system of initiative and referendum, and the
Q: Do they have inherent powers? exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly
propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law
A: Since they are mere creations of the congress or legislature or part thereof passed by the Congress or local legislative
unlike the state. They may only exercise such power which body after the registration of a petition therefor signed by
has been delegated to them or those which can be implied at least ten per centum of the total number of registered
from the delegated power. voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered
Tests of a valid delegation voters thereof.
Q: What are the tests for valid delegation? LEGISLATIVE POWER OF CONGRESS
1. completeness test A: It is the power to make, amend, repeal laws and to alter or
2. sufficiency standard test change laws vested in the Congress.
A: The work of congress is not limited to such enacting of Q: What is power of oversight?
laws, namely:
A: Broadly defined, the power of oversight embraces all
a. impeachment cases as prosecutorial body or activities undertaken by Congress to enhance its
impeachment court (Sec.2, Art. XI); understanding of and influence over the implementation of
b. constituent assembly: sovereign function of the legislation it has enacted. Clearly, oversight concerns post-
highest function; enactment measures undertaken by Congress:
c. Power to declaration of existence of state of war
(sec.23 (1) of art. VI); (a) to monitor bureaucratic compliance with program
d. Power to act as board of canvassers for votes for objectives,
president and vice president. It will proclaim the duly (b) to determine whether agencies are properly
elected: It will act as national board of canvassers administered,
(Sec.10, Art, VII); (c) to eliminate executive waste and dishonesty,
e. Amnesty proclamation by the president: (d) to prevent executive usurpation of legislative
concurrence of majority of all the members of authority, and
Congress (Sec. 19, Art. VI); (e) to assess executive conformity with the
f. Treaties or international agreements; concurrence of congressional perception of public interest.
at least 2/3 of all the members of the Senate (Sec.
21, Art. VII); The power of oversight has been held to be intrinsic in the
g. power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation grant of legislative power itself and integral to the checks
(investigatorial power); and and balances inherent in a democratic system of
h. question hour government. [Thus, you cannot deny such power to
congress]. Among the most quoted justifications for this
J. Puno dissenting opinion in Makalintal case: Congressional power are the writings of John Stuart Mill and Woodrow
oversight powers and functions. Wilson. In his Consideration of Representative Government,
Mill wrote that the duty of the legislature is “to watch and
Congressional oversight powers and functions: the work of control the government; to throw the light of publicity on its
congress does not end in the enactment of the law. It has acts; to compel a full exposition and justification of all of
continuing interest to see to it that the laws that it enacted them which any one considers objectionable; and to censure
are properly implemented and administered them if found condemnable.” Wilson went one step farther
and opined that the legislature’s informing function should be
ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL v. preferred to its legislative function. He emphasized that
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS “*E+ven more important than legislation is the instruction and
G.R. No. 157013 July 10, 2003 guidance in political affairs which the people might receive
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION (Puno, J.) from a body which kept all national concerns suffused in a
broad daylight of discussion.”
Congress checks the other branches of government primarily
through its law making powers. Congress can create Over the years, Congress has invoked its oversight power
administrative agencies, define their powers and duties, fix with increased frequency to check the perceived “exponential
the terms of officers and their compensation. It can also accumulation of power” by the executive branch. By the
create courts, define their jurisdiction and reorganize the beginning of the 20th century, Congress has delegated an
judiciary so long as it does not undermine the security of enormous amount of legislative authority to the executive
J.Puno: Most encompassing power by which congress RA 9165- Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs act of 2003
exercises legislative powers
SJS vs. Dangerous Drugs Board (2008): drug-testing
Supervision connotes… requirement provision for the application to run for senate.
Mandatory drug testing is unconstitutional. In effect, it
Allows congress to scrutinize the exercise of such delegated prescribes another qualification for the aspiring senators
quasi-legislative power to administrative agency and retains which is not found in the constitution.
part of such power.
Term of office
Administrative agencies cannot exercise such power if not
granted by the congress. Such is subject to review power of a. Senators: 6 years, 2 consecutive terms
congress b. Congressmen: 3 years, 3 consecutive terms
c. President: 6 years, no re-election by express
“subject to review by congress or an oversight committee of provision of the law
congess” d. Vice president: 6 years; 2 consecutive terms
A qualified party, regardless of the actual number of votes We therefore strike down the two percent threshold
shall be entitled to 3 seats: only in relation to the distribution of the additional seats as
1. One qualifying seat found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941.
2. 2 additional seats The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle
Ex: 10 million; party X=10 million votes: 3 seat limit, but to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the
supposedly 5 seats. Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the broadest
possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests
A single political party can be so strong that it can dominate in the House of Representatives.”*30+
the party list system. Such will defeat the purpose of the
party-list In determining the allocation of seats for party-list
representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the
Proportional representation following procedure shall be observed:
Additional seat in proportion to the actual number of votes 1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be
ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the
Banat vs. comelec (July 2009) number of votes they garnered during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at
The 2% threshold was not declared as unconstitutional. Such least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the
is a misreading. What was declared unconstitutional was the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed
continued use or application of the 2% threshold in the seat each.
distribution of the additional seats. This is against the 3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes,
“Panganiban formula” used in the Veterans case. according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be
entitled to additional seats in proportion to their
1. List down the participating parties total number of votes until all the additional seats
2. Check who got the 20% are allocated.
3. Give one seat to each of the qualifying parties 4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be
4. Do not use the 2% threshold in distributing the entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
additional seats
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats
We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, shall no longer be included because they have already been
the continued operation of the two percent threshold for the allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus,
distribution of the additional seats as found in the second the remaining available seats for allocation as “additional
clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. seats” are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List
This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are
The Labo doctrine is not applied because of section 10 of the BODIES ATTACHED
Party-list law. The votes shall not be counted: express
provision of the law. 1. COA (Secs. 18 and 19)- act on presidential
appointments. A check on the appointing power of
Reaffirmed in Grego vs. COMELEC the president
Another reason for not applying Labo and Grego doctrine is Composition:
that the cases involve a single elective post while this involves
a number of congressional seats… 12 senators
Contempt is a process. Section 22: question hour which is imported concept from
parliamentary governments. Here members may validly
Congress is helpless to conduct attendance. Such is absurd. refuse to appear. After all, the question hour is not a regular
GR: Contempt, in general, is an inherent nature of the courts. feature of presidential form of government but a borrowed
concept from parliamentary form of government.
XPN: legislative contempt
Neri vs. Senate committee on public accountability: diluted
You may even be imprisoned. How long shall you remain in the doctrine under Senate vs. Ermita.
prison? You hold the key to your freedom according to
Arnault. You remain as long as you do not cooperate. Talo pa How does a bill become a law: Process in law-making
ang corned beef!
Section 24: Bills required to originate from the HoR (APREL):
You cannot be validly granted pardon by the president in 1. Appropriations
view of the separation of powers. This is one important 2. Private bills
limitation on the pardoning power of president. The 3. Revenue bill
pardoning power does not extend to legislative contempt.
Last phrase: but the senate may propose or concur or with
Senate vs. Ermita: PO: 464: prohibiting them from appearing the amendments.
during congressional inquiry without her consent
-legacy of Justice Conchita-Morrales Tolentino v. sec. of finance:
6 readings all in all- since we have a bicameral congress. This -they become conclusive upon the court.
is very costly. 3 readings on each house.
Last stage: President for his signature: Rule on the
XPN: When the president certifies the necessity of the presentment of bills to the President
enactment of the bill to meet an existing emergency:
a. Need not comply with the 3 readings on separate Options:
days rule a. Signs the bill and bill becomes a law
b. Need not to comply with.. b. President vetoes it and the bill does not become a
law. He must return to the house with his objections.
What constitutes a public calamity or emergency which will The congress may over-turn the veto by votes of 2/3
certify the necessity of the enactment is a political question c. Inaction on the part of the president: bill
which is not within judicial power. automatically becomes a law
Section 26: Bicameral house of congress: It is a mechanism Pocket veto- no such thing in the Philippines. Present in U.S.
for compromising differences between the senate and house because of express provision of their constitution.
of representatives. If what we have is a unilateral congress,
there is no need for a BCC. Veto of the president (Sec. 27, Art. 6)
By the nature of its functions, a BCC is capable of producing -there are 2 paragraphs:
unexpected results which might even go beyond its own
mandate. This is unavoidable. It will go through compromises a. General veto of the president
and reconciliations. Thus, US authorities considered it, in b. Item or line veto of the president
effect, as the “third house of congress.”
The president may not veto a specific provision in the bill
NOTE: From the BCC, the bill has to be sent back to both without vetoing the entire bill. No such thing as selective
houses of congress to be subjected to votation. No more 3 veto.
readings on separate days requirement. If the yes prevails
over the nays, the senate president or the speaker Bengzon v. Drilon: veto in its entirety or not at all. He cannot
…otherwise, the nays prevents over the yes, the bill is not act as an editor crossing out specific line or provision which
killed. If that happens, then it is about time that another BCC he dislikes. It is all or nothing. Take it or leave it basis.
convenes until such time that it crafts a version which is Package deal.
acceptable to both houses of congress.
nd
XPN: 2 paragraph: item veto (ART)
Enrolled bill doctrine- once a bill becomes enrolled bill it
becomes conclusive upon the courts of its due enactment. a. Appropriations bill
Thus, the court cannot inquire into whether that bill has been b. Revenue
duly and regularly enacted. c. Tariff bills but will not affect the provision which it
does not object
-conclusive of its due enactment because of the doctrine of -Expressly allowed by the law. But this is only limited to 3
separation of powers. The bill contains signature of speaker kinds of bills.
and senate president as well as certification of the respective
secretaries of the houses as to its due enactment. Courts Gonzales vs. Macaraeg
must give respect to the signature of speaker and senate
president as well as certification of the respective secretaries Court invoked the doctrine of inappropriate provision (Sec.
of the houses. 25 of Art. 6): no provision….
Between the enrolled bill and journal, the enrolled bill -must relate to some particular appropriation therein.
prevails because of the enrolled bill doctrine. Otherwise, then it becomes an inappropriate provision. It
may now be treated as an item subject to item veto. Veto will
XPN: Arroyo vs. Devenecia: Matters which the constitution not affect the item/s he does not object.
has required to be entered in the journal:
1989: general appropriations bill. But there is a violation
a. Yes and nays of third and bilateral reading of the ill which Cory found to be objectionable: provision prohibiting
b. X her from augmenting savings from other department items
c. President’s objection over the bill which it vetoed. which are trimmed down by the congress…. There is selective
LOC GOV’T: Local chief executives (Punong Barangay) have VP shall assume office not merely as acting President.
NO veto power. But the governor and the mayor has veto
power. ERAP: The president can only be removed via impeachment.
He was impeached but not removed via impeachment.
Punong Barangay has no vice. He presides during the session Similar to Clinton, he was impeached but he was not removed
of the s. baranggay. He cannot veto his own act. He is part of via impeachment
the law-making process there.
SC: Erap did resign (Erap v. Desierto). Constructive resignation
Punong barangay should not be belittled. He is the most doctrine.
powerful person in our system of our government. He has
executive power as well as legislative and judicial power Elements:
(lupon), military power (tanod). He is also a person in 1. Intent to resign
authority. More powerful than a policeman. All the powers of 2. Act of relinquishment
the government are concentrated on this person. He is a
virtual dictator in the baranagay. Predicates: not governed by any provision as to form. As long
as clear, can be given legal effect:
Sangguniang bgy. members are persons in authority. Section
388 of the LGC: The title is “persons in authority.” Same as Determined from the acts: totality of prior contemporaneous
the members of the lupon tagapamayapa, for purposes of the posterior facts and circumstances
RPC, in their respective jurisdiction.
Totality of circumstances test:
Grounds for vetoing an ordinance (Section 55-A)
1. Expose of Singson
1. Ultra vires 2. Walk-out
2. Prejudicial to public welfare 3. Edsa Dos
4. Mass resignation
Local chief executive veto (Governor and Mayor) also has 5. Withdrawal of support by AFP and PNP
item veto (Section 55-B): 6. Angara entry on his diary *“pagod na pagod na ko…
gusto ko na lang linisin ang pangalan ko”+
a. Appropriations ordinance
b. X Section 16-23
c. X
16-appointing power
These are actually parallel functions.
17-control power: exercised over all executive departments
Article 7 and bureaus (power of control). In the LGU, he exercises
general supervision only: POLICY ON LOCAL AUTONOMY
-Executive power shall be vested to the President.
18-
19-
a. Pardoning power
b. Reprieves
c. Commutation
d. Remit fines and forfeitures
e. amnesty
22-budgetary power
Examples:
The Executive can use savings to augment budgets when authorized by law, typically stated in the General Appropriations Act, which must specify that the funds are actual savings within the same office and are used to augment items within that office's budget. There are restrictions against using these savings to fund projects not initially included in the appropriation act or transferring them outside the office that generated the savings .
Preventive suspension does not result in the loss of title to the office. The suspended individual is temporarily prohibited from exercising the functions of the office but retains the title and is reinstated once the suspension is lifted. This does not interrupt the term for purposes of the three-term limit. An effective term interruption would necessitate losing the title and right to office, completely breaking the term count .
The phrase "for their respective offices" restricts the authority to transfer funds to augment budgets strictly within the transferring entity's operations and not across different government branches or offices. This ensures that savings are channeled directly to address shortfalls within the same agency or department, maintaining accountability and fidelity to legislative appropriations .
For a valid transfer of appropriated funds under Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, these conditions must be met: there must be a law authorizing the transfer; the funds to be transferred must be savings generated from the appropriations of the transferring office; and the transfer's purpose must be to augment an item within the general appropriations law for the respective office .
Accountability in the Philippine budget process is ensured through distinct phases: Budget Preparation, Legislation, Execution, and Accountability. Overlapping these phases, the system enables checks and balances, with congressional oversight and hearings during the execution phase to ensure funds are used according to legislative intent and any deviations are scrutinized to maintain fiscal discipline .
Arguments for the 2% threshold include providing a concrete criterion for ensuring only significant parties receive seats, intended to maintain a manageable number of party-list representatives. Against it, it's argued to limit the representativeness of marginalized groups and is potentially unconstitutional. The court ruled the threshold unconstitutional for additional seats, allowing a broader range of parties to gain representation without the stringent 2% limit .
The inclusion of major political parties in party-list elections is permissible because neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 explicitly prohibits it. The framers intended for political parties to participate through their sectoral wings, allowing a broader representation within the legislature. This approach aligns with the legislative intent and the interpretation of a 'party' as either a political or sectoral entity .
The interpretations of privacy protections highlight that government actions to curb identity theft must balance the right against unreasonable searches and seizures with privacy of communication. Government measures must ensure they do not unnecessarily invade these privacy zones without justification. In practice, regulations aim to control the acquisition and misuse of personal data, respecting privacy rights, while tackling issues like identity theft .
The primary distinction is that "temporary inability" refers to situations where an elected official cannot exercise the functions of their office due to reasons such as preventive suspension or serious illness, but still retains the title and right to hold the office. This does not count as an interruption of a term under the three-term limit rule. In contrast, an "interruption of a term" occurs when the office holder loses the right to hold their office, effectively breaking the tenure, which can reset the term count under the limit rule .
The decision in the Lonzanida case underscored the framers' intent to prevent manipulation of the three-term limit rule by ensuring that voluntary renunciation of office does not negate the term's existence for calculating eligibility. The ruling reinforced that a renounced term counts towards the three-term limit, aligning with the aim to limit continuous service and encourage turnover while respecting democratic choices .