.R. No. 190566 December 11, 2013 into only four clusters instead of five clusters worth ₱10,000.
00
per cluster. He then placed markers for ₱10,000.00 each cluster
MARK JEROME S. MAGLALANG, Petitioner, of cash and declared the total amount of ₱40,000.00 to Cecilia.
vs. Perplexed, Cecilia asked petitioner why the latter only dished out
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION ₱40,000.00. She then pointed to the first cluster of bills and
(PAGCOR), as represented by its incumbent Chairman requested petitioner to check the first cluster which she observed
EFRAIM GENUINO, Respondent. to be thicker than the others. Petitioner performed a recount and
found that the said cluster contained 20 pieces of ₱1,000.00 bills.
DECISION Petitioner apologized to Cecilia and rectified the error by
declaring the full and correct amount handed to him by the latter.
Petitioner, however, averred that Cecilia accused him of trying to
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
shortchange her and that petitioner tried to deliberately fool her of
her money. Petitioner tried to explain, but Cecilia allegedly
Before this Court is a petition1 for review on certiorari under Rule continued to berate and curse him. To ease the tension, petitioner
45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, seeking the was asked to take a break. After ten minutes, petitioner returned
reversal of the Resolution2 dated September 30, 2009 issued by to his booth. However, Cecilia allegedly showed up and continued
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA"".G.R. SP No. 110048, which to berate petitioner. As a result, the two of them were invited to
outrightly dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by herein the casino’s Internal Security Office in order to air their respective
petitioner Mark Jerome S. Maglalang (petitioner). Also assailed is sides. Thereafter, petitioner was required to file an Incident
the appellate court's Resolution3 dated November 26, 2009 which Report which he submitted on the same day of the incident.6
denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
On January 8, 2009, petitioner received a Memorandum 7 issued
The facts follow. by the casino’s Branch Manager, Alexander Ozaeta, informing
him that he was being charged with Discourtesy towards a casino
Petitioner was a teller at the Casino Filipino, Angeles City Branch, customer and directing him to explain within 72 hours upon
Angeles City, which was operated by respondent Philippine receipt of the memorandum why he should not be sanctioned or
Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), a government- dismissed. In compliance therewith, petitioner submitted a letter-
owned or controlled corporation existing by virtue of Presidential explanation8 dated January 10, 2009.
Decree (P.D.) No. 1869.4
On March 31, 2009, petitioner received another
Petitioner alleged that in the afternoon of December 13, 2008, Memorandum9 dated March 19, 2009, stating that the Board of
while he was performing his functions as teller, a lady customer Directors of PAGCOR found him guilty of Discourtesy towards a
identified later as one Cecilia Nakasato5 (Cecilia) approached him casino customer and imposed on him a 30-day suspension for
in his booth and handed to him an undetermined amount of cash this first offense. Aggrieved, on April 2, 2009, petitioner filed a
consisting of mixed ₱1,000.00 and ₱500.00 bills. There were 45 Motion for Reconsideration10 seeking a reversal of the board’s
₱1,000.00 and ten ₱500.00 bills for the total amount of decision and further prayed in the alternative that if he is indeed
₱50,000.00. Following casino procedure, petitioner laid the bills found guilty as charged, the penalty be only a reprimand as it is
on the spreading board. However, he erroneously spread the bills the appropriate penalty. During the pendency of said motion,
petitioner also filed a Motion for Production11 dated April 20, 2009, as petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies before
praying that he be furnished with copies of documents relative to seeking recourse from the CA. Invoking Section 2(1), Article IX-B
the case including the recommendation of the investigating of the 1987 Constitution,17 the CA held that the CSC has
committee and the Decision/Resolution of the Board supposedly jurisdiction over issues involving the employer-employee
containing the latter’s factual findings. In a letter-reply12 dated relationship in all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and
June 2, 2009, one Atty. Carlos R. Bautista, Jr. who did not agencies of the Government, including government-owned or
indicate his authority therein to represent PAGCOR, denied the controlled corporations with original charters such as PAGCOR.
said motion. Petitioner received said letter-reply on June 17, Petitioner filed his Motion for Reconsideration18 which the CA
2009. denied in the assailed Resolution19 dated November 26, 2009. In
denying the said motion, the CA relied on this Court’s ruling in
Subsequently, on June 18, 2009, PAGCOR issued a Duty Free Philippines v. Mojica20 citing Philippine Amusement and
Memorandum13 dated June 18, 2009 practically reiterating the Gaming Corp. v. CA,21 where this Court held as follows:
contents of its March 19, 2009 Memorandum. Attached therewith
is another Memorandum 14 dated June 8, 2009 issued by It is now settled that, conformably to Article IX-B, Section 2(1), [of
PAGCOR’s Assistant Vice President for Human Resource and the 1987 Constitution] government-owned or controlled
Development, Atty. Lizette F. Mortel, informing petitioner that the corporations shall be considered part of the Civil Service only if
Board of Directors in its meeting on May 13, 2009 resolved to they have original charters, as distinguished from those created
deny his appeal for reconsideration for lack of merit. Petitioner under general law.
received said memoranda on the same date of June 18, 2009.
PAGCOR belongs to the Civil Service because it was created
On August 17, 2009, petitioner filed a petition15 for certiorari under directly by PD 1869 on July 11, 1983. Consequently,
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, controversies concerning the relations of the employee with the
before the CA, averring that there is no evidence, much less management of PAGCOR should come under the jurisdiction of
factual and legal basis to support the finding of guilt against him. the Merit System Protection Board and the Civil Service
Moreover, petitioner ascribed grave abuse of discretion Commission, conformably to the Administrative Code of 1987.
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction to the acts of PAGCOR
in adjudging him guilty of the charge, in failing to observe the Section 16(2) of the said Code vest[s] in the Merit System
proper procedure in the rendition of its decision and in imposing Protection Board the power inter alia to:
the harsh penalty of a 30-day suspension. Justifying his recourse
to the CA, petitioner explained that he did not appeal to the Civil a) Hear and decide on appeal administrative cases involving
Service Commission (CSC) because the penalty imposed on him officials and employees of the Civil Service. Its decision shall be
was only a 30-day suspension which is not within the CSC’s final except those involving dismissal or separation from the
appellate jurisdiction. He also claimed that discourtesy in the service which may be appealed to the Commission.
performance of official duties is classified as a light offense which
is punishable only by reprimand.
Hence, this petition where petitioner argues that the CA
committed grave and substantial error of judgment
In its assailed Resolution16 dated September 30, 2009, the CA
outrightly dismissed the petition for certiorari for being premature
1. IN OUTRIGHTLY DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR administrative case. As authority, petitioner invokes our ruling in
CERTIORARI FILED BY PETITIONER AND IN DENYING Geronga v. Hon. Varela23 which cited Section 47,24 Chapter 1,
THE LATTER’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION[;] Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292
otherwise known as The Administrative Code of 1987. Said
2. IN RULING THAT THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION Section 47 provides that the CSC may entertain appeals only,
HAS APPELLATE JURISDICTION OVER THE among others, from a penalty of suspension of more than 30
SUSPENSION OF THE PETITIONER DESPITE THE days. Petitioner asserts that his case, involving a 30-day
FACT THAT THE PENALTY INVOLVED IS NOT MORE suspension penalty, is not appealable to the CSC. Thus, he
THAN THIRTY (30) DAYS[;] submits that his case was properly brought before the CA via a
petition for certiorari.25
3. IN RESOLVING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
FILED BY PETITIONER IN A MANNER WHICH IS On the other hand, PAGCOR alleges that petitioner intentionally
UTTERLY CONTRARY TO LAW AND omitted relevant matters in his statement of facts. PAGCOR
JURISPRUDENCE[;] essentially claims that petitioner refused to apologize to Cecilia;
that he treated Cecilia’s complaint with arrogance; and that before
4. IN UNJUSTIFIABLY REFUSING TO RENDER A taking the aforementioned 10-minute break, petitioner slammed
DECISION AS TO THE PROPRIETY OR VALIDITY OF the cash to the counter window in giving it back to the customer.
THE SUSPENSION OF THE PETITIONER BY THE PAGCOR argues that the instant petition raises questions of fact
RESPONDENT[;] which are not reviewable in a petition for review on certiorari.
PAGCOR maintains that the CA’s ruling was in accordance with
law and jurisprudence. Moreover, PAGCOR counters that
5. IN UNDULY REFUSING TO RENDER A DECISION
petitioner’s remedy of appeal is limited as Section 37 of the
DECLARING THAT THE ASSAILED
Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
DECISIONS/RESOLUTIONS OF THE RESPONDENT
Service provides that a decision rendered by heads of agencies
ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON
whereby a penalty of suspension for not more than 30 days is
RECORD[; AND]
imposed shall be final and executory. PAGCOR opines that such
intent of limiting appeals over such minor offenses is elucidated in
6. IN UNJUSTIFIABLY REFUSING TO RENDER A the Concurring Opinion of former Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno
DECISION DECLARING THAT THE ASSAILED in CSC v. Dacoycoy26 and based on the basic premise that appeal
DECISIONS/RESOLUTIONS OF RESPONDENT WERE is merely a statutory privilege. Lastly, PAGCOR submits that the
ISSUED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION 30-day suspension meted on petitioner is justified under its own
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF Code of Discipline.27 Prescinding from the foregoing, the sole
JURISDICTION.22 question for resolution is: Was the CA correct in outrightly
dismissing the petition for certiorari filed before it on the ground of
Petitioner claims that the CA clearly overlooked the applicable non-exhaustion of administrative remedies?
laws and jurisprudence that provide that when the penalty
involved in an administrative case is suspension for not more We resolve the question in the negative.
than 30 days, the CSC has no appellate jurisdiction over the said
Our ruling in Public Hearing Committee of the Laguna Lake matter is a private land in land case proceedings; (10) when the
Development Authority v. SM Prime Holdings, Inc.28 on the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is instructive, to (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of
wit: judicial intervention, and unreasonable delay would greatly
prejudice the complainant; (12) where no administrative review is
Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, provided by law; (13) where the rule of qualified political agency
before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, he applies and (14) where the issue of non-exhaustion of
or she should have availed himself or herself of all the means of administrative remedies has been rendered moot.29
administrative processes afforded him or her. Hence, if resort to a
remedy within the administrative machinery can still be made by The case before us falls squarely under exception number 12
giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to since the law per se provides no administrative review for
decide on a matter that comes within his or her jurisdiction, then administrative cases whereby an employee like petitioner is
such remedy should be exhausted first before the court's judicial covered by Civil Service law, rules and regulations and penalized
power can be sought. The premature invocation of the with a suspension for not more than 30 days.
intervention of the court is fatal to one’s cause of action. The
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is based on Section 37 (a) and (b) of P.D. No. 807, otherwise known as the
practical and legal reasons. The availment of administrative Civil Service Decree of the Philippines, provides for the
remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier unavailability of any appeal:
disposition of controversies. Furthermore, the courts of justice, for
reasons of comity and convenience, will shy away from a dispute Section 37. Disciplinary Jurisdiction.
until the system of administrative redress has been completed
and complied with, so as to give the administrative agency
(a) The Commission shall decide upon appeal all
concerned every opportunity to correct its error and dispose of
administrative disciplinary cases involving the imposition
the case.
of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days, or
fine in an amount exceeding thirty days’ salary, demotion
However, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from
not absolute as it admits of the following exceptions: Office. A complaint may be filed directly with the
Commission by a private citizen against a government
(1) when there is a violation of due process; (2) when the issue official or employee in which case it may hear and decide
involved is purely a legal question; (3) when the administrative the case or it may deputize any department or agency or
action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of official or group of officials to conduct the investigation.
jurisdiction; (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the The results of the investigation shall be submitted to the
administrative agency concerned; (5) when there is irreparable Commission with recommendation as to the penalty to be
injury; (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose imposed or other action to be taken.
acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and
assumed approval of the latter; (7) when to require exhaustion of (b) The heads of departments, agencies and
administrative remedies would be unreasonable; (8) when it instrumentalities, provinces, cities and municipalities shall
would amount to a nullification of a claim; (9) when the subject
have jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters be appealed, ergo, even a decision acquitting a government
involving disciplinary action against officers and official from a major offense like nepotism cannot also be
employees under their jurisdiction. Their decisions shall appealed.
be final in case the penalty imposed is suspension for not
more than thirty days or fine in an amount not exceeding Nevertheless, decisions of administrative agencies which are
thirty days’ salary. In case the decision rendered by a declared final and unappealable by law are still subject to judicial
bureau or office head is appealable to the Commission, review. In Republic of the Phils. v. Francisco,32 we held:
the same may be initially appealed to the department and
finally to the Commission and pending appeal, the same Since the decision of the Ombudsman suspending respondents
shall be executory except when the penalty is removal, in for one (1) month is final and unappealable, it follows that the
which case the same shall be executory only after CA had no appellate jurisdiction to review, rectify or reverse the
confirmation by the department head. (Emphasis same. The Ombudsman was not estopped from asserting in this
supplied.) Court that the CA had no appellate jurisdiction to review and
reverse the decision of the Ombudsman via petition for review
Similar provisions are reiterated in the aforequoted Section 4730 of under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. This is not to say that
E.O. No. 292 essentially providing that cases of this sort are not decisions of the Ombudsman cannot be questioned. Decisions
appealable to the CSC. Correlatively, we are not unaware of the of administrative or quasi-administrative agencies which are
Concurring Opinion of then Chief Justice Puno in CSC v. declared by law final and unappealable are subject to judicial
Dacoycoy,31 where he opined, to wit: review if they fail the test of arbitrariness, or upon proof of
gross abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law. When such
In truth, the doctrine barring appeal is not categorically administrative or quasi-judicial bodies grossly misappreciate
sanctioned by the Civil Service Law. For what the law declares
1âwphi1 evidence of such nature as to compel a contrary conclusion, the
as "final" are decisions of heads of agencies involving suspension Court will not hesitate to reverse the factual findings. Thus, the
for not more than thirty (30) days or fine in an amount not decision of the Ombudsman may be reviewed, modified or
exceeding thirty (30) days salary. But there is a clear policy reversed via petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
reason for declaring these decisions final. These decisions of Court, on a finding that it had no jurisdiction over the
involve minor offenses. They are numerous for they are the usual complaint, or of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
offenses committed by government officials and employees. To excess or lack of jurisdiction.It bears stressing that the judicial
allow their multiple level appeal will doubtless overburden the recourse petitioner availed of in this case before the CA is a
quasijudicial machinery of our administrative system and defeat special civil action for certiorari ascribing grave abuse of
the expectation of fast and efficient action from these discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
administrative agencies. Nepotism, however, is not a petty of PAGCOR, not an appeal. Suffice it to state that an appeal and
offense. Its deleterious effect on government cannot be over- a special civil action such as certiorari under Rule 65 are entirely
emphasized. And it is a stubborn evil. The objective should be to distinct and separate from each other. One cannot file petition for
eliminate nepotic acts, hence, erroneous decisions allowing certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules where appeal is available,
nepotism cannot be given immunity from review, especially even if the ground availed of is grave abuse of discretion. A
judicial review. It is thus non sequitur to contend that since some special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 lies only when
decisions exonerating public officials from minor offenses can not there is no appeal, or plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. Certiorari cannot be allowed when a party SO ORDERED.
to a case fails to appeal a judgment despite the availability of that
remedy, as the same should not be a substitute for the lost
remedy of appeal. The remedies of appeal and certiorari are
mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive.33
In sum, there being no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law in view of petitioner's
allegation that P AGCOR has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, the CA's outright dismissal of the petition
for certiorari on the basis of non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies is bereft of any legal standing and should therefore be
set aside.
Finally, as a rule, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is valid
only when the question involved is an error of jurisdiction, or
when there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of the court or tribunals
exercising quasi-judicial functions. Hence, courts exercising
certiorari jurisdiction should refrain from reviewing factual
assessments of the respondent court or agency. Occasionally,
however, they are constrained to wade into factual matters when
the evidence on record does not support those factual findings; or
when too much is concluded, inferred or deduced from the bare
or incomplete facts appearing on record.34 Considering the
circumstances and since this Court is not a trier of
facts, 35 remand of this case to the CA for its judicious resolution is
in order.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The
Resolutions dated September 30, 2009 and November 26, 2009
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 110048 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The instant case is REMANDED to
the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.
No pronouncement as to costs.