URBANO M. MORENO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND NORMA L. MEJES G.R. NO.

168550, August 10, 2006, TINGA, J. CASE ACCUSED VICTIM LOCATION OUTCOME

Facts: Norma L. Mejes (Mejes) filed a petition to disqualify Moreno from running for Punong
Barangay on the ground that the latter was convicted by final judgment of the crime of Arbitrary
Detention and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of Four (4) Months and One (1) Day to
Two (2) Years and Four (4) Months by the RTC of Catbalogan, Samar. Moreno filed an answer
averring that the petition states no cause of action because he was already granted probation.
Allegedly, following the case of Baclayon v. Mutia, the imposition of the sentence of
imprisonment, as well as the accessory penalties, was thereby suspended. Moreno also argued
that under Sec. 16 of the Probation Law of 1976 (Probation Law), the final discharge of the
probation shall operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his
conviction and to fully discharge his liability for any fine imposed. The order of the trial court
allegedly terminated his probation and restored to him all the civil rights he lost as a result of his
conviction, including the right to vote and be voted for in the elections. According to the
Comelec en banc, Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code provides that those sentenced by
final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1)
year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence, are disqualified from
running for any elective local position. In this petition, Moreno argues that the disqualification
under the Local Government Code applies only to those who have served their sentence and
not to probationers because the latter do not serve the adjudged sentence. The Probation Law
should allegedly be read as an exception to the Local Government Code because it is a special
law which applies only to probationers.

Issue: Since Moreno was granted probation and never served a day of his sentence, would the
disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code apply to him?

Held: No. The resolution of the present controversy depends on the application of the phrase
"within two (2) years after serving sentence" found in Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code,
which reads: Sec. 40. Disqualifications. – The following persons are disqualified from running for
any elective local position: (a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral
turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2)
years after serving sentence; [Emphasis supplied.] .... Sec. 4 of the Probation Law specifically
provides that the grant of probation suspends the execution of the sentence. During the period
of probation, the probationer does not serve the penalty imposed upon him by the court but is
merely required to comply with all the conditions prescribed in the probation order. Those who
have not served their sentence by reason of the grant of probation which, we reiterate, should
not be equated with service of sentence, should not likewise be disqualified from running for a
local elective office because the two (2)-year period of ineligibility under Sec. 40(a) of the Local
Government Code does not even begin to run. The fact that the trial court already issued an
order finally discharging Moreno fortifies his position. Sec. 16 of the Probation Law provides that
"[t]he final discharge of the probationer shall operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or
suspended as a result of his conviction and to fully discharge his liability for any fine imposed as
to the offense for which probation was granted." Thus, when Moreno was finally discharged
upon the court's finding that he has fulfilled the terms and conditions of his probation, his case
was deemed terminated and all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction were
restored to him, including the right to run for public office. It is important to note that the
disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code covers offenses punishable by
one (1) year or more of imprisonment, a penalty which also covers probationable offenses. In
spite of this, the provision does not specifically disqualify probationers from running for a local
elective office. This omission is significant because it offers a glimpse into the legislative intent
to treat probationers as a distinct class of offenders not covered by the disqualification.
Probation Law should be construed as an exception to the Local Government Code. While the
Local Government Code is a later law which sets forth the qualifications and disqualifications of
local elective officials, the Probation Law is a special legislation which applies only to
probationers. It is a canon of statutory construction that a later statute, general in its terms and
not expressly repealing a prior special statute, will ordinarily not affect the special provisions of
such earlier statute. Hence, We rule that Moreno was not disqualified to run for Punong
Barangay of Barangay Cabugao, Daram, Samar in the July 15, 2002 Synchronized Barangay
and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections. Petition was GRANTED.

G.R. No. 168550 August 10, 2006

URBANO M. MORENO, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and NORMA L. MEJES, CHICO-NAZARIO, Respondents.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

In this Petition 1 dated July 6, 2005, Urbano M. Moreno (Moreno) assails the Resolution 2 of the
Commission on Elections (Comelec) en banc dated June 1, 2005, affirming the Resolution 3 of the
Comelec First Division dated November 15, 2002 which, in turn, disqualified him from running for the
elective office of Punong Barangay of Barangay Cabugao, Daram, Samar in the July 15, 2002
Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections.

The following are the undisputed facts:

Norma L. Mejes (Mejes) filed a petition to disqualify Moreno from running for Punong Barangay on
the ground that the latter was convicted by final judgment of the crime of Arbitrary Detention and was
sentenced to suffer imprisonment of Four (4) Months and One (1) Day to Two (2) Years and Four (4)
Months by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28 of Catbalogan, Samar on August 27, 1998.

Moreno filed an answer averring that the petition states no cause of action because he was already
granted probation. Allegedly, following the case of Baclayon v. Mutia, 4 the imposition of the
sentence of imprisonment, as well as the accessory penalties, was thereby suspended. Moreno also
argued that under Sec. 16 of the Probation Law of 1976 (Probation Law), the final discharge of the
probation shall operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction
and to fully discharge his liability for any fine imposed. The order of the trial court dated December
18, 2000 allegedly terminated his probation and restored to him all the civil rights he lost as a result
of his conviction, including the right to vote and be voted for in the July 15, 2002 elections.

The case was forwarded to the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor of Samar for preliminary
hearing. After due proceedings, the Investigating Officer recommended that Moreno be disqualified
from running for Punong Barangay.

The Comelec First Division adopted this recommendation. On motion for reconsideration filed with
the Comelec en banc, the Resolution of the First Division was affirmed. According to the
Comelec en banc, Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code provides that those sentenced by final
judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or
more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence, are disqualified from running for
any elective local position. 5 Since Moreno was released from probation on December 20, 2000,
disqualification shall commence on this date and end two (2) years thence. The grant of probation to
Moreno merely suspended the execution of his sentence but did not affect his disqualification from
running for an elective local office.

Further, the Comelec en banc held that the provisions of the Local Government Code take
precedence over the case of Baclayon v. Mutia cited by Moreno and the Probation Law because it is
a much later enactment and a special law setting forth the qualifications and disqualifications of
elective local officials.

In this petition, Moreno argues that the disqualification under the Local Government Code applies
only to those who have served their sentence and not to probationers because the latter do not
serve the adjudged sentence. The Probation Law should allegedly be read as an exception to the
Local Government Code because it is a special law which applies only to probationers. Further, even
assuming that he is disqualified, his subsequent election as Punong Barangay allegedly constitutes
an implied pardon of his previous misconduct.

In its Comment 6 dated November 18, 2005 on behalf of the Comelec, the Office of the Solicitor
General argues that this Court in Dela Torre v. Comelec 7 definitively settled a similar controversy by
ruling that conviction for an offense involving moral turpitude stands even if the candidate was
granted probation. The disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code subsists and
remains totally unaffected notwithstanding the grant of probation.

Moreno filed a Reply to Comment 8 dated March 27, 2006, reiterating his arguments and pointing out
material differences between his case and Dela Torre v. Comelec which allegedly warrant a
conclusion favorable to him. According to Moreno, Dela Torre v. Comelec involves a conviction for
violation of the Anti-Fencing Law, an offense involving moral turpitude covered by the first part of
Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code. Dela Torre, the petitioner in that case, applied for
probation nearly four (4) years after his conviction and only after appealing his conviction, such that
he could not have been eligible for probation under the law.

In contrast, Moreno alleges that he applied for and was granted probation within the period specified
therefor. He never served a day of his sentence as a result. Hence, the disqualification under Sec.
40(a) of the Local Government Code does not apply to him.

The resolution of the present controversy depends on the application of the phrase "within two (2)
years after serving sentence" found in Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code, which reads:

Sec. 40. Disqualifications. – The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective
local position:

(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense
punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving
sentence; [Emphasis supplied.]

....
We should mention at this juncture that there is no need to rule on whether Arbitrary Detention, the
crime of which Moreno was convicted by final judgment, involves moral turpitude falling under the
first part of the above-quoted provision. The question of whether Arbitrary Detention is a crime
involving moral turpitude was never raised in the petition for disqualification because the ground
relied upon by Mejes, and which the Comelec used in its assailed resolutions, is his alleged
disqualification from running for a local elective office within two (2) years from his discharge from
probation after having been convicted by final judgment for an offense punishable by Four (4)
Months and One (1) Day to Two (2) Years and Four (4) Months. Besides, a determination that the
crime of Arbitrary Detention involves moral turpitude is not decisive of this case, the crucial issue
being whether Moreno’s sentence was in fact served.

In this sense, Dela Torre v. Comelec is not squarely applicable. Our pronouncement therein that the
grant of probation does not affect the disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government
Code was based primarily on the finding that the crime of fencing of which petitioner was convicted
involves moral turpitude, a circumstance which does not obtain in this case. At any rate, the phrase
"within two (2) years after serving sentence" should have been interpreted and understood to apply
both to those who have been sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral
turpitude and to those who have been sentenced by final judgment for an offense punishable by one
(1) year or more of imprisonment. The placing of the comma (,) in the provision means that the
phrase modifies both parts of Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code.

The Court’s declaration on the effect of probation on Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code, we
should add, ought to be considered an obiter in view of the fact that Dela Torre was not even entitled
to probation because he appealed his conviction to the Regional Trial Court which, however,
affirmed his conviction. It has been held that the perfection of an appeal is a relinquishment of the
alternative remedy of availing of the Probation Law, the purpose of which is to prevent speculation or
opportunism on the part of an accused who, although already eligible, did not at once apply for
probation, but did so only after failing in his appeal. 9

Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code appears innocuous enough at first glance. The phrase
"service of sentence," understood in its general and common sense, means the confinement of a
convicted person in a penal facility for the period adjudged by the court. 10 This seemingly clear and
unambiguous provision, however, has spawned a controversy worthy of this Court’s attention
because the Comelec, in the assailed resolutions, is alleged to have broadened the coverage of the
law to include even those who did not serve a day of their sentence because they were granted
probation.

Moreno argues, quite persuasively, that he should not have been disqualified because he did not
serve the adjudged sentence having been granted probation and finally discharged by the trial court.

In Baclayon v. Mutia, the Court declared that an order placing defendant on probation is not a
sentence but is rather, in effect, a suspension of the imposition of sentence. We held that the grant
of probation to petitioner suspended the imposition of the principal penalty of imprisonment, as well
as the accessory penalties of suspension from public office and from the right to follow a profession
or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage. We thus deleted
from the order granting probation the paragraph which required that petitioner refrain from continuing
with her teaching profession.

Applying this doctrine to the instant case, the accessory penalties of suspension from public office,
from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the
right of suffrage, attendant to the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period 11 imposed upon Moreno were similarly suspended upon the grant
of probation.

It appears then that during the period of probation, the probationer is not even disqualified from
running for a public office because the accessory penalty of suspension from public office is put on
hold for the duration of the probation.

Clearly, the period within which a person is under probation cannot be equated with service of the
sentence adjudged. Sec. 4 of the Probation Law specifically provides that the grant of probation
suspends the execution of the sentence. During the period of probation, 12 the probationer does not
serve the penalty imposed upon him by the court but is merely required to comply with all the
conditions prescribed in the probation order. 13

It is regrettable that the Comelec and the OSG have misapprehended the real issue in this case.
They focused on the fact that Moreno’s judgment of conviction attained finality upon his application
for probation instead of the question of whether his sentence had been served.

The Comelec could have correctly resolved this case by simply applying the law to the letter. Sec.
40(a) of the Local Government Code unequivocally disqualifies only those who have been
sentenced by final judgment for an offense punishable by imprisonment of one (1) year or
more, within two (2) years after serving sentence.

This is as good a time as any to clarify that those who have not served their sentence by reason of
the grant of probation which, we reiterate, should not be equated with service of sentence, should
not likewise be disqualified from running for a local elective office because the two (2)-year period of
ineligibility under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code does not even begin to run.

The fact that the trial court already issued an order finally discharging Moreno fortifies his position.
Sec. 16 of the Probation Law provides that "[t]he final discharge of the probationer shall operate to
restore to him all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction and to fully discharge his
liability for any fine imposed as to the offense for which probation was granted." Thus, when Moreno
was finally discharged upon the court’s finding that he has fulfilled the terms and conditions of his
probation, his case was deemed terminated and all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his
conviction were restored to him, including the right to run for public office.

Even assuming that there is an ambiguity in Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code which gives
room for judicial interpretation, 14 our conclusion will remain the same.

It is unfortunate that the deliberations on the Local Government Code afford us no clue as to the
intended meaning of the phrase "service of sentence," i.e., whether the legislature also meant to
disqualify those who have been granted probation. The Court’s function, in the face of this seeming
dissonance, is to interpret and harmonize the Probation Law and the Local Government
Code. Interpretare et concordare legis legibus est optimus interpretandi.

Probation is not a right of an accused but a mere privilege, an act of grace and clemency or
immunity conferred by the state, which is granted to a deserving defendant who thereby escapes the
extreme rigors of the penalty imposed by law for the offense of which he was convicted. 15 Thus, the
Probation Law lays out rather stringent standards regarding who are qualified for probation. For
instance, it provides that the benefits of probation shall not be extended to those sentenced to serve
a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six (6) years; convicted of any offense against the
security of the State; those who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense
punished by imprisonment of not less than one (1) month and one (1) day and/or a fine of not less
than P200.00; those who have been once on probation; and those who are already serving sentence
at the time the substantive provisions of the Probation Law became applicable. 16

It is important to note that the disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code
covers offenses punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, a penalty which also covers
probationable offenses. In spite of this, the provision does not specifically disqualify probationers
from running for a local elective office. This omission is significant because it offers a glimpse into
the legislative intent to treat probationers as a distinct class of offenders not covered by the
disqualification.

Further, it should be mentioned that the present Local Government Code was enacted in 1991,
some seven (7) years after Baclayon v. Mutia was decided. When the legislature approved the
enumerated disqualifications under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code, it is presumed to
have knowledge of our ruling in Baclayon v. Mutia on the effect of probation on the disqualification
from holding public office. That it chose not to include probationers within the purview of the
provision is a clear expression of the legislative will not to disqualify probationers.

On this score, we agree with Moreno that the Probation Law should be construed as an exception to
the Local Government Code. While the Local Government Code is a later law which sets forth the
qualifications and disqualifications of local elective officials, the Probation Law is a special legislation
which applies only to probationers. It is a canon of statutory construction that a later statute, general
in its terms and not expressly repealing a prior special statute, will ordinarily not affect the special
provisions of such earlier statute. 17

In construing Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code in a way that broadens the scope of the
disqualification to include Moreno, the Comelec committed an egregious error which we here
correct. We rule that Moreno was not disqualified to run for Punong Barangay of Barangay Cabugao,
Daram, Samar in the July 15, 2002 Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections.

Finally, we note that Moreno was the incumbent Punong Barangay at the time of his conviction of
the crime of Arbitrary Detention. He claims to have obtained a fresh mandate from the people of
Barangay Cabugao, Daram, Samar in the July 15, 2002 elections. This situation calls to mind the
poignant words of Mr. Justice now Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban in Frivaldo v. Comelec 18 where
he said that "it would be far better to err in favor of popular sovereignty than to be right in complex
but little understood legalisms."

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the Commission on Elections en

SO ORDERED.

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
 REYNATO S. PUNO LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice Associate Justice
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice Associate Justice
RENATO C. CORONA CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice