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In: Nuclear Power Plants ADVANCED NUCLEAR REACTORS AND PASSIVE

SAFETY

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Chapter 2

ADVANCED NUCLEAR REACTORS AND

PASSIVE SAFETY

Tim Abrama* and Ayah E. Elshahatb*

a
Westinghouse professor of Nuclear Fuel Technology,
University of Manchester, Preston M60 1QD, UK
b
Nuclear & Radiological Engineering Department, Faculty of Engineering,
Alexandria University, 21544 Alexandria, Egypt

1. INTRODUCTION
The world demand for energy is growing rapidly, particularly in
developing countries that are trying to raise the standard of living for billions
of people, many of whom do not have access to electricity or clean water.
Climate change and the concern for increased emissions of green house gases
have brought into question the future primary reliance of fossil fuels. With the
projected worldwide increase in energy demand, concern for the
environmental impact of carbon emissions, and the recent price volatility of
fossil fuels, nuclear energy is undergoing a rapid resurgence. This ―nuclear
renaissance‖ is broad based, reaching across Asia, North America, Europe, as
well as selected countries in Africa and South America. Many countries have
publicly expressed their intentions to pursue the construction of new nuclear
energy plants. Some countries that have previously turned away from

*
Corresponding Author, Tel: +447730052564; E-mail address: [email protected];
42 Tim Abram and Ayah E. Elshahat

commercial nuclear energy are reconsidering the advisability of this decision.

This renaissance is facilitated by the availability of more advanced reactor
designs than are operating today, with improved safety, economy, and
operations.
About 85% of the world's nuclear electricity is generated by reactors
derived from designs originally developed for naval use. These and other
second-generation nuclear power units have been found to be safe and reliable,
but they are being superseded by better designs.
In the early days of nuclear power development, many different reactor
types were considered and indeed prototypes were built. These included light
water, heavy water, gas reactor and liquid metal-cooled fast reactor systems.
The majority of the reactors in operation in the world today are light water
reactors (LWRs) but there is also a sizeable fraction of heavy water reactors
[1].

2. ADVANCED NUCLEAR REACTORS

2.1. Nuclear Reactors Generations

There are many generations of nuclear power plants:

Generation I reactors were the first to be developed; many were small.

Generation II reactors include most reactors operating today and will
be the predominant type in operation up to 2020 and beyond. With
extensions of their operating life to 60 years, many of these reactors
will be operating past 2035.
Generation III reactors are what have been built in the last few years
in France and Japan. Some reactors of this general type are called
Generation III+. More Generation III reactors will be built in the next
decade, including several to be built in the United States.
Generation IV reactors are usually referred to as advanced reactors.
None have been built and none are close to being under construction
[2].

The progression of nuclear power can be shown in table 1.

 Advanced Nuclear Reactors and Passive Safety 43

Table 1. Progression of nuclear power

Category Description Examples Time frame

Generation Early prototypes Shippingport, 1950 to 1960+
I Dresden, Magnox
Generation Commercial power PWRs, BWRs, 1960+ to 1980–
II CANDU
Generation Advanced LWRs CANDU 6, System 1980– to 2010–
III 80+, AP600
Generation Evolutionary ABWR , ACR1000, 2010– to 2020+
III+ Designs AP1000, APWR ,
EPR, ESBWR
Generation Revolutionary 2030 +
IV designs
Source: U.S. Department of Energy. Years are approximate. PWR, pressurized water
reactor; BWR, boiling water rector; LWR, light-water reactor; ABWR, advanced
boiling water reactor; APWR, advanced pressured water reactor; EPR, European
pressurized reactor; economic simplified boiling water reactor.

Third-generation reactors have many distinguished features such as: a

standardized design for each type to expedite licensing, reduce capital cost and
reduce construction time, a simpler and more rugged design, making them
easier to operate and less vulnerable to operational upsets, higher availability
and longer operating life - typically 60 years, further reduced possibility of
core melt accidents, resistance to serious damage that would allow radiological
release from an aircraft impact, higher burn-up to reduce fuel use and the
amount of waste, burnable absorbers ("poisons") to extend fuel life.
The greatest departure from second-generation designs is that many
incorporate passive or inherent safety features which require no active controls
or operational intervention to avoid accidents in the event of malfunction, and
may rely on gravity, natural convection or resistance to high temperatures [3].
The International Generation-IV Initiative was established in 2000 with
the aim of fostering the research and development necessary to underpin the
development of a new generation of nuclear energy systems. The activities are
guided by the Generation-IV International Forum (GIF. The Generation-IV
systems, which comprise both the reactors and their associated fuel-cycle
facilities, are intended to deliver significant advances compared with current
advanced light water reactors (ALWRs, the so-called Generation-III systems,
Figure 1) in respect of economics, safety, environmental performance, and
44 Tim Abram and Ayah E. Elshahat

proliferation resistance. The Generation-IV systems are expected to be

developed to the point of commercial deployment by at least 2030, while
nearer-term systems (deployable within the next 15 years) are expected to be
developed by industry, and are therefore excluded from Generation-IV.

Figure 1. .

2.2. Comparison of Advanced and Conventional Reactors

2.2.1. Safety Performance

The conventional reactors or so called ‗‗Traditional ones‘‘ have seen an
extensive use of ‗‗active‘‘ engineering safety systems for reactor control and
protection in the past. These systems have certain potential concerning
termination of events or accidents that are effectively coped with a protective
system limited by the reliability of the active safety systems or prompt
operator actions to prevent significant fuel failure and fission product release.
Since the reliability of active systems cannot be reduced below a threshold and
that of the operator‘s action is debatable, there is growing concern about the
safety of such plants due to the large uncertainty involved in Probabilistic
Safety Analysis (PSA) particularly in analyzing human faults. In view of this,
a desirable goal for the safety characteristics of an innovative reactor is that its
primary defense against any serious accidents is achieved through its design
features preventing the occurrence of such accidents without depending either
on the operator‘s action or the active systems 4. That means, the plant can be
 Advanced Nuclear Reactors and Passive Safety 45

designed with adequate passive and inherent safety features to provide

protection for any event that may lead to a serious accident. Such robustness in
design contributes to a significant reduction in the conditional probability of
severe accident scenarios arising out of initiating events of internal and
external origin. The function of confinement of any radioactivity released in
the containment is also made more reliable by adopting robust, redundant, and
passive design features.
That means such reactors are different from traditional ones, i.e. they are
designed on the philosophy of ‗‗safety by design‘‘. Such reactors have the
potential to restore the reactor to a stable state in any postulated accident
condition and the risk to the public must be at least in the same level or even
lower than the other industrial plants. The most important safety tasks of the
future reactors are not only to prevent excessive radioactive release to the
environment but also to avoid necessity of evacuation of the population.
Minimum frequency of such events should not exceed an acceptable level,
which is much lower than that of current reactors. Generally, this is very
ambitious and, often, economically expensive task if the future reactors are
built with active engineering safety features. On the other hand, passive safety
systems have higher reliability compared with active safety systems and could
help in meeting the above criteria without much economic penalty. Moreover,
advanced reactor safety systems can be designed and built with more inherent
and passive systems with multiple lines of defense-in-depth which would
provide adequate protection against any release of radioactivity outside the
plant containment [4].

2.2.2. Economics and Licensing

The main factors enhancing the competitiveness of advanced reactors can
be summarized as follows.

Simplification of plant design to minimize the number of systems,

valves, pumps, etc. consistent with maintaining the plant's safety
envelope is a key objective. These, together with improved man-
machine interfaces help to minimize operator demand and reduce risk.
In the US, there has been considerable progress towards better co-
operation between plant vendors and regulatory bodies in respect of
the licensing process. The aim has been to develop the 'one-step
licensing process'. An important objective in achieving low costs is to
use a standardized approach. Thus design and engineering costs can
be amortized over many units, licensing costs can be reduced,
46 Tim Abram and Ayah E. Elshahat

construction methods can be optimized and operator training can be

made more efficient.
Construction duration can be kept to a minimum by adherence to the
above principles. A significant fraction of the design should be
completed before construction starts. The EPRI URD has introduced a
quantitative criterion that 90% of design drawings must be 100%
complete. Modularization whereby plant components can be
assembled in a factory helps to ensure fabrication takes place in a
controlled environment, also with more automation and higher
productivity.
Another way to improve competitiveness is to aim for multiple unit
sites. This can be more efficient by taking advantage of better
construction scheduling and the use of common administrative
buildings and facilities. Thus much can be done to improve
competitiveness by reducing capital cost, which contributes to over
one half of the total generation cost of a nuclear plant [5].

2.3. Characteristics of Innovative Reactors

Advanced reactors are often classified into two categories namely,

'evolutionary' and 'innovative'. In this context 'evolutionary reactor' refers to
the class of reactors with relatively small modifications from existing designs.
By contrast, 'innovative reactors' incorporate substantially new designs, which
would require significant investment to develop.
Many features of the innovative designs contribute to enhanced
performance relative to the current generation of reactors can be summarized
in six characteristics:

Safety features that contribute to enhanced safety, including those that

reduce the probability and severity of both core damage and
radioactive release following core damage;
Economic competitiveness features that contribute to improved
economic competitiveness relative to other methods of generating
power, including those that reduce overnight construction cost,
construction time, operating and maintenance costs, or fuel-cycle
costs, and those that improve the reliability or capacity factor;
Proliferation resistance and safeguards features that contribute to
enhanced proliferation resistance, including reduced generation or
 Advanced Nuclear Reactors and Passive Safety 47

transport of fissile materials, particularly plutonium; increased

technical difficulty of extracting weapons-grade fissile materials from
spent fuel; and increased ease of implementing international
safeguards;
Waste management features that contribute to enhanced performance
with respect to waste management, including those that reduce the
generation of some or all categories of radioactive waste or ease the
management or disposal of such waste;
Efficiency of resource use features that contribute to the efficient use
of nuclear fuel(s) through means such as higher fuel burn up,
recycling, increased plant efficiency or use of fuels other than
uranium;
Flexibility of application – features that facilitate flexible use of the
reactor, for example, for electricity generation, cogeneration
applications and process-heat applications.

Each of these characteristics shows qualitatively how these designs, by

attaining high levels of performance in these areas, may achieve an enhanced
probability of being sold in competitive energy markets [4].

3. CONCEPT OF PASSIVE SAFETY SYSTEMS

3.1. Definition of Passive System

The IAEA defined the passive safety systems as follows [6],

For components and systems (but not structures) having safety functions,
there must be at least two states corresponding to the normal function and to
the safety function. Then, to change from the normal to the safety state:

There must be "intelligence" such as a signal or parametric change to

initiate action;
There must be power and potential difference or motive force to
change states; and
There must be the means to continue to operate in the second state.
48 Tim Abram and Ayah E. Elshahat

A component or system can be called passive when all three of these

considerations are satisfied in a self-contained manner. Conversely, it is
considered active if external inputs are needed.
There are, however, other considerations that must be taken into account
because passive has a connotation of superior performance that cannot be
accepted without evaluation and justification.
These other considerations include:

Reliability and availability in the short term, the long term and under
adverse conditions;
Longevity; the equivalent of shelf life, against corrosion or
deformation by creep etc;
The requirements for testing or demonstration; and
Simplification and man-machine interaction.

It should be emphasized that passivity is not synonymous with reliability

or availability, even less with assured adequacy of the safety feature, though
several factors potentially adverse to performance can be more easily
counteracted through passive design. On the other hand active designs
employing variable controls permit much more precise accomplishment of
safety functions; this may be particularly desirable under accident
management conditions.

3.2. Active versus Passive Safety Systems

Figure 2. Active safety system and Passive safety system.

 Advanced Nuclear Reactors and Passive Safety 49

Active Safety Systems rely on availability of AC electrical power for

safety functions

Use active safety grade components, e.g., pumps, valves, cooling

water, HVAC, instrumentation & controls, etc.
Housed in separate seismic buildings.
Typically use 4 train redundancy to achieve desired safety level.

Passive Safety Systems do not require AC electrical power for safety

functions.

Utilize natural forces such as gravity, natural circulation, evaporation,

etc.
Housed in the reactor containment building.
Use 2 train safety grade redundancy and non-safety active systems to
achieve safety level [7]

4. EXAMPLES OF ADVANCED REACTORS

4.1. AP1000

The Westinghouse AP1000 Advanced Passive pressurized water reactor

(PWR) is a 1117 MWe PWR based closely on the AP600 design. The AP1000
maintains the AP600 design configuration, the use of proven components, and
the licensing basis by limiting the changes to the AP600 design to as few as
possible. The AP1000 design includes advanced passive safety features and
extensive plant simplifications to enhance the safety, construction, operation,
and maintenance of the plant.
Passive safety systems are used to provide significant and measurable
improvements in plant simplification, safety, reliability, investment protection
and plant costs. The AP1000 uses proven technology, which builds on over 35
years of operating PWR experience. The AP1000 received Final Design
Approval (FDA) from the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission in
September 2004; the AP1000 has also received Design Certification by the
USNRC in December 2005. The AP1000 and its predecessor AP600 are the
only nuclear reactor designs using passive safety technology licensed
anywhere in the world. The safety performance of AP1000 has been verified
50 Tim Abram and Ayah E. Elshahat

by extensive testing, safety analysis and probabilistic safety assessment.

AP1000 safety margins are large and the potential for accident scenarios that
could jeopardize public safety is extremely low.

Figure 3. Westinghouse AP1000 plant (Small cutway).

Simplicity is a key technical concept behind the AP1000. It makes the

AP1000 easier and less expensive to build, operate, and maintain.
Simplification also provides a hedge against regulatory driven operations and
maintenance costs by eliminating equipment subject to regulation. There are
60 percent fewer valves, 75 percent less piping, 80 percent less control cable,
35 percent fewer pumps, and 50 percent less seismic building volume than in a
conventional reactor.
The AP1000‘s greatly simplified design complies with NRC regulatory
and safety requirements and the EPRI advanced light water reactor (ALWR)
utility requirements document [8].
Plans are being developed for implementation of the AP1000 plant. Key
factors in this planning are the economics of AP1000 in the de-regulated US
electricity market, and the associated business model for licensing,
constructing and operating these new plants.
The FDA is a very important achievement for the AP1000 plant designed
by Westinghouse with the support of an international group of partners among
which Ansaldo Energia – Nuclear Division has been played a major role.
 Advanced Nuclear Reactors and Passive Safety 51

AP1000, together with the AP600, is the only Advanced Plant that has
obtained the FDA by US NRC. The FDA represent an important advantage for
the AP1000 commercialization in a moment in which nuclear energy seems,
once again, to be a mandatory choice for the future energy mix in the
industrialized countries[9].
The AP1000 design is based on the use of innovative passive technology
and modular construction, which require significantly less equipment and
commodities that facilitate a more rapid construction schedule. Because
Westinghouse had the vision and the perseverance to continue the
development of this passive technology, the AP1000 design is ready to meet
today‘s challenge of near-term deployment [10].
A detailed description of AP1000 can be found in section 5.

4.2. IRIS

The international reactor innovative and secure (IRIS) nuclear power plant
is among the advanced plant designs that major nuclear vendors around the
world have proposed and developed in recent years at the welcome sight of a
possible nuclear power renaissance. The IRIS program began in October 1999
as one of the winning proposals in the first nuclear energy research initiative
(NERI) solicitation by the US Department of Energy. IRIS is a modular
pressurized water reactor with an integral configuration (all primary system
components – reactor core, internals, pumps, steam generators, pressurizer,
and control rod drive mechanisms – are inside the reactor vessel. The IRIS
conceptual design was completed in 2001.
The pre-application licensing process with the United States Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (USNRC) started in October 2002. Currently the
project is progressing through the preliminary design stage [11].
The first line of defense in IRIS is to eliminate event initiators that could
potentially lead to core damage. If it is not possible to eliminate certain
accidents altogether, then the design inherently reduces their consequences
and/or decreases their probability of occurring. One of the most obvious
advantages of the IRIS ―Safety-by-Design‖ approach is the elimination of
large break loss-of-coolant accidents (LBLOCAs), since no large primary
penetrations of the reactor vessel or large loop piping exist.
52 Tim Abram and Ayah E. Elshahat

Figure 4. IRIS integral layout.

Some of the distinguishing and defining characteristics of IRIS are:

Integral configuration, which, to a greater or lesser degree, addresses

all the four objectives.
The capability of employing high burnup, long-life cores, which,
together with the capability of operating four years without shutdown
for maintenance, addresses the proliferation-resistance requirement,
but, more important, increases the capacity factor and decreases the
operation and maintenance (O&M) costs [11].
 Advanced Nuclear Reactors and Passive Safety 53

Innovative containment design, which practically eliminates small-to-

medium loss-of-coolant accidents (LOCAs) as a safety concern.
The ―Safety-by-Design‖ approach, where, rather than coping with
their consequences, accidents are eliminated from occurring;
alternatively, if this is not possible, their consequences are lessened by
design or their probability of occurring is reduced.
For many countries, especially those that have little or no nuclear
infrastructure, small modular plants offer the best solution for
providing additional power in appropriate increments, and also for
matching power and water needs to non-uniform population
distributions. The IRIS reactor design is especially well suited for this
application [12].

In [13], three ―conventional‖ design basis accidents have been preliminary

evaluated: a Loss Of primary Flow Accident, a Loss Of Coolant Accident and
a Loss Of Feed Water accident.
The IRIS design is not susceptible to damage during the postulated
accidents analyzed, since IRIS safety by design provides means to remove
core decay heat to the environment maintain primary system water inventory
for core cooling and provide necessary containment cooling. These functions
occur with no need for AC-power or other support systems. Further
development in the design of the passive system will refer mainly to the in-
pool condenser component and to the optimization of the heat transfer
capabilities, in order to reach a more uniform behavior in the heat extraction
from the RPV and rejection to the heat sink [13].
Westinghouse organized an expert panel whose members were carefully
selected to insure that the Iris small break LOCA phenomena identification
and ranking table (PIRT) results reflect internationally recognized experience
in reactor safety analysis, and were not biased by program preconceptions
internal to the IRIS program.
The SBLOCA PIRT Panel concluded that continued experimental data
and analytical tool development in the following areas, in decreasing level of
significance, are perceived as important with respect to satisfying the safety
analysis and licensing objectives of the IRIS program: (1) steam generator; (2)
pressure suppression system, containment dry well and their interactions; (3)
emergency heat removal system; (4) core, long-term gravity makeup system,
automatic depressurization system, and pressurizer; (5) direct vessel injection
system and reactor vessel cavity [14].
54 Tim Abram and Ayah E. Elshahat

4.3. ABWR

The ABWR is a direct cycle Light Water Reactor that reflects 50 years of
continued evolution from GE‘s initial BWR concept combining the best
features from our worldwide BWR fleet [15].
Some of technology enhancements that improve ABWR performance are:

Reactor internal pumps improved safety and performance by

eliminating external recirculation systems.
Integrated containment and reactor building: improved seismic
response, compact, and easier to construct.
Compact reactor building: less construction material and shorter
construction times.
Optimized modularization: module designs refined and proven in real
installations.
Sophisticated control systems: fully digital, providing reliable and
accurate plant monitoring, control, and diagnostics.
High integrity fuel, improved water chemistry, and radiation source
elimination–reduced radwaste and occupational exposure.
Safety and Reliability

Probabilistic safety assessments (PSAs), one measure of a plant's safety,

indicate that the ABWR design is much improved compared to current plants.
A major contributor to the core damage frequencies (CDF) of current
BWRs is station blackout. To address this issue head on, the ABWR has a
steam driven, high pressure safety system. It does not rely on ac power and
provides diverse protection against common mode failure. For added
protection, the ABWR has an on-site, dedicated combustion turbine to provide
a diverse source of emergency power to any of the three divisions of safety
systems.

Simplified Active Safety Systems

Another unique feature of ABWR is its simplified active safety system.
The ABWR has three completely independent and redundant divisions of
safety systems. The systems are mechanically separated and have no cross
connections as in earlier BWRs. They are electronically separated so that each
division has access to redundant sources of ac power and, for added safety, its
own dedicated emergency diesel generator. Divisions are physically separated.
 Advanced Nuclear Reactors and Passive Safety 55

Each division is located in a different quadrant of the reactor building,

separated by fire walls. A fire, flood or loss of power which disables one
division has no effect on the capability of the other safety systems. Finally,
each division contains both a high and low pressure system and each system
has its own dedicated heat exchanger to control core cooling and remove
decay heat. One of the high pressure systems, the Reactor Core Isolation
Cooling (RCIC) system, is powered by reactor steam and provides the diverse
protection needed should there be a station blackout.

Figure 5. Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR).

Refueling Outage Length

The ABWR's operating cycle is 18 months with capability up to 24
months. The refueling outage for these cycle lengths is 43 days. These outages
lengths assume that there is only normal maintenance work and no major
56 Tim Abram and Ayah E. Elshahat

turbine generator work. A number of design features speed up the outage: an

automated fuel movement platform, a "minimum shuffle" core loading
strategy, fewer control rod drive removals, automated handling of FMCRDs
and RIPs, and automated startup times, all of which improve the availability
factor by about 2.5%.
A two unit ABWR can be built today in the U.S. environment in a 40
month construction period, each, for a price of $1611/kWe for the basic
1371Mwe (net) power units and $1535/kWe for the 1465MWe (net) uprated
power units [16].

4.4. VHTR

The VHTR is a graphite-moderated, helium-cooled reactor with a thermal

neutron spectrum. It is designed to be a high-efficiency system that can supply
electricity and process heat to a broad range of high-temperature and energy-
intensive processes. The reference reactor is a 600 MWth core connected to an
intermediate heat exchanger to deliver process heat. The reactor core can be a
prismatic block core or a pebble-bed core.

Figure 6. Very High-Temperature Reactor (VHTR).

 Advanced Nuclear Reactors and Passive Safety 57

Fuel particles are coated with successive layers of high-temperature

materials, then formed either into graphite-coated pebbles, or compacts
embedded in graphite blocks. The reactor supplies heat with core outlet
temperatures up to 1000°C, which enables such applications as hydrogen
production or process heat for the petro- chemical industry. Hydrogen can be
efficiently produced from water by thermo chemical reactions such as the
iodine-sulfur process, or the bromine-calcium process, by high temperature
electrolysis, or with additional natural gas by the steam reformer process.
Thus, the VHTR offers high-efficiency electricity production and a broad
range of process heat applications, while retaining the desirable safety
characteristics in normal as well as off-normal events. The basic technology
for the VHTR has been well established in former High Temperature Gas
Reactor plants around the world. The technology is being advanced through
near- or medium-term projects led by several plant vendors and national
laboratories [17].
It is expected that the VHTR will be purchased in the future as either an
electricity producing plant with a direct cycle gas turbine or a hydrogen
producing (or other process heat application) plant. The process heat version
of the VHTR will require that an intermediate heat exchanger (IHX) and
primary gas circulator be located in an adjoining power conversion vessel. A
third VHTR mission – actinide burning – can be accomplished with either the
hydrogen-production or gas turbine designs. The first ―demonstration‖ VHTR
will produce both electricity and hydrogen using the IHX to transfer the heat
to either a hydrogen production plant or the gas turbine.
The plant size, reactor thermal power, and core configuration will be
designed to assure passive decay heat removal without fuel damage during
accidents. The fuel cycle will be a once-through very high burnup low-
enriched uranium fuel cycle [18].

Safety and Proliferation Resistance

Past and near-term HTGRs have illustrated the high level of safety
inherent to gas-cooled reactors. The graphitic core structure, helium coolant,
and coated fuel particles allow the VHTR to withstand accident temperatures
without structural damage or fission product release.
his provides a significant amount of inherent safety which eliminates the
need for active, and expensive, safety systems such as those in current LWRs.
Also, HTGRs have inherently better proliferation resistance compared to
current LWRs due to their dilute fuel form and difficulty in reprocessing.
Some of these features are:
58 Tim Abram and Ayah E. Elshahat

The graphite core of HTGRs has a high thermal conductivity, which

aids in preventing hotspots from forming within the core. The high
thermal capacity of graphite combined with the low core power
provides a relatively long delay in the thermal response during loss of
coolant accidents or reactivity insertions.
The TRISO (TRIstructural ISOtropic) coated fuel particles represent
another intrinsic safety feature of HTGRs. As mentioned before, each
fuel particle is essentially its own pressure vessel able to retain fission
products. This results in very little radioactive release and plate-out
during operation, as has been shown by past HTGR prototype and
demonstration plants. TRISO fuel may require less overpacking than
traditional LWR fuel, reducing the total amount of repository space
required.
Another intrinsic safety feature of HTGRs is the helium coolant.
Helium is chemically and neutronically inert. This precludes safety
complications which can arise due to irradiation of the coolant or
corrosion of component materials. Contrary to water-cooled reactors,
helium does not undergo a phase change at or above reactor operating
temperatures. This simplifies the mechanical design and operation of
the reactor, thereby improving the safety. On the other hand, helium
does not have the same biological shielding effect as water. This
results in higher radiation exposure in and around the core than
traditional LWRs.
Gas-cooled reactors are able to retain fission products effectively and
are designed to prevent radioactive release without operator
intervention or active safety systems. Therefore, no external accident
management should have to be undertaken outside the plant fence.
That is, HTGRs do not require any offsite emergency response. Also,
HTGRs do not require as leak-tight a containment building as LWRs,
which could reduce capital costs. These advantages have significant
economic benefits, but raise a number of safety concerns from
opponents of nuclear power who are hesitant to rely on the inherent
safety of advanced reactors. Ultimately, these features may allow the
VHTR to be built at industrial sites in areas with dense population, in
order to support process heat applications and reduce carbon
emissions.
HTGRs also have intrinsic design features for proliferation resistance.
The VHTR has a relatively low power density and overall power
output compared to contemporary monolithic water-cooled reactors.
 Advanced Nuclear Reactors and Passive Safety 59

These features result in initially low fissile inventories and a highly

dilute fuel form. In addition, TRISO fuel is difficult to reprocess.
Each coated fuel particle has a diameter of approximately 650 to 850
microns. A full fuel load for the VHTR will contain approximately 10
billion coated particles which must be separated from the graphite
pebbles or blocks in which they are dispersed. Reprocessing is further
complicated since the protective pyrolytic carbon and silicon carbide
layers must also be removed in order to gain access to the fissile
material. Although these features do not completely prohibit
reprocessing, they greatly complicate the process when compared to
traditional LWR fuel reprocessing [19].

5. AP1000 AND PASSIVE SAFETY

The AP1000 is designed to achieve a high safety and performance record.
While conservatively based on proven PWR technology, the AP1000
emphasizes safety features that rely on natural forces. The AP1000 safety
systems use natural driving forces, such as pressurized gas, gravity flow,
natural circulation flow, and convection. The AP1000 safety systems do not
use active components (such as pumps, fans, or diesel generators), and they
are designed to function without safety-related support systems, such as ac
power; component cooling water; service water; and heating, ventilation, and
air conditioning (HVAC). The number and complexity of operator actions
required to control the safety systems are minimized; the approach is to
eliminate operator action rather than automate it [20].
The AP1000 design meets well established deterministic safety criteria
and probabilistic risk criteria with large margins; these criteria have been
applied both by the United States and by many international regulators. The
extensive AP600 testing program, which is applicable to the AP1000, verifies
that the innovative plant features perform as designed and analyzed. PRA
results show a low core damage frequency, which meets the goals established
for advanced reactor designs and a low frequency of release due to improved
containment isolation and cooling. An important aspect of the AP1000 design
philosophy focuses on plant operability and maintainability. The AP1000
design includes features, such as simplified system design, to improve
operability while reducing the number of components and associated
maintenance requirements. In particular, simplified safety systems reduce
60 Tim Abram and Ayah E. Elshahat

surveillance requirements by enabling significantly simplified technical

specifications.

5.1. Passive Safety System in AP100

The AP1000 uses passive safety systems to improve the safety of the plant
and to satisfy safety criteria of regulatory authorities. The use of passive safety
systems provides superiority over conventional plant designs through
significant and measurable improvements in plant simplification, safety,
reliability, and investment protection.
The passive safety systems require no operator actions to mitigate design
basis accidents. These systems use only natural forces – such as gravity,
natural circulation, and compressed gas – to make the systems work. No
pumps, fans, diesels, chillers, or other active machinery is used. A few simple
valves align and automatically actuate the passive safety systems.
To provide high reliability, these valves are designed to actuate to their
safeguards positions upon loss of power or upon receipt of a safeguards
actuation signal. They are supported by multiple, reliable power sources to
avoid unnecessary actuations.
The AP1000 passive safety-related systems include the following:

Passive core cooling system

Passive containment cooling system
Main control room emergency habitability system
Containment isolation [21]

5.1.1. AP1000 Passive Core Cooling System

The passive core cooling system (Figure 7) protects the plant against
reactor coolant system leaks and ruptures of various sizes and locations. The
passive core cooling system provides the safety functions of core residual heat
removal, safety injection, and depressurization. Safety analyses demonstrate
the effectiveness of the passive core cooling system in protecting the core
following reactor coolant system break events up to a full double-ended
rupture of a reactor coolant system main loop pipe.
 Advanced Nuclear Reactors and Passive Safety 61

Figure 7. AP1000 Passive core cooling system.

5.1.2. Safety Injection and Depressurization

The passive core cooling system uses three passive sources of water to
maintain core cooling through safety injection. These injection sources include
the core makeup tanks, the accumulators, and the IRWST.
In addition, after injection of these water supplies, long-term containment
recirculation can be provided by gravity-driven flow. These injection sources
are directly connected to two injection nozzles on the reactor vessel so that no
injection flow spills during a large LOCA.

The two core makeup tanks inject water into the reactor coolant
system at any pressure. The core makeup tanks replace the function of
high-head safety injection pumps. These tanks are located inside
containment at an elevation above the reactor coolant system loops.
They are normally full of water with an open pressure balance line
connected to the reactor coolant system cold leg.
Natural circulation provides the driving force; as cold water is
injected from the core makeup tanks to the reactor coolant system, hot
62 Tim Abram and Ayah E. Elshahat

water or steam flows up from the reactor coolant system to the top of
the tank. The core makeup tanks are actuated by fail-safe air-operated
valves.
Two accumulators inject water into the reactor coolant system at
intermediate pressures. These tanks use nitrogen pressure to provide
rapid injection of water in case of large LOCAs or during reactor
coolant system depressurization caused by operation of the automatic
depressurization system. These tanks are located inside containment.
The accumulators are self-actuated by check valves when the reactor
coolant system pressure is less than the accumulator pressure.
The IRWST injects water into the reactor coolant system at low
pressures. The IRWST injection replaces low-head safety injection
pumps. The IRWST is a large, atmospheric pressure, water storage
tank located inside containment at an elevation above the reactor
coolant system loops. It is connected to the reactor coolant system by
two injection lines. Operation of the automatic depressurization
system reduces the reactor coolant system pressure and allows
gravity-driven injection from the IRWST. Injection from the IRWST
is actuated by squib valves and check valves. The IRWST also serves
as the heat sink for the PRHR HX.
Containment recirculation is provided through two recirculation lines
from the containment to the reactor coolant system. Following a
LOCA, these lines allow gravity-driven flow from the containment
after the IRWST has injected and raised the water level in the
containment.

Containment recirculation replaces low-head safety injection pumps and

the containment sumps.Large vertical screens protect the inlets to the
recirculation lines. The containment recirculation is actuated by squib valves
and check valves. The automatic depressurization system provides a controlled
method to depressurize the reactor coolant system in case the core makeup
tanks have significantly drained. [9].

5.1.3. Passive Residual Heat Removal

The passive core cooling system includes a PRHR HX. The PRHR HX is
connected through inlet and outlet lines to reactor coolant system loop 1. The
PRHR HX protects the plant against transients that upset the normal steam
generator feedwater and steam systems. The PRHR HX satisfies the safety
criteria for loss of feedwater, feedwater line breaks, and steam line breaks.
 Advanced Nuclear Reactors and Passive Safety 63

The IRWST provides the heat sink for the PRHR HX. The IRWST water
volume is sufficient to absorb decay heat for more than one hour before the
water begins to boil. Once boiling starts, steam passes to the containment. This
steam condenses on the steel containment vessel and, after collection, drains
by gravity back into the IRWST. The PRHR HX and the passive containment
cooling system provide indefinite decay heat removal capability with no
operator action required.

5.1.4. Passive Containment Cooling

The passive containment cooling system (Figure 8) provides the safety-
related ultimate heat sink for the plant. As demonstrated by computer analyses
and extensive test programs, the passive containment cooling system
effectively cools the containment following an accident so that the pressure is
rapidly reduced and the design pressure is not exceeded.

Figure 8. AP1000 Passive Containment Cooling System.

64 Tim Abram and Ayah E. Elshahat

The steel containment vessel provides the heat transfer surface that
removes heat from inside the containment and rejects it to the atmosphere.
Heat is removed from the containment vessel by continuous natural circulation
flow of air. During an accident, the air cooling is supplemented by evaporation
of water. The water drains by gravity from a tank located on top of the
containment shield building. The tank is sized for 3 days. If additional water is
necessary, water can be provided from the ancillary water storage tank, which
is part of the fire protection system, or offsite water sources.

5.1.5. Main Control Room Emergency Habitability

The main control room emergency habitability system provides fresh air,
cooling, and pressurization to the main control room following a plant
accident. Operation of the main control room emergency habitability system is
automatically initiated upon receipt of a high main control room radiation
signal, which isolates the normal control room ventilation path and initiates
pressurization.
Following system actuation, all functions are completely passive. The
main control room emergency habitability system air supply is contained in a
set of compressed air storage tanks. The main control room emergency
habitability system also maintains the main control room at a slight positive
pressure to minimize the infiltration of airborne contaminants from the
surrounding areas.

5.1.6. Containment Isolation

AP1000 containment isolation is significantly improved over that of
conventional PWRs. One major improvement is the large reduction in the
number of penetrations. Furthermore, the number of normally open
penetrations is reduced by 60 percent. There are no penetrations required to
support post-accident mitigation functions (the canned motor reactor coolant
pumps do not require seal injection, and the passive residual heat removal and
passive safety injection features are located entirely inside containment).

5.1.7. Long-Term Accident Mitigation

A major safety advantage of the AP1000 versus current PWRs is that
long-term accident mitigation is maintained by the passive safety systems
without operator action and without reliance on offsite or onsite ac power
sources. For the limiting design basis accidents, the core coolant inventory in
the containment for recirculation cooling and boration of the core is sufficient
 Advanced Nuclear Reactors and Passive Safety 65

to last for at least 30 days, even if inventory is lost at the design basis
containment leak rate [9].

5.2. Cost and Construction Schedule

The AP600 plant meets the U.S. utility requirements including the cost
goals. Westinghouse recognized that the current estimate of 4.1 to 4.6¢/kWh
for the AP600 is not competitive in the U.S. market. It, therefore, embarked on
the development of the AP1000, which applies economies of scale to passive
safety plants to reduce the cost per kWh to about 3.0 to 3.5¢.kWh.
The AP600/AP1000 plant costs and construction schedules benefit
directly from the great simplifications provided by the design. In addition,
modular construction techniques have been adopted. Three types of modules
are employed; structural, mechanical, and piping. The approach was design the
plant from the beginning to maximize the use of modules. These modules are
rail shippable and would be built in factories and then shipped to the plant. At
the plant these modules would be assembled into larger modules in parallel
construction areas and then lifted into the plant as needed. The AP600/AP1000
plants use over 270 modules [22].

NOMENCLATURE
LWR : Light Water Reactor
BWR : Boiling Water Reactor
PWR : Pressurized Water Reactor
AP1000 : Advanced Passive Pressurized Water Reactor
NRC : Nuclear Regulatory Commission
IAEA : International Atomic Energy Agency
USNRC : United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
EPRI : Electric Power Research Institute
URD : Utility Requirements Document
PSA : Probabilistic Safety Analysis
FDA : Final Design Approval
IRIS : International Reactor Innovative and Secure
NERI : Nuclear Energy Research Initiative
LOCA : Loss-Of-Coolant Accident
LBLOCA : Large Break Loss-Of-Coolant Accident
66 Tim Abram and Ayah E. Elshahat

PIRT : Phenomena Identification and Ranking Table

SBLOCA : Small Break Loss-Of-Coolant Accident
ABWR : Advanced Boiling Water Reactor
CDF : Core Damage Frequency
RCIC : Reactor Core Isolation Cooling
FMCRDs : Fine Motion Control Rod Drives
RIP: Reactor Internal Pump
VHTR: Very High-Temperature Reactor
IHX: Intermediate Heat Exchanger
HTGR : High-Temperature Gas-cooled Reactors
TRISO : TRIstructural ISOtropic
HVAC : Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning
PRA : Probabilistic Risk Assessment
IRWST: In-containment Refueling Water Storage Tank
PRHR: Passive Residual Heat Removal
PRHR HX: Passive Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger

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