FXStreet - Trade The News Series Inflation Theory
FXStreet - Trade The News Series Inflation Theory
News Series
An asset manager’s
guide to Inflation
Theory
Index
Introduction
Part 1
What is Inflation?
Demand-Pull Inflation
What are the main causes of Demand-Pull Inflation?
Cost-Push Inflation
What are the main causes of Cost-Push Inflation?
Asset Inflation
What are the main causes of Asset Inflation?
Implicit Inflation
What are the main causes of Implicit Inflation?
Interesting Reads
Want to trade inflation and business/economic cycles like a fund manager? To accomplish
that, you should start with a solid understanding of inflation
dynamics. The more knowledge you have, the more confident you will feel trading the
inflation data. Making your own predictions, you don’t need to accept the
market estimates as written in stone anymore.
Awareness of the impact that inflation has on financial markets, the economy, and mo-
netary policy is growing. Indeed, it will be interesting to keep an eye on inflation expecta-
tions over the coming years, not only because inflation has the potential to greatly affect
our investment outcomes, but also because as we mentioned they are an important input
for central banks decision making processes. At the same time, they are a good measure
of the confidence of the markets in the policy makers’ ability to do their job.
In these pages, we describe a framework for analyzing inflation in its multifaceted form.
Our framework includes official economic indicators as well as market-based studies to
better understand not only which factors are potential drivers of inflationary forces, but
also over which sectors of the economy (financial assets, interest rates, currency, etc.) can
these factors exert an impact.
The content is organized as follows: Part 1 distinguishes between four different types of
inflation and describes their main causes while Part 2 looks at 18 survey- and market-ba-
sed measures of inflation. Although the study is mainly focused on the U.S. economy, at
the end you should be well geared to keep an eye on inflation levels across the globe, and
include this knowledge in your trading and investment decisions.
What is Inflation?
Inflation is a sustained rise in the general price level. Although it’s common knowledge
that prices go up over time, the general public doesn’t quite understand the forces behind
inflation. Inflation can manifest in many different ways and finds its roots in different
aspects of the economy. Moreover, different people have different understandings of what
inflation is, and accordingly, there are many ways to measure and estimate inflation.
What causes inflation? How does inflation manifest? What does inflation mean for a na-
tion’s currency? How does it affect my standard of living? In the end, is it bad or good for
the economy?
Let’s start answering these questions by taking a closer look to the different types of in-
flation and their main causes.
Demand-Pull Inflation
Inflation can start rising as a result of unchecked growth in an economy. This happens
when aggregate demand is growing at an unsustainable rate leading to increased pres-
sure on scarce resources. Extra money is then necessary because consumers are taking
money out of their bank accounts and purchasing products. It can be expected that wor-
kers’ wages will increase as well as businesses are bringing in larger revenues and profits.
As wages increase, consumers go out and buy even more goods making producers raise
their prices again aiming for bigger profit margins.
Direct or indirect taxes: if taxes are reduced, consumers have more disposable
income which causes a rising demand. Tax breaks for mortgage interest rates, for
example, increase demand for housing.
Brands: marketing campaigns can create high demand for certain products, like Apple
products, which are higher priced than comparable products.
Technological innovation: a company developing a new technology will have the entire
market to grow until other companies cope with the innovations.
For example, Tesla’s electric sports car was a recent technological breakthrough.
Cost-Push Inflation
Another commonplace view of inflation, cost-push inflation, happens when firms respond
to rising costs by increasing prices in order to protect their profit
margins. Increased costs can include things such as wages, taxes, or increased costs of
imports.
The 1960s was a time when the American standard of living rose to record levels. It was
also a period during which a legitimate scarcity in skilled labor in the U.S. resulted in es-
calating wages. The rise in the cost of labor resulted in a self-perpetuating escalation in a
cost-push style of inflation with wages being the source.
Labor costs: wage costs, for instance, likely rise when unemployment is low
because skilled workers become scarce and this can drive pay levels higher. This is a rea-
son why the Average Hourly Earnings is such a closely monitored piece of data within the
Employment Situation Report in the U.S.
Indirect taxes: a rise in Value Added Tax, for example, may lead suppliers to choose to
pass on the burden of the tax onto consumers.
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Monopolies: when dominant firms use their market power to increase prices well above
costs, independently of the level of demand.
Changes in the exchange rate: a fall in the exchange rate can increase the prices of impor-
ted products such as essential raw materials, components and finished products, making
the domestically manufactured products more expensive.
Cost-Push Inflation
Asset Inflation
Both prior definitions assume that the cause of inflation is deeply rooted somewhere within
the market structure – from both the demand- and the supply-side of an economy – rather
than in the perceived value of money itself. The fact is that money has several functions: it
can serve as a medium of exchange, as a unit of account, but it can also serve as a store of
value. And within this overlooked aspect of money lies the basis for a flip-side definition of
inflation: what happens when the value of money declines in relation to the value of goods
and services? Notice the word “value” as a precedent to “price”. The appearance is that
assets rise in price whereby the fundamental drive is a lack of trust in the money as a store
of value.
Rising asset prices are potentially misleading signs of a growing economy. Hard assets
can become more valuable, with no changes to the productivity levels, i.e. no real econo-
mic goods are directly produced. This creates the illusion of growth through asset bub-
bles.
Political and economical risk: the lack of trust in government or in the banking system can
also force capital to run into tangible assets, reducing the velocity of money, collapsing the
liquidity in the system, and setting the stage for an economic implosion.
Changes in the exchange rate: since everything has a relative international value, when a
currency declines, assets will generally rise in proportion to the decline. On the day Brexit
was voted, the Pound collapsed but the UK stock market rose. It did not collapse as it would
be the case if money had moved out of the stocks into other asset classes. The nominal
price of the FTSE went up in absolute terms, but there were no actual performance gains in
relative terms. Although a strong move in the exchange rate is immediately seen in financial
assets like stocks or bonds, the repricing of products and services throughout the economy
is reflected on most sectors.
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Implicit Inflation
Broader definitions of inflation are not only necessary to better understand our economies,
but also to get a sense of what the future will bring from a market and investment perspec-
tive. If we get back to the idea that a loss of the “quality” of money (as a store of value) can
manifest through inflation, we can also think of other causes of inflation which could have
the same end result, that is, a collapse in purchasing power and a lower standard of living.
By doing that, we do not necessarily search for explicit phenomena such as the rise in asset
prices or in goods and services, but rather those implicit causes which could have similar
effects as the other forms of inflation already described. Which causes can we think of
that sooner or later could manifest through apparent economic deterioration for everyone?
Notice that implicit causes could come unnoticed for most economic indicators tracking
inflation.
Wealth destruction: financial crashes, bail-ins and bail-outs, arbitrary expropriations, manda-
tory debt restructuring, controls on capital movement, monetary reforms, cash elimination…
All these factors, some recently experienced in different parts of the world, have the potential
to change the way people perceive value, and therefore how they decide what can serve as
an hedge to preserve their wealth, and how to compensate for the perceived losses in many
areas of their life.
Inflation has a substantial effect on various economical factors, going from the cost of
money (interest rates), impacting on labor and growth prospects, to the behavior of all
financial assets, including currencies.
In this section you will get to know 18 inflation-oriented measures which are an integral
part of fundamental and technical analysis. The aim of this suite of indicators is to offer
you the tools necessary to expand your view on inflation and inflation expectations. Having
all these indicators at one place gives you a broad view of how strong or weak inflationary
forces come into play at any given moment.
Survey-based Measures
Measuring inflation is a difficult task for everyone, including government officials. To do this,
statisticians conduct large surveys by contacting thousands of retail stores, service establi-
shments, rental units and professional offices to acquire price information on a variety of
items. These items are put together into what is commonly referred to as a “market basket”,
and represent a scientifically selected sample of the prices paid by consumers for pur-
chased goods and services. The results are computed into indices which in the end are used
to track and measure inflationary pressures surrounding the economy.
Calculating CPI involves considering the weighted average pricing of goods and services as
experienced by consumers in their day-to-day living expenses, analyzing more than 200
categories, which are organized in eight groups: housing (41%), transportation (17%), food
and beverages (15%), medical care (7%), education and communication (7%), recreation (6%),
apparel (4%), and “other goods and services” (3%). As you can see, the biggest single com-
ponent in the CPI is housing with a 41% weight.
To reduce some of the statistical noise in the inflation data and to give a more accurate
measure of inflation, the government publishes the Core CPI, which is the CPI without the
volatile components of food, which can suffer from seasonal price variations, and energy,
Calculating CPI involves considering the weighted average pricing of goods and services as
experienced by consumers in their day-to-day living expenses, analyzing more than 200
categories, which are organized in eight groups: housing (41%), transportation (17%), food
and beverages (15%), medical care (7%), education and communication (7%), recreation (6%),
apparel (4%), and “other goods and services” (3%). As you can see, the biggest single com-
ponent in the CPI is housing with a 41% weight.
To reduce some of the statistical noise in the inflation data and to give a more accurate
measure of inflation, the government publishes the Core CPI, which is the CPI without the
volatile components of food, which can suffer from seasonal price variations, and energy,
which can fluctuate wildly as a result of geopolitical shocks.
The Core CPI is typically more important to traders and the Federal Reserve as a measure
of actual inflation since it tends to provide a more representative view of the inflationary
forces in presence in the domestic economy.
Comparing the CPI with the Core CPI can give you a good idea of how much consumers, who
account for two-thirds of the economic activity, are spending on commodities such as ener-
gy and on agricultural products.
Once you understand there are different types of inflation, it is fairly easy to see that the
CPI can perpetuate a kind of cost-push inflation, in which the cause of rising prices is pre-
cisely rising prices. This is not the only criticism the CPI is fraught with. Many analysts claim
that the basket of goods is too static, that it changes infrequently, and it may not always
reflect items that provide an accurate accounting of the consumer experience. For instance,
The PPI is somewhat similar to the CPI with the exception that it looks at the rate of chan-
ge in prices from the perspective of the producer rather than the consumer. Every month,
around the week that includes the 13th, the Labor Department receives answers to ques-
tionnaires requesting prices on about 100,000 different items. It then gauges the average
changes in those prices received by domestic producers for their output at all stages of
processing. Certain categories are intentionally left out of the PPI basket such as imported
goods and most services. Excise taxes are also excluded.
In total there are three measures of PPI which are based on the different stages of proces-
sing: the PPI Crude Goods, the PPI Intermediate Goods, and the PPI Finished Goods. One
way to forecast the future movement of the PPI Finished Goods consists of monitoring the
Intermediate index, and in turn, the direction of this index can be determined by analyzing
the PPI Crude Goods.
In the end, the PPI Finished Goods provides a sense of the expected CPI movement, ser-
ving as a leading indicator because when companies experience higher input costs, those
costs are ultimately passed on to the subsequent buyers in the distribution network.
Although firms throughout the supply chain will typically hedge their input costs, higher
prices will eventually be realized once the hedging contracts expire.
Tracking PPI also allows one to determine the cause of the changes in CPI. If, for example,
CPI increases at a much faster rate than PPI, such a situation could indicate that factors
other than inflation may be causing retailers to increase their prices. However, if CPI and PPI
increase in tandem, retailers may be simply attempting to maintain their operating margins.
Discrepancies between the PPI and CPI can be based on factors such as sales taxes and
markups as products move through the various stages of the supply chain.
But don’t look at the PPI as a short-term leading indicator. A correlation does exist, but only
over larger time horizons. The reason is the volatile behavior in food and energy prices. For-
tunately, the U.S. government also publishes the so-called “Core Rate” where energy and
The monthly data is subject to revisions that are published four months later, which can
also lead to a significant market impact. In addition, deviations of the most recent PPI
number from expectations can be seen in FXStreet’s Market Impact Tool (to be found in all
economic data of our Economic Calendar):
The PCE consists of the actual and imputed expenditures of households, and includes data
pertaining to durable goods, non-durable goods and services. Thereby, it measures the
changes in prices of consumer goods and services which are affected by inflation, and its
swings can lead to major shifts in the business cycle (see “The Business Cycle”).
According to many analysts, the PCE is the preferred consumer inflation gauge for the
Federal Reserve because it switches the specific goods and services that make up its sam-
pling more often than the CPI in order to account for shifts in shopping habits.
What policy makers study most carefully though is the percentage changes in the core PCE
(that is, excluding food and energy). The reason for excluding these essential and routine
expenses for households has been explained in the previous indicators.
The PCE is presented in both current dollars (which are not adjusted for inflation) and
constant or real dollars (which removes the effects of inflation). Similarly, the GDP is also
initially calculated based on the current dollar (nominal) value of all goods and services.
However, this measure does not help to discern whether an increase in GDP came from
greater output of goods and services or simply because of higher prices.
The BEA publishes several so-called “chain-type” inflation measures that help convert cu-
rrent GDP to real GDP. This way, with complex methodologies, the statisticians aim to remove
price inflation.
On the FXStreet Economic Calendar you can find the PCE presented in percentage change in
chain-type price indices in monthly (MoM), in quarterly (QoQ), and yearly (YoY) totals. These
longer periods are calculated to avoid the short-term volatility in the monthly numbers.
So, while the quarterly GDP report lags behind many other monthly indicators, the inflation
statistics contained in the GDP -like the PCE- can make it a market mover, specially if the
numbers deviate from the Fed’s comfort zone which is a rise between 1,75% and 2,0% per
year. A Core PCE number below that range gives the doves within the FOMC members the
upper hand. Conversely, any release above the 2% target would improve rate hike expecta-
tions significantly.
The below picture shows the PCE’s market impact on the EUR/USD pair in terms of number
of pips that moved 15 minute and 4 hours after the data is published.
Notice how the short-term impact has been increasing in recent releases.
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Another good measure of true consumer purchasing power is the Real Disposable Per-
sonal Income expressed as chained-dollars. The reason why this is important is the the
following: if general price levels rise, and therefore inflation rises, but disposable personal
income also rises, people gain nothing from the rise in income since prices jumped by an
identical rate. However, if income climbs more than inflation, real purchasing power grows.
Data on Real Disposable Personal Income cannot be found in FXStreet’s Calendar, but a link
to the BEA’s website is provided. Once on the home page, click on “Personal Income and
Outlays”, and finally on “News Release: Personal Income and Outlays” to access the report.
Finally, search for “Disposable Personal Income” to get the latest releases of the numbers.
Several analysts have pointed to possible caveats with this indicator. One of them is the fact
that when firms want to reduce wage costs, they can allow inflation to erode an unchanged
or slowly increasing nominal wage, instead of cutting wages in nominal terms. Some eco-
nomists argue that in the recent low-inflation environment, this erosion has been so slow
that real wage cuts effectively restrain wage growth, despite a recovering labor market. This
might conceivably also affect wages’ forecasting power for price inflation.
With wages accounting for a significant share of costs in most industries, it makes intuiti-
ve sense that rising labor costs would soon develop into higher inflation. But according to
some analysts, however, wage growth tells us little about future inflation. If anything, they
say, the relationship runs the other way, with inflation leading wage growth.
Another caveat is the changing structure of the U.S. economy, with technology making it ea-
sier than ever for consumers to compare prices. This intensifies price competition and limits
the influence of wage growth on inflation. At the same time, globalization has diminished
the role of the domestic labor market with a larger share of consumption goods imported
from abroad. And finally, the inability of many firms to adjust prices frequently generates
the need to set prices in anticipation of future costs, making inflation expectations a more
significant inflation driver than wages (more on inflation expectations when we come to
market-based indicators).
The data can be seen on FXStreet’s Economic Calendar. Past months’ data, consensus and
actual releases, are shown as a separate report from the NFP.
Rising labor costs can ignite inflation and unleash a vicious cycle that is hard to stop.
There can be several reasons for employees to demand increases in wages and salaries, for
instance, scarcity in skilled labor, or to keep up with expected inflation. Should employers
comply and pay workers more money, this can lead to a jump in retail prices, which in turn
can be a reason for workers to demand another increase in wages. Economists call this a
“wage-price spiral”, one of the causes of cost-push inflation. This is one of the reasons to
watch the Employment Situation Report for any hints of pushing-lower unemployment.
Its source is the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics who conducts surveys of both private and
public sectors, then organizes the data in a fixed basket of job types, and finally converts it
into an index expressed in percentage change.
To even better gauge inflation pressures, compare the annual percentage change in com-
pensation costs for private industry with the annual change in non-farm productivity (this is
published as a standalone input in the FXStreet’s Calendar). If costs rise no faster than the
pace of annual productivity, there is no sign of price inflation. But costs rising faster than
productivity growth can fire up price pressures and eventually force the Fed to raise rates.
Once on the FXStreet’s Calendar, expand the event row, and then click on “Read the official
report” to get the suggested numbers.
As in the case of other inflation indicators, the reason for establishing this index in the first
place was to convert the monthly U.S. trade figures from current dollars into real dollars.
Only by converting the trade figures into real dollars...”, you’ll know if an increase in im-
ports was the result of more products being purchased or because foreign exporters raised
prices. The same applies for exports which can increase because of domestic firms actually
selling more products, but the rise can also result from companies hiking prices.
It’s also well established that changes in import and export levels tend to be inversely
related to currency value. You don’t need to be an experienced currency trader to unders-
tand the logic: domestic goods and services are less expensive in foreign markets when the
home currency’s value falls. But this is a two-way street: a weaker currency also translates
into higher prices for imports. With imports now pricier, domestic companies will be em-
boldened to lift their own prices as well because they have less to worry about in terms of
foreign competition.
To summarize: a strong currency is deflationary for the domestic economy, while a weak
currency is inflationary, a reason why this piece of information should be always analyzed
together with currency charts. The impact of the dollar can be best seen in the report’s sec-
tion for “non-petroleum imports”. Under the section for “petroleum imports”, on the other
hand, patterns can emerge in tandem with the developments in the price of oil. That’s also
a key issue for the U.S., which is dependent on crude oil imports in rather large quantities.
But when both the cost of petroleum and non-petroleum goods fall, then we can interpret
that given inflation could remain tame for a while. In such case, PPI expectations would
also decrease, as import prices and oil serve as leading indicators.
If import prices are rising, analysts expect higher reading in the CPI release, whereas a sus-
tained fall in import prices is a forerunner for disinflationary forces (or outright deflation in
case the CPI is already depressed). This makes import prices a leading indicator for the CPI.
Some analysts though, say the U.S. does not import enough for a weak dollar to push goods
inflation upward, only about 15.5% of GDP.
An increase in productivity increases the supply of goods and services, then companies
generate greater revenues and these lead to greater pay for workers, higher dividends for
shareholders, all in all diminishing the inflationary pressures. On the other hand, poor
productivity is a recipe for economic stagnation and invites inflation, unemployment, and
little or no gains in real income.
The ULC indicator contains three major components: “output” (labor productivity), “hourly
compensation” and “unit labor costs”. It is published quarterly by the U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics, about five weeks following the end of the quarter.
Revisions can be substantial and frequent because many of the statistical sources that
underlie this report come from other indicators. Data on hours worked comes from the
monthly payroll employment report, for instance, and for output the BLS uses the total GDP.
Because of the data being already published in these other reports, traders will rarely get
excited at the ULC release. But to keep inflation in check, which is the aim of this study, you
should know how to read it.
Unit Labor Costs is the indicator published on the FXStreet’s calendar. In order to analyze
the data, click on the indicator row to expand it, and click on “Read the official report”. This
will take you to the source where you have access to the above table.
There is the same problem with trying to understand an economy’s performance: price
inflation skews results. For example, if over the past year your wages increased by 5%, but
now as a result of price inflation it costs 15% percent more to buy goods, you’ve actually lost
buying power. Your own personal economy isn’t 5% greater: in real terms you lost about 10%
of purchasing power.
Looking at the source document for the GDP report, under “Updates to GDP”, we see a small
table with several rows of data. Of our interest, in terms of inflation concerns, are the upper
two rows. The first shows the “Real GDP” which, expressed in percentage terms, reflects the
change of the constant-dollar output, which means how much the economy really produced
in volume or quantity. The second row shows the current-dollar GDP which is the nominal
GDP or the value of aggregate output including price increases. In economies where in-
flation is positive and not negative, real GDP should be lower than nominal GDP. The real
dollar percentage change is the one you can get on FXStreet’s calendar and is the one more
closely followed to get an accurate picture of the economy’s health.
But to get a specific measure for price inflation, economists have developed the concept
of the GDP Deflator (also called “Implicit Price Deflator”). This is a way to measure the
relationship between nominal and real GDP, and is simply nominal GDP divided by real GDP
and then multiplied by 100. It is important because an economy’s nominal GDP differs from
The advantage this econometric has over the CPI, for instance, is that the fixed basket used
in CPI calculations is static and sometimes misses changes in prices outside of that basket
of goods, while GDP as such isn’t based on a fixed basket of goods and services. Conse-
quently, the GDP Deflator has an advantage over the CPI in that changes in consumption
patterns or the introduction of new goods and services are automatically reflected in the
Deflator. Therefore, it can be used as a measure for price inflation. A rising GDP Deflator
means inflation is mounting, whereas a GDP Deflator in its lower levels reflects the increa-
sing deflation pressures that the economy is facing.
To some people it may sound enigmatic that we experienced close to zero inflation during
a period of almost a decade in many areas of the developed world, whereas markets have
behaved in many sectors like in an inflationary environment. Well, this is enigmatic insofar
inflation is not considered in its multi-dimensions. Survey-based indicators, like the ones
discussed in Part 1, do not accurately capture certain forms of inflation. Therefore, other
measures are needed to make inflation visible when it is not detected by official economic
indicators of inflation.
When trying to interpret financial market developments, and especially when trying to give
an economic meaning to those developments, we usually only have proxies for what we
really want to know. In this regard, there is no such thing as “the” real inflation rate. Rather,
there are observed patterns on specific market prices, which can be used to detect infla-
tionary forces derived from all sorts of causes.
In this section we will use asset prices as the building blocks to detect not only inflation,
but also future expectations of inflation. Most of the time, acting in anticipation is what
leads investors and policymakers in their decision making. In this sense, the selection of
market-based measures contained in Part 2 is build on the premise that financial mar-
kets act as leading indicators for economic trends. Furthermore, many of these measures
elevate the usefulness of technical analysis to the realm of economic forecasting. Markets
anticipate future economic conditions in a way that even if there is no official inflation, they
will anticipate inflationary conditions and reflect it on the charts.
Oil Prices
Are commodities, in general, reliable as a barometer of inflationary expectations? A number
of studies conclude that commodity prices can be used as a leading indicator of inflation
although some of the characteristics of an “optimal” leading indicator are not met.
Above all it’s the flexible nature of commodity prices that make them ideal candidates to
be labeled as inflation-leading indicators. Commodity prices are set in competitive auction
markets and are faster than overall prices in reacting to economy-wide demand shocks. As
an example, a change in monetary policy or a change in the supply of important commodi-
ties would tend to raise commodity prices before other prices begin to rise.
But financial markets also move on expectations, that is before facts become reality. In this
context, the relationship between the price of oil and inflation is often perceived when the
oil price is expected to rise. This is called “backwardation”, when futures prices are higher
than spot prices. Backwardation can suggest a pent-up demand for oil, which may put
upward pressure on CPI readings, lifting inflation expectations down the line.
In practice though, the opposite may also happen if people continue to use the same
amount of oil as before, they will simply allocate more money to oil and less money for
There are other scenarios which can be misleading: oil prices can also rise to compensate
a falling U.S. dollar. A weak dollar, in the eyes of oil producers, carries the consequence of
falling purchasing power as the weak currency erodes the value of their dollar-denominated
oil receipts. This rise in the commodity, in turn, is expected to result in inflationary pressures.
Analogous to the cause-effect relationship between oil and inflation, a rising gold price
increases inflationary expectations, and a falling gold price may imply deflation and reces-
sion. But gold is not really an inflation hedge per se. If it was true, the price of gold would
have not felt from $850 in 1980 to $250 in 2000 with inflation every step of the way. Rather,
gold seems to perform well in specific instances, the primary ones being a loss of faith in
central banks and their monetary policies, or when political and economic instability is
sensed.
Although many real case studies reject the hypothesis that there is a reliable long-run
relationship between the level of gold prices and the level of inflation, there is a way to
measure changes in the price of gold that anticipate other inflationary signs. This con-
sists of denominating gold prices in a broad index of major-country currencies. Generally,
when commodity prices are rising, the U.S. dollar is falling, a reason why foreign currencies
usually rise along with commodity markets. But when a commodity rises in all currencies,
it means that a real inflow of capital is pushing that commodity higher. As a result, higher
asset-inflation can be expected.
The below chart shows how the recent high in the gold price in USD (grey mountain) is not
confirmed by all currencies. Despite warning of a possible false breakout in the price of
gold, the chart does not contain an inflationary narrative.
Gold/Oil Ratio
On the theory that rising oil prices push up inflation, increasing demand for gold as an
hedge, conventional wisdom tells us that inflation can be eliminated from the chart if we
express the two prices as a ratio. Because both commodities react to different situations,
it’s the lack of a tight correlation between these commodities that makes the gold/oil ratio
meaningful. Expressed mathematically as the per-ounce price of gold divided by the cost of
a barrel of crude oil, the ratio tells you how many ounces of gold it takes to buy a barrel of
oil. Essentially, what this means is that if the ratio rises, oil is down (or at least underperfor-
ming), and gold is rising (or at least outperforming).
The long-term average multiple over the past 40 years sits above 15:1, and above 20:1 if we
account the first half of the 20th century based on annual closings (on monthly closings,
as in the picture below, the peaks are higher). Should the price of gold rise because of an
asset-inflation scenario - due to a collapse in confidence in the monetary system, for ins-
tance-, then this ratio could hit historical highs above the Great Depression levels (above
30:1 on annual closings).
While the gold/oil ratio may be a somehow arbitrary indicator, when it rises to extreme
levels it’s a clear signal that investors are nervous, preferring safety to growth, that is, the
safety hedge gold is believed to offer over the confidence in economic growth expressed via
oil prices.
Gold prices rise most steeply when investors hoard the metal in anticipation of some sys-
temic troubles or when reacting to any other cause of implicit - or asset-inflation. Oil prices,
Commodity/Bond Ratio
Continuing with the idea that commodities have special characteristics that make them
ideal candidates to receive at least a small allocation in every investor’s portfolio as an
inflation protection, another commonly used study is the ratio between commodities and
bonds.
The rationale for using this ratio is rather simple: when commodity prices are rising faster
than bond prices, we see this as an indication of inflation. Conversely, when commodities
are declining in relationship to bond prices, it is viewed as a deflationary sign.
A rising commodity/bond ratio means commodity prices are outperforming bond prices,
which can derive from either higher commodity prices (hence inflationary) and/or lower
bond prices (which means higher yields, hence inflationary as well). In either case, the
interpretation is of upward inflationary forces if the ratio rises, and deflationary forces if
it falls.
When constructing this ratio with a single commodity though, if that commodity’s price
starts to rise faster than bond prices, it can be partially a result of a falling dollar. Fortuna-
tely, there are several commodity indices which can be used as a numerator for this ratio in
order to offset the currency effect: the S&P GSCI is widely recognized as a leading measure
of general price movements and inflation in the world economy; the JOC-ECRI Industrial
Price Index developed by the Economic Cycle Research Institute is considered a leading
indicator of inflation based on a broad assortment of raw materials used in industrial
production; the Thomson Reuters/Core Commodity CRB Index, made up of 19 commodities,
also provides accurate representation of broad commodity price trends; or the S&P World
Commodity Index which is based on investable commodity index futures contracts traded
on exchanges outside the U.S. It is broad-based, world-production-weighted, and designed
to measure international commodity market performance over time. Although a ratio can’t
be calculated on our charts, you can follow the S&P WCI here at FXStreet’s Rates & Charts
section.
As a Forex trader, you are probably familiarized with bilateral nominal exchange rates which
is basically the price of one currency expressed in terms of another currency. For example,
EUR/USD at 1.30 means one Euro is worth 1.30 U.S. Dollars. But there are other ways to re-
flect a currency rate.
One of them is an aggregate measure, called the nominal effective exchange rate (NEER),
which provides a clearer picture of currency value developments. The NEER is a way of eva-
luating the strength of a country’s currency which consists of weighting its value according
to the relative amount of trade carried out with each of its trading partners. If the majority
of a country’s trade is with Japan, for instance, then the movement of its currency against
the yen will be given greater weight in the overall measurement of that exchange rate’s
value. Being a nominal variable, the NEER only describes relative value: the price of the
national currency in terms of trading-partner currencies. But at the same time, NEERs are
relatively straight-forward to calculate and widely available for almost any country. As with
all exchange rates, the NEER can help identify which currencies are becoming attractive as a
store of value and thus attracting lots of flows.
There are two well-known trade-weighted currency indices. The first is the U.S. Dollar Index
(USDX), calculated using six major world currencies where the euro has more than 50% of
the weight, reason why a USDX chart is almost the mirror image of a EUR/USD chart. The
second is the Trade Weighted U.S. Dollar Index, sometimes called the Broad Index. The
Federal Reserve realized the bias of the USDX and created a trade weighted index that accu-
rately reflects the Dollar’s strength against the currencies from 26 selected countries which
the U.S. trades more frequently with. Unlike the USDX, this one is updated annually to reflect
current trading exposures.
For our purposes of detecting inflationary signals, neither the nominal nor the nominal
effective rates indicate the relative (real) price of goods. For instance, how do we answer the
question: is the value of one UK-produced car the same as an identical U.S.-produced car
of the same brand and model? In order to answer this question, we need to measure the
currency’s strength in real terms. To do that, we need to take into account price and wage
developments and construct what is known as the real effective exchange rate (REER).
Suppose the UK-produced car from our example costs £50,000 in the UK and $50,000 in
the U.S. The REER is thereby 1:1. If the nominal exchange rate was also £1 = $1, then we have
perfect purchasing power parity (PPP) and none of these two countries is showing stron-
ger inflation. Now suppose that the cost of the British car increases to £75,000 in the UK,
and in the U.S. it still costs $50,000. This means that the car in terms of Pound is 50% more
expensive than the one in U.S. dollar. The real exchange rate, the REER, is £1.5 = $1. But if the
nominal exchange rate is still £1 = $1, what will arbitrageurs do? They could buy the car for
$50,000 in the U.S. and sell in the UK for £75,000. They would make a profit of £25,000, which
they could convert into $25,000 at a rate of GBP/USD= 1,000 (other things being equal).
Normally, we would expect the nominal exchange rate to adjust to reflect the real chan-
ges, and if there is inflation in the UK, we would expect the Sterling to fall in relation to the
dollar. Indeed, in theory, the nominal exchange rate should reflect the real exchange rate.
But sometimes we can see divergences between the two, which induce global investors to
speculate on a devaluation.
Forex markets are very liquid and efficient so the nominal exchange rates are thought to be
always in equilibrium with the REER. Internally, the equilibrium can be kept if there is no
output gap and no inflationary pressures, and externally, if the current account is financed
with a sustainable level of capital flows. Failure to understand capital flows can make many
inflation indicators mislead you. So let’s learn something about capital flows.
You can find NEERs and REERs on sites like the Bank of International Settlements and The
World Bank.
As we also explained in Part 1, hard assets can rise a lot in price, with no accompanying
changes in the productivity levels, creating thereby the illusion of economic growth. The
same asset bubbles can also create the illusion that a certain asset is a very good invest-
ment because of its persistent advance in price. Remember that hard assets are non-debt
related, fixed assets in general. This includes some commodities, equities, and real estate,
but it can expand to collectibles, antiques, wines, art, etc.
Unfortunately, most people -and not few financial market pundits- do not understand the
fact that a currency (money) is most of the time playing the opposite role of hard assets
in terms of store of value. Usually, when hard assets rise, this means that the currency in
which these assets are priced, declines in purchasing power. Now, how do we find out that
a rising trend is reflecting real-asset inflation? How can we detect that a certain asset is
attracting money from all corners of the world?
To qualify as a bull market, whatever asset you are looking at must rise in terms of all cu-
rrencies.
Most of the time, bull markets never unfold simultaneously. Let’s assume that gold has dou-
bled in U.S. dollar terms, but the U.S. dollar depreciated 50% against the Australian dollar.
Down under, the gold price is unchanged, there is no ascending trend. Or imagine new highs
in the FTSE making headlines, when it is only because the Sterling is declining. Only looking
at FTSE in international terms (in USD, JPY, EUR) exposes the real trend, and in that case it
might expose a sideways meandering price as well.
This means that a sharp correction on a stock index can be mitigated by the rise in the do-
mestic currency because in the eyes of foreign investors, their weaker currencies make the
index look better priced even if it lost value in domestic (nominal) terms.
Revealing the real trend would also help understand many situations which go against text-
book theories. One of these claims that stock markets fall if interest rates are rising. From
a foreign perspective, the local stock market may rally despite rising rates, because of the
rise in the domestic currency.
The same disparities happen in the commodity world. Let’s assume commodities are de-
clining in dollar terms but this time with the dollar rising at the same time. Domestic (do-
llar-based) producers reduce production because it is now more difficult to export that
commodity with the more “expensive” dollar. The problem is that we assume all producers
(inclusive foreign ones) will do the same, when they may actually accelerate their output.
How can this be? Because in local currencies, outside the U.S., the cost of production decli-
nes. A more expensive commodity in dollars, may lead local commodity producers to pro-
duce even more, because they are selling the commodity cheaper once “translated” to their
local currencies which are weaker than the USD.
You see, money is in many ways a metaphor for language. We look at the world of financial
and hard assets without making the effort to translate the different languages or trying to
In order to monitor capital flows capable of igniting a so-called asset-inflation, we look for
situations when we see domestic assets and the currency value both rising in an aggres-
sive manner. A currency with a bullish trajectory because of a strong capital inflow, one
based upon foreign investment, will make assets quoted in that currency also look attracti-
ve for global investors. So, one trend feeds the other: a true bull market in stocks will bid up
the currency in which those shares are negotiated. Ratio analysis, made of asset/currency
studies, provides a useful technical tool for spotting true trend changes in these complex
global relationships.
The above chart illustrates the Dow Jones Industrials Average in USD (in black). Concurrently
the the same DJIA expressed in EUR (in blue) is staging a different sort of performance, an
inconsistency that argues against a true bull market.
Phillips Curve
The Phillips curve is a graph describing the relationship between wage changes and price
level changes on the one hand, and the unemployment rate on the other. This relations-
hip is often attached to monetary policy decision-making by several central banks. Its
framework purports that greater demand drives unemployment lower, and as the labor
market tightens, higher aggregate spending pulls prices up and create thereby inflation. It
posits that inflation and unemployment have a stable and inverse relationship.
But modern economy, with its global and technological features, has challenged our un-
derstanding of labor market equilibrium. This was the case during the oil shock and resul-
ting stagflation - rising inflation and unemployment - experienced in the 1970s. This see-
mingly paradoxical outcome ignored cost-push inflation, or inflation-driven by changes on
the supply side (see Part 1.). It was also the case in the early 1980s when the Fed responded
In case you haven’t noticed, many of the dedicated contributors at FXStreet.com are critical
with the Fed’s reliance in the Phillips curve, in that the tighter labor market will eventually
push wage growth implying higher inflation. Several causes of the rupture of this broken
relationship have been noted, so that we can still form a conjecture on the evolution of
inflation.
Some analysts mention the increased focus on the deflationary effects of technology,
demographics, and the debt burden as main reasons why the model doesn’t actually help
predict inflation. Others mention the problem is that the tightness of the labor market
is not the only factor determining wage growth: after many years with low interest rates,
employees expect inflation to remain low. In fact, they can live with low wage growth, as real
wage growth may look solid. Inflation is then less likely to reach the target, at least from a
cost-push perspective.
Still others consider the flaws in the model coming from the time when the curve was
created for the first time, in 1958. It has been modified several times since, like in the 1960s
when the Phillips curve was expanded, but the monetary system was still under Bretton
Woods and its fixed exchange rate system. The point is that in fixed exchange rate regime
there is no issue of inflation derived from currency movements, making its basic assump-
tions irrelevant in today’s globalized economy.
Once again, we recognize how difficult it is to de facto measure inflation. There is no yards-
tick by which the purchasing power of money can be effectively measured. We are also
forced to recognize that both money and goods are subject to changes in supply and
demand, hence averaging the prices of goods and services simply makes no logical sen-
se when the issue at hand is money itself which sees its lure changed. As the supply and
demand of goods and services goes down and down, the supply and demand of money also
goes up and down.
Although the original concept has been challenged empirically, we should pay attention to
the Phillips Curve since the Fed has been using this model for decades as a guideline to
set interest rates.
One relatively straightforward method to calculate such a forward rate is to examine the
difference between the yield on a nominal fixed-rate bond, and the real yield on an infla-
tion-linked bond of similar maturity and credit quality, such as a Treasury Inflation Protec-
ted Security, or TIPS. This difference is sometimes described as the forward “inflation com-
pensation” or “break-even inflation” rate, and might be interpreted as the inflation rate
that market participants anticipate to hold in the future. This method has the advantage of
being determined by market prices, so it reflects the views of investors who have money on
the line.
Let’s break it down a little bit for clarification purposes: TIPS are so-called “inflation-in-
dexed government bonds”. A plain-vanilla bond, like a Treasury note in the U.S., is a stream
of payments that is fixed in nominal terms: for example, $1,000 in 10 years, and 6% interest
paid semi-annually ($30 every 6 months). In case inflation goes up, the purchasing power
of that $1,000 goes down, and the bondholder may suffer real losses when collecting the
redemption value of the vanilla bond because of the effects of inflation.
By contrast, an inflation-indexed bond also provides investors with a fixed-rate yield with
interest paid semi-annually but with a key difference: the principal is then adjusted to some
measure of inflation like CPI.
A TIPS bond may have a $1,000 face value and pay a 2% interest rate. However, every 6 mon-
ths, the interest payment is adjusted for inflation. Then, after 10 years, the bondholder gets
back $1,000 multiplied by the ratio between the CPI at the end of the period and the CPI at
the beginning of the period. This way, the bondholder is guaranteed a 2% real return no ma-
tter what the rate of inflation is in the interim. Because the amount of principal an investor
receives on the original investment is adjusted, the coupon rate represents the investor’s
“real return,” or return above inflation.
The difference between the yield on a regular plain-vanilla bond and the yield on an
inflation-indexed bond with the same maturity is the implied inflation expectation. If the
5-year Treasury has a yield of 4% and the TIPS with a same maturity of 5-year has a yield of
2%, then inflation expectations for the next five years are (roughly) 2% per year. Similarly,
using two- or ten-year issues would tell us the expectation for those periods.
The reasoning is: since plain-vanilla bonds carry no inflation protection, leaving investors
fully exposed to the impact of inflation, they demand a premium- a higher interest rate-
, which can be thought of as the amount of “protection” investors require to buy regular
bonds rather than TIPS. This, in turn, tells us what inflation expectations may be. And effec-
tively, an investor has to be paid a higher yield to compensate him for the level of inflation
that he expects.
Therefore, in equilibrium, the difference should reflect the market’s consensus for future
inflation, but only roughly. This distortion happens because actually, in addition to expected
inflation, the bond investor bears the risk that inflation may be very different from the level
expected by the market. All things being equal, it is better not to have inflation risk than to
have it. But investors in TIPS, which are adjusted for whatever inflation occurs, do not bear
this risk. So the implied inflation expectation is actually slightly less than the breakeven rate
because the bond yield may include an extra risk premium to compensate for this additio-
nal risk.
Another reason why the breakeven inflation rate is not a perfect estimate of inflation ex-
pectations is that the bond market is more heavily traded and liquid than the TIPS market.
In this case, the yields on TIPS may have an additional premium to compensate for lower
liquidity. This can push its price down (yield up) in an eventual rush to liquidity, which can
be misinterpreted as a signal of expected deflation.
Also some investors believe that official measures of inflation, like the CPI, are not accurate
measures of the true level of inflation (see Part 1), which can make the forward breakeven
inflation rate less reliable.
Nevertheless, it’s worth keeping an eye on this measurement of far-forward inflation espe-
cially in those economies where people believe that monetary mavens are not capable to
keep inflation under control. In contrast, in countries with credible inflation targeting, the
breakeven rate does not react as much to economic developments.
You can use the Treasury and TIPS yield curve rates which are published daily on the U.S.
Treasury Department website.
The yield spread precisely describes this relationship between yields at different maturity
lengths, reflecting the direction of future inflation changes. Thereby, the yield spread also
provides information on the slope of the so-called “yield curve”. The slope of the yield curve
is equally used by financial and policy analysts as an indicator of future real activity and
inflation.
The larger the spread, the steeper the slope of the yield curve will be. A positive slope
reflects investor expectations for the economy to grow in the future and, importantly, for
this growth to be associated with a higher inflation. Remember, higher expected inflation
erodes the value of an investor’s existing bond holdings and creates a need for a risk pre-
mium associated with the uncertainty about the future rate of inflation. For this reason, the
front-end of the curve is normally fairly well “anchored”, while yields at the long-end of the
curve are pushed higher when inflation is expected to make the spread larger and the curve
steeper.
A large spread also predicts that in response to relatively accommodative monetary policy,
real growth will pick up and inflation will increase. The same expectations of higher inflation
can also lead to expectations that the central bank will raise short-term interest rates in the
future.
If widening spreads lead to a positive yield curve, contracting spreads, however, are indicati-
ve of worsening economic conditions in the future, thus resulting in a flattening of the yield
curve, another sign that market expectations for inflation have eased. Long-term maturity
securities are the ones usually affected by inflation expectations. Yields on short-term ma-
turity securities, in turn, are more affected by changes in monetary policy.
Improved credibility of monetary policy, or a response to the relatively tight stance of mo-
netary policy (aimed to slow economic activity and to decrease inflation), may also trans-
late in a suppressed spread, that is, when current short-term yields are high relative to
long-term yields. Long-term yields may react to policy as well, but they rarely rise mirroring
short-term interest rate increases. Generally speaking, in a rising interest rate environment,
professional money managers shift to shorter maturity bonds.
Narrower spreads can even lead to a negatively sloped yield curve indicating not only
lower growth and inflation but also a possible recession. A so-called “inverted yield curve”
means the yield difference between a long-term bond and a shorter-term one is negative.
This is in contrast to what is considered a normal market, where longer-term instruments
should yield higher returns to compensate for time. Inverted yield curves thereby imply that
the market believes inflation will remain low because, even if there is a recession, a low
bond yield will still be offset by low inflation.
The chronological sequence of peaks and troughs in the various asset classes (bonds, stoc-
ks and commodities) can be used as a framework for identifying in which phase of the cycle
the market is in, so that gyrations in the different assets can be anticipated.
These gyrations of the different asset classes in the business cycle reflect distinct changes
in the rate of growth in economic activity, as well as changes in the employment backdrop
and monetary policy. Unforeseen macroeconomic events or shocks can sometimes disrupt
the business cycle, but nevertheless its framework provides a relatively reliable guide to
recognizing the different phases of an economic cycle and with its inflationary and defla-
tionary forces in play. During the early stages of the business cycle, for instance, deflatio-
nary forces predominate, whereas inflationary pressures come to the fore as the recovery
matures in later stages.
The idealized picture usually starts with bond prices bottoming in an early recessionary
phase (below the equilibrium line). Midway during a recession, commodity and stocks are
still falling together, but at some point, falling bond yields are positive for equity prices.
Once the economic recovery has been underway, commodity prices bottom and also start to
rally, and all asset classes are rallying together. Gradually, the economic and financial slack,
which developed as a result of the recession, is substantially absorbed, and the demand for
credit puts upward pressure on interest rates. As a consequence, the bond market peaks
out and begins its bear phase. When bonds peak, usually in the late upswing phase (above
equilibrium), it’s a signal that a period of healthy non-inflationary growth has turned into
an unhealthy period of inflationary growth.
In the latest phase, when the economy starts to slow, the demand for commodities reduces
and the cycle slips into a recession. At this point, all asset classes are declining together
until the credit markets bottom out first and the cycle starts once again.
Now let’s take equities in isolation, analyze the different sectors of the stock market in their
own rotation cycle, and categorize them according to their sensitivity to deflationary or
inflationary forces. The stock market peaks and bottoms in stages, which means that not all
issues change their trends simultaneously. This also implies that different stocks will dis-
play leading or lagging characteristics, which can be used as a gauge of inflationary and
deflationary forces.
Cyclical stocks, also named consumer discretionary (automobile, steel, real estate, hou-
sehold durable goods) tend to follow the business cycle and are thereby considered infla-
tion-sensitive. These are consumer-linked industries that typically benefit from increased
borrowing, including diversified financials. Financials, albeit being liquidity-driven, sees
money flowing to them because interest rates are starting to rise. Also speculative informa-
tion technology and transportation stocks bottom first in the early stage of the cycle becau-
se they depend on capital spending and consumer demand. These groups, although they
typically benefit most from a backdrop of still low interest rates, are considered leading
indicators of early inflationary pressures because they are boosted by shifts from reces-
sion to recovery.
While it is important to note outperformance, it is also helpful to recognize sectors with
consistent underperformance. In this sense, basic materials and energy stocks are conside-
red to be laggards at this stage of the cycle because interest rates are still low and so are
commodities. Yield spreads are now widening and the yield curve steep, but inflationary
pressures tend to be still low during a recovery from recession.
FXStreet 2017 Trade the News Series
32
In the late expansion, industrial stocks which are considered economically sensitive sec-
tors (aerospace and defense, industrial machinery, tools, lumber production, construction,
cement and metal fabrication) take the lead. They are closely tied to economic trends and
higher demand for products leading companies to expand their production capacity. So-
mehow higher inflation also favors other so-called “inflation stocks” like basic material
stocks (aluminum, copper, and mining shares), and energy. Near the end of an economic
expansion, energy stocks usually take over market leadership primarily due to rising energy
prices (oil) and the resulting build up of inflation pressures preluding a peak in the cycle.
The energy sector has seen the most convincing patterns of outperformance and are the
ones which peak last. This usually signals the end of an economic expansion and the begin-
ning of a contraction.
At this stage consumer staples and services are underperforming because the economy is
still growing and there is no perceived need for defensive stocks yet. Investors drop these
groups because they still expect more future inflation. Utilities and financials are also not in
vogue because interest rates are probably still rising.
One way to tell when the economy has crossed the threshold from late expansion to early
contraction is when leadership switches from energy stocks to more defensive stock groups
like healthcare and consumer staples. Drug stocks are also defensive in nature and show
better relative strength when investors begin to glimpse signs of an economic slowdown.
Their leadership is a sign of lack of confidence in the stock market and anticipates defla-
tionary forces in the economy. This is also the stage when the yield spreads can get nega-
tive and the curve inverted.
On the opposite side, industrials, basic materials, information technology, and cyclical stoc-
ks (which are inflation-sensitive) tend to suffer the most during this phase, as inflationary
pressures crimp profit margins.
In the late contraction or recession phase in the business cycle, those stock sectors that are
defensively oriented move to the front of the performance line. Telecommunication services
and healthcare which consumers are less likely to cut back on during a recession (auto-re-
lated, entertainment, home-builders, home appliances, restaurants, and retailers, i.e. pro-
ducts with inelastic demand) are now leading. Note that inelastic items constitute aprox.
80% of the CPI, the remaining 20% being commodities other than food and energy.
Service companies in general, which don’t rely on large amounts of debt to finance their
business are also preferred. Interest rate-sensitive stocks like utilities usually bottom first
owing to topping interest rates. Utilities are big borrowers and their profits are enhanced by
lower interest costs. The business model of telecommunication firms is reminiscent of utili-
ties firms, which have stable, predictable cash flows and typically carry high debt levels
While deflation favors these interest rate-sensitive stock groups, energy and basic industry
groups, which are related to interest rate-sensitive commodities, are now in disadvantage.
The business cycle approach is best deployed with the use of relative strength studies
(ratios) which are an ideal technical tool to visualize shifts in phases allowing investors to
adjust their exposure accordingly. For Forex traders, it can be used to complement the other
approaches we have been studying, and so anticipate changes in monetary policies.