Ganga Action Plan:
A Review of the Technological and
Institutional Failures
By
Ajith E (10335005)
Under the guidance of
Prof. N C Narayanan
Centre for Technology Alternatives for Rural Areas
(CTARA)
Indian Institute of Technology, Bombay
29 th November 2010
Quoting former PM Rajiv Gandhi on his
Inaugural speech of GAP at Varanasi
“The felling of trees has caused severe floods, and silt and mud
now flow into the Ganga making the river shallow so that
boats can not ply in it as they did before. Sewage and
pollution from cities, industries and factories and dead
animals are also being thrown into the Ganga. From now on,
we shall put a stop to this. We shall see that the waters of
the Ganga become clean once again.
The Ganga Action Plan is not just a government plan. It has not
been prepared for the PWD or government officials alone.
It is a plan for all the people of India; one in which they can
come forward and participate. It is upto us to clean the
whole of Ganga and refrain from polluting it.
This programme, starting at Varanasi here today will reach out
to every corner of our land and to all our rivers. In the years
to come, not only the Ganga, but all our rivers will be clean
and pure as they were thousands of years ago.”
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Index
Why do we need to think about Ganga
Ganga Action Plan
Tech failures
Institutional Failures
State wise review
SWOT
Conclusions
References
3
Why do we need to think about Ganga
Total length of 2,525 km
About half a million people; over 500 per sq km
Yamuna, Ramganga, Ghaghara, Gandak, Bhuri
Gandak, Kosi, Gomati, Chambal, Sind, Betwa, Kens, Tons and Sone
Farakka Barrage
Delhi, Kolkata, Kanpur, Lucknow, Patna, Agra, Meerut, Varanasi and
Allahabad are situated in this basin
Pollution
31% of the waste generated in the country is from the basin
1.3 billion liters per day of human waste, and 260 million liters
of industrial waste enters the river
Corpses and cremated ashes make the problem worse
Most of the urban centers along the river banks lack proper
sewage treatment facilities
4
Source: [Link]
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Ganga Action Plan
Launched in1985
Interception, diversion and treatment of 882 MLD out of 1340
MLD of wastewater in 25 class-I towns
The approved cost for GAP-I was Rs.462.04 crores
GAP-I was scheduled for completion by March 1990, but it was
extended up to 31 March 2000
GAP-II was initiated in 1993 stages between 1993 and 1996 on the
tributaries of river Ganga [Link], Damodar and Gomati
Technical Specifications of the goals of GAP
(Source: PAC Report 2004)
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Organizational Structure
(Source: CAG Report, 2000)
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Operational Profile
The GAP aimed to tackle 2794 MLD of sewage; 882
MLD under the GAP-I and 1912 MLD under the
GAP-II.
State – Centre sharing
Core and non-core schemes
◦ The core sector schemes were designed to tackle ‘point
pollution
◦ It consisted of interception & diversion schemes and
sewage treatment plants
◦ Non-core schemes comprised of low cost sanitation
schemes, river front development schemes, electric and
improved wood crematoria
◦ It tackled non-point, non-measurable pollution, such as
dumping of solid waste and open defecation, dumping of
unburnt / half-burnt dead bodies etc.
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Technological failures
Inappropriate technologies for STPs
◦ Decisions were taken based on the Dutch Technical
Mission
◦ NEERI recommended coupled aerobic and anaerobic
systems which was not taken into consideration
Inadequate treatment
◦ Low efficiency in removal of pathogens
◦ Toxic chemicals from the industries were nt removed
Energy intensive technologies
◦ Centralized systems
◦ Capital and energy intensive technologies like UASB
◦ Biogas could be generated from such sewage
treatment plants, such ideas are still on paper
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Institutional Failures
Core schemes
Delays in the civil works leading to cost escalation, idling of the
plants, mismatch with interception & divergence schemes, technical
flaws, diversion of resources
Non-Core schemes
Wide scale impairment of assets created at public expense because of
neglect lack of maintenance and mostly due to delays in their setting
up of infrastructure
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Institutional Failures
Operation and maintenance
◦ The state agencies almost neglected the developed
infrastructures
◦ In GAP I only about 45% of the polluting industrial
units had installed Effluent Treatment Plants. 18 % of
those did not function properly, and did not meet the
technical standards. The NRCD had no mechanism to
see that the installed plants functioned satisfactorily.
Financial management
◦ Many instances of financial mismanagement; such
as, funds diversion to unauthorized activities (Rs 36.07
crore), incorrect reporting (Rs 6.75 crore), and
parking of funds (Rs 1.17 crore), and unutilized funds
with the implementing agencies (Rs 72.62 crore), etc
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Institutional Failures
Monitoring mechanism
◦ The apex body headed by the Prime Minister to
monitor the plan, viz. the National River
Conservation Authority, met only twice, in 1994
and 1997.
◦ The States were asked to set up Citizen
Monitoring Committees which was supposed to
get public participation in the schemes. But most of
them ignored that plan.
Public participation
◦ No mechanism to tackle the pollution issues raised
by the pilgrims
◦ Lack of social mobilization 12
State wise review
Interception &
Diversion Schemes
Sewage Treatment Plants
100 35
90
30
80
70 25
60
20
50
40 15
30
20 10
10 5
0
0
UP WB Bihar Haryana Delhi
UP WB Bihar Haryana Delhi
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State wise review
Non core schemes Sewage Capacity (MLD)
80 1600
70 1400
60 1200
50 1000
40 800
30 600
20 400
10 200
0 0
Uttar West Bihar Haryana Delhi Uttar West Bihar Haryana Delhi
Pradesh Bengal Pradesh Bengal
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State wise review
The scheme was implemented in a sluggish manner
which caused the performance failure
UP and West Bengal
◦ Delays and mismanagements
◦ Financial overrun.
◦ Misuse of funds
Bihar
◦ Failed to achieve most of the set targets
◦ Many of them were achieved as late as 2000
◦ Parking of funds
Haryana
◦ STPs did not meet the required mandates
◦ State showed inflated expense reports.
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SWOT
Strengths
◦ It had a comprehensive vision.
◦ Complete support of the governing bodies.
◦ A strong institutional framework consisting of both state and central
controls.
Weakness
◦ Ambitions of the vision were not properly backed by technical and
institutional setups.
◦ Lack of appropriate monitoring action from the governing body.
◦ Lack of support from the people.
Opportunities
◦ Bring Ganga back to purity.
◦ A test model to handle various other water pollution problems of the
country.
◦ A working model for state-centre partnership in large projects
Threats
◦ Loss of huge investments.
◦ Chances for more corruption and imposition of vested interests.
◦ Skewed project activities hamper the life of local stakeholders. 16
Conclusions
The Ganga is still in poor shape.
The Scheme turned out to be a big failure.
The institutional bodies for implementation
of such projects needs to be more
accountable and responsible.
We need better laws and mechanisms for
pollution control.
Public mobilization is a key factor.
Future
◦ “Mission Clean Ganga”
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References
Alley, K., “Ganga and Gandagi: Interpretations of Pollution and Waste in
Benaras”, Ethnology ., pp 127-145. (1994).
Divan, S., “Cleaning the Ganga”, Economic and Political Weekly., pp 1557-1558.
(1995).
“Ganga Action Plan”, Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General of
India.,(2000)
Jaiswal, R., Ganga Action Plan-A critical analysis., (2007).
Lacy, S., “Modeling the Efficacy of the Ganga Action Plan’s Restoration of
the Ganga River, India”, Natural Resources and Environment, The
University of Michigan., (2006).
Menon, U., “Technology and Development Aid: The Case of Ganga Action
Plan”, Economic and Political Weekly., pp 1693-1701.(1988).
“Status Paper on River Ganga: State of Environment and Water
Quality”, National River Conservation Directorate, MoEF, (2009).
“Sixty Second Report Public Accounts Committee – Ganga Action
Plan”, MoEF. (2004).
Tare,V. and Bose, P., “Compendium of Sewage Treatment
Technologies”, National River Conservation Directorate., (2009).
Tripathi, P., “Captive Ganga”, Frontline , 3, pp 41-45. (2009).
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