Evolutionarily Stable Strategies
Consider the game
Hawk Dove
Hawk -2,-2 2,0
Dove 0,2 1,1
Let σp be the strategy: play Hawk with probability p and Dove with prob-
ability (1 − p).
Recall that F (p, q) is the expected payoff to Player 1 when Player uses σp
and Player 2 uses σq .
Definition 0.1 We say that σp is an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS) if
either:
i) F (p, p) ≥ F (q, p) for all q 6= p, or
ii) F (p, p) = F (q, p) and F (p, q) > F (q, q) for all q 6= p.
In case i) we say p is a strong ESS and in case ii) it is a mild ESS.
Remarks:
• If p is an ESS, then F (p, p) ≥ F (q, p) for all q. Thus (σp , σp ) must be a
symmetric Nash equilibrium.
• Any strong ESS, must be a pure strategy equilibrium.
• A strict pure strategy symmetric equilibrium is a strong ESS. [Here strict
means that if Player 1 changes her move while Player 2 does not, Player
1’s payoff will go down.]
In the Hawk–Dove game there is a unique symmetric equilibrium where each
player uses the mixed strategy σ1/3 , i.e., play H with probability 1/3. We show
this is a mild ESS.
1 1 2 4
F ( , q) = [q(−2) + (1 − q)(2)] + [q(0) + (1 − q)(1)] = − q
3 3 3 3
F (q, q) = q[q(−2) + (1 − q)(2)] + (1 − q)[q(0) + (1 − q)(1)] = 1 − 4q − 3q 2
We need F (1/3, q) > F (q, q) for all q 6= p.
F (1/3, q) > F (q, q)
4
− 2q > 1 − 4q − 3q 2
3
1
3q 2 − 2q − > 0
3
9q 2 − 6q − 1 > 0
(3q − 1)2 > 0
Which is always true as long as q 6= 1/3.
Thus we have a mild ESS when p = 1/3. In other words, it is evolutionarily
stable to have a population of 1/3 Hawks and 2/3 Doves.
1
Consider next the game
Slow Fast
Slow 6,6 0,2
Fast 2,0 1,1
In this case both (Fast, Fast) and (Slow, Slow) are symmetric pure strategy
equilibria and both are strict equilibria thus both are strong ESS.
There is a third symmetric equilibria where both players are Slow with
probability p = 1/5. Since this is a mixed strategy equilibrium F (1/5, 1/5) =
F (q, 1/5) for all q, so it can not be a strong ESS. Is it a mild ESS?
1 1 4 7
F ( , q) = [q(6) + (1 − q)(0)] + [q(2) + (1 − q)(1)] = q + 1
5 5 5 5
F (q, q) = q[q(6) + (1 − q)(0)] + (1 − q)[q(2) + (1 − q)(1)] = 1 + q + 4q 2
We need F (1/5, q) > F (q, q) for all q 6= p, i.e., we need
7
q + 1 > 1 + q + 4q 2
5
for all q 6= 1/5, but it easy to see this is false if, say q = 1. Then the left hand
side is 12/5 and the right hand side is 6. Thus 1/5 is not anevolutionarily stable
solution.
Thus in an evolutionarily stable population either everone is Slow or everyone
is Fast.
Finally consider the game
A B
A 1,1 0,0
B 0,0 0,0
(A,A) is a symmetric strict Nash equilibrium and hence a strong ESS.
(B,B) is a Nash symmetric equilibrium, but F (B, A) = 0 while F (A, A) = 2
so F (B, A) 6> F (A, A), so B is not evolutionarily stable.
There are no mixed strategy equilibria in this game (if there is any posi-
tive probability your opponent plays A you should play A, in which case your
oppoent should play A). Thus (A,A) is the only ESS.
